





To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Dennis Allan Hemphill entitled "Sport and Social Freedom." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Physical Education.


William J. Morgan, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:


Vice Chancellor
and Dean of The Graduate School

SPORT AND SOCIAL FREEDOM

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Dennis Allan Hemphill

December 1990

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In Loving Memory

Of

Allan Francis Hemphill

. . . as good a friend, as good a master, and
as good a man, as the good old city knew, or
any other good old city, town, or borough in
the good old world.

(Charles Dickens. A Christmas Carol.)

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ABSTRACT

"Sport and Social Freedom" entails a philosophical analysis of the links between sport and social freedom in liberal, free-market society. Chapter I involves a critical survey of the traditional (i.e., "sport-as-play") and the contemporary (i.e., "sport-as-alienated-labour") accounts of sport and its connection to freedom. Chapter II addresses the larger issue of social freedom in liberal, free-market society. It also involves a critical assessment of forms of social life that have the potential to express social freedom in distinctive terms even while operating largely under the influence of capitalist institutions. Chapter III explores sport in terms of its potential to express social freedom in distinctively sporting ways. Chapter IV critically examines the institutional operations of some prominent North American professional sport leagues and their impact on sport relations and social freedom within them. The concluding chapter suggests a normative framework for guiding institutional change and enhancing sport's potential to express social freedom.

Analysis demonstrated that the view of social freedom offered by the "sport-as-play" account is expressed in metaphysical-spiritual terms, or else in terms entirely supportive of rational-scientific institutions under capitalism. On the "sport-as-alienated-labour" account social freedom was shown to be virtually impossible within capitalist institutions. The distinction made between "social institutions" and "social practices" (and other similar social

formations) in Chapter II makes it possible to articulate social freedom in other than simply capitalist terms. The mutual pursuit, acquisition, extension, and appreciation of shared standards of (ethical and aesthetic) excellence in the "good" sport contest was shown in Chapter III to be the basis upon which social freedom between contestants, among teammates, and among spectators can be understood. Analysis of professional sport league operations in Chapter IV showed that social freedom in sport can be threatened by the pursuit of (institutional) economic and political ends. The concluding chapter suggested that the social freedom expressed in social practices could be employed as a normative framework to guide institutional change and thus protect sporting excellence and the long term welfare of the practice.

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INTRODUCTION

It can be said that any highly organized sport is too much of a sport to be a business and too much of a business to be a sport. On the one hand there exists an "idyllic" view of sport as an activity detached from the material and political concerns of everyday existence and offering up to individuals the opportunity to develop, demonstrate, or witness athletic prowess. Often portrayed as a creative and exciting alternative to the drudgery, monotony, and confusion of everyday existence, sport is viewed as a challenging and fulfilling form of freedom and self-expression. However, in light of recent developments such as escalating player salaries, dubious franchise shifts and public subsidization of sporting facilities, antitrust battles for franchise relocation or player free agency, plus increasing violence and drug use, there also exists a more cynical view of sport. This view sees it as nothing but big business and politics that renders fragile the possibilities for social freedom.

Underlying these distinct and antithetical images of sport, there exist equally distinct political-economic agendas that, when fully uncovered, reveal fundamental differences in how social freedom in sport is defined or understood. Traditional philosophical accounts of sport regard it as essentially an extension of play, and thus the opposite of labour. As play, freedom in sport is thought to be the "voluntary submission to form," the effect of which is to detach sport from material necessity and open up new possibilities

for meaningful human engagement. Rather than being simply an escape, sport is thought to be a humanizing retreat from the alienating conditions of modern industrial, commercial, and political life. How sport's ties to play establish it as a source of social freedom in these ways will be examined in Chapter I. This will necessitate an investigation of the ways "voluntary submission to form" can be thought of as liberating, and how this liberation can be related to the liberal, free-market institutions within which sport is conducted.

In contrast to the "idyllic" view that sport is separate and distinct from political-economic matters, there is also a materialist view that sport reflects the dominant institutional features of liberal, free-market society. This means that sport, rather than being a source of (playful) freedom, is a source of alienation; for in the process of coming to be rationally and scientifically organized according to principles of profit, individuals are neither free in terms of their personal actions nor free in their relations with others. This view that sport is a behavioural and structural "mirror-reflection" of alienated capitalist labour will also be examined in Chapter I. Part of this examination will focus on the ideological foundations of the sport-as-alienated-labour view and its suggestion that the social possibilities of sport's freedom lie in a post-capitalist state. Chapter I will conclude with some preliminary suggestions as to how an alternative to the sport-as-play and the sport-as-alienated-labour accounts of sport's social freedom can be formulated.

Before working out the details of sport's potential to articulate an alternative to the sport-as-play and the sport-as-alienated-labour accounts of sport's social freedom, it is first necessary to consider the more general question of social freedom in liberal, free-market society. The dilemma facing liberal society is the attempt to promote individual freedom without producing the asocial, apolitical implications of possessive individualism, and to promote the common good in such a way as to avoid the totalizing effects of collectivism. Liberal views regarding individualism, pluralism, co-operative-individualism, "public" life, and "private" life will be critically assessed in terms of their bearing on social relations and whether social freedom can exist or in them. Liberal definitions of social freedom and liberal attempts to reconcile the individual and the social (i.e., common good) will be analysed in light of the predominant role that rational-scientific capitalist institutions can play in the social life of liberal society.

After reviewing and critically assessing the views and expressions of social freedom in liberal, free-market society, this chapter will also explore the possibility that there exist forms of social life that have the potential to express social freedom in distinctive terms, even while largely dependent upon and influenced by capitalist institutions. The possibility that these forms of social life can be found in liberal, free-market institutions will be based primarily on a distinction made between social institutions and social practices. While social institutions deal with the production

and distribution of "external" goods (e.g., money, social status, etc.), social practices are thought to be centered on the pursuit and achievement of "internal" goods (i.e., shared standards of performance or service excellence). The social relations possible in social practices and other similar social formations will be examined for the possibilities they hold for establishing a view of social freedom that is neither divorced from mainstream political-economic institutions nor completely assimilated to them.

The distinction thought to exist between social institutions and social practices opens up the possibility that there may be an alternative avenue for investigating the social freedom in sport issue. Connecting sport to social practices (and other similar social formations) suggests the possibility that the understanding of social freedom in sport need not be restricted to metaphysical-spiritual terms nor to political-economic ones. The purpose of Chapter III is to explore sport in terms of its potential to express social freedom in distinctively sporting ways. This will involve an examination of the nature and significance of competitive relations between opponents, cooperative relations among teammates, and relations among spectators of the contest. Of the various types of social relations that can emerge within or between these groups, not all will be thought to exemplify social freedom. Determining what types of social relations in sport can be linked to social freedom will involve assessing various features of the sport contest itself. Of special interest in this regard is the "good" sport contest.

Whether the criteria used to define the "good" contest are based upon winning, commercial profit, or some ethical or aesthetic features, there will be fundamental differences in the nature and significance of social relations and their potential to exemplify or promote social freedom. Much of this chapter will be devoted to identifying and assessing the features of the "good" sport contest that may be conducive to promoting social freedom.

Chapter IV examines in more detail the nature of sport as a social institution and its impact on sport as a social practice and as a potential source of social freedom. This will involve investigating the political-economic institutionalization of some prominent commercial spectator sports in the United States. In particular, this will entail outlining the cartel structure and operation of professional sport leagues, and then assessing the economic, political, and sporting interests that are served or jeopardized by these league operations. Attention will be paid to examining the production and distribution of sport's "external" goods and its effect on the relations between sport management, sport labour, the State, and sport spectators. Special attention will be focused on the possibility that the league's political-economic institutionalization can jeopardize sport's potential to promote the "good" contest and thus sport's potential to exemplify social freedom.

Chapter V will summarize and conclude the critical analysis of the issues that dealt with sport's connection to play and freedom; sport's links with capitalism and alienated labour; liberal social

freedom; social practices and social freedom; sport and social freedom; and the impact of sport league operations and on social freedom. In addition, this final chapter will consider and recommend a number of institutional changes that could possibly contribute to the integrity of sport as a social practice and its potential to promote social freedom.

CHAPTER I

PLAY, ALIENATED LABOUR, AND FREEDOM IN SPORT

The purpose of this chapter is to critically survey the major representative views of sport highlighting in what ways freedom is defined or addressed. There are, in this regard, principally two such accounts. The first, traditional account regards sport as fundamentally an extension of play. As a form of play, sport is thought to involve the voluntary submission to "form," a submission which at once detaches the activity from material considerations and creates an opening for personally meaningful action. The view that sport's freedom lies in its voluntariness, intrinsic rewards, and material disinterestedness will be critically examined in terms of its ideological presuppositions and the service it can render in support of liberal, free-market institutions. The second, contemporary account regards sport as fundamentally a "mirror-reflection" of alienated capitalist labour. It argues that with the increasing rational-scientific organization of sport for the purpose of productive success and profit, not play, sport cannot be considered a source of freedom. The claims that athletes are neither free in their productive activity nor in their relations with other athletes and sport management will be critically assessed in terms of their validity and in terms of the ideological weight they can carry in the efforts to undermine liberal, free-market society.

Sport-as-Play, and Freedom

The purpose of this section is to critically examine some of the predominant claims made about sport-as-play and the nature of the freedom that sport-as-play provides. In traditional accounts, sport is thought to be essentially an extension of play, and its ties to play establish it as an important source of freedom. The freedom that is thought to exist on this account of sport-as-play is based upon the voluntary creation or submission to boundaries (i.e., rules) that at once set apart or insulate the activity from material or other instrumental concerns. It is within this newly created separate order that individuals are free to channel their creative energy in intrinsically satisfying or meaningful ways. After examining what are thought to be the most salient characteristics of the sport-as-play view, the problems with this view and its connection to freedom will be addressed. Criticism in this regard will focus on the relationship that is thought to exist between the formal and social properties of sport, the limited view of freedom that arises when these two properties are fused, and the ideological service that this (limited) view of freedom in sport can render in support of liberal, free-market institutions.

Major proponents of the sport-as-play account such as Huizinga (38), Schmitz (76), Novak (65), and Guttmann (30) claim that play is essentially a voluntary activity that distinguishes itself from material or other instrumental forms of life so to realize values intrinsic to the activity. Play can be seen as the act or activity of suspending certain restraints, compulsions, or obligations

commonly associated with material survival, and bringing into being a new temporal and spatial order with its own type of "seriousness." Huizinga sums up well the formal characteristics when he refers to play as

. . . a free activity standing quite consciously outside "ordinary" life as being "not serious", but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise or other means (38: p. 13).

Schmitz suggests something similar to this:

. . . play seems to begin by abandoning forms of everyday behaviour, but it maintains that abandonment in a positive and determinate way by creating a new space and time with new forms and rules of behaviour that are not determined by or functional within the everyday world but which nevertheless have a positive meaning of their own. Within its boundaries and objectives the play-world exhibits a totality of meaning and value that is strikingly complete and perfect. Play reveals itself as transnatural, fragile, limited perfection (65: p.33).

This suggests that play can be thought of as a source of freedom in the following ways: it is a freedom from the obligations associated with the everyday world of material or instrumental necessity; it is voluntary activity in terms of its initiation, structure, duration, and cessation; and it offers new possibilities for engaging in creative and meaningful activity for its own sake. What is of special concern here is the fact that play's freedom is attached to "submission to form." In other words, the play impulse or the play spirit realizes its freedom through the creation of form. Play separates and distinguishes itself in very determinate ways. For

Novak,

The spirit of play is the invention of rules. At the heart of play is love for the finite, the limited, the bounded. "Out of bounds" is the primal cry of play. The description of a fixed universe is the first and indispensable step of every free act. For human beings are embodied spirits. The free spirit is not pure spirit, pure will, pure intellect, pure desire; it is incarnate in hands and legs and lungs and sinews, in a place, at a time, in a culture, among others like oneself. To choose to move in this direction is to choose against going in that. To step forward is to place one foot on a limited bit of sod. Without limits, no act. No act, no freedom. Freedom is the art of limits. Play is the exercise of freedom (65: p. 225).

Huizinga believes that play is a primordial, creative impulse that precedes and gives rise to various forms of culture (e.g., law, theatre, ritual, sport, etc.); play not only creates order but is order, and " . . . into an imperfect world and into the confusion of life it brings a temporary, a limited perfection" (38: p. 10).

As for sport's connection to play and freedom, it is rule-bound play that is central to the understanding of freedom in sport. For Schmitz, " . . . sport is primarily an extension of play, and that it rests upon and derives its central values from play" (76: p. 29). Sport is thought to be an extension of play by virtue of the "submission to form" it requires to make the activity possible. For Schmitz, the " . . . absolutely binding force of the rules is a free acceptance flowing out of and essentially one with the play decision" (76: p. 33). In so doing it detaches itself from material necessity and opens up within this "form" new possibilities for the creation of human values. While it may be the case that some instrumental activities may be engaged in in the "spirit" of play (e.g., by adding

a "friendly" wager to best a monthly sales quota), and while engagement in some sports may lack the play "spirit" (e.g., through cheating), sport-as-play means something more. For Schmitz,

. . . sport emerges from play as from an original and founding existential posture. Sport is free, self-conscious, tested play which moves in a transnatural dimension of human life, built upon a certain basis of leisure. Sport is in its origin and intention a movement into transcendence which carries over from the founding decision to play and which builds upon that decision an intensified thrust towards the values of self-consciousness tested through performance, competition and victory (76: p. 35).

In this sense, sport as play is the voluntary submission to a form that makes competition and self-testing possible for their own sake. The play attitude maintains the boundaries that are supposed to set off sport's form of competition from the type of competition associated with everyday material survival.

Huizinga (38) and Novak (65) share the view that sport's freedom lies in its voluntary submission to form and its detachment from material concerns, yet both go further with respect to defining the essential characteristics of sport. In addition to being a contesting activity, it is also a representational one, not so much in the sense of replicating the world as it is, but rather in the sense of "re-organizing" and "re-presenting" it in ways that highlight and accentuate the more profound and sublime features of the human condition. In activities pursued for their own sake, one can catch a glimpse of the divine, and one can appreciate one's place in a larger (metaphysical and spiritual) scheme of things. For Novak, "the basic reality of all human life is play, games and sport;

these are the realities from which the basic metaphors for all that is important in the rest of life are drawn" (63: p. xii). In contrast to the everyday world, which is " . . . pragmatic, glib, superficial and cynical. . .," Novak claims for sport a different orientation:

. . . sports flow outward into action from a deep natural impulse that is radically religious: an impulse of freedom, respect for ritual limits, a zest for symbolic meaning, and a longing for perfection (65: pp. 19-20).

On this account, sport is more than a simple escape from the instrumental rationale of everyday existence, and it is more than just entertainment. It is rather a "re-presentation" of life that promises salvation. One must turn oneself over to the liturgy of sport as one would a religion. For Novak,

Sports are far more serious than the dramatic arts, much closer to primal symbols, metaphors, and acts, much more ancient and more frightening. Sports are mysteries of youth and aging, perfect action and decay, fortune and misfortune, strategy and contingency. Sports are rituals concerning human survival on this planet: liturgical enactments of animal perfection and the struggles of the human spirit to prevail (65: p. 24).

As a dramatic and essentially religious "re-presentation" of life, sport penetrates the mysteries of life, death, and immortality in ways that draw forth a belief in heroic effort and salvation. The "life and death" struggles among contesting athletes show how human beings, through active participation or vicarious spectating, come to grips with mortality and fate, and how they keep alive the images of the sublime (e.g., heroism) that lend a focus and significance to life. Team "rootedness," combined with respect for sport's "sacred" places (e.g., stadia), "sacred" times (e.g., game-day or sport season), as well as for its rituals, ceremonies, and myths, draws

participant and spectator alike into a community with a sense of continuity and purpose.

While Huizinga, Novak, and Schmitz would concur that sport in the modern age is being systematically infiltrated by rational-scientific, commercial, and political standards and practices, freedom in sport can be maintained providing that sport can be insulated from these more mundane, utilitarian concerns. For Schmitz, the exaggeration of the importance of victory, an overemphasis on technical perfection, and commercialization can threaten the play spirit. As a result, sport can become a brute power struggle where athletes subordinate themselves to technical and commercial standards of productivity. To engage in sport as play requires on the part of the participant an attitude that brings out the most human(e) possibilities of sport. This entails the desire to perform as well as humanly possible within the rules (and not trying to win at all costs); it entails humane moderation with respect to expectations of performance improvement; and it involves finding in sport the communal significance of athletic action in terms of creating and appreciating human excellence (76: pp. 35-37). When Novak (65) contends that sports are not the "game of life," he is directing his attack against the political ideologues, social/moral reformers, and the education-minded who seek to import instrumental standards into sport as a way of advancing their respective political, moral, or pedagogical agendas. For Novak, "to fail to recognize in each thing its own uniqueness is a sin of intellect" (65: p. 217), so to press sport into a social engineering role is to

cloud sport's essentially transcendent nature. Accordingly, the freedom of sport as both a freedom from political-economic concerns and a freedom for engaging in creative self (and communal) discovery acts as the standard against which the institutionalization of sport can be measured and judged.

While Guttmann too recognizes that modern sport has undergone a gradual transformation from a "sacred" to a more "secular" and institutional form, he argues that modern sport still provides the freedom to lose oneself in play " . . . and forget the creative and sustaining (and restricting) social organization and cultural assumptions . . . " (30: p. 160) of the modern age. In fact, Guttmann (30: p. 157) claims: "despite imperfections and false emphases, modern sports hold forth the possibility of a realm of relative if not absolute freedom" (30: p. 157). The nature of this freedom for Guttmann is twofold: first, that the voluntary submission to the rules that constitute a game allow it to be engaged in for its own sake (i.e., as the overcoming of gratuitous obstacles); and second, that the constraints associated with the submission to the rules can expand choices and possibilities. Unlike Huizinga and Novak, Guttmann's vision of sport's freedom through "submission to form" is neither grounded in, nor does it derive its significance from, spiritual or metaphysical forms of transcendence.

While Guttmann (30: pp. 159-160) argues that sport as play provides an escape from the social organization and cultural assumptions of the times, he also claims that the freedom expressed in modern sport cannot be conceived of in terms of a complete freedom

from restraint. Unlike the rugged individualism characteristic of one side of the liberal tradition, cooperative individualism thrives under the other side of the liberal tradition which developed social democracy. While spontaneous freedom is curtailed on this account, cooperative individualism, as may be found in team games, " . . . expands choices and opportunities for action" (30: p. 159). In addition, the transition from traditional to modern (i.e., rational-scientific) forms of social organization (including sport) " . . . represents a net gain, an increased opportunity for each person to maximize his or her human potential" (30: p. 160). In other words, Guttmann suggests that the voluntary acceptance of constitutive rules and rational-scientific methods in sport are constraints that broaden individual freedom. The voluntary submission to form in sport thus parallels the acceptance of rational-scientific order in society, since in both cases the individual is capable of doing more within a group than as an individual acting alone. In each case the voluntary submission to form expands the range of individual choices and possibilities.

Critique of the Sport-as-Play Account

The arguments that sport is essentially an extension of play, and that sport derives its freedom from its play features can be criticized on several grounds. It is clear that play means the voluntary submission to form, an action which at once divorces itself from material concerns and allows the activity to be engaged in for its own sake. The freedom thought to exist in play centers on play's freedom from material imperatives and freedom to creatively engage in

the activity for the sake of the intrinsic rewards it can offer. It is also clear on this account that sport is a special form of play (i.e., competitive, self-testing play). However, it is not clear on this account whether sport can be considered a source of freedom if it does not satisfy both conditions of play. The "professional player" example to be discussed below will illustrate the difficulties associated with making freedom in sport contingent upon both "submission to form" (to make the activity possible for its own sake) and its necessary detachment from material necessity or interests. A second problem, one that is thought to stem from the first, is associated with the linkages made between sport's freedom and certain metaphysical properties (in Huizinga and Novak's case) and with certain rational-scientific properties (in Guttmann's case). The problem lies in the assertions that sport's freedom is always a detachment from material necessity in the metaphysical ways suggested by Huizinga and Novak, and that sport can always be considered a source of freedom when tied to the rational-scientific features as suggested by Guttmann. As a result of what is thought to be a fusion of the formal and the metaphysical properties on one hand, and the formal and the rational-scientific features on the other, there can exist corresponding biases in the ways the social possibilities of freedom in sport are framed.

Since sport is claimed to be essentially an extension of play, the case of the "professional player" is troublesome. By voluntarily submitting to the rules that constitute tennis, for example, certain possibilities are opened up to creatively engage the player's skills

and powers in tennis-specific ways. In this sense the athlete appears to be playing, or at least satisfying one condition of play. However, in light of the financial reward that is sought after or received, the athlete is not suspending material imperatives and interests. With respect to this condition, it does not appear that the athlete is playing. Deciding whether or not tennis in this case is or isn't play means deciding whether both conditions are necessary for the activity to be considered play and thus a source of freedom. Since sport is thought to be essentially an extension of play, much like theatre is thought to be essentially an extension of play, this suggests that whatever specific form play takes, it still embodies play's fundamental properties. Failure to fulfill either condition of play not only invalidates sport as an example of play, but also invalidates the activity as sport; for overturning the essential play elements of sport, by definition, overturns sport. The implications for the freedom in sport-as-play position appear obvious; sport cannot be a source of freedom unless it fulfills both conditions of play.

The sport-as-play view makes several valuable contributions to the understanding of freedom in sport. It is rare when an activity can be disengaged from all political or economic concerns and enjoyed simply for the intrinsic benefits that the activity can make possible. However, it also appears to be an overly restrictive notion in terms of the conditions that must be satisfied in order for sport to be considered a source of freedom. An alternative view of sport that can resolve some of the problems associated with the sport-as-play view of freedom can be delivered by making several

cleaner distinctions about the ways "submission to form" separates the activity from material imperatives or interests.

A hint at what this alternative might entail is suggested in the following. It has been shown on the sport-as-play view that material imperatives or interests are apparently suspended when the choice is made to accept certain boundaries within which human talents and powers can be exercised for their own sake. To maintain the boundaries that define and thus distinguish a sport as play requires on the part of the participant a special attitude or posture, otherwise the sport form of play is broken. Suits (82), although not himself a "sport-as-play" theorist, refers to the voluntary acceptance of the constitutive rules of a game just to make the activity possible as the "lusory attitude." What is instructive about Suits's notion of the "lusory attitude" is the specific way that the constitutive rules distinguish games or sports from material considerations. On Suits's account, the formal properties or logic of sport is different from the logic that predominates in activities geared toward technical effectiveness and material survival. In contrast to these "technical" activities, where the most effective means available are employed to achieve a given end, and certainly where unnecessary obstacles are avoided, the acceptance of limited means to overcome gratuitous obstacles is essential for the understanding of games and sport.¹ It is always the case that

¹For example, certainly the most effective way of putting a ball into a hole in the ground located some three hundred metres away is to pick up the ball in your hand, travel to the hole in the ground by a motorized cart (or better, a helicopter) and place the ball

"technical" activities involve the overcoming of obstacles, but these obstacles are "necessary" to overcome. In "technical" activities there is always another reason to accept limited and less-effective means; in games, there is no other reason to accept the limited and less-effective means other than to make the activity possible. Suits (82) makes this point clearly when he claims that athletes choose to stay on the running track during a race rather than cut across the infield not because the infield is sown with land mines, but in order to make the activity referred to as a "race" possible.²

Suit's notion of "lusory attitude" shows that the logic of sport distinguishes the activity from the "technical" logic operating in more mundane political-economic affairs. While this demonstrates how sport can be distinguished from the methods typically employed to deal with economic imperatives or interests, it does not mean that sport cannot serve material interests. Unlike the sport-as-play view, where sport is distinguished from economic activities in both

into the hole. However, there is a peculiar tendency on the part of some people to insist on propelling the ball through the air or along the ground with the aid of various instruments, being careful to avoid trees, rough grass, streams, ponds, sand pits, and other obstacles along the way. Human beings engaged in such behaviour appear to derive considerable satisfaction from their ability to avoid such obstacles and propel the ball into the hole in the fewest number of strokes. This peculiar state of affairs is referred to as "golf."

²On Suit's account, all sports are games but not all games are sport, the distinguishing characteristic being that sports involve physical prowess as an essential feature. From this viewpoint chess is a game but not a sport because physical prowess is not essential in the overcoming of obstacles or in the achievement of the game's specific end (i.e., checkmating opponent's King). To simplify matters, the words "sport" and "game" will be used synonymously.

formal terms (i.e., submission to form for the sake of the activity) and social terms (i.e., material disinterestedness), the sport alternative requires only a formal separation. This resolves the dilemma of the "professional player;" for engaging in a sport for the purpose of generating an income does not alter the fact that it is a sport that is being engaged in. To make the determination whether or not a sport is play (or alienated labour for that matter) requires an assessment of the social circumstances surrounding sport. As a (formally) distinct activity, it is then a contingent matter as to whether or not sport is play or alienated labour. If the rules of a sport are accepted in order to make it (and its intrinsic benefits) possible, and it is detached from material obligations or interests, then the sport can be considered an instance of play. If the athlete finds intrinsic satisfaction within the boundaries defining the sport, yet still receives material rewards, the sport can be categorized as intrinsically satisfying labour, but labour just the same. If no intrinsic satisfaction is gained from participation and the context is laden with economic imperatives, then the sport can be considered alienated labour. The value of this approach lies in the ability to define and locate freedom in sport without necessarily having to tie that view of freedom to play, or to both conditions of play. While freedom on the sport-as-play view is important, there are limitations on what activities qualify for inclusion as sources of freedom.

A second problem with the sport-as-play position, one that stems from the first, concerns the additional metaphysical or spiritual features that Huizinga and Novak attach to sport's "submission to form." Recall that the creative freedom of play is made determinate by the introduction of rules. Huizinga (38) and Novak (65) claim, in addition, that play is a primordial, creative essence that exists prior to and generates culture. Play expresses itself as activity that is engaged in for its own sake. Play also has the potential to create symbolic forms that idealize human existence. Sport is thought to be a representational or symbolic form of play in this way. Sport-as-play does more than detach itself from material necessities and interests; as a representational activity, it also projects the struggle for survival into a metaphysical or spiritual arena where heroism, salvation, perfection, and immortality reign as dominant values. It is here on an abstract metaphysical or spiritual plane that the individual, in harmony with others, achieves a sense of purpose. Insisting, as the sport-as-play theorists do, that play is a transhistorical, creative human essence, that sport is essentially an extension of play, and that sport is a representational activity that draws the various facets of human existence into a "higher" unity means that the starting point for analyzing the freedom in sport issue lies with the individual divorced from material history. Gruneau has argued for this point:

Here the abstract idea of the playful individual acting in the presence of open alternatives and in the presence of

enabling structures which guarantee nonpurposive action becomes the starting point for the analysis of social development (27: p. 28).

The sport-as-play position can thus be open to charges of being idealistic and blind to the possibility that freedom can mean more than a metaphysical or spiritual retreat from material conditions. In order to understand how sport can be a source of freedom without connecting it necessarily to metaphysical or spiritual forms requires a greater sensitivity to the ways both play and labour influence the understanding of freedom in sport. Idealist sport (as play) theory, broadly conceived with its emphasis on metaphysical and spiritual states of freedom, falsely detaches these states from their objective social and material moorings, the result being a one-sided and distorted view of sport and the freedom that is thought to exist in sport. Put in another way, the sport-as-play view is ill-equipped to handle the issue of freedom in any other terms but play.

Furthermore, the sport-as-play theorists fail to recognize the possibility that their own view of sport's freedom is located within a certain political-economic tradition. That is, they overlook the possibility that the very notion of sport's freedom as play is the product of certain historically specific conditions. A hint at what these conditions might be can be gleaned, in part, from Schmitz's statement (76: p. 35) that sport's playful freedom has its basis in leisure. The question "leisure for whom?" puts the issue in more of an historical context. If leisure is, and always has been, accessible to everyone, then it might be plausible to suggest that sport-as-play (i.e., as engaged in for its own sake) is "as old as

the hills." However, if leisure has been a distinct possibility for only the few economically elite, and if sport has its basis in leisure, then it is plausible to suggest that sport has been at various times the exclusive province of the economically elite. Much more than just having accessibility to sport, the elite inadvertently define sport, and thus the freedom thought to exist in sport, by virtue of their exclusive participation in it. Leisure, in the Aristotelian sense, means both a freedom from necessity and a freedom for contemplation or engagement in activities for its own sake.³ For a group of individuals with the resources and liberty to engage in activities (including sport) for its own sake, it would be quite natural to think that sport's freedom lies in its disinterestedness. In a similar way, the "amateurism" issue in sport can be seen as more than just an attempt to maintain the integrity of sport (as play); it can also be considered an instrument of class rule in so far as working class (professional) participation in sport is blocked. Accordingly, the view that sport's freedom in play lies in some transhistorical human essence is questionable; it is more plausible to think that this view stems from specific, class-based, political-economic circumstances.

³Characteristic of the Aristotelian notion of leisure is "contemplation," the engagement of one's energies in activities for their own sake, and "arete," the all-round development of personal talents and powers. The enjoyment of leisure by a minority of "citizens" was made possible by a slave population who, through their labour, released the "citizens" from the material obligation to work. It is in this sense that leisure can be viewed as both a freedom "from" material necessity and a freedom "for" contemplation and personal development in activities engaged in for their own sake.

Given that sport has undergone a considerable degree of democratization (i.e., greater accessibility and participation by all social classes), and given that the sport-as-play view of freedom still retains some of its ideological power, it is necessary to establish how this power is still manifested. The tendency in the sport-as-play position to promote freedom from material necessities and freedom through submission to metaphysical or spiritual form clearly reveals its compatability with liberal, free-market institutions. Not only do the sport-as-play theorists regard sport as a distinct new order of reality, they also regard it as a superior one. Sport is thought to be a superior realm by virtue of its ability to dramatically symbolize the struggle for existence and to offer individuals a promise of deliverance. For Huizinga (38) and Novak (65) in particular, the characteristics of sport that suggest human struggle (in the face of adversity), redemption (in the face of failure), faith, human perfectability, and immortality, to name a few features, are romanticized and projected as idealizations of human existence. Ideologically, this can serve to socialize individuals into the existing social relations of capitalist production, and it can also serve to direct attention away from the exploitative nature of those social relations. How an activity can serve both a socializing and a distracting function at the same time requires further elaboration.

Idealizing and romanticizing human traits such as heroic effort, perseverance, faith, "heart," self-sacrifice, and dedication can suggest and reinforce that these traits are essential for

survival. Sport, in this sense, provides a metaphor for life. It does not, in any significant way, say anything about how these practical "realities" came to be, why they persist, or how they can be changed in a practical sense. In other words, the unpleasantness of life-conditions could come to be perceived as an accidental feature of life rather than as necessary feature of the capitalist form of life. Given that material scarcity has been, and is, a basic human condition, and given capitalism's tendencies to perpetuate existing, or to promote new, scarcities, life in capitalist society carries with it a certain expectation that material survival is uncertain. To bear the belief that the vicissitudes of life are to be expected, and that they are to be endured through personal effort and discipline, is to accept the existing material and social conditions as given. To idealize certain traits that are required for survival without questioning the conditions that make survival so precarious can promote an apolitical mentality prone to social adaptation than social critique or change.

The adaptation to the given social order is hardly a passive affair, and the ideological power of sport cannot be underestimated in this regard. In the case of the metaphysical and spiritual properties of sport-as-play, personal engagement, if anything, is heightened and brought into a "higher" unity. In heightening experience in the sport domain, the senses can be dulled to the experiences of the material one. Individuals are thus encouraged to identify less with their existing material and social conditions and

more with a reality that is supposedly separate and distinct. Romanticized and idealized views of human struggle, sacrifice, perfectability, and community are projected into this supernatural world in such a way that "salvation" need not rely on any change of existing material and social conditions. In addition, it can be argued that such a retreat into metaphysical or spiritual satisfactions ensures that the ideological and commercial penetration of capitalism into sport goes unnoticed. If "true" sport is identified with play, that is, if the freedom of sport is translated into metaphysical or spiritual terms, the incursions into sport of a political or commercial nature can be passed off as aberrations of "pure" form rather than them meaning the possible unseating of play as the organizing principle of sport.

To talk about sport in terms of romanticized, idealized "higher" realities means that the issue of human freedom centers on " . . . spiritual rather than social possibilities" (27: p. 31). Hoberman claims that the conception of the world as existing outside or beyond political categories is " . . . an orientation whose historical position has been situated consistently on the political right in Europe" (34: p. 85). It appears to be consistent with conservative notions that sport lies beyond politics and economic, and with a liberal tradition of separating the State and sport and consigning the latter to the "private" sphere. Gruneau argues that from a liberal pluralist account of culture and the State,

. . . sport would generally be seen as a voluntary set of social and cultural practices that allow for periodic

releases from the tensions of everyday existence (e.g., play and recreation) and which provide for collective representations of diverse community interests (e.g., neighbourhood or ethnic teams) (28: p. 18).

On this view, sport is not seen as part of the State political apparatus. In fact, Gruneau claims that this view is accompanied by a moral corollary which suggests,

not only that sport is separate from the state system, but that it ought to be separate from the state system. Sport is, in short, assumed to belong to an ideal realm of unrestrained voluntary action, expressive meaning and cultural creation, and state "intervention" is seen to be an unjustified intrusion into this realm. According to this view, sport should be an area of life that is somehow set off from the "realities" of politics and government (28: p. 19).

Guttmann's view of freedom in sport-as-play goes further. The rational-scientific organization of modern sport can be viewed as a source of "positive" freedom comparable to the cooperative-individualism produced through liberal-democratic institutions. In other words, Guttmann's view of freedom in sport reveals the larger freedom of capitalism and liberal-democracy. While Guttmann (28) accepts that sport (as the voluntary overcoming of gratuitous obstacles) is distinct and allows the activity to be engaged in for its own sake, he does claim that the freedom in modern sport cannot be explained in terms of complete freedom from restraint. Guttmann does not want to equate the freedom found in sport to metaphysical or spiritual properties, but he still wants to equate sport, in some significant sense, to play. At the same time, Guttmann recognizes the ascendancy of a rational-scientific world-view and its effect on sport, so much so that freedom in sport cannot be conceived in terms of complete material disinterestedness. By framing the freedom in

sport issue in this way, Guttmann is still left with the problem of reconciling whether play or something like "high performance" is the foundation and the organizing principle of modern sport.

Rather than linking the formal properties with the metaphysical-spiritual ones, as did Huizinga and Novak, Guttmann has conjoined the formal with the social (i.e., rational-scientific performance) properties of sport in such a way that it is unclear in what way sport is to be considered a source of freedom. While it is one thing to claim that sport (as the voluntary overcoming of gratuitous obstacles) is free in a formal sense, it is quite another to say that it is free in a social sense. Gruneau lends support to this view:

Freedom from necessity in sports is achieved by submitting to established rules and conventions, but social and political freedom may involve working against or challenging certain rules and conventions (27: p. 44).

Guttmann is left trying to justify how the penetration of rational-scientific methods in sport can be seen to promote freedom. This he does by emphasizing how submission to (rational-scientific) form is less a freedom from necessity and more a "positive" freedom, that is, a freedom tied into the expansion of individual possibilities through cooperative action. Furthermore, by tying this view of freedom into the "positive" freedom thought to exist in liberal-democratic societies, the social (i.e., cooperative-individualist) freedom found in sport reveals a strong ideological bias. What starts out, for Guttmann, as an attempt to define the social possibilities of freedom in sport (to account for its rational-

scientific organization), ends up being an ideological justification for the political-economic conditions that can fuel such technocratic penetration into sport in the first place. In other words, the social possibilities of freedom in sport are defined in a way that it cannot help but play a supportive role to liberal, free-market institutions.

While the links between social class and the rational-scientific organization of society, and its effect on freedom, will be dealt with more fully in the following chapter, it is worth noting that Guttmann's preoccupation with changing "world-views" (i.e., from spiritual to rational-scientific) as the basis of social change fails to acknowledge the extent to which certain class interests can be served or jeopardized by the ownership, development, and employment of rational-scientific methods. This, combined with his failure to consider the potential alienation or "human costs" (e.g., decline of personal creativity, responsibility, and attributability) of the rational-scientific organization of modern life, suggests that his view of freedom in sport can serve less an oppositional or critical function and more of a reproductive one.

It has been shown in this section that the freedom of play is related to the voluntary creation of, or submission to, an order of activity which at once frees the activity from material imperatives and interests, and frees the player to engage certain skills and powers for their own sake. The freedom of sport-as-play was demonstrated to be a "submission to form" that allows self-testing

in competitive play to be pursued for its own sake. It was also shown that as a symbolic or representational activity, sport can accentuate certain metaphysical and spiritual possibilities of freedom. In another case, the voluntary submission to rational-scientific forms of sport was equated with cooperative-individual freedom. In spite of the merits of the sport-as-play view of freedom, it was criticized for being overly restrictive in terms of the conditions that need to be satisfied in order for sport to be considered a source of freedom. It was suggested that some cleaner distinctions could be made about the ways "submission to form" separates sport from material imperatives and interests. It was demonstrated that sport can be logically distinguished from everyday "technical" activities without it having to be divorced entirely from material interests. This opened up the possibility that freedom in sport could be defined and assessed in other than just play terms.

It was also shown that because of the fusion of the formal and metaphysical properties in one case, and the formal and rational-scientific properties in another, the social possibilities of sport's freedom are severely limited. In the case where "submission to form" meant the submission to metaphysical or spiritual form, the threat to the social possibilities of freedom was clearly apparent. In other words, the metaphysical and spiritual freedom thought to exist on the sport-as-play view was idealistic, and it left untouched the question of whether or not political-economic changes need to be made for freedom in sport to

exist in social terms. As a result, the sport-as-play view of freedom in this case was shown to be compatible with liberal, free-market institutions. In the case where "submission to form" meant submission to rational-scientific order in sport, the threat posed to the social possibilities of freedom took another form. By equating the freedom in sport with the cooperative-individual freedom of rational-scientifically organized market institutions and liberal-democracy, the sport-as-play view of freedom was shown to be blind to the possibility that modern social organization can threaten freedom. As a result, the sport-as-play view of freedom was shown to be not just compatible with, but essentially supportive of liberal, free-market institutions.

Sport-as-Alienated-Labour

If the freedom thought to exist on the sport-as-play account ignored or largely restricted the social possibilities of freedom, then a superior account of freedom in sport would need to consider in greater detail the nature and significance of political and economic influences on sport. The sport-as-alienated-labour view is based on the idea that any inquiry into the nature of sport and its possibilities to express freedom cannot take place outside of historically specific material considerations. On this view, sport is thought to be very much conditioned by the ideologies and methods of the prevailing political-economic institutions. In capitalist society, this means that rational-scientifically organized production and consumption for profit is the dominant orientation

for commercial sponsors, sport organizers, management, and athletes. It is the purpose of this section to critically examine the structural and behavioural similarities that are thought by the sport-as-alienated-labour theorists to exist between sport and alienated capitalist labour. The alienation that is alleged to exist in sport when it is organized under capitalism centers on the demise of creative innovative labour, the loss of control of the performance process and its products, and the lack of mutually fulfilling personal relationships. The claims that sport under capitalism cannot be a source of freedom will be critically assessed in light of the ideological agenda thought to inform the sport-as-alienated-labour position.

Major proponents of the sport-as-alienated-labour view such as Rigauer (72), Brohm (9), and Beamish (4) regard sport as essentially a capitalist institution. Rather than emanating from, or generating its principal values from play, sport is thought on this account to be grounded in the capitalist principles of productivity and profit. For Brohm, bourgeois sport is " . . . totally integrated into the framework of capitalist production relations . . . " (9: p. 47); in concrete and ideological terms, sport " . . . always plays an integrative and never an oppositional role" (9: p. 178). Beamish supports this view when he claims that sport " . . . is completely subsumed under capitalist relations . . . " (4: p. 177); it is " . . . not the least bit autonomous . . . " (4: p. 181) and " it is totally tied, as a form of social

labour and as a form of surplus value to the social framework of which it is a part" (4: pp. 181-182). How capitalist ideology and principles of organization are thought to manifest themselves in sport requires an examination of both the production and exchange processes.

Achievement is thought by Rigauer (72) and Brohm (9) to be the driving force in modern Western society and thus in sport. Rigauer claims that in an economically organised industrial society,

Achievement has become a socially sanctioned model of behavior related to high productivity, economic competition, material rewards, vocational practice, and social mobility (72: p. 15).

Fuelled by the drive for achievement, Rigauer (72) and Brohm (9) argue that sport and alienated labour are structurally and behaviourally analagous. That is, sport and alienated labour exhibit the same division of labour, specialization, and managerial control as can be seen in industrial or bureaucratically organized labour. Evidence which appears to support this view is not hard to come by. Sport exhibits division of labour and specialization in the employment of athletic specialists (e.g., pinch runners, designated hitters, or kick-off returners) or special "teams" (e.g., kick-off, conversion, or "nickel" defences) to execute limited strategic manoeuvres. Similarly, the proliferation of sport managers, coaches, coordinators, and assistants suggest that sport management has undergone significant specialization of its own, and exerts ever-increasing control over many facets of game preparation and performance. In addition, one can evidence the ever-growing

impact of the sport science establishment on the training, preparation, game performance, and recovery of athletes. It is not uncommon for sport teams or training centers to employ a host of exercise physiologists, biomechanists, nutritionists, masseurs, pharmacists, psychologists, or hypnotists to administer the latest "high-tech" performance assessment, training, and therapeutic techniques.

Characteristic of the athletic training process for Rigauer (72: pp. 9, 19-27, 32-46) is the endless repetition of fragmented fitness, skill, and strategic movements organized along mechanistic and "Tayloristic" (i.e., movement/time efficiency) principles. On Brohm's account, " . . . the athlete is completely alienated to a process over which he has no control and by which he is dominated" (9: p. 107). With the mobilization and application of technical/medical expertise and industrial labour methods along cybernetic lines, the athlete " . . . is totally tied up in a network of standardized repressive techniques" (9: p. 62), the result being the reduction of the athletic performance " . . . to a stereotyped and mechanical routine, just like the assembly line worker" (9: p. 110). Further, Brohm claims:

Sport is both a constraint in itself, and a preparation for further constraints, since it removes all bodily freedom, all creative spontaneity, every aesthetic dimension and every playful impulse (9: p. 41).

Rigauer argues that with the assimilation of the achievement ideology, and with the intensifying of rationalization, there is a concomitant " . . . diminution of the individual's freedom to act"

(72: p. 53). Athletes, more and more, have been relieved of the responsibility for on-field decision making and their roles restricted to the provision of discrete, specialized skills. That is, the strategic needs of the system seem to dictate the type, amount and employment of skill, very often at the expense of more all-round talents, innovation, and continuity with the on-going sport action. Teamwork, in particular, which had previously allowed for individual choice of action has come to be degraded to a form of "structural cooperation," a predetermined and coerced cooperation based upon the division of labour, specialization, and strategic necessity (72: pp. 53-54). Thus, not only has individual freedom been constrained, but the intelligibility of the sport contest in terms of individual initiative has been superseded by that of team function and strategy.

As a social activity firmly embedded in the logic of capitalist production and exchange relations, professional sport, Beamish argues, " . . . creates an edifice of secondary alienated production relations" (4: p. 178) which dominate the athlete to an ever-increasing degree. On this account, changes in the sport production process " . . . demand tremendous human subjugation to 'scientific training' . . . " (4: p. 181). As a form of entertainment commodity, sport entails the ascendancy of exchange over concrete use values and the ever-increasing extraction of surplus value from athletes. Not only does the organization of sport along positivist, behaviourist, and cybernetic lines have the effect

of replacing the concrete, particular human life-world with a mechanistic one, but it also turns sport relations into commodity ones. As a commodity, the athlete's value is determined in quantifiable, abstract exchange or surplus value terms; Rigauer claims: "behind these quantifications, the living human, with his special qualities, disappears" (72: p. 71). Individuals come to be valued more for their ability to generate entertainment value for others rather than for their concrete, personal characteristics.

The commodification of the athletic performance acts to reify the athlete, and, for Brohm (9), it also serves as a powerful ideological tool for reproducing the social relations of capitalist production. As an ideological apparatus employed by the State, sport, for Brohm,

. . . ideologically reproduces bourgeois social relations such as selection and hierarchy, subservience, obedience, etc.; secondly, it spreads an organisational ideology specific to the institution of sport, involving competition, records and output; and thirdly, it transmits on a huge scale the general themes of ruling bourgeois ideology like the myth of the superman, individualism, social advancement, success, efficiency etc. (9: p. 77).

That is, through the rationalization process, the repressive sublimation of playful and sexual drives, the glorification of discipline, sportsmanship, and personal effort in a "make-believe" world of equality (i.e., status based on achievement not ascription), sport, for Brohm, promotes submission to the established social order (9: pp. 56-59). More than this " . . . sport has the advantage of diverting young people away from revolt against the bourgeois order" (9: p. 59).

The major features that distinguish Marxist from non-Marxist accounts and criticisms of sport is the explanatory force of economics and class relations. The Marxist would criticize the sport-as-play theorists (i.e., Huizinga, Novak, and Schmitz) for their failure to ground inquiry in historical-economic terms. They argue that not only is it necessary to understand the rational-scientific organization of sport, but it is also necessary to realize that the ownership and control of sport largely conditions the manner in which sport will be perceived and conducted. The dominant capitalist class, on this account, exerts its power through the control of the production, exchange, and consumption processes, and solidifies this power through direct manipulation of, or infiltration into, cultural and political institutions. In their most radical arguments, Marxist sport critics like Brohm (9) and Beamish (4) suggest that the capitalist elite exerts such a powerful influence on some institutions (e.g., sport, mass media, or politics) that a way of socio-cultural life favourable to capitalist interests and control is all but guaranteed.

Critique of the Sport-as-Alienated Labour Account

However, while Marxist sport critics like Rigauer (72), Brohm (9), and Beamish (4) point out the various ways in which they believe the principles, methods, and behaviours of sport replicate "exactly" those of alienated capitalist labour, there is some question as to the validity of their claims. How these critics can mount such a wholesale indictment of sport depends in large part on their

theoretical and methodological commitments. Inasmuch as Marxist inquiry unveils and reveals sport's penetration by rational-scientific and commercial interests and methods, the particular brand of Marxism subscribed to by these critics overstates their case. This is due in large part to its "vulgar" (economic) reductionism and to its ideological assumptions regarding freedom and the supersession of capitalism.

In the first instance, the sport-as-alienated-labour position represents a "vulgar" reductionist type of Marxism because of its heavy reliance on economics to explain all facets of cultural life. It is presumed on this account that cultural activities are merely epiphenomenal; that is, they represent merely by-products of production and consumption activities. Support for a reductionist position can be generated through a selective reading of Marx. Support for the view that the economic "base" has a determining influence over the cultural "superstructure" can be gleaned from Marx when he claims:

In the social production of their life, men enter into determinate, indispensable relations, (that are) independent of their will; relations of production which accord with a determinate stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and which accords with determinate forms of social consciousness (55: p. 503).

It is clear from this that "social consciousness," or cultural beliefs and ideas, are derivative of the social relations of production. While the meaning in this case is quite clear, there is evidence to suggest that economic dominion over the cultural realm is

not absolute. For example, Marx claims:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past (56: p. 398).

This suggests that, indeed, human beings are born into and socialized into certain historically specific economic conditions and relations. Yet, there is nothing in this view to suggest that history determines the lives of people in such a way that they only passively reproduce those conditions and relations. Gorman argues:

If we "make our own history," presumably we are free actors shaping the world according to subjectively experienced needs and wishes. But if, we "do not make it just as [we] ... please," then some uncontrollable force determines the quality of our actions and limits free expression (25: p. 13).

To support the notion that human beings are not passively determined by economic factors one need only consider Marx's following statement:

freedom . . . can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind forces of Nature . . . (54: p. 820).

This suggests that human beings are capable of recognizing the conditions of their servitude and changing them in accordance with their needs and interests. While these new conditions can, in turn, shape future expectations to a certain extent, it is necessary to recognize that these conditions are human creations that can be constantly reassessed and transformed.

A reductionist reading of Marx by Brohm, Rigauer, and Beamish turns out to be unfaithful to the various texts of Marx that suggest a broader role for human agency. If the role of human agency is diminished, then so to is the potential for theory to guide practice or transform social conditions. When applied to sport, this results in a limited perspective from which to view the interplay between sport's economically conditioned features and its self-determining ones. While sporting action cannot be considered completely separate from the material conditions within which it is organized, neither can it be considered simply a passive, determined product of them. The critical account of sport goes a long way towards establishing sport's connection to dubious economic and social arrangements, but it fails to recognize and consider the possibility that sport actions or relations can reflect oppositional values and practices.

Despite Rigauer's wholesale indictment of sport as a structural and behavioural replica of alienated capitalist labour, he does make several concessions that seriously undermine the validity of his reductionist methodology. Much of Rigauer's argument that sport mirrors alienated labour focuses on the sport training process. Yet, when he considers the sport contest, he does concede that there is "something" about the contest itself that defies its reduction to work-like structures and behaviours. Rigauer claims that despite the mobilization of collective (rational-scientific) human resources and abilities towards achievement, these attempts in sport " . . . are almost always

stymied by human unpredictability, by indecision, and by sudden lapses in ability" (72: p. 21). During the sport contest, in the "moment of truth" concedes Rigauer, the rational analysis disappears and "in contrast to the narrowly determined, analytical demands of work, the playing field offers the possibility for independent solutions to problems" (72: pp. 33, 37). In contrast to his claim above that teamwork is a form of coerced cooperation, Rigauer concedes that "since playing maneuvers are not related to each other deterministically, there is room for spontaneous "assists" and thus for a widening of the role of the player" (72: pp. 52-53). This suggests further that the sport-as-alienated-labour views are deficient, and that the concrete features of sport, especially the contest itself, require further elaboration and analysis. Where it can be shown, as Rigauer's concessions do, that elements of sport possess oppositional qualities, the reductionist thesis falters. While the sport-as-alienated-labour critics contribute much to the understanding of sport by tying it to its political-economic context, a more comprehensive understanding requires a greater sensitivity for, and appreciation of, the potential oppositional as well as the reproductive elements of sport.

It can also be argued that, just as the sport-as-play view reveals an ideological orientation consistent with liberal-democratic politics, the sport-as-alienated-labour position reveals its own ideological agenda. The "vulgarity" (i.e., reductionism) of Brohm, Rigauer, and Beamish's materialist criticism of sport makes the freedom in sport issue entirely dependent on changes in the

overall political-economic conditions of society. For Brohm, the reform of sport is not sufficient; sport is "alienating" and "it will disappear in a universal communist society" (4: p. 52).

Rigauer suggests that if sport is organized more like recreation, that is, less rule-bound, rationalized, and achievement oriented, it could withstand the trend toward complete rational-scientific and commercial domination (72: pp. 103-105). However, Rigauer recognizes the reformist flavour of these comments and corrects himself by asserting, in less strident terms than Brohm, that an alternative to the present sport system cannot come about through reform but rather through " . . . the unity of sports and work under social conditions of autonomy and self-determination" (72: p. 110). Given the indictment of capitalism by the sport-as-alienated-labour critics, capitalism must be superseded if there is any hope for sport to be a source of social freedom.

Constrained as it is by a reductionist methodology, and by an ideology that sees social freedom existing only in some post-capitalist state, it is not surprising that the sport-as-alienated-labour proponents ignore some of the concrete and potentially oppositional elements of sport. Rigauer's failure (72: pp. 21, 33, 37, 52-53) to account for the autonomy detected in the sport's contest itself reflects this oversight. While bourgeois sport for Brohm removes, among other elements, " . . . every playful impulse" (4: p. 41), there is nothing in Brohm's argument that addresses how play can be reconciled with the (reductionist) "mirror-reflection" thesis. Presumably, play exists, and sport can be engaged in a

playful manner. Yet, Brohm does not address either of these possibilities. One is left with the impression that the ideology and methodology of the sport-as-alienated-labour view handicaps itself with respect to how sport can or cannot be considered a source of social freedom.

While the sport-as-alienated-labour account provides a thorough assessment of sport's grounding in, and penetration by, liberal, free-market principles and practices, its overstatement of sport's link with alienated capitalist labour proved to be unsatisfactory. The wholesale indictment of sport was shown to be driven by a "vulgar" (i.e., reductionist-materialist) methodology and by a revolutionary ideology (i.e., the supersession of capitalism), the effect of which was to foreclose discussion on the possibility of sport expressing anything but capitalist values. However, the concessions and oversights made by some of the leading proponents of the sport-as-alienated-labour view were shown to undermine the credibility of their wholesale indictment of sport under capitalism.

This chapter has shown that both the sport-as-play and the sport-as-alienated-labour accounts of freedom in sport are flawed. In linking the notion of freedom in sport with play, and tying the notion of freedom in play so closely with submission to metaphysical spiritual, and to rational-scientific form, this account was shown to restrict the social possibilities of sport. By consigning sport's freedom to a metaphysical or spiritual plane, or by equating sport's freedom with cooperative-individualist freedom (i.e., the

expansion of individual freedom through submission to rational-scientific form) the sport-as-play view of freedom was shown to have limited potential to oppose or change the given political-economic conditions. The sport-as-alienated-labour account, on the other hand, indicted sport under capitalism in such a way that its social possibilities were all but eliminated or else projected into a post-capitalist social order. However, the acknowledgement of autonomy in the sport contest, and of the existence of play itself, was shown to diminish the force of the charges that sport is an exact replica of alienated capitalist labour.

If the shortcomings in both the sport-as-play and the sport-as-alienated-labour views suggest anything, it is that sport and the freedom thought to exist in sport cannot be fully understood if analysis is either divorced from political-economic categories or reduced entirely to them. Understanding how sport can be considered a socially liberating or constraining human activity requires an analysis that is more sensitive to the nature and organization of sport in liberal, free-market society. This does not mean that the metaphysical or spiritual characteristics have to be ignored; it does mean, however, that more attention needs to be paid to framing the issue of social freedom in concrete terms. The analytical framework should be critical and constructive without falling into the trap of inadvertently providing ammunition for one ideological camp or another. The analytical perspective must also be open to the possibility that some types of social relations may take forms

other than the dominant institutional ones, and that these social relations may embody alternative and perhaps oppositional values. If these forms of social life can be found, then it is imperative that they be examined in concrete and personal terms, and in terms of their relation to the larger institutional order. If alternative forms of social freedom are found to exist, a critical analysis should be alert to the conditions or processes which account for their viability or longevity.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL FREEDOM

In the previous chapter it was shown that freedom on the sport-as-play view is equated with "submission to form," the effect of which is to detach sport from material necessity or interests so that it could be engaged in for its own sake. Owing to the connections made between sport's formal and metaphysical-spiritual, and between sport's formal and rational-scientific properties, the social possibilities of freedom were shown to be not only limited but ideologically loaded in support of liberal, free-market institutions. The sport-as-alienated-labour view, on the other hand, was thought to be more realistic in terms of examining the issue of sport's freedom in a political-economic context, yet it erred in the opposite direction by attributing too much of sport's meaning to alienated forms of social life. Due to its own ideological (i.e., anti-capitalist) bias and methodological narrowness (i.e., economic reductionism) certain social possibilities of freedom in sport under capitalism were shown to be ignored or restricted. The upshot of this argument was that freedom in sport can be examined without necessarily tying that view entirely to play, and that sport's rational-scientific and commercial organization does not necessarily extinguish its freedom.

Before addressing the issue of social freedom in sport in Chapter III, it is necessary to establish an understanding of what is meant by social freedom. In the initial section of this chapter this

will mean examining the nature of social freedom in liberal, free-market society. The liberal view, with its emphasis on individualism, pluralism, and minimal State intervention will be critically assessed in terms of the social relations it can generate and how individuals are thought to be free or not free in them. In particular, this will mean examining the impact capitalist institutions can have on social relations and the social freedom thought to exist in the political-economic "public" spheres and in areas of social life thought to be "private." The following section will address the possibility that certain features of liberal social life and social freedom can be redefined in ways that are consistent with liberalism, yet uncharacteristic of, and perhaps inimical to, the current vocabulary of social freedom in capitalist institutions.

Liberal Social Freedom

The purpose of this section is to critically examine the nature and expression of social freedom in liberal, free-market society. After a brief clarification of the terms "public" and "private" as they apply to various sectors or types of social life in liberal society, a critical examination of the type of social freedom that exists in the "public" and "private" realm will be carried out. Specifically, this will mean exploring how liberal social freedom is defined and justified as a general political principle, and how it can in turn shape the role of the State, the social relations within the political-economic sphere, and the personal areas of social life thought to be separate from political or economic considerations.

This will be followed by a critical assessment of the possibilities, consequences, and limitations of liberal social life and social freedom when rational-scientific and capitalist institutions have a predominant role in liberal society.

The terms "private" and "public," when used to designate various social realms within liberal society, can be ambiguous. The terms are very often used when referring to the distinction between the corporate or commercial "private" sector and the State-sponsored "public" sector. Sometimes the word "private" is used to describe a type of social organization that permits or encourages the interplay of individuals pursuing "private" or personal interests. "Private" society in this case refers to a type of social system where social relations are valued primarily for their ability to advance political or economic interests. Besides exercising rights of association in an economic or political manner, individuals can also be thought to have a "private" life involving personal or social activity of a largely non-economic or non-political nature. Taken together, this means that common (liberal) political principles allow for diverse forms of social life, some of which may be centered on political-economic interests (i.e., private society) and some more oriented toward non-political or non-economic interests and affiliations (i.e., private life). What is central for this inquiry is exploring how individual freedom can be reconciled with the common good under different social conditions in liberal society. In other words, it means examining how social freedom can be defined and understood in the social relations spawned by liberal, free-market society.

The political principles that undergird liberal society include features such as individualism, pluralism, and minimal State intervention. This means that the liberal social order is based not on a collective, uniform notion of the good life, but on the orderly interplay of individual visions and pursuits of the good life. There is no predefined moral or political ideal on this account that requires a voluntary, engineered, or coerced consensus. Where individualism and pluralism flourish, there can likely be conflicts of interests. While recognizing that liberal society can be criticized as a "war of all against all" (81: p. 41), Stout argues that there may not exist a consensus on what constitutes the common good, but there is a tacit understanding that conflict, debate, and negotiation are preferable to social uniformity and the coercive pressures that might be required to create and sustain it. In other words, in liberal society it is preferable to have a plurality of interests rather than an identity of interests. While public life does not engender social solidarity, it is believed by Meilaender (cited in 81: p. 47) that public political life is at its worst when it seeks to establish an identity of interests. Public political life can spawn diverse conceptions of the good life, but attempts to promote a consensus would ultimately require for its realization some type of manipulation or political coercion.

Social freedom in liberal society largely means the absence of constraint. This can simply mean that individuals are free to do what they want to do, when they want to do it. However, with pluralism and the conflicts of interests that can result, there is a

need to ensure some type of orderly exercise of individual freedoms. This the liberal society attempts by identifying and attaching "freedom" to the notion of rights and equality; in principle this is expected to curtail absolute individual freedom in favour of a freedom that does not infringe on the equal rights of others. Social freedom in this sense is as much a freedom from certain restraints (i.e., absolute State authority) as it is the exercise of certain rights (e.g., freedom of trade, speech, religion, association, etc.) which, in principle, apply to all. In economic terms, social freedom generally means the pursuit of self-interest in a market economy "free from" or unencumbered by State designs or controls. When involved, the State's role is expected to be the provision of the legal infrastructure (e.g., antitrust laws, labour laws, etc.) and mechanisms (e.g., public litigation, collective bargaining, etc.) necessary to mediate and allow conflicts or competing rights claims to be settled. The State may be called upon to recognize and empower dispossessed or disadvantaged groups (e.g., through equal opportunity or affirmative action programs) so that competition for scarce material rewards can continue on a more equitable basis. In other words, the State may overturn, modify, or introduce rules in order to protect or promote the exercise of individual rights. The legitimacy of these interventions is based on the State's apparent "neutrality," that is, its embodiment and protection of collective interests (i.e., freedom and equality) as opposed to the interests of a narrower constituency (e.g., the capitalist class).

While there may not be a consensus on what constitutes the ultimate "good" worth living for, there appears to be agreement on what constitutes permissible means for pursuing personal "goods." Social freedom on this view can mean the voluntary submission to social rules that are thought to be in the best interests of all. Again, this does not mean that there will be an identity of interests; it does mean that whatever ends are pursued, it is in everyone's interest that there be freedom of choice, equality, and fairness. In other words, the individual can be reconciled with the common good in so far as the "war" with other individuals or groups is carried out fairly. This also suggests that otherwise socially indifferent or antagonistic individuals can form associations to advance individual (or group) political or economic interests. In what is referred to as the "war of all against all" individuals can forge and dissolve their alliances on the basis of what arrangements best serve the achievement of individual interests. Yet, here it must be recognized that social relations can be largely impersonal, instrumental political or economic affairs. While "public" life should remain a means for persons to seek private fulfilment, either individually or in groups, Meilaender contends that it should also be a means " . . . to foster private, social bonds - to make space in life for families, friendships, clubs, faiths, neighbourhoods" (cited in 81: p. 47). Individuals in liberal society have to reconcile themselves to the fact that much of public life can be impersonal, utilitarian, legalistic, and hostile. However, they are still free to pursue their vision of the good life in non-political or

non-material ways. In other words, individuals are (or should be) free to seek or establish in their private lives voluntary associations that presumably fulfill needs and interests for contacts of a more personal or sociable nature. This means that social freedom in liberal society can mean not only freedom from State coercion (for political solidarity), but also freedom from political or economic interests. At the same time, this means that individuals have autonomy to engage their abilities (if at all) and define their affiliations in ways that are divorced from political-economic interests and the types of instrumental social relations they can generate.

Critique of Capitalist Institutions in Liberal Society

However, there are several presumptions about the liberal view of social freedom that can be questioned. It is one thing to say that individuals make voluntary choices, but it is another to presume that these choices are always made in the face of open alternatives, and that the voluntary submission to constraints is always in everyone's best interests. There is clearly a sense that liberal accounts of social freedom cannot admit the possibility that social structures can have a determining or conditioning character of their own. Since the explanation of social activity begins with individuals who are presumably free to define and pursue their interests in light of open alternatives, and free to enter into social relations that advance their individual interests, it is difficult to imagine that institutions can have the capacity to structure alternatives, delimit choices, or produce outcomes that run

contrary to the interests of the individuals who comprise them. It can be the case that amidst the pluralism fostered by liberal society, some institutions can have a disproportionate influence over others. It is possible that the very political conditions that promote individualism and pluralism can give rise to forms of social life that can threaten or co-opt individualism and pluralism. It can be argued that rational-scientific capitalist institutions can absorb individualism and pluralism for its own interests; individualism and pluralism thrive, but they are framed in economic terms. This means that the "open alternatives," the voluntary associations, and the individual interests thought to exist for agents can be regarded, conversely, as economically structured alternatives and associations that promote a narrow economic agenda. As a result, the social freedom thought to exist in liberal society can serve as an ideological prop for capitalist interests. The pervasive effects of capitalist institutions could also threaten the autonomy thought to exist in the non-political, non-economic "private" spheres of life. This means that individual pursuits or the voluntary associations that have the potential to promote alternative values, interests, and social relations can be jeopardized. Even a defender of liberal society like Meilaender recognizes this threat:

When enshrined at the center of our public consciousness is the minimal virtue which asks only civility, when our common life acknowledges a plurality of forms of the good life and the need for freedom to pursue our private visions of the good life - when these are the beliefs upon which our community is founded - it will be difficult to prevent a belief in the primacy of private interests from seeping down into dominating our understanding of virtue. Serious moral education, serious training in virtue, may then become difficult to

sustain [sic]. We may even have difficulty sustaining the common life of smaller groups upon which we are relying to transmit those "higher" elements of our moral vision (cited in 81: p. 47).

In addition to being a threat to the autonomy of "private," voluntary associations, Meilaender's comments suggest that capitalist institutions have moral shortcomings. The nature and extent of these moral shortcomings will be examined in the context of how social freedom can be threatened by, or assimilated to, capitalist interests. This means examining how rational-scientific capitalist institutions can effect the personal and social characteristics of freedom. It also means examining the possibility that liberal notions of social freedom can legitimize the capitalist appropriation of social life.

The transition from traditional to modern forms of social organization has highlighted the growth of individualism, and this transition has been attributed in part to the extension of rational and scientific methods into many areas of social life. Gruneau and Albinson refer to this social transformation as rationalization, in other words, a

. . . process whereby action pursued in an effective manner as an end in itself and guided by traditional values or sentiment, becomes transformed into action that is oriented to particular ends in a secular atmosphere of efficiency and production (29: p. 22).

This process entails, on a larger social scale, a shift from "intimate, communally based, non-utilitarian sets of social relations, to more contractually based, individualistic and utilitarian patterns of social organization" (cited in 29: p. 20).

In distinguishing Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as typical of this transformation, Ingham states:

Gemeinschaft is used to describe a form of social organization which is backward looking (based on tradition), intimate (blood linked), communal (actions are performed for the collectivity), relatively homogeneous (little division of labor), and which work is viewed as life activity. On the other hand, Gesellschaft is used to describe a form of social organization which is forward looking (suffers from an illusion of progress to use an idea of Sorel), loose (the most intimate bonding being the nuclear family), personal (actions are performed for one's own status or pecuniary enhancement), relatively heterogeneous (specialization has engendered an increasing division of labor) and in which work has become a means to an end (the acquisition of abstracted commodities which have universal exchange value, e.g., money) (41: p. 345).

According to Durkheim (cited in 24), the division of labour and specialization inherent in the rationalization process increase not only efficiency and productivity, but also individualism. Durkheim comments that the rationalization process provides an opportunity for individuals to demonstrate a particular skill and to appreciate the significance of the contribution to a larger social product. Interdependence is necessary even more so in this type of social organization, and effective means must be employed to ensure that these individual specialists are coordinated in such a way as to guarantee their continued cooperation. When this opportunity and this interdependence are recognized, a certain functional cohesion or "organic solidarity" can be generated (cited in 24: p. 277). In other words, a social belief can emerge that assigns worth to the contribution of individual specialists to the collective product.

Weber affirms this view when he claims that the fragmentation of work is offset by the productive gains of the collective (cited in 23). In other words, in an ever-increasingly rationalized labour process, individuals are asked to identify less with occupational fulfilment and more with the material benefits and opportunities made possible through their collective efforts. Individuals can appreciate that harnessing the talents of individuals in this manner is more conducive to higher productivity than the efforts of solitary individuals working alone. Rawls recognizes that society is a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage," yet it is marked by an identity and a conflict of interests. There is an identity of interests in so far as individuals perceive their achievements to be greater ~~through social~~ cooperation than through solitary efforts, yet there is also a conflict of interests since individuals prefer a greater to a lesser share of the collectively produced benefits (71: p. 4). It is also assumed on this account that the social order requires for its maintenance the fulfillment of various functions (e.g., agricultural, industrial, commercial, administrative, etc.), and that individuals vary in their ability to provide certain skills. Bilton et al. indicate that certain functional roles can be considered more essential to the effective ordering and maintenance of the system, and in order to induce individuals to educate themselves and occupy these roles, certain material or social advantages must attend to the positions. Inequality of rewards is thus thought to be justifiable on the grounds that it stimulates competition and draws out the most

talented persons to fulfill the essential occupational roles in society (6: p. 48-49). As a result, individuals are asked to identify more with equality of opportunity than equality of condition. In summary, individuals are encouraged to accept a rational-scientifically organized system that involves personal subordination to a fragmented production process, and competition for the scarce rewards produced by their collective efforts.

Legitimizing a social system such as this can occur if individuals can be convinced they are free in it. Various features of the rational-scientific organization of society and distribution of rewards appear compatible with liberal notions of social freedom. That is, individuals are free not in the sense of being free from restraint, but in terms of expanding individual opportunities through submission to social order. In other words, social freedom on this "organic" or "functional" view can be considered the "common good" of fulfilling occupational roles that, when coordinated in an interdependent manner, promote material growth. Despite some co-operative features, there is no "good" that individuals desire for one another; individuals still seek to secure for themselves as much of the collectively produced benefits as possible. Individuals are free not to the extent that their conditions of life are equal but rather to the extent that they have equal opportunity to compete for scarce rewards. Individuals are generally reconciled to the idea that how these collectively produced benefits are distributed is largely dependent on "superior" individual achievements. As a result, the

view of social freedom as involving co-operative individualism, equality of opportunity, and personal reward based on achievement can legitimize the material inequalities of condition generated by a rational-scientifically ordered and competitive society.

While the liberal view of social freedom can be linked to the rational-scientific and competitive organization of society, these features can also be linked to certain class interests.

Giddens notes:

In capitalism authority relationships in . . . (industry and the state) . . . ultimately rest upon the rights inherent in the possession and deployment of capital. In neither case are these right of a specific minority; their legitimacy derives from newly recognized concepts of freedom and equality. In the sphere of the economy itself, freedom of contracts effectively sanctions the dominance of the owner of capital, since the wage-labourer is forced to deliver himself into the hands of the capitalist by dint of economic necessity. This position of nominal freedom and actual bondage is reinforced and stabilized by the modern state, which recognizes 'political' rights of citizenship, but separates these from industry. Thus, in Marx's analysis, the authority structure of capitalist industry is treated as flowing from the rights, and therefore the powers, of capital as bolstered or sanctioned by the bourgeois state (cited in 28: pp. 9-10).

This suggests that the State is not a "neutral" body that represents collective interests; rather, it embodies capitalist interests, and sanctions the institutions that develop around capitalist interests and values.

If liberal social freedom can be associated with capitalist interests at the State level, it remains to be seen how it can be associated with the rational-scientific organization of production and consumption. According to Braverman,

. . . for while all known societies have divided their work into productive specialties, no society before capitalism systematically subdivided the work of each productive specialty into limited operations. This form of the division of labor becomes generalized only with capitalism (7: p. 70).

All-round skills are purposely fragmented in order to enhance not only productivity, but profit. Babbage claims that " . . . in a society based upon the purchase and sale of labor power, dividing the craft cheapens its individual parts" (cited in 7: p. 80). Scientific management, another facet of rationalized labour, can be conceived of not only as a method of enhancing efficiency and productivity by assigning conceptual and execution skills to appropriately trained workers, but also as a method for capitalists to control the production process. According to Braverman, scientific management starts

. . . not from the human point of view but from the capitalist point of view, from the point of view of the management of a refractory work force in a setting of antagonistic social relations. It does not attempt to discover and confront the cause of the condition, but accepts it as an inexorable given, a "natural" condition (7: p. 86).

Bureaucratization, the final element of the rationalization process, refers to the progressive development of hierarchical management structures as a way of coordinating individual specialists toward achieving a productive goal. While Ingham notes that the growth of bureaucratization has been attributed to greater occupational specialization and the increased size of administrative units to be controlled, it has also been due to the "hegemony of the profit principle which required a disciplined work force subject to increased managerial control" (41: p. 353).

What this suggests is that while the rationalization process may be an effective way of promoting productivity, this process cannot be abstracted from political-economic conditions, namely, the social relations of production. The capitalist ownership of production and the free-market principles upon which production, distribution, and consumption are based holds out the promise that the forces of nature can be harnessed in ways to significantly alleviate the material struggle for survival. However, while the dream of abundance remains a possibility, the "institutionalization of scarcity," according to Morgan (61: p. 2), renders problematic the relation between material production and the general satisfaction of human needs. That is, the unemployment produced through rationalization, the inequality of conditions produced through private ownership and competition, and the ill-afforded over-consumption promoted by mass-marketing and advertising, all act to sustain scarcity and the utilitarian and antagonistic social relations that can accompany it. That is, the rationalization process enhances productivity and profit, but in the end it reduces the need for human labour. In the absence of an equitable wealth distribution system (recall that inequality of condition is thought to be necessary to promote competition to fill "essential" occupations), the struggle for survival is intensified for unemployed workers. The reduced demand for labour and thus the reduction in the market value of that labour, accompanied by the increased productivity of the employed workers, results in a

favorable situation for the accumulation of surplus value by the capitalist (61).

Not only do division of labour, specialization, scientific management, and bureaucratization act to perpetuate scarcity and thus the struggle for survival, the production process exacts additional human "costs." Marx, who is critical of forces that distort the function of creative labour, argues that it is through labour that the human being satisfies human needs, namely to transform the world into objects in order to satisfy material needs, to realize oneself as a full existing being, and to recognize interdependence and mutuality with others in their labour. Under capitalism, however, the owners of the means of production transform the worker's fundamental needs into capitalist needs to possess power, to conduct the lives of others, and to transform worker interdependence into dependence (cited in 2: pp. 96-98). Allen contends that if the sense of humanity is aroused in the creative process of labour, and if the human beings sense of mutuality begins in labour, then the capitalist control over the means of production entails control over the nature of a person's humanity (2: pp. 96-98). According to Braverman, while the rationalization process improves overall system productivity, it does so through the dissociation of the labour process from the (all-round) skills of the worker, through the separation of conceptual and execution skills, and the " . . . use of this monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of execution" (7: pp. 112-120). Consequently, the workers are relegated to the

position of providing predetermined, abstract, and discrete units of skill that involve little sense of creativity, personal responsibility, attributability, or meaningful contact with others.

This suggests that the liberal view of social freedom has several limitations and deficiencies. Voluntarism can be considered a significant feature of social freedom, but liberal views tend to emphasize the exercise and protection of rights as opposed to the quality of human activity and social relationships. The liberal view of social freedom, however, props up the rational-scientific capitalist organization of society by making collective effort and competition for scarce rewards palatable. This it does by attaching freedom and equality (of opportunity) to it. In addition, it can make the human "costs" of rationalized labour appear as "natural" and necessary parts of the collective struggle for material prosperity.

Sartre argues that alienated social formations (i.e., "collectives") and non-alienated formations (e.g., "fused groups" or "organizations") always emerge or dissolve in the context of material scarcity. The condition of material scarcity does not in itself produce particular types of social relations; it is rather the human response to scarcity that can generate personal anonymity, social indifference, antagonism, or, on the other hand, mutuality, reciprocity, and community. While material scarcity has been a dilemma facing societies throughout history, it is the artificial scarcities promulgated by capitalism that magnifies the potential for social divisiveness (75). In the absence of some equality of

condition, and without the moral consensus as to the value of each person's contribution, and without some degree of social reciprocity, there exists the possibility that individuals will seek in their efforts only that which will fulfill them as individuals.

Owing to the ever-increasing institutionalization and rationalization of everyday life, Sartre argues most human social groupings lack any internal unity and possess a being that is conditioned from outside the group (75: p. 259). A gathering of workers in a highly rationalized (industrial or commercial) production system, for example, are united by virtue of an hierarchically ordered system that defines particular functions, communication patterns, and accountability. The final product and the production or administration process is predetermined and precisely regulated by management. In the case of a highly rationalized work process, the individual is defined by function, and the collective group is defined by how all the functions are interrelated to produce the predetermined finished product. In contrast to the functionalist view that submission to rational-scientific institutional constraint enhances individual freedom, Sartre argues that individual initiative in this context becomes more a functional freedom, a freedom that does not mean the possibility of choice, but the " . . . necessity of living these constraints in the form of exigencies that must be fulfilled by a praxis" (75: p. 326). Since the rationalized labour process circumscribes personal responsibilities and actions precisely, there is little opportunity for individuals to exercise choice in the

selection of means to accomplish a task or to produce novel actions that expand the choices and powers of co-workers.

In addition, a precisely defined task does not allow individuals to go above and beyond that requirement, as if the completion of the end product would be facilitated for all as a result. Exceptional individual efforts are not typically perceived as a "team" strength that will facilitate others or "carry" the group towards greater output. Very often the overproduction by one member is disdained by co-workers, for it signals to management that greater productivity is possible for the entire production unit. If pressure is then put on the others to replicate the efforts and output of the most productive workers, it is not uncommon to find the most productive workers punished by their peers.³ While it is understood that such group production norms are very often established and enforced as a defensive measure against relentless management pressure for productivity increases, it still attests to the fact that creativity, diligence, and conscientiousness are tolerated only to the extent that similar traits and efforts are not expected by the other members of the group. In summary, rationalized labour can diminish the opportunities for creative labour, personal initiative, and for social recognition and support of these talents and powers.

³Homans found that workers exerted intense pressure on those who worked too much and those who worked too little. In the case of "rate busters" (i.e., over-producers) and "chiselers" (i.e., free-riders) offenders could be "binged," that is, dealt a sharp blow to the upper arm as symbolic punishment for going against the production "ethos" of the group (cited in 75: pp. 359-360).

Calling such a social arrangement an expression of "co-operative-individualist" freedom can only legitimize the failings of the process.

In addition to the consequences of rationalized labour, the accumulation of surplus value through promotion of consumerism can also produce its own "human" costs. If the level of material need satisfaction remains constant, and if productivity is sufficient to satisfy these needs, then this can reduce the necessity to labour. This state of affairs can thus jeopardize the accumulation of profits. However, mass-marketing and advertising techniques can promote consumption through the continuous introduction or reintroduction of "novel" goods and services. Very often these goods and services can go beyond what is considered "necessary" for material survival. Yet, they can be perceived as necessary for social survival. This means that a genuine human need (e.g., intimate social contact) can be manipulated in such a way that the satisfaction of the need comes to be associated with the purchase of certain commodities (e.g., "trendy" clothing or automobiles) or services (e.g., Club Med vacations).

Rojek (74: p. 121) adds that "individuation" is a key element of promotion and advertising strategies; that is, certain products and services are promoted on the basis of their contribution to personal identity. Keeping ahead of the trends or at least keeping up with the trends in fashion and entertainment to demonstrate one's uniqueness can require relentless consumption. Even if individuals

recognize that making a "personal statement" requires conformity to commercially manipulated trends, failure to do so can result in (perceived or real) social ostracism or isolation. The irony of needing to make a "personal statement" by purchasing a commodity that conforms to market-produced trends is not lost on Rojek here; he contends that the "individuation" process " . . . penetrates to the heart of alienation in capitalist society" (74: p. 121).

Possessive individualism, nurtured in an atmosphere of consumerism, tends on this account to be an illusory freedom; it "masks shared life conditions," the most relevant of these being the conditions of the manipulation in the first place.

In the spheres of both production and consumption, individual actions are mediated in such a way that it is difficult to establish or locate a concrete sense of personal identity. Human beings create various products or services to satisfy their needs; yet, the institutions evolving around the production and delivery of goods and services can appear to take on a "life of their own." For Sartre,

As soon as man begins to designate himself not as a mere reproduction of his life, but as the ensemble of products which reproduce his life, he discovers himself as other in the world of objectivity; totalized matter, as inert objectification perpetuated by inertia, is in effect non-human or anti-human. All of us spend our lives engraving our maleficent image on things, and it fascinates and bewilders us if we try to understand ourselves through it, although we are ourselves the totalizing movement which results in this particular objectification (cited in 69: p. 62).

This means that the social structures created originally for the purpose of need satisfaction can be infused with alternative

meanings. In terms of the infiltration of capitalist interests, this can mean that profit, and not the satisfaction of needs, becomes paramount. If productive activity loses its palpable, creative features, it can be due to the ascendancy of exchange value. Compensation for loss of personal identity in productive activity can take the form of consumption, but here too individual identity is fleeting. Failure to find personal satisfaction in productive activity can give way to the pursuit of higher exchange value; finding higher exchange value can in turn precipitate competition in the job market; and higher income can fuel the perpetual chase for "identity" in market-determined fashion trends. As "divided and conquered" individuals who vie with one another for scarce material resources and social recognition, human beings can either lose sight of, or be indifferent to, the fact that they have created the very conditions of their servitude.

The impersonal character of social interdependence in capitalist society is due to the ascendancy of commodity relations.

Keil and Ashley note:

commodity relations are interactions between individualized actors which involve the exchange of some depository of value. The value is assessed in terms of money, or money equivalence. Exchange and production of commodities (the value depositories) are carried out in market or market-like relations. With the building up of market relations, person-to-person transactions, both economic or social, come to occupy less and less of a place in an individual's life. Person-to-person relations are replaced with abstract market relations with anonymous others, usually a large corporation. (cited in 48: p. 15).

What the liberal view of social freedom suggests is that spheres of

life exist or should exist that allow for voluntary associations of a kind that differ from the impersonal ones characteristic of public political-economic life. The "institutionalization of scarcity" (i.e., the rationalization of production and the expansion of material needs), as essential features of capitalism, tend to perpetuate impersonal and antagonistic relations not only in economic life but also in that realm thought to be separate and private. For example, Braverman argues that under capitalism the provision and consumption of goods and services by relatively self-sufficient families and communities has been taken over by the market to a large extent:

The social structure, built upon the market is such that relations between individuals and social groups do not take place directly, as cooperative human encounters, but through the market as relations of purchase and sale. Thus the more social life becomes a dense and close network of interlocked activities in which people are totally interdependent, the more atomized they become and the more their contacts with one another separate them instead of bringing them closer (7: p. 277).

Braverman is suggesting that forms of social life which in the past involved direct social interdependence and community (e.g., care of the young and elderly, clothing, shelter and food, safety, recreation, etc.), are now mediated by institutional forms such as bureaucratically organized work, police services, fast-food outlets, public health-care facilities, and the like. Like Borgmann's "device," a structure which makes a commodity available " . . . in an instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe and easy fashion," the market disburdens " . . . us of our dependency on a complex social network of family and friends" (cited in 51: pp. 18-19).

The fast-food industry, for Capon, is a "device;" for while it delivers the commodity (i.e., food) in an effective, time-efficient, and trouble-free manner, it strips the activity of its palpable creative qualities and detaches it from its more intimate social moorings. While the traditional "festive" meal could be the occasion for creative engagement in food preparation and presentation, and for direct, immediate, and personal interactions with others, the fast-food meal "on-the-run" can disengage the individual from personal and interpersonal involvement. The traditional "festive" meal requires the coordinated efforts of many individuals not only in the preparation of various culinary specialties but also in table arrangements and decorations appropriate to the occasion (e.g., Christmas, Easter, Thanksgiving, birthdays, etc.). The word "traditional" suggests that certain themes are reinforced through repetition; in this case, the "festive" meal brings together a group of individuals who can reinforce familial, religious, ethnic, or other social bonds (cited in 51: p. 21). Even daily family meals, lacking in the special "festive" elements, can offer in the very least an opportunity for family members to unite and converse in a more direct and intimate manner.

Sartre (75) argues that social life is very often characterized by the passive, uncritical acceptance of services, conventions, and protocols that have the effect of producing and reinforcing social isolation, indifference, or antagonisms. A line of people awaiting a bus, for example, are unified not through the interrelation of concrete, personal characteristics or actions, but

by virtue of the expected bus arrival and a conventional procedure to determine boarding priority. To understand the nature of this gathering, which Sartre calls a "collective," it is not necessary to understand (nor need to understand) or appreciate the unique, personal characteristics of its members. The bus queue is a unity by that which exists outside it, namely the impending arrival of the bus. While members of the bus queue have the same aim (i.e., to catch the bus), it tends not to be a common aim; for everyone desires a seat on the bus for themselves, even if it means that some are excluded. The external "unity" of the queue masks the animosity or social indifference that tends to pervade the relations among members. Moreover, the queue itself indicates that members have an implicitly accepted and expedient (first-come, first-served) protocol that determines boarding priority. The bus queue is an expedient and perhaps "fair" way of determining boarding priority, especially when the possibility exists that there might not be a sufficient number of seats available. Rather than a chaotic free-for-all scramble to board, individuals passively accept the protocol as a way of reconciling themselves to scarcity or expected scarcity conditions. However, for Sartre, this means that the queue members " . . . accept the impossibility of deciding which individuals are dispensable in terms of the intrinsic qualities of the individual . . . " (75: p. 261). In a similar manner to a "device," the boarding protocol "disburdens" members of the necessity of taking into consideration the special needs or circumstances of individuals in the queue. This is not to say that acts of sociability, generosity, and altruism do

not occur; however, these are contingent occurrences and are thus not necessary for understanding the nature of this social formation.

A further example of the external unity of a "collective" can be a television audience to a political speech; the dynamics and unity of this group vary considerably to that of an audience gathered together in a town square or assembly hall. While members of the latter group can respond directly to the speaker, and can appreciate the significance of affirmative and negative responses amongst each other, the television viewers are being addressed as independent, isolated units. Much like Borgmann's "device" structure, the nature of the medium and the convenience of the speech's reception mutes the direct "feel" for the event and precludes direct interaction and potential for dialogue. Affirmative or negative individual responses made in isolation fall on deaf ears; the situation thus precludes the opportunity for immediate and direct interchange of sympathies, disagreements, or plans for concerted opposition or support. This example, plus the others discussed above, point to some of the shortcomings of social life in a rational-scientifically organized production and consumption system. For all the talk about availability, efficiency, and the convenience of the modern service economy, Braverman (7) argues that a large part of the population is confined to conditions where individuals react alone, or indifferently, or even antagonistically towards one another:

. . . the all-powerful market place which, governed by capital and profitable investment, is both chaotic and profoundly hostile to all feelings of community. Thus the very social services which should facilitate social life and social solidarity have the opposite effect. As the advances of modern household and service industries

lighten the family labor, they increase the futility of family life; as they remove the burden of personal relations, they strip away its affections; as they create an intricate social life, they rob it of every vestige of community and leave in its place the cash nexus (7: p. 282).

It has been demonstrated in this section that the liberal view of social freedom has its shortcomings. While it was shown to promote the idea that individualism, pluralism, and minimal State intervention are preferable to totalitarian uniformity, the liberal view fails to recognize the extent to which capitalist interests and mechanisms infiltrate and dominate social life. It was shown that under capitalism, rational-scientific methods have been employed to bolster productivity. Yet, for the material advantages gained, labour that engages the individual in a personally and socially satisfying manner has largely been lost. In the area of material consumption, "individuality" comes to mean the mass consumption of commodities associated with (media-manufactured) personal lifestyle statements. Social relations come to be mediated more and more by market mechanisms and services (e.g., health, transport, food, and welfare, etc.) such that the necessity of personally responsible and effective action is diminished, and relations among individuals become more instrumental, indifferent, emotionally barren, and unfulfilling. When defined in terms of voluntary individual action (in the face of open alternatives), and voluntary associations that serve collective interests (i.e., individual rights and equality of opportunity), liberal views of social freedom were shown to be ill-equipped to recognize how capitalist interests and institutions

can infiltrate social life and appropriate individualism and pluralism for its own purposes. When social freedom was defined in terms of co-operative individualism (i.e., the expansion of individual possibilities through collective effort), equality of opportunity, and possessive individualism (to compete for a greater share of the collectively produced benefits), it was shown to serve an ideological function by legitimizing the material inequalities and the human "costs" (i.e., personal and social alienation) generated by a rational-scientific and competitive capitalist society. Forms of social life that can engage the creative abilities of individuals in ways that contribute to mutual recognition, reciprocity, solidarity, and mutual fulfillment would represent an alternative to the alienated forms of social life shown to exist in (capitalist-dominated) liberal society. How these alternative social relations might be recognized, and how they can be articulated in terms of social freedom, are the major issues to be addressed in the next section.

A Liberal Social Freedom Alternative

The purpose of this section is to explore the possibility that liberal social freedom can be expressed in ways that overcome the pitfalls of social life under rational-scientific capitalist institutions. Essential to the development of this view is the condition that the possibilities for freedom must be social possibilities. That is, social freedom cannot be seen to be a retreat from social-political life, and neither can it be seen as an

ideological prop for dominant interests or institutions within liberal society. Where these alternative forms of social life can be identified and located, they must be capable of expressing oppositional values, principles, and behaviours even amidst what is considered the dominant institutional form of life. As a alternative to being bound to rationalized labour, individuals would need to be reintegrated with their productive efforts in such a way that their creative abilities are engaged and nurtured in an empowering manner. Rather than the monotonous repetition of fragmented and abstract skills or services, opportunities would need to be available for one's perceptions and abilities to be "stretched." In place of exchange and production relations that, according to Keil, replace person-to-person relations " . . . with abstract market relations with anonymous others . . . " (48: p.15), social relations would need to re-establish the bond between personal and social features of life. Rather than being mediated by exchange and production systems that divide and isolate individuals (which in turn contribute to personal anonymity, social indifference, or social antagonisms), human interactions would need to be mediated more by activities that can promote mutual development, recognition, facilitation, and fulfilment. People would need to be able to relate to one another not as objects but more in terms of their concrete, personal characteristics, and in such a way that their efforts are recognized and welcomed for the valuable challenges and opportunities they present. Similarly, in place of market or service mechanisms or "devices" that disburden individuals from personal effort and social

responsibility, activities would need to return to individuals a sense of responsibility for the conditions of their own existence and welfare, and a sense of mutual challenge and fulfilment that comes with active engagement with others.

Stout (81) claims that criticism of liberal society is easy to come by, yet proposals for an alternative social order (e.g., communitarian) often appear utopian and thus unrealistic. Accordingly, " . . . if imagined utopias are to generate more than terminal wistfulness . . . " (81: p. 45), there must be some way of making these social alternatives non-utopian. Rather than yearn for some perceived historical golden-age (e.g., pre-capitalist Gemeinschaft) or some future social ideal (e.g., communitarian solidarity), an alternative is to start from one's present circumstances and focus on those forms of social life thought to provide an alternative to possessive individualism and to totalitarian uniformity. This is not to assume an ahistorical approach; it suggests that perhaps a greater effort can be made to consider, recognize, and salvage, where they exist, concrete forms of social life that appear to harmonize individual freedom and the common good in a more satisfying manner. While it is important to work out how utopian alternatives to liberal social freedom can be made more concrete, it is equally important in one's condemnation of a particular social order to not commit the error of "throwing out the baby with the bathwater." That is, in one's zeal to highlight the pitfalls of social life under capitalism, one runs the risk of overlooking those kernels of freedom that might, if allowed enough

recognition and nurturing, form the basis of a more humane social order. According to Nisbet and Perrin,

No matter how vast and impersonal, how regimented and externally directed a society may be, close investigation reveals that it is quite literally honeycombed with small, mediating groups that can become very influential in the lives of their individual members. They can promote or undermine the goals of the larger structure (62: p. 82).⁴

In contrast to the orthodox Marxist position that the realm of "true freedom" emerges in a post-capitalist state, Hearn (31: pp. 150-151) argues that alongside capitalist institutions there exist cultural events and relations that can contradict the prevailing values, methods, and social relations of capitalist production and consumption. Hearn (31) refers to "liminality" as the times out of (capitalist) structure where individuals express through language, poetry, song, dance, and festival-like activity the contradictions of everyday life. These "times out of structure" have a certain "as if" quality to them because they allow for critical reflection and for contemplating and fashioning alternative activities thought to be more conducive to the satisfaction of personal needs and

⁴Discussions with Dr. Gary MacEoin proved to be very fruitful in this regard. Dictatorships in South America, for example, make serious efforts to dismantle every form of social groups (e.g., the Church) that can diminish the direct power of the State. The "divide-and-conquer" strategy is aimed at forging a direct link between the individual and the State, thereby undermining social relations that might act as a power base or conduit for oppositional or private meanings and actions. Despite the wholesale purging of such attempts, individuals invariably find or create some "underground" or clandestine social group to encourage and satisfy their social and political purposes.

interests.⁵ In addition, these festival-like occasions of shared social criticism and transcendence can promote a sense of social solidarity that Turner (cited in 31: p. 151) refers to as "communitas." For Hearn, "communitas" represents the " . . . collective celebration of the human bond . . . " (31: p. 151), while for Turner, it means social relations based on " . . . an intense comradeship and egalitarianism . . . " (cited in 31: p. 151). Taken together, " . . . communitas typically transgresses or dissolves the norms that govern structured and institutionalized relationships and is accompanied by an experience of unprecedented potency" (cited in 31: p. 151). It is on the basis of similar types of activities and experiences that alternative expressions of social freedom within liberal, free-market society will be considered. Liberals assume, according to Lasch, " . . . that men and women wish only to pursue their private purposes and that they form associations only in order to advance these purposes more effectively" (49: p. 73). Even a

⁵Referring to some of these alternative activities and experiences as "out of structure" might suggest that they require the suspension of material or political concerns. This would mean that these alternative conditions or states could be considered play. Some activities, though not "out of structure" in Hearn's sense of the phrase, are definitely "out of character" with the type of social relations characteristic of "private" society. Referring to these alternative types of social relations as "out of character" will allow them to be articulated in terms contrary or distinct from the general character of social relations in liberal, free-market society without being committed to the position that these social relations are play. While these activities and social relations may turn out to be play-like in some respects, the important concern here is exploring how the social possibilities of these relations can perhaps extend or broaden the notion of liberal social freedom. In other words, some of these alternative expressions of social freedom will be sought within liberal, free-market institutions, yet the basis of the social freedom need not depend entirely on the notion of play.

liberal reformer like Rawls argues that in "private" society individuals " . . . have their own private ends which are either competing or independent but not in any case complementary" (71: p. 521). This means that social groups or organizations are seen as a stock of instrumentalities for individuals to use to their own advantage. For Lasch, even the public-private sphere distinction " . . . so dear to liberals, doesn't catch the important concerns . . . " (48: p. 73), for it assigns too much importance to material over moral matters and then trivializes those activities most capable of articulating and nurturing moral qualities. Upon examination of the social relations found in Sartre's "fused group" (75), MacIntyre's "social practice" (53), Borgmann's "focal practice" (cited in 51), Rawls' "social union" (71), Sartre's "organization" (75), and Marx's view of "species-being" (57), certain elements can be weaved together in a way to highlight the moral qualities and social possibilities of freedom.

The alienated types of social relations critiqued in the previous section of this chapter are not static, inert forms; they sustain themselves to the extent that human agents passively and unreflectively accept historical, material, and social conditions as natural and unchangeable. However, the external unity of social gatherings (in "private" society) spawned by instrumental rationality and commercialism can be dissolved when members unite and act towards the realization of a common objective. Rather than the unity of the gathering being the product of that which exists outside it, the unity here is an internal one generated by elements and social

relations intrinsic to the activity itself. Sartre (75: pp. 346, 350) argues that an essential component in the transformation of persons organized in an alienated form to one of reciprocity is the mutual recognition of a common threat or danger, an organized counter-force to the as-yet isolated praxes of individuals. In recognizing the unity of an "out-group," in so far as it poses this threat (e.g., the proletariat coming to a recognition of itself as a dispossessed group with a common interest at stake only after the solidification of the bourgeoisie), isolated individuals then come to see themselves as similar or common. As a result, they can undertake what action is deemed necessary to overcome the potentially negating power of the "out-group." In other words, "inter-group" conflict is the basis upon which "intra-group" solidarity can be generated. While it may be the case that perception of a common threat or danger is one factor that can contribute to the generation of a common consciousness and the "fused" action of some groups (e.g., combat units, persecuted religious or racial groups, or mountain climbing expeditions, etc.), it is certainly not the only factor, nor is it true for all groups. Sartre admits as much when he argues that some groups (e.g., anglers, book clubs, etc.) establish themselves on the basis of a real need or commonality of purpose that has nothing to do with a "threat of mortal danger" (75: p. 350). However, it is only when these "secondary" groups are constituted in the context of material scarcity, that is, when they are considered in terms of revolutionary praxis, that the idea of social unity through a common and reciprocal response to an external threat or danger can be

understood. This suggests that groups can be understood in their own terms (e.g., as an expression of concrete, personal needs) as well as in the context of danger, threat, or material scarcity.

To support the view that a social group can be understood in other than just political or economic terms, consideration can be given to the useful distinction MacIntyre (53) makes between a "social practice" and a social "institution." A social practice is

. . . any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended (53: p. 187).

By "goods" internal to a social practice, Stout, in summarizing MacIntyre, comments:

. . . they can be specified only in terms drawn from the activity itself, recognized only by people experienced in the activity and realized only by participating in the activity well as judged by its standards of excellence (81: p. 51).

To understand what it means to be a good painter, for example, it is necessary to have some understanding of both the techniques, skills, and procedures of painting, and also what constitutes excellence in painting. To judge something to be "good" or excellent in painting is not to rely on categories drawn from another activity (e.g., baseball) or another field (e.g., economics), and neither is it to rely on judgements produced by individuals not experienced with the art. While artistic standards may undergo historical shifts,

MacIntyre argues that, despite the progressions and declines, " . . . it is in participation in the attempts to sustain progress and to respond creatively to problems . . . " (53: pp. 189-190) that the goods internal to painting can be extended or refined.

For Lasch, social practices nourish the virtue of judgement, in other words, " . . . the kind of skill one learns in the course of training for a practice (like architecture, medicine, baseball, the performing arts, or the art of political oratory) . . . " (49: p. 68). It is important to note that "judgement" is not identical to technical expertise. While technical expertise is indeed essential in the practice of piano-playing, for example, it cannot be equated with "musicianship." For Lasch,

Whether the frame of reference is music, sports, medicine, or warfare, judgement implies a sense of timing and proportion, a feeling for the relations between the parts and the whole, a painstaking attention to detail which nevertheless is careful not to let details obscure the larger outlines of the performance, a willingness to improvise if necessary, an ability to combine spontaneous feeling with disciplined forethought, a kind of controlled exuberance, and most important and elusive of all, an ability to communicate the inner meaning of an activity to others so that they become vicarious participants (49: p. 68).

Dance, such as the ballet, is clearly a social practice. That is, it not only requires a great deal of discipline and training according to exacting standards of the art, but it also requires a certain "feel" for the music and the theme of the ballet. In a similar manner to any "inspired" performance in the arts, but not necessarily restricted to the arts, there is a certain "giving-over" of oneself to the medium of expression in order for it to be fully commanded and

displayed. In a sense, "there are no dancers, there is only the dance" (10: p. 83). This means that the ballet "lives" through the dancers. As in other performances or endeavours, whether they be in the arts, sport, medicine, science, or teaching, a clear line can be drawn between those who are "going through the motions" and those who "live" their work. In this respect, medical care is also a social practice; for not only does it require technical knowledge and skills associated with diagnosis and treatment, but " . . . it requires the cultivation of virtues, including skills of caring and discernment specific to medicine as such" (81: p. 52). "Skills of caring and discernment" presumably entail sympathy, empathy, honesty, sensitivity to patient's needs, confidentiality, the promotion of informed choice, and the appropriate use of medical technologies, bearing in mind the patient's peculiar needs and moral concerns. Technical expertise, combined with experience, can produce in the committed practitioner the ability to make the subtle discriminations in diagnosis and treatment often likened to intuitive power.

Social practices are to be clearly distinguished from social "institutions," even though social practices are embedded in and ultimately depend on institutions for their existence. While the social practice of medicine has its own telos (i.e., the prevention and treatment of illness), it operates within the institutions of the medical schools and associations, hospital administrations, capitalist market mechanisms, and government social welfare schemes. These institutions operate according to different and not necessarily

complementary agendas. MacIntyre states that institutions, as opposed to social practices, trade in external goods:

They are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also the practices of which they are the bearers (53: p. 194).

This suggests that each social practice requires some type of institutional arrangement to organize, administer, and market its "product". The very existence of a social practice can depend on the ability of its management to market it well, which means entangling the practice in the webs of commercial, governmental, or other institutions. Yet, in being connected to and ultimately dependent upon institutions, the external goods (e.g., money, notoreity, etc.) may corrupt the social practice. Lasch argues that it is not just that individuals can be tempted (by money or prestige) to compromise their practice-integrity; it is rather the nature of institutions to " . . . almost unavoidably underwrite and legitimize these ambitions" (49: p. 69). For example,

the university provides a home for scholarship, but it also corrupts scholarship by subjecting it to standards derived from the marketplace, just as it corrupts instruction by reducing it to standard units used to measure academic progress and achievement - courses, credits, grades, and cumulative grade point averages (49: p. 69).

In other words, articulating the value of a social practice in institutional terms very often requires imposing quantitative standards of measurements on it. Consequently, the qualitative dimensions of the social practice can suffer or "lose something in translation." While it is often the case that excellence can

generate social rewards for the practitioner and the institution, it is still clear that the standards used to judge practice success (e.g., financial or political success) are different from those used to judge practice excellence.

The assessment of social practices up to this point suggests two significant and complementary notions; first, that social practices promote the "goods" of the practitioner and, second, that they promote the "goods" of the activity. That is, individuals are free in the sense of having the opportunity to develop, express, and extend their powers and abilities according to commonly recognized and accepted standards of excellence. While the shared standards of excellence precede and inform the efforts of the individual practitioner, these standards can still be extended, broadened, or refined by their personal efforts. Through the pursuit of excellence as defined by the practice, these standards are reinforced and the "goods" of the practice are extended to the intended beneficiaries of the practice (e.g., the patients in terms of medical services, the students in terms of education, or the music audience in terms of the orchestra performance, etc.). In light of the criteria thought necessary to support an alternative expression of liberal social freedom, social practices measure up well. This is especially true because of their ability to manifest their internal goods in terms other than the economic or political ones predominant in institutions. Yet, the pursuit and achievement of a practice's internal goods are still social possibilities because they need not be consigned to "private life."

Much has been said about the internal goods of social practices in terms of the technical and "artistic" qualities the practitioner must possess if standards of excellence are to be maintained. What remains to be discussed in this regard is the relationship between practitioners. In distinguishing the internal from the external "goods" of a social practice, MacIntyre comments:

It is characteristic of what I have called external goods that when achieved they are always some individual's property and possession. Moreover characteristically they are such that the more someone has of them, the less there is for other people. This is sometimes necessarily the case, as with power and fame, and sometimes the case by reason of contingent circumstances as with money. External goods are therefore characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers and winners. Internal goods are indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the practice (53: pp. 190-191).

This means that in contrast to the achievement of an external good, (i.e., social notoreity) which excludes some from its attainment, competition for internal goods results in the achievement of mutually beneficial or inclusive goods. In other words, the internal goods, when achieved, include the intended recipient and other similarly committed practitioners. This suggests that relations between practitioners are of a special kind. In other words,

. . . whether we are painters or physicists or quarterbacks or indeed just lovers of good painting or first-rate experiments or a well-thrown pass - that its goods can only be achieved by subordinating ourselves to the best standard so far achieved, and that entails subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other practitioners. We have to learn to recognize what is due to whom; we have to be prepared to take whatever self-endangering risks are demanded along the way; and we have to listen carefully to what we are told about our own inadequacies and to reply with the same carefulness for the facts. In other words we have

to accept as necessary components of any practice with internal goods and standards of excellence the virtues of justice, courage and honesty (53: p. 191).

Rather than being mediated by rational-scientific or commercial standards and mechanisms that can result in abstract, impersonal social relations, the concrete standards of excellence relevant to social practices mutually orient, engage, and develop the "judgement" of the practitioners and, in some cases, the practice recipient (e.g., the fine arts connoisseur).

The idea that individuals can be guided and united by shared standards can be found in Borgmann's discussion of a "focal practice" (cited in 51: p. 25). In contrast to the technological "device," which disburdens individuals from personal responsibility, effort, and reciprocating social engagement, a "focal practice" can have a world-gathering force. That is, each "focal practice" entails a focal "thing" and a distinct set of social relations based upon nurturing it. For example, the "festive meal," (as opposed to the fast-food meal) engages the expertise of several individuals to bring about a social "event," an event that can create or reinforce social bonds (cited in 51: p. 21). Other "things" can elicit focused attention, care, and social engagement. A wood stove (as opposed to a central heating system) is a "thing" because its warmth cannot be secured without difficulty and effort; it is also a "focal practice" because it, can organize (spatially, temporally, and personally) a world around it (cited in 50: p. 20). For Borgmann, a wood stove furnished more than warmth:

it was a focus, a hearth, a place that gathered the work and the leisure of a family and gave the house a centre.

Its coldness marked the morning, and the spreading of its warmth the beginning of the day. It assigned to the different family members tasks that defined their place in the household. The mother built the fire, the children kept the firebox filled, and the father cut the firewood. It provided for the entire family a regular and bodily engagement with the rhythm of the seasons that was woven together of the threat of cold and the solace of warmth, the smell of the wood smoke the exertion of sawing and of carrying, the teaching of skills, and the fidelity to daily tasks (cited in 51: p. 20).

In this example, certain skills, powers, and relations are required to produce a desired event; individuals are neither relieved from responsibility and effort nor excluded from sharing the benefits of their collective efforts.

Rawls' notion of "social union" (71: pp. 520-529) also captures several of the features of "social practices" and "focal practices" in so far as skill and "judgement" are acquired, nurtured, and extended in complementary and socially unifying ways. It is presumed to be a psychological fact for Rawls (71: p. 432) that individuals prefer activities that call upon the exercise of their skills in novel and challenging ways. However, not every enterprise or exercise of skill will be publicly recognized; those activities more likely to be socially recognized will be those that tend to promote the "goods" of others. For Rawls, " . . . the familiar values of personal affection and friendship, meaningful work and social cooperation, the pursuit of knowledge and the fashioning and contemplation of beautiful objects . . . " (71: p. 425) are considered complementary goods because they are good not only for the one producing them but also good for others. The companion effect of

gaining recognition and support for the development and demonstration of one's own abilities is the likelihood that individuals will appreciate the demonstration of someone else's ability. It is Rawls (71) contention that for individuals with similar or complementary interests there should be (and are) practical "social unions" wherein abilities and efforts are combined in a way that is mutually satisfying for all involved. In this way individuals find that their interests and abilities have a fertile ground for development and expression, and that the efforts of all can be recognized in ways that contribute to mutual respect. These types of social relations stand in stark contrast to "private" society, where individuals with their independent aims assess social relations solely as means to private gains. Social unions also stand in contrast to the "sociability" or cooperation required for material survival, or for the acquisition of language and the transmission of culture, "for all these things are equally true of persons who view their relations purely instrumentally" (71: p. 522). Rawls has something more personal in mind:

. . . human beings have in fact shared final ends and they value their common institutions and activities as good in themselves. We need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complimentary to our own good . . . different persons with similar or complementary capacities may cooperate so to speak in realizing their common or matching nature. When men are secure in the enjoyment of the exercise of their own powers, they are disposed to appreciate the perfections of others, especially when their several excellences have an agreed place in a form of life the aims of which all accept (71: pp. 522-523).

Science, art, families, friendships, musical groups, games, and the like all qualify for Rawls as instances of social unions - as forms of life characterized by shared final ends and by being valued for their own sake. While the example of games as social unions will be examined in detail in Chapter IV, Rawls' assessment of a musical orchestra exemplifies the notion of social union. In this case,

. . . we may consider a group of musicians every one of whom could have trained himself to play equally well as the others any instrument in the orchestra, but who each have by a kind of tacit agreement set out to perfect their skills on the one they have chosen so as to realize the powers of all in their joint performances (71: p. 524f).

In this case the "good" performance is the shared end, the achievement of which cannot exclude any of the members. The shared end requires not only the interrelation of individual talents, but also the balancing of those individually excellent performances in such a way as to achieve the rhythm, tone, harmony, etc. required by the musical piece itself. It is often the case that in an orchestra piece the theme or movement may at various times highlight the virtuosity of some individual performer or another, but it is not the case that every individual performance is highlighted at the same time all the time. At certain times the demonstration of musical excellence requires it to be in a supportive role, as then it is intended to accentuate or complement the efforts of others, and vice versa.

In the idea of "social union" one can evidence social relations that stand in contrast to those alienated forms characteristic of much of social life under capitalism. Rather than

relations being mediated by contractual terms that define the rights and obligations of the individuals party to it, relations in "social unions" are mediated or defined by activities that require concerted action. More than this, members recognize a common purpose and how the harmonious interrelation of individual talents and powers is necessary for all to benefit from the performance.⁶ In the case of the orchestral group, member's actions are mediated by a musical score that unites them as individuals each hoping for and facilitating (e.g., complementing) the efforts of others to make mutual fulfilment possible.

Sartre (75) explains the structure and dynamics of this type of social formation in a similar way. In contrast to social formations (i.e., "collectives"), where individuals relate to one another impersonally, where free praxis becomes compelled conformity, and where members appear as interchangeable organic units, "organization" members are united by the interrelation of their actions toward a mutually defined common goal. In contrast to alienated social formations, where the "being" of the gathering

⁶Rawls (71: p. 524f) comments that he expected to find a similar idea to "social union" in Marx's earlier writings (e.g., Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts) but could not. However, Rawls interprets Marx's view of communist society to mean one where individuals completely realize and express all of their powers. Brenkert argues that while Marx does encourage individuals to fully develop all their desires and abilities, it is implausible to think that "fully develop" means unending or ever-extendable development or fulfilment. It would be plausible to think that "fully develop" means the greatest development or fulfilment within a self-determined hierarchy of priorities or preferences. In other words, there are certainly physical, temporal, natural or social limitations, or just plain personal preferences, that would make it impossible to fully develop each and every one of one's powers (8: p. 96).

precedes, awaits, and determines them, members of an "organization" can see their individual common commitment reflected in each other's practical actions. Individuals are first defined as "common" individuals in so far as they are pre-defined by the requirements of their self-chosen task and by the sought-after goal of their combined efforts. In between the two moments where they are defined as "common," individuals demonstrate their individual prowess in relation with other similarly committed individuals. In a combat group, for example, individuals are first defined as "common" by virtue of their common objective and how their individual actions are seen to be strategically interrelated toward the achievement of their common objective. However, the group goal cannot be achieved unless individuals succeed through their personal struggles and initiatives. This in turn cannot come about unless all members perceive and respond to the initiatives of each other in ways that advance the group's objectives. In responding to the contingencies of battle (e.g., injury of a group member, weather conditions, or enemy strategies, etc.), the ability of the individual to succeed is very often dependent upon the possibilities for action and support provided by group members. The combat unit members "live" their common strategies and objectives through a series of fluid, reciprocal interactions with each other. In other words, members act on the conditions they produce in such a way as to recognize and promote each member's ability to advance the group's objective. In contrast to "private" society, where members generally affirm themselves as "private" individuals, the "mediated reciprocity" of members of an

"organization" means that the social is affirmed in the individual at the same time that the individual is affirmed in the social. Social freedom in this sense means the exercise and interrelation of concrete personal abilities in ways that can mutually facilitate each member's ability to achieve their common goal.

The notion that individuals can realize their social natures through the interrelation of individual talents and powers is also addressed by Marx. In contrast to the social isolation, indifference, and antagonisms that accompany capitalist life, human emancipation for Marx (58: p. 31) involves becoming in one's activities and relationships a "species-being." In other words, the starting point for any discussion of human liberation is the recognition and appreciation of the fact that humans are essentially social beings. The basis upon which an understanding of this essentially social human nature can be gleaned in part from Marx's discussion of sexual relations:

The immediate, natural and necessary relation of human being to human being is also the relation of man to woman. In this natural species-relationship man's relation to nature is directly his relation to man, and his relation to man is directly his relation to nature, to his own natural function. Thus, in this relation is sensuously revealed, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which human nature has become nature for man and to which nature has become human nature for him. From this relationship man's whole level of development can be assessed. . . . The relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being It also shows how far man's needs have become human needs, and consequently how far the other person, as a person, has become one of his needs, and to what extent he is in his individual existence at the same time a social being (57: p. 154).⁸

If "man's whole level of development can be assessed" with respect to this most natural of human relations, this suggests that human beings only become fully human when their lives are a personal expression and satisfaction of their needs. In order for all human beings to broaden their self-expression and fulfilment of needs, relations between human beings must be conducive to mutual recognition and fulfilment. Not only can current social conditions be assessed in terms of how this "species-being" does or does not find expression, but social alternatives can also be envisaged in terms of the full expression

⁸Avineri's interpretation of this passage suggests that the family or, more specifically, sexual relations can serve a much more critical function. Avineri states:

"Sexual relations are at once necessary and spontaneous; they are also other-oriented par excellence. Man's need for a partner in the sexual relationship makes his own satisfaction depend on another person's satisfaction. By definition, sexual relations are reciprocal. If they are unilateral they cease to be a relationship, degrading the other person to the status of a mere object, rather than a co-equal subject" (3: p.89).

Avineri claims for Marx that the uniqueness of these relations makes it possible to project them as a model for the structure of human relations in socialist society (3: p. 89). While Avineri embellishes Marx's views of sexual relations somewhat, he does advise that family and sexual relations should not be romanticized. What Avineri should be saying is that his embellished view of sexual relations should not be romanticized. It is clear from Marx's critique of the bourgeois family that the bourgeois form of this "natural" relation between man and woman is hardly indicative of community. If individuals in the bourgeois family become instruments of labour, or if they are socialized for acceptance of authority and hierarchy, then the bourgeois family is the antithesis of community. Avineri's view does suggest, however, that this "natural" interdependence of man and woman can take a social form exemplifying community. As Avineri rightly suggests, family and sexual relations can be a paradigm for future social organization "only so far as they point to the possibility of other directed relations" (3: p. 91).

of this "natural" social being. With respect to personal relations Marx states:

Let us assume man to be man, and his relation to the world to be a human one. Then love can only be exchanged for love, trust for trust, etc. If you wish to enjoy art you must be an artistically cultivated person; if you wish to influence other people you must be a person who really has a stimulating and encouraging effect upon others. Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life. If you love without evoking love in return, i.e. if you are not able, by the manifestation of yourself as a loving person, to make yourself a beloved person, then your love is impotent and a misfortune (57: pp. 193-194).

With respect to productive relations Marx states:

Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other. 1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature. 3) I would have been for you the mediator between you and the species, and therefore would become recognised and felt by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and in your love. 4) In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature (cited in 8: pp. 119-120).

Brenkert (8) sees Marx's view of communal life as a form of social freedom. Individuals are socially free to the extent that they are rationally self-determined in ways that mutually develop a

broad range of human abilities and powers. In contrast to capitalist society, where human relations are mediated and controlled more by abstract exchange values (i.e., money), social freedom means responding openly to others with respect to their concrete, particular human characteristics. Brenkert states:

We object to the person who flaunts his money or property, and seeks to relate to others on such a basis. We want to know what others are like behind their extravagant masks. We do not want to be offered, in our personal relations, money for our thoughts, but to share thoughts. We do not want a stand-in servant's help as an expression of someone else's helpfulness, but that someone else's own efforts. We want our attempts to secure relationships in which we offer our own individualities to be met with corresponding offers of the other's individuality. When the relations between people are such that the people involved do not manifest in themselves, or reciprocate, the qualities they seek in others, but attempt to command the qualities of others by abstract means, such as money, the relation is felt to be wrong, mistaken, imperfect (8: p. 112).

To be self-determining in light of one's own concrete, particular qualities as well as those of others is to forge and solidify an essential human bond. The community at once promotes individual flourishing, yet in a way that necessarily recognizes, involves, and supports the like flourishing of others. This means that the individual is affirmed in the social (e.g., in the expansion of personal abilities and powers) and the social is affirmed in the individual (e.g., through reciprocal action promoting mutual recognition and fulfilment).

However, while these types of social relations can promote a fuller expression of an essentially social human nature, it is clear for Marx that capitalism is not conducive to its flourishing. Marx

(54: p. 820) argues that "true" freedom, in other words, a realm where the development of human energy is an end in itself, exists beyond the realm of necessity (or at least in a state where material necessity is significantly reduced). This statement, combined with Marx's position (59) on the abolition of private property, makes it clear that "true" freedom can exist only in some post-capitalist state. The purpose of introducing Marx's argument regarding the impossibility of social freedom existing within a capitalist order is not intended to make the search for alternative expressions of liberal social freedom more difficult than it has to be. Marx contributes to the understanding of social freedom argument because of what he has to say regarding the essentially (interdependent) social nature of human beings and on the characteristics of social life thought to be an appropriate expression of "species-being." Human beings are thought to be socially free on this account to the extent that concrete, creative expressions of individuality are mutually facilitated and affirmed in social relations. The value of discovering social activities or relations that support this view of social freedom cannot be underestimated regardless of the institutional order that bears them. The similarities that exist between Marx's view of community and Sartre's "organization," Rawls' "social union," Borgmann's "focal practice" and MacIntyre's "social practice" suggest that the search for examples of social freedom need not be restricted to post-capitalist social conditions. They also suggest that these social forms need not be limited to "private life."

This chapter has demonstrated that the pluralism (of ideas and pursuits of the "good" life) thought to abound in liberal society can be undermined due to the pervasive influence of capitalist institutions on social relations. For all the material benefits produced under capitalism, the rational-scientific and market organization of production and consumption has diminished the possibilities for personally meaningful labour and social relations. Liberal appeals to voluntarism and cooperative-individualism were shown to provide ideological support for the material inequalities and other human "costs" associated with life under capitalism. In response to this, alternative forms of social life were sought out and explored for their potential to counter-act the disintegration of personal and social life in capitalist-dominated liberal society. Based largely on the distinction made between a social institution and a social practice, it was shown that human relations in social practices (and other similar associations) can be mediated in ways that give scope for personal development, initiative, reciprocity, and fulfilment with others. Rather than being mediated by institutions that "disburden" and isolate individuals, social practices were shown to promote "judgement" and social unity among practitioners (and recipients) based upon the recognition and advancement (or appreciation) of shared standards of excellence. Social freedom on this account was shown to be the recognition and confirmation of the social in the individual and the individual in the social. In other words, the pursuit or achievement of practice excellence can promote rational self-determination and "judgement" in

mutually challenging, complementary, and affirming ways. The internal goods sought out and achieved within a community of practitioners (including recipients) could not come about without them being, at the same time, inclusive goods for all concerned.

In light of the liberal society's potential to promote diverse expressions of social freedom, and in light of capitalism ability to turn diversity into (commodity or market-based) uniformity, social expressions of alternative values, interests, and relations should be welcomed. The social institution-social practice distinction makes it possible to recognize and flesh out those forms of social life thought to possess a markedly different and superior form of social freedom. Social relations that mutually engage and empower committed individuals in a way that promotes mutual recognition, facilitation, and fulfilment marks an advance over both the asocial or anti-social (i.e. possessive individualist) and the conformist (i.e., "functional" freedom) expressions of social freedom in liberal, free-market society. The purpose of the next chapter is to explore the possibility that sport, as a social practice within liberal, capitalist institutions, can be thought of as a source of social freedom.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL FREEDOM IN SPORT

Chapter II established that capitalist values and methods can infiltrate both the public and private spheres to promote a one-dimensional (i.e., commodity-based) society. It was also shown that the alienation produced by the rational-scientific organization of social life under capitalism could be legitimized by liberal notions of social freedom. In contrast to activities in "private" society that produce personal disengagement, subordination, social indifference, and antagonism, liberal society was shown to offer an alternative. Social practices, while dependent upon and effected by institutions, were shown to be capable of creatively engaging and socially unifying individuals through the recognition and advancement of shared standards of excellence. It was on the basis of pursuing and achieving the internal and inclusive goods of a social practice, even while located within capitalist institutions, that liberal social freedom could be re-expressed.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the possibility that sport can be considered a source of social freedom in a similar fashion. This will mean examining the links that can be established between sport and social practices (or other similar social formations). It is not necessary, however, that sport demonstrate every feature of each of these social groupings, nor is it necessary to limit the parameters of social freedom in sport to these features. Rather, sport must be shown to exhibit social features

that clearly distinguish it from the largely asocial or anti-social characteristics of "private" society under capitalism. That is, for sport to be considered a source of social freedom, it must be shown to encourage the engagement and expansion of concrete, personal skills and powers; it must engage these skills and powers in ways that can be mutually recognized, facilitated, or shared; it must be capable of uniting individuals around internal "goods" or standards of excellence, the achievement of which produces mutual or inclusive benefits; and the possibilities for freedom must be socially grounded possibilities. This means that if sport can be considered a source of social freedom, then it must be capable of not only creatively engaging and socially unifying individuals around internal goods or standards of excellence, but it must do so even while organized within and sustained by capitalist institutions. This means that social freedom in sport represents neither a complete freedom from institutions nor an assimilation to them.

If the goods or excellences in social practices require, in addition to technical expertise, "judgement," artistry, and moral sensitivity, then it needs to be shown that the inclusive internal goods of sport can extend beyond individual athletic expertise. This possibility will be explored by examining the ethical and aesthetic standards that are thought to exist in the "good" sport contest. The "good" sport contest is very often judged not only in terms of victory, but also in terms of, among others, "fairness," mutual challenge, commensurate opposition, closeness, and mutual disclosure. When the standards relevant to ethical or aesthetic

excellence are mutually pursued or achieved, sport holds out the promise of social freedom. The possibility that sport can fulfill this promise will be examined in light of competitive relations among contesting individuals or teams, cooperative relations among teammates, and relations among spectators of the contest.

Competitive Relations in Sport

Competition between opposing individuals or teams is a dominant feature of many sports.⁸ Competitive sports are organized as "zero-sum" activities; that is, they are structured to produce one winner and one loser. The attempts by athletes to achieve an end in an activity where there can be only one winner can produce a variety of social interactions. At times, vigorous and aggressive play can lead to a breakdown of skills, and an increase in cheating and violence; at other times, such play can generate mutual challenge and superior athletic or strategic efforts. In order to explore the possibility that competitive relations in sport can be a source of

⁸Examples of sport contests where opposing individuals simultaneously interact with one another include: boxing, wrestling, judo, karate, kendo, aikido, fencing, tennis, racquetball, squash, paddleball, handball, table tennis, cycle racing (sprints), and running (sprints, middle-distance, marathon). Examples of sport contests where opposing teams simultaneously interact with one another, and where team members interact with one another, include: football, soccer, hockey (ice, field, box), Korfbal, rugby, hurling, basketball, netball, team handball, lacrosse, baseball, softball, team cycling, doubles tennis, Gaelic football, Australian Rules Football, water polo, and cricket. The list of sports is not intended to be exhaustive of sports in general or of individual and team sports in particular; rather, it highlights some of the more well-known sports where there exists a high degree of social interaction among contestants and among teammates, or both.

social freedom, it is first necessary to understand the difference between the rules and conventions that constitute (and regulate) competition and those that are used to judge "good" competition. It is on the basis of the ethical and aesthetic goods internal to the practice of sport itself that the links between sport and social freedom will be explored. Of the various ethical or aesthetic ways that a sport contest can be considered a "good" one, those features to be considered are: fairness, commensurate and challenging opposition, and mutually disclosing, skilful play.

Constitutive Rules and the "Good" Game

The first issue that needs to be addressed is the distinction between the formal rules of a game and the criteria used to judge the "good" game. Sport was shown in Chapter I to be the demonstration of athletic prowess in a game. A game, according to Suits, is " . . . the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles" (82: p. 43). The constitutive rules of a game define a particular state of affairs to be achieved, the obstacles to be overcome, and the means to be employed. The constitutive rules not only limit the means available, but they also rule out more effective in favour of less effective means. This stands in contrast to "technical" activities where the most effective means are employed and where unnecessary obstacles are avoided. In games there need be no reason for accepting the limited and less effective means other than to make the activity possible. Suits refers to this as the "lusory" attitude, in other words, " . . . the knowing acceptance of constitutive rules

just so the activity made possible by such acceptance can occur" (82: p. 43).

The constitutive rules of a game, once accepted, mark out a separate activity within which athletes then attempt to develop and demonstrate their athletic and strategic prowess. In other words, athletes can strive to become as efficient as possible in the use of limited and less effective means. While the constitutive rules of a sport clearly mark it off from non-sport activity (i.e., "technical" activity) and other sports, there is more to the idea of sport as a social practice than just its distinctive formal boundaries. If social practices trade heavily in internal goods, that is, if social practices are intelligible in terms of clearly articulated shared ends, then it is necessary to examine the same with respect to sport. Based on MacIntyre's notion of social practice (53: p. 187), sport and games can equally be thought of as coherent and complex forms of cooperative human activity where the goods internal to the activity can be realized in the course of play. While external goods such as prestige or wealth are intelligible in terms other than the games or sports in which they figure, the goods internal to games and sports cannot be achieved or recognized in any way but by playing and playing them well. Part of what it means to participate in a social practice well is the exercise of technical expertise and "judgement". Yet, while social practices involve a distinct set of technical skills, they are not limited to them:

What is distinctive in a practice is in part the way in which conceptions of the relevant goods and ends which the technical skills serve—and every practice does

require the exercise of technical skills - are transformed and enriched by these extensions of human powers and by that regard for its own internal goods which are partially definitive of each particular practice or type of practice (53: p. 193).

Competing individuals or sporting teams direct their athletic skills and powers toward an end (i.e., winning), the achievement of which excludes one opponent. However, it is the nature of the pursuit of this end that determines whether or not the contest is a "good" one. In addition to the constitutive rules that define the activity, sport contests are governed by other rules and conventions that, when adhered to or achieved, establish what it means to play a "good" game.

There are many different ways in which games can be "good" depending on the criteria or perspective from which they are evaluated. A game could be considered "good" because of the fitness or health benefits, the commercial success of the venture, or the political exposure gained by a politician or country. In these cases the "goods" of the game are external ones. That is, the fitness, economic, and political value of sport is measured in other than sporting terms. A "good" game could also mean the satisfaction derived from winning, the display or witnessing of athletic excellence, the fair contest, the close contest, or the contest that mutually inspires, engages, and extends the skills, powers, and perceptions of the opponents. In these cases the good game is based on ethical or aesthetic criteria that are internal to the activity itself. That is, satisfaction from winning, athletic excellence,

the fair contest, the close contest, and mutual challenge and disclosure are intelligible in terms of the social practice of sport. While there may be various ways that a game can be considered a "good" one, it is clear that some of the "goods" are considered external and some internal to the practice itself. More importantly, it is clear that some of the internal criteria of the "good" game produce exclusive benefits while others produce mutual or inclusive benefits. That is, the satisfaction gained from winning is an exclusive good, while fairness and the aesthetically well-played game can be shared and appreciated by all contestants. When recognized as such or achieved, even within a competitive framework, the mutual good of the fair or aesthetically well-played game can establish the basis for social freedom.

As suggested above, social practices can have exclusive goods as well as those that are both internal and inclusive. Social practices that have internal goods that can be shared (i.e., can be inclusive) show similarities to what Rawls refers to as "social unions." While science, art, families, and friendships are instances of "social unions" (i.e., activities with shared final ends and valued for themselves), games, according to Rawls (71: p. 525), illustrate them most simply. To understand why this is the case, the various ends of the activity need to be distinguished. For Rawls, four ends can be distinguished:

. . . the aim of the game as defined by its rules, say to score the most runs; the various motives of the players in playing the game, the excitement they get from it, the desire for exercise, and so on, which may be different for each person; the social purpose served

by the game which may be unintended and unknown to the players, or even to anyone in the society, these being matters for the reflective observer to ascertain; and then finally, the shared end, the common desire of all the players that there should be a good play of the game. This shared end can be realized only if the game is played fairly according to the rules, if the sides are more or less evenly matched, and if the players all sense that they are playing well (71: p. 525).

While participant motivation and social purposes are external ends, scoring the most points, fair play, commensurate opposition, and skilful play are internal ends that can be understood only in terms of the game itself. However, to achieve the internal "aim of the game as defined by its rules, say to score the most runs" means that one opponent will be excluded. In this case, the desire for the same thing does not necessarily establish a sense of social unity. For a game to be considered a "social union" more is required than simply the pursuit of an exclusive internal end. That a game is being played does not guarantee that it will be a "good" game, that is, a game in which certain shared ends can be achieved. Rather, it is the manner in which the exclusive end in competitive games is pursued that establishes the basis upon which shared ends and social unity can be achieved. When Rawls claims that social unity requires " . . . an agreed scheme of conduct in which the excellences and enjoyments of each are complementary to the good of all" (71: p. 526), this means that there must be some agreement as to what constitutes the "good" game. In Rawls' example of games, this entails fairness, commensurate opposition, and mutually skilful play. Rawls states:

The essential thing is that there be a shared final end and accepted ways of advancing it which allow for the public recognition of the attainments of everyone. When this end is achieved, all find satisfaction in the very same thing; and this fact together with the complementary nature of the good of individuals affirms the tie of community (71: p. 526).

Regardless of the outcome in terms of winning and losing, it is the manner in which winning or losing comes about that establishes the basis upon which social unity and thus social freedom can be attributed to games. The notions of fairness, commensurate (and challenging) opposition, and mutually skilful play as mentioned above will figure prominently in the account of social practices, social unity, and social freedom.

Fairness

Having established a basic distinction between a game and a "good" game, it is necessary to elaborate on the links that can be made between the "good" game and social practices, social unions, and thus social freedom. The notions of fairness, commensurate (and challenging) opposition, and mutually skilful play will be addressed in turn. It was shown above that the constitutive rules of a sport define the particular sport, but they do not indicate what it means to play well. In other words, the formal rules do not furnish enough information or guidance as to how the "good" game is to be played. There are some, however, that do believe that the constitutive rules provide enough information or guidance. Suits (82), DeLattre (15), and Pearson (68) claim that there is one and only one way to engage in a game, and that is strictly by the

rules. These authors support what can be called the "logical incompatibility thesis." This means that the rules define the particular game in question, and failure to adhere to those rules "breaks" or terminates the game. In other words, since the rules define what counts as playing and winning, it is logically impossible to play or win and, at the same time, break one of the rules. While D'Agostino (15) claims that this logical or formalist account does have some merit (e.g., it allows one to explain the peculiar state of affairs of voluntarily attempting to overcome gratuitous obstacles), it also has its problems. The most conspicuous problem is that fair and unfair play appear unintelligible. The formalist is committed to the position that rule violations indicate not that the athlete is playing unfairly, but that he or she is not playing at all. On the formalist account, it is a clear case of either strict adherence to the rules, in which case a game can be said to be taking place, or else rule violation, in which case the game in question ceases to be taking place.

The formalist position on what constitutes and what "breaks" a game flies in the face of some of the most common intuitions about games: that some types of rule violations do "break" the game while others do not even though they are considered unfair. For example, using a machete to hinder the progress of an opponent during a one hundred metre sprint event is a clear case of ceasing to compete. However, running the same race with the assistance of a banned substance (e.g., amphetamines) is not ceasing to compete; it is competing, yet in an unfair manner. To understand how some rule

violations can be considered fair or unfair requires an understanding of how social meanings enter into the interpretation of the rules. In addition to the constitutive rules of a competitive sport, D'Agostino claims that there is also an "ethos," in other words, an " . . . unofficial system of conventions which determines how the official rules of the game will be applied in various concrete circumstances" (14: p. 69). While the formalist account allows only a distinction to be made between acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour, the appeal to the "ethos" of a game allows the distinction to be made " . . . between behaviour that is permissible, behaviour that is impermissible but acceptable, and behaviour that is unacceptable" (14: p. 15). For D'Agostino,

permissible behaviour is, on this non-formalist account of games, either in accordance with the formal rules of a game or violates these rules only in a way which, according to the ethos of that game, does not require the invocation of penalties. Impermissible but acceptable behaviour, on this account, violates the rules of the game in a way which, according to the ethos of that game, does require the invocation of penalties. And unacceptable behaviour violates the rules of the game in a way which, according to the ethos of that game, disqualifies its perpetrator as a player of that game (14: p. 15).

For example, a certain degree of body contact is permissible in basketball even though its formal rules suggest that it is a non-contact sport. Beyond a certain intensity or duration, body contact is considered impermissible (i.e., requires the assessment of a penalty but not disqualification). Strategic or "professional" fouls (e.g., fouling a basketball opponent during a last-second attempt to score the winning basket) also exemplify such impermissible yet acceptable rule violations. However, body contact in basketball of

an especially violent nature (e.g., with the intent or consequence being the injury of an opponent) may result in the expulsion of the player from the game. In terms of the prevailing "ethos" in basketball, such violent action amounts to "breaking" the game. In each of the above examples rule violations are recognized and judged differently according to the "ethos" of the game.⁹ The "ethos" of a game can also determine that certain behaviours are unacceptable even though they are permissible in terms of the formal rules. The infamous "underarm bowl" incident in cricket is a case in point; a tactic was employed that was considered legal according to the official rules of the game, yet it was "just not cricket" in terms of the "ethos" of the game.¹⁰

On this account, determining what is meant by fair play or cheating involves more than a strict, legalistic interpretation of the rules; it also involves an understanding of how social customs come to influence what actions within sport are deemed acceptable or unacceptable. It is clear from this that how a game is supposed to be played cannot simply be read off its formal rules. However, once

⁹Lehman (52) contends that it can be a matter of utility or social custom that determines how strictly rules will be interpreted or enforced. In some instances (e.g., offensive holding in American football), detecting every infraction would be next to impossible, and penalizing every observable violation would undoubtedly disrupt the "flow" of the game. In a case like this, many of these infractions just become "part of the game."

¹⁰In a test cricket match between Australia and New Zealand, the Australian captain, Greg Chappell, instructed his brother, Trevor, to bowl the match's final ball underarm along the ground in order to prevent the possibility of the ball being lofted for the potentially winning runs.

the move is made to introduce social customs into the discussion of how games are to be played, this opens up the possibility that social customs and, hence, the standards of "good" play, can change. For sport and other social practices, the goods internal to the activity are historically situated. While a practice such as the (classical) ballet has preserved its standards of excellence for several centuries, MacIntyre claims that "practices never have a goal or goals fixed for all time . . . " (53: p. 193). While all practices have a history, the standards or internal goods

. . . are not themselves immune from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of the best standards realized so far. If, on starting to listen to music, I do not accept my own incapacity to judge correctly, I will never learn to hear, let alone appreciate, Bartok's last quartets. If, on starting to play baseball, I do not accept that others know better than I when to throw a fast ball and when not, I will never learn to appreciate good pitching let alone to pitch. In the realm of practices the authority of both goods and standards operates in such a way as to rule out all subjectivist and emotivist analyses of judgement (53: p. 190).

To engage in a social practice is to associate oneself with the standards of technical and artistic excellence relevant to the practice and with the bearers or guardians of these shared standards of excellence. Within this framework, individuals identify, develop, and test their individual talents and powers with peers and against the standards of excellence relevant to the practice.

Unique artistic or athletic expressions serve to harmonize and extend individual initiatives in ways that maintain or extend the standards of practice excellence. The effect of introducing the notion of "ethos" into the argument is to support the position that

adherence to the conventions of a game, or the creation or emergence of new conventions, the terms of which are recognized and accepted by participants, establishes a basis upon which mutual expectations can be generated, athletic "judgement" can be guided and assessed, and social unity can be established.

To understand how an "ethos" can govern behaviour and contribute to achieving inclusive internal goods in competitive games, it is necessary to understand the capacity of humans to formulate and follow rules. If a rational and mutually binding principle of action can be established, then adherence demonstrates respect for "personhood." According to Downey and Telfer, "personhood" is the capacity for self-determination, rule-following, and sustained, complex emotional involvement. This means that, in contrast to instinct-bound creatures and programmable machines, human beings have the capacity to conceive of and act on a future of their own choosing, they are reflexive and capable of formulating rational and mutually binding principles of action, and they are capable of creating and sustaining (rationally-based) complex emotions (18). Truth-telling, for example, makes meaningful dialogue possible, and it can also create or strengthen bonds of trust between individuals. In this case, rule-abiding behaviour makes a mutual benefit possible, it can promote mutual respect, and it can generate or sustain the complex emotions of "good faith" and trust.¹¹

¹¹This is not to say that self-determination is not relevant here. Downey and Telfer (18) claim that the ability to

It might be argued, however, that the notions of rule-abiding behaviour and "fairness" that arose in Sartre's "bus queue" example did not establish a common bond among participants nor did it produce an end that could be shared. In fact, the point of the "bus queue" example was to demonstrate that under scarcity conditions (e.g., the possibility of there not being enough seats for everyone) members passively accept a boarding protocol that, while expedient and perhaps fair, reinforces personal anonymity and social indifference. In other words, the unity of the bus queue is an external one, and has nothing to do with the personal characteristics of its members or how their actions interrelate to produce a common and mutually beneficial end. It might be the case that a quiet satisfaction comes from the recognition that the outcome, while not producing mutual benefits (e.g., everyone getting a seat), was at least fair. "Fairness" in this case could be viewed as a valuable principle that mitigates what would otherwise be an unsavoury struggle to board the bus, or else it could be construed as a sign of "honourable" resignation to a condition where mutual satisfaction is not possible. Similarly, if the sport contest is viewed exclusively as a zero-sum game, that is, where achieving the end of winning, by definition, excludes one opponent, then "fairness" in the contrived scarcity conditions of

"stick to one's guns," to "stand on one's own feet," and the like, are thought to be desirable traits as well. Respecting "personhood" in this sense means acting in a way to allow or promote someone's ability to take responsibility for their own actions. Adhering to rules one has voluntarily submitted to or created is consistent with self-determination.

the game (e.g., one winner, one loser) might be seen as an equally "honourable" regulating principle or consolation for losing.

However, rather than "fairness" being simply regarded as a principle that makes for the more orderly achievement of an exclusive end, it can also be regarded as a regulative principle that makes possible the achievement of an inclusive or mutually beneficial end. If fairness means behaviour in accordance with the "ethos" of the game, then it should be possible to ascertain what mutual or inclusive benefits can stem from "ethos" adherence. As with the case of truth-telling, "ethos" adherence in sport can mean respect for persons as ends. This means that whatever other internal goods of the practice can be achieved, rule and "ethos" adherence can establish a basis for mutual expectations and mutual respect. Adherence to the constitutive rules of a sport makes the activity possible; adherence to an "ethos" of fairness makes a moral good possible. "Respect for persons as ends" can mean confirming the ability of human beings to suspend pure self-interest and create or submit to rules that can promote mutual benefits. It is on this basis that "good faith" and trust can help establish the ties of community. In other words, "ethos" adherence can contribute to defining the standards of excellence that guide athletes in the social practice of sport. It is upon this basis that other inclusive internal goods of the social practice can be achieved.

Fraleigh argues that fairness, as a condition of engagement, validates the contest. A contest is valid if the participants are taking the same test. A test is valid if the test measures what it

is supposed to measure. The purpose of sport for Fraleigh is the mutual appraisal of the relative abilities of all participants in taking a test (23: p. 41). For Fraleigh this means that the comparison of relative abilities is a value consequence that is inherent in the sport's contest as sport contest (23: p. 54). Irrespective of winning or losing, the comparison of relative abilities is necessarily present in the contest. Fraleigh states,

To say that this value consequence is always there for all participants does not mean that all participants will always accept that value at the highest level in their priorities. It means, simply, that it is always available to all participants whether or not they give it priority in their own value pursuits. Furthermore, it means that it is the unique value which is guaranteed solely by the nature of the sports contest - no other human event can always provide that kind of knowledge for all participants (23: p. 54).

It is clear from the discussion of Rawls' notion of games as social unions and Fraleigh's description of the sports contest that the attribution of social unity or community to the sports contest depends not on whether a game is simply played, but on whether a "good" game is played. While Rawls does not argue for why fairness is relevant to the understanding of social unity in games, it is apparent on Fraleigh's account: fairness validates the contest. That is, fairness in the contest makes it possible to achieve the purpose or "telos" of sport. While knowledge or feedback about one's performance can be achieved even in the unfair contest, it is only in the fair contest that this knowledge is conducive to community.

Struggling to compare relative abilities is a value consequence open to all participants. Yet, this does not say enough about the nature of the struggle itself. Struggling to compare relative abilities may be half-hearted, in which case the comparison of relative abilities is spurious. Implicit perhaps in Fraleigh's account is that athletes must also attempt to win. In other words, if the "comparison of relative abilities" is to have mutual significance, there must be a commitment to excellence. Keating (44) argues that when sport is engaged in as "athletics" or, more accurately, in an "athletic" manner, a particular code governs behaviour.¹² In this case, the end of winning is a stimulus; in order for a genuine assessment of superiority to be made the contest must be fair and "sportsmanlike." In an "athletic" context, "sportsmanlike" means the mutual understanding that the exercise of talents and powers is to be intense and that there are to be "no favours asked and none given." Once expectations are mutual in this

¹²Keating claims that in order to understand what is meant by "sportsmanship" it is necessary to make a distinction between "sport" and "athletics." The purpose of "sport" is thought to be pleasant diversion, so the qualities of behaviour appropriate to achieving this shared end are magnanimity and generosity. The purpose of "athletics," on the other hand, is achieving victory (i.e., the possession of an exclusive end); and appropriate behaviour entails fairness (i.e., impartiality in rule enforcement) and honour (i.e., modesty in victory and composure in defeat). However, Keating's position poses a problem; by claiming that "sport" and "athletics" are distinct activities, the game of basketball, for example, can be distinguished as a "sport" and as "athletics." That is, basketball can have two essential purposes. If the same game has two essential purposes, then the two different purposes do not distinguish two activities but rather two (possible) ways of engaging in the same activity. Keating's distinctions would be more useful if they were associated more with how the same activity can be regulated in different ways.

regard, it is somewhat disrespectful to show, for example, generosity. To suggest to an opponent in this case that you would "let up on the rules," or play below your own standard in order to keep the opponent "in the game" would be, if detected by the opponent, a breach of the implied or overt agreement to come to a fair and accurate determination of superiority. Since trying to win is essential, acts of generosity would be out of place and demeaning to the opponent, and certainly not the basis upon which mutual respect could be generated.¹³ When put into practice, fairness and "sportsmanship" (as "athletics") can produce competition where athletic excellence can be recognized and validated by a community of practitioners and the spectating public. Rather than the suspiciousness and cynicism that can arise when athletes resort to the use of dubious means, the validated performance can generate mutual respect among athletes.

The links between fairness, the "good" contest, and social

¹³In cases where "genuine superiority" or "comparison of relative abilities" is irrelevant to participants, a different ethos may regulate behaviour. For example, it can be the case that some individuals desire to participate in a game simply for the fun of the activity itself. During the play of such a game the rules are interpreted and enforced in ways that promote mutual enjoyment is achieved. Sometimes the "ethos" that may regulate interactions in a game for fun involves "bending" rules in order to maintain the continuity of sport action. For example, lesser-skilled players in tennis who want to just go out and "hit" may find that strict rule adherence does not allow for any type of sustained action. As a result, foot faults or boundary calls may not be enforced as strictly if the mutual purpose is simply the enjoyment of keeping the ball in play. Keating (43: pp. 244-245) comments that sport engaged in this manner is characterized more by generosity and magnanimity. Since the purpose is mutually recognized and sought after, actions that diminish the mutual enjoyment of the participants are avoided.

freedom can be summarized in the following ways. While games have both exclusive and inclusive internal goods, it is the pursuit and achievement of sport's inclusive internal goods that forms the basis of social unity and thus social freedom. Fairness is a criterion that can be employed to determine whether or not a sport contest is a "good" one. The "ethos" of fairness was shown to regulate the pursuit of sport's exclusive internal good (i.e., winning) in a way that could also contribute to the achievement of inclusive internal goods. These inclusive internal goods were shown to be respect for persons as ends, contest validity, and the mutual recognition and affirmation of athletic excellence. Individuals are socially free in the sense that their personal efforts, while informed and guided by shared standards of excellence, can extend or broaden the standards of excellence in ways that can be recognized and validated by a community of practitioners.

Commensurate Opposition

While fairness in competitive sport situations is one of the pre-conditions of the "good" sport contest, it is not the only one. Commensurate opposition, while not guaranteeing "good" competition, can also be considered a relevant factor. Commensurate or evenly matched opposition is not a good in itself; rather, it is good because it can heighten the possibilities for the contest to be mutually challenging and close, and for it to promote mutual disclosure and recognition. Challenge in sport is non-existent if the obstacles to be overcome are perceived to be either too simple

or too difficult, in other words, if the skills and powers possessed are perceived to be well below or well above what is required to overcome the obstacles. Esposito argues that games are essentially " . . . contrived situations, the purpose of which is to heighten and bring into focus the inter-play between possibility and actuality" (20: p. 177). Yet, the possibility of exploring and stretching one's capabilities cannot occur if " . . . the player overwhelms the possibilities of the game or the possibilities of the game overwhelm the player" (20: p. 181). A certain delicate balance must exist between one's perceived abilities and the perceived obstacles to be overcome if a challenge is to exist. Kretchmar (47: p. 226) after Fraleigh refers to the "sweet tension" that can exist between sports "impregnability" (i.e., the probability that the endeavour will fail) and sport's "vulnerability" (i.e., the probability that one's efforts will succeed). A mountain, for example, would be considered "impregnable" if the athlete's skills and powers were thought by the athlete to be insufficient to overcome the obstacles presented by the rock face. In this case, no challenge would exist. The mountain would be considered "vulnerable" if the athlete's skills were thought to be considered more than adequate to overcome the obstacles. In this case as well, no challenge would exist. In accepting, modifying, or creating rules of a game, attention is very often paid to establishing a relatively even match between task difficulty and human skill level so that the achievement of the sport-specific end is challenging and thus worth the effort to the athletes. Similarly, a contest between opponents can be considered "good" by both athletes

and spectators alike if the competitors are commensurate, that is, if their abilities are matched in such a way that dramatic tension exists as to who will emerge as the winner. In addition to athletic excellence, and sometimes in the absence of it, a game can be considered "good" if it exhibits unpredictability of outcome, or closeness. Relatively poorly skilled opponents can still produce a "good" game if it is marked by dramatic encounters and the outcome lies in doubt throughout the contest. This goes some way towards explaining why individuals often seek out new opposition, and why sport leagues employ "drafting" procedures, (i.e., rules that allow the poorest finishing team(s) from the previous year's competition higher priority in the selection of the most talented incoming players) to balance competition. In addition to these features of sport, age, weight, height, or skill categorization and "handicapping" (i.e., self-imposed or externally-imposed fitness, motor skill, or strategic advantages or disadvantages) to balance competition in sport would be unintelligible without making some reference to the desirability of unpredictability of outcome and challenge in the sport contest.

Skilful Play

Challenging and commensurate opposition can be considered "good" also because of the possibilities it presents for athletes to mutually "stretch" or extend personal abilities and powers in ways that can be mutually recognized and valued. The opportunity to broaden or extend one's athletic and strategic prowess is largely

dependent upon the possibilities for action that the opponent presents in the course of play. Surpassing oneself in the athletic action does not guarantee success (if success is measured solely in terms of points scored); while loss of the game may be a very shattering experience psychologically, it can still be the case that self-disclosure and extension were made possible only through the mutual challenges presented by the opponent(s). It may be the case that, at times, individuals become preoccupied by the personal "test" rather than the "contest." However, Kretchmar argues:

if two members are truly contesting, they are interested in each other's progress in taking the test. Their own strategies, rhythms, their very relationship to the test is, in part, dictated by the other's performance. Contestants watch one another. The contestants cannot be concerned merely with passing the test, for an opponent may pass it in a superior fashion. The test itself cannot give a contestant sufficient information on what is required of him (47: pp. 228-229).

A personal concern with simply crossing the finish line ahead of the other contestants, or with achieving a personal-best time in a middle-distance running event, for example, are not always the measure of a "true" contest. Kretchmar is suggesting that "true" contesting involves an ongoing estimation of one's own and the contestant's abilities and powers throughout the course of the competition. In a middle-distance race, for example, runners can be involved in estimating the appropriate time(s) to maintain the lead, "draft" a lead runner, slow the pace, chase a lead runner or break from the pack, and the like. All these instances require a sense of timing and finesse that can only be developed or exercised in the context of each particular race.

DeLattre regards one's opponent in a sport competition as a "touchstone;" in a contest this means " . . . by rubbing against a worthy opponent, against his skill, dedication and preparation, the quality of a competitor's mettle is tested" (15: p. 273). While sport cannot lay claim to be unique in this regard, it does

. . . provide opportunities for self-discovery, for concentration and intensity of involvement, for being carried away by the demands of the contest and thereby in part for being able to meet with a frequency seldom matched elsewhere. It is in the face of these demands and with respect to them that an athlete succeeds or fails. This is why it is a far greater success in competitive athletics to have played well under the pressure of a truly worthy opponent and lost than to have defeated a less worthy or unworthy one where no demands were made (15: p. 273).

As well as the fitness levels and the motor skills that opponents must contend with, there are also personal characteristics and powers of the opponents that must be taken into consideration when preparing for, and presenting oneself within, the competition. Simon contends that competition in sport is the mutual struggle for excellence between "persons". As a person, the athlete is considered to be a unique combination of talents (e.g., strength, speed, agility, or endurance) as well as personal powers such as determination, courage, ingenuity, perseverance, and discipline. (79: p. 293) Failing to take into consideration or underestimating the will power or the tactical ingenuity of an opponent, for example, diminishes the possibilities of not only achieving the end of the game (e.g., scoring more points), but also the possibilities for mutual testing. Challenging competition can mean that each athlete must extend his or her abilities and powers to match those

of the opponent. It is in this mutual broadening and extending of personal talents and abilities that individuals can achieve mutual satisfaction and can come to regard the competition as the "struggle with" rather than the "struggle against" an opponent.¹⁴ Hyland lends support to this idea when he argues that being "human" is essentially to be incomplete, to recognize incompleteness, and to attempt to overcome this incompleteness (39: p. 234). When competition is considered to be a "struggle with" an opponent, the opponent provides the stimulus and the opportunities to explore and "stretch" one's own abilities, perceptions, and capabilities. This is not to say that one cannot pit oneself against inanimate forces or objects as a way of creating challenges and testing one's prowess. It is to say that human beings present challenges and opportunities

¹⁴However, it is quite possible in competitive games for some athletes to regard the sport encounter not as a challenging contest but as a brute struggle for survival or superiority. In cases such as this, the opponent can come to be seen merely as an obstacle to be overcome. It would seem to follow from this that if winning was the sole concern for athletes, and opponents simply regarded each other as dangerous threats, then athletes would always choose inferior opponents. Overcoming the opponent as a obstacle in order to win would then become to sole purpose of the encounter. However, it is not often the case that athletes (apart from some athletes such as boxers leading up to a title challenge) purposely select inferior opponents. While conventions surrounding boxing, for example, allow the title holder to prepare for a major title defense by "tuning up" with several matches with much lesser skilled boxers, it is expected that eventually the title defense requires a match-up with a ranking (highly-skilled)opponent. In cases where an athlete did choose an inferior opponent (for whatever reason), the ensuing competition might not be considered by the public to be "good" (except in cases where the "underdog" opponent generates public interest.) It is also the case that sport events employing "handicapping" mechanisms or (age, weight, height or skill) categorization of players, prevent to a certain extent, the possibility of athletes competing at a "lower" level that would improve the likelihood of success.

to one another in a way that allows for mutual recognition and respect. It is the potential for reciprocal challenges, mutual recognition, and mutual fulfilment that clearly distinguishes the social form of this "struggle with" from its inanimate forms.

The "struggle with" another individual or group of individuals in an attempt to uncover and extend one's abilities and talents requires on the part of the individual a certain "responsive openness" (39: p. 225), that is, a willingness to open oneself up to the possibilities presented by the opponent. It also entails and requires an ongoing assessment of the opponent's actions in terms of the kind(s) of personal tactical responses that are required or are appropriate. Quite unlike the "device" structures of modern (rational-scientific) society, which have the effect of "disburdening" or disengaging human beings from personally effective action or social concern, the possibilities available in the sport contest can provide just the opposite. In contrast to the ambiguity of standards or values in everyday life, and the feelings of indifference or helplessness that may accompany them, sport provides a situation where what is at stake is clearly defined and individual actions within the sport are effective in settling the issue (1). This means that the sport contest provides a context where the standards of victory defeat and "good" play are quite clearly recognizable, and where personal efforts are seen to be relevant. For Esposito, opportunities for action in sport are not just possible courses of action but rather ones in which " . . . we have a stake through concern . . . ones in which failure (i.e.,

making mistakes) is an issue for us" (20: p. 178). In other words, on a particular day, in a particular game with its specific rules and conventions, and in response to the concrete opportunities for action presented by the opponent(s), personal athletic or strategic action will figure prominently in determining the outcome and the degree of personal disclosure.

Competition, rather than being considered a naked power struggle, can be considered an intense, highly spirited engagement between opponents to compare abilities and validate excellence. Commensurate opposition is a pre-condition that can promote the achievement of sport's aesthetic internal goods, ones that also turn out to be inclusive goods. In this sense competition offers athletes the opportunity to mutually extend or broaden personal skills and powers in a challenging environment. The "good" contest in this case can mean more than mutual disclosure and fulfilment; it can also mean the recognition, acknowledgment, and confirmation of the opponents as indispensable to the mutually challenging and disclosing action.

The arguments connecting sport's ethical and aesthetic inclusive internal goods to social freedom can be summarized in the following ways. The sport contest was shown to be based upon the voluntary acceptance of the constitutive rules to make the game possible, and also upon a set of social conventions and customs that regulate competition within the constituted game. Recognition and adherence to certain ethical and aesthetic standards of "good" play were shown to have a "world-gathering" force in so far as

participants have common standards of excellence against which the exercise of technical expertise can be guided, recognized, and assessed. The mutual recognition of, and adherence to, fairness as an internal good, and thus a standard regulating behaviour in sport as a social practice, was shown to produce several favourable outcomes: it can establish a framework for mutual expectations; it can promote mutual recognition and the development of complex emotions of trust and respect; it can validate the contest as a comparison of relative abilities; and it can affirm athletic excellence among members of the sporting community. The "good" contest in this ethical sense produces inclusive internal goods, which means they can be shared by all contestants (and spectators) regardless of who wins or loses.

It has also be shown that the "good" contest can be based upon the recognition, pursuit, and achievement of certain aesthetic internal goods. Commensurate opposition was shown to be a condition that can heighten the possibilities for close and challenging competition. This in turn was shown to contribute to the achievement of several inclusive goods: it can promote the mutual extending and broadening of concrete talents and powers; it can nurture a greater sensitivity among opponents to their respective concrete personal skills and powers; and it can enhance mutual recognition and respect for the valuable challenges provided by the opponent. Rather than being considered a socially divisive force, "good" competition can be viewed as a factor promoting and intensifying the possibilities sport holds out for mutual

inspiration, engagement, disclosure, and recognition. It is within a community of practitioners guided by these ethical and aesthetic standards of excellence that inclusive internal goods and thus social freedom in the practice can be pursued and achieved. In contrast to liberal, free-market institutions, where individuals can be personally or socially "disburdened," and where social relations are largely impersonal, indifferent, or hostile, sport offers the opportunity to engage and test one's abilities and powers in personally and socially fulfilling ways.

Relations in Teams

While the case for social freedom in sport up to this point has focused on competitive relations, the relations among teammates in a competitive situation are also noteworthy. A major obstacle to overcome in making sense of social freedom in competitive relations was clarifying how mutual or inclusive benefits could be achieved while contestants were pursuing an end (i.e., winning), the achievement of which excludes one contestant. It might be expected that the case for social freedom in team relations will be easier to establish given that individual athletes recognize and struggle to achieve a common goal. Yet, here too, understanding team relations in terms of social freedom is not unproblematic. What must be overcome is the tendency to explain sport behaviour in either abstract, functionalist terms or in strictly individualist ones. That is, on the functionalist account, individual behaviour is largely thought to be the product of the determining influence of social structures, while on the individualist account, social

formations are largely thought to be voluntary associations that represent the individual interests and actions of its members. It was shown in Chapter II that, when applied to the issue of social freedom, the conditioning effect of (rational-scientific) institutions was underestimated, while the voluntaristic nature of social was overestimated. If applied to sport, this means that the explanation of sport team action can be reduced either to abstract team functions and strategies or else to voluntaristic athletic efforts. It is difficult, if not impossible, on such accounts to attribute a concrete social "being" to team behaviour, that is, a social "being" that marks the affirmation of the social in the individual and the individual in the social.

The purpose of this section is to explore the possibility that the social relations that constitute the sport team in action can be linked to social freedom. The social "being" of a sport team will be examined in such a way that team success cannot be discussed without referring at the same time to individual freedom, and individual freedom and initiative cannot be articulated without referring to common goals, mutual recognition, and reciprocity. Rather than being mediated by structures, mechanisms, and conditions that create and reinforce personal ineffectiveness or social indifference, the sport team will be examined in terms of its potential to promote empowering relations among teammates. Standards of "good" team play will also be assessed in terms of its potential to encourage reciprocity (i.e., mutual recognition and facilitation) and the broadening and extending of personal talents and powers in mutually fulfilling ways. In

order for social relations and the social "being" of a sport team to be thought of in terms of social freedom, they must be shown to be concrete, personal, and social, even while the social practice operates within capitalist institutions embodying different, if not antithetical, social values and relations.

When referring to a sport team as a "social practice," it is important to recognize not only the formal properties of the association but also the conditions and forces that effect the type and degrees of social interaction. Sport team action involves joint or collaborative behaviour toward a common goal; there is not only a common interest or goal but also a recognition and facilitation of member's efforts as each contributes to the achievement of a common goal. This means that the dynamics of a sport team, and the type of social freedom to be found in social practices, cannot be fully understood if the inquiry is limited to formal team structures or strategies, or simply to individual athletic actions. Sport team action (in such highly differentiated sports such as football, basketball, lacrosse, volleyball, rugby, hockey, baseball, etc.,) are typically understood in terms of abstract, ideal team strategies and functions or in terms of the relative particularity and completeness of concrete, individual actions. In other words, explanation of sport action tends to emphasize either the determining character of team functions and strategies or else the voluntaristic character of individual action. For the purpose of understanding social freedom in sport, it is necessary to recognize more than just the abstract "being" of a team and the relative sovereignty of the individual

athlete. It is also worthwhile to consider a third dimension, one related to the concrete, particular social "being" of the team in action. This third dimension relates to the interpersonal or intersubjective totality, that is, to how individuals, acting in terms of "we," strive to achieve the team's objectives. In the following, each of these dimensions will be addressed in more detail.

Abstract Team "Being"

Referring to a team as an abstract social unit means considering it in terms of predefined structures and functions. Stripped bare of its subjective elements, the intelligibility of the team lies in how individual functions are defined and how they are combined together (in abstract or ideal terms) to fulfill team strategies and objectives. This requires, first, an understanding of the constitutive rules of the game. Not only do the constitutive rules of a sport act in such a way as to rule out more effective in favour of less effective means, they also act to distinguish particular sports from one another. Each sport is distinguished not only in terms of the goal to be achieved or the obstacles to be overcome, but also in terms of the basic motor skill(s) and implement(s) to be employed. The constitutive rules of soccer, for example, stipulate that the ball is to be propelled by body parts other than the hands (except by goalkeepers, or players putting the ball back into play from the sidelines). The relevance of this seemingly obvious point is that the rules proscribe certain actions, yet, there are numerous ways that the athlete can choose to manoeuvre

and propel the ball within the rules. So the acceptance of the constitutive rules not only brings into being an activity that wouldn't be possible otherwise, but it also provides a context for the possibility of demonstrating various sport-specific athletic and strategic manoeuvres.

While the constitutive rules define what counts as winning and what means are permissible in order to achieve the game's end, there are a host of possible team strategies that can be created and employed within these rules to achieve the game's end. Styles of team play vary; yet, they may be also constrained by team traditions (e.g., Oakland/Los Angeles Raiders' "intimidation" style of defense) or by rational-scientific coaching "systems". In either case, the "being" of the team can be reducible to a predefined tradition or "system," the athletes themselves being considered only the bearers of such systems. If the intelligibility of the team is limited to the structure of team "game plans" (i.e., strategies) and how athletes are trained to mechanically reproduce such plans, then it is not surprising to find sport critics (e.g., Brohm, Rigauer, and Beamish) claiming that sport is a replica of the rational-scientific or cybernetic organization of labour under capitalism. The practice of coaches admonishing players to "not think just do" promotes the impression that the functioning of a sport team requires little more than the subordination of the thinking or feeling individual to the dictates of the team's strategic system. Sartre (75) has shown that this type of social organization represents the "collective," an alienated type of social formation where the "being" of the gathering

precedes and thus defines participant roles and relations. Adherence to a "game plan" in sport may define what is needed to be done in order to achieve the team's common objective, but if it is thought of as an inflexible blueprint for action, then it confines athletes to atomized, yet mechanically integrated roles. This, in turn, has the effect of uniting athletes only in an external manner and requires on the part of members little more than that each "do one's job." If the intelligibility of sport team action is limited in this way, so too will the notion of freedom that corresponds to it. While Guttman (30) argues that the voluntary submission to rational-scientific form is a type of "positive" freedom, in other words, one where individual choices and possibilities are expanded through co-operation, critics such as Rigauer (72) and Brohm (9) argue otherwise. For them, in spite of the concessions they make, the "structural co-operation" of team activity along rational-scientific lines indicates the increasing subordination of the athlete to a "system" that diminishes the individual and social possibilities of freedom. Yet, Guttman, Rigauer, and Brohm's respective views of the social freedom that is thought to exist or not to exist in sport were shown to be deficient. This can be attributed to their tendency to focus on the structural properties of social formations rather than on the potential dynamics of the interpersonal relations themselves.

Not only will the intelligibility of the sport team be limited on this view, but so too will the practical effectiveness of the team if such a view is put into practice. Weiss states:

if there is too great a submission to the conditions of play - when a team, for example, is completely guided by

a game book, by coaches on the side line, or by traditions it has long cherished - it will be prompted to act inappropriately at times. The players and their direct interactions will tend to be disconnected. Distinct, atomized ways will be the norm, bolstered by the hope that they will somehow mesh together (87: p. 50).

In other words, if athletes regard themselves simply as discrete, functional units, or they regard their interactions as requiring a rigid faithfulness to a predetermined strategic plan, then it will be difficult for athletes to recognize and conduct themselves as an effective team. "Good" team play requires more than just "doing one's job," for very often athletes are called upon to improvise in order to cover a teammate's error or to take advantage of teammate's (or opponent's) manoeuvre(s). While this notion will be discussed in more detail below, it does point to the possibility that athletes, like other practitioners, can exercise "judgement" with respect to the exercise of their technical expertise.

Team Member Sovereignty

What is required to bolster this account of team action is some recognition that athletes, while constrained or guided by common team objectives, have a certain sovereignty within their defined role on the team. While the individual athlete is defined by a particular role or function, and while this function circumscribes to a certain extent the responsibilities and actions of the athlete, both Sartre (75) and Weiss (87) concur that the intelligibility of sport team action cannot be exhausted by reference to team objectives, structures, and functions. In the case of a football team, Sartre states:

. . . the action of every player is predetermined as an indefinite possibility by function, that is to say, in relation to a future objective which can realize itself only through an organized multiplicity of technical activities. Thus, function is for every member a relation to the objective as a totality to be totalized. In the match, every common individual will, in the light of the group's objective, effect a practical synthesis (orientation, schematic determination of possibilities, of difficulties, etc.) of the field in its present particularities (mud, perhaps, or wind, etc.); in this way he tries to make himself generally prepared for the specific characteristics of the match (75: p. 456).

An individual athlete is first defined abstractly as a "common" individual by virtue of a particular role or function (e.g., wide receiver) and how that role is interconnected with those of other athletes (e.g., quarterback, running backs, and the offensive line) in the overall group scheme (e.g., offensive team strategy). In other words, athletes are first "common" by virtue of their predetermined functions and the extent to which these functions are organized functionally (i.e., strategically) to fulfill overall team objectives. However, team functions and strategies do not exhaust the range of athletic or tactical actions available to the player. While certain attributes of the team (e.g., formal functions or strategies) can be specified independently of the actors, others cannot. It is the individual who must execute the sport-specific running, throwing, catching, kicking, or other motor skills based on his or her assessment of conditions, actions, and determinations of possible courses of action. In other words, a formal "game plan" is an abstract, empty structure without it being enlivened by the action of individual athletes.

To say that a structure or function cannot materialize without the efforts and initiatives of individual athletes is not to state anything profound, for how else can team functions be realized? More importantly, in contrast to a rationalized labour process, where individual action is narrowly circumscribed within specific roles and monitored according to pre-established standards and rates of production, function in team sport defines only the abstract possibility of undertaking particular actions. The general organization of team functions and strategies toward the achievement of the team's common goal presupposes individual actions, personal struggles, and the demonstration of physical and strategic prowess. Between two moments of objectivity, that is, between the two moments when the individual is defined as "common" (e.g., by virtue of a predefined team function and the sought-after team objective) there will be numerous situations produced or acted on by the athlete. The main point here is that the team strategy can be accomplished in a number of ways: during the contest each individual is responsible for organizing the practical field in light of the team strategy and also on the basis of the contingencies of the action itself.

Not only is there diversity in the types of strategies and tactics that can be employed, there are also many variations as to how each of the strategies and tactics can be executed. This suggests that athletes can personalize or individualize their techniques, powers, and tactics. Athletes need to acquire and master certain technical skills so that they become, in a sense, "automatic," but athletes still need to acquire a sense of

"judgement" with respect to the execution of these technical skills in concrete circumstances. It is at this level that the athletic performance cannot be thought of simply as a mechanical replication of a pre-determined function or "game-plan." As much as practice sessions can generally prepare athletes for the contingencies of the sport contest, it is only in the contest itself that the athlete can confront the equally personalized or individualized tactics and strategies of the opponent. It is at this level, either shoulder-to-shoulder "in-the trenches," or "one-on-one" in the open field that athletes put their personal stamps on their efforts.

It is in this sense that Sartre (75) claims that the individual has a certain "sovereignty" over the skills and tactics associated with a particular athletic playing position. A player's repertoire of tactics, his or her "bag of tricks," if you will, indicate not only what the athlete has developed and mastered, but also that which can be brought to bear in the sport contest when he or she is called upon to personally surpass one or a number of opponents. The athlete employs these tactics in a reactive and also in a pro-active manner. This means that the athlete has to be able to maintain a "responsive openness," in other words, an alertness and ability to respond to the opportunities for action presented by the opponent(s). This requires on the part of the athlete a certain preparation beforehand to estimate the competitive playing strengths of the opposition, and it also requires the ability to respond to the frequent unanticipated challenges and opportunities presented by the opponent in the course of play. Just as important, and at times

more important, is the ability of the athlete to "set the pace," maintain the "momentum," or control the tempo of the sport action. This can involve the employment of various tactical sequences, tactical combinations, and feinting techniques in order to mislead the opponent during specific manoeuvres or to generally keep the opposition "off-balance." Having achieved a team objective through the execution of a particular manoeuvre (e.g., a wide receiver catching a touchdown pass), the individual athlete " . . . must have triumphed, through his personal qualities, over another individual . . . " (75: p. 459), yet " . . . the moment of freedom has to be passed over in silence, since it would negate the team if it were to posit itself for itself" (75: p. 460). This suggests that the moment of individual freedom is a relevant factor in understanding the social "being" of a team.

Unlike a rational-scientifically organized labour process that narrowly defines individual function, and unlike a "device" structure where individuals are "disburdened" from personal effort and responsibility, the athlete can still be responsible for the manner in which concrete personal skills are exercised in response to similar potentialities in the opponent. However, if the act of individual freedom is taken out of the context of how the individual is defined as "common" within the larger outlines of team strategies, then the practical effectiveness of the team can be jeopardized, and the social "being" of the team can be largely misunderstood or neglected. Weiss lends support for this view:

What will perhaps not be readily seen or allowed by most in the United States - Eastern bloc countries, in

contrast, are inclined to insist on it - is the contention that a unit team, the complex of individuals and the conditions which enable them to be and function together, can act and be acted on. Only individual players, it might be said, can act; only they can be observed, trained, or paid. No team can run down the field, tackle, or throw the ball - in fact do anything at all. Still it is a team that wins or loses; it is a team that is penalized; it is a team that is the topic of a strategy; it is a team that continues to play while the players replace one another; it is a team to which the score and the season's wins and losses are credited (88: p. 50).

If the "social" being of a team were explained by starting with individualistic or voluntaristic premises, then it can appear consistent with certain liberal notions of social freedom. In Guttman's case, individual freedoms (i.e., choices and opportunities) are expanded through voluntary co-operation. The "co-operative individualism" that Guttman speaks of also appears consistent with the notion of "private" society critiqued by Rawls. In this case, the team could be regarded as a stock of instrumentalities that can be employed by each athlete simply to secure their private interests. In "private" society, individuals are not defined as "common" nor do they realize their "commonality" through their individual initiatives. Rather, private individuals realize their private aims, or affirm themselves as individuals, through their voluntary associations. For Novak (65), baseball represents the myth of America: individualism, limited social commitment, and respect for law and order. It is different game to, say, football:

Baseball is a Lockean game, a kind of contract theory in ritual form, a set of atomic individuals who assent to

patterns of limited cooperation in their mutual interest. "Fair play" characterizes baseball more than it does football (65: p. 59).

Baseball teams, if understood in this way, are collections of individuals who act serially to produce team action; they are integrated not so much by each other but by the web of rules that informs play.

The argument up to this point has established that individual athletes are defined to a certain extent by function, and that the functions of all team members are coordinated to fulfill (ideal) team strategies. However, these team functions do not exhaust the range of individual possibilities for action open to the athlete. The individual within a team is still contesting with an opponent in such a way that the team strategies can be achieved only as a result of a series of individual initiatives and tactics. This requires a certain sense of "judgement" in the development, selection, and employment of tactics within overall team strategies, and in light of the possibilities presented by opponents. It is clear that the intelligibility of team action can be partially established by reference to abstract team functions and strategies and to individual struggles and initiatives, but it is certainly not limited to them. It is also clear that several liberal assumptions about social life and social freedom underlie these (limited) views of the team, and the relation of the individual to the team. Yet, these views cannot account for how individual team members realize a common social "being" through their individual acts of freedom within the contest.

Social "Being" of Teams

To understand the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of affirming the social in the individual and the individual in the social (as the basis of social freedom) is made especially difficult by the limited vocabulary available to articulate such social action. The language of individualism and the language of structuralism produce accounts of social action that reinforce the dichotomies between the individual and the social. Cooper argues that understanding the sense of "we," when applied to social relations, is obscured by dichotomies such as egoism/altruism, I-desires/non-I desires, self/other, and drives of the self/external justification of morality (11). In other words, discussions about social relations very often focus on the distinction between choices based upon the satisfaction of drives, needs, or interests and those based upon social obligation or duty. If left with an "either-or" vocabulary of egoism and altruism, for example, then it will be difficult to capture the meaning of situations where individuals are neither entirely self-oriented, nor entirely oriented towards others. Cooper suggests the phrase "self-in-association-with-others" as a way of capturing this dialectical relation:

. . . when a person associates himself with others there is a form of reasoning with him that appeals to his feelings of group solidarity, rather than his selfish demands or strictly moral considerations.

It is a common experience in cooperative sports to do things that one would not do if one were concerned solely with one's own welfare (11: p. 68).

The notion of "self-in-association-with-others" has implications for the understanding of team relations when in action. The voluntarism/structuralism and the individual freedom/common good dichotomies used to frame the social freedom in sport issue may not be sensitive enough to capture all the features of a team's social "being." What is required to further understand team action, and thus the social freedom thought to exist in sport, is an understanding of how "common" individual team members interact in light of overall team strategies and objectives. In the "good" team effort it is not enough that the athlete attempt to achieve team objectives through independent individual action, for very often the possibility of demonstrating individual skills and powers is facilitated (or hindered) by the actions of teammates. On this, Sartre argues:

From the moment when the real struggle begins, his individual actions (though they require initiative, daring, skill and speed, as well as discipline) no longer appear meaningful apart from those of the other members of his team (in so far, of course, as each team is also defined by the other) - not only in the abstract, in so far as each function presupposes the organization of all functions, but also in the very contingency of the concrete, in so far as a particular player's slip or clumsiness at a particular point strictly conditions the movement of another player (or, all the others) and gives it a teleological meaning which can be understood by the other players (and, though this is incidental here, by the spectators) (75: p. 457).

This requires on the part of an athlete not just the ability to mechanically replicate a game plan, or just the ability to "do one's job," but also to show a certain sensitivity and responsiveness to the anticipated but never entirely predictable teammates' (and

opponents) actions. This view is also expressed by Weiss:

Because the end to which one athlete is committed is the end for the others as well, what each does has a bearing on that at which all aim. If a player does not understand and anticipate what others might do with reference to the very end which all of them seek to realize, he will not be able to take advantage of the support that his teammates provide, or will overlook the opposition which his opponents might offer (88: p. 56).

The course of team play is determined by the ability of each athlete to combine his or her own initiatives with those of others to facilitate one's own or one's teammate's ability to contribute to the achievement of the team's objectives. In the course of the sport action the athlete is constantly making assessments and determinations as to how the play is unfolding and how these events (e.g., the actions of teammates and opponents) can be either incorporated or acted upon such that the team strategy can be fulfilled. In other words, the athletes act not only in light of function and strategies but also in terms of the concrete outcomes produced in the course of play. Based on the internalization of the strategic scheme, the soccer player, for example, assesses which individual (including possibly him/herself) is in the best strategic position to receive the ball, and then undertakes what action is deemed necessary to place the ball or oneself in the best strategic position to be effective. This requires on the part of the athlete more than just a mastery of the technical (athletic) skills but also a sense of "judgement;" as Lasch (49) points out, this requires a sense of timing and proportion with respect to the exercise of technical expertise. This means that the athlete must have a

sensitivity or "feel" for the larger scheme of things (i.e., strategies) within which individual actions take place, for the meaning of the ongoing action as it unfolds, and for how possibilities for further action can be taken advantage of or created. At various times during the sport action the advancing of team objectives requires a "sacrifice" on the part of one or several athletes to ensure that the athlete in the best strategic position receives the ball. It is understood that, since each athlete is defined as "common" (i.e., as embodying the overall team strategy), certain sacrifices have to be made by all. These sacrifices, it should be noted, are not made to individuals as private individuals but as "common" individuals who will, in turn, act in a judicious manner to advance the team objectives.

It should be noted also that such "altruism" can become counter-productive if individual athletes do not take advantage of the opportunities for action presented by teammates. For example, the experience among basketball players of passing the ball "one-too-many" times while moving close or under the opponent's basket can at times prove awkward and ineffective. Assessing when to "sacrifice" and when to personally take advantage of a strategic opportunity must always be considered in light of one's own and one's teammate's role and actions as "common" with respect to realizing a team strategy. The acquisition of such powers of "judgement" requires on the part of teammates a considerable amount of time engaging in the sport together, and a high degree of sensitivity to each other's tendencies, habits, idiosyncratic styles, strengths, and

weaknesses. Through experience, athletes develop an intuitive "feel" for the movements of their teammates, so much so that at times coordinated team actions do appear "automatic." However "automatic" or mechanical such team synchronicity may seem, it must be remembered that the attempts to realize team strategies (especially in a contesting situation) always occur in the context of anticipated but never predictable teammate (and opponent's) actions. Recall Rigauer's concessions that in the contest in the "moment" of truth, the rational analysis disappears and possibilities are presented for alternative courses of action (72: pp. 21, 33, 37, 52-53). Teams act on what they (and opponents) produce; the variety of situations and outcomes produced in the course of play suggests that the realization of team strategies cannot occur in a mechanical way, nor exactly in the same way each time.

While the examples above relate to competitive team sports that involve direct interaction between opposing teams, the notion of "common" individuals interacting to achieve a common objective is not limited to them. For example, a mountain-climbing team may not compete with other teams, and if they do, it is not in a direct, interactive manner. In spite of this, climbing team members need to develop "judgement" with respect to the exercise of skills and powers in concrete circumstances. While members of a climbing team need not have to deal with the obstacles or challenges presented directly by opponents, they still have to harmonize their respective talents and powers in the face of the concrete contingencies of the climb (e.g., rock faces, weather conditions, etc.). Not only do these athletes

have to respond to what can be changing natural conditions, they also, in a similar manner to any team, respond to the actions they produce (e.g., accidents, ingenious belay techniques, etc.). Meier contends that the "life and death" nature of this activity can unite team members and foster open, direct, and undistorted communication. Meaningful self-testing and communication in a climb which involves mutual interdependence and reciprocity can produce a type of social unity that Meier refers to as the "kinship of the rope" (60).¹⁵

While the type of "judgement" acquired and expressed in the examples above can be considered a "good" internal to the activity itself, there exist other "goods," that, when realized in sport action, can contribute to the notion of social freedom in sport. Much like the symphony orchestra performance that exemplifies social unity for Rawls (71), the individual talents and powers of teammates must not only be harmonized and synchronized, but they must also be balanced and complementary. The notions of balance and complementarity have implications not only for the practical effectiveness of the team, but also in terms of the social freedom that can be said to exist in teams. It is often the case that a particular team tactic will highlight the abilities and powers of one

¹⁵Meier does add, however, that an existentially "superior" form of interpersonal communication would focus less on the immediate concreteness of the situation and the significance of task fulfilment to the relationship, and more on the ability of individuals to mutually stimulate, assist, and support the discovery and expansion of their fullest, most unique potentialities for their own sake. Despite the narrower focus of the "kinship of the rope," it still offers a promising alternative to the tedious occupations and impersonal social relations prevalent in everyday existence (60).

or a small number of players within a team, but it is not possible that every individual performance will be highlighted at the same time all of the time. In a similar way to a symphony orchestra, the demonstration of excellence in team sport requires that individuals (or small groups) sometimes play a prominent and, at other times, a more supportive role. However, the sport team faces problems that would likely be inconceivable to a symphony orchestra performer. That is, while the sport team attempts to coordinate and harmonize its constituent members to execute a team strategy, it must attempt to do so in the face of concerted opposition attempting to thwart it. Some team sports (e.g., mountain climbing) do not involve direct ("face-to-face") interactions with other teams, yet they still attempt to coordinate actions in the face of the obstacles encountered by natural forces (e.g., rock faces, wind, rain, etc.). In the cases where there is a high degree of face-to-face interaction among members of opposing teams, the notions of harmony, balance, and complementarity are more fluid, but no less important to "good" team play. Moreover, the notions of balance and complementarity have special connotations when applied to team strategies.

To be successful, the sport team cannot always depend solely on the raw athletic skills of its members; it must also rely to a large extent on tactical and strategic ingenuity and execution. Tactical and strategic ingenuity is very often centered on producing and maintaining strategic unpredictability of outcome. This means that keeping the opposition "off-balance" or "guessing" as to what tactical or strategic manoeuvre will be employed is a fundamental

strategem for much of offensive and defensive team play. This feature of team play is not only expedient in terms of achieving group objectives (e.g., scoring more points than the opposition), it is especially conducive to mutual recognition, mutual reliance, and reciprocal, complementary action among teammates. A team that employs the same strategies in the same sequences, or that continually emphasizes the talents of one or a small number of players, will find that, inevitably, the opposition will make adjustments to its respective offensive and defensive strategies in order to neutralize the heavily relied-upon individual or strategy.

Keeping the opponent "off-balance" and "guessing" by combining strategies and tactics in order to make its actions unpredictable is often the key to team success. Examples to support this notion are not hard to come by: they range from "pick-off" plays in baseball, "misdirection," "play-action" passes and "blitzing" in football, to multiple spikers in volleyball, to presses, zones, and "man-to-man" variations and combinations in basketball. A "balanced" attack, or a balanced defense, often means employing a full range of offensive or defensive tactics throughout the course of the game. While a co-ordinated team effort is required on each play, balanced team play can also mean the continuous shifting of emphasis among individuals (or small groups) throughout the contest. Taken together, diversity in play selection and player emphasis can create the impression that any athlete (or small group) could be a potential threat to the opponent at any time. Maintaining this diversity is equivalent to the strategic unpredictability largely sought after by sport teams.

In a balanced team effort, the "sacrifices" made by team members are reciprocal and thus complementary.

Complementarity also means that athletes involved in the execution of a strategy demonstrate their talents and powers convincingly (especially in a decoy role). If an athlete only "goes through the motions" during the execution of a particular group tactic, this can diminish the likelihood of team success. For example, in "double pump" and "shoot set" tactics in volleyball, each "spiker" must execute the specific spiking manoeuvre as if he or she was the intended spiker on the play. A "half-hearted" effort by one of the two spikers might alert the defending team to the "real" intentions of the tactic, in which case a suitable defensive response could be mounted. An "attacking" manoeuvre in team cycling, for example, needs to be persuasively aggressive if the "true colours" of the opposition's abilities and tactics are to be revealed. In this way, the responsibility of "each for all" and the contribution of "all to each" can be heightened.

Also relevant to the effectiveness of concerted team action are the strategems of "playing to win" versus "playing not to lose." In the latter case, a team becomes very conservative in its play selection or employment of tactics, very often as a way of protecting a lead. In this case, athletes and teams resort to those plays or tactics with the highest probability of success. This, of course, minimizes the possibilities for error and the opportunities these errors may present for the opposition to regain lost momentum or scoring potential. "Playing it safe" can have the effect of

protecting a lead, but at times, it can also act to stifle the lead-producing exercise of skills, enthusiasm, ingenuity, momentum, and effectiveness of the team in the first place. In contrast to this conservative team strategy is the "playing-to-win" approach. This entails more than just a concerted attempt to score more points than the opposition. It has been argued above that the player's role is only the abstract possibility of undertaking certain actions; yet, through "responsive openness" to teammates (and opponents), athletes can mutually extend or broaden their sporting prowess. "Playing to win" means engaging and "stretching" the full range of individual talents and team powers to be effective. This does not mean that a team proceeds with reckless abandon; it suggests rather that teams express "controlled exuberance" in the exercise of "judgement" (49: p. 68). It also means, as MacIntyre suggest, " . . . we have to be prepared to take whatever self-endangering risks are demanded along the way . . . (53: p. 191). In other words, the team is encouraged to welcome (manageable) risks as a way of "stretching" their capacities to excel. Rather than restricting the potential of the team, the "playing-to-win" approach entails a courageous commitment to a style of play that expands the depth and breadth of team abilities and powers.

It has been demonstrated that the intelligibility of a sport team is impoverished if it is limited to abstract team functions or to isolated individual actions. To better understand the team in action required a shift away from individualist and structuralist presuppositions and vocabulary concerning the nature of social

relations in teams. This shifted the focus to the social "being" of a team, that is, to the region where the individual is affirmed in the social and the social is affirmed in the individual. It is here where social freedom was shown to flourish. The reconciliation of the individual and the social in these instances stems from the possibility that individual athletes, defined as "common" by virtue of their predefined role in team strategies, can develop, engage, and test their personal abilities and powers in manifestly intersubjective ways. This means that concrete, personal actions mediate, and are mediated by, the expected but never entirely predictable actions of teammates (and opponents). In other words, the common team strategies and objectives are "lived" through the personal struggles and initiatives of team members as they seek to recognize and facilitate one another in the execution of team strategies. Rather than being mediated by industrial, bureaucratic, or commercial mechanisms and conditions that can promote personal ineffectiveness, atomization, and social indifference, the "good" team effort was shown to heighten active engagement and the development and exercise of mutual recognition, "judgement," "responsive openness," responsibility, and facilitation. These internal goods of the social practice also found their expression in the strategically valuable conditions of team balance, complementarity, and "playing to win." The dynamics of sport teams was shown to center around certain standards of excellence that, when achieved, promote mutual recognition, development, and fulfilment. The standards of excellence are intelligible only in sport terms, and

their pursuit or achievement establishes or re-affirms a social "being." The effect of this is to reinforce the claim that the possibilities for freedom in sport are social possibilities, even though the practice of sport operates within liberal, free-market institutional life. While the case for social freedom, up to this point, has been linked to opponents and to teammates in competitive (i.e., contesting) situations, the following section addresses the issue of social freedom with respect to spectators of the contest.

Sport Spectator Relations

Part of what it means to engage in a social practice is the acquisition and extension of personal talents with reference to the recognized standards of excellence of the social practice in question. This requires on the part of the individual not only the development of technical expertise, but also a sense of "judgement" with respect to the application of the technical skills. When the notion of social practice was applied to sport, it was shown that the recognition, pursuit, and achievement of certain ethical and aesthetic goods internal to the practice produced benefits that can be shared by all participants. In terms of competitive relations between opponents, the "good" sports contest engaged and extended the concrete, personal talents and powers of athletes in ways that promoted mutual recognition and disclosure. In cooperative relations among teammates, the "good" sport contest meant the coordination of personal abilities and initiatives in ways that promoted mutual recognition, facilitation, reciprocity, and fulfilment. It now

remains to examine the relationship of the spectator(s) to the social practice of sport. There will be two main issues to be explored in this regard. First, partisanship, as a type of social relation among spectators, will be examined in terms of its links to the social practice of sport. Second, knowledgeable spectatorship will be investigated in terms of its effects on social relations and social freedom in the practice of sport.

Partisan Spectatorship

Given the pressing needs and obligations associated with material survival, mass participation in sport is indeed a strange phenomenon. Stranger still is the phenomenon of mass sport spectatorism. In light of the value attached to the instrumental, pragmatic, and productive features of life, it might at first be difficult to explain the vast public attention and energy devoted to engaging in or witnessing games. Yet, there is no denying that sport has a significant place in modern Western culture:

Agriculture, manufacture, and business play a much larger role in our economy than is possible to sport, though, of course, sport is not without economic importance. The economically more important enterprises, however, do not often arouse the full attention of most men. Rarely do they enter into men's daily disputes or lay claim to basic loyalties in a way or to the degree that sport does. It is sport that catches the interest and elicits the devotion of both the young and the old, the wise and the foolish, the educated and the uneducated (88: p. 9).

The enthusiasm for sport by the spectator can be attributed to a number of factors, some of which include the vicarious thrill of victory, the close contest, and the witnessing and vicarious sharing of athletic excellence. If sport is viewed as a social practice, and

social practices are centered on the pursuit and achievement of internal goods, then it should be possible to gauge how spectatorism relates to the pursuit or achievement of these internal goods. The enthusiasm and camaraderie exhibited by sport spectators can often center on their affiliation with one team or the other, and on their desire to see that team succeed. Owing to the contesting nature of many sports, that is, their ability to pit opposing individuals or teams against one another to determine superiority, it is not uncommon for spectators to align themselves with their favorite individual athlete(s) or team. For many reasons that have little or nothing to do with sport as such, the spectators' affiliation with the contestants and the importance attached to the outcome of the contest can be heightened. That is, athletes or teams may come to be seen as representatives of various ethnic, economic class, municipal, regional, or national interests or groups. When sport comes to be valued for these instrumental or external goods, very often the achievement of the end of winning is paramount for the partisan supporters. In these cases the importance of victory can at times overshadow the features of sport (as a social practice) that highlight performance quality.

The rallying of the public behind a team in this exoteric manner can be likened to Sartre's "fused group." That is, the perception of a common danger or threat can set in motion a process where individuals come to develop a recognition of themselves as having a common identity and focus of attention. In other words, while the link to a sport team may provide a focus of public

attention and may provide a sense of common identity for a community, the experience of supporting the "home" team must also be understood in terms of the team it is opposed to. The social unity that can be generated for the "in-group" is in part due to a recognizable and perhaps threatening "out-group." This, in turn, means that the social unity of the opposing groups is bolstered to the extent that divisiveness and tension are maintained or heightened between them. Social unity in a chauvinistic guise can thus find fertile soil in the sport contest. While it may be the case that sport can act as a stage for opposing supporters to vent their collective frustrations on and against others, or to inflame existing non-sport rivalries, or to feel a sense of common identity, these factors are all considerations external to sport as such. Taken to extremes, rabid partisanship can overshadow those goods considered to be internal to sport. However, despite these excesses, few human endeavors are capable of generating such identification.

Knowledgeable Spectatorism

In spite of the divisiveness that can be produced by rabid partisanship, opposing partisan supporters can be united by elements of the "good" sports contest. One such element is the close contest. Both the antagonistic and the unifying elements of the close contest are captured well in Davis's following account of a football match between Yale and Princeton:

It was obviously easy after that to argue that if the Tigers had scored twice in ten minutes they could score at least once more . . . or even snatch a victory out of defeat. And at the thought of this the yells redoubled, and the air shook, and every play, good, bad or

indifferent, was greeted with shouts of encouragement that felt like blows of a whip on one side and tasted like wine to the other. People forgot for a few precious minutes to think about themselves, they enjoyed the rare sensation of being carried completely away by something outside of themselves, and the love of a fight, or a struggle, or combat, or whatever else you choose to call it, rose in everyone's breast and choked him until he had either to yell and get rid of it or suffocate (cited in 15: p. 271).

While the close contest can create challenging situations for athletes to test their talents and powers, it can also have a suspenseful, dramatic appeal for vicariously involved spectators.

Other examples where dramatic tension can exist in sport include:

the immanent collision of players in football, the loose ball on the (basketball, netball) court, the loose (hockey) puck in front of the net, the last-second (football) field goal, the (soccer) corner or penalty kick, the double-pump (volleyball) spike, the (baseball) squeeze play or attempted stolen base. In each of these cases there exists the heightening of anticipation before the resolution of dramatic tension. In the course of play momentum and fortunes can change; heroic effort sometimes bring triumph and elation, at other times, failure and agony. All these, to mention only a few features, are what epic stories or suspense thrillers are made of.

Yet, in sport, the action is all too human. Kaelin notes,

The game itself considered as an aesthetic object is perceived as a tense experience in which pressure is built up from moment to moment sustained through continuous opposition, until the climax of victory or defeat. The closer this climax occurs to the end of the game, the stronger is our feeling of its qualitative uniqueness. Sudden death play-offs and perhaps extra-inning games, are as close as a sport may come to achieving this aesthetic ideal (43: p. 329).

These examples recall the point made in the first section of this chapter regarding the close contest as an element of the "good" contest: athletes have open to them a distinct world where the standards of victory and defeat are clearly defined, and individual action is effective in settling the issue. In other words, there is a clarity and a heightened sense of potency in the close contest. While these features are considered to be relevant for both the player and the spectator, there is a special appeal for the spectator:

The delightful opportunity this spectacle affords those who know the intricacies of the game should not be underestimated. We men crave to pass final judgments upon things and often we make fools of ourselves by doing so, but in the midst of the translucent game we are in that delightful situation of being able to estimate with some accuracy the ultimate worth of actions and men (1: p. 186).

While it may be the case that opposing fans can be divided with respect to their affiliations and support, it is still the case that spectators (even opposing spectators) can recognize and appreciate the "good" contest in these aesthetic terms. It should be noted that in this case the aesthetic goods are internal to the activity itself and have the potential to be inclusive or shared by spectators.

In addition to the aesthetic appreciation of the close contest, the spectators can also be united with respect to the recognition and appreciation of athletic or strategic excellence. Weiss argues that performance excellence, whether it be in the arts, sciences, or sport excites and interests human beings " . . . because it reveals to us the magnitude of what then can be done" (88: p. 3).

This means that as much as human beings recognize their deficiencies and limitations, they still seek out excellence and appreciate it where it can be found. Athletes are recognized not only for their ability to achieve excellence as individuals; they also symbolically represent the collective pursuit and achievement of excellence:

So far as we see the athlete to be a splendid epitomization of man we look at him and his performance objectively, de-emphasizing what he is as an individual. At the same time we feel as though we ourselves had personally achieved something. By representing us, the athlete makes all of us be vicariously completed men. We cannot but be pleased by what such a representative man achieves (88: p. 14).

In this sense, spectating is both a witnessing of athletic excellence and a vicarious sharing of that excellence. Athletic excellence reveals not just what the individual can be; rather, it is a revelation of what humans can collectively aspire to be and achieve.

The vicarious involvement in, and appreciation of, the close contest and athletic excellence indicate sport's potential to promote the achievement of its inclusive internal goods. To make the claim that sport has the potential to unite spectators in these ways is to presuppose that spectators are not just familiar with, but knowledgeable with respect to, the intricacies of play and the standards of "good" play. To recognize and appreciate athletic expertise and "judgement" also requires the exercise of "judgement" on the part of the spectator. The acquisition and exercise of "judgement" on the part of both athletes and spectators can have a bearing on the type of relationship that exists between the two groups. As Lasch argues (49: p. 85), the exercise of "judgement" in

a social practice entails, in part, a sense of "controlled exuberance" with respect to how individual effort and expertise fit into the larger scheme of the activity. This means that the practitioner attempts to express his or her own unique interpretations in ways consistent with the rigour demanded by the standards of practice excellence. The committed and fully engaged practitioner (e.g., teacher or dancer) can communicate the "inner meaning" of the activity in a manner such that recipients become vicarious participants. Whether it be in teaching, dancing, or sport, the knowledgeable spectator can recognize when a practitioner is simply "going through the motions" or when the practitioner is inspired, honest, and faithful to the rigours of the art. When this is the case, it is easier for spectators to dissociate themselves from the mere partisan spectator role and engage themselves vicariously with the respective academic, artistic, or sporting action. With respect to sport, Lasch argues:

at a higher level of mastery, the performer no longer wishes merely to display his virtuosity - for the true connoisseur can easily distinguish between the performer who plays to the crowd and the superior artist who matches himself against the full rigor of his art itself - but to ratify a supremely difficult accomplishment; to give pleasure; to forge a bond between himself and his audience, which consists in their shared appreciation of a ritual executed flawlessly, with deep feeling and a sense of style and proportion (50: pp. 188-189).

This suggests that the achievement of the internal goods of a practice involves a commitment to excellence on the part of the artist, scholar, or athlete. This means that the practitioner is committed to the art rather than to the mere entertainment of the

spectator. Merely entertaining the spectators often means patronizing them, playing to the crowd. Post-touchdown antics in football, for example, may have some bearing on the entertainment value of the game, but the value in this case cannot be said to be based on football (as football) criteria. Through a committed and inspired performance, the spectator is invited to share in the sporting moment. Rather than being mediated by mechanisms or systems that tend to "disburden" and socially isolate individuals, the "good" sport performance can draw forth a committed, albeit vicarious, engagement on the part of the spectator. The "good" performance can mediate the relation between performer and spectator in such a way that both are recognized and affirmed.

In order for the spectator to recognize when a practitioner is simply "going through the motions," or when he or she is giving an inspired performance, some common frame of reference for the practitioner and audience is required. In other words, there needs to be some shared standards of excellence between the performer and the spectator if evaluations and assessments are to be meaningful. Spectators can come to recognize and appreciate athletic action in terms of shared qualitative standards. Just as opposing athletes can produce outcomes that can be mutually recognized and appreciated, so too can spectators come to judge the merits of the sport action in terms of athletic or strategic excellence, the dramatic closeness of the contest, or the fairness of the contest. Prior to and during the sport contest itself, knowledgeable spectators may go through a similar process to players and coaches

with respect to the estimation of player strengths and weaknesses, or how personnel selections (i.e., team "lineups"), play selection, weather conditions, or other variables are likely to effect the course and outcome of the game. While the "armchair quarterback" always has the benefit of a more detached position from which to make such assessments, it is still the case that, for many, their involvement is hardly passive spectating. Lasch comments:

It is by watching those who have mastered a sport, however, that we derive standards against which to measure ourselves. By entering imaginatively into their world, we experience in heightened form the pain of defeat and the triumph of persistence in the face of adversity. An athletic performance, like other performances, calls up a rich train of associations and fantasies, shaping unconscious perceptions of life. Spectatorship is no more "passive" than day dreaming, provided the performance is of such quality that it elicits an emotional response (50: p. 407).

Owing to their former or current involvement in sport, many spectators bring with them more than just a general knowledge of the game. Knowledgeable spectators in sport can bring them a broader and deeper background against which critical evaluation or appreciation can take place. For Lasch,

Ceremony requires witnesses: enthusiastic spectators conversant with the rules of the performance and its underlying meaning. Far from destroying the value of sport the attendance of spectators makes them complete. Indeed one of the virtues of contemporary sports lies in their resistance to the erosion of standards and their capacity to appeal to a knowledgeable audience (50: p. 406).

In fact, Lasch (50) argues that in contrast to the arts (as a social practice), where the aesthetic standards tend to fluctuate, standards of excellence in sport are relatively stable. One effect of having

relatively stable and clear standards of excellence is that it establishes a firmer basis upon which evaluations and judgements can be rendered. The stability and continuity of standards opens up the possibility for meaningful dialogue and shared appreciations. Even the most rabid partisan fan can admit, however begrudgingly, occasions where an opposing athlete or team demonstrates exceptional athletic or strategic ability. To admit excellent or "good" play on the part of an opposing player or team reveals that, beyond the non-rational, non-sporting motives that can form the basis of partisan support, there can still exist (for the knowledgeable spectator) commonly recognized and appreciated standards of excellence. While debate over the merits or demerits of sport action are rarely dispassionate, the discussions can involve what Bern refers to as "rational persuasion." Rational persuasion is a dialogue between equals who employ reason as the standard by which judgements and conclusions are reached about practices such as sport. In such a dialogue, rational comments by some can invite similarly rational comments by others. Rather than relying on non-rational (e.g., emotional) or coercive measures to persuade others to accept an evaluation or judgement, rational persuasion respects the autonomy of all parties to the discussion (5). A dialogue committed to reason cannot help but produce mutual benefits. It engages not only the critical powers of individuals against commonly recognized and accepted standards of sporting excellence, but it can also broaden or deepen mutual understanding and support of what constitutes the "good" contest.

If a relative consensus exists as to what constitutes "good" sporting action, then knowledgeable spectators, as a group, can have an impact on the standards of excellence thought to be relevant to sport. This means that certain styles or standards of play can be reinforced. Recalling McIntyre's comment (53: p. 193) that the internal goods of social practices are never immutable, it can be the case that the styles and standards of "good" play change. This may be due in part to innovations within the sport itself. For example, the Fosbury flop in the high-jump, or the slap shot in ice hockey are consistent with what is thought to be the purpose of sport. In other words, an innovative jumping style still means that jumping is the primary athletic ability that is being tested. Likewise, the slap shot in ice hockey means that shooting skills still figure prominently as one of the athletic abilities being compared among athletes. Certain rule violation (e.g., offensive holding in North American football) may even become "part of the game" because of the disruptive effect that too frequent penalty assessments can have on the "flow" of the game. In other words, the generation and resolution of dramatic tension through the execution of running, passing, catching, and other similar skills are criteria that can be used to mount a public condemnation for excessive penalty assessments.

However, it can also be the case that certain other "innovations" are not thought to be "part of the game." While Lehman argues that perfect adherence to every rule is not usually essential to the occurrence of a given game, he concedes " . . . that at some

(probably hard-to-define) point, excessive rule violations become incompatible with playing a given game . . . " (51: p. 285). Ice hockey, a game "traditionally" known for its coordinated team action and for its skating, passing, goal scoring, and defensive checking skills (including body checking), has "evolved" into a contest where intimidation and violence are the tactics of choice. Similarly, Australian Rules Football, a game highly regarded for its continuous running, kicking, hand-passing, "marking" (i.e., gaining possession by catching a kicked ball), and kicking skills has been recently plagued by frequent and prolonged interference tactics.¹⁶ These examples suggest that it is not simply the excessive number of rule violations that are incompatible with playing a given game. It can also be the case that the nature of rule or "ethos" violations are deemed socially unacceptable. This may be so for reasons some having to do with fairness and many having to do with certain aesthetic standards considered relevant to the "good" game. Systematic or strategic fighting (in ice-hockey), and frequent or prolonged interference tactics (in Australian Rules Football) are not implied by the rules of these games but neither are they entirely ruled out.

However, it is clear that tactics such as those illustrated in the hockey and football examples are not publicly recognized nor desired as the basis of comparing relative abilities in the sport.

¹⁶This is especially true in cases where a player "taking a mark" is interfered with. The interference tactic can diminish the strategic advantage of "taking a mark" by allowing opposing players to recover their defensive positions before the ball is advanced by the opponent with the ball.

In other words, individual or team proficiency in executing brutal or violent manoeuvres, or flow-disrupting interference tactics is, for the majority, not the basis of sport's appeal nor the basis upon which the "good" contest is assessed. Owing to public pressure (by some groups more than others), the National Hockey League has attempted (with limited success) to reduce the amount of strategic violence in the sport. However, owing in part to a desire to reinstate the features that account for Australian Rules Football's appeal, league officials have all but eliminated the interference infractions (i.e., those impeding the progress of player after "taking a mark") by instituting a severe fifty metre penalty for them. This shows that as a group, knowledgeable spectators can contribute to attempts to reinstate certain skills and styles over others. Yet, it also suggests that it is only within a community of knowledgeable spectators that such a contribution can occur.

In this section it has been demonstrated that support of a team can produce social unity based on non-sport criteria. In addition, it was shown that the mutual recognition and appreciation of the "good" contest could unify otherwise antagonistic partisan spectators. Within a community of knowledgeable spectators, individuals could acquire, exercise, and develop their powers of "judgement" in ways that could maintain the integrity of practice excellence. It is in the mutual development of spectator "judgement," and in mutual recognition, appreciation, and support of shared standards and achievements of sporting excellence that

(knowledgeable) spectatorism can be considered a source of social freedom.

This chapter has established the case that sport, as a social practice, can be source of social freedom. In order to accomplish this task, it was necessary to show that social relations of a more communal nature could be detected even within largely impersonal liberal, free-market institutions. This was accomplished by linking the notion of social freedom to the pursuit or achievement of the inclusive internal goods of sport. As a social practice, sport was shown to have certain standards of excellence or "good" play that could mediate relations between opposing players, among teammates, and among spectators of the contest. In competitive relations between opposing players, certain ethical and aesthetic goods internal to the practice of sport itself were found to be inclusive goods. That is, fairness, as a regulative principle, could promote social unity based upon respect for persons as ends, contest validity, and the mutual recognition and affirmation of athletic excellence. The aesthetically well-played game, which included such features as challenging and commensurate opposition, and mutual disclosure, was shown to engage and extend the abilities and powers of athletes in ways that could be mutually recognized and valued. The ethically or aesthetically well-played or good game implied mutual contribution, shared goals, and social unity among contestants.

The first step in showing how social freedom could be possible in social relations among teammates was to overcome the tendency to

explain team behaviour in strictly functionalist or strictly individualistic terms. This was done by attributing an active social "being" to sport team action. How the individual could be reconciled with the social in this case was accomplished by pointing out how social relations among teammates could be mediated or guided by standards of excellence. "Good" team play was shown to involve the development and exercise of sporting "judgement" with respect to the individual initiative and reciprocity required to achieve shared team goals and other internal goods of team play. The achievement of these other internal goods included team balance and complementarity (to achieve strategic unpredictability) and "playing to win," the pursuits of which accentuated how team play can broaden and extend the concrete, personal abilities and powers of teammates in mutually fulfilling ways.

It has been demonstrated that partisan spectatorism can promote social unity based largely upon external, non-sport criteria. In spite of the excesses associated with partisan support, few activities are capable of generating such public identification. It was also shown that otherwise antagonistic partisan supporters can be socially united in their recognition and appreciation of the "good" sport contest. Knowledgeable spectators, that is, those spectators familiar with the rules, conventions, traditions, and ethical and aesthetic standards of excellence relevant to the sport, were shown to be capable of promoting informed "judgement" amongst themselves and, as a group, appreciating and maintaining the integrity of sport as a social practice. In this latter regard,

spectators, as part of the sporting community, could also exert public pressure on sport institutions to ensure certain standards of "good" play.

By virtue of demonstrating how the internal goods of sport can be recognized and pursued, even though the social practice is organized within capitalist institutions, the social possibilities of sport's freedom were established. Rather than framing sport's freedom in metaphysical, individualist, or functionalist terms, the concrete, communal type of freedom found in sport as a social practice expresses it in a distinctively social way. It is the purpose of the following chapter to explore in the more detail the institution of sport and its influence on sport's potential to promote social freedom.

CHAPTER IV

SPORT INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL FREEDOM

In Chapter III a distinction was made between sport as an institution and sport as a social practice. Unlike institutions, which deal with the generation, management, and distribution of external goods (e.g., money, social status, etc.), social practices are centered on internal goods. The internal goods of a social practice were thought to be those that require the development and exercise of expertise and "judgement" within a community of practitioners involving shared standards of excellence. The pursuit and achievement of internal goods, while at times competitive, were said to produce inclusive benefits (i.e., benefits that can be shared). As a social practice, sport was shown to be capable of being engaged in, judged, and appreciated in terms of commonly accepted ethical or aesthetic standards of excellence. The "good" sport contest was shown in various ways to engage the concrete talents and powers of athletes in ways that could be mutually recognized, facilitated, challenged, and appreciated. As a result of the pursuit and achievement of sports internal and inclusive goods, sport was thought to be a source of social unity and social freedom. The purpose of introducing the distinction between sport as an institution and sport as a social practice was to establish the case that the possibilities for freedom in sport can be viewed as distinct social possibilities. This meant that social freedom in sport need not be considered a retreat from public life; it can be achieved in

social practices even though such practices are dependent upon capitalist institutions.

While there are numerous examples of sport institutions that could be discussed (e.g., the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the United States Olympic Committee, etc.), it is the purpose of this chapter to examine the institution of commercial spectator sport and its effects on the social practice of sport. In particular, sport as a commercial spectator institution will be examined in light of the economic organization of some of the more prominent professional sport leagues operating in the United States. This will entail an analysis of professional sport leagues in terms of the production, management, and distribution of external goods, and how this effects social relations between sport management, sport labour, and the State. It will also involve a critical analysis of how institutionalization effects sport's ability as a social practice to achieve its inclusive internal goods, and thus the social freedom based upon them.

Professional Sport Institutions

The purpose of this section is to examine the nature and significance of the institutionalization process in (selected) North American professional sport leagues (i.e., football, baseball, basketball, and hockey). This will involve tracing out the essential features of sport league operations (i.e., territorial franchise rights, the sale of broadcasting rights, and the player reservation system) in order to determine how external goods (i.e.,

league revenues) are produced and distributed. An examination of the institution of sport in liberal free-market society would be incomplete if it did not address the political-economic implications of institutionalization. This will be done by examining the extent to which league operations are justified in terms of dealing with the interests of the sport labour sector, the spectating public, and the State.

Gruneau states that institutions in society are generally characterized as " . . . distinctive patterns of social interaction whose structural features represent recognized, established, and legitimized ways of pursuing some activity" (27: p. 59). Keeping in mind the typological distinction utilized in Chapter II between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, the institution of sport has undergone a similar " . . . shift from intimate, communally based, non-utilitarian sets of social relations, to more contractually based, individualistic and utilitarian patterns of social organization" (29: p. 20). This means that, like other institutions in modern society, sport appears as " . . . an increasingly rationalized activity that seems greatly caught up in the bureaucratic principles of economic production and political organization" (29: p. 23). Specifically, this means that sport is becoming more commercialized (i.e., oriented to production and patterns of consumption), more technique oriented (as a standard of "enjoyment" and achievement), more bureaucratized (e.g., by promoting universal standards of participation and efficient administration), and more democratic (29: p. 23). While all of these developments

make it possible to market and stage sport events to larger audiences, it also raises questions about the effect of these developments on social relations within the institution and on the quality of the sport event itself.

Heinila refers to the institutionalization process as the "totalization" of sport. This involves the following, roughly fleshed out, process. The "spiral of competition" that defines sport sets in motion a rise in performance standards, professional commitment, and expectations for compensation. Mass media and other commercial involvements in sport accentuate the monetary or publicity benefits of sporting success for sponsors and players alike. As the commercial value of sporting success increases, so too are the demands (by athletes) for compensation. The greater the mobilization of resources to support sporting success, the greater is the struggle between commercial sponsors and athletes to control sport and its revenues.¹⁷ Put in terms of MacIntyre's discussion, "totalization" involves the institutionalization of sport, a process that is predicated on the pursuit and distribution of external goods (e.g., money, political power, social status, etc.). It will be recalled that social practices, even though they are oriented to the

¹⁷The political value that can be derived from sporting success can mean the mobilization of more public and private resources to fund and administer national and international sport programs. As sport takes on more of an ideological role in representing national interests, higher public expectations of sporting success soon follow. This paves the way for further politicization, for greater bureaucratic control over athletes, and for an intensified struggle by athletes to protect or advance their individual interests (32).

achievement of internal goods (i.e., practice excellence), are still intimately connected to, and dependent upon, institutions for their survival. In MacIntyre's words, " . . . no practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions" (53: p. 194). This means that the social practice of sport requires more than just an administrative body to manage its affairs. It also means that the social practice operates within, but not necessarily according to, certain economic and political mechanisms that generate or provide the resources required to sustain the practice. It will also be recalled that while competition for internal goods in a social practice produces inclusive benefits, competition for external goods at the institutional level produces exclusive benefits. In other words, the achievement of external goods for some invariably means the losing or diminishing of the same goods for others. This means that institutions can operate according to commercial or political agendas that are not always connected to the interests served by the social practices that they bear. How sport can be viewed as a commercial spectator institution will be illustrated in more detail by examining the case of professional sport.

Sport Management and Monopoly Power

The professional sport industry has undergone significant changes in its operation from its inception as a player-controlled enterprise to its contemporary "big business" orientation. Besides the fact that ownership of teams has been taken over largely by individual entrepreneurs or corporations, certain aspects of the sport production and marketing process have been rationally and

systematically developed to enhance profitability. While professional sport leagues generally operate according to free-market principles, there are several anomalies in the operation of leagues that can have significant commercial and social consequences. A professional sports institution operates essentially as a combination of profit-oriented clubs within a framework known as a league or association. A professional sport league is a combination of profit-oriented clubs, yet the profit potential is dependent upon the provision and public consumption of a sport contest that no single team can produce on its own. A sport season is comprised of a succession of these contests culminating in a play-off to determine a champion in the particular sport league. The club or franchise owners comprise the primary decision-making units of the league or association. Policy regarding league membership, expansion, merger, playing schedules, labour relations, public relations, and the negotiation of broadcasting rights, is formulated by the team owners. Each league or association is also administered by a sport commission. This regulatory body is headed by an owner-appointed and retained commissioner or president who is endowed with certain administrative powers pertaining to league competition.

The management of competition in a professional sport league has a number of peculiar features. "Competition," in a general economic sense, refers to the " . . . condition prevailing in a market in which rival sellers try to increase their profits at one another's expense" (26: pp. 82-83). In conditions of "pure" competition there are a large number of sellers, the goods or services sold are identical, and

additional sellers are free to enter the market (26: pp. 82-83).

However, a professional sport league operates in a manner quite distinct from other businesses. A district court, in ruling on the United States v. National Football League case in 1953, commented:

professional football is a unique type of business. Like other professional sports which are organized on a league basis it has problems which no other business has. The ordinary business makes every effort to sell as much of its product or services as it can. In the course of doing this it may and often does put many of its competitors out of business. The ordinary businessman is not troubled by the knowledge that he is doing so well that his competitors are being driven out of business. Professional teams in a league, however, must not compete too well with each other in a business way. On the playing field, of course, they must compete as hard as they can all the time. But it is not necessary and, indeed, it is unwise for all the teams to compete as hard as they can in a business way. If all the teams should try as hard as they can in a business way, the stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial failure. If this should happen not only would the weaker teams fail, but eventually the whole league . . . because without a league no team can operate profitably (73: p. 388).

Competition among member clubs in a business sense must be curtailed to a large extent if the viability of the league and the profitability of each franchise is to be enhanced. The regulations regarding competition among teams within a league fall under two broad categories: those that deal with the marketing of the sports product (i.e., territorial franchise rights and broadcasting rights) and those that deal with the sport production process (i.e., player reservation system). Territorial franchise rights entail the assignment and preservation of exclusive marketing and broadcasting rights to the sport product within certain geographic boundaries. Purchasing a franchise basically amounts to the acquisition of certain monopoly powers; it is the license to share in the revenues

generated from the sale of national broadcasting rights, to generate revenues from gate receipts and the sale of local broadcasting rights in a competition-free environment, and to have exclusive access to the sport labour pool.¹⁸ Additional revenues are generated through favourable tax treatment and the public subsidization of playing facilities.¹⁹

The entry of new franchises through league expansion or merger, or the movement of existing franchises within a league, does not occur solely as a function of the demand of sport consumers or of public sponsors seeking entry into the established league. Franchise distribution is strictly controlled, and the decision to expand operations is subject to a large majority or unanimous approval of franchise owners. The league disperses any new team(s), or existing team(s) that seek to shift its operation, into market

¹⁸In some professional sport leagues gate equalization schemes are in place. The division of revenues between the home and visiting teams is 65% - 35% for the National Football League, and 80% - 20% for professional baseball. There are no such gate equalization arrangements for the National Basketball Association or the National Hockey League.

¹⁹Like any other business, a professional sport team owner subtracts the operating expenses from overall revenues and pays taxes on the difference. However, franchise owners have had the additional advantage in declaring player service contracts as depreciable assets and deducting the depreciation as a business expense. In computing taxable income the owner attempts to allocate as much of the franchise cost to player contracts as possible. This has the effect of allowing the owner to "shelter" revenues that equal the depreciation total. For a more comprehensive analysis of the tax advantages of sport franchise ownership, see B. Okner (66). Local governments reduce the operating costs of a franchise owner by not only constructing the stadium or arena, but by offering rents below the economic value of such facilities, and often by foregoing taxes on such property. For a fuller treatment of how public subsidization benefits team owners, see B. Okner (67).

areas that do not threaten the monopoly rights of other franchises.

As a rule, leagues expand slowly and cautiously. A few new franchises are allowed to enter the league, yet a few that desire entry are usually barred. This causes a scarcity, which in turn

. . . reduces competition for fans; causes revenues from national broadcasting rights to be divided among fewer teams; allows the market price of existing and expansion teams to be higher; preserves a few potentially lucrative franchise sites so that an existing team that begins to fail financially has an attractive alternative site; and, because of the threat of moving, gives a team additional bargaining powers when negotiating stadium agreements or local broadcasting rights (64: p. 412).

The key to the success of the franchising rules is the mutual agreement among teams to abide by the league's decision to limit the number of franchises, and to not compete with other teams for the same fans in a given area. Subsumed within the territorial franchise rights is the exclusive right of the franchise owner to broadcast league games. The area of sports broadcasting is covered by the Sports Broadcasting Act. Enacted in 1961, it grants anti-trust immunity to any agreement among the clubs in professional football, baseball, and basketball to pool and sell broadcasting rights to sponsored telecasts of league games (37: p. 415). This type of collective bargaining serves to consolidate the sports product and offer the competing broadcasting networks a more formidable national sales package. As a result, the sale of these exclusive national broadcasting rights can generate substantially higher revenues for a league than if separate arrangements were negotiated by individual teams. While national broadcasting networks pay enormous sums for this valuable right, they, in turn,

have profited from the sale of shares in broadcasting time to corporate sponsors. The sale of national broadcasting rights on a pooled basis has been a steadily increasing source of revenue for sport leagues, and the equal distribution of these revenues among teams within a league has determined, to a large extent, the viability and profitability of many sport franchises.²⁰

In addition to revenues generated from the sale of national broadcasting rights, each franchise owner is entitled to individually negotiate the sale of local broadcasting rights. The team owner has the exclusive right to broadcast the home game as well as to prevent the broadcast of competing (local or national) telecasts in the franchise territory. Each franchise retains the revenues derived from the sale of these rights, but the value of these rights will differ according to the location of the franchise, population, fan interest, team success, and competition from other sport telecasts. In the absence of a revenue sharing scheme for local broadcasting revenues (and an equitable gate equalization scheme), sport markets will vary in their profitability.²¹ The

²⁰Sullivan (cited in 18: p. 231) notes that the National Football League's three-year contract with the three major broadcasting networks and ESPN in 1987 was for \$1.43 billion. Each team in the league received in excess of \$17 million annually. The five year contract (1984-89) with major league baseball netted the league \$1.1 billion, making the annual income of teams in the league over \$7 million.

²¹Broadcasting magazine's survey of local broadcasting revenues in major league baseball for 1982 (cited in 83: p. 54) reveals the financial advantage enjoyed by teams located in the larger markets. The following ranking indicates the dollar value (in millions) of local broadcasting revenues: Montreal (8.1),

variations that exist among the markets in terms of local broadcasting revenue potential can account, in part, for the long-standing stability of certain franchises and also for the desire of other franchises to relocate to larger markets.

The dependence on mass media institutions as a major source of revenue for sport leagues means that these institutions can have a significant influence on the character of the game. According to Sewart (78), sport is undergoing a process of "commodification and massification." This means that sport events are being modified in various ways to conform to mass-marketing principles. To make sport an exciting entertainment spectacle that will appeal to as large a consumer market as possible, various styles of play have been encouraged, and certain rule changes and technological innovations have been incorporated into the game. The marketing of ice hockey on the basis of its violent body contact and brawls could be seen to have a greater mass appeal than the more technical and strategic aspects of the game (especially in some areas where the spectators were unfamiliar with the game). In a game formerly ruled by decorum, Lasch (50) argues that promoters have urged tennis fans to become rabid and vocal partisans. Sewart (78) contends that various rule changes in the National Football League (e.g., moving back goal

Philadelphia (6.5), New York Yankees (6.5), New York Mets (4.25), Toronto (4.0), Texas (2.8), Los Angeles (2.75), Boston (2.7), Chicago White Sox (2.0), Cleveland (2.0), Houston (2.0), San Francisco (2.0), Chicago Cubs (1.95), Cincinnati (1.9), Pittsburgh (1.8), Detroit (1.7), Atlanta (1.6), St. Louis (1.5), Oakland (1.3), Minnesota (1.25), San Diego (1.2), California (1.1), Milwaukee (1.0), Kansas City (1.0), and Seattle (1.0).

posts and kickoff lines, moving in the in-bounds markers, restricting downfield coverage of punts, and the single "chuck" allowed against potential pass receivers) act in various ways to discourage the kicking game, disadvantage defensive play, and thus promote what is thought to be a more wide-open and exciting (especially passing) style of play. More symptomatic of "commodification and massification" is the promotion of pre-game, half-time, and post-game entertainment extravaganzas (e.g., marching bands, singing and dancing routines, skydivers or hang-gliders, etc.). For Sewart, this process also includes, among others, the sexual objectification of cheerleaders (now called dance squads), the proliferation of merchandizing gimmicks (e.g., Ball Day, Helmet Day, T-Shirt Day, etc.), and the rescheduling of games to suit a wider television audience (78). All of these features are thought to create an entertainment spectacle that has something exciting to offer a larger segment of the population.

The third major feature of the monopoly power exercised by the sport team owners is the player reservation system. This system is a set of mechanisms designed to control the entry into, the movement within, and departure of players from a particular league. Two of the more prominent features of this monopoly control deal with player entry and player movement within a league. While many significant changes have taken place since the mid-1970's with respect to certain restrictions (e.g., player draft, mandatory renewal and compensation clauses in standard player contracts), the institutionalization of the sport labour sector (to compete better

for external goods) would be virtually unintelligible without some appreciation of the original restrictive mechanisms. Apart from baseball, where many players enter the league through a minor league (or "farm") system, entry into a sport league has been typically controlled by a (draft) system, the effect of which is to distribute incoming players throughout the league. The selection order of players by teams has been, and currently is, based on the inverse order of team standings from the previous year's regular season competition. Draft rights to a player can be transferred as part of a negotiated agreement between two clubs before the draft, but, once drafted, the player becomes the sole property of the drafting team. The effect of the draft, in economic terms, is to eliminate the ability of athletes to choose their employers or to have competitive bidding for their services. Upon agreement to provide services for the drafting team, athletes are obliged to sign a standard or uniform contract which, in the past, included some type of perpetual or limited renewal clause. The "reserve" clause in (baseball and hockey) player contracts gave the owner exclusive right to renew an expired contract. This was the case because each renewed contract also had a renewal clause, the effect of which was to bind a player to a team until such time that the owner decided to transfer the contract by means of sale or trade. The "option" clause in football and basketball allowed the owner to renew the player's contract for one year only, but players would receive only ninety percent of that

year's salary if they chose not to re-sign after the renewal or "option year".²²

While an assessment of the nature and extent of all the restrictive mechanisms employed by sport league's (including the free agent draft, waivers and "blacklisting") is unnecessary, it is clear that the purpose of these mechanisms remains the same, namely, to " . . . limit if not eliminate competitive bidding among teams for the services of players" (61: p. 3).²³ If the ability of athletes to negotiate the value of their services in a free and open market is restricted by these mechanisms, then the ability of team owners to secure for themselves a greater share of the external goods (i.e., revenues) can be accentuated. Sport team owners

²²By virtue of an amendment to the National Football League's Constitution and By Laws in 1963, the limited renewal clause known as the "option" clause was restructured and became as restrictive as baseball and hockey's "reserve" clause owing to the implementation of a compensation device that came to be known as the "Rozelle Rule". The commissioner of the National Football League had broad discretionary powers in the assignment of compensation payments to teams losing the services of players who sought employment with another team. The ordered compensation payments (e.g., cash, players, or future draft selections, or combinations of these) became so costly in some cases that it was made clear to all league owners and players that teams would have to pay an unreasonably high price for free agents. For further discussion of this issue, see J. Purcel and J. Ryan (70).

²³To consolidate their monopoly power sport leagues have resorted to tactics such as: league mergers (e.g., The American Basketball Association and National Basketball League in 1976, the American Football League and the National Football League in 1966); absorption of financially viable franchises of failing competitive leagues (e.g., the Quebec Nordiques, Hartford Whalers, Winnipeg Jets, Edmonton Oilers, and Atlanta Flames of the World Hockey Association into the National Hockey League); and league expansion (e.g., the National Hockey League in 1967, 1970, and 1972) in order to take advantage of the newly created hockey market in the United States, and to pre-empt plans for the creation of a rival league.

contend that the league must possess the power to distribute or reallocate playing talent within a league so as to equalize competitive playing strengths and promote unpredictability of outcome. Free and open competition in the player market would lead, in the owner's view, to inequalities in playing strengths because the wealthier franchises would inevitably secure the services of the most highly talented players. Certain franchises would benefit at the expense of others, sport exhibitions would become predictable, fan interest would decline, weaker franchises would suffer and, ultimately, the league would collapse. The impact of competition would reduce the amount of professional sport to the level of public demand. How these monopoly powers are justified requires an examination of the links between these commercial practices and to legislation regarding free-market competition, labour relations, and the public interest (i.e., public good) in sport.

As a joint venture which attempts to regulate competition by controlling the conditions of sale of the product, fixing prices, allocating productive activities, sales territories and customers among its members, and awarding a fixed share of the business to each member, a sport league resembles a cartel. Strictly speaking, "a cartel is an association of independent industrial enterprises producing similar goods that is formed to secure a monopoly in a specific market" (26: pp. 82-83). As mentioned above, a professional sport league is a combination of profit-oriented clubs, yet it is dependent upon the league structure to create a product that no single team could produce on its own. Monopolization of the

sport product and labour markets in these ways is dependent upon the strict adherence, by member clubs, to the self-imposed rules and regulations concerning economic competition. When members of a sport league agree to abide by the anti-competitive regulations designed to ensure the profitability of each franchise and the league as a whole, they engage in a legally questionable business practice.

Critique of Professional Sport Cartels

The cartel arrangement of an industry is considered illegal according to the Sherman Antitrust Act because it involves business practices (e.g., price fixing, boycotting, or collusive bidding, etc.) which can lead to monopoly control, a situation considered contrary to the spirit of economic competition. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a contract or conspiracy is illegal under these sections of the Act only if the resulting restraint of trade is deemed "unreasonable". In this case, a judicial measure referred to as the "Rule of Reason" is applied. This means that the courts are called upon to weigh the value of reasonable regulatory practices against the anti-competitive effects of those regulations (16: p. 780). Recognition that some restraints are necessary and justifiable does not imply that all features of the system should be immune from antitrust scrutiny. It is appropriate for the courts to require convincing evidence that those restraints genuinely promote the ends asserted to justify it, but also that those results could not have been obtained by methods with less anti-competitive effects (80: p. 424).

The controversy regarding these restrictions centers on the desire of professional athletes to have the value of their services determined in a free and competitive market, and on the desire team owners to equalize competitive playing strengths and thus maintain the economic viability of all the franchises in a particular sport league. However, according to Rottenberg (cited in 13: p. 89), a team owner has the option to either sell or utilize a player. If the return will be higher from selling the player, the contract will be transferred by means of a sale or trade. If the player can be sold to a team for a price higher than the worth to the selling team, it is because the services are worth more to the team desiring those services. Ultimately, players are distributed throughout the league in a manner to maximize their productive ability; each player will play for a team that is capable of securing the highest return from the player's services. This process is identical to a free market system, the difference being such that, in a market subject to the player reservation system, part of the value of the player's services is transferred to the team obtaining the contract and part of the value is retained by the team selling the contract. In a free market, the player would retain the full value in the process of transferring services (cited in 13: p. 89). Separate studies by El Hodiri and Quirk, and Noll and Okner (cited in 13: p. 89), concluded that the player reservation system alters the initial allocation of players from what they would be in a free market, but the procedures do not alter the final distribution enough to effect

the ability of teams.²⁴ El Hodiri and Quirk (cited in 13: p. 89) found that franchises located in higher drawing potential markets will have stronger teams because franchises in weaker markets tend to sell players to wealthier franchises. In other words, while the addition of a highly talented player to a team in a weak market may boost the chances of franchise success in both sporting and financial terms, there is no guarantee that the player will be retained on this basis. In addition, the private ownership of the player's services means that if the highly talented player is subsequently sold to a team simply for the financial gain, there is no guarantee that the "capital gain" will be reinvested to accentuate team sporting strength. The player reservation system thus eliminates competitive bidding for the services of (entering) players, and it provides the team owner with human capital for potential sale to wealthier franchises. This suggests that the player reservation system can produce a favourable financial situation for team owners while at the same time restricting

²⁴Data from 1978 suggests that the restrictions embodied in the player reservation system have done little to achieve competitive playing equality in the league. Out of a possible 150 baseball pennants over the last seventy-five years, teams in the three largest cities have won seventy-six, while New York teams alone have won fifty-six. Of twenty-six National Basketball Association championships from 1947-72, the Boston Celtics have won eleven and the Los Angeles Lakers six. Since the American Football League and the National Football League merger in 1966, eight teams have been in the playoffs a total of forty-seven times, and ten teams have never been in the playoffs. Montreal Canadiens of the National Hockey League have won the Stanley Cup fourteen out of the last twenty-three seasons. Since the National Hockey League expanded in 1967, fourteen out of seventeen teams have never won the title (16: p. 82).

economic freedom for players and jeopardizing competitive balance in the league.

How these and other features of league operations are regulated also requires an understanding of the nature of the sport's bureaucracy and the role of the league commissioner. Ingham claims that while the bureaucratic organization of social life is increasing, attempts have been made in sport to " . . . constrain the bureaucratic process within the framework of traditional patrimonialism" (41: p. 354). "Traditional" means that management is personal and directed by a belief in the "sanctity" of traditional modes of operation. Characteristic of the traditional approach to management is the "sportsman" owner who, in the "pure" sense of "sportsman" undertakes sport management as an avocation and is concerned with preserving the best interests of the game. The exercise of patrimonial authority, which often involves unilateral decision-making, can be considered legitimate if it does indeed serve the sporting interests of the game. However, traditional "sportsman" ownership has been largely superseded by owners concerned with profit maximization. In this case, the "best interests of the game" appear to be economic, not sporting ones. With the increasing value of sport's external goods, and with increasing competition between team owners and players to control them, the owners have been reluctant to part with their patrimonial authority and adopt legalistic mechanisms to conduct league affairs.

The use of sport commission (and commissioner) as an "impartial" regulatory body is intended to legitimize the cartel's

operation under a quasi-legalistic framework. A legalistic bureaucracy differs from a patrimonial one in the sense that it does not recognize traditional privileges; it impartially executes its authority on the basis of legal principles that are equally binding on all members (40: pp. 383-384). However, the league commissioner is an owner-appointed and retained official; the commissioner or president ultimately serves the collective interests of a private association of owners. The partial authority granted to the commissioner or president extends not only to policy regarding franchise distribution, the sale of broadcasting rights, and player reservation, but also to maintaining the public integrity of the game. As a result, this can at times put league commissioners in an awkward and controversial position with regard to balancing owners, players, or referees' economic interests with the "good of the game" itself.²⁵ The various league commissioners have had difficulty not only in curtailing rivalries among the owners for sport's external goods, but also in legitimizing the commission's authority with the sport labour sector.²⁶

²⁵For an intriguing view of sport cartels' treatment of its commissioners, see Davis (12: pp. 359-369, 373-381).

²⁶The plan by Al Davis to transfer the operation of the highly successful Oakland Raiders football team to Los Angeles met with strong National Football League Commission disapproval. After having had his proposal defeated in a vote by league owners, Davis filed an antitrust suit against the league on the grounds that the owners' action represented an illegal combination in restraint of trade. The courts upheld the charge, and Davis was allowed to move the franchise to Los Angeles. It is ironic that the very antitrust laws that team owners (including Al Davis) want to be shielded from (in order to exercise certain monopoly powers as a cartel), were used by Al Davis against the cartel to promote his own profit-making plans for the Raiders franchise.

On this latter point, Demmert states that professional sport organizations have enacted broad regulations requiring all individuals with an association to the sport to " . . . refrain from any 'conduct detrimental to the best interests' of their sport, regardless of the effect of their conduct on the level of competition" (16: p. 774). What could be construed as "conduct detrimental to the best interests" of sport can include: criticism by professional athletes of the sport or management, gambling on sports events, association with persons related to gambling, personal drug use, or other lifestyle behaviours that might be considered by the commissioner to be publicly suspect or reprehensible. While these regulations are stipulated in general terms, there exists broad discretionary power in the hands of the sport commissioner and team owners in defining such detrimental conduct and determining appropriate disciplinary measures. Professional athletes, in signing a standard or uniform contract, not only negotiate the terms of service and remuneration, but submit themselves to the laws of sport. Disciplinary decisions by a sports commission are often arbitrarily and unilaterally dispensed, and offer the athlete little or no avenue of appeal. As a result, there is some question as to the impartiality and thus the legitimacy of league authority when it comes to dealing with the conduct of athletes. The reluctance of team owners to part with some of their patrimonial authority in economic matters and in terms of the regulation of "off-the-field" conduct highlights the question of

what interests of sport are being best served by the cartel and sport commission operation of the leagues.

To challenge the hegemony of the sport owners, players have resorted to two key tactics: first, they have formed players associations or unions to act as their exclusive bargaining agents, and second, they have utilized antitrust litigation against individual teams or leagues. After being accepted under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board in 1969, the various players associations were recognized as the exclusive bargaining agents for their respect athletes. Under the Labor Act the rights of athletes could be protected, and disputes could be settled through a collective bargaining process. Rather than divesting the sport owners of their power, the Labor Act provides the players, as a group, with the means to collectively bargain to advance their interests. However, while the collective bargaining process opened up a new avenue for sport management and sport labour to settle their disputes, it still did not " . . . provide a standard which can be used to test the substance of labour-management agreements under the antitrust laws or to determine when those laws should be applied" (89: p. 529). This meant that the restrictive measures embodied in the player reservation system, for example, could not be subject to collective bargaining until such time as they were deemed to be restraints of trade under the antitrust laws. A series of landmark decisions striking down the player (entry) draft, the renewal clauses (i.e., "reserve" and "option"), the "Rozelle" and other compensation rules

paved the way for a series of collective bargaining agreements that saw the broadening of player free agency and (impartial) binding arbitration to settle sport management and labour disputes.²⁷ As a result of these landmark decisions, sport team owners were more willing to employ the collective bargaining process to reach agreement with players over conditions of employment. Collective bargaining agreements up to the present allow for more free agency, competitive bidding for player's services, and for impartial arbitration proceedings to settle salary disputes or compensation to team owners losing the services of players.

Professional Sport and the State

It is clear that legislative and judicial institutions have figured prominently in the institutionalization of both the sport management and labour sectors. The antitrust concessions granted to sport team owners in the areas of franchising, broadcasting, and player reservation have had a significant impact on how external

²⁷The ruling in *Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.* in 1975 saw the player (entry) draft declared illegal (90: p. 20). In *Mackey v. the National Football league* in 1975 (90: p. 27), and in *Bryant v. the National Football league* in 1975 (89: p. 510), the courts ruled that the "Rozelle Rule" was a group boycott in restraint of trade. In 1975 the *Robertson v. National Basketball Association* ruling struck down basketball's draft system, "option" clause, and compensation rule (equivalent to football's "Rozelle Rule") as unfair and illegal (89: pp. 507-508). Hockey's "reserve" clause was declared illegal in the case of *Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.* in 1972. Unlike the other professional sport leagues, major league baseball enjoyed an antitrust exemption. However, the contract arbitration case involving Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally in 1975 saw baseball's "reserve" clause interpreted by the courts as a limited, as opposed to a perpetual, renewal clause (89: pp. 517, 578). This had the effect of releasing baseball players as free agents after fulfilling a one year (only) renewal period.

goods (i.e., revenues) are generated and distributed. These concessions were granted on the assumption that monopoly control over the marketing and production of the sports event were essential to the economic viability of the leagues and thus the continued provision of the sports product to the public. While the provision of the sport product has been sustained, the equalization of playing strengths has not been achieved because of the inequalities in team revenues and "misuse" of the player reservation system. Recognition by the United States Congress and the courts that the player reservation system was overly restrictive prompted changes in the institution of sport. Rather than divesting the sport franchise owners of their powers, additional bargaining mechanisms and concessions were granted to athletes. Under the Labor Act, players associations were recognized as collective bargaining units for players, the effect of which was to sanction the use of strikes and collective bargaining to advance their interests. Judicial decisions striking down elements of the player reservation system as illegal restraints of trade opened the door to player free agency.

While the legislative and judicial measures that empowered the sport labour sector could be viewed as liberal reforms to promote sport management and labour harmony, they also can be viewed in more ideological terms. That is, the political agenda for sport can be seen as more than just establishing equitable ground rules for team owners and athletes to conduct their commercial affairs in sport. The provision of the sport contest to a vast audience is more than just an economic concern; it is also thought to be a way

of inculcating dominant social values. Sport is seen by some State officials as an important cultural phenomena and thus deserving of protection under the law. The 1952 Report of the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power advanced the view that the sport of " . . . baseball typifies the basic ideals of the American people," and that "fairness and competition are the passwords of the sport" (cited in 42: p. 110). The dominant view of sport at the time centered on sport's separation from economics, sport's ability to combat juvenile delinquency, and sport's capacity to promote democratic values and social integration. Convened to investigate the business practices of sport leagues, the Select Committee on Professional Sport in 1977 commented:

. . . do not think we can minimize the importance of sports, and particularly professional sports in the fabric of American life. The healthy competitive spirit, the sense of hard but fair play, and the enthusiastic involvement in team play that we wish to nurture in our youth can only be diminished by an incessant diet of reports which breeds cynicism toward athletic life. Nor can we play down the effects of such reports on the pure entertainment value of sporting events for the individual spectator (90: p. 2).

Presumably, the "incessant diet of reports which breeds cynicism" include issues such as salary disputes, arbitration cases, strikes, lockouts, antitrust suits, dubious franchise relocations and public subsidization schemes, or other related economic issues. In other words, the cynicism is based upon the growing public perception that sport is becoming just another "big business" enterprise. In light of this, the same committee concluded:

If some action is not taken soon to restore some semblance of balance and stability in the world of professional sports, we stand the possibility of losing much of the

meaning and value intrinsic in athletic competition (90: p. 2).

The "meaning and value intrinsic in athletic competition," as referred to by the above committee, is not to be confused with the sort of internal goods referred to by MacIntyre in his analysis of social practices. In the former case, there is an implied contrast between sport's intrinsic values (i.e., competitiveness and fair play) and its external commercial values. However, the implication here is that "competitiveness" and "fair play" are good not because they maintain the integrity of social practices as such, but because they support social institutions. The role that the "intrinsic" values of sport play in this case is an ideological one, and this ideological role can best be nurtured if sport is insulated from the perceived effects of mainstream commercial activity. Rather than question the legitimacy of the (commercial) way of everyday life (which breeds cynicism when applied to sport), the public is asked to identify more with a supposedly separate form of life that "typifies the basic ideals of the American people". In other words, sport can be thought to fulfill its ideological function best when it is not be connected to political-economic matters. In a manner reminiscent of Huizinga and Novak's metaphysical view of sport, the ideological function of sport can be served in two ways; first, it can deflect attention away from the mundane economic realm by idealizing competition and fairness in a supposedly separate sport world; and second, by doing so, it can make the competitive (yetfair) pursuit of self-interest in everyday life appear more

palatable. The State's involvement in sport can be described in terms of providing the means necessary to stabilize competition between sport owners and labour for (commercial) external goods so that sport can, in turn, promote the achievement of (ideological) external goods.

It was the purpose of this section to examine the nature and significance of the institutionalization process in commercial spectator sport. This entailed tracing out the essential features of sport league operations in order to determine how external (commercial) goods were produced, managed, and distributed. It was shown that professional sport leagues operate largely as cartels, and that they enjoy certain monopoly privileges with respect to franchising, broadcasting rights, and the sport labour pool. As a result of the revenues generated from these and other mechanisms (i.e., favourable tax treatment, public subsidization of sport facilities, and the "commodification" of the sport product), ownership of a sport franchise can prove to be a lucrative financial enterprise. Team owners defended these monopoly powers on the grounds that they were necessary to equalize competitive playing strengths and thus the financial viability of the league as a whole. However, it was shown that franchises located in the larger metropolitan centers tended to prosper most in both economic and sporting terms. The unequal distribution of gate receipts and local broadcasting revenues contributed to the greater financial strength enjoyed by franchises located in the larger metropolitan centres, and to the tendency for players to be sold to these teams for their

greater exchange value. All in all, the cartel structure of the league favoured the team owners (some more than others) over the players in the competition for the (monetary) external goods of sport.

Part of the institutionalization of sport involved the response of the sport labour sector to the monopoly powers enjoyed by the team owners. After a highly visible period of labour unrest, the subsequent recognition of players unions under the Labor Act, and a series of landmark judicial decisions striking down various features of the player reservation system as illegal restraints of trade under the antitrust laws, came a new era of player free agency. With this also came an increased use of the collective bargaining process to mediate the struggle between sport management and sport labour over the control of sport's external (financial) goods. It was also shown that the State's involvement in the institutionalization of sport leagues was not limited simply to empowering the sport labour sector. While legislative changes and judicial decisions had this consequence, the stability between sport management and sport labour sought by the State was also driven by ideological considerations. Stable league operations were expected to shelter the sporting public from the harsher realities of economics, and thus promote sport's potential for inculcating various dominant social values. The institutionalization of sport can now be seen as relatively complete. Institutional mechanisms are in place to mediate the struggle between sport management and sport labour for the production, management, and distribution of

external (monetary) goods. State-sanctioned institutional mechanisms were shown to serve these (commercial) ends as well as ends of a more ideological nature. The purpose of the next section is to critically examine in more detail the particular effects of this institutionalization process on sport as a social practice.

Institutionalization and Social Freedom

The purpose of this section is to examine the impact of the institutional features of sport leagues on the social practice of sport and its potential to promote social freedom. Because of the connection that exists between social practices and institutions, it was suggested in Chapter II that institutions have the potential to corrupt social practices. It is worth recalling that institutions deal with the production and distribution of exclusive external goods. This means that the goods of the institution (e.g., money, social status, etc.) are not internally linked to the goods of a social practice, and the achievement of the external goods for some very often means the diminishing of the same external goods for others. While social practices cannot exist without political-economic institutions, Stout claims that a life dominated exclusively by the pursuit of the external goods proffered by institutions can be " . . . morally empty" (81: p. 53). However, even when practices are responsive to the overtures of their corresponding institutions, they can, and do, remain responsive to their own set of internal goods. The internal and inclusive goods of sport were shown to be those based on ethical and aesthetic features of the "good" contest.

In all this, of course, there is some question as to the extent of influence the institution is thought to have over the social practice of sport. Keeping this in mind, an examination of certain features of commercial spectator sport will be undertaken to determine the extent of their impact on the nature and significance of the sport event. Specifically, this means exploring how financial inequality among teams in a league, commercialization, and State involvement can corrupt sport in terms of its potential for promoting practice excellence, social unity, and social freedom.

Financial Inequality and the Corruption of Social Freedom

The differences that exist in the financial strengths of teams within a league has a large bearing on franchise and league stability, social unity, and the ability of the sport to achieve the inclusive internal goods of the activity. The cartel operation of a sport league allows team owners to regulate competition and share in the economic advantages that go along with it, but there is no guarantee that all franchise owners will benefit equally from them. Since the revenues generated from the sale of national broadcasting rights are divided equally among all teams in a league, the cartel arrangement can be said to significantly promote the financial viability of all member teams. However, in the absence of equitable sharing of other significant sources of revenue (i.e., gate receipts and local broadcasting rights), there can be wide variability in financial strengths among teams. This can contribute to a number of situations that can undermine league stability and social unity

(i.e., as both an "external" institutional good and an "internal" practice good): franchise owners may be tempted to relocate their franchises to larger metropolitan centers; franchise owners may threaten to re-locate their teams in the hope that more favourable public subsidies can be extracted from local municipalities; players may be tempted to seek free agency in order to negotiate more lucrative agreements with the wealthier franchises; and owners may be tempted to utilize players more for their exchange value by selling or trading them to wealthier franchises. Frequent player transfers or franchise shifts can have a significant impact on the municipalities that come to regard the local team as "their" team (e.g., the city of Oakland's affiliation with the Raiders organization). Public support for a team can be regarded as the result of "mere" entertainment, or it can serve as a mode of collective identification. When sport does serve as a means of collective identification, a local community has a more personal attachment and concern for the welfare and "rootedness" of the team. Koppett claims that it is essential to the institution of sport that fan interest and loyalty to the team be maintained. There must exist the "illusion of common interest," otherwise the identification bond can be undermined (cited in 90). Frequent franchise or player shifts, dubious public subsidization schemes, combined with the publicity surrounding sport management and labour conflicts, can threaten the "illusion" that the owners, players, and spectators are united in their commitment and loyalty to the team. In other words, growing public cynicism with the priority given by owners and players

to economic interests over sporting loyalties can undermine the collective identification thought to be necessary for franchise stability.

The type of institutional social unity that can be attributed to local affiliation with a team is an important phenomenon in its own right. However, it needs to be distinguished from the type of social unity that is germane to the present inquiry concerning social freedom in sport. To understand why this is the case requires a brief reiteration of the distinction between the idea of social unity in liberal, free-market institutions and in social practices. Liberal, free-market institutions are not geared toward the promotion of common interests or common goods. Rather, institutions are oriented toward the achievement of exclusive external goods. This means that they regulate the pursuit of private interests but the benefits may not be shared. Social unity need be no more than the public acknowledgment that the regulatory mechanisms do, in fact, produce some type of orderly pursuit of self-interest. In other words, the procedures for competing for external goods may be fair, but the outcomes may not be mutually beneficial. Social practices, on the other hand, are thought to be capable of generating social unity and social freedom because they are oriented toward the pursuit or achievement of inclusive internal goods. The "good" sport contest, for example, can be produced, understood, and appreciated in (ethical or aesthetic) terms drawn from the activity itself. In this case, the procedures for competing for sport's exclusive internal good (i.e., winning) are fair and they can also produce mutually

beneficial or inclusive goods for participants and spectators.

However, partisan solidarity and support establishes a type of social unity that can be based on factors (e.g., locality, nationality, ethnicity, social class, etc.) that can have little or no connection to the internal goods of sport as such. Collective identification and solidarity exemplify an inclusive good, but it is centered around external (i.e., non-sport) criteria. It may be the case that the institutional viability of a team depends, in part, on the ability to generate such mass public support for it. However, the social unity among partisan supporters needs to be distinguished from the social unity and social freedom based upon the common recognition and pursuit of the sport's internal and inclusive goods (i.e., the ethical or aesthetically "good" contest).

A major concern for understanding the institution's impact on the social practice of sport is how the differences in financial strengths of teams in a league effect the achievement of the inclusive internal goods of the activity itself. It is worth recalling that some of the internal goods of a social practice relate to the development and exercise of technical expertise and "judgement" within a shared tradition of excellence. Practitioners are informed by common standards of excellence, and their efforts, which are often competitive, can serve to broaden, extend, or refine those standards of excellence. When applied to sport, it is thought that the "good" contest can also be understood in terms of shared standards of (ethical and aesthetic) sporting excellence. Several of the notable features of the "good" contest include challenging and

commensurate opposition, unpredictability of outcome, and closeness. In principle, the more a contest is marked by these features, the more it can be said to produce outcomes that can have a common appeal. However, the concentration of playing talent in teams located in the larger metropolitan centers can contribute to imbalances in competition throughout the league. Where imperfect cartelization has contributed to economic and sporting imbalances in league competition, the potential for sport to promote the "good" contest can be diminished.

In largely unbalanced competition, several aesthetic features that have the potential to contribute to the production and appreciation of the "good" contest can be threatened. A "good" contest can be diminished if the opposition is not commensurate and challenging, and if the contest is not close. If these qualities are lacking, that is, if the contest is one-sided and predictable, athletes may have fewer opportunities to mutually develop, express, recognize, and appreciate technical expertise and "judgement". When the competition is neither close nor challenging, this can also diminish the athletes' perceptions that their individual actions can "make a difference" in settling the outcome. In largely unbalanced competitions, one opponent's efforts may appear futile, while the other's efforts may seem superfluous. In situations like these, the mutual development, testing, and "stretching" of technical expertise and "judgement" can suffer. Since many standards of sporting excellence cannot be developed, extended, or refined through the efforts of individual athletes or teams acting alone, it is important

that there be a stimulating contest. In the course of engaging their skills and powers in a close contest, athletes may come to recognize that their self-disclosing and extending actions are due in part to the valuable challenges presented by the opponent. Being a "touchstone" for one another means that opponents can come to recognize that excellence in sport is a mutual effort and achievement. In conditions where the contest is unchallenging and predictable, and where concrete, personal powers do not appear to be effective, the contest can lose some of its potential to be a complementary, mutually empowering, and fulfilling activity. In other words, unbalanced competition due to inequalities in financial and sporting strengths among teams can jeopardize the achievement of some of sport's inclusive internal goods and thus sport's potential to exemplify social freedom.

It was also shown in the previous chapter that the spectator could appreciate the "good" contest in terms of commensurate opposition, unpredictability of outcome, and the closeness of the contest. While sport can be a source of collective identification for a community, it can also be the site of some bitter rivalries between partisan supporters. In spite of sport's potential to create or enflame existing rivalries, it is also the case that mutual appreciation of the "good" contest can transcend antagonistic partisan social relations. In other words, the dramatic tension associated with balanced and close competition can also serve as a criterion to appeal to and unify otherwise opposing partisan spectators. How the close contest, or at least the expectation of a

close contest, relates to the institution of sport can be gleaned from Fraleigh's comments on the comparative utility of the good sport contest:

Prospective profit making is generally dependent upon contest marketability and also generally, a contest which has the prospect of being an even match is more marketable than one which is not. In principle, then, fulfillment of the good making characteristic of the opponents being known as equally competent performers before the contest is important in relation to the economically valued end of profit making. In principle, contests which have this characteristic are more attractive to the ticket buying public than contests which are known mismatches (23: p. 57).

It may turn out, says Fraleigh (23), that the contest itself is not close. However, the major point here is that the contest has profit-making potential if there is at least the public expectation beforehand that the contest will be close, and this can occur only if there has been a tendency for previous competitions to be close. Fraleigh recognizes, of course, that the good contest, viewed in terms of the close contest, is not the only characteristic necessary for the marketability of sport. What is important to consider from Fraleigh's comments is that the economic utility of the "good" sport contest is dependent, in part, on the pursuit or achievement of a "good" (i.e., the close contest) internal to the contest itself. This suggests that the good sport contest is "good" not only because it can achieve an inclusive internal good of the social practice, but also because it can promote an external good of the institution. It would appear that it would be in the best interests of sport, in both a sporting and commercial sense, that commensurate and challenging opposition, and close contests be promoted.

The implications for the institution of sport in terms of its current revenue sharing schemes seem obvious. Imperfect cartelization means that some important sources of revenue are divided equally among teams in a league, some are divided unequally, and some are not divided at all. As a result, this can lead to economic imbalances which, in turn, can tempt team owners to utilize players for their exchange value rather than for their use value. If economically weaker teams utilize the players secured from the player reservation system for short-term financial gain rather than for bolstering team performance (and thus the greater likelihood of balanced league competition), there is the risk of losing or diminishing a feature of sports' public appeal (i.e., the close contest). Imperfect cartelization and "misuse" of the player reservation system can thus undermine a feature of sport that can contribute to both the integrity of sport as a social practice and the financial viability of sport as an institution. This points to the possibility that the conditions necessary to promote the "good" contest (in these particular aesthetic terms) cannot be achieved when sport is conducted in a free-market manner. While some of the cartel mechanisms can go some way towards remedying the economic and sporting imbalances, they do not go far enough.

The argument that imbalances in playing strengths can impair the achievement of social freedom in the "good" sport contest can be taken a further step. Irrespective of imbalances of "legitimate" athletic skills and powers between opponents, the institutionalization of sport means that enormous pressure is put on individuals and teams

to win. The "totalization" process referred to by Heinila (32) involves an ever-increasing mobilization of resources to produce and reward sporting success. When the pressure to win increases and the use of legitimate means is unsuccessful, the use of "illegitimate" or dubious means may be very tempting. As Lasch argues,

Since excellence in a practice often brings an abundance of social rewards, it is notoriously tempting for people to pursue a practice for the wrong reasons - for the sake of money, say, or social status, or simply for the sake of besting one's opponent, in which case it becomes perfectly acceptable to cheat . . . (49: p. 69).

The inequalities in financial strengths of teams due to imperfect cartelization may contribute to the development and use of "illegitimate" means. This can have severe repercussions for the social practice of sport and its ability to promote excellence, social unity, and, thus social freedom.

It is clear from the discussion of social practices (49, 53, 81) that the choice of means in a practice is governed by standards of excellence, and that excellence can be achieved only after a lengthy commitment to exacting training and discipline. In the course of struggling with other equally devoted practitioners, self-knowledge (including one's limitations), self-mastery, "judgement", and shared standards of excellence can be broadened, extended, or refined. The pressure to forego training and developing "judgement" in the exercise of more "traditional" skills and powers in favour of more effective, albeit, "illegitimate," means can be illustrated in the following examples. Despite attempts to control violence in professional hockey, it is still a

prevalent part of many games. Contrary to the National Hockey League president's claim that fighting, for example, is the " . . . spontaneous combat which comes out of the frustrations of the game . . . " (cited in 84: p. 15), there is plenty of evidence to suggest that fighting or other forms of intimidation are integral tactics employed by teams to neutralize the opponent's most talented players or to protect their own. In the words of New York Islanders general manager, Bill Torrey:

There were always tough guys in our business. . . . Back when none of the players wore helmets, if you raised your stick around a guy's head, it was war. Guys knew it. There was a line there you didn't want to cross. But it didn't used to be a tactic. When you have somebody on your team whose sole purpose is to punch somebody's lights out, that's a tactic. It's become a bit of a problem (cited in 83: p. 61).

What may be considered a "problem" for some coaches and players, is a necessary part of survival in the sport for others. Calgary Flames general manager, Cliff Fletcher states:

Intimidation is still a big factor in hockey . . . In fact it's probably the major factor. Every team likes to have one or two enforcers or designated hit men so that the rest of the team feels comfortable (cited in 84: p. 14).

An Edmonton Oiler coach confirms this tendency:

If that's what this game comes down to - taking the skills away from a guy by pushing his face in - then we're in the wrong business. You know how to get rid of that --? You send your guy out to get their guy first (84: p. 13).

These comments are instructive for a number of reasons: first, they correctly identify "intimidation" and "taking the skills away" from the athlete as sources of hockey's problems; and second, they ironically suggest that selective violence is the solution to

returning skilled play back into the game. It is ironic only because it is misguided; the proposed solution only exacerbates the problem. Enough has been mentioned here to establish the point that individual and team survival in professional hockey can depend in large part on the employment of tactics that not only run contrary to the "traditional" skills of the game, but in effect, threaten them with extinction. A similar case could be made for the use of physical intimidation, verbal abuse, or delay tactics in other sports.

Unfair play, or the use of dubious means can adversely effect the social practice of sport in at least two other ways. First, it can undermine respect for persons and, second, it can undermine the integrity of social relationships. For DeLattre, violation of the rules that govern the competitive contest is cheating, and cheating is the " . . . failure to act with respect for the moral status of persons as ends" (15: p. 274). In other words, the cheater exploits those who are competing in good faith. Although "cheating" has been shown in Chapter III to be sometimes more and sometimes less than just the violation of rules, DeLattre's point is still valid with respect to "ethos" violations. That is, if there is a mutual understanding or agreement concerning the rules or conventions to be followed then failure to adhere to them violates the good faith relation. The treatment of the opponent strictly as an obstacle to be overcome or as a means to one's own victory can also diminish the sense that individuals can have common interests that can be served by mutual adherence to the "ethos" of fairness.

It can also be the case that interpersonal divisiveness or antagonisms can arise when an "ethos" that has previously acted as a common regulating and unifying factor among participants (e.g., amateurism) is subverted, compromised, or challenged by an emergent and perhaps contradictory "ethos" (i.e., winning-at-all-costs). For example, if one or more athletes resort to delay or intimidation tactics that have not traditionally or conventionally been part of the game, then the "victims" of such tactics can likely feel indignant and resentful, if not antagonistic, toward their opponent(s). It is ironic in cases such as these that as intimidation or delay tactics become more a part of some games, the psychological ability of athletes to resist such tactics becomes one of the measures of their athletic strength of character. Being "cool," detached, and indifferent, so not to be unnerved by an opponent employing such tactics, has become, in some cases, a part of the defensive tactics essential for victory. Another example that highlights the turmoil produced by an emergent (winning-at-all-costs) "ethos" is performance-enhancing drug use (e.g., anabolic steroids or amphetamines) in sport. Drugs use of this kind appears to be increasing among athletes, yet there is no consensus regarding its acceptability. While in some sport circles the use of illegal performance-enhancing drugs is "common practice," their use is certainly not seen as acceptable or fair among all athletes or with the spectating public. Hoberman argues on this view that relationships in sport are "poisoned" by the use of such unfair methods (33). Not only are athletes becoming more suspicious of one

another as to what substances or methods are being used against the rules, but the public is becoming more cynical with respect to the authenticity of record-breaking or personal-best performances. It is becoming more prevalent to hear claims that excellence in sport is somehow the result of illegal performance-enhancing methods. This can have an unsettling social effect. It can undermine sport's potential for unifying contestants and for unifying athletes and spectators around shared standards of excellence, the pursuit and achievement of which allows for mutual affirmation of sporting excellence. It is also dehumanizing in the sense that suspicion, mistrust, and cynicism, when built up over time, can generate social isolation, indifference, or antagonism amongst athletes, and between athletes and the spectating public.

One of the criteria that Downey and Telfer refer to when they discuss the essential attributes of "personhood" is the development and sustaining of complex emotions (18). While Downey and Telfer do not discuss what respecting "personhood" means in this case, the following implications can be drawn from their discussion of "rule-following" and "self-determination." If, as Downey and Telfer suggest self-determination means the ability and power to develop and exercise independent judgement, and rule-following means the ability to universalize principles of action and live by them, it is not implausible to suggest that individuals can be bound by rules or conventions that they voluntarily create or consent to without it jeopardizing their self-determination. It is clear from the discussion above that, in conditions where athletes are suspicious of

one another regarding the use of illegitimate or dubious means, and where spectators are cynical with respect to the authenticity of athletic performances, the emotional connections among athletes or between athletes and spectators are not ones indicative of social unity. If anything, bitterness, resentment, or indifference can have the effect of socially dividing athletes from one another or from the spectating public. On the other hand, rule or "ethos" adherence can be considered an implicit acknowledgement of the "personhood" of opponents, and it can also foster or solidify bonds between athletes based upon mutual respect, trust, camaraderie, and the like. While "ethos" violation may be more tempting in an environment based on the importance of winning, it can have the unsavoury effect of diminishing the ways that individuals can respect one another and foster emotional bonds of a socially unifying nature.

There is yet another situation connected to the pressure to win in sport that can jeopardize the "personhood" of athletes. It is common practice in many sports for some athletes to test the game officials (e.g., umpires, referees, or judges) in terms of how strictly rules will be enforced. This means that some athletes will very often attempt to "bend" or break the rules and conventions in order to test how stringently the officials will enforce them. This can produce not only the unsettling social effects between athletes as discussed above, but it can diminish that facets of "personhood" Downey and Telfer (18) refer to as "self-determination" and "rule-following." Self-determination suggests the ability to "stand on one's own feet" or to "chose for oneself," and it was shown above

that the voluntary creation or acceptance of rules can be considered consistent with autonomy. More than this, universalizing and living by rules means that individuals are choosing for others as well as for themselves. Yet, individuals can act toward one another in ways that take away the responsibility the other person has for their own interests, welfare, or choices. For example, over-zealous, conscientious, and well-meaning parents, teachers, or coaches can care so much for their "charges" that they are given little or no opportunity to develop and exercise autonomy. Rather than being given the opportunity to explore alternatives, learn from their mistakes, and develop independent judgement, children, students, and athletes can be overly supervised or overly directed to the point where dependence rather than independence is fostered.

It can also be the case that individuals attempt to relieve themselves of the responsibility for their own actions. The case of "bending" or breaking rules in order to test the officials or gain an advantage, can have the effect of transferring the responsibility for rule adherence to the game officials. To get away with as many rule violations until one is caught reflects a move away from self-regulation to one of external regulation. Rather than athletes regulating themselves according to shared standards of (ethical) excellence, their relations are mediated and regulated by (third-party) game officials. It is not uncommon in these situations to see officials being blamed by contestants and spectators for not "controlling the game" or ensuring the fairness of a particular contest. The "totalization" process referred to above can contribute

to the conditions where the pressure to win and the temptation to employ illegitimate or dubious means increases together. The situation where athletes transfer the responsibility for rule adherence from themselves to the sport officials can increase the need for a greater number of officials or greater use of "high-tech" surveillance methods (e.g., video cameras) to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the contest. At this stage there can be some serious doubts raised as to the ability of the sport practice to promote mutual development and exercise of "judgement," and mutual recognition and respect within a sporting community.

It should be stressed that the "ethos" violations or clashes can threaten not only the ethical but also other aesthetic features of social freedom in sport. Social relations capable of promoting social unity and thus social freedom can be undermined by relations that resemble more a "struggle against" an opponent for an exclusive external good rather than a "struggle with" an opponent for the achievement of an inclusive internal one. The employment of "unskilled" specialists, for example, to neutralize an opponent's ability through physical violence or intimidation not only degrades the social relation, but it also limits the range of technical skills and powers of "judgement" that can be mutually developed, refined, and responded to in the contest. In addition to minimizing the opportunities available to mutually recognize and respect they for the valuable challenges the opponent can present, intimidation tactics also diminish the range of talents and power that can be developed, tested and compared. Rather than matching and comparing

similar skills (e.g., skating, running, rebounding, etc.) or dissimilar ones (e.g., shooting/kicking with goal-keeping, etc.), the contest can become one where "unskilled" tactics are employed with the intention of simply neutralizing the opponent's abilities. "Neutralizing" the opponent's skills and powers through "traditional" sport-specific means opens up possibilities for mutual development and affirmation. However, the employment of any means whatsoever simply to "get the job done" does not. Where mutual development, recognition, and affirmation of concrete, personal talents and powers are minimized, so too are the possibilities for social unity and social freedom.

The use of "unskilled" specialists in this way is also indicative of a trend in sport toward increasing division of labour, specialization, and managerial control. Making use of athletic specialists to execute narrowly defined athletic or strategic manoeuvres can also diminish the sense of self-mastery and "judgement" that is possible for athletes. Part of what is meant by "judgement" in a social practice is developing and exercising technical expertise within shared standards of excellence and within the broader outlines of the performance itself. This means that developing or refining "judgement" requires, in addition to technical expertise, a sensitivity to the contours of the performance as it is designed and as it unfolds, and an ability to respond effectively (e.g., with finesse, timing, pace, or rhythm, etc.) and perhaps innovatively to the opportunities presented. Specialization and managerial control, which are motivated largely by the belief that

they minimize the potential for error by precisely allocating the requisite type and degree of skill or effort, does a disservice to athletes. Taking the decision-making responsibility out of the hands of athletes and investing it with specialist coaches and coordinators can diminish the importance of developing and exercising "judgement". Play-calling by coaches from the sidelines, for example, can mediate the relations among athletes in such a way that it can disrupt the intuitive "feel" that athletes can have for assessing the ongoing actions with teammates (and opponents) and selecting appropriate actions. In addition, the restricted range of skills provided by specialist teammates can diminish the opportunities to develop and sustain the type of focused and intimate interactions that are needed to develop the powers of "judgement" in the first place. The fragmentation of the team action and the devaluation of "judgement" can thus diminish sport's potential to be a source of social freedom. Taken together, these examples point to some of the ways that institutionalization can endanger the social practice of sport. In other words, unequal financial strengths, unequal competition, and the social rewards that make "winning-at-all-costs" attractive can threaten the achievement of sport's inclusive internal goods and thus its potential to exemplify and promote social freedom.

It can be argued that financial inequalities among teams in a league can also have a bearing on the ability of teams to maintain the continuity required to produce "good" team play. The financial inequalities among teams, which can tempt team owners to re-locate

franchises to larger markets or to sell players to wealthier franchises, can also be a reason for players to seek employment with wealthier franchises. In other words, revenue imbalances among teams, combined with player free agency, can contribute to conditions of increased player mobility and reduced (on-the-field) stability and continuity. Frequent player movement was shown above to have an unsettling effect on communities that have a strong collective identification with "their" team. It can also have an unsettling effect on the ability of a team to achieve its inclusive internal goods. "Good" team play has been shown to be more than the a mechanical reproduction of a strategic "game plan" and more than just the demonstration of individual expertise. "All-star" games do not necessarily mean that "good" team play will be demonstrated. "Good" team play requires an appreciation of the larger outlines of the performance and how individual actions can be mutually facilitated to achieve the team's common objectives. The achievement of team synchronicity very often requires a sustained commitment and interaction among team members. Frequent player movement can thus undermine the team stability and continuity that may be required to produce harmonious and effective team play. In cases like these, the social unity associated with the mutual struggle and achievement of a common end can be threatened.

Commercialization and the Corruption of Social Freedom

In the previous section of this chapter the claim was made that the revenues generated from the sale of national and local

broadcasting rights were essential to the operation of the sport leagues. It was also stated that because of the sport league's heavy reliance on these revenues, the mass media institutions could have a significant impact on the character of sport. Through the process of "commodification and massification," Sewart (78) argues that sport is gradually being modified along commercial mass-marketing lines. This has meant, in some cases, that sport rules have been changed to encourage a more wide-open and exciting (offensive) style of play; entertainment extravaganzas have been introjected before, during, and after the sport event; television advertising time has interrupted the "flow" of the contest; and spectators have been inundated with merchandising gimmicks and paraphernalia. The effect of this, for Sewart, is to transform sport into an entertainment spectacle.

With respect to this transformation of sport, both Sewart (78) and Lasch (49) agree that what matters is not so much that sport is being commercialized, but that it is being trivialized. By "trivialization," Lasch means the mass-marketing strategy that reduces the meaning of an activity to a level that is easily consumable by a mass audience. In place of the more sophisticated, subtle, sublime, aesthetic, or technical features of an activity, the consumer is offered a tantalizing mix of cheap, sensational gimmicks and spectacles (49). Lasch argues that television has " . . . enlarged the audience for sport while lowering the level of its understanding" (49: p. 106). This suggests that commercialization can have a positive effect in terms of broadening exposure to sport, but it can also have a deleterious effect by simplifying it. While

having played a sport is not essential to becoming a knowledgeable spectator, familiarity with the traditions, conventions, and standards of excellence that inform and guide play is. Acquiring an understanding of these traditions, conventions, and standards of excellence requires on the part of spectators a certain amount of attention, dedication, and experience. Knowledgeable spectators can engage their critical capacities to render judgements on the merits of sporting action because they have shared standards of (ethical or aesthetic) excellence from which critical judgements can be advanced, and against which these judgements can be defended. As a group, they are also capable of exerting public pressure to reinstate styles and standards of play that were previously compromised by sensationalistic-oriented promoters and spectators. While Iasch argues that "one of the virtues of contemporary sports lies in their resistance to the erosion of standards and their capacity to appeal to a knowledgeable audience" (49: p. 105), attempts are still being made by promoters to appeal to the lowest common denominator of spectator interest.

In terms of "cost-effectiveness" it would appear prudent (in the short run) to market sport in easily understandable terms rather than educating potential spectators to the finer points of sporting excellence. That is, it would seem easier to lower the standards of the practice in order to appeal to a larger audience rather than maintaining high standards that would likely appeal to a restricted one. If put into practice, this could have the effect of obscuring the (ethical and aesthetic) features of the "good" contest.

Spectators unfamiliar with the standards of athletic or strategic excellence could not be expected then to develop and demonstrate a sense of "judgement" with respect to the (internal) merits of the contest. So in this sense, maintaining or extending the standards of excellence relevant to the social practice of sport could prove more difficult for the spectator. The decline or absence of knowledgeable spectators might also prove to be a disincentive for athletes; they might show less concern for, or take less pride in, excellence if aware that their efforts are no longer judged, appreciated, and affirmed by a knowledgeable audience. Ignorance of standards or lower expectations on the part of spectators can thus diminish the incentive for league management and promoters to promote the "good" contest, and it can leave spectators more vulnerable to promotional tactics that accentuate the lowest common denominator of spectator appeal (e.g., crude, sensationalized entertainment).

Exception could be taken, however, to Sewart's point (78) that emphasis on offensive displays in football is also part of the "trivialization" process. It appears, on Sewart's account, that the kicking game and defensive team play, as skilful as they might be in their own right, fail to have much spectator appeal. Rule changes to accentuate offensive scoring potential is, presumably, a more exciting aspect of football, and thus a facet of the game more likely to attract increased spectator interest. However, keeping in mind the previous discussion concerning challenging opposition, unpredictability of outcome, and the close contest, these same rules changes could be interpreted in a way that is compatible with the

"good" contest. For example, if the purpose of the kick-off in football is to put the ball into play, then the powerful kicking specialist of recent years has all but eliminated the dramatic kickoff return. By consistently kicking the ball through the end-zone or so deep into the end-zone such that it significantly reduces the likelihood of a return, the athletic ability of one player has outstripped the (team) possibilities presented by kickoff coverage and return. Moving back the kick-off line can have the effect of re-introducing the relevance of (team) kick-off and return skills and strategies. Similarly, consistently overwhelming defensive play may be considered excellent in its own right, but it can diminish the sense of dramatic tension and excitement that precedes, and mounts during, the clash between offensive and defensive teams. In other words, if the defensive team is consistently "impregnable," then there exists little or no challenge, unpredictability of outcome, or dramatic tension. These two examples alone show that some rule changes can have the effect of reintroducing the importance of certain skills and strategies to the production of balanced and dramatic action. When this occurs, the rule changes can be said to be compatible with the "good" sport contest.

State Involvement and the Corruption of Social Freedom

In Chapter III it was also shown that the State has had an impact on the institution of sport. For the most part the State (i.e., legislature and judiciary) has mediated the struggle between

sport management and labour by providing mechanisms for them to settle their disputes. However, in the course of trying to stabilize league operations, there has been a public interest at stake besides the provision of relatively balanced sporting contests to the public. Some State authorities were shown to support the view that the "intrinsic" value of sport (i.e., competitiveness, fair play, and teamwork), as they perceived it, could prove useful in terms of inculcating dominant social values (e.g., hard work, democracy) and alleviating a variety of social ills (e.g., crime, juvenile delinquency, etc.). In addition to the ideological and therapeutic value that sport can have, it was also thought that the pure entertainment value could not be overlooked.

While it may be the case that sport can serve ideological, therapeutic, and entertainment functions, there is a danger in the State associating the value of sport too heavily with these instrumental ends. The danger lies in focusing the debate over the merits of sport exclusively at the institutional level and, thus, overlooking the distinctive features and contributions of sport as a social practice. In other words, if the State is concerned with stabilizing sport league operations in order to promote certain ideological ends, then this simply means that now two institutions have agendas and claims on what are thought to be the external (economic or political) goods of sport. Again, the value of the "good" sport contest in terms of practice excellence, social unity, and social freedom goes unnoticed. Rather than competitiveness, fair play, and teamwork being considered in terms of their potential

development within, and contribution to, practice excellence within a community of practitioners and spectators, the State's case for sport's social benefits is derived more from institutional concerns. The case for social freedom in sport has been made on the basis of recognizing how social practices, even while dependent upon institutions, can unite individuals through the pursuit and achievement of inclusive internal goods. The State's emphasis on external goods, and its failure to recognize the social value of sport in terms of practice excellence and social unity makes the State an unwitting accomplice to the corruption of sport. In other words, the State's concern for the integrity of sport (as a political instrument) is misplaced because it ignores how its own instrumental designs on sport can overshadow the inclusive internal goods of the activity.

This chapter has shown that the equal distribution of certain league revenues (i.e., the sale of national broadcasting rights) can contribute to balancing the economic strength of teams in a league. However, variations in economic strength were shown to be due to the different potential each franchise has to generate revenues from gate receipts, the sale of local broadcasting rights, and public subsidization. In the absence of equal revenue sharing schemes for gate receipts and local broadcasting revenues, franchises located in the larger metropolitan areas tended to dominate competition in economic and sporting terms. The tendency for franchises to re-locate to larger markets, for franchises to negotiate lucrative subsidization agreements under threat of re-locating, for players to

be sold (for their exchange value) to the wealthier franchises, and for free agents to re-locate, was shown to have deleterious consequences for sport as a source of social unity and social freedom. The social unity thought to be essential to franchise stability could be compromised when partisan spectators become disillusioned and cynical with respect to the loyalties of sport management and labour. More significantly, economic and sporting imbalances were shown to diminish sport's potential to promote social freedom through the "good" sports contest. That is, sport contests lacking commensurate opposition, unpredictability of outcome, and closeness were shown to diminish the potential sport has for promoting for mutually satisfying challenges, effective action, personal disclosure, "judgement," mutual recognition, and respect. In addition, unbalanced competition can also diminish spectator appeal and the ability of spectators and athletes (as a knowledgeable sport community) to uphold the traditions and standards of "good" play in the face of attempts to commodify and "trivialize" sport. It was also established that the State's role in promoting sport management and labour harmony was motivated, in part, by a desire to see certain ideological, therapeutic, and entertainment goals served by mass sport. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the State's concern for the integrity of sport was partially misplaced; for the preoccupation with external political goods (as opposed to external economic ones) could overshadow recognition and concern for the preservation of the inclusive internal goods of sport thought to form the basis of social freedom.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary and Conclusions

The analysis of the sport and social freedom issue began with the suggestion that any highly organized sport is too much of a sport to be a business and too much of a business to be a sport. Public perceptions toward sport appear to be torn between two seemingly antithetical orientations: first, that sport has a "seriousness" of its own that cannot be understood in political-economic terms; and second, that sport has a commercial and ideological "seriousness" that renders problematic its status as sport. "Sport and Social Freedom" set out to philosophically explore the "sporting" and political-economic dimensions of social freedom in the context of liberal, free-market institutions.

Chapter I demonstrated that the conception of sport and its links to social freedom differed on both the sport-as-play and the sport-as-alienated-labour accounts. Underlying these distinct and antithetical images of sport there was shown to exist equally distinct political-economic agendas that reveal fundamental differences in how social freedom in sport is defined or understood. In one version of the sport-as-play account, the fusion of sport's formal and metaphysical-spiritual features rendered a view of sport's social freedom that situated it outside of mainstream political-economic activity. In another version, the fusion of sport's formal

and rational-scientific features produced a view of social freedom that situated it within the liberal framework of co-operative individualist freedom. Neither version was shown capable of mounting concrete social resistance to existing rational-scientific institutions under capitalism. On the sport-as-alienated-labour account, however, sport's (overstated) links to alienated capitalist institutions precluded the possibility of sport being considered a source of social freedom. The (vulgar, reductionist) Marxist presuppositions of the sport-as-alienated-labour account was shown to make the issue of sport's social freedom contingent upon the supersession of capitalism. However, analysis suggested that social freedom in sport need not be limited to a (playful) withdrawal from, a positive affirmation of, or a supersession of liberal free-market institutions.

The understanding of how sport can express a distinctive, yet socially grounded form of freedom within liberal, free-market society first required an understanding of the larger issue of liberal social freedom. While liberalism, in principle, suggests that diverse expressions of social life can thrive, analysis revealed that the domination of social life by industrial, bureaucratic, and market institutions under capitalism renders the possibility of social freedom problematic. It was shown in Chapter II that liberal notions of individual freedom could be used to ideologically justify the personal alienation, social indifference, and social antagonisms that can result from institutional life under capitalism. However, it was also demonstrated that individuals could actively engage their

talents and powers in mutually empowering, fulfilling, and socially unifying ways through their commitment to pursue, extend, or refine the internal goods (i.e., standards of excellence) of a social practice. The social practice - social institution distinction made it possible to discuss the issue of social freedom in distinctively concrete, social, and critical terms, even while social practices are located within, and a largely dependent upon, social institutions for their survival.

The distinction made between social practices and social institutions also made it possible to examine the sport and social freedom issue without necessarily tying it to the sport-as-play and sport-as-alienated-labour accounts. Chapter III established that the mutual recognition, pursuit, achievement, and appreciation of sport's internal standards of (ethical and aesthetic) excellence could be considered a basis for social freedom in sport. Social freedom in competitive relations was shown to be based upon the ethical and aesthetically "good" contest. Despite the fact that competition produces an outcome (i.e., one winner) that cannot be shared, the manner in which this end is pursued was shown to be capable of generating mutual or inclusive benefits. "Fairness," as a pre-condition of the "good" contest, was shown to be a basis upon which mutual trust, respect, contest validity, and mutual recognition and affirmation of excellence can be achieved. Analysis of "good" sport team action was also shown to involve social relations that exemplify social freedom. Rather than being mediated by social structures that diminish the possibilities for effective, mutually

empowering, and fulfilling social relations, "good" sport team action was shown to heighten the mutual and complementary acquisition, development, and exercise of talents and powers among teammates. Despite some of the excesses associated with partisan spectator support, it was also demonstrated that otherwise antagonistic partisan supporters can be socially united in their recognition, appreciation, and affirmation of the "good" sport contest. In each of the three cases above, it was shown that the acquisition, development, and extension of personal talents and powers cannot come about without contributing, at the same time, to the like development of others. The inclusive benefits that were shown to be possible through the pursuit of sport's internal standards of excellence lent support to the argument that individuals can be socially free in distinctively concrete and social manner even while the practice of sport is organized within capitalist institutions. It also lent support to the position that sport's social freedom need not be connected entirely to a (playful) withdrawal from political-economic life, nor to an outright supersession of capitalist institutions.

Chapter IV demonstrated that the major professional sport leagues did not operate quite like other capitalist institutions, yet the struggle to control sport's external goods still threatened the integrity of sport as a social practice. While some of the anti-competitive practices employed by the sport leagues (i.e., franchise distribution, revenue sharing, and player reservation) were thought by owners to be necessary to establish financial and sporting parity among teams in a league, it was shown that the unequal distribution

of some other important sources of revenue contributed to the financial and sporting advantages enjoyed by some franchises. This was shown to produce a situation where owners can be tempted to employ dubious means to maximize franchise revenues (e.g., player sales, threatened franchise shifts to boost public subsidization, "trivialization" of the sport event, etc.) and where players can become more militant with regard to their demands for economic freedom (i.e., free agency). The State's role in the institutionalization of the sport management and labour sectors has been limited mainly to providing the necessary legislative and judicial means for both groups to settle their economic disputes. However, the State's concern for ensuring sport's institutional stability was shown to be motivated more by external ideological goals (i.e., socialization of dominant values, tension management, and integration) than by the ethical or aesthetic goods internal to the practice of sport itself. In sum, the concern for promoting the achievement of sport's external monetary and ideological goods was shown to threaten the achievement of sport's internal goals and thus its potential to express social freedom.

Recommendations

Sport, as a social practice, has been shown to have the potential to promote a communal alternative to the types of social relations and social freedom prevalent in capitalist institutions. This inquiry would be incomplete if it did not address the issue of how social freedom in sport could be enhanced or better understood.

While it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to work out the full details of such a proposal, it is still possible to tease out the criteria that could be employed to guide further research and mount a program of institutional reform. Whatever suggestions that are advanced must take into consideration the potential sport institutions have for corrupting the social practices they bear. It would do well to consider Horkheimer's following comments:

It has often been said that sport should not become an aim, but should remain an instrument. To me the first idea seems right and the second one wrong. As long as it is only an instrument, and consciously recognized as such, it may be used in the service of profit, politics, egotism or just as a pastime. Whether it serves health is, in my view, problematic. But all these ends, whether good or problematic, will destroy sport if they are allowed to dominate it totally, will prevent its being an expression of freedom. In this respect sport is like art, literature and philosophy, and all the springs of the productive imagination. To preserve its freedom, to allow it to make its own decisions and dictate its own regulations, in spite of all the powerful influences from outside, seems to be the historic task of all those who are seriously concerned with sport (35: p. 185).

Horkheimer is suggesting that a distinction can be made between sport as an instrument and sport as an end-in-itself. In the first instance, sport appears to be tied to necessity, while in the second instance, sport is linked to autonomy and freedom. Rather than being guided by external, instrumental objectives, sport expresses its freedom when it is guided by standards internal to sport itself. Horkheimer is not suggesting, however, that sport's ties to external, instrumental ends be completely severed. For all the instrumental goods that can be achieved through sport, Horkheimer is suggesting that it is the integrity of sport's internal goods that need to be recognized, protected, and advanced.

It has been argued at various stages of this inquiry that social freedom need not mean an escape into "private life" nor an assimilation to capitalist notions of social freedom. It has also been argued that sport's potential to exemplify and promote social freedom need not be a (playful) withdrawal from, a merging with, or a supersession of, capitalist institutional life. As a social practice, sport appears to straddle the realm of play and the realm of political-economy without being entirely reducible to either. The appeal to sport's inclusive internal goods has meant the introduction of a new frame of reference and language through which the sport and social freedom issue can be articulated. Moreover, the language of inclusive internal goods of social practices also provides a backdrop against which the ideological penetration of sport can be detected:

For ideological dispositions to sport, we realize, are grounded in political psychology, which in turn finds its own sources in questions of philosophy. In this sense, sport can function as a powerful instrument in the search for the origins of ideology itself (34: p. 110).

It has been shown that the major representative views of sport have carried ideological baggage with them the effect of which was to skew the definitions or understanding of social freedom.

While the appeal to the inclusive standards of (ethical and aesthetic) sporting excellence can hopefully encourage critical debate on the sport and social freedom issue, further efforts are required to break free from the theoretical and ideological shackles that limit current sport theory. Future research needs to transcend the individualistic and the deterministic frames of reference that tend to dominate the discussions of social freedom in liberal

society. The vocabulary of inclusive internal goods needs to be elaborated upon in order to capture the distinctively intersubjective elements of social relations within social practices. The mutually empowering and affirming social relations that are possible within social practices need to be consciously recognized for the alternative view of social freedom they can support. Future research in sport will require a departure from the strictly metaphysical-spiritual and the political-economic frameworks that hold sway. Critical inquiry in sport needs to take its cues more from the standards internal to sport as such rather than from categories (i.e., play, or alienated labour) which may not be entirely applicable to sport. In other words, sport critics and defenders need to consciously recognize an internal as well as an external vantage point from which to assess sport and its potential to express social freedom.

While valuable as a heuristic tool, the appeal to the liberating features of inclusive (ethical and aesthetic) goods can act to "alert all those who are seriously concerned with sport" to the dangers faced by sport from institutions. The case for social freedom in sport hinges on the ability of athletes and spectators to mutually recognize, nurture, and appreciate shared standards of (ethical and aesthetic) sporting excellence. It is upon this normative framework that charges of institutional corruption can be levied and against which institutional reform can be justified. A practical example which highlights this potential can be found in the issue of revenue distribution in sport leagues.

It was shown that while capitalism has the potential to produce abundance, it has a vested interest in maintaining scarcity. The major criticism of capitalism centered on its tendency to aggravate a host of personally obliterating and socially divisive institutional forms of life in response to scarcity conditions. This suggests that one solution to the problem is eliminating or significantly reducing the material and social inequalities that give rise to these alienating social conditions in the first place. While this is a commonplace suggestion in socialist circles, even Rawls (71) suggests that, in the name of justice, material and social inequalities need to be redressed somewhat. When Rawls suggests that individuals can come to appreciate the excellence of others (in social unions) when they are secure in the exercise of their ability (71), he means that resources need to be distributed in such a way as to diminish the material obligations and incentives that can accompany and influence participation in social unions.

When applied to sport, this suggests that the pursuit, achievement, and distribution of sport's external goods (i.e., revenues) may need to be modified along similar lines. That is, the inclusive internal goods of the social practice can establish the criteria against which the generation and distribution of league revenues should take place. However, analysis revealed that certain features of the cartel structure of the major sport leagues considered in the study are already justified, in principle, by sporting standard of excellence. That is, the monopoly privileges enjoyed by franchise owners are legally justified on the basis of their contributing to balanced sporting competitions. Sporting parity is thought to require financial parity; "good" contests, in terms of

dramatic closeness, serve both internal (i.e., sporting) and external (i.e., commercial) goods. The anti-competitive practices of dividing markets and certain forms of revenues is thought to be justifiable on the grounds that it redresses the economic imbalances that exist between the franchises located in larger, more lucrative markets and those that are not. However, while the cartel structure of the major sport leagues is indeed an anomaly in a largely free-market system, it still can produce economic imbalances which ultimately threaten the pursuit and achievement of sport's inclusive internal goods.

To remedy this situation the following institutional reforms can be considered. If sport leagues are allowed to operate as cartels (and not as competing firms within the same industry) so as to provide balanced sporting competitions, then measures need to be taken to redress the economic imbalances that persist in the league. Perfect cartelization, or at least a more equitable division of all league revenues, could have the effect of making the economic value of each franchise similar. This in turn could reduce the economic incentive that exists for owners to relocate franchises, for players to be sold simply for their exchange value, and for players to seek higher salaries with franchises located in the larger markets. These changes could go some way toward improving team stability, continuity, and local spectator identification with players and teams. Balanced financial strength among teams can contribute in part to the achievement of sport's internal and external goods. Balanced competition, which can mean the greater likelihood of close contests, can contribute to the aesthetic appreciation and thus the economic utility of the "goods" contest. In addition, the greater likelihood of close

contests means that sport can serve as a better platform for mutually challenging and disclosing action among athletes, and thus for greater possibilities of mutual recognition, respect, and affirmation.

However, balancing financial strengths among teams in a league may not go far enough in redressing all the situations in sport where the pursuit of external goods (i.e., financial reward and social notoriety) can corrupt the internal goods of sport. The financial and social rewards attached to success in sport are still sufficiently large enough to tempt players, owners, and sport broadcasting networks to employ dubious means which in turn threaten sporting excellence and the long term welfare of the practice. It is clear that whatever changes need to be addressed or made in the operation of sport within capitalist institutions, the inclusive standards of (ethical and aesthetic) sporting excellence can serve as a normative guide.

The recognition of the sport practice's normative criteria could justify an expanded role for the State in sport matters. The State's scrutiny and involvement in sports affairs is largely limited to the regulation of the pursuit of sport's external goods. Empowering the sport labour sector to allow athletes to better compete for sport's external goods, as just one example of how the State can intervene in sports, still limits the action of the State to institutional matters. Much more needs to be done if the integrity of sport's inclusive internal goods, and thus sport's potential to promote social freedom, is to be maintained. In order for this to come about, it would be necessary for the State to broaden its conception of what public interest is at stake in the operation of professional sport leagues. However, if the protection of

"moral content" in sport is an unsavory situation for a liberal State to find itself in, intervention to protect sport's inclusive internal goods will pose a dilemma. It may very well be that the endeavour to articulate what (alternative) social freedoms are possible in liberal society also has the effect of exposing liberal society's limitations in being able to protect them.

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