

**RELIGION AND CONFLICT:
WHAT EXPLAINS THE PUZZLING CASE OF “ISLAMIC VIOLENCE” AND
ISLAMIST PARTY MODERATION?**

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Suveyda Karakaya

August 2013

© by Suveyda Karakaya, 2013

All rights reserved

*This dissertation is dedicated to my husband Mahmut
and my beautiful daughter Zeynep Neda.*

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to many people that made this work possible. Though I cannot thank all of the numerous people who have contributed to this experience, a few deserve select mention. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Brandon Prins. He always enlightened my path with his patient guidance, encouragement and careful assessment. Also, I would like to thank my committee members Dr. Ian Down, Dr. Wonjae Hwang, and Dr. Youshaa Patel. Their advice and counsel have been of equal importance. I greatly appreciate their time and input to this dissertation.

Furthermore I would also like to acknowledge with much appreciation the crucial role of Dr Ahmet Kuru, Dr Kadir Yildirim, and Dr Renat Shaykutdinov, who patiently reviewed initial drafts of this dissertation and provided very useful suggestions. Within the Political Science Department, I owe many thanks to my fellow graduate students, Amanda Sanford and Nurgul Aitalieva, who were always willing to help me.

Last but not least, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my husband Mahmut, who had been through the same challenging process, and earned his PhD degree just two years ago. You taught me so much about sacrifice, self-discipline, patience, and compromise. Finishing this dissertation would be a dream without your never-ending love, encouragement, and support. I feel very lucky and privileged to have you.

Abstract

Despite considerable interest in the relationship between Islam and political violence, there is little systematic empirical research that explores the intra-state conflict proneness of Muslim-majority states. Existing studies either offer inconclusive evidence of a relationship or suffer from methodological flaws. If we analyze the proportion of countries with large Muslim populations that experience domestic armed conflicts, Muslim-majority states do in fact stand out. What explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world and to what extent does religion play a role in promoting violence? Under which conditions ethno-political organizations opt for violent strategies to achieve their political goals? Under which conditions Islamist parties denounce violence and shift from radical to moderate, pragmatist positions? These questions are yet to be fully addressed. In an attempt to fill a gap in the extant literature, this dissertation investigates the empirical nexus between Islam and political violence/nonviolence by specifically focusing on the incidence of domestic armed conflict, group-level political violence (such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party moderation. I explore the role of religion and Islamist ideology in driving political violence in the first two quantitative chapters whereas the qualitative chapter focuses on Islamist party moderation. I argue that religion alone does not necessarily make countries more or less conflict-prone. Socio-economic and political conditions usually determine the decision to resort to violence or alternatively to renounce violence and to moderate. Higher prevalence of repressive regimes, poverty, and youth bulges make Muslim-plurality countries very vulnerable to domestic conflict. The overall findings indicate that, contrary to suggestions and claims in the literature, neither religious fractionalization nor Islam promotes political violence once socio-economic and political factors are taken into account. Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionately

involved in domestic armed conflict, but these states are also characterized by lower GDP per capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate strongly with domestic armed conflict. Moreover, the analysis of Islamist parties suggest that Islamist parties respond to societal changes, renounce violence and moderate their radical ideologies when they are given a chance to participate in the political system.

Table of Contents

I.	Chapter 1	
a.	Introduction.....	1
b.	Reference List.....	11
II.	Chapter 2	
a.	The Puzzling Case of “Islamic Violence”: What Explains Prevalence of Domestic Armed Conflict in the Muslim World?.....	13
b.	Reference List.....	44
c.	Appendix 1: List of Tables.....	51
d.	Appendix 2: List of Figures.....	60
III.	Chapter 3:	
a.	Ethno-political Organizations in the Middle East: When Do They Opt for Violence?.....	61
b.	Reference List.....	86
c.	Appendix 1: List of Tables.....	89
d.	Appendix 2: List of Figures.....	94
e.	Appendix 3: Description of Variables.....	96
IV.	Chapter 4	
a.	De-radicalization and Moderation of Islamist Parties.....	101
b.	Reference List.....	136
c.	Appendix 1: List of Tables.....	142
d.	Appendix 2: List of Interviewees.....	144
V.	Chapter 5	
a.	Conclusion.....	145
b.	Reference List.....	158
VI.	Vita.....	159

List of Tables

Table	Page
2.1 Summary of Variables.....	51
2.2 Summary of Descriptive Statistics in Muslim-plurality and other countries.....	52
2.3 Bivariate Regressions.....	53
2.4 Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict (1981-2009).....	54
2.5 Correlation of Independent Variables.....	55
2.6 Random-Effects Model.....	56
2.7 Relogit Model.....	57
2.8 Regressions with Muslim Proportion.....	58
2.9 List of Domestic Armed Conflict.....	59
3.1 Correlation of Independent Variables.....	89
3.2 Summary of Variables.....	90
3.3 Summary of Descriptive Statistics.....	91
3.4 Logistic Regression on Use of Violence by Ethno-political Organizations (1980-2004)....	92
3.5 Alternative Model Specifications.....	93
4.1 Arguments on Islamist Moderation in the Literature.....	142
4.2 Summary of Cases.....	143

List of Figures

Figure	Page
2.1 Repression and the Predicted Probability of Intra-state Conflict.....	60
3.1 Probability of Violence in Autocratic and Non-Autocratic Countries.....	94
3.2 Youth Bulges and Predicted Probability of Use of Violence.....	95

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In December 2010, a Tunisian vegetable peddler burned himself to death as a protest after his cart is taken away by police. This incident created a spillover effect of violent and nonviolent protests in many Middle Eastern countries, and initiated the Arab Spring. So far, the Arab Spring successfully toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya while the protests in Syria transformed into a bloody civil war. Both academicians and policy makers are wondering about the causes of these ongoing protests and the cycle of violence in the Middle East. In fact, it is not uncommon to see politically oriented violence in the Middle East, as well as in other parts of the Muslim world.

While some scholars argue that unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions such as state repression, income inequality, and unemployment are driving violence in the Muslim world, others emphasize the influence of religion in fostering violence (Dalacoura 2011; Fish et al. 2010; Hafez 2003; Huntington 1996; Toft 2007; Zaidise et al 2007). Not surprisingly, since 9/11, Islam is used as an explanatory concept for many issues involving Muslims. More specifically, even among scholars, there is the tendency to refer to Islamic culture to explain many failures in the Muslim world without proper research (Roy 2004). Yet, the Muslim world is very diverse; there is no unique Islam and the understanding/practice of Islam differs considerably from one region to another. For example, while many mainstream religious leaders and Muslims contend that those who kill civilians in the name of Islam are not Muslims, some militant groups with an “Islamist” ideology argue the opposite; they believe that those who denounce the physical struggle against nonbelievers are not Muslims (Vertigans 2009). What explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world? To what extent does religion play a role in promoting violence? Even though public interest in this subject significantly

increased especially after 9/11 terrorist attacks, these questions remain underexplored and existing studies suffer from oversimplification or methodological flaws.

Some scholars argue that religious fundamentalism and/or political Islam is a reaction to modernity; the goal is protection of religious identity from modernity and secularism (Ayoob 2005; Fox 2004). Modern social scientists such as Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, and Max Weber, predicted that modernity would lead to the institutional separation of religious and secular spheres as well as the marginalization and decline of religion (Appleby 2000). Contrary to the expectations of modernization and secularization theory, the portion of the world population adhering to Christianity, Islam and Hinduism increased from fifty percent in 1900 to sixty-four percent in 2000 (Toft et al 2011:2). In-line with this trend, the influence of religion on politics has also increased (Armstrong 2009; Berger 1999; Fox 2007; Philpott 2007). Toft et al. note that “Once passive, religion is now assertive and engaged. Once local, it is now global. Once subservient to the powers that be, religion has often become prophetic and resistant to politicians at every level” (2011:3). Ironically, the resurgence of religion is facilitated by the dynamics of modernization (which predicted the demise of religion) such as democracy, technological improvements in communication, and globalization. The crises in secular ideologies also contributed to this religious resurgence (Toft et al 2011).¹

The religious resurgence that we have witnessed since the 1960s has led to the increasing impact of religion in politics. In many parts of the world, religious institutions have prominent public roles and the public-private distinction is blurred (Appleby 2000). The increasing influence of religion on politics is also manifested in wars. Civil wars driven by religious differences have increased over time as they are often cited to be more destructive, more likely to

¹ Many secular governments have failed to provide prosperity and stability in the developing countries. As a result, secular ideologies lost popularity whereas ideologies inspired by religion became more prominent.

recur, and longer lasting compared with non-religious civil wars (Toft 2007). In 2010, 50% of sixteen ongoing civil wars had a religious basis (Toft et al. 2011).

Religion has the potential to promote conflict by influencing the identity, loyalty and political goals of people. However, religious goals and identities often mix with non-religious goals in many conflicts (Philpott 2007). Religious cleavages are not clearly distinguishable from ethnic grievances in some cases and, therefore, may not be the root cause of many supposedly religious domestic armed conflicts (Appleby 2000; Philpott 2007). For example, Appleby points out that the exact role of religion in the Bosnian war (1992-1995) is not clear. Even though religious symbols were clearly utilized, some analysts point out that the most Bosnian Muslims were secularized and only a few Serb or Croat nationalist leaders were practicing Catholicism or Orthodoxy. For instance, according to Paul Mojzes, a religious historian, the Bosnian war was primarily ethno-national, not religious (Appleby 2000: 67-68). Similarly, it is not exactly clear whether the Chechen fighters in Russia and the Palestinians (e.g., Hamas in Gaza) are motivated by religion or nationalism.

Some scholars (Fox 2007; Toft et al. 2011) criticize the tendency on the part of international relations scholarship to underestimate the impact of religion by emphasizing social and economic causes, whereas other scholars (Canetti et al. 2010; Fish et al. 2010; Sorli et al. 2005) are more skeptical about the impact of religion. Toft et al. argue that 'religion is a basic driver of politics in its own right' (2011:219). On the other hand, Canetti et al. (2010) and Zaidise et al. (2007) argue that socio-economic deprivation plays a mediating role between political violence and religion. As Coward and Smith (2004) point out, religious texts and practices are open to interpretation. Therefore, the interpretation or manipulation of religion by social actors explains how the same religious sources could be used to promote both violence

and peace. Moreover, improvements in cross-cultural communication caused religious polycentrism. Therefore, seemingly religious behaviors cannot be explained by religious affiliation alone.

Extremists, who argue that they uphold the fundamentals of religion, are highly selective in choosing religious doctrines to justify violence. Thus, they convince uneducated ordinary believers by using selective religious scriptures, which seemingly endorse violence (Appleby 2000). While there are instances when Islamic groups tend to shift from radical to moderate positions, or vice versa, there is little evidence that these shifts in strategies stem from religious teachings. For example, the concept of “Jihad” can be used both to justify violence and peaceful activities since it is interpreted differently by different Muslims. Classical Islamic scholars point out two primary types of jihad: the greater jihad and the lesser jihad. The first one refers to the spiritual struggle to be a morally better person by fighting off immoral desires, whereas the latter one, which is only a means to achieve the greater jihad, refers to a physical struggle permitted under certain conditions such as self-defense or oppression. Yet, contemporary radical Islamist groups redefined jihad as an individual duty for all Muslims to fight against non-Muslims as well as some seemingly “Muslim” leaders. So, any person who does not follow Islam and who prevents “the realization of Islam” becomes a legitimate target of jihad (Mandaville 2006).

Among all religions, Islam is the most commonly associated with political violence.² It is argued that Islam is intolerant towards nonbelievers and hence, it is inherently conflict-prone. The scholars who refer to Islamic culture to explain prevalence of domestic and inter-state conflict in the Muslim world rely on the concept of jihad, some selective historical cases, and selective verses from the Koran (Laquer 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For instance, Huntington (1996) argues that “Islam has bloody borders and bloody innards”. Yet, numerous quantitative

² Indeed, many scholars argue that Islam is particularly prone to violence. See Zaidise et al. (2007:502) for details

studies have tested Huntington's (1996) famous "clash of civilizations" thesis and found little or no empirical support.³ Similarly, some scholars claim that Islam encourages the use of violence against non-Muslims since the obligation of jihad calls for a fight against nonbelievers (Laquer 2003). All in all, even though these scholars do not necessarily explore the causal factors that lead to Muslim-majority states' disproportionate involvement in intra-state conflicts, they still characterize Muslim-majority countries as more violence/conflict prone in general.

However, Muslims historically have been mostly peaceful and tolerant. Just two decades ago, religious ideologies in the Middle East were not popular at all and suicide terror in the name of jihad was very rare (Mousseau 2011). Moreover, socio-economic and political grievances may be the root cause of seemingly religiously oriented violence. For example, public opinion surveys show that those who think 9/11 terrorist attacks are justified are not Islamists at all and most radical Muslims have a Western education, not a religious one (Kurzman 2011; Roy 2004). According to a survey conducted in 2001, seventy five percent of Muslims believe that the US foreign policy was partly responsible for the 9/11 attacks (Kurzman 2011). Similarly, Roy (2004:46) notes that "Al Qaeda did not attack Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome but the World Trade Center; it targeted modern imperialism".

To sum up, while theoretical debates about the role of Islam in promoting conflict are abundant, there are only a handful of empirical studies. The existing studies provide mixed evidence regarding Islam's role in promoting conflict (Fish et al 2010; Fox 2007; Sorli et al 2005; Toft et al 2011). There is no scholarly consensus about the extent to which religion in general and the Islamic faith in particular, may foster violence. Does religion have an independent effect on conflicts regardless of socio-economic conditions or does it act as a catalyst under certain

³ Many studies have challenged Huntington's thesis. For a comprehensive list of quantitative studies testing Huntington's thesis, see Fox (2007:366).

circumstances? Under what conditions do ethno-political organizations resort to violence? Are religious organizations more violence-prone than others? Under what conditions do Islamist parties renounce the use of violent means and ideologically and behaviorally moderate? These questions are yet to be addressed systematically.

The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to these literatures by investigating the empirical nexus between Islam and political violence/nonviolence. This dissertation will specifically focus on the incidence of domestic armed conflict, group-level political violence (such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party moderation. The benefits of this research are threefold. First, it sheds light on the complex relationship between Islam and political violence through a more systematic, theoretically oriented and empirical analysis that better controls for alternative explanations for political violence. Second, understanding the factors that make ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies over non-violent ones has significant policy implications. The findings of this research are likely to inform policy makers and assist them in developing strategies that help to reduce the threat of religious radicalism. Third, understanding the evolution of radical Islamist parties (the moderation process) is necessary for better policymaking especially in the wake of the “Arab Spring.” Islamist parties are key political actors in the Middle East and their degree of commitment to liberal democratic principles as well as the moderation process will be very influential during the democratic transitions in the region.

Chapter Outline

In chapter 2, I examine factors that increase a country’s risk of experiencing domestic armed conflicts and I empirically test competing arguments proposed by scholars to explain domestic conflict in the Muslim world. Muslim-majority states’ domestic conflict proneness is

explained by a number of competing arguments that rely on either case studies or mere descriptive statistics. In this chapter, I first review the literature on Islam and political violence, and domestic armed conflict, respectively. Second, I compare the prevalence of domestic armed conflicts and some socio-economic indicators in Muslim-plurality countries to other countries by using descriptive statistics. Then, I develop a general domestic armed conflict onset model and conduct logistic regression analysis to test my hypotheses. I argue that the higher prevalence of repressive regimes, poverty, and youth bulges in the Islamic world make Muslim-plurality countries very vulnerable to domestic armed conflict. I utilize the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's recent data for the 1981-2009 period to test my hypotheses. The empirical findings show that Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionately involved in domestic armed conflicts, but these states are also characterized by lower GDP per capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate strongly with domestic armed conflict. The significance of Islam disappears when controls for such factors are included in the statistical model.

In chapter 3, I conduct a group-level analysis and explore conditions under which ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their goals. This chapter builds on the previous chapter by focusing on factors that increase the probability of the use of violence at the group-level rather than country-level. The review of the literature suggests that ethno-political organizations' decision to use violence is influenced by the existence of grievances, political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, organizational structure, and the ideology of the organization. In addition to these commonly cited factors, I argue that the existence of youth bulges in a society also increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. Frustrated young males under repressive and authoritarian regimes tend to be

likely recruits for violent organizations. I use the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, which includes 118 organizations in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa to test my hypotheses. Even though the level of analysis and also degree of violence differs from the previous chapter, the findings suggest that similar causal factors that promote domestic armed conflict such as socio-economic grievances, existence of repressive states, and youth bulges also increase the probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. Ethno-political organizations that have a religious/ Islamist ideology are no more conflict-prone than other organizations. These findings are consistent with the findings of the previous chapter; socio-economic factors and political opportunities/constraints rather than religion drives the decision to resort to violence. Some scholars argue that youth have played a significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Those young people, dissatisfied with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled against their governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). The findings of this chapter support the argument that the existence of youth bulges in the Middle East increases the probability of resorting to violence.

In chapter 4, I examine causal factors that contribute to moderation of Islamist parties. While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist parties is equally important, which remains underexplored. In this respect, exploring the evolution of radical Islamist parties (moderation process) will yield important clues to better understand democratization in the Muslim world and formulate more cohesive policies in the wake of the “Arab Awakening.” Shifting from radical to moderate positions has been a common trend for many Islamist parties. However, there exists great variation—both among Islamists

and others—as to what the notion of moderation refers. Moderation, hence, has become a catch-all term. What forms does Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each form of moderation? Although a prevalent question in recent years, less is known about the causes and forms of Islamist moderation in a systematic fashion. By building on the findings of the Communist moderation literature, I introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist moderation over time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation refers to the kind of moderation where radical parties leave armed struggle and decide to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve ideological goals without compromising their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors and state repression are causes of tactical moderation. Ideological moderation pertains to shifts in platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes (economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) to gain greater popular support. Empirically, the Italian Communist Party and the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco are analyzed in a comparative perspective.

Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the key findings and contributions of this dissertation to the social science literature. I also discuss potential policy implications and provide final remarks for future research in this concluding chapter.

Reference List

- Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield
- Armstrong, Karen. Think Again: God. *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2009, Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/19/god_0?page=full
- Ayoob, Mohammed. 2005. The Future of Political Islam: The Importance of External Variables. *International Affairs* 81(5): 951-961
- Berger, Peter L. 1999. *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. New York: Random House
- Canetti, Daphna ;Stevan E Hobfoll, Ami Pedahzur and Eran Zaidise. 2010. Much Ado About Religion: Religiosity, Resource Loss, and Support for Political Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5): 575-587.
- Coward, Harold G. and Gordon S. Smith. 2004. *Religion and Peacebuilding*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Dalacoura, Katerina. 2011. *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fish, Steven M., Jensenius, Francesca R., and Katherine E. Michel 2010. Islam and Large-Scale Political Violence: Is There a Connection? *Comparative Political Studies* 43(11): 1327-1362
- Fox, Jonathan. 2004. Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996. *International Political Science Review* 25(1): 55-76
- Hafez, Mohammed M. 2003. *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Rienner Publishers Inc: Colorado.
- Hoffman, Michael and Jamal Amaney. 2012. The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and Similarities. *Middle East Law and Governance* 4: 168–188
- Huntington, Samuel. 1996. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Kurzman, Charles. 2011. *The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are so few Muslim Terrorists*. USA: Oxford University Press.
- Laquer, Walter. 2003. *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Inc.

- Mandaville, Peter. 2007. *Global Political Islam*. New York: Routledge
- Mohammad, Al-Momani. 2011. The Arab “Youth Quake”: Implications on Democratization and Stability. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 3 (1-2): 159-170
- Mousseau, Michael. 2011. Urban poverty and support for Islamist terror Survey results of Muslims in fourteen countries. *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (1): 35-47.
- Philpott, Daniel. 2007. Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion. *American Political Science Review*, 101 (3): 505-525
- Roy, Olivier. 2004. *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. London: Hurst
- Sørli, Mirjam, Gleditsch Nils Petter, and Havard Strand. 2005. Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(1): 141-165.
- Toft, Monica Duffy. 2007. Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War. *International Security*. 31(4): 97-131.
- Toft, Monica D., Daniel Philpott, & Timothy S. Shah. 2011. *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*, New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Vertigans, Stephen. 2009. *Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences*. New York: Routledge.
- Zaidise, Eran; Daphna Canetti-Nisim & Ami Pedahzur. 2007. Politics of God or politics of man? The role of religion and deprivation in predicting support for political violence in Israel. *Political Studies* 55(3): 499–521

CHAPTER 2

The Puzzling Case of “Islamic Violence”: What Explains Prevalence of Domestic Armed Conflicts in the Muslim World?

A. Abstract

Despite considerable interest in the relationship between Islam and political violence, there is little systematic empirical research that explores the intra-state conflict proneness of countries with large Muslim populations. The studies that do exist either offer inconclusive evidence of a relationship or suffer from methodological flaws that bring into question their very findings. If we analyze the proportion of countries with large Muslim populations that experience domestic armed conflicts, Muslim-majority states do in fact stand out. How can we explain this high hazard of intra-state conflict among countries with large Muslim populations? To what extent, if at all, Islamic faith is a contributing factor to this phenomenon? Indeed, might there be potentially overlooked socio-economic or political characteristics that explain the seeming association between Islam and intra-state conflict? These questions have yet to be fully addressed. In an attempt to fill a gap in the extant literature, this chapter investigates the empirical nexus between Islam and domestic armed conflict through the conditional factors of relative deprivation and opportunity structures. I argue that higher prevalence of repressive regimes, poverty, and youth bulges make Muslim-plurality countries very vulnerable to domestic armed conflicts. Further, the role of state repression is examined in relation to domestic armed conflict onset, which has largely been ignored in existing research. Utilizing Uppsala Conflict Data Program's recent data for the 1981-2009 period, the findings indicate that Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionately involved in domestic armed conflicts, but these states are also characterized by lower GDP per capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate strongly with domestic armed conflict onset. The significance of Islam disappears when controls for such factors are included in the statistical model. Among the factors that increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, the presence of a youth bulge has the greatest impact in Muslim-plurality countries.

B. Introduction

Not surprisingly, the tragic events of 9/11 led to growing interest in the topic of religion and violence for the common audience and for scholars alike. As the terrorists were self-declared jihadists, it was also no surprise that Islam became very closely associated with political violence. While it is true that a large proportion of terrorist attacks during recent decades have been committed by Muslims in the name of Islam (Fish et al 2010), some scholars blame the Western media for an exaggerated and undue association of Islam and violence (Ahmed 2011; Said 1997). A prominent instance is the bombing of the Federal Office building in Oklahoma City in 1995 and its initial attribution to Muslims (Ahmed 2011). Similarly, when Anders Behring Breivik killed 76 civilians in Norway in 2011, some media outlets in the US rushed to blame Muslims. *The New York Times* featured a headline: “Powerful Explosions Hit Oslo; Jihadis Claim Responsibility.” Interestingly, the killer was initially labeled a terrorist; once the media discovered that the attack was committed by a right wing Norwegian, he was described as a “madman” or simply as “insane.”⁴

Besides the media, many scholars either implicitly or explicitly argue that the Islamic faith is particularly conflict-prone (Ben-Dor and Pedahzur 2003; Huntington 1993; 1996; Lewis 2001; 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For example, Huntington (1996) argues that “Islam has bloody borders and bloody innards”. Huntington contends that future conflicts in the world will be between different civilizations, especially between the Islamic and Western civilizations. However, Huntington’s thesis relies on a selective reading of history. Numerous quantitative studies have tested Huntington’s conjectures and found little or no empirical support.⁵ Historian Bernard Lewis (1990:8) states that “It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a

⁴ “When it is easy to blame Muslims”, Today’s Zaman, July 27 2011; Dr. Abdullahi Sheikh Rashid.

⁵ Many studies have challenged Huntington’s thesis. For a comprehensive list of quantitative studies testing Huntington’s thesis, see Fox (2007: 366).

movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.” There is also some evidence that Muslim majority states are more likely to engage in domestic conflicts than other states (Fox 2007; Toft 2007). On the other hand, some scholars criticize the tendency to stereotype the Islamic faith as violence-prone and refer to the diversity within the Muslim world and suggest that other socio-economic factors explain the seeming conflict-proneness of Muslim countries (Ahmad 2011; Esposito 1992; Hafez 2003; Zaidise et al 2007).

While theoretical debates about the role of Islam in promoting conflict are abundant, as Fish et al. (2010) and Fox (2004) note, there are only a handful of systematic empirical studies. The extant research on the relationship between Islam and violence largely relies on case studies, which prevents making broad generalizations (Fish 2011). Further, the existing studies provide mixed evidence regarding Islam’s role in promoting domestic conflict (Fish et al 2010; Fox 2007; Sorli et al 2005; Toft et al 2011). While religion can incite conflict by influencing the identity, loyalty, and political goals of people, religious ends and identities mix with non-religious goals in many conflicts (Philpott 2007). This chapter argues that Islam alone does not necessarily make countries more or less conflict-prone. Indeed, existing studies that conclude that Muslim-majority countries are characterized by a higher rate of domestic armed conflict and political violence fail to control for factors that increase the risk of conflict, such as socio-economic development, state repression, and oil dependence, and confound many variables under “Islam”. Without controlling for confounding factors, we cannot evaluate the impact of Islam on conflict properly.

This chapter focuses on the onset of domestic armed conflict and contributes to the research on Islam and political violence by examining the causal factors that explain variation in the prevalence of domestic armed conflict in Muslim-plurality states⁶. I argue that higher prevalence of repressive regimes, youth bulge, and oil dependent economies, all of which highly correlate with domestic armed conflict onset, make Muslim-plurality countries particularly vulnerable to intra-state conflicts. In other words, Muslim-plurality states should be no more conflict prone than others once we control for the correlates of domestic armed conflict. This chapter also contributes to the literature on domestic armed conflict by exploring the role of state repression (which has largely been overlooked) in increasing the risk of domestic armed conflict.

This chapter is organized into five sections. First, I review the literature on Islam and political violence, and domestic armed conflict onset respectively. Next, I discuss my theory and hypotheses. Then, I summarize data, methods, and my research design, which will be used to test the derived hypotheses. I discuss empirical findings in the fourth section. Lastly, implications of these findings and some suggestions for future research are provided in the concluding section.

C. Islam and Political Violence

Despite historical evidence to the contrary, Islam is commonly associated with violence and terrorism by the US media and some scholars. Muslims have historically been mostly peaceful and tolerant. Just two decades ago, secular and nationalist ideologies were far more popular than religious ones in the Middle East and suicide terror in the name of jihad was very rare (Mousseau 2011). Yet, some scholars argue that the core principles of Islam include intolerant views toward nonbelievers and that Islam is inherently violence-prone. The scholars who attribute conflict proneness of Muslims to Islam largely rely on the concept of jihad and some selective verses from the Koran to support their arguments (Laquer 2003; Pipes 2003; Toft 2007). For instance,

⁶ Muslim-plurality states are defined as countries in which Islam is the most commonly practiced religion.

Laquer (2003) argues that violence is blessed in Islam if it is carried out against *infidels* (nonbelievers) and there is no room for them in the Islamic faith. Similarly, Pipes (2003) claims that the violence-proneness of Muslims stems from the very nature of Islam: the obligation of jihad. Jihad is an Arabic word which literally means “struggle” and it is translated as “holy war” by Pipes.

However, this highly controversial concept of “Jihad” can be interpreted in different ways; a small minority of fundamentalist Muslims think jihad justifies physical violence against “infidels” whereas the vast majority regard it as an internal struggle to be a morally better person (e.g., by fighting off immoral desires). Roy (2004) notes that jihadist Islam is a product of sociological changes. Traditionally, jihad was understood as a collective, defensive duty, but modern radicals view it as an individual permanent duty to fight against the West. Islam is also portrayed as a totalitarian and politically oriented religion (Zaidise et al 2007). Islam has not undergone a reformation like Christianity, which separated the religious and political spheres; religiously oriented violence is attributed to the lack of secular state systems in the Muslim world (Appleby 2000; Toft 2007).

Toft (2007) argues that in Abrahamic traditions violent conflict is regarded as a manifestation of God’s will. These traditions tend to be uncompromising and encourage people to sacrifice in this world (for eternal reward in the afterlife) to defend their faith. Thus, the indivisibility of religious doctrines and the promise of martyrdom render bargaining and deterrence useless. Radical Islamic groups promise spiritual incentives (paradise) to individuals; therefore, high-cost activities in the present life become rational since the future benefits exceed the costs (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2006). All in all, even though these scholars do not necessarily differentiate Muslim-majority states’ tendency to engage in inter-state or intra-state

conflicts, they generally characterize Muslim-majority countries as more violence/conflict-prone and attribute this to Islam. However, the Muslim world is very diverse; there is no unique Islam practiced by all Muslims in the world. These cleavages within Islam prevent to treat Islam as a single monolithic entity and draw a conclusion regarding Islam's role in promoting conflict. Extremists, who refer to some selective religious doctrines to justify use of violence, exist in all religions.

As mentioned above, there are only a few empirical studies that examine the link between Islam and domestic armed conflict. Sorli et. al (2005) observe that Islam is not a significant factor in driving civil war once they control for other explanatory factors such as economic development, oil dependency, ethnic diversity etc. Similarly, Fish et al. (2010) examine Islam's conflict proneness by analyzing episodes of large scale political violence that occurred during 1946-2007. They observe that there is no significant correlation between the Muslim proportion living in a country and the number of deaths in political violence episodes. The authors also examine whether radical Islamism as an ideology, rather than the Islamic faith, is associated with political violence. They rely on press reports and secondary sources to code conflicts instigated by Islamists. The findings indicate that Islamist ideology is involved in eleven percent of total episodes and accounted for sixteen percent of total deaths. Even though one may conclude that the episodes involving Islamists seem to account for a disproportionate amount of deaths, Fish et al. note that some episodes were instigated by both Islamist and other actors who bear joint responsibility.

On the other hand, Toft (2007) finds that in forty-two religious civil wars from 1940 to 2000, eighty one percent had either incumbent governments or rebels identified with Islam. In fifty eight percent of religious civil wars, Islam was the dominant religion. Toft explains Islam's

overrepresentation in civil wars with historical (lack of Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia in Islam), geographic (proximity of Israel, oil reserves, and Islam's holiest sites), and particularly ideological (jihad) factors. Toft notes that the destructiveness of the Thirty Years' War and the following Enlightenment period decreased the power of religious authorities and resulted in the development of the modern secular state system in Europe. In contrast, the Islamic world has not experienced its own Thirty Years' War, which may have enabled a continued role of religion in politics. The geographic proximity of oil reserves and Islam's holiest sites, Western industrial states' interest in the Middle East, and colonial experience also contributed to the rise of Islamic identity and radicalization. Lastly, Toft emphasizes the concept of jihad to explain the prevalence of civil wars in the Muslim world and argues that violence is justified in Islam to defend the faith from unbelievers. Toft provides some historical examples to support her argument, such as Muslim fighters who arrived from Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to help the Afghan mujahedeen combat Soviet invasion in 1979.

However, Toft's (2007) findings suffer from several methodological weaknesses. First, Toft bases her conclusions on mere descriptive statistics, which prevents drawing any inferences about the drivers of civil war. Second, the author does not attempt to address the possibility of spurious relationships through the use of a multivariate statistical model. Toft only looks at mere percentages of civil wars in which Islam is somehow involved. Also, Toft provides insufficient information about the coding of religious civil wars, particularly those that are associated with Islam. Toft (2007:112-113) provides detailed information about the criteria to be coded as a civil war but does not provide any explanation about the coding of "religious civil wars" or civil wars in which Islam is involved. For example, Toft states that "of the forty two religious civil wars fought from 1940 to 2000, one or both parties adhered to Islam in a striking thirty four cases and

thirty four of the civil wars had an Islamic component” (2007:113). Toft does not explain what exactly “adherence to Islam” or “Islamic component” means.

In a recent study, Fox (2007) tests Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and finds partial support for Huntington’s argument about Islam’s conflict-proneness. Fox uses the State Failure dataset to operationalize domestic conflicts between 1960 and 2004. Fox examines both intra-religious and inter-religious conflicts in which at least one party invokes religion. Fox (2007) finds that, while the Islamic civilization is found to be more conflict-prone, the majority of conflicts involving Islamic countries is with other Muslim-majority states (not with other civilizations). Fox also observes that beginning in 2002, religious conflicts became a majority of all conflicts. However, Fox’s study suffers from oversimplification and failure to control for war onset factors. Fox relies on comparative analysis of proportion of state failures in Muslim-majority and other countries.

In sum, there is some evidence that domestic armed conflicts are more common among Muslim-majority states compared to other countries. Yet, it is not possible to draw a causal relationship between Islam and the risk of domestic conflict without controlling for the correlates of domestic armed conflict. Muslim-majority states’ domestic conflict-proneness is explained by a number of competing arguments that rely on either case studies or mere descriptive statistics. I argue that a more systematic analysis is necessary to investigate other potential explanatory factors that account for Muslim majority states’ involvement in intra-state conflicts. Below, I review the literature on domestic armed conflict onset which may help to explain the disproportional involvement of Muslim-majority countries in domestic conflicts.

Correlates of Domestic Armed Conflict

There are numerous quantitative studies that examine factors that increase the risk of domestic armed conflict. Even though different scholars use different sets of variables and sometimes disagree on how to operationalize similar concepts or provide different interpretations of similar findings, at least some factors are found to be robustly correlated with domestic armed conflict onset. Economic factors, the resource curse, demography, geographic and environmental factors, ethnic and religious diversity, conflict history, government type and regime change are among the commonly tested concepts which are deemed to impact risk of domestic conflict (Dixon 2009). Among hundreds of variables used to proxy some of the concepts mentioned above, population, GDP per capita, economic growth, democracy, political instability, small military capacity, rough terrain, war-prone neighbors, and oil dependence are found to be significantly correlated to domestic armed conflict and robust to sensitivity checks (Dixon 2009; Hegre and Sambanis 2006).

Economic factors, which are generally operationalized by GDP per capita or annual GDP per capita growth rate, are among the few variables which are robustly correlated with domestic armed conflict onset. Yet, GDP per capita is a very broad concept which can be interpreted in different ways. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use GDP per capita to measure the opportunity cost of rebellion, whereas Fearon and Laitin (2003) use the same variable to measure state capacity. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that countries with low GDP per capita would be characterized by low state capacities or low opportunity cost of rebellion. Regardless of the way economic factors are interpreted, it is safe to conclude that poor countries are more prone to intra-state conflicts.

Oil-dependence, or natural resource dependence, is another economic factor which increases the risk of domestic armed conflict. Oil rents make leaders less dependent on tax revenues, which create weak state institutions. Weak institutions in turn increase the feasibility of rebellion (Fjelde 2009). Fearon (2005) argues that oil producers generally have low state capabilities, and therefore are more prone to conflict, whereas Ross (2006) claims that oil and other minerals increase the risk of conflict because they make independence more desirable for resource-rich regions. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) confirm that the existence of natural resources creates opportunities to rebel. Natural resource dependent economies may also make countries more conflict prone by increasing the probability of trade shocks (Humphreys 2005). On the other hand, oil money can also be used to co-opt potential dissidents, especially in politically corrupt regimes, thus reducing the risk of domestic conflict (Fjelde 2009). Hegre and Sambanis (2006)'s sensitivity analysis suggests that oil dependence is marginally robust whereas natural resource dependence is not robust. The relative robustness of oil dependence compared to natural resource dependence is a theoretical puzzle that can be explored by future studies. One potential reason could be missing data and measurement errors. Ross (2006:265) notes that the studies that examine the link between natural resource wealth and civil war suffer from measurement error, endogeneity problems, lack of robustness, shortage of data, and uncertainty about causal mechanisms.

The demographic and geographic characteristics of a country also affect the likelihood of domestic armed conflict; conditions that favor insurgency, such as total population, youth bulges, and mountainous terrain make countries more conflict-prone. It is hard to control people and deter insurgency in highly populated countries. Indeed, population is one of the variables that robustly and positively correlates with domestic armed conflict. Similarly, the existence of

mountainous terrain makes it easier for rebel groups to hide from government and it is robust to sensitivity analyses (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). The existence of a youth bulge also increases the risk of domestic conflict. There is historical evidence that violent outbreaks are correlated with the proportion of a society's young male population. Young people tend to be more violence-prone compared with adults, because they tend to be more risk-acceptant and they are not fully aware of the consequences of their actions and (Fuller 2003). The existence of a youth bulge increases both grievances (especially when coupled with poverty, unemployment, and repressive regimes) and the supply of potential rebel recruits (Urdal 2006).

The role of ethnic or religious diversity in promoting domestic conflict is debated by many scholars. Theoretically, ethnic and religious differences are likely to be sources of grievances and therefore increase the risk of intra-state conflict. Empirically, existing studies provide contradictory findings. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that greater social fractionalization (both ethnic and religious) actually reduces the risk of conflict. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) show that ethnic fractionalization is robustly associated with the risk of domestic conflicts, in which 25 battle deaths is used as a threshold to code conflicts, whereas it is insignificant in civil wars which has at least 1,000 battle deaths. As far as religious diversity is concerned, the findings are again inconclusive. De Soysa (2002) finds that religious homogeneity increases the risk of civil war whereas religious heterogeneity decreases it. On the other hand, Reynal-Querol's (2002) analysis of ethnic civil wars indicates that religious polarization increases the risk of ethnic conflicts. Lastly, Fearon and Latin (2003) find no significant relationship between civil war and religious fractionalization between 1945 and 1999.

Regime type is another important factor which affects the risk of domestic armed conflict. Semi-democracies are deemed to be more conflict-prone since they are characterized by

insufficient repressiveness to deter violence and insufficient openness to induce substitution to nonviolent tactics (Hegre et al 2001). Both Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Dixon's (2009) analyses confirm that anocracy and institutional inconsistency (change in polity score prior to the civil war) are robustly associated with the risk of civil war.

Finally, more recent studies explore some new concepts which are ignored in the previous research, such as state repression (Jakobsen and De Soysa 2009; Young 2012), different dimensions of state capacity (Fjelde and Soysa 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010), political corruption (Fjelde 2009) or focus on developing better measures of existing concepts. Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) argue that Polity scores or GDP per capita are poor indicators of state strength and offer an alternative variable: irregular leader changes, which occur through a military coup or violent takeover of the government, to measure state weakness. The authors find that irregular regime transitions indeed increase the risk of domestic conflict. Fjelde and Soysa (2009) examine impact of state capacity and categorize state capacity into three types: coercion, co-optation, and cooperation. Their findings indicate that high government spending (co-optation) and trustworthy institutions (cooperation) can better reduce the risk of conflict than coercive state capacities. Jakobsen and De Soysa (2009) find that state repression in ethnically fractionalized states negatively affects the likelihood of civil war, whereas it increases the risk of domestic conflict in ethnically homogenous states. Young (2012) finds that poor and repressive regimes are particularly more prone to conflict. Fjelde (2009) finds that while both oil and corruption alone increase the risk of civil war, the interaction of oil and political corruption actually decreases the risk of civil war, which suggests that oil dependency can play a pacifying role in politically corrupt regimes through co-opting potential dissidents.

In sum, the literature on domestic armed conflict onset suggests that there are numerous factors which have the potential to increase the risk of domestic conflicts and there is no “right” set of variables which should be included in a domestic armed conflict onset model. Nevertheless, thanks to the development of more sophisticated statistical models and new data collection, considerable progress has been made in understanding the causes and correlates of domestic armed conflict.

Returning to the relationship between Islam and intra-state conflict, how do these potential factors that increase the risk of domestic conflict operate in the Muslim world and to what extent are these factors seen among Muslim-plurality countries? Also, can we explain the prevalence of domestic conflict with these commonly cited correlates of domestic armed conflict or is there another causal mechanism that might be driving insurgency in the Muslim world? In other words, is there an “Islamic exceptionalism”? These questions still remain underexplored. A more systematic and empirical analysis is required to examine the relationship between Islam and the risk of intra-state conflict. To do so, I rely on another body of literature that focuses on the underlying causes of radicalization and violence in the Muslim world. In the next section, I review the literature on radicalization and violence in the Muslim world and synthesize it with the domestic armed conflict onset literature from which I derive my testable hypotheses.

D. Theory and Hypothesis

Most of the research about Islamic activism is either descriptive or focuses on the unique ideological orientation of Islam and thus perpetuates “Islamic exceptionalism” (Wiktorowicz 2004). Since 9/11, emphasizing Islamic culture in explaining many failures in the Muslim world without proper research and evidence has become a common trend in many fields (Roy 2004). In this chapter, I empirically test competing arguments proposed by scholars to explain domestic

violence in the Muslim world. According to the literature on radicalization and violence in the Muslim world, the prevalent causal factors of religious violence can be categorized into cultural explanations, relative deprivation, political opportunity structures, existence of rentier states and youth bulges.

According to cultural-identity based explanations, Islamists adhere to radical religious identities as a response to cultural imperialism, colonial history, and the growing influence of Western culture. These cultural arguments frame Islamic identity as violence-prone and emphasize the salience of religious-cultural norms among Muslims (Ashour 2009). It is argued that the failure of secular and liberal ideologies in the Muslim world also contributes to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (Appleby 2000; Toft 2007). Yet, identity does not always determine political behavior. Surveys show that there is no significant correlation between personal piety and political attitudes (Tessler 2003). Tessler and Robbins (2007) find that religious orientations do not seem to affect approval of terrorism among people living in Jordan and Algeria. Unfortunately, it is hard to operationalize concepts such as radical Islamic identity. Due to limitations in data availability, I proxy Islamic identity with the most commonly practiced religion practiced in a country and the proportion of Muslims living in a country. I test the political culture approach with the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: Muslim-plurality states are more likely to have domestic armed conflict than non-Muslim states, *ceteris paribus*.

Hypothesis 1b: The risk of domestic armed conflict increases with an increase in the proportion of Muslims within a state, *ceteris paribus*.

Social, economic, and political grievances and a growing sense of relative deprivation are commonly cited reasons for religious violence (Ansari 1984; Appleby 2000; Canetti et al

2010; Hafez 2003)⁷. The relative deprivation hypothesis was originally proposed by Tedd Gurr's (1970) theory of conflict behavior. The role of grievances in increasing the risk of domestic armed conflicts is also much debated in the literature on civil war. Further, some scholars argue that grievances such as high inequality, lack of political rights, ethnic and religious divisions are the root causes of civil war, whereas others contend that greed— the existence of an opportunity to rebel (e.g., natural resources) – plays a more important role in civil war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al 2009; De Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Ansari (1984) argues that Islamist militancy is a product of rapid urbanization and rural migration. Studies show that militant Islamists tend to come from common backgrounds: educated students and professionals in their twenties and thirties, members of the lower middle class, recent migrants to cities, unemployed or underemployed. Canetti et al. (2010) also observe the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence. The authors use individual surveys conducted among Muslims and Jews living in Israel to explore the relationship between support for political violence and religious affiliation. Muslims are found to be more supportive of political violence in general. However, Jews become more supportive of political violence once they control for objective and subjective deprivation by using a structural equation model. Although limited in scope, the findings indicate that objective and perceived deprivation mediates between religious affiliation and support for political violence. Mousseau (2011) finds that approval of Islamist terror is not associated with religiosity, lack of education, poverty or income dissatisfaction, but rather with urban poverty. If the relative deprivation hypothesis is correct, then, socio-economic grievances should be more prevalent among Muslim-plurality states and the risk of domestic conflict should increase with increasing grievances. The above discussion leads to one more testable conjecture.

⁷ Mass media increased awareness of inequalities and grievances

Hypothesis 2: The risk of domestic armed conflict in a state increases with increasing socio-economic grievances.

Hafez (2003) contends that non-militant movements also emerged under unfavorable socio-economic conditions and not all Muslim societies experience Muslim rebellion. He argues that the Muslim rebel is not the result of economic deprivation or psychological alienation produced by failed modernization but a response to indiscriminate state repression and institutional exclusion. Hafez criticizes socioeconomic and psychological approaches for ignoring the resources required to mobilize and for simplistic assumption that a certain level of discontent almost automatically generates rebellion. Moreover, the relative deprivation hypothesis ignores the possibility that deprived individuals could also seek reforms by lobbying, petitioning, and forming political parties. To rebel, deprived groups should believe that violent action is the only option. Therefore, political opportunities play a significant role in transforming grievances into militant action. Hafez (2003:19) proposes a “political process approach” to Islamist rebellions. This approach considers the political environment in which Islamists operate, the mobilization structures by which resources are acquired and allocated, and ideological frames with which Islamists justify collective action. It is argued that while exclusive and repressive regimes promote violence, inclusive regimes decrease the probability of Islamist violence. Hafez’s (2003) political process approach resembles the feasibility hypothesis in the civil war onset literature, which focuses on factors that increase the feasibility of rebellion (Collier et al 2009).

State repression, which is an important factor in determining the choice of violent or non-violent strategies by dissidents, has largely been ignored in the civil war onset literature (Young 2012). Repression has the potential both to increase and decrease the risk of domestic conflict.

On the one hand, repression can increase the cost of collective action and deter rebellion. On the other hand, repression can also increase grievances and the risk of conflict. Hafez (2003) argues that the timing and nature of repression matters; selective and preemptive repression is likely to deter rebellion, whereas indiscriminate repression and institutional exclusion breeds more violence. Gupta et al (1993) find that repression breeds both violent and nonviolent protests in democracies, whereas there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and violent/nonviolent protests in non-democracies. Gurr (1970) also argues that there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and rebellion. I expect to find an inverted-U shaped relationship between repression and domestic armed conflict. Repression initially increases domestic violence since grievances increase with more repression. However, extremely high levels of repression should decrease the risk of conflict since the costs of collective action will be greater in highly repressive states.

Hypothesis 3: There is an inverted-U shaped relationship between state repression and the probability of domestic armed conflict.

Going back to the political process approach proposed by Hafez (2003), there are other political opportunities and constraints (in addition to state repression) which also affect the likelihood of domestic conflict. A higher proportion of young males, which increases the number of potential dissidents as well as grievances when coupled with unemployment and poverty, also make countries more vulnerable to domestic conflict (Urdal 2006). Finally, rebel groups need both financial and human resources to mobilize and to rebel against a government. Oil-dependent or natural resource-dependent economies are also associated with a higher risk of domestic armed conflict. Indeed, the majority of Muslim states have repressive authoritarian governments, oil dependent economies, and an increasing youth population that is plagued with high rates of

unemployment. For example, the Middle East, which is predominantly Muslim, has the highest rate of unemployment in the world: 15 million as of 2011. According to a report by the International Finance Corporation and Islamic Development Bank, youth (ages 15-24) unemployment rate in the Middle East is 25.1 % compared to 12.6 % in the world as of 2010⁸. Middle Eastern countries have rich oil supplies as well. Six Gulf countries –Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE– sit on nearly 500 billion barrels of crude oil and 41.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves (Harrigan and El-Said 2011). The coexistence of all of these factors creates a political environment that is very vulnerable to domestic conflict. The following hypothesis will test the political process approach:

Hypothesis 4: The risk of domestic armed conflict increases if there is a rentier state and a growing youth population in a state.

E. Data, Methods, and Research Design

This section describes the data, methods, and research design that I use to test the hypotheses derived in the previous section. I examine causal factors that increase a country's probability of experiencing domestic armed conflict. A time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes all the states in the international system, is used to test the hypotheses above. First, I compare the prevalence of domestic armed conflicts and some socio-economic indicators in Muslim-plurality countries to other countries by using descriptive statistics. Then, I develop a general domestic armed conflict onset model and conduct logistic regression analysis.

The dependent variable is domestic armed conflict onset and the unit of analysis is the country-year. Since reliable data are rarely available during ongoing wars, using conflict onset rather than conflict prevalence is preferred. Following Collier and Hoeffler (2004), ongoing conflict years are dropped for the purpose of not conflating domestic armed conflict initiation

⁸ http://www.e4earabyouth.com/downloads/IFCBook_A4_Online_Complete.pdf

and duration. I utilize Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)'s recent data collected by Harbom and Wallensteen (2010) and Gleditsch et al (2002) which covers all domestic armed conflicts that occurred between 1945 and 2009. The onset dataset contains annual observations of 172 states in the international system, as defined by Gleditsch and Ward (1999). Even though the data on domestic armed conflict onset are available starting from 1945, it is hard to find reliable data about socio-economic indicators before 1980. Data on oil production starts from 1970 whereas CIRI integrity data, which measure state repression, begin in 1981. Given these data limitations, I analyze the period from 1981 to 2009.

The UCDP/PRIO conflict data defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 618). In total, there are 163 domestic armed conflict onsets out of 4,079 country-year observations, or 4% of all country-year observations. The working sample consists of only about 3,000 country-year observations due to the missing data on several explanatory variables. All 172 countries in the international system are included in the analysis.

Independent Variables

The main explanatory variables included in the analyses below include: Muslim-plurality country, Muslim proportion of the total population, GDP per capita, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) integrity score, oil rents, natural resource rents, and the proportion of young males (ages between 15-24) in a society. The Muslim-plurality variable is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for countries in which Islamic faith is practiced by a plurality of the population. This variable comes from Jonathan Fox's (2004) Religion and State (RAS) project. I also use the proportion of Muslims living in a country to assess the robustness of the relationship between

Islam and political violence. Data on the proportion of Muslims living in a country are taken from Kuru (2011). Kuru (2011) collected these demographic data from the International Religious Freedom Reports, the CIA World Factbook, and the US Department of State's country analysis reports. GDP per capita intends to proxy economic grievance (lower values indicates less development and hence more grievances). Purchasing power parity converted GDP per capita (constant in 2005 international dollars) data come from The Penn World Tables. Unemployment rates and education data may better capture the existence of economic grievances, but these data have many more missing observations. In fact, more than 50% of the observations of these two variables are missing in the World Bank data. I utilize the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) data to measure state repression. The Physical Integrity Rights Index is an additive index constructed from torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). I rescale the CIRI scores from 1 to 9 in which higher values indicate less government respect of human rights and more repression to make interpretation easier. I also include a squared term of repression to capture the hypothesized curvilinear relationship between state repression and conflict onset. Natural resource and oil dependence data come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Natural resource dependence measures the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents as a percentage of GDP. Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production as a percentage of GDP. Finally, the data on the proportion of young males between the age of 15 and 24 to total adult male population (15+) come from the UN's World Population Prospects data.

I also include the following control variables, which are expected to increase the risk of domestic conflict (based on the findings of previous studies): ethnic fractionalization and religious fractionalization, a dummy for transitional regimes, percentage of mountainous terrain, and total population. I use the polity 2 score from the Polity IV project to control for regime type. Previous research suggests that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between regime type and domestic armed conflict onset and transitional regimes are more conflict prone (Hegre et al. 2001) I create a dummy variable to operationalize transitional regimes; the countries that have polity 2 score between -5 and +5 are coded as anocracies. Ethnic and religious fractionalization data come from Fearon and Laitin (2003). I extrapolate the data for years after 2000. Both ethnic and religious fractionalization in a society hardly change over time. The ethnic fractionalization index gives the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are from different ethno-linguistic groups. Similarly, the religious fractionalization index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are from different religions. Lastly, I use the natural log of GDP per capita, percentage of mountainous terrain, and the population. The variables GDP per capita and repression are lagged one year to avoid problems in inferring causal direction. Table 2.1 summarizes the list of variables used in the empirical analysis and how the concepts are operationalized.

Table 2.1 about here

Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use a logistic regression statistical estimator to test my hypotheses, with robust standard errors clustered by country. Domestic armed conflict is a rare event; King and Zeng (2001) point out that standard logistic regression models might produce biased coefficient estimates when the proportion of zeroes to ones is very low in the dependent variable. I use King and Zeng's Relogit method to test whether the rare

event issue can generate any significantly different outcomes in the analysis. To control for unobserved heterogeneity which typically exists in a time-series-cross-sectional data set, I employ a random effect model as well. To address the problem of temporal dependence— the fact that for a given country, many observations over time are statistically related— I follow the advice of Carter and Signorino (2010) by adding number of peace years since the last conflict, peace years squared, and a cubic term of peace years to each model. Carter and Signorino (2010) argue that polynomial approximation is less complex and easier to interpret than using natural cubic splines suggested by Beck et al (1998). Finally, I report the pairwise correlations of the independent variables to assess multicollinearity. The correlation matrices are included in Table 2.5 in the Appendix 1⁹.

F. Findings

If we only look at the proportion of Muslim-plurality countries and the proportion of domestic armed conflicts, Islam plurality states are indeed more conflict-prone. Sixty two of 163 intra-state conflicts (38%) occurred in Muslim-plurality states, whereas 26.5 % of all states have Muslim-plurality population. Six percent of Muslim-plurality states and 4% of all countries experienced intra-state conflict respectively. Yet, a closer look at some of the explanatory variables that increase the risk of domestic conflict suggest that Muslim-plurality countries are also associated with lower levels of life expectancy, lower GDP per capita, oil-dependent economies, higher proportion of young males, more state repression and autocratic governments.

⁹ There is a high correlation between GDP per capita and youth bulges (-.76) which leads to some concern about multicollinearity in the model. Unfortunately, there is no statistical method to overcome the multicollinearity problem. As Arceneaux and Huber (2007) notes, dropping one of the collinear variables from the model can bias coefficient estimates whereas multicollinearity only makes estimates less precise. Moreover, the youth bulge variable remains insignificant when I drop GDP per capita from Models 4, 5, and 6. Similarly, the impact of GDP per capita does not change when youth bulge is dropped from Models 4, 5, and 6. The findings do not change when GDP per capita is dropped from Model 7 whereas Islam-youth interaction loses significance when GDP per capita is dropped from Model 8. I decided to keep both GDP per capita and youth bulges in the regression models since dropping one of the collinear variables might lead to omitted variable bias which is deemed to be more severe than imprecision in the standard error of a coefficient.

The median GDP per capita in Muslim-plurality states is \$2,761, whereas it is an average of \$7,011 for other countries and an average of \$5,537 for the world. Similarly, median life expectancy in Muslim-plurality states is 65.6 compared to an average of 70.1 in other countries. The median polity score in Muslim-plurality states is only -6 compared to +7 in other countries. On average, oil rents constitute 14.9% of GDP in Muslim-plurality states whereas only 0.025% of GDP comes from oil rents in other countries. The proportion of young males is 21% higher in Muslim-plurality states compared to other countries whereas the CIRI integrity score is 20% lower (which indicates that Muslim-plurality states more often have repressive regimes). Table 2.2 compares descriptive statistics of Muslim-plurality countries to non-Islamic countries. Given the lower levels of GDP per capita, lower life expectancy, a lack of democracy, more repressive regimes, higher proportion of young males, and oil or natural resource dependent economies, it is not surprising to find higher rates of domestic conflict in Muslim-plurality countries. The comparison of main explanatory variables in Muslim-plurality states and other states provide suggests that both grievances—which motivate rebellion—, and natural resources, and human resources—which provide opportunity to rebel— are more prevalent in the Muslim world.

Table 2.2 about here

In order to better explore role of religion in domestic armed conflict onset, I first estimate several bivariate regressions. Then, I specify a more complete theoretical model and examine several interactions. In Model 1, I regress domestic armed conflict onset on Islam and include only peace years, and its polynomial combinations to control for temporal dependence. Islam is positive and significant which provides support for Hypothesis 1 if we overlook other factors that make countries more conflict-prone. However, the statistical significance of the Islam dummy disappears when repression and its squared term are added to the regression in Model 2.

Repression is positive and significant whereas the squared term is negative and significant which confirms the curvilinear relationship between repression and domestic armed conflict onset. In Model 3, I drop the repression and add oil dependence to the regression. Similarly, the Islam dummy becomes insignificant when oil dependence is controlled for even though oil dependence alone is not significant either. The bivariate regression results suggest that the Islamic faith alone does not make countries more conflict prone once we control for even just one other variable that increases the risk of conflict. Table 2.3 shows the results of these regressions.

Table 2.3 about here

In Model 4, I develop a general domestic armed conflict onset model to explore the role of Islam in promoting conflict once one controls for the correlates of domestic armed conflict. I include ethnic fractionalization, oil rents, logged GDP per capita, repression and its squared term, proportion of young males, a dummy for anocracies, a Muslim-plurality dummy, and the percentage of mountainous terrain. Ethnic fractionalization, population, anocracy, and oil rents significantly increase the risk of domestic armed conflict whereas religious fractionalization and Muslim-plurality are negative but insignificant. Repression is positive and significant whereas its squared term is negative and significant, which confirms the curvilinear relationship between state repression and domestic armed conflict. The graph in Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the predicted probability of domestic armed conflict and repression¹⁰. This finding supports Hypothesis 3; repression initially increases the risk of domestic armed conflict due to increasing grievances but extreme levels of repression decreases the risk of conflict since collective action becomes very costly and hence rebel groups are deterred. One potential critique of the impact of repression could be the potential endogeneity problem; increasing repressive

¹⁰ I used the clarify program to calculate the predicted probabilities

measures by a state may be part of the conflict rather than a cause of the conflict which later escalates into domestic armed conflict. Yet similar arguments could be made for other correlates of domestic armed conflict such as GDP per capita and regime type, which are commonly included in domestic armed conflict onset models. I lagged the measure of repression one year to mitigate this problem. As a robustness check, I also lagged the measure of repression for two years and it remained statistically significant. Moreover, I drop ongoing conflict years and use onset of domestic armed conflict as my dependent variable, which mitigates endogeneity problems.

Figure 2.1 about here

Unlike previous studies, GDP per capita and youth bulge do not seem to affect the risk of domestic armed conflict. States characterized by oil-dependent economies, repressive regimes, transitional political institutions, and ethnic diversity are more conflict-prone, whereas neither Islam nor religious diversity has any significant effect. For a robustness test, I used both King and Zeng (2001)'s Relogit procedure and a random effects model. The results did not change. I also replaced the Muslim-plurality dummy with Muslim proportion and the results again did not change¹¹. One can reasonably conclude that there is little support for Hypothesis 1.

In model 5, I drop oil rents and replace it with natural resource rents. Like oil rents, natural resource rents also positively and significantly affect the likelihood of domestic armed conflict onset. The anocracy variable loses significance whereas GDP per capita becomes negative and significant. The number of observations increases by about 500 in this model (since the variable oil rents has more missing data), which might be the reason for slightly different

¹¹ These alternative model specifications are reported in the Appendix 1, Table 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8

findings. Alternatively, inclusion of oil rents might be the reason for the insignificance of GDP per capita in Model 4. Even though wealthier countries are expected to be less conflict-prone, those countries with both high GDP per capita and highly oil-dependent economies might actually still be vulnerable to domestic conflict. Islam is still insignificant and again, replacing the Muslim-plurality dummy with Muslim proportion does not change the results. In model 6, I add a dummy variable for countries in which Christianity is the most commonly practiced religion. Like Islam, Christianity is also insignificant.

Overall, these findings suggest that religious denomination alone does not necessarily make countries more or less conflict-prone. State repression, which is previously ignored in many studies, significantly affects the likelihood of domestic conflict, whereas the impact of other variables is similar to previous studies. Even though Muslim-plurality countries are no more conflict prone than others once one controls for the correlates of domestic armed conflict, one may wonder what may account for the higher proportion of domestic armed conflicts in the Muslim world. In other words, what explains the variation in conflict-proneness of Muslim-plurality countries specifically? To answer this question, I interact various explanatory variables with Islam. The interactions of Islam dummy with all of the explanatory variables were all insignificant except youth bulges-Islam interaction. In Model 7, I interact the proportion of young males with the Muslim-plurality dummy. Muslim-plurality dummy becomes negative and significant whereas the interaction of Muslim-plurality and young male proportion is positive and significant. Interestingly, religious fractionalization is negative and significant in Model 7. Unlike theoretical expectations, increasing religious heterogeneity seems to decrease the risk of domestic armed conflict. Islam-youth interaction remains significant when I replace oil rents with natural resource rents in Model 8. While youth bulges in general do not make countries

more conflict prone, they do increase the risk of domestic armed conflict in Muslim-plurality countries. Yet, it is important to note that this finding is not robust to alternative model specifications; Islam-youth interaction loses significance when I use a random-effects model or when the Islam dummy is replaced with proportion of Muslims living in a country.¹² These findings are summarized in Table 2.4

Table 2.4 about here

The significance of Islam-youth interaction is a theoretical puzzle, which can be explored by future research. Theoretically, youth bulges alone do not create problems in a society. Young people usually become more prone to use of violence when they face unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions such as unemployment, poverty, income inequality, repressive, and autocratic regimes. I control for economic development with GDP per capita, which is a very crude proxy variable. The existing cross-national data about unemployment or other socio-economic indicators such as income inequality or education have many missing observations. In addition to these potential explanations, young people are more exposed to the external world, which increase grievances and perceptions of relative deprivation. Moreover, social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter make it easier for young people to communicate with each other, to spread their ideas, to mobilize and rebel against governments. Indeed, young people played a crucial role during Arab Spring.

I also estimate the analysis by adding the interactions of Islam and GDP per capita, Islam and oil, Islam and repression, Islam and anocracy, and Islam and ethnic fractionalization one at a time to the model. None of the interactions were statistically significant. When I conduct the

¹² These alternative model specifications are reported in Appendix, Table 2.6, Table 2.7 and Table 2.8

analysis for only Muslim-plurality countries, ethnic fractionalization, repression and youth bulge are positive and significant whereas the squared term of repression is negative and significant. Surprisingly, oil-dependence does not seem to make Muslim countries more conflict-prone even though there is a high correlation between Muslim-plurality and oil rents (0.44), and oil in general increases the risk of conflict.

Finally, I calculate predicted probabilities for domestic armed conflict onset to explore the substantive effect of other explanatory variables using Model 8¹³. Domestic armed conflict is a rare event; the predicted probability of domestic armed conflict is only one percent when all explanatory variables are held at their mean values and dummy variables are set to 0. The risk of domestic armed conflict increases by 240% (from 0.004 to 0.014) when repression shifts from 10th percentile to 90th percentile value while all explanatory variables are held at their mean values and dummy variables are set to 0. Similarly, a shift in ethnic fractionalization from 10th to 90th percentile leads to 208% increase in the risk of domestic armed conflict. The substantive impact of GDP per capita and natural resource dependence are relatively small; the risk of domestic armed conflict decreases by 72% when logged GDP per capita shifts from 10th to 90th percentile value whereas a shift from 10th to 90th percentile in natural resource dependence leads to only a 34% increase in the risk of war. The probability of domestic armed conflict increases by 224% when logged total population shifts from 10th percentile to 90th percentile whereas a shift of log of percentage of mountainous terrain from 10th to 90th percentile leads to 90% increase in the probability of domestic armed conflict.

¹³ I use clarify program to calculate predicted probabilities.

G. Conclusion

What explains variation in the prevalence of domestic armed conflicts in the Muslim world and to which extent could religion play a role in fostering violence? In this chapter, I conduct a time-series and cross-national analysis to find answers to preceding research questions. Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. Most importantly, contrary to suggestions and claims in the literature, religion by itself does not promote conflict; religious diversity is negative and insignificant in all of the regressions. Second, intra-state conflicts are indeed more prevalent in Muslim-plurality states, but social, economic, and political conditions in these states create an environment which is very susceptible to domestic armed conflicts. Muslim-plurality states are characterized by a higher proportion of youth bulges, more repressive regimes, oil dependent economies, and lower GDP per capita. Religious denomination does not seem to make countries more or less conflict prone once one controls for these socio-economic and political conditions. Both Muslim-plurality and interactions of Muslim-plurality with various explanatory variables remain insignificant in most of the regressions even after trying different operationalization of Islam –use of Muslim-plurality or Muslim proportion–, and alternative model specifications (Random-effects model, logit and relogit). Third, state repression, which is overlooked in previous studies, is significant in all of the models. Repression initially increases risk of conflict due to increasing grievances, but extreme levels of repression actually decreases the risk of conflict since rebel groups are deterred. Fourth, the insignificance of Islam*oil interaction or oil rents when the analysis is run for only Muslim countries is puzzling; previous studies about the causes of domestic armed conflict suggest that oil dependence increases the risk of conflict (Fearon 2005; Ross 2012). Yet, oil dependence does not seem to increase the risk of conflict in Muslim-plurality countries. Future research may focus on solving this puzzle. One potential

explanation could be that leaders may use oil money to co-opt or contain potential dissidents and thus prevent domestic conflicts as suggested by Fjelde (2009). Gause (2011) argues that autocratic leaders in the Arab world successfully co-opted and contained mobilizations against the governments until very recently. Finally, even though interactions of Islam with many explanatory variables are insignificant, Islam-youth bulge interaction positively affects risk of domestic conflict. Future studies may focus on exploring the causal mechanisms by which youth bulges increases risk of domestic armed conflict in the Muslim world. Some scholars argue that youth bulges have played a significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East; those young people, dissatisfied with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled against their governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). Future research can test conditional impact of youth bulges by interacting youth bulge with unemployment rate, and education. All in all, this chapter contributes to the literature by exploring causal factors that increase risk of domestic conflict in Muslim-plurality states as well as in other states.

Reference List

Arceneaux, Kevin and Gregory A. Huber. What to Do (And Not Do) with Multicollinearity in State Politics Research. *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, 7(1): 81-101.

Ahmad, Isham Pawan. 2011. Western Misperceptions Against Islam and the Muslims An Analysis. *Journal of Islam in Asia*, 4:433-451.

Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, May 2011.

Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield

Ansari, Hamied N. 1984. The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16 (1): 123-144.

Armstrong, Karen. Think Again: God. *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2009, Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/19/god_0?page=full

Argo, Nichole. 2006. The Role of Social Context in Terrorist Attacks. *Chronicle of Higher Education*.

Ashour, Omer 2009. *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements*. New York: Routledge

Ayoob, Mohammed. 2005. The Future of Political Islam: The Importance of External Variables. *International Affairs*, 81(5): 951-961

Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable. *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (4): 1260-1288.

Ben-Dor, Gabriel and Ami Pedahzur. 2003. The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Fourth Wave of International Terrorism. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 4(3): 71-90

Berger, Peter L. 1999. *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. New York: Random House

Canetti, Daphna ;Stevan E Hobfoll, Ami Pedahzur and Eran Zaidise. 2010. Much Ado About Religion: Religiosity, Resource Loss, and Support for Political Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(5): 575-587.

Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data. *Political Analysis* 18 (3): 271-292.

Cingranelli, David L. and David L. Richards. 2008. The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project. Retrieved from:
<http://www.humanrightsdata.org/index.asp>

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50:563-73.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 61 (1): 1-27.

Coward, Harold G. and Gordon S. Smith. 2004. *Religion and Peace Building*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Dekmejian, R. Hrair. 1995. *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, 2nd edition rev. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

De Soysa, Indra. 2002. Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99. *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (4): 395-416.

Dixon, Jeffrey. 2009. What causes civil wars? Integrating quantitative research findings. *International Studies Review* 11 (4): 707-735.

Eickelman, Dale F. 2003. "Inside the Islamic Reformation," in *Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East*, ed. Barry Rubin Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 203-06.

El-Said, Hamed and Richard Barrett. 2011. Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Violent Extremism in the Arab World. In *Globalisation, Democratisation and Radicalisation in the Arab World*, El-Said and Harrington, eds. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Esposito, John L. 1992. *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2002. *Unholy war: Terror in the name of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Faksh, Mahmud A. 1997. *The Future of Islam in the Middle East*. Westport: Praeger.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 75-90.

Fearon, James. D. 2005. Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 483-507.

Fish, Steven M., Jensenius, Francesca R., and Katherine E. Michel. 2010. Islam and Large-Scale Political Violence: Is There a Connection? *Comparative Political Studies* 43(11): 1327-1362

Fjelde, Hanne. 2009. Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985—99. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(2): 199-218.

Fox, Jonathan. 2004. Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996. *International Political Science Review* 25(1): 55-76

———. 2007. The Rise of Religion and the Fall of the Civilization Paradigm as Explanations for Intra-state Conflict. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20 (3): 361-382

Fox, Jonathan. (2004). The Religion and State Project. Retrieved from:
<http://www.thearda.com/ras/>

Fuller, Graham E. 2003. The youth factor: the new demographics of the Middle East and the implications for US policy. Draft, 18 Jan 2003. Retrieved from:
<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/islam/fuller2003.pdf>

Fuller, Graham E. 2004. The Future of Political Islam. *Foreign Affairs* 81(2):48-60

Gause, F. Gregory III. 2011. Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: the Myth of Authoritarian Stability. *Foreign Affairs* 90 (4): 81

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. 2002. Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5).

Gupta, Dipak K., Harinder Singh, and Tom Sprague. 1993. Government Coercion of Dissidents Deterrence or Provocation? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(2): 301-339.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.

———. 1988. War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State. *Comparative Political Studies* 21: 45-65.

———. 1993. Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945. *International Political Science Review*, 14: 161-201.

———. 1996. "Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict." In *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 53-78.

———.1999. Minorities at Risk Dataset. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.

———.2000. *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Gurr, Ted Robert and Will H. Moore 1997. Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41: 1079-1103.

Hafez, Mohammed M. 2003. *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Colorado: Rienner Publishers Inc.

Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen, 2010. Armed Conflict, 1946-2009. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(4)

Harrigan, Jane and Hamed el-Said.2011. *Globalization, Democratization, and Radicalization in the Arab World*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. Toward a Civil Democratic Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review*, 95: 33-48.

Hegre, Håvard, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (4): 508-535.

Hofheinz, Albrecht. 2005. The Internet in the Arab world: Playground for political liberalization. *International Politics and Society*, (3):78-96.

Hoffman, Valerie J. 1995. Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychosocial Profiles. In *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hoffman, Michael and Jamal Amaney. 2012. The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and Similarities. *Middle East Law and Governance* 4: 168–188.

Horowitz, Michael C. 2009. Long Time Going Religion and the Duration of Crusading. *International Security*, 34(2): 162-193.

Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49: 508-37.

Huntington, Samuel. 1993. The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer):22-49.

———. 1996. *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Jakobsen, Tor G., and Indra De Soysa. 2009. Give me Liberty, or Give me Death! State Repression, Ethnic Grievance and Civil War, 1981–2004. *Civil Wars* 11(2): 137-157.

Karagiannis, Emmanuel & Clark McCauley. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Nonviolent. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18(2)

King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data. *Political Analysis* 9 (2): 137-163.

Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Malečková. 2003. Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(4): 119–144.

Kuru, Ahmet T. “Rentier States and Regional Effects: Authoritarianism in Muslim-majority Countries,” Paper Presented at APSA Conference, September 1-4, 2011.

Laquer, Walter. 2003. *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Inc.

Lewis, Bernard.1990. The Roots of Muslim Rage. The Atlantic Online, September 1990

———. 2001. What went wrong? The clash between Islam and modernity in the Middle East. New York : Perennial

———. 2003. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York : Modern Library

Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1987. Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31(2): 266-297.

Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr. 2011. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010. Retrieved from:
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

McAdam, Doug (1982). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6):1212-1241.

Mohammad, Al-Momani. 2011. The Arab “Youth Quake“: Implications on Democratization and Stability. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 3 (1-2): 159-170.

- Mousseau, Michael. 2011. Urban poverty and support for Islamist terror Survey results of Muslims in fourteen countries. *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (1): 35-47.
- Philpott, Daniel. 2007. Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion. *American Political Science Review*, 101 (3): 505-525
- Pipes, Daniel. 2003. *Militant Islam Reaches America*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.
- Piscatori, James. 1994. "Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalism" in *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, pp. 361-73. London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil War, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 46(1): 29-54
- Ross, Michael. 2006. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 9: 265-300.
- Roy, Olivier. 2004. *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. London: Hurst.
- Russell, Charles and Bowman Miller. 1983. "Profile of a Terrorist," reprinted in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., pp. 45-60.
- Said, Edward. 1997. *Covering Islam: How The Media And The Experts Determine How We See The Rest Of The World*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Sampson, Cynthia. 2007. Religion and Conflict: 273-326, in *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques* ed. by I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press
- Sørli, Mirjam, Gleditsch Nils Petter, and Havard Strand. 2005. Why Is There So Much Conflict in the Middle East? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(1): 141-165.
- Soysa, De Indra. 2002. Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989-99. *Journal of Peace Research*. 39(4): 395-416.
- Schwedler, Jillian. 2007. Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties." *Development* 50(1): 56-61.
- Stephan, Marian and Chenoweth, Erica. 2008. Why Civil Resistance Works? The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security* 33(1): 7-44.
- Stephan, Marian 2009. *Civilian jihad: nonviolent struggle, democratization, and governance in the Middle East* New York : Palgrave Macmillan

Svensson, Isak and Emily Harding. 2011. How Holy Wars End: Exploring the Termination Patterns of Conflict with Religious Dimensions in Asia. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(2): 133-149

Tarrow, Sydney. 1998. *Power in Movements* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tessler, Mark. 2003. Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey Research. *International Studies Perspectives*, 4: 175–181.

Tessler, Mark and Michael D. H. Robbins. 2007. What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States? 51(2): 305-328

The United Nations. 2010. *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision*. Retrieved from: <http://esa.un.org/wpp/>

Toft, Monica Duffy. 2007. Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War. *International Security*. 31(4): 97-131.

Toft, Monica D., Daniel Philpott, & Timothy S. Shah. 2011. *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*, New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.

Urdal, Henrik. 2006. A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3): 607-629

Waltz, Susan. 1986. Islamist Appeal in Tunisia. *Middle East Journal* 40(4): 651-670.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2004. *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press

Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and Karl Kaltenthaler. 2006. The rationality of radical Islam. *Political Science Quarterly*. 121 (2): 295-319.

World Bank. 2012. *World Development Indicators*. Retrieved from: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>

Young, Joseph K. 2012. Repression, Dissent, and the Onset of Civil War. *Political Research Quarterly*. August :1-17.

Zaidise, Eran; Daphna Canetti-Nisim & Ami Pedahzur. 2007. Politics of God or politics of man? The role of religion and deprivation in predicting support for political violence in Israel. *Political Studies* 55(3): 499–521.

Appendix 1: List of Tables

Table 2.1: Summary of Variables

Variable Name	Concept
Islam	Dummy for countries in which Islam is the most commonly practiced religion
Log of GDP per capita	Economic grievances
Repression (rescaled CIRI score)	Political constraints (repression)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	Rentier state status
Natural resource rents (% of GDP)	Rentier state status
Muslim proportion	Religion
Anocracy	Political opportunity structure (control variable)
Youth bulge	Human resources
Ethnic fractionalization	Ethnic diversity (control variable)
Religious fractionalization	Religious diversity(control variable)
Log of total population	Population(control variable)
% of mountainous terrain	Geographic factors(control variable)

Table 2.2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics in Muslim-plurality and Other Countries

Muslim-plurality Countries	Median	St.dev.	Min	Max	Other countries	Median	St. dev.	Min	Max
GDP per capita	2761.7	16852.4	454.2	159144.5	GDP per capita	7011.4	11814	136	89814
Life expectancy	65.6	10.3	38.1	77.9	Life exp.	70.09	10.5	30.4	82.9
CIRI integrity	5	1.96	0	8	CIRI integrity	6	2.01	0	8
Polity	-6	5.4	-10	9	Polity	7	7.02	-10	10
Prop. of young males	0.34	0.06	0.14	0.42	Prop. of young males	0.28	0.08	0.11	0.47
Oil rents (%of GDP)	14.9	18.3	0	103.2	Oil rents (%of GDP)	0.025	10.05	0	79.5
Natural resource rents (% of GDP)	9.8	25.3	0	214.4	Natural resource rents (% of GDP)	2.2	10.9	0	80.6
Number of domestic armed conflicts	62 (38%)				Number of domestic armed conflicts	101 (62%)			
Proportion of Muslim-plurality countries	26.5%				Proportion of other countries	73.5%			

Table 2.3 Bivariate Regressions

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Islam	.463* (.250)	.0456 (.290)	.292 (.306)
Repression		1.12*** (.281)	
Repression square		-0.081*** (.029)	
Oil rents			.01 (.006)
Peace years	-.72*** (.160)	-.44*** (.174)	-.741*** (.178)
Peace years ²	.066*** (.018)	.036** (.017)	.062*** (.019)
Peace years ³	-.0014*** (.000)	-.001** (.000)	-.002*** (.000)
N	4079	3443	3071

Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war onset. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not reported).*

Table 2.4: Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict (1981-2009)

Variables	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Repression^a	.832** (.377)	.586* (.302)	.807** (.372)	.895** (.379)	.641** (.298)
Repression squared^a	-.07* (.038)	-.049 (.031)	-.068* (.038)	-.0771** (.039)	-.054* (.031)
GDP per capita^{a b}	-.129 (.215)	-.353* (.184)	-.182 (.214)	-.209 (.220)	-.390** (.192)
Ethnic fractionalization	2.27*** (.671)	1.545** (.645)	2.30*** (.674)	2.36*** (.688)	1.606*** (.666)
Religious fractionalization	-1.049 (.732)	-.663 (.702)	-1.122 (.736)	-1.183* (.730)	-.689 (.681)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	.021** (.008)		.0212** (.009)	.020** (.009)	
Natural resource rents (% of GDP)		.009* (.005)			.010* (.006)
Youth bulge(15-24/15+)	-4.084 (3.247)	-1.792 (3.128)	-4.232 (3.184)	-5.451* (3.282)	-3.735 (3.239)
Islam	-.413 (.344)	-.024 (.317)	-.234 (.434)	-4.65** (2.099)	-3.983** (1.995)
Islam*Youth bulge				13.205** (6.109)	11.598** (5.595)
Christian			.307 (.351)	.297 (.354)	
Anocracy	.632** (.320)	.415 (.279)	.656** (.322)	.605* (.321)	.394 (.274)
Population^b	.373*** (.128)	.276** (.110)	.399*** (.126)	.397*** (.130)	.274** (.111)
% of Mountainous terrain^b	.165* (.103)	.155* (.092)	.167 (.104)	.176* (.102)	.191** (.095)
Peace years	-.229 (.149)	-.259* (.137)	-.231 (.147)	-.228 (.145)	-.248* (.138)
Peace years²	.011 (.014)	.019 (.013)	.011 (.013)	.010 (.013)	.018 (.013)
Peace years³	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
N	2497	3007	2497	2497	3007

Note: Logit regressions, dependent variable: war onset. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not reported).*

a: Lagged one year

b: Logged

Table 2.5: Correlation of Independent Variables

	Ethnic fr.	Population	GDP capita	Youth bulge	Polity	Natural res	Relig. Fr.	Muslim prop	Mount. Ter	CIRI	Oil rents
Ethnic fr.	1.00										
Population	-0.02	1.00									
GDP capita	-0.38	-0.08	1.00								
Youth bulge	0.45	-0.02	-0.77	1.00							
Polity	-0.21	-0.08	0.32	-0.44	1.00						
Natural res.	0.15	-0.05	-0.07	0.24	-0.44	1.00					
Relig. Fr.	0.38	0.08	0.06	-0.01	-0.04	0.03	1.00				
Muslim prop.	0.10	-0.05	-0.14	0.29	-0.58	0.41	-0.12	1.00			
Mount. Ter.	0.01	0.16	-0.14	0.10	0.07	-0.03	-0.20	0.04	1.00		
CIRI	-0.24	-0.27	0.54	-0.53	0.46	-0.23	0.07	-0.29	-0.24	1.00	
Oil rents	0.10	-0.04	0.01	0.19	-0.45	0.82	0.04	0.40	-0.08	-0.22	1.00
Islam	0.02	-0.04	-0.10	0.25	-0.52	0.42	-0.14	0.95	0.03	-0.27	0.42
Christian	-0.15	-0.18	0.21	-0.34	0.56	-0.26	0.03	-0.70	0.00	0.33	-0.25

Table 2.6: Random-Effects Model

Variables	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Islam	-.412 (.353)	-.012 (.364)	-.234 (.434)	-4.795 (3.5)	-4.25 (2.938)
Islam*Youth bulge				13.139 (10.33)	12.44 (8.464)
Repression ^a	.832** (.391)	.704** (.331)	.808** (.392)	.922** (.398)	.746** (.33)
Repression squared ^a	-.07* (.036)	-.06* (.032)	-.068* (.036)	-.079** (.037)	-.064** (.032)
GDP per capita ^{a b}	-.129 (.2)	-.316 (.199)	-.181 (.214)	-.157 (.206)	-.365* (.2)
Ethnic fractionalization	2.266*** (.675)	1.753** (.675)	2.3*** (.683)	2.325*** (.676)	1.757*** (.661)
Religious fractionalization	-1.105 (.825)	-.48 (.855)	-1.122 (.84)	-1.113 (.826)	-.509 (.84)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	.021** (.009)		.021** (.009)	.020** (.009)	
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)		.009 (.007)			.011 (.006)
Youth bulge(15-24/15+)	-4.082 (3.57)	-.132 (3.75)	-4.232 (3.184)	-5.374 (3.654)	-2.4 (3.86)
Christian			.307 (.41)	.296 (.415)	
Anocracy	.631** (.314)	.416 (.281)	.656** (.316)	.582* (.315)	.401 (.28)
Population ^b	.373*** (.112)	.35*** (.123)	.399*** (.117)	.370*** (.112)	.338*** (.12)
% of Mountainous terrain ^b	.165 (.118)	.192* (.116)	.168 (.12)	.172 (.117)	.224* (.116)
Peace years	-.229 (.149)	-.15 (.148)	-.231 (.149)	-.227 (.149)	-.151 (.146)
Peace years ²	.01 (.015)	.012 (.015)	.011 (.015)	.01 (.015)	.011 (.0145)
Peace years ³	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
N	2497	3007	2497	2497	3007

Table 2.7: Relogit Model

Variables	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Islam	-.397 (.341)	-.024 (.316)	-.244 (.431)	-4.325 (1.98)	-3.873 (1.984)
Islam*Youth bulge				11.877** (5.859)	11.324** (5.565)
Repression ^a	.762** (.376)	.542* (.3)	.739** (.37)	.849** (.383)	.599** (.297)
Repression squared ^a	-.063* (.037)	-.044 (.03)	-.062* (.037)	-.072* (.038)	-.049* (.03)
GDP per capita ^{a b}	-.134 (.213)	-.352* (.183)	-.182 (.212)	-.159 (.219)	-.386** (.19)
Ethnic fractionalization	2.162*** (.666)	1.489** (.642)	2.197*** (.666)	2.2*** (.68)	1.542** (.663)
Religious fractionalization	-1.001 (.727)	-.655 (.698)	-1.055 (.73)	-1.061 (.723)	-.672 (.677)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	.021** (.008)		.021** (.008)	.020** (.009)	
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)		.009* (.005)			.011* (.005)
Youth bulge(15-24/15+)	-4.05 (3.227)	-1.868 (3.11)	-4.157 (3.163)	-5.255 (3.32)	-3.765 (3.222)
Christian			.274 (.348)	.254 (.351)	
Anocracy	.624** (.318)	.414 (.277)	.645** (.32)	.596* (.318)	.392 (.273)
Population ^b	.362*** (.127)	.271** (.109)	.385*** (.125)	.378*** (.129)	.268** (.111)
% of Mountainous terrain ^b	.161 (.102)	.153* (.09)	.162 (.1)	.168* (.1)	.188** (.094)
Peace years	-.204 (.147)	-.237* (.136)	-.2 (.146)	-.202 (.144)	-.226* (.136)
Peace years²	.07 (.014)	.016 (.013)	.07 (.013)	.07 (.013)	.015 (.013)
Peace years³	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
N	2497	3007	2497	2497	3007

Table 2.8: Regressions with Muslim Proportion

Variables	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Muslim prop.	-.003 (.003)	.000 (.003)	.000 (.005)	-.027 (.024)	-.032 (.021)
Muslim*Youth bulge				.085 (.073)	.097 (.063)
Repression ^a	.831** (.384)	.587* (.302)	.793** (.377)	.858** (.396)	.638** (.31)
Repression squared ^a	-.07* (.039)	-.049 (.031)	-.067* (.038)	-.074* (.04)	-.053* (.031)
GDP per capita ^{a b}	-.127 (.215)	-.349* (.182)	-.203 (.214)	-.217 (.217)	-.373** (.186)
Ethnic fractionalization	2.245*** (.675)	1.524** (.652)	2.277*** (.679)	2.325*** (.685)	1.575** (.671)
Religious fractionalization	-.954 (.772)	-.613 (.694)	-1.072 (.732)	-1.067 (.723)	-.558 (.681)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	.019** (.009)		.019** (.008)	.02** (.009)	
Natural res. rents (% of GDP)		.008 (.005)			.009* (.005)
Youth bulge(15-24/15+)	-4.288 (3.258)	-.1.838 (3.107)	-4.451 (3.178)	-5.88* (3.52)	-3.931 (3.436)
Christian			.483 (.395)	.454 (.398)	
Anocracy	.64** (.323)	.415 (.278)	.682** (.327)	.661** (.326)	.404 (.277)
Population ^b	.353*** (.125)	.273*** (.105)	.402*** (.124)	.394*** (.126)	.266** (.107)
% of Mountainous terrain ^b	.172* (.103)	.156* (.09)	.165 (.104)	.175* (.103)	.185** (.093)
Peace years	-.235 (.149)	-.259* (.137)	-.235 (.148)	-.234 (.147)	-.252* (.137)
Peace years²	.011 (.014)	.019 (.013)	.011 (.013)	.011 (.013)	.018 (.013)
Peace years³	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
N	2497	3007	2497	2497	3007

Table 2.9: List of Domestic Armed Conflicts

Algeria	1991-2009	Ghana	1981	Lesotho	1998	Russia (Soviet Union)	1990-1991
Angola	1991-1993	Guinea	2000-2001	Liberia	1989-1990	Russia (Soviet Union)	1993
Angola	1994-1997	Guinea-Bissau	1998-1999	Liberia	2000-2003	Russia (Soviet Union)	1994-1996
Angola	1998-2001	Haiti	1989	Macedonia	2001	Russia (Soviet Union)	1999-2006
Angola	2002	Haiti	2004	Malaysia	1981	Russia (Soviet Union)	2007-2009
Angola	2007	India	1982	Mali	1990	Rwanda	1990-1994
Azerbaijan	1991	India	1983-1988	Mali	1994	Rwanda	1997-2002
Azerbaijan	1993-1995	India	1989	Mali	2007-2009	Rwanda	2009
Azerbaijan	2005	India	1990-1991	Mexico	1994	Senegal	1990
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992	India	1992	Moldova	1992	Sierra Leone	1991-2000
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1993-1995	India	1993	Myanmar (Burma)	1987-1989	Somalia	1982-1984
Burkina Faso	1987	India	1994	Myanmar (Burma)	1990	Somalia	2001-2002
Burundi	1991-1992	India	1997-1999	Myanmar (Burma)	1991	Somalia	2006-2009
Cameroon	1984	India	2000-2002	Myanmar (Burma)	1992	South Africa	1981-1988
Central African Republic	2001-2002	India	2003-2004	Myanmar (Burma)	1993-1994	Spain	1985-1987
Central African Republic	2006	India	2005-2007	Myanmar (Burma)	1995	Spain	1991-1992
Central African Republic	2009	India	2008	Myanmar (Burma)	1996	Sri Lanka	1984-1988
Chad	1997-2002	India	2009	Myanmar (Burma)	1997-2003	Sri Lanka	1989-2001
Chad	2005-2009	Indonesia	1981-1989	Myanmar (Burma)	2005-2008	Sudan	1983-2009
Comoros	1989	Indonesia	1990-1991	Myanmar (Burma)	2009	Surinam	1987
Comoros	1997	Indonesia	1992	Nepal	1996-2006	Tajikistan	1992-1996
Congo	1993-1994	Indonesia	1997	Nicaragua	1982	Thailand	2003-2009
Congo	1997-1999	Indonesia	1999	Niger	1991-1992	The US	2001
Congo	2002	Iran	1986-1988	Niger	1994	Togo	1986
Cote D'Ivoire	2002-2004	Iran	1991-1992	Niger	1995	Trinidad and Tobago	1990
Croatia	1992-1993	Iran	1993	Niger	1997	Turkey	1984-1990
Djibouti	1991-1994	Iran	1996	Niger	2007-2008	Turkey	1991-2004
Djibouti	1999	Iran	1997	Nigeria	2004	Turkey	2005-2009
Egypt	1993-1998	Iran	2005-2009	Nigeria	2009	United Kingdom	1998
Eritrea	1997	Iraq	1982-1986	Pakistan	1990	Uzbekistan	1999-2000
Eritrea	2003	Iraq	1987-1990	Pakistan	1995-1996	Uzbekistan	2004
Ethiopia	1983-1992	Iraq	1991-1994	Pakistan	2004-2006	Venezuela	1982
Ethiopia	1994-1995	Iraq	1995-1996	Pakistan	2007-2009	Venezuela	1992
Ethiopia	1996	Iraq	2004-2009	Panama	1989	Yemen	1986
Ethiopia	1998	Israel	1990-1999	Papua New Guinea	1989-1990	Yemen	1994
Ethiopia	1999-2009	Israel	2000-2005	Paraguay	1989	Yemen	2009
Gambia	1981	Israel	2006-2009	Peru	1982-1999	Yugoslavia (Serbia)	1991
Georgia	1991	Kenya	1982	Peru	2007-2009	Yugoslavia (Serbia)	1998-1999
Georgia	1992	Laos	1989-1990	Philippines	1993-2009	Zaire	1996-2001
Georgia	2004	Lebanon	1982-1986	Rumania	1989	Zaire	2006
Georgia	2008	Lebanon	1989-1990			Zaire	2007

Appendix 2: List of Figures




Figure 2.1: Repression and the Predicted Probability of Intra-state Conflict

CHAPTER 3

Ethno-political Organizations in the Middle East: When Do They Opt for Violence?

A. Abstract

Why do some ethno-political organizations resort to violence while others abstain from it? Are ethno-political organizations with a religious/Islamist ideology more violence-prone compared to non-religious ones? This chapter attempts to find answers to these questions by analyzing ethno-political organizations in the Middle East. The factors that increase a country's risk of experiencing domestic armed conflicts are examined in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I conduct a group-level analysis and explore conditions under which ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their goals. I use the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, which includes 118 organizations in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa to test my hypotheses. Even though the level of analysis and also degree of violence differs from the previous chapter, the findings suggest that similar causal factors that promote domestic armed conflict such as socio-economic grievances, existence of repressive states, and youth bulges also increase the probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. Youth bulges foster violence especially in autocratic countries.

B. Introduction

“Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded history and the existence of a “youth bulge” has historically been associated with times of political crises” (Goldstone 2001:95)

“The Middle East is facing a demographic bulge in which youth aged fifteen to twenty-nine comprise the largest proportion of the population. These young people, frustrated with the lack of jobs, have been at the forefront of anti-government protests” (Assaad 2011, cited in Hoffman and Jamal 2012:169)

In the previous chapter, I examined causal factors that increase a country’s risk of experiencing domestic armed conflict. This chapter builds on those analyses by focusing on factors that increase the probability of violence at the group-level rather than country-level. I explore conditions under which ethno-political organizations prefer violent strategies to achieve their goals. Kalyvas (2006) calls for studies that incorporate micro, meso and macro level data into a coherent picture of violence within domestic armed conflicts and other irregular conflicts. This dissertation aims to do so by building a bridge between the research on domestic armed conflicts, contentious politics, social movements, and radicalization, and testing similar hypotheses at the state and group levels. Even though the level of analysis and also degree of violence differs from the previous chapter, similar causal factors that promote domestic armed conflict such as socio-economic grievances and the existence of repressive states are also used to explain the adoption of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. Therefore, I test similar hypotheses to the ones examined in the previous chapter.

Ethno-political organizations are politically active communal groups. Gurr (1993:161) defines communal groups as “cultural and religious identity groups that do not have recognized states or institutionalized political status”. The review of the literature suggests that ethno-political organizations’ decision to use violence is influenced by the existence of grievances,

political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, organizational structure, and the ideology of the organization. In addition to these commonly cited factors, I argue that the existence of youth bulges in a society also increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. Frustrated young males under repressive and authoritarian regimes tend to be likely recruits for violent organizations. I utilize the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset to test my hypotheses. The dataset includes 118 organizations in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004. The empirical findings confirm that youth bulges, state repression, organizational fractionalization, external support for the organization, and economic grievances positively affect adoption of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations, whereas an increasing GDP growth rate has a pacifying impact. Ethno-political organizations that have a religious/ Islamist ideology are no more conflict-prone than other organizations. These findings are consistent with the findings of the previous chapter; socio-economic factors and political opportunities/constraints rather than religion drives the decision to resort to violence.

This chapter is organized as follows. First I review the literature on contentious politics, social movements, and radicalization and derive testable hypothesis. Next, I describe the data, methods, and the research design. Then, I discuss the empirical findings. Finally, I provide a brief conclusion in which I discuss implications of these findings as well as the limitations of this research.

C. Literature Review

While some ethno-political organizations prefer to use conventional means to advance their interests such as participation in elections, others engage in either nonviolent protest or violent resistance. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) use the concept ‘contentious politics’ to refer to both violent

and nonviolent strategies used by organizations such as protest and rebellion. They define contentious politics as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:4). Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) find that nonviolent campaigns are actually more successful than violent campaigns in achieving political goals. Yet, violence is regarded as a viable option and used by many ethno-political organizations. Why do some ethno-political organizations choose violence rather than conventional politics or protest, which is less risky, less costly, and tends to be more successful in achieving political goals? What factors influence ethno-political groups’ choice of violent vs nonviolent strategies? The review of the literature suggests that there are five broad concepts, which affect decisions to use violent or nonviolent strategies by ethno-political organizations: grievances, resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, organizational structure, and the ideology of the organization. In addition to these factors, I argue that ethno-political organizations, which are active in societies with a large youth population, tend to be more violence-prone. Below, I first review these concepts and point out the weaknesses of existing literature. Then, I explain how youth bulges may foster the use of violence by ethno-political organizations and conclude this section with my testable hypothesis.

Grievances

According to Gurr (1970)’s relative deprivation hypothesis, grievances, which stem from inequalities— either subjective or objective—, lead to frustration and motivate collective violence. In other words, the difference between the expectations of an individual and what the individual actually possesses, leads to discontent and eventually incites violence. Globalization and ready

access to information have increased awareness of inequalities, increased expectations, and consequently deepened the feelings of frustration. Regan (2009) confirms that grievances that stem from poverty, inequality, and discrimination lead to violence. Gurr (1993) argues that grievances are especially critical in early stages of group mobilization but become less significant once people are committed to collective action. In other words, leaders initially use grievances to mobilize people for collective action and recruit potential rebels but once the conflict process begins, it becomes a self-sustaining dynamic.

The literature on social movements also focuses on grievances and structural and psychological causes of mass mobilization. It is argued that structural factors such as modernization (rapid economic liberalization and industrialization) or economic crises disrupt social life and create a sense of despair and anxiety which in turn makes joining social movements attractive. Likewise, Islamic activism is explained by socio-psychological factors as well as grievances; the popularity of Islamist movements is explained by a power vacuum, which emerged due to the failure of autocratic regimes and secular modernization projects to promote economic development (Ayoob 2005; Fox 2004; Moghadam 2009; Wiktorowicz 2004).

While the corrupt, authoritarian regimes in many Muslim countries fail to provide social services, Islamists fill this vacuum through charity organizations. Islamist parties, which are very popular in many Muslim countries, are regarded as being less corrupt than other parties. It is argued that rapid structural and demographic dislocations during the postcolonial period also contributed to a sense of relative deprivation and alienation. While literacy rates and education increased, these educated new elites could not find employment or they were underemployed. Moreover, the modernization process increased expectations among people (Hafez 2003). Ansari (1984) argues that Islamist militancy is a product of rapid urbanization and rural migration.

Studies show that militant Islamist tend to come from familiar backgrounds; educated students and professionals in their twenties and thirties, members of the lower middle class, recent migrants to cities, unemployed or underemployed. In addition to these domestic grievances, globally, surveys show that Muslims are dissatisfied with the international status quo, especially with the US foreign policy. The US support of Israel and the Iraq war in 2003 are among the commonly cited political grievances (Ayoob 2005; Harrigan and El-Said 2011).

While social movement theory focuses on groups as the unit of analysis and provides group level explanation of political violence, the literature on terrorism is insightful in providing individual level explanations for radicalization and the decision to use violence. Even though unfavorable socio-economic conditions, such as poverty and low levels of education, are sometimes associated with terrorism, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Russel's (1983) findings suggest that poverty and lack of education do not necessarily lead to higher rates of terrorism. Russel and Miller (1983) examine the profile of 350 terrorists from revolutionary groups and find that the majority of these terrorists were in fact well educated and come from middle or upper-middle classes. Therefore, inequalities and injustices are deemed to be more influential than poverty in driving violent extremism (El-Said and Barret 2011).

Still, some scholars are skeptical about the impact of grievances in fostering violence; they argue that such discontent exists in all societies (Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004). Existing studies provide mixed evidence regarding the impact of grievances in promoting violence. Gurr (1993) observes that political grievances such as the historical loss of autonomy and differential political status increase the probability of rebellion whereas severe political discrimination and cultural grievances decrease it. Gurr and Moore (1997) find that grievances don't have a direct impact on rebellion but increase mobilization capacity of ethno-political organizations which in

turn increases the risk of rebellion. Regan and Norton (2005) find that political discrimination increases the risk of rebellion and civil war. Similarly, Cederman et al (2010) find that the probability of ethnic conflict increases if leaders of an ethnic group are excluded from central executive power or if they are underrepresented.

Resource Mobilization Theory

Resource mobilization theory, which is based on rational choice perspective, rose as a major challenge to the relative deprivation approach (Brush 1996). The resource mobilization theory emphasizes the ability of social movements to gain resources of power, to organize, to recruit members, and to provide individual incentives or coercion in motivating participation in social movement activities. According to resource mobilization theory, movements are rational, organizational manifestations of collective action. Collective action depends on members' shared interests as well as organization and opportunities (Tilly 1978:55). The relative deprivation approach is criticized for ignoring the resources required to mobilize and maintain insurgency (Muller 1985).

Tilly (1969) argues that collective violence occurs when individuals believe that collective action will be successful and the expected benefits exceed the costs rather than when individuals have grievances. In other words, frustration is not sufficient for mobilization; groups need resources to translate individual frustration into group mobilization. Grievances exist in all societies and can easily be manufactured by the mobilizing efforts of movement entrepreneurs (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Hafez (2003) criticizes the relative deprivation hypothesis for ignoring the possibility that deprived individuals could also seek to advance their interests through the use of nonviolent strategies.

Weinstein (2006) finds that rebel groups that emerge in natural resource rich regions or those that have external support use higher levels of violence whereas movements that emerge in poor nations use violence selectively. Dalton et al (2010) use the World Value Survey to test the influence of relative deprivation and the availability of resources in driving protest. They find that protest increases not because of increasing grievances such as dissatisfaction with government, but because of the availability of resources. Similarly, Muller (1985) examines the relationship between income inequality—which is used to measure grievances— and collective political violence for the 1958-1977 periods and finds only a weak correlation between inequality and the number of death stemming from political violence. Muller (1985) concludes that discontent in general is weakly related to political violence whereas resources play a more significant role. In sum, it is argued that both external and internal resources, which facilitate mobilization, are more crucial than grievances in driving collective violence (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

Political Process Approach

The political process approach, originally developed by McAdam (1982), could be regarded as a modified version of resource mobilization theory. According to a political process approach, collective action is limited by external opportunities and constraints. Therefore, the decision to use violence by a group is influenced by the broader political context (Hafez 2003; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998; Wiktorowicz 2004). McAdam (1982) points out three important factors that influence the organizations' collective action: the level of organization within the group, the group's belief in the probability of success of collective action, and the political opportunities available to achieve the goals. While "political process" is a very broad concept, which can be a

catch-all term, the characteristics of the state and regime type are two key factors in shaping opportunities and constraints for organizations or social movements.

In democratic and inclusive regimes, organizations have the option of participating in elections or protest rather than rebellion to search for their rights. Therefore, they will be less likely to adopt un-conventional, risky and violent strategies. On the other hand, exclusive and repressive regimes legitimize the use of violence since conventional political participation is not available (Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004). Tilly and Tarrow (2007) argue that violent rebellion is more likely to occur in low-capacity and non-democratic regimes. Similarly, Goodwin (2001) examines revolutionary movements between 1945 and 1991 and concludes that revolutionary movements do not occur just because of economic inequality but rather due to political oppression. Goodwin argues that revolutions are most likely to occur in authoritarian, exclusive, repressive, organizationally incoherent and militarily weak states. In other words, revolutions occur when “there is no other way out” (Trotsky 1961; cited in Goodwin 2001:26).

State repression is another important factor in determining the choice of violent or non-violent strategies by dissidents. Yet, there is no consensus among scholars regarding the impact of repression in motivating violence. Regan and Norton (2005) find that repression decreases protest but increases both rebellion and civil war. Lichbach (1987) argues that dissidents switch between violent and nonviolent protest depending on the government response. If the government responds to one type of protest with violence, the dissidents will switch to another type. Lichbach also argues that consistent government accommodative or repressive policies reduce dissent; inconsistent policies increase dissent. Gupta et al (1993) find that repression breeds both violent and nonviolent protests in democracies whereas there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and violent/nonviolent protests in non-democracies. Gurr (1970)

and Muller (1985) confirm that there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and the probability of rebellion.

Organizational Factors

While external factors such as state institutions, resources, and grievances are influential in motivating adoption of violent strategies, internal factors such as organizational structure and ideology are also important in promoting violence. Inter-group or intra-group competition and group fractionalization foster violence (Borum 2011; Dalacoura 2011). According to the theory of outbidding, competing groups tend to radicalize and resort to violence to increase their support and to out-bid other groups (Bloom 2004; Lawrence 2010). Similarly, group fractionalization and intra-group competition lead less-motivated members to leave the group and thus increase group radicalization (Borum 2011).

Finally, the ideology of an organization has the potential to influence the decision to resort to violence. Juergensmeyer (2003) argues that religious organizations tend to be more violent since they believe that God is their primary audience and they see the enemy as evil. Toft (2007) notes that violent conflict is regarded as a manifestation of God's will in religious traditions. Among all religions, Islam is the most commonly associated with political violence as discussed in the previous chapter. If Islam is inherently prone to violence as argued by some scholars, ethno-political organizations with an Islamist ideology should be more likely to behave violently than others.

In sum, the review of the literature suggests that all of the concepts discussed above—grievances, resources, political opportunities and constraints, ideology of the organization, and organizational structure— have the potential to promote violence. Numerous studies have tested the impact of these factors. Yet, there is no consensus among scholars about whether grievances

or resources as well as political opportunities play a more important role in driving violence. This chapter intends to shed light on these grievances versus resources debates by examining the impact of grievances, resources, and political opportunities in motivating violence by ethno-political organizations in the Middle East. Moreover, this chapter examines the role of youth bulges in driving group-level violence, which has been ignored by existing studies. I argue that the existence of large youth cohorts also increases the probability of adoption of violence by ethno-political organizations since young people are more likely to be prone to violence.¹⁴

Youth bulges lead to competition and scarcity in labor markets and educational systems, which in turn increases grievances and the potential for violence (Urdal 2004). Furthermore, large youth cohorts provide an excellent human resource for violent organizations. The opportunity cost of joining insurgency movements is usually lower for young people since they have less to lose (Collier 2000). Thus, a youth bulge has the potential to increase both grievances and available resources. Goldstone (2001) claims that youth population has historically been associated with political violence. Goldstone (2001) contends that well-educated youth are specifically more prone to political violence since they will have higher economic and political expectations. Resorting to violence becomes very likely if these educated youth are unemployed or underemployed and live in authoritarian countries in which conventional means of expressing frustration and political demands are usually unavailable. Moller (1968) points out that the youth population played an important role during the French Revolution and the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s (cited in Urdal 2004).

¹⁴ The brain's prefrontal lobe, which is deemed to play an important role in preventing inappropriate behavior, does not reach full development until the age of 20 (Fuller 2003).

Youth bulges create instability in a society especially when social infrastructure is weak and demands of these youth are not met. Fuller (2003) argues that young people will be more prone to radical ideologies if they feel desperate and see few opportunities in the future (Fuller 2003). Some evidence shows that rising youth population increases support for Islamist movements (Moghadam 2009; Urdal 2004). For example, violent Islamist movements such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria and Gamaa Islamiyya in Egypt rely on young, uneducated, urban poor people (Dalacoura 2011). Indeed, youth population has played a significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Arguably, the large number of unemployed youth in Arab nations, frustrated under repressive, autocratic, and corrupt regimes, drove the Arab Spring (Mohammed 2011). For these young people who have a low socio-economic status, participation in violent organizations becomes a tool for power and prestige, mitigates feeling of insecurity and helplessness and offers a sense of identity (Dalacoura 2011; Fuller 2003).

The Middle Eastern region, which is analyzed in this chapter, has the highest proportion of youth population in the world: the average percentage of youth population—those under age of thirty— is around sixty percent compared to only thirty percent in North America (Hoffman and Jamal 2012). In addition to having a higher proportion of youth population, the unemployment rate is also highest in the Middle East. According to a report by the International Finance Corporation and Islamic Development Bank, the average youth (ages 15-24) unemployment rate in the Middle East is twenty five percent compared to twelve percent in the world as of 2010.¹⁵

In sum, even though youth bulges is a theoretically significant concept, which has the potential to increase political violence, none of the existing studies quantitatively tested the

¹⁵ http://www.e4earabyouth.com/downloads/IFCBook_A4_Online_Complete.pdf

impact of youth bulges in fostering violence at the group-level. This chapter fills this gap in the literature by examining the role of youth bulges in motivating the adoption of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations. I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis: Ethno-political organizations that are active in countries in which there are large youth cohorts will be more likely to resort to violence.

D. Data, Methods, and Research Design

I examine the causal factors that increase ethno-political organizations' probability of use of violence. A time-series cross-sectional dataset, which includes all active ethno-political organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, is used to empirically test the hypothesis. The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) project is a subsidiary of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. The dataset includes 118 organizations representing the interests of all 22 ethno-political groups in 16 countries of the Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004. The data are unbalanced panel data in an organization year format with 1,789 observations. The MAROB data provides information about ideology, motivations, and strategies (both violent and non-violent) of organizations as well as the state behavior (repressive or tolerant towards the organization). In order to be included in the dataset, an organization should meet the following criteria:

- 1. The organization makes explicit claims to represent the interests of one or more ethnic groups and/or the organization's members are primarily members of a specific ethnic minority.*
- 2. The organization is political in its goals and activities.*
- 3. The organization is active at a regional and/or national level.*
- 4. The organization was not created by a government.*

5. *The organization is active for at least three consecutive years between 1980 and 2006.*
6. *Umbrella organizations (coalitions/alliances) are NOT coded. Instead, member organizations are coded (MAROB codebook 2008).*

The dependent variable is dichotomous; coded as 1 for the years during which the organization used violence as a strategy and coded as 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, so I use a logistic regression statistical estimator to test my hypothesis, with robust standard errors clustered by country and organization. I use two ordinal variables from MAROB data to create the dependent variable.¹⁶ These variables code the frequency of use of violence by organizations as a strategy. Since I am interested in whether the organization adopts a violent strategy or not rather than frequency of use of violence, I recoded these variables. Thus, organizations that use violence either to target domestic *or* transnational entities are coded as 1. In total, organizations used violence in 30.3 % of all organization years. I also include the correlation matrices in Table 3.1 to document multicollinearity; there is no multicollinearity problem.

Table 3.1 about here

Independent Variable and Control Variables

My primary independent variable is the existence of youth bulges in a society. The data on the proportion of young males between the age of 15 and 24 to total adult male population (15+) come from the United Nations World Population Prospects data. I also control for the following variables in the empirical analysis since the review of the literature suggest that these variables

¹⁶ These variables are called “domorgviolence” and “transvioltarg” in the MAROB data, the description of variables are in the Appendix 1.

have the potential to affect the likelihood of resorting to violence by organizations: democracy, state repression, political, economic, and cultural grievances, external support for organization, organizational popularity, organizational split, leadership type, religious/Islamist ideology, a dichotomous variable for organizations that operate in Israel, and GDP growth rate.

Regime type and state repression intend to test the impact of political opportunity structure on the probability of violence by ethno-political organizations. Ethno-political organizations that are active in democratic countries are expected to be less violence-prone since other nonviolent strategies available could be less risky, less costly and hence more attractive. I use the polity 2 score from the Polity IV project to control for regime type. I create a dichotomous variable for democracies by coding countries with Polity scores greater than five as one. Repression is like a double-edged sword; it can either deter or foster rebellion. Some scholars suggest that there is a curvilinear relationship between repression and dissidents' probability of use of violence. While lower levels of repression may foster violence by increasing grievances, extreme repression can deter insurgency since collective action becomes very costly (Muller 1985). Unfortunately, it is not possible to test the curvilinear relationship between state repression and use of violence with MAROB data since the variable that measures state repression is an ordinal variable with only three categories. Therefore, I simply expect to find a positive correlation between state repression and political violence. The state violence measures whether the state uses lethal violence against the organization and ranges from 1 (no repression) to 3 (high repression). I create a dummy variable by combining the second (periodic lethal violence against the organization) and third (consistently high lethal repression of the organization) categories. The repression is lagged one year to avoid problems in inferring causal direction.

Even though the empirical evidence is mixed, grievances have the potential to motivate violence. Therefore, I control for grievances in the empirical analysis. Economic grievance, cultural grievance, and political grievance data are taken from the MAROB data. Economic grievance is an ordinal measure for the dominant economic grievance; zero denotes that there is no expressed economic grievance; one means that eliminating economic discrimination is a major goal, and two means that the organization focuses on creating or strengthening remedial policies. Cultural grievances are also measured by an ordinal variable with three categories. All of the ethno-political organizations included in the MAROB dataset have some sort of political grievances, which make it hard to test the impact of political grievances. The dominant political grievance of the organization in the original MAROB data is coded as the following:

1. *Major organizational goals focused on eliminating discrimination*
2. *Major organizational goals focused on creating or increasing remedial policies*
3. *Major organizational goals focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status for group*
4. *Major organizational goals focused on creating a separate state for the group or revanchist change in border of state*
5. *-88 Other*

There are 703 (out of 1775) observations in the other category with text description of these grievances such as “Palestinian independence”, “Establishing an Islamist state”, “regime change” etc. To avoid dropping 703 observations in the other category, a close reading of each case description was done by the author and each of the independence movements was coded as a four. In other words, a dichotomous variable, which takes the value of one for independence or separationist movements, called “high political grievance” is created. Organizations that focus on

gaining independence and/or establishing a separate state are expected to be more violence-prone. Alternatively, I create another dummy for only separatist organizations by coding category number four above as one (it is called autonomy in the regressions below).

The variables that measure external support for organization and organizational popularity are included to test the resource mobilization theory. An organization's ability to mobilize people and engage in collective action depends on existence of external and internal support for the organization. To measure external support for the organization, four dummy variables from the MAROB data are used. The organizations that received support (financial support, human support, or political support) from diasporas, from foreign states, from international governmental organizations, from international non-governmental organizations, or from other non-state actors are coded as one. There is an ordinal variable (ranges from 1 to 3) that measures organizational popularity among the group that the organization represents. I create a dichotomous variable for highly popular, dominant organizations¹⁷ to test the impact of domestic support.

I use two dichotomous variables from MAROB data, which measure intra-group competition, in order to test the impact of organizational structure (the theory of out-bidding). There is a dichotomous variable coded as one if there is an organizational split during the year of observation. I also create a dummy for organizations with factionalized/competing leaders by using the leadership type variable in MAROB data. Ethno-political organizations that are fractionalized and/or have a weak/competing leadership are expected to be more violence-prone. I use two variables to control for religion. There is a dichotomous variable which is coded as one for organizations that have a religious ideology. For robustness, and to test the impact of

¹⁷ A dummy variable is preferred since the use of an ordinal variable leads to multicollinearity problem. Also, 87.9% of all observations are in the middle category (number 2) which suggests that most of the organizations have some sort of popularity. Therefore, controlling for dominant organizations is empirically more valid.

Islamist ideology specifically, I create a dummy variable for organizations that focus on establishing an Islamist state by using the text description found in the other political grievances category.

Finally, I control for economic development and organizations that are active in Israel. Israel is an outlier in the Middle East; it is a democratic, wealthy country with a long history of conflict with the Palestinians. I use annual GDP per capita growth rate to control for economic development. Purchasing power parity converted GDP per capita (constant in 2005 international dollars) data come from The Penn World Tables. Table 3.2 summarizes the list of variables used in the empirical analysis and how the concepts are operationalized whereas Table 3.3 summarizes descriptive statistics of variables.

Table 3.2 and 3.3 about here

E. Findings

In Model 1, I include annual GDP per capita growth rate, a dummy for democracy, youth bulges, state repression, organizational popularity, external support, high political grievances, economic grievances, cultural grievances, a dummy for organizations that have a religious ideology, and a dummy for organizations located in Israel. Youth bulge is positive and significant, which supports my hypothesis. State repression positively affects the likelihood of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political organizations, whereas democracy is insignificant; these findings indicate that there is partial support for political opportunity structure argument. However, caution is warranted in interpreting the insignificance of regime type; the analysis is limited to the Middle East, which is predominantly non-democratic. There is not enough variation in this explanatory variable, which may be the reason for the insignificant results.

Economic grievances increase the probability of use of violent strategies. Interestingly, the high political grievance dummy is insignificant; organizations that focus on gaining independence or establishing a separate state are no more violence-prone than others. Therefore, the relative deprivation argument is partially supported. Likewise, there is partial support for the resource mobilization argument; external support is positive and significant but organizational popularity—which intends to proxy domestic support for organization—is insignificant. The Israeli dummy is positive and significant; ethno-political organizations that are active in Israel are indeed more violence-prone. Religious ideology is not statistically significant whereas increasing GDP growth rate has a pacifying effect.

In model 2, I drop the high political grievance dummy and replace it with an autonomy dummy which is coded as one for separationist organizations (4th category of the dominant political grievance variable in the original data). While autonomy is insignificant, like high political grievance, impact of all other variables is similar to the previous model. In Model 3, I drop the religious ideology dummy and replace it with a dummy for organizations that focus on creating an Islamist state as a robustness check. Like religious ideology, an Islamist state dummy is insignificant; there is no support for the argument that religious or Islamist organizations are more violence-prone than non-religious ones.

I add organizational split and weak leadership dummies in Models 4 and 5 respectively¹⁸ to examine the impact of organizational structure. According to the theory of out-bidding, both inter-group and intra-group competition cause more radicalization, thus increase the probability of violent strategies. I can only examine the impact of intra-group competition since there is no

¹⁸ I added these two variables separately since they intend to measure the same concepts: intra-group competition and organizational coherence.

variable that measures inter-group competition in the MAROB dataset.¹⁹ I use organizational split and leadership type (weak/competing leaders indicate existence of intra-group competition) to proxy intra-group competition. The findings indicate that fractionalized organizations and organizations with competing/weak leadership are indeed more violence-prone than other ethno-political organizations. Youth bulge is positive and significant in Model 4 and Model 5, like in previous models; one can conclude that the significance of youth bulge is robust to alternative model specifications.

While the empirical analysis above confirms that youth bulges foster violence, exploring the underlying causal mechanisms of youth-violence relationship and mediating variables is another interesting research question. Those scholars who argue that youth bulges are more prone to violence generally argue that such violence-proneness is conditional on other socio-economic and political factors. High unemployment rate, state repression and autocracy are among the commonly cited factors that act like a catalyst between violence and youth bulges. I interact autocracy and youth bulges and democracy and youth bulges in Model 6 and Model 7, respectively to see if the existence of youth bulges creates more problems in autocracies. The interaction of youth bulge and autocracy is positive and significant, whereas the youth-democracy interaction is insignificant. This finding suggests that youth bulges in autocratic regimes tend to be more violence-prone than youth bulges in democratic regimes. Young people in democracies can express their frustration/dissatisfaction through nonviolent means, whereas such conventional strategies usually do not exist in autocracies, which makes resorting to violence the only viable option. The graph in Figure 3.1 show the predicted probability of violence for changing values of youth bulges in autocratic and other (non-autocratic) countries.

¹⁹ The dataset includes a dichotomous variable which is coded 1 if there is an inter-organizational conflict. I did not use this variable since it measures conflict rather than competition. Inter-organizational conflict is correlated with the dependent variable (0.56); it may be tautological to use this variable as an explanatory factor.

While the predicted probability of violence is higher in non-autocratic countries for low values of youth bulges, autocratic countries face a greater risk of violence when the proportion of young males exceeds about 38%. The higher risk of violence in non-autocratic countries may be because of inclusion of both democracies and anocracies in this category. As visually seen in the graph, the substantive impact of youth bulges in increasing risk of violence is higher in autocratic countries compared to other countries.

Figure 3.1 about here

I also interact youth bulges with state repression, negative GDP growth rate,²⁰ economic grievances, and Islamist ideology in order to find out whether youth bulges foster violence when coupled with any of these factors. I add these interacted variables one at a time to the model. None of the interactions was significant.²¹ I suspect that the insignificance of the interaction terms might be due to the use of crude proxies to measure the theoretically relevant concepts or alternatively limitations in the structure of the data. For example, economic grievance is an ordinal variable with only three categories whereas repression is a dichotomous variable. Overall, while the empirical analysis above suggests that the existence of youth bulges in general increases likelihood of political violence at group-level, the insignificance of most of the interaction terms is a theoretical puzzle that requires further research. Table 3.4 summarizes the regression analysis.

Table 3.4 about here

Finally, I calculate the predicted probabilities to show the substantive importance of the explanatory variables by using Models 4, 5, and 6. The predicted probability of an organizations' use of violence is 5.7% when all continuous variables are held at their mean values and dummy

²⁰ I do not have the unemployment data. Therefore, negative GDP growth rate is used to test whether impact of youth bulges is conditional on economic development.

²¹ These alternative model specifications are reported in table 3.5, in Appendix. .

variables are set to 0. The graph in Figure 3.2 shows the changes in predicted probability of use of violence by ethno-political organizations as the proportion of youth bulges shifts from its minimum value to maximum value. The probability of use of violence increases from 2% to 10% as the proportion of young males shifts from 21% to about 40%. In other words, the probability of use of violence by ethno-political organizations increases by 400%.

Figure 3.2 about here

The probability of use of violence increases from 5.7% to 13% when repression shifts from 0 to 1 while all continuous variables are held at their mean values and dummy variables are set to 0. In other words, the predicted probability of use of violence increases by 131%. Similarly, the probability of violence increases 100% when the weak leadership dummy shifts from 0 to 1. Shifting external support from 0 to 1 also leads to a 115% increase in the probability of violence. A shift in economic grievance from the lowest to highest value (0 to 2) leads to a 191% increase in the probability of violence. The impact of GDP growth rate is relatively small; shifting GDP growth rate from 10th to 90th percentile leads to only a 20% decline in the probability of violence. Shifting organizational split dummy from 0 to 1 leads to 188% increase in the dependent variable. Lastly, a shift in youth*autocracy interaction from 0 to 0.39 (90th percentile of youth bulge) leads to a 78% increase in the probability of violence.

All in all, these findings indicate that youth bulges, economic grievances, external support for organization, state repression, organizational split, and fractionalized leadership all increase probability of use of violent strategies by ethno-political organizations whereas increasing GDP growth rate has a negative impact. Youth bulges especially foster violence in autocratic regimes.

F. Conclusion

In December 2010, a Tunisian vegetable peddler burned himself to death after his cart is confiscated by a policewoman. This incident created a spillover effect of protests in many Middle Eastern countries, and initiated the Arab Spring.²² Some scholars describe the recent uprisings in the Middle East as youth revolutions; those young people, dissatisfied with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled against their governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011). The findings of this chapter supports the argument that existence of youth bulges in the Middle East increase the risk of resorting to violence by ethno-political organizations.

In addition to youth bulges, other internal and external factors also influence decision to resort to violence by organizations. Economic grievances and state repression foster violence whereas increasing GDP growth rate has a negative impact. While political grievances are found to be insignificant; one needs to be cautious while interpreting this finding. All of the organizations included in the MAROB dataset have political grievances, which makes it hard to explore role of political grievances. Organizational factors such as fractionalization and competing leadership increase likelihood of resorting to violence, which confirms the theory of outbidding. External support for the organization has a positive impact, whereas domestic support (measured by organizational popularity) is insignificant; there is partial support for resource mobilization theory. Religious/Islamist ideology is insignificant in all of the models; there is no support for the argument that religious organizations are more violence-prone than others.

²² <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8839143/Arab-Spring-timeline-of-the-African-and-Middle-East-rebellions.html>

In conclusion, two observations stand out. First, socio-economic and political factors such as youth bulge, economic development, and state repression, as well as internal factors such as organizational structure are crucial in the decision to resort to violence whereas religious ideology does not seem to be a driving force. Second, these findings are consistent with the findings of the previous chapter; religious ideology does not seem to make countries more or less conflict prone once we control for socio-economic and political conditions that increase risk of domestic armed conflict. Among all of the variables tested in this chapter and in the previous chapter, state repression and economic grievances are significant in most of the regressions, which suggests that violence is largely driven by socio-economic and political conditions.

Finally, it is important to note some of the limitations of this research. The analysis is limited to only sixteen countries that are located in MENA region, which introduces a selection bias problem and prevents making broader generalizations. The analysis is limited to MENA due to limitations in data availability. Future research may test the generalizability of these findings if cross-national data become available.

Reference List

- Ayoob, Mohammed. 2005. The Future of Political Islam: The Importance of External Variables. *International Affairs* 81(5): 951-961
- Bloom, Mia M. 2004. Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding. *Political Science Quarterly* 119(1): 61-88.
- Borum, Randy. 2011. Radicalization into Violent Extremism: A Review of Social Science Theories. *Journal of Strategic Security*. 4(4): 7-36.
- Collier, Paul, 2000. 'Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective', In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 91-111.
- Dalacoura, Katerina. 2011. *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Russell Dalton, Alix Van Sickle and Steven Weldon. 2010. The Individual-Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour. *British Journal of Political Science*, 40:51-73
- Fox, Jonathan. 2000. The Effects of Religious Discrimination on Ethno-Religious Protest and Rebellion. *Journal of Conflict Studies* 20 (1).
- . 2004. Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996. *International Political Science Review* 25(1): 55-76
- Fox, Jonathan and Shmuel Sandler. 2004. *Bringing Religion into International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Fuller, Graham E. 2003. The youth factor: the new demographics of the Middle East and the implications for US policy. Draft, 18 Jan 2003. Retrieved from: <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/islam/fuller2003.pdf>
- Golstone, Jack A. 2001. Demography, Environment, and Security. In *Environmental Conflict*. Eds. Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Boulder, CO: Westview, 84-108
- Gupta, Dipak K., Harinder Singh, and Tom Sprague. 1993. Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 37:301-39.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
- . 1993. Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945." *International Political Science Review*, 14: 161-201.

Gurr, Ted Robert and Will H. Moore 1997. Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A CrossSectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41: 1079-1103.

Hafez, Mohammed M. 2003. *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Rienner Publishers Inc: Colorado.

Hoffman, Michael and Jamal Amaney. 2012. The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and Similarities. *Middle East Law and Governance* 4: 168–188

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2003. *Global Religions: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Karagiannis, Emmanuel & Clark McCauley. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating the Threat Posed by a Radical Islamic Group That Remains Nonviolent. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18(2)

Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Malečková. 2003. Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(4): 119–144.

Lawrence, Adria. 2010. “Triggering Nationalist Violence: Competition and Conflict in Uprisings against Colonial Rule.” *International Security* 35 (2): 88-122.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1987. Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31:266-97

McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6):1212-1241.

McAdam, Doug, 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Moghadam, Valentine M. 2009. *Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement*. United Kingdom: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Muller, Edward N. 1985. Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence. *American Sociological Review* 50(1):47-61.

Regan, Patrick, and Daniel Norton. 2005. Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(3): 319–36

Regan, Patrick M. 2009. *Sixteen Million One*, Paradigm Publishers.

Russell, Charles and Bowman Miller. 1983. “*Profile of a Terrorist*,” reprinted in *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., pp. 45-60.

- Saxton, Gregory D. 2005. Repression, Grievances, Mobilization, and Rebellion: A New Test of Gurr's Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion. *International Interactions*. 31 (1):87-116
- Stephan, Maria J. and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security*. 33(1): 7-44.
- Schwedler, Jillian. 2007. Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties. *Development* 50(1): 56-61.
- Tarrow, Sydney. 1998. *Power in Movements* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. *Contentious Politics*. London: Paradigm Publishers.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From mobilization to revolution*. Random House
- Urdal, Henrik. 2004. The Devil in Demographics: The Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000. *Social Development Papers, The World Bank*. No: 14.
- .2006. A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3): 607-629
- Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2004. *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Bloomington& Indianapolis: Indiana University Press

Appendix 1: List of Tables

Table 3.1: Correlation of Variables

	organizational split	economic grievance	cultural grievance	religious ideology	youth bulge	external support	Islamist ideology	repression	Israel	democracy	GDP growth
organizational split	1										
economic grievance	0.0192	1									
cultural grievance	0.0383	0.3631	1								
religious ideology	0.0283	-0.0792	0.418	1							
youth bulge	0.0542	0.0779	0.313	0.0322	1						
external support	0.0012	0.0514	-0.002	0.068	-0.081	1					
Islamist ideology	0.0244	-0.0527	0.4417	0.4848	0.1183	-0.0843	1				
repression	0.0187	0.3888	0.2748	0.032	0.145	0.201	0.0486	1			
Israel	-0.0027	-0.0357	-0.228	-0.0179	-0.4689	-0.0975	-0.1131	0.053	1		
democracy	-0.0339	-0.1182	-0.3391	-0.1216	-0.6788	0.0485	-0.0137	-0.0687	0.4375	1	
GDP growth	0.0338	-0.0056	-0.0109	-0.0147	0.0008	0.0241	-0.0118	0.0487	0.0055	0.0055	1
weaklead	0.4696	-0.0126	0.0443	0.0929	0.0435	0.0678	0.0036	0.0179	0.0053	0.0238	0.0335

Table 3.2: Summary of Variables

Variable Name	Concept
Youth bulge	Demographic character
Annual GDP per capita growth rate (%)	Economic development
Repression	Political Opportunity Structure
Organizational popularity	Domestic support (resource mobilization)
External support	External support (resource mobilization)
Religious ideology	Religion
Islamist ideology	Organizations that aim to create an Islamist state
High political grievance	Organizations that focus on creating a separate state/ gaining independence
Economic grievances	Economic grievances
Cultural grievances	Cultural grievances
Democracy	Political Opportunity Structure
Organizational split	Organizational structure (resource mobilization)
Weak leadership	Organizational structure (resource mobilization)
Israel	Dummy for organizations that operate in Israel

Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Annual GDP growth rate (%)	0.012	0.181	-0.648	0.605
Youth bulges	.31	0.057	0.20	0.41
Repression	0.131	0.337	0	881
Polity 2	−0.49	7.91	-10	10
Prop. of young males	0.31	0.057	0.206	0.411
Organizational popularity	2.02	0.461	1	3
External support	0.411	0.492	0	1
Leadership Type	3.1	0.754	1	4
Religious ideology	0.233	0.423	0	1
Islamist ideology	.072	0.259	0	1
High Political Grievance	0.386	0.487	0	1
Economic Grievance	0.258	0.617	0	2
Cultural Grievance	0.562	0.857	0	2
Autonomy	0.186	0.389	0	1
Autocracy	0.325	0.468	0	1
Democracy	0.485	0.499	0	1
Organizational split	0.029	0.168	0	1
Israel	0.163	0.37	0	1

Table 3.4: Logistic Regression on Use of Violence by Ethno-political Organizations (1980-2004)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Repression	.886*** (.268)	.885*** (.267)	.865*** (.269)	.903*** (.262)	.897*** (.262)	.934*** (.27)	.897*** (.262)
Youth bulge	7.474*** (2.461)	7.497*** (2.466)	7.554*** (2.465)	7.126*** (2.549)	7.306*** (2.5)	3.46 (3.17)	7.628*** (2.75)
GDP growth	-.980*** (.378)	-.967** (.379)	-.973** (.382)	-.991*** (.382)	-1.026*** (.385)	-1.059*** (.385)	-1.028*** (.384)
Religious ideology	.324 (.334)	.335 (.341)		.328 (.343)	.335 (.340)	.349 (.358)	.334 (.34)
Islamist ideology			.175 (.456)				
Economic grievance	.570*** (.208)	.585*** (.209)	.518** (.209)	.591*** (.208)	.579*** (.21)	.609*** (.214)	.579*** (.21)
Cultural grievance	-.137 (.163)	-.117 (.163)	-.03 (.15)	-.03 (.164)	-.119 (.161)	-.095 (.163)	-.118 (.161)
High political grievance	-.146 (.271)						
Autonomy		-.053 (.280)	-.083 (.281)	-.082 (.292)	-.069 (.278)	-.033 (.269)	-.072 (.28)
External support	.906*** (.233)	.877*** (.207)	.936*** (.216)	.854*** (.208)	.883*** (.204)	.854*** (.2)	.882*** (.204)
Organizational popularity	.360 (.289)	.359 (.291)	.335 (.282)	.369 (.282)	.375 (.283)	.41 (.272)	.38 (.283)
Democracy	.207 (.256)	.194 (.259)	.198 (.262)	.155 (.26)	.186 (.259)		.474 (1.486)
Autocracy						-4.413** (1.72)	
Organizational split					1.171*** (.37)	1.217*** (.371)	1.173*** (.371)
Weak leadership				.722* (.369)			
Youth*autocracy						11.584** (4.6)	
Youth*democracy							-.891 (4.679)
Israel	.670** (.331)	.685* (.358)	.772** (.349)	.704** (.361)	.721** (.359)	.461 (.381)	.696* (.379)
Peace years	-1.560*** (.182)	-1.560*** (.183)	-1.573*** (.186)	-1.557*** (.185)	-1.558*** (.183)	-1.546*** (.183)	-1.558*** (.183)
Peace years²	.199*** (.045)	.199*** (.045)	.201*** (.046)	.2*** (.046)	.199*** (.045)	.197*** (.045)	.197*** (.045)
Peace years³	-.007*** (.003)	-.007*** (.002)	-.007*** (.002)	-.007*** (.003)	-.007*** (.003)	-.007*** (.003)	-.007*** (.003)
N	1649	1649	1649	1649	1644	1644	1644

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks (*, **, ***) indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include an intercept (not reported).

Table 3.5: Alternative Model Specifications

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Repression	3.587** (1.814)	.854*** (.272)	.895*** (.261)	.876*** (.262)
Youth bulge	8.092*** (2.447)	6.514** (2.55)	7.4*** (2.5)	7.521*** (2.6)
GDP growth	-.995*** (.374)	-1.032*** (.388)		-1.032*** (.389)
Negative GDP growth			-2.362 (4.23)	
Religious ideology	.318 (.346)	.440 (.346)	.332 (.34)	
Islamist ideology				.741 (3.292)
Economic grievance	.606*** (.215)	-1.31 (1.589)	.579*** (.209)	.507** (.209)
Cultural grievance	-.109 (.161)	-.165 (.171)	-.118 (.161)	-.031 (.152)
Autonomy	-.089 (.271)	-.159 (.275)	-.076 (.279)	-.101 (.28)
External support	.892*** (.207)	.886*** (.206)	.883*** (.205)	.943*** (.215)
Organizational popularity	.360 (.287)	.359 (.285)	.371 (.282)	.349 (.274)
Democracy	.178 (.258)	.207 (.259)	.184 (.258)	.183 (.261)
Organizational split	1.173*** (.367)	1.228*** (.372)		1.168*** (.371)
Youth*Repression	-8.034 (5.33)			
Youth* Negative GDP growth			9.244 (11.66)	
Youth* Economic grievance		5.8 (4.663)		
Youth*Islamist ideology				-1.668 (8.751)
Israel	.677* (.361)	.758** (.346)	.722** (.359)	.826** (.353)
Peace years	-1.565*** (.184)	-1.543*** (.182)	-1.559*** (.186)	-1.571*** (.186)
Peace years2	.198*** (.045)	.196*** (.045)	.198*** (.045)	.2*** (.046)
Peace years3	-.007*** (.003)	-.008*** (.003)	-.007*** (.002)	-.007*** (.002)
N	1644	1644	1644	1644

Appendix 2: List of Figures




Figure 3.1: Probability of Violence in Autocratic and Non-Autocratic Countries




Figure 3.2: Youth Bulges and Predicted Probability of Use of Violence

Appendix 3: Description of Variables (From MAROB codebook)

Dependent Variable:

DOMORGVIOLENCE: To what degree is the organization using violence domestically as a strategy?

0 Organization is not using violence as a strategy

1 Organization is using violence as occasional strategy but is not specifically targeting persons.

2 Organization is using violence regularly as a strategy but is targeting security personnel (including state security personnel and nonstate armed militias) and not government nonsecurity personnel or civilians

3 Organization is using violence regularly as a strategy but is targeting security personnel (including state security personnel and nonstate armed militias) and/or government nonsecurity personnel, but not civilians

4 Organization is occasionally targeting civilians but most of its violent acts target security

5 Organization is targeting civilians regularly

TRANSVIOLTARG: To what degree is the organization using violence to target transnational entities as a strategy? (The classification is the same as domorgviolence, ranges from 0 to 5)

Independent Variables:

ORGPOLGR Dominant political grievance of the organization

Value Label

1 Major organizational goals focused on eliminating discrimination

2 Major organizational goals focused on creating or increasing remedial policies

3 Major organizational goals focused on creating or strengthening autonomous status for group

4 Major organizational goals focused on creating a separate state for the group or revanchist change in border of state

-88 Other: goal described in ORGPOLGRDES

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

ORGECCR Dominant economic grievance of the organization

Value Label

0 No expressed economic grievances

1 Economic grievances focused on elimination of discrimination

2 Economic grievances focused on creating or strengthening economic remedial policies

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

ORGCULTGR Code the dominant cultural grievance of the organization

Value Label

0 No expressed cultural grievances

1 Cultural grievances focused on elimination of discrimination

2 Cultural grievances focused on creating or strengthening economic remedial policies (i.e., establishing or increasing state funding for cultural protection and/or promotion)

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

ORGSPLIT Did the organization split this year?

Value Label

0 No split

1 Split

-99 Unclear

LEAD Type of leadership for organization

Value Label

1 Factionalized/competing leaders

2 Weak or decentralized leadership

3 Strong ruling council

4 Strong single leader

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

ORGPOP Popularity of organization

Value Label

1 Fringe- no evidence of support from group

2 One of several organizations with support from group

3 Dominant organization

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

RELORG Does the organization advocate policies that incorporate religion into public life?

Value Label

0 No (non-religious)

1 Yes

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

DIASUP Has org. received support from diaspora in year being coded?

Value Label

0 No

1 Yes

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

FORSTSUP Has org. received support from foreign state in year being coded?

Value Label

0 No

1 Yes

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

IGOSUP Has org. received support from international governmental organization in year being coded?

Value Label

0 No

1 Yes

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

INGOSUP Has org. received support from international non-governmental organization or other non-state actor?

Value Label

0 No

1 Yes

-99 Missing Value/No basis for judgment

STATEVIOLENCE

Does the state use violence against the organization?

Value Label

- 1- State is not using lethal violence against the organization
- 2- State is using periodic lethal violence against the organization
- 3- State is using consistent lethal violence against the organization

CHAPTER 4

De-Radicalization and Moderation of Islamist Parties²³

²³ Some portions of this article have previously been published in July 2012 issue of *Democratization* with my co-author A. Kadir Yildirim.

A. Abstract

While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist parties is also equally important which remains underexplored. In this respect, exploring the evolution of radical Islamist parties (moderation process) will yield important clues to better understand democratization in the Muslim world and formulate more cohesive policies in the wake of the “Arab Spring.” What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each form of moderation? By building on the findings of Communist moderation literature, this chapter introduces a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist party moderation over time and across space: tactical vs. ideological moderation. *Tactical moderation* refers to the kind of moderation where radical parties make a decision on whether to accept electoral democracy (rather than violent strategies) as a means to achieve ideological goals without compromising their platforms. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors and state repression are causes of tactical moderation. *Ideological moderation* pertains to shifts in a platform from a radical niche to more moderate lines to respond to societal changes (economic liberalization, economic growth, generational changes, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) to gain greater popular support. Empirically, I analyze the Italian Communist Party, the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco, the Welfare Party, The Justice and Development Party, the Felicity Party in Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wasat Party in Egypt, the Hamas in Gaza strip, and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan. In providing evidence through structured comparisons and field interviews, this chapter develops a generalizable theory of radical party moderation.

B. Introduction

While exploring the conditions which foster political violence and radicalism is an interesting and important research question, the process of de-radicalization and moderation of Islamist parties is also equally important, which remains underexplored. The militant Islamist groups receive disproportional media coverage, whereas the voices of those nonviolent or mainstream organizations such as moderate political parties are hardly heard. When Islamist parties issue statements, which emphasize commitment to democracy or respect for rule of law, their ‘true’ intentions are usually questioned. More specifically, there are theoretical debates about whether Islam and democracy can coexist or not, and whether political parties with an Islamist ideology can contribute to democratization or not, which is somehow similar to the debates about whether Islam promotes violence or not. I explored driving forces of violence and radicalism in the previous chapters. This chapter builds on the previous chapters by examining a reverse trend: de-radicalization and the moderation of Islamist parties.

While the debates about whether Islam and democracy can coexist or not continue, support for Islamic-oriented political parties has increased considerably since the 1980s. Attempts by Islamic parties to participate in political systems in semi-democratic Muslim societies are crucial in understanding the democratic consolidation of these countries. On the one hand, some scholars and policy makers contend that Islamist parties’ participation should be viewed with caution since they might have the hidden agenda of changing the regime and establishing an Islamic state once they come to power. Schwedler (1998) calls this possibility ‘the paradox of democracy’; the idea that democratic processes might empower nondemocratic actors. Yet, there is no historical case supporting a hidden agenda argument. On the other hand, others contend that the inclusion of these Islamic parties leads to moderation and hence helps

democratic consolidation (Nasr 2005; Schwedler, 2006; Wickham 2004). Indeed, there is a growing trend of shifting from ideology-oriented policies to moderate pragmatic policies among Islamic oriented parties and growing support for these moderate Islamic parties (Nasr, 2005).

Moderation appears to have emerged as a key term in discussions about Islamists and Islamist political participation in the Muslim world, as Schwedler (2007) duly notes. That violence, radicalism, and opposition to democracy are increasingly viewed as illegitimate means for political participation led many Islamists to reframe their political discourse accordingly. This trend has been most visible within the context of the Arab Spring in the Middle East. However, there exists great variation—both among Islamists and others—as to what the notion of moderation refers. Moderation, hence, has become a catch-all term.

In popular discourse, virtually every Islamist group either has a claim on moderation, or is being cast as an example of moderation. Examples include the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco (PJD),²⁴ the Islamic Action Front in Jordan,²⁵ the Yemeni Islah Party,²⁶ the Algerian Islah Party,²⁷ the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP),²⁸ the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,²⁹ Al-Nahda in Tunisia,³⁰ the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,³¹ and

²⁴ “Don’t Hang the Barber,” *Economist*, July 24, 2003; Khadija Finan, “Western Sahara Impasse,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, January 11, 2006; “Islamists Slip in Moroccan Elections,” *Christian Science Monitor*, September 10, 2007; “Morocco: Islamists Divided, Jihadists Contained, Monarchy Secure,” *Stratfor Report*, September 7, 2007.

²⁵ “Jordan Questions Dozens Over Amman Bombings,” *ABC News Online*, November 12, 2005

(<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200511/s1505087.htm> - accessed January 30, 2011); Clark 2006.

²⁶ “Yemen Pursuing Terror Its Own Way; Tactics, Results Vary, But Target Is Al Qaeda,” *The Washington Post*, October 17, 2002.

²⁷ “Algerian Leader Eyes Poll Victory,” *BBC*, April 7, 2004 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3607603.stm> - accessed January 30, 2011).

²⁸ “Turkey: Post-Islamists in Power,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 6, 2003.

²⁹ Joshua Stacher and Samer Shehata, “Hear out Muslim Brotherhood,” *Boston Globe*, March 25, 2007; “Egypt’s Banned Muslim Brotherhood Wins 29 More Seats in Runoff Polls,” *USA Today*, November 27, 2005; Matthew Kaminski, “Among the Muslim Brothers: The Contradictory Faces of Political Islam in Post-Mubarak Egypt,” *The Wall Street Journal*, April 9, 2011.

³⁰ Mahan Abedin, “Islamist Leader Returns From Exile – An Interview with Rashid Al-Ghannoushi,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 31 January 2011; Gearon, Eamonn, 2011. “The ‘Real Deal’ Revolutions.” *Middle East* 421: 18-21; Olivier Roy, “The Tunisian Revolt: Where Have All the Islamists Gone?” *Christian Science Monitor*, January 21, 2011

³¹ “Syria Muslim Brotherhood Leader Urges West to Boycott Assad,” *Lebanon Wire*, March 18, 2006.

Hamas in the Palestinian Territories.³² When groups as diverse as the Turkish AKP and Hamas are branded as “moderate,” the term is likely to lose much of its distinctiveness. This apparent lack of consensus on moderation is not limited to popular discourse. Scholarly literature also shows great variance as to the meaning and causes of Islamist moderation. Such variation might be a symptom of the different types of Islamist moderation. Hence, the question guiding this research is as follows: What forms do Islamist moderation take, and which factors underlie each form of moderation?

From a social science perspective, the inconsistent use of the term moderation amounts to “conceptual stretching” implying that some attributes of the concept are eliminated in favor of broader applicability, which ultimately decreases the usefulness of the concept (Sartori 1970; Goertz 2006). This suggests a lack of progress toward a coherent *and* systematic approach to explaining Islamist moderation. A more systematic approach is thus likely to contribute to a better understanding of Islamist moderation in a cross-national perspective.

Another implication is that moderation can become an instrument in ideological struggles; different factions may utilize the concept to gain legitimacy and sympathy from a broader domestic and international audience. Where moderation and democracy have become the currency of political discourse, it is crucial to understand what kind of moderation each party claims and the conditions under which such moderation comes about.³³ Finally, a better understanding of moderation is necessary for better policymaking especially in the wake of the “Arab Awakening.” That Islamist parties are key political actors in the Middle East and whether

³² “Hamas Represents Islamic ‘Current of Moderation,’” *Al-Arabiya TV*, September 9, 2007.

³³ Moderation can also be a double-edged sword; hence, parties need to maintain a delicate balance between actual moderation and retaining ideological purity of the party to prevent credibility problems and not to alienate core supporters (D’Alimonte 1999; Sánchez-Cuenca 2004; Kitschelt 1994, as cited in Adams et al. 2006).

Islamist parties moderate or not—or, to what extent they moderate—may shape the course of transitions in the region.

In this chapter, I analyze Islamist moderation to identify the different forms it takes and to explain how each kind of moderation comes about. To this end, I present a preliminary systematic framework, arguing that moderation of Islamist parties takes on two complementary forms. The first form of moderation is marked by a change in strategy. Islamist parties choose to participate in the formal political structure (rather than use of violent tactics) by renouncing their original stance, i.e., that the formal political structure is irrelevant to their ultimate goal of an Islamic state. All of this is done, however, without compromising their core ideology. Such limited engagement implies that Islamists will work within the procedural rules of an electoral game, yet the end-goal remains the same—replacement of the existing system with an Islamic one. Hence, Islamist parties shift from use of violent strategies to nonviolent electoral participation and have a strong conviction that they can attain the ultimate goal via popular support, which leads the ideological platform to remain largely unchanged, and Islamist parties to remain policy-seeking parties. I call this process *tactical moderation*.³⁴

Some Islamist parties, however, go further and overhaul major elements of their ideology in favor of more centrist positions. Specifically, these parties change their ideological positions on democracy, the economic system, and the political role of Islam. This shift is a clear indication that the party has moved toward becoming a vote-seeking party rather than a policy-seeking one. I call this second kind of moderation *ideological moderation*. The causal factors that motivate each type of moderation differ from each other. While the tactical moderation is largely driven by structural factors (e.g., political liberalization, international factors, failure of

³⁴ The term “tactical moderation” is previously used in different contexts such as Spanish Communist Party, PSOE, (Share 1985) and the British Labor Party (Barker 1973). The use of the term for Islamist groups did not occur until very recently (Matesan 2009).

non-democratic paths to achieve ideological goals and regime repression), societal factors, such as socioeconomic changes, electoral participation, and intra-party dynamics, motivate ideological moderation.

The theory developed in this chapter rests in part on the findings of the Communist moderation literature, and more broadly on party moderation. The motivation for reliance on Western Communist party moderation literature is twofold. Theoretically, the literature on Communist moderation presents a coherent conceptual framework with which to analyze Islamist moderation. Secondly, and more conceptually, a crossover from Communist moderation to Islamist moderation points to a key categorical similarity between Communist and Islamist parties. Both kinds of parties are anti-system parties; that is to say both, ideally, want to replace the current political, economic and social system with one that is in line with their ideological commitments.

Empirically, I analyze The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (PJD) in a comparative perspective. I also examine several other cases of moderation in the Middle East and I apply the theoretical framework developed in this chapter to these cases. The PCI has been one of the most radical, yet simultaneously one of the most influential and successful working-class parties in Western Europe in the 20th century. Hence the PCI case offers insights into the moderation of Western Communist parties. For its part, the PCI helps to substantiate the theoretical argument as I build on the Communist moderation literature to analyze Islamist moderation. The analysis relies on secondary literature, and aims to offer a comparative perspective on Islamist moderation. The analysis of the PJD relies on interviews with party officials in Morocco, and primary sources, i.e., party publications. The PJD's selection offers a unique opportunity. The party is one of the few Islamic parties that has traveled

the whole spectrum of moderation from extreme radicalism in the 1970s to a mainstream Muslim democratic platform in the 21st century, and allows observing both kinds of moderation in a single case.

This chapter is organized into five sections. First, I review the literature on Islamist moderation and identify distinct hypotheses of Islamist moderation. Then, I present a succinct review of the Western Communist party moderation literature, and introduce the theoretical framework for analyzing Islamist moderation based on this literature. In this, I utilize the moderation of the Italian PCI to demonstrate the framework. In the third section I analyze the Moroccan PJD. The fourth section briefly reviews various cases of Islamist moderation in different countries and examines how well each case of moderation fits to the theory of Islamist moderation developed in this chapter. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses the implications of the analysis.

C. Islamist Moderation in the Literature

There exists a wide range of arguments on what constitutes Islamist moderation and the causal factors leading to moderation. The inclusion-moderation hypothesis is one of the most important arguments on Islamist moderation (Brooks 2002; Brumberg 2002; Willis 2004; Schwedler 2006, 2007 and 2011; Wickham 2004; Tezcur 2010), and on party moderation more broadly (Tilly 1978; Kitschelt 1986; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Tarrow 1994; Bermeo 1997). Islamist parties' inclusion in the formal political structure (such as elections) is highlighted as the leading cause of moderation because it leads Islamist parties to recognize the constraints of a formal system, and to moderate as a result. On the other hand, exclusive regimes lead to radicalization and legitimate the use of violence, as discussed in previous chapters (Hafez 2003). In a recent analysis, Schwedler (2011) offers the most critical review of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis

to date. Schwedler, essentially, distinguishes three discrete arguments within the body of this argument: ideological moderation of parties, of individuals, and behavioral moderation.

Others have suggested variants of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. Wickham (2004) uses a combination of inclusion-moderation and social learning hypotheses to explain the emergence of the Wasat Party in Egypt, emphasizing middle generation Islamist leaders' interactions with people from "other" convictions and ideologies as a key factor in their moderation. Cavatorta (2006) and Yilmaz (2009) also emphasize social learning in other contexts. In a similar way, electoral participation is viewed as a key cause of moderation and democratization (El-Ghobashy 2005; McFaul and Wittes 2008; Hovdenak 2009).

Clark, however, challenges the inclusion-moderation hypothesis by arguing that any meaningful cross-ideological cooperation—as an observable implication of moderation—requires a "spirit" of compromise and an intra-organizational discussion of compromise (2006, 542). For Clark, inclusion/participation in a formal political structure of multiple ideological stripes is not sufficient to bring about moderation; moderation on the part of the Islamist party (IAF) must come first for cooperation and compromise to emerge. Yet, Robinson (1997) argues that Jordanian IAF's moderation—as evidenced by its support for the democratic opening in Jordan in the late 1980s—emanated out of self-interest. For Robinson, IAF's decision to support political liberalization then was not because the group was made up of "Jeffersonian democrats" but because the group had a genuine "organizational interest" in liberalization.

Underscoring institutional factors, Wegner and Pellicer (2009) argue that the nature of the relationship between the Islamic party and the Islamic movement the party hails from is a key dynamic of moderation. For moderation to emerge the Islamic party should be sufficiently autonomous from the Islamic movement, according to Wegner and Pellicer. In the case of the

PJD in Morocco, the party turned out to be more moderate because it set up its own mobilization resources, and the party organization was institutionalized distinctly from the Islamic movement.

The strategic interaction hypothesis highlights Islamist parties' interactions with secular governments and military as a determinant of Islamist moderation. The credibility of signals sent by the moderating party is deemed to be crucial in convincing the state and others that the party's moderation is not a "Trojan horse." The costliness of the signal is a factor contributing to the credibility of moderation (Kalyvas 2000). In a variant, state-military repression of Islamist groups (such as deprivation of freedoms of assembly and religious practice, arbitrary detentions and imprisonment) forces Islamists to moderate their ideological stance on various issues in order to ensure survival (Mecham 2004; Ozbudun 2006; Somer 2007; Cizre ed. 2009). However, repression also has the potential to foster radicalization and violence, as discussed in previous chapters. Ashour (2009:139) points out that "repressive autocrats breed violent theocrats". For example, state repression has led to moderation of Islamist parties in Turkey whereas repression led to radicalization of the Algerian FIS.

Finally, some scholars offered socioeconomic explanations for Islamist moderation. Typically, the analogy is to Moore's (1966) emphasis on the bourgeoisie's role in bringing democracy. The size of the middle class directly correlates with the moderation and democratic disposition of the country in general (Demiralp 2009; Gulalp 2001; Gumuscu 2010; Langohr 2002; Lipset 1994; Nasr 2005 and 2009; Salame 1994; Yavuz 2009; Zakaria 2004). Some make the link between a stronger middle class and Islamist moderation more explicit (Nasr 2005 and 2009), while others emphasize economic liberalization's potential to create a business group with "a stake in openness, in rules, and in stability" (Zakaria 2004, 16).

Table 1 summarizes key arguments regarding Islamist moderation. Overall, the literature on Islamist moderation is expansive, yet little agreement exists. Two interrelated problems stand in the way of a generalizable theory of Islamist moderation: 1) how moderation is defined, and 2) the large degree of variance of moderation across different studies. While one analysis considers it sufficient for a party to participate in elections for moderation to occur (Robinson 1997), another account might find it insufficient because the adoption of democratic ideals and pluralism is deemed to be a more critical signal of moderation (El-Ghobashy 2005). Hence, moderation takes on different meanings suggesting that there may be different kinds of moderation. Second, the multitude of processes and competing explanations on moderation—i.e., inclusion, participation, organizational interest, party autonomy, social learning, socioeconomic factors—imply that varying mechanisms of moderation exist. It may be the case that for one particular kind of moderation to emerge (i.e., giving up violence) a particular set of factors should exist (i.e., state repression, or political liberalization). In summary, there is no framework that systematically connects various explanations of moderation. Although most explanations deserve merit given the cases and their contexts, in the absence of a unified framework it is virtually impossible to reach a theory of Islamist moderation.

D. Communist Moderation in the Literature

In what follows I review the Communist moderation literature, and more broadly the party moderation literature, in order to provide a more systematic explanation to the question of moderation. Unlike the literature on Islamist moderation, Communist moderation literature presents a coherent conceptual framework by which one can analyze Islamist moderation. Both Communist and Islamist parties are anti-system parties; they both want to replace the current political, economic and social system with one that is in line with their ideological commitments.

I argue that two distinct kinds of moderation exist in both Communist and Islamist party moderation: tactical moderation and ideological moderation. They differ on both the extent of moderation and its underlying causes.

I define *tactical moderation* as the kind of moderation where anti-system parties (i.e., Communist or Islamist) strategically decide to embrace electoral democracy to realize their ideological goal of a different political, economic and social system while renouncing the use of violence. Democracy thus carries an instrumental value. Such moderation arises in response to changes in domestic institutional structure (i.e., political liberalization, economic crises), shifting international influence, or the failure of non-democratic paths to achieve ideological goals (Gray 1980; Pasquino 1980; Amyot 1981; Share 1988; Waller & Fennema 1988; Ishiyama 1995; Gunther et al. 2004). I call these structural factors. The primary motivation behind tactical motivation is that by adapting to changing circumstances, anti-system parties are still convinced that they can fulfill their ideological goals. Hence, notwithstanding the use of democratic means, anti-system parties retain most of their ideology.

Ideological moderation, in contrast, is marked by a major transformation of the central tenets of party ideology. For Communist parties, this translates into modified positions on capitalism, western alliance, and pluralist democracy. For Islamist parties, it involves embracing pluralist democracy, the free market, and Muslim values. Electoral dynamics underlie ideological moderation. Because parties want to win a greater share of votes *and* be more responsive to the electorate to prevent increasing marginalization, they moderate their ideologies. Societal factors (i.e., intraparty dynamics, economic liberalization, economic growth, electoral loss and changing voter preferences) are deemed to play a key role in bringing about ideological moderation

(Amyot 1981; Ishiyama 1995; Share 1988 and 1999; D'Alimonte 1999; Sánchez-Cuenca 1999; Greene 2002; Berman 2008; Somer-Topcu 2009).³⁵

Communist Moderation and the Italian Communist Party

Several mechanisms are offered in the scholarly literature to explain the moderation of Western Communist parties. While some scholars focus on intra-party dynamics, others emphasize electoral incentives and survival concerns. The ideological rigidity of the party (Cuenca-Sánchez 2004), power struggles between radicals and reformists within the party, leadership change (Charlton 1979, Ishiyama 1995; Tucker 1967), the structure of political system (Berman 2008), electoral system (Ishiyama 1995; Share 1999), economic growth or crises (Berman 2008; Putnam 1978; Share 1988) and international factors, such as the decline of the Soviet influence (Amyot 1981; Sánchez-Cuenca 1999), are among the commonly cited causes of post-communist moderation.

Tucker (1967) argues that a radical movement that survives for a long time without the opportunity to implement its objectives undergoes a deradicalization process in which initial deradicalization creates pressure for further deradicalization. Tucker points out four manifestations of the deradicalization of Marxist movements: 1) change in patterns of action, 2) change in strategy and tactics, 3) intra-party conflict between reformists and radicals, and 4) ideological deradicalization. While Tucker's first two manifestations of deradicalization pertain to what I call tactical moderation, the latter two are examples of ideological moderation. Charlton (1979) analyzes the deradicalization of the French Communist Party (PCF) in the 1970s based on Tucker's framework and argues that changes in the domestic and international

³⁵ On ideological moderation, the literature suggests additional explanations. The most prominent among such explanations is Downs' (1957) median voter theorem, arguing that once parties start playing the electoral game, they are forced to appeal to the plurality of voters, which in turn leads to broad, centrist platforms. Challenging a crucial assumption in the median voter theorem, others argued that ideological change in political parties reflects shifts in voter preferences (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Adams et al. 2006).

environments played an important role in the PCF's changes in action-pattern, strategy and tactics. This early phase of deradicalization is cited as a major causal factor for ideological deradicalization; the tension between ideology and practice eventually leads to modification of the ideology.

According to Cuenca-Sánchez (2004), ideological rigidity, which is affected by organizational reforms, generational renewal, and leadership, might prevent moderation even though moderation might potentially lead to electoral gains. For example, the PSOE in Spain decreased its vote share in 1979 and the general secretary suggested a renouncement of Marxism in order to gain more votes. However, 61% of PSOE delegates rejected this offer claiming that electoral benefits would not be worth the ideological sacrifice. Similarly, the British Labor Party lost all national elections between 1979 and 1997 due to its radical position, yet refused to moderate until the mid-1990s (Cuenca-Sánchez 2004).

The structure of the political system is another factor which affects the likelihood of moderation. In weak democracies, in which governments fail to meet citizens' demands and to prevent the armed struggle of communists, communist political parties remain committed to revolutionary tactics, whereas the existence of strong democracies and economic development facilitates moderation (Berman 2008). Lastly, failure of non-democratic strategies to achieve ideological goals in the past or in other parts of the world (Pasquino 1980), declining Soviet influence (Amyot 1981), and economic growth (Putnam 1978) also contributed to the moderation of communist parties.

Western Communist parties' initial experience with moderation dates back to the 1930s with the adoption of the Popular Front strategy. This two-stage strategy—as dictated by the Comintern—envisioned first an anti-fascist coalition coming to power through democratic

means, also called “progressive democracy,” and then preparing the society for a socialist revolution (Amyot 1981). The Popular Front was a new tactic rather than a fundamental ideological change since Communist parties remained committed to a Marxist-Leninist ideology and saw democracy as instrumental for their end-goal. The key change was giving up armed struggle to achieve socialist revolution; hence it conforms to tactical moderation.

Togliatti, PCI’s Secretary General between 1926 and 1964, promoted the Italian version of the Popular Front strategy, *via italiana al socialismo* (Amyot 1981, 41). Togliatti’s gradualist approach to acquiring state power emphasized a parliamentary road to socialism rather than revolution. He eliminated the militant image of the PCI, dismissed the idea of non-collaboration with non-leftist groups, and tried to legitimize the PCI as a national party prioritizing Italian national interests (Gray 1980; Samuels 2003). Although Togliatti’s efforts constituted a key step in moving the PCI away from radicalism and non-participation, the change ultimately remained tactical. Togliatti tried to create a “partito nuovo, one open to Catholics and former fascists as well as doctrinally orthodox” that did not compromise the party’s core ideology (Samuels 2003). Although many refer to Togliatti’s pragmatic personality to explain PCI’s tactical moderation (Amyot 1981; Gray 1980; Pasquino 1980; Samuels 2003), external factors explain the transformation better. Togliatti viewed extreme leftism as risky since such experiences in the 1920s almost destroyed the Italian left (Gray 1980). Similarly, the defeat of Communist guerillas in Greece (1944-1949) showed the failure of armed struggle in a world divided between two ideological camps (Pasquino 1980). Hence, Samuels notes, Togliatti was convinced that “the domestic and international balance of forces would not support a [communist] insurrection in any event” (2003, 303). Stronger governments of the postwar period also reinforced this perspective especially when contrasted with the interwar period which was plagued with weak

governments unable to prevent armed struggle and ideas about a revolutionary path to communism (Berman 2008).

Beginning with the 1960s, Eurocommunism increasingly gained traction among Western Communist parties (Spieker 1980). It laid out the disassociation from the Soviet Union and a break with Leninist ideology as cornerstones of a new era (Gentili and Panebianco 1980; Waller and Fennema 1988). For some, Eurocommunism was a major sign of de-radicalization among Western Communist parties (Amyot 1981; Devlin 1979). Yet, others challenged this view as a vague concept, arguing that it was not clear whether Communist parties embraced democratic principals, or viewed them as a means to achieve Marxist ideological goals (Sánchez-Cuenca 1999; Spieker 1980). Skepticism about Eurocommunism arose specifically because Communist parties still viewed a dual role for themselves, a party of both “government” and “revolution.” Eurocommunism’s emphasis on “organized mass movements” and their role as “the first step to the hidden dictatorship of the Communist party” aggravated suspicions. Eurocommunist parties also failed to guarantee certain basic civil rights such as freedom of organization and political activity, and they were vague on property rights (Spieker 1980, 442-443). Hence, Eurocommunism exemplified another case of tactical moderation.

As for the PCI, Eurocommunist ideals brought the party a step closer to ideological moderation. With the 1964 Yalta Memorandum and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the PCI slowly disassociated itself from the Soviet Union by emphasizing polycentrism (multiple roads to socialism) (Pasquino 1980). Moreover, post-war economic growth led to gradual changes in attitudes toward the European Economic Community (Gentili and Panebianco 1980). Yet, similar concerns about ideological conservatism and the limits of transformation were leveled against the PCI. While party behavior in the parliament showed loyal opposition,

messages and declarations of the PCI did not favor a democratic system (Pasquino 1980, 91). The rank and file of the party, especially older members, remained committed to the revolutionary ideology (Gray 1980). Also, the party did not stray too far from the Soviet Union albeit with a “national emphasis” (Samuels 2003). Yet, communist parties’ moderation required that they sever ties with the Soviet Union (Sánchez-Cuenca 1999, 21).

PCI’s Historic Compromise in the 1970s and the accompanying policy shifts are examples of ideological moderation that transformed the party from a policy-seeking one to a vote-seeking one. Changing socioeconomic conditions in the 1960s did not bode well for PCI in terms of membership or party ideology. Italy experienced economic growth in the post-war period, undermining PCI’s expectation for a capitalist crisis. PCI’s membership and organization thus weakened in this period. By the late 1960s, the PCI lost one third of its entire membership (Samuels 2003). International economic constraints and domestic constraints played a crucial role in PCI’s dramatic shift on positions regarding a NATO alliance and the European Community. Italy’s export-oriented postwar economic growth required integration with the world economy as well, especially with Western Europe and North America. Public opinion also favored European integration and good relations with the US. European integration was popular even among the Communist electorate during late 1960s and early 1970s while Communist leaders remained suspicious of it. These electoral incentives and PCI’s need for an alliance with non-Communists put pressure on the PCI leadership to moderate positions on foreign policy (Putnam 1978).

The most crucial step toward ideological moderation of the Italian Communist Party came in 1972, largely as a result of deep socioeconomic transformation in Italian society. Enrico Berlinguer, PCI’s leader at the time, proposed the Historic Compromise at the XIII Party

Congress. By accepting the proposal, the PCI decided to support governments led by Christian Democrats (DC) in return for two tangible benefits: greater legitimacy and the introduction of structural reforms that would include elements of socialism (D'Alimonte 1999; Gentili and Panebianco 1980).³⁶ Increasing numbers of middle class youth (1968-78), who joined the party for positions rather than revolutionary commitment, were also influential in the historic compromise (Amyot 1981). Between 1976 and 1979, the PCI supported DC-led governments directly, or indirectly (through abstention in the Parliament). It also accepted NATO and European integration, key issues that would facilitate collaboration with the DC (Samuels 2003). Hence, key elements of the party's communist ideology were relinquished, paving the way for ideological moderation. As a testament to the party's ideological moderation, between the early 1960s and the late 1970s, the PCI moved from the extreme left (-30) to center left (-7) in the left-right spectrum (Manifesto Project). In the same period, the PCI virtually eliminated its statist discourse on the economy and instead expressed favorable views on capitalism.³⁷ In the short term, PCI's ideological moderation led to an increase in popular support, confirming the idea that societal changes and electoral concerns motivated PCI's ideological moderation. The party increased its vote share from 27% in the early 1970s to around 35% in the mid-1970s.

However, it is important to note that the PCI's ideological moderation was still a work in progress in the 1970s. For example, according to a majority of the rank and file of the party members, the Historic Compromise was driven by tactical motives to eventually come to power (Amyot 1981). The Historic Compromise also led to intraparty conflicts within the PCI; there

³⁶ Another concern for the PCI was the possibility of a fascist union between the center and the right as exemplified by the 1973 military coup in Chile where a left wing government that tried to rule out Christian Democrats was crushed by the military (Pasquino 1980; Amyot 1981; Sassoon 1981). By accepting capitalism and democracy, the PCI would be able to avoid the worst outcome.

³⁷ On market regulation, PCI moved from over 6 points to almost 0; on nationalization, the party moved from 3 to 0; on planned economy, from 9 to 2. The points indicate the number of mentions in party programs; greater figures imply more mentions and greater significance. The data are from the Manifesto Project Database.

were different interpretations on the new policy. Even though Berlinguer argued that the sacrifices were needed to introduce elements of socialism in Italy, some regarded it as “a policy of subordination” (Sassoon 1981: 228-29). In a personal interview in 1977, Dr. Antonio Tato, one of the closest figures to Berlinguer, stated that:

“Gramsci’s proletarian hegemony has not been abandoned by the PCI. The hegemony is not the hegemony of a party but of a class. The Historic Compromise will provide the transition period to the new hegemony, and the means by which the DC in particular accepts the new force (proletarian class) politically as the dominant trend in Italy” (Rusceo 1982: 114).

The rise of left wing terrorism and Red Brigades’ kidnapping of DC leader Moro eventually led to the PCI’s withdrawal from the DC led government in 1979 (Sassoon 1981). The PCI continued its moderation later throughout the 1980s making the policy of “democratic alternative” a key element of its platform in the 1980s. Yet, the PCI continued to be criticized by major portions of Italian society on various grounds, including a lack of internal democracy, commitment to vestiges of Marxism-Leninism, and a relative lack of commitment to Italy’s international alliances (Daniels 1987). As a result, the PCI was left politically isolated. While some blamed the PCI’s Historic Compromise for its declining popularity, others referred to left wing revolutionary terrorist episodes that were prevalent in the 1970s. Even though the PCI condemned the terrorist attacks, the rhetoric of the terrorists made the party appear to belong in a “Communist family” album (Weinberg 1995:49).

In a further move to carve a niche in the political landscape and move away from its association with communism, the PCI adopted “new internationalism,” advocating a more independent role for Western Europe between the superpowers, during the 17th party congress in

1986. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan was also condemned. The main motivational factors in the evolution of the PCI's international choices were to gain closer ties with other left-wing parties in Europe and to become an acceptable, legitimate partner in government (Daniels 1987). In 1988, Achille Occhetto, the young reformist leader of the PCI, proposed radical changes for the party, called the new discourse. Occhetto focused on a new political agenda, emphasizing the role of women in Italy, environmental problems, and an expansion of democratic rights. Intra-party democracy was also strengthened, ending the idea of democratic centralism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Occhetto pushed for further changes and proposed to change the party's name; a new party founded on the principles of democracy and human liberation was needed since the old conflict between capitalism and socialism became obsolete (Weinberg 1995). Finally in 1991, the PCI adopted a social democratic strategy and transformed itself into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS). Sánchez-Cuenca claims that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the elimination of the Soviet constraint enabled full moderation of the PCI: "Moderation meant for the PCI ceasing to be communist; credibility was attained at the cost of renouncing its very identity" (1999, p. 23).

In summary, PCI's moderation was motivated by two sets of factors leading to two different kinds of moderation. International factors and constraints convinced the PCI of the need to relinquish the "militant liturgy" and adhere to procedural democracy in the 1940s. Such a limited moderation (tactical moderation) did not necessitate ideological compromise, while electoral democracy could be instrumentally valuable in reaching communism gradually instead of revolution. The PCI's ideological change (ideological moderation) came only after the 1960s. The party renounced central tenets of its communist ideology, thereby enabling the PCI to endorse pluralist democracy, capitalism, European integration and NATO. PCI's tactical

moderation was largely driven by its reaction to unsuccessful revolutionary experiences in Italy and the rest of the world, and the international context; moderation was undertaken to ensure organizational survival. In contrast, it was largely societal changes in Italy that motivated PCI's ideological moderation and eventual transformation into the PDS; international factors such as the fall of the Berlin Wall played a comparatively minor role in this process. In Table 2, I present a summary of PCI's moderation along with that of the Moroccan PJD, which is discussed next.

E. Party for Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco

Like the Italian PCI, the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development's (PJD) experience with moderation also came in two distinct phases: tactical moderation between the 1980s and the 1990s, and ideological moderation after 2000. Both types of moderation are discussed below.

PJD's origins lie in the Islamic Youth Association (*Al-Shabiba*), an Islamist organization established in 1969, which was largely influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's prominent and highly controversial leader, Sayyid Qutb. During this period, the Islamic Youth Association viewed use of violence to establish an Islamic state as a legitimate tool, while participating in the political process was deemed to be against Islamic principles (Tlaidi interview, 2009; Shahin 1997, 182). In 1970s, King Hassan II banned the organization and persecuted many members within the group due to the Islamic Youth Association's involvement in violent activities (Wegner and Pellicer 2009, 159).³⁸

In 1981, a new organization called Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) was established by the younger leaders of the group. The new group emerged with revisions in organizational structure, ideology and practice. Unlike the Islamic Youth Association, Al-Jama'a Al-Islamiyya rejected the revolutionary ideology of Qutb and decided to participate in the

³⁸ Despite allegations, the group rejected any part in the violence (Burgat and Dowell 1997, 172). Even though the group was formally outlawed in 1975, members continued its activities for years (Shahin 1997, 188).

political system. The goal was to “push” the government to apply Islamic law gradually. Wegner and Pellicer note that *Al-Jama’a*’s goals during this period conform to classical Islamist discourse: “...To renew the understanding of religion, to advocate the implementation of sharia law, to achieve a comprehensive cultural renaissance, to work on accomplishing the unity of Muslims, to confront ideologies and ideas which they believed were subversive to Islam, and to raise the educational and moral level of the Moroccan people” (2009, 160).

Al-Jama’a officially recognized “the political and religious legitimacy of the monarchic regime” while many members of the group still regarded participation in politics as un-Islamic (haram). The group published a report called “The Paper of Political Participation” to justify the political participation (Wegner and Pellicer 2009, 160). According to this report *Al-Jama’a* decided to participate in politics to reach a wider audience, to break the “siege of secularists” and to obtain parliamentary immunity to ensure the security of *dawa* (religious mission) activities (Tlaidi interview, 2009). In 1992, *Al-Jama’a* changed its name to *Harakat al-Islah wal-Tajdid al-Maghribiyya* (Moroccan Movement for Reform and Renewal) to reassert its commitment to the rules of the political game in Morocco (Shahin 1997, 191). Thus far, the trajectory of the Movement closely resembled that of the PCI. Initial extremism and rejection of electoral politics was followed by a phase of tactical moderation that entailed the recognition that revolutionary tactics were not serving the ideological goal well. Hence, to better serve *dawa* and to establish an Islamic state, the Movement opted for tactical moderation, i.e., changing its strategy without changing the core ideology.

The Moroccan Movement for Reform and Renewal first proposed to establish a political party in 1992, but the government did not allow the Movement to form the party due to the domestic armed conflict in neighboring Algeria (El-Khalfi interview, 2009). Then, the group

sought to join an existing party's legal umbrella and cooperation with Abdelkarim Al-Khatib's moribund Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPDC) (Desrues and Moyano 2001, 30). In 1997, the MPDC participated in legislative elections and won nine seats (Willis 2004). In 1998, the party also changed its name to the Party for Justice and Development (PJD). However, neither the merger nor the name change greatly affected its Islamist ideology. While the PJD abandoned revolutionary ideas, it maintained the core Islamist ideology. Over the course of the next few years, the PJD underwent a substantial transformation, which resulted in ideological moderation. First, PJD's platform evolved toward a moderate position, which emphasized pluralist democracy, liberal economy, and Muslim values. Second, the separation between the PJD and the Islamic movement that the party hailed from (Movement of Unity and Reform) facilitated further ideological moderation of the party.

In 2002, PJD officials held internal discussions on the party's future direction. As McFaul and Wittes (2008) note, electoral participation stimulated intraparty debates that are deemed to play a key role in PJD's moderation. Bilal Tlaidi, a member of the PJD's national council and a researcher on Islamic movements, stated that intra-party debates focused on party identity: was the PJD an Islamic party or a political party with an Islamic reference? Tlaidi noted the distinction as, "When you say an Islamic party, issues of Islamic identity and morals should be the main priority for the party. When you say a political party with an Islamic reference, that means the priority is public policy, but the solutions suggested by the PJD are based on Islamic values, not political Islam" (Tlaidi interview, 2009). After 2002, party programs clearly demonstrated that "public affairs" and problems around corruption and the economy took precedence over issues of Islamic identity (El-Khalfi interview, 2009).

PJD officials attributed the ideological transformation of the party to societal changes. For example, former PJD leader Saad Eddin Uthmani emphasized such changes and stated, “It is impossible for societal changes not to change parties” (Uthmani interview, 2009). Similarly, Nezha El-Ouafi, a female legislator from the PJD, pointed out changes taking place both in Morocco and worldwide, and the concomitant necessity for the party to transform itself to “keep up” with the changes in their own constituency (El-Ouafi interview, 2009). The economic liberalization process that Morocco went through in the 1980s and 1990s led to new issues and demands in Morocco including economic development, democracy and social justice (Cohen 2004; Cammett 2007). Interviews with party officials show that the party considered expectations from the public while formulating the new platform to echo the people’s “agenda” (El-Khalfi and Uthmani interviews, 2009).

Specifically, the PJD party program shows a commitment to democracy (PJD Party Program 2007, 1-3), which Amara defined as “transparency, clean elections, human rights, and freedom of expression” (Amara interview, 2009). Critically, PJD officials likened the PJD to Christian democratic parties (El-Khalfi interview, 2009). The PJD assumes that Islamic/Muslim values represent the authentic identity of the party (and, of the Moroccan society) and therefore they should be upheld; yet, it does not go as far as calling for the imposition of an Islamic state on the society. Thus, the PJD was able to adopt a sincere democratic stance while keeping Muslim values. Islamist parties, by contrast, generally take on a stronger position on the role of Islam by calling for Islamic state and application of Islamic law, which prevents them from fully embracing democratic principles such as freedom of conscience and minority rights.³⁹

Economically, the PJD adopted a liberal discourse. Recognizing the “reality” of increasing economic globalization, the PJD called attention to Morocco’s “need” for greater

³⁹ For an excellent review of Islamism and identity politics in the Arab world, see Ismail (2004).

integration into global markets and its potential to benefit from it (Amara and El-Ouafi interviews, 2009). PJD legislator Lahcen Daoudi explained the “need” for Moroccan economic liberalization as follows: “In Morocco, economic opening is a necessity because we are a small state. It is not possible for us to develop with our domestic market only; we don’t have oil, minerals, or gold” (Daoudi interview, 2009). Complementing this statement, another PJD official argued that Moroccans are “benefiting” from economic liberalization, and hence the party favors a liberal economic policy (Bouanou interview, 2009). Though similar in emphasizing market economy, the PJD’s liberal economic stance differs from Islamist parties’ conventional pro-market approach. Islamist parties ascribe a disproportionately large role for the state in managing the economy, whereas the PJD’s economic stance does not include the state’s management of the economy. Islamist parties’ vision of the state’s extensive role in regulating and supervising the economy goes beyond the liberal economic perspective that the PJD adopts. Overall, the new party mantra strives to capture the sentiment of its own constituency while attempting to be “a party of all Morocco”: *Asalah, Adalah, Tanmiyah* (Authenticity/Origins, Justice, Development) (El-Khalfi interview, 2009).

In addition to socio-economic changes, organizational factors such as separation of the PJD from its founding organization, Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), also fostered the ideological moderation process in late 1990s. The movement focused largely on “religious activities, education, culture, social welfare” whereas the party dealt with “the management of public affairs, political activities, and public policies.”⁴⁰ The membership in the movement was not a formal condition for membership in the party which enabled the party to embrace ideas not

⁴⁰ In 2007, the Moroccan daily *Al-Tajdid* (part of the MUR network) reported on movement-party separation, identified the functions of the PJD and the MUR as distinct organizations, including various issues of disagreement between the two such as the caliphate. “Al-Tamayuz Bayna al-Haraka wal-Hizb Masar La Raja’ah Fihi” [The Separation between the Movement and the Party Now Irreversible] *Al-Tajdid*, 28-29 August, 2007.

wholly endorsed by the movement. In 1997 elections all MPs except one were MUR members, whereas only 31% of PJD candidates up for a parliamentary seat were also MUR members in 2002 elections. Moreover, currently a lower percentage of intermediate-level and local-level officials in the party are also members of the MUR. The PJD set up its own “independent mobilization resources” accompanied by financial independence, institutionalization of party structure, and parallel structures (Wegner and Pellicer 2009). Overall, these changes show that the party was becoming increasingly independent of the movement. Thus, separation from the movement enabled the party to engage with a broader audience. Since the party did not represent Islam in its political platform—thanks to the movement-party separation—it had a relatively a greater opportunity to address the demands of a more diverse people.

Crucially, the PJD began enjoying greater popular support in the post-2002 period following its ideological moderation. While the party won nine seats in the 1997 parliamentary elections, it received 13% and 11% of the votes in 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively, producing 42 and 46 parliamentary seats. The PJD won the plurality of seats (107 seats out of 395) during the most recent parliamentary elections in 2011. PJD’s reach to a wider audience is analogous to PCI in Italy in the 1970s. The PJD aims to represent a broader constituency by moderating its policy platform, in response to perceived societal changes. The change in the constituency in the post-liberalization Morocco and the party’s willingness to separate the Islamic movement from the party support my argument. Hence, I conclude that PJD’s move to engage in ideological moderation in the post-2002 period is motivated by societal dynamics rather than structural factors.

F. Application of the Theoretical Framework to Other Cases

While the moderation by the PCI and PJD support the theoretical framework proposed in this chapter, such a limited analysis prevents drawing more general inferences. In this section, I briefly review the moderation of several other Islamist parties, examine various arguments proposed by scholars to explain moderation of these parties, and test the theory's generalizability to other cases. While the cases reviewed here are far from being exhaustive, it presents a cross-section of arguments explaining Islamist moderation. Below, I briefly review the moderation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Wasat Party in Egypt, the Welfare Party, the Justice and Development Party, and the Felicity Party in Turkey, the Hamas, and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.

The moderation process of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, one of the oldest and popular Islamist movements, started in 1980s (El-Ghobasy 2005). The MB experienced both tactical and ideological moderation throughout its history. The MB gradually moved away from Sayyid Qutb's (1906-66) radical ideologies to a more moderate stance. The shift from "uncompromising" views of Sayyid Qutb to Hasan el Banna's moderate views and an emphasis on liberal democracy, an example of tactical moderation, occurred as a result of strategic calculations and participation in parliamentary elections in the 1980s (El-Ghobashy 2005; Harnisch and Mecham 2009; Schwedler 2007). Elections and working within the system are viewed as ways to spread their message (Islam is the solution); the MB participated in the system to spread the word of God (Abed-Kotob 1995; Harnisch and Mecham 2009). The party also wanted to benefit from the increasing political openness of the new Mubarak regime (Harnisch and Mecham 2009). Pargeter (2010) argues that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the fear of being labeled a terrorist organization pushed MB towards more moderation. On the

other hand, the MB's ideological moderation, which is demonstrated by the adoption of a more "democratic" and "moderate" stance on various controversial issues such as women's rights, parties and political pluralism, and the role of Egyptian Copts, occurred as a result of generational change—growing, better educated, young, pragmatic activists became dominant in the MB—, and learning institutional rules of participation (state repression) (El-Ghobashy 2005; Rutherford 2006). The MB issued statements which emphasize women's rights, party pluralism, and equal rights for the Christian Copts in 1994-95. The MB's ideological moderation gained new momentum as a result of the passing of old, radical minded members in the 2000s (El-Ghobashy 2005). However, whether MB's ideological transformation is complete or not and whether their commitment to democracy is sincere or not, are debatable questions (El-Ghobashy 2005; Masoud 2008; Pargeter 2010). The MB claims a commitment to liberal progressive ideas while keeping references to Sharia law, which creates contradictions (Pargeter 2010). After the 2011 Arab Spring and toppling of Mubarek, The MB won the first free elections and came to power in 2012. While the movement assures that their goal is "participation, not domination," President Mohamed Morsi's recent decision to grant himself extraordinary powers increased doubts about the movements' commitment to liberal democracy (Masoud 2012). Tadros (2012) argues that the Muslim Brotherhood is a pragmatic movement that has changed as a result of changing political circumstances but the MB has a highly conservative ideology. To sum up, some refer to the Muslim Brotherhood's transformation as involving extensive ideological moderation (El-Ghobashy 2005; Rutherford 2006) whereas others view it merely as a tactical maneuver to gradually establish an Islamic state (Abed-Kotob 1995; Schwedler 2007; Harnisch and Meham 2009; Pargeter 2010).

The Wasat Party, which split from the MB and formed in 1996, also took the path of ideological moderation and altered positions on certain controversial issues such as the inclusion of women in parliament, and advocacy of equal rights for Egyptian Copts (Stacher 2002; Wickham 2004). The Wasat Party's ideological moderation was largely driven by strategic calculations, social learning, and intra-party debates. The core beliefs and values of leaders changed as a result of interaction with seculars and cross-ideological cooperation (Clark 2006; Wickham 2004). Moreover, fear of repression, demand to seize new political opportunities and avoid constraints with the autocratic elite also contributed to the ideological moderation of the party (Wickham 2004). Wickham argues that strategic moderation leads to changes in the public rhetoric and behavior of actors which can eventually cause change in ultimate goals. In other words, "The mask becomes the face" (Hoeber 2003, as cited in Wickham 2004, 225).

The Justice and Development Party of Turkey (JDP) engaged in ideological moderation whereas the Welfare Party (WP), and the Felicity Party (FP) experienced only tactical moderation. Both the JDP and the FP are offshoots of the Welfare Party which was closed by the Constitutional Court after the 1998 postmodern military coup. Turkish politics is characterized by a power struggle between the secular elite (represented by the Constitutional Court, the military and leftist parties) and religious parties. Islamic parties were banned from politics several times by the Constitutional Court since they are regarded as a threat to secular democracy.

The WP gained a plurality of votes and came to power in the 1996 elections. Survival concerns and the realization of institutional constraints, such as the fear of closure by the Constitutional court, motivated the tactical moderation of both the WP and the FP (Mecham 2004). Even though the WP was committed to liberal democratic principles, it remained an anti-

system party; the election campaigns emphasized creation of an interest-free Islamic economy, anti-Western sentiments, and religious freedom (Mecham 2004, 342). When the WP came to power, Erbakan, the leader of the party, visited Islamist states such as Iran and Libya in order to establish an economic bloc of Muslim countries. Erbakan also invited religious leaders to the prime minister's residence which led to criticism by the secular elite and the eventual closure of the party (Mecham 2004). The members of the WP established the Virtue Party after the closure of the WP. Meanwhile, there were intra-party debates and a power struggle between the reformist young generation and old members who were loyal to Erbakan. The Virtue party was also eventually closed by the Constitutional Court in 2001 since it was regarded as continuation of the WP. Then, two splinter parties established: reformists and more pragmatists established the JDP and those loyal to Erbakan formed the Felicity Party. The JDP came to power in the 2002 elections and focused on legislative and constitutional reforms that promote democracy, market economy, and pro-EU reforms while avoiding religious references. Institutional constraints—political learning from past experiences—, generational change—existence of young, reformist leaders—, socio-economic changes, and electoral incentives—the recognition that majority votes for centrist parties—motivated the ideological moderation of the JDP (Mecham 2004; Ozbudun 2006; Tezcur 2010; Yilmaz 2009) On the other hand, even though the FP faced similar institutional constraints with the JDP, its religious ideology remained intact. Tezcur (2010) argues that the unresponsiveness of the FP to institutional constraints was because of the lack of reform-minded leaders. The leaders of the FP kept a rigid Islamist ideology which prevented their full moderation.

Hamis is another influential Islamist group that went through tactical moderation for a limited time period. Hamis chose violent resistance rather than electoral politics and acted like a

spoiler during the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in 1990s. However, Hamas changed its strategy by declaring a unilateral ceasefire towards Israel in 2003 and participating in elections in 2005-2006. Hamas also changed uncompromising views regarding the borders of the future Palestinian state and accepted pre-1967 borders. Hovdenak (2009) argues that international pressure and demand for recognition led to the moderation of Hamas. However, unresponsiveness of international actors to Hamas's compromises and the boycott of the Hamas government after the 2006 elections weakened moderate leaders within Hamas. As a result, Hamas re-radicalized and violently took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 (Hovdenak 2009). The international constraints played a significant role during both the moderation and re-radicalization process of Hamas. In other words, international actors' unwillingness to reward the tactical moderation of the Hamas back-fired the moderation process.

Finally, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan experienced tactical and arguably ideological moderation to a certain extent. The IAF's ideological platform emphasizes implementation of sharia, denouncing corruption, liberation of Palestine, women's equality within an Islamic framework, freedom and democracy. The leaders of IAF claim that the party believes in democracy, not as a tactic but as a strategy. The goal is Islamization of society, gradually and democratically. Robinson (1997) explains the IAF's embracement of democracy (tactical moderation) with strategic reasons; mainly to protect organizational and political interests and to secure survival of the party in a repressive regime. The IAF played by the rules of the game even though the King adopted a new electoral law (1993) which limited the IAF's chances of gaining seats in the parliament. The King also signed a peace treaty with Israel (1994) which was highly criticized by the IAF. Nevertheless, the IAF did not resort to violence. The IAF started to cooperate with leftists and liberals by the mid-1990s. Schwedler (2006) argues

that the IAF moderated both behaviorally (what I call tactical moderation) and to some extent ideologically. According to Schwedler (2006; 2007), political inclusion leads to cooperation with other parties (and hence tactical moderation) but inclusion alone is insufficient for ideological moderation; internal party debates within the party and Islamic justification of new practices—cooperation with other parties and participation— produced ideological moderation of IAF.

To sum up, two observations stand out from the review of these moderation cases. First, with two notable exceptions (the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Islamic Action Front for which both tactical and ideological moderation explanations exist in the literature), the distinction between tactical and ideological moderation largely correlates with how Islamist moderation is conceptualized as a dependent variable. Cases of tactical moderation and how they are operationalized contrasts sharply with cases of ideological moderation. While factors like renunciation of violence, use of electoral politics, and cross-ideological cooperation are offered as observable implications of tactical moderation, ideological moderation is marked by the moderation of Islamist ideology on democratic values, pluralism, women's rights, market economy, and adoption of more centrist positions.

Second, regarding the causes of moderation, there is some level of convergence, although the convergence is to a lesser extent than the one observed for types of Islamist moderation. Among the causes of tactical moderation mentioned in the literature are inclusion, international pressure, political liberalization, internal debates, and organizational survival/interest. By contrast, factors leading to ideological moderation are less coherent: institutional constraints, rules of participation, generational differences, social learning, internal conflict, participation, state repression, electoral concerns, and socioeconomic changes. Some of these factors are, in

fact, reminiscent of factors leading to tactical moderation. The incongruence between the theoretical framework proposed in this chapter and the factors assumed to lead to ideological moderation is partly related to the way ideological moderation is conceptualized as ideological change. As discussed above, there exists a certain level of disagreement as to whether certain groups actually went through a process of ideological transformation or not. Overall, the theoretical framework largely captures the variation in Islamist moderation in a cross-national setting. Nonetheless, a more rigorous test of the theory is necessary to confirm the preliminary findings in this analysis.

G. Conclusion

Moderation has been both a key term in popular discourse and an important research question in the scholarly literature recently. In this chapter, I reviewed the Islamist moderation literature and demonstrated that the literature thus far failed to produce a systematic approach to analyze Islamist moderation. Specifically, I showed that moderation stands for a wide array of ideas ranging from limited attitudinal self-restraint (or, being tolerant) to far-reaching ideological renunciation and democratization. Moreover, there is no consensus among scholars about the underlying causes of moderation; a number of competing arguments are provided to explain moderation of Islamist parties. My goal in this chapter was to introduce a preliminary framework to examine Islamist moderation in a systematic fashion across a wide range of contexts. To this end, I examined the literature on Communist parties' moderation in Western Europe. Because Communist parties went through different waves of moderation throughout the 20th century just as Islamist parties have been going through in recent years, the case of Communist parties and their moderation is analytically valuable.

I identified two kinds of moderation: tactical and ideological. Tactical moderation refers to a limited kind of moderation in which radical parties renounce use of violence but the anti-system ideology remains largely intact, and democracy is instrumental in achieving the ideological goal. Ideological moderation, in contrast, refers to an extensive effort in abandoning major elements of the anti-system ideology on issues such as the Islamic state, economy and pluralist democracy. Building on this framework, I presented several case studies. The first one was the moderation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) until the 1990s. The second case study was that of the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (PJD) from its origins in the 1970s until the early 2000s. Both cases served to demonstrate the theoretical framework developed in this chapter.

The moderation processes of the PJD and the PCI indicate that similar paths of moderation occur as a result of similar causal factors. The PCI's decision to adopt the Popular Front strategy and to leave the revolutionary path was largely due to the international context, namely, the failure of revolutionary strategies in other parts of the world. On the other hand, the PJD decided to participate in the political system and recognized the political and religious legitimacy of the monarchic regime since the more radical form of the group was banned. In both cases, the fear of repression and the failure of non-democratic alternatives were the driving force for tactical moderation. Neither the PCI nor the PJD sacrificed ideological principles while participating in the political system and maintaining the end-goals of communism and Islamic state at this stage. Socioeconomic changes in the 1950s and the 1960s due to rapid economic growth in Italy and the economic liberalization process throughout the 1990s in Morocco underlie ideological moderation in both cases in the following decades. A preliminary analysis of

the moderation process of other Islamist parties provides partial support for the theoretical framework developed in this chapter.

The findings of previous chapters indicate that religious ideology and/or Islam is not a significant factor in driving conflicts and decision to resort to violence in the Muslim world; other socio-economic factors and political opportunities/ constraints largely shape the likelihood of eruption of domestic conflicts. The findings of this chapter are in line with previous findings. Like radicalization and violence, moderation is significantly influenced by socio-economic factors as well as international constraints. Ideologies and ideas change over time. Even though some Islamist parties initially moderate for strategic purposes and survival concerns, changing electoral dynamics push for further ideological moderation. Thus, one can conclude that political parties even with rigid radical ideologies may not resist societal changes and hence gradually moderate. Finally, the similarities between moderation of Communist parties and Islamist parties suggest that there is no “Islamic exceptionalism”. Radical Islamist parties are similar to other radical parties and respond to changing societal conditions in a similar way.

Reference List

- Adams, J., M. Clark, L. Ezrow, and G. Glasgow. 2006. "Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different From Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976-1998." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 513-529.
- Amyot, Grant. 1981. *The Italian Communist Party: The Crises of the Popular Front Strategy*. New York: St Martin Press.
- Barker, Bernard. 1973. "Anatomy of Reformism: The Social and Political Ideas of the Labour Leadership in Yorkshire." *International Review of Social History* 18: 1-27.
- Berman, Sheri. 2008. "Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe." *Journal of Democracy* 19(1): 5-18.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 1997. "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions." *Comparative Politics* 29: 305-22.
- Botella, J., R. Montero, and R. Gunther. 2004. *Democracy in Modern Spain*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Brooks, Risa A. 2002. "Liberalization and Militancy in the Arab World." *Orbis* 46(4): 611-621.
- Brumberg, Daniel. 2002. "Islamists and the Politics of Consensus." *Journal of Democracy* 13(3): 109-115.
- Burgat, Francois and William Dowell. 1997. *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Cammett, Melani C. 2007. *Globalization and Business Politics in North Africa: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cavatorta, Francesco. 2006. "Civil Society, Islamism and Democratisation: The Case of Morocco." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 44(2): 203-222.
- Capoccia, Giovanni. 2002. "Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14(1): 9-35.
- Charlton, Sue Ellen M. 1979. "Deradicalization and the French Communist Party." *The Review of Politics* 41(1): 38-60
- Cizre, Ümit, ed. 2009. *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party*. New York: Routledge.
- Clark, Janine. 2006. "The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38: 539-560.

- Cohen, Shana. 2004. *Searching for a Different Future: The Rise of a Global Middle Class in Morocco*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- D'Alimonte, Roberto. 1999. "Party Behavior in a Polarized System: The Italian Communist Party and the Historic Compromise". In *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions* eds. Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, pp.141-171. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Daniels, Philip A. 1987. "The Italian Communist Party: Goodbye to Eurocommunism" *The World Today* 43(8/9): 139-142.
- Demiralp, Seda. 2009. "The Rise of Islamist Entrepreneurs and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in Turkey." *Comparative Politics* 41(3): 315-336.
- Desrues, Thierry and Eduardo Moyano. 2001. "Social Change and Political Transition in Morocco." *Mediterranean Politics* 6(1): 21-47.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- El-Ghobashy, Mona. 2005. "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37(3): 373-395.
- Fennema, Meindert and Waller, Michael 1988 eds. *Communist Parties in Western Europe*. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.
- Gentili, Maria Anna and Panebianco, Angelo.1980. "The PCI and International Relations, 1945-1975: The Politics of Accommodation." In *The Italian Communist Party Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, eds. Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray, pp.109-128. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Goertz, Gary. 2005. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gray, Lawrence.1980. "From Gramsci to Togliatti: The Partito Nuavo and the Mass Basis of Italian Communism." In *The Italian Communist Party Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, eds. Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray, pp. 21-36. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Greene, Kenneth F. 2002. "Opposition Party Strategy and Spatial Competition in Dominant Party Regimes: A Theory and the Case of Mexico." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(7): 755-783.
- Gülalp, Haldun. 2001. "Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey's Welfare Party." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33(3): 433-448.
- Gumuscu, Sebnem. 2010. "Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(7): 835-861.

- Hovdenak, Are. 2009. " Hamas in Transition: The Failure of Sanctions." *Democratization* 16(1): 59-80.
- Ishiyama, John T. 1995. "Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe." *Comparative Politics* 27(2): 147-166.
- Ismail, Salwa. 2004. "Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics." *Government and Opposition* 39(4): 614-631.
- Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica* 47(2): 263-92.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 2000. "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties." *Comparative Politics* 32(4): 379-398.
- Keren, Michael. 2000. "Political Perfectionism and the 'Anti-System' Party." *Party Politics* 6(1): 107-116.
- King, G., R. Keohane, and S. Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16: 57-85.
- Langohr, Vickie. 2002. "An Exit from Arab Autocracy." *Journal of Democracy* 13(3): 117-122.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review* 59(1): 1-22.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 1997. *The Dynamics of Dominant Party Decline: The Mexican Transition to Multipartyism*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, Durham, NC.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. 2003. *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Matesan, Emy. 2009. "The Effects of Political Integration on the Strategic and Tactical Moderation of Islamist Groups." Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the ISA, New York, NY.
- McFaul, Michael and Wittes, Tamara Cofman. 2008. "Morocco's Elections: The Limits of Limited Reforms." *Journal of Democracy* 19(1): 19-33.
- Mecham, Quinn R. 2004. "From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey." *Third World Quarterly* 25(2): 339-358.
- Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.

- Nasr, Vali. 2005. "The Rise of Muslim Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 16(2): 13-27.
- . 2009. *The Rise of Islamic Capitalism: Why the New Middle Class Is the Key to Defeating Extremism*. New York: Free Press.
- Onis, Ziya. 2006. "Globalization and Party Transformation: Turkey's Justice and Development Party in Perspective." In *Globalizing Democracy: Party Politics in Emerging Democracies*, Peter Burnell, ed. London: Routledge.
- Ozbudun, Ergun. 2006. "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey." *South European Society and Politics* 11(3-4): 543-557.
- Pasquino, Gianfranco. 1980. "From Togliatti to Compromesso Storico: A Party with a Governmental Vocation." In *The Italian Communist Party Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*, eds. Simon Serfaty and Lawrence Gray, pp.75-108. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1978. "Interdependence and the Italian Communists." *International Organization* 32(2): 301-349
- Robinson, Glenn E. 1997. "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan." *Middle East Journal* 51(3): 373-387.
- Ruscoe, James. 1982. *On the Threshold of Government: The Italian Communist Party, 1976-81*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Salame, Ghassan. 1994. *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Samuels, Richard. 2003. *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. 1999. "The Logic of Party Moderation." *Estudio/Working Paper* 1999/135, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones.
- . 2004. "Party Moderation and Politicians' Ideological Rigidity". *Party Politics* 10(3): 325-342.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misinformation in Political Science." *American Political Science Review* 64 (4): 1033-1053.
- . 1976. *Parties and Party Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Sassoon, Donald. 1981. *The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party: From the Resistance to the Historic Compromise*. London: Frances Pinter Limited
- Schwedler, Jillian. 2006. *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2007. “Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties.” *Development* 50(1): 56-61.
- . 2011. “Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis.” *World Politics* 63(2): 347–376.
- Shahin, Emad Eldin. 1997. *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Share, Donald. 1985. “Two Transitions: Democratisation and the Evolution of the Spanish Socialist Left.” *West European Politics* 8(1): 82 - 103.
- . 1988. “Dilemmas of Social Democracy in 1980s: The Spanish Socialist Workers Party in Comparative Perspective”. *Comparative Political Studies* 21(3): 408-435.
- . 1999. “From Policy seeking to office seeking: the metamorphosis of the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party.” In *Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions* eds. Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, pp. 89-111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Somer, Murat. 2007. “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy.” *Third World Quarterly* 28 (7): 1271-1289.
- Somer-Topcu, Zeynep. 2009. “Timely Decisions: The Effects of Past National Elections on Party Policy Change.” *The Journal of Politics* 71(1): 238-248.
- Spieker, Manfred. 1980. “How the Eurocommunists Interpret Democracy.” *Review of Politics* 42(4): 427-464.
- Stimson, James, Michael MacKuen, and Robert Erikson. 1995. “Dynamic Representation.” *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 543-65.
- Tadros, Mariz. 2012. *The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined?* New York: Routledge.
- Tarrow, Sydney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tezcur, Gunes Murat. 2010. “The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors.” *Party Politics* 16(1): 69-88.

- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Tucker, Robert C. 1967. "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements." *American Political Science Review* 61(2): 343-358
- Yilmaz, Ihsan. 2009. "Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst." *Insight Turkey* 11(2): 93-112.
- Wegner, Eva and Miquel Pellicer. 2009. "Islamist Moderation without Democratization: The Coming of Age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development." *Democratization* 16 (1): 157-175.
- Weinberg, Leonard. 1995. *The Transformation of Italian Communism*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
- Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. 2004. "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party." *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 205-228.
- Willis, Michael J. 2004. "Morocco's Islamists and the Legislative Elections of 2002: The Strange Case of the Party That Did Not Want to Win." *Mediterranean Politics* 9(1): 53-81.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 2004. "Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism." *Political Science Quarterly* 119(1): 1-20.

Appendix 1: List of Tables

Table 4.1: Arguments on Islamist Moderation in the Literature			
	Independent variable	Type of moderation	Definition of moderation
<i>Schwedler (2006)</i>	Inclusion	Participate in democratic processes	“Movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and tolerant of alternative perspectives”
<i>Wickham (2004)</i>	Inclusion & social learning	Ideological moderation	Ideological moderation and respect for the democratic processes
<i>Brooks (2002)</i>	Inclusion & political liberalization	Participation in democratic processes	
<i>El-Ghobashy (2005)</i>	Participation	Ideological transformation	Ideological moderation and democratic understanding
<i>Clark (2006)</i>	1) Spirit of compromise, 2) more than a mere “tactical” compromise, and 3) intra-organizational discussion of compromise	Cross-ideological cooperation	
<i>Robinson (1997)</i>	Organizational self-interest	Endorsing democracy	Democracy
<i>Wegner and Pellicer (2009)</i>	Party autonomy	1) Level of disagreement between party and Islamic social movement, and 2) level of cooperation with other (left) parties	“Increasing flexibility towards core ideological beliefs”
<i>Somer (2007)</i>	State repression	Ideological moderation	
<i>Nasr (2009)</i>	Economy/capitalism	Moderation	Moving away from extremism
<i>Zakaria (2004)</i>	Economic liberalization	Ideological moderation	

Table 4.2: Summary of Cases						
	Italian Communist Party (PCI)			Party for Justice and Development (PJD)		
Pre-moderation	- Marxist/Leninist ideology - Armed struggle - Socialist revolution			- Moroccan society in <i>jahiliyya</i> (pre-Islamic ignorance) - Use of force legitimate - Political participation un-Islamic		
	Change	Causes	Outcome	Change	Causes	Outcome
Tactical moderation	<i>Popular Front Strategy</i> (“ <i>via italiana al socialismo</i> ” (1940s)	- Risks associated with extremism - Defeat of communist guerilla warfare in Greece (1944-1949) - International opposition	- Democracy as a means - Limited ideological change - Reach socialist revolution gradually	<i>Dissolution of Al-Shabiba & establishment of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya</i> (1981)	- To break “secularist” siege - To obtain parliamentary immunity to ensure security of <i>dawa</i> activities - Desire to reach a wider audience	- Break with Qutb’s extremist ideas (Moroccan society is not <i>jahili</i>) - Use of force not acceptable - Reach Islamic state and Islamic law gradually - Accept rules of electoral game in Morocco - Engage with other parties (political participation)
	<i>Eurocommunism</i> (1960s)	- 1964 Yalta Memorandum - 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia	- Disassociation from the S.U. - Break with Leninist ideology - Uncertain democratic commitment - Conflicting views from the party			
Ideological moderation	<i>Historic Compromise</i> (1970s) & <i>party name changed to Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)</i>	- Socioeconomic changes precipitated by the sustained post-war economic growth - Weakening social base - 1/3 of membership lost	- Support for Christian Democratic governments - Accept NATO and European integration - Accept free market capitalism - Democratic commitment	<i>Intraparty discussions on party identity & direction</i> (2002) & <i>separation of the movement and the party</i>	- Socioeconomic changes in the post-1980 economic liberalization period - To appeal to a wider audience	- Shift from idealism to pragmatism - Democratic commitment - Support for liberal economy and globalization - Emphasis on Islamic values, not Islamic state

Appendix 2:List of Interviewees

Mustapha El-Khalfi – PJD official and editor of *Al-Tajdid* newspaper; Rabat, December 8, 2009.

Saad Eddin Uthmani – Former secretary general, PJD; Rabat, December 8, 2009.

Dr. Driss Bouanou – Youth leader and member of Committee on Foreign Relations, PJD; Rabat, December 10, 2009.

Abdulkadir Amara – PJD parliamentarian and member of the PJD General Secretariat; Rabat December 17, 2009.

Bilal Tlaidi – PJD National Council member, independent researcher, and reporter for *Al-Tajdid* newspaper; Rabat, December 17, 2009.

Lahcen Daoudi – PJD parliamentarian; Rabat, December 18, 2009.

Nezha El-Ouafi – PJD parliamentarian and academician; Rabat, December 23, 2009.

Noureddine Karbal – PJD parliamentarian; Rabat, December 23, 2009.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

The recent uprisings and the ongoing violent/nonviolent protests in the Middle East once again led to popular debates about what drives conflict in the Muslim world. There are a number of competing arguments that explain driving forces of violence in the Muslim world, radicalization, de-radicalization, and moderation of Islamist parties/groups. These explanations focus on a variety of factors such as socio-economic and demographic factors, religion, culture, political opportunities, and constraints. Specifically, there is a theoretical debate about whether Islam fosters violence or not. Yet, there is no consensus among scholars about the extent to which religion may promote political violence.

This dissertation investigates the empirical nexus between Islam and political violence/nonviolence by specifically focusing on the incidence of domestic armed conflict, group-level political violence (such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party moderation. In chapter 2, I examine factors that increase a country's risk of experiencing domestic armed conflict, whereas chapter 3 analyzes conditions under which ethno-political organizations opt for violent strategies to achieve their goals. Chapter 4 examines moderation of Islamist parties.

I argue that religious denomination alone does not necessarily make countries more or less conflict-prone. Socio-economic and political conditions usually determine the decision to resort to violence or alternatively to renounce violence and to moderate. While numerous conflicts in the world may be framed as religious, ignoring root causes of violence and solely attributing conflict-proneness to cultural or ideological factors would be an oversimplification of these complex events. Indeed, existing studies that conclude that Muslim-majority countries are more conflict/violence-prone fail to control for factors that increase the risk of insurgency, such as socio-economic development, state repression, youth bulges, and oil dependence, and

confound many variables under “Islam”. It is not possible to draw a causal relationship between Islam and conflict-proneness without controlling for factors that increase the risk of domestic conflict. Below, I review the general findings from the preceding analysis of this dissertation. First, I compare and contrast findings of chapter 2 and chapter 3, and organize my findings based on key concepts tested in both chapters: religion, demographic factors, grievances, political opportunity structure, and resources. I also suggest potential explanations for some of the null findings, and provide suggestions for future research. Next, I summarize the findings from chapter 4, which focus on Islamist party moderation. Finally, I conclude by discussing the policy implications of my overall findings.

Religion

What explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world and to what extent does religion play a role in promoting violence? These research questions motivated my dissertation. I conducted a number of empirical analyses to evaluate the impact of religion in fostering violence at both state-level and group-level. The overall findings indicate that, contrary to suggestions and claims in the literature, neither religious fractionalization nor Islam promotes conflict once socio-economic and political factors are taken into account.

First, religious fractionalization is negative and insignificant in all of the regressions in chapter 2, which suggests that religious diversity is not a significant factor in inciting domestic armed conflict. Second, intra-state conflicts are indeed more prevalent in Muslim-plurality states, but social, economic, and political conditions in these states create an environment that is very susceptible to domestic armed conflicts. Muslim-plurality states are characterized by more repressive regimes, oil dependent economies, more poverty, and a higher proportion of youth bulges. While Islam appears to be significantly correlated to domestic armed conflict onset in a

bivariate regression, the significance of Islam disappears once the correlates of domestic armed conflict are controlled for. Both Muslim-plurality and interactions of Muslim-plurality with various explanatory variables remain insignificant in most of the regressions even after trying different operationalization of Islam –use of Muslim-plurality, Muslim-majority or Muslim proportion–, and alternative model specifications. Third, the findings from chapter 3 also confirm that Islamist ideology is not a significant factor in driving violence at the group level. Even though the limitation of the analyses to Middle Eastern region prevents making broad generalizations and comparing conflict-proneness of organizations in Muslim countries with non-Muslim ones, not all of the ethno-political organizations in the Middle East are inspired by religious/Islamist ideology. Thus, I was able to control for the influence of religion by comparing the conflict-proneness of organizations that have a religious/Islamist ideology with non-religious ones. Like the Muslim-plurality variable in the previous chapter, Islamist ideology is insignificant in all of the models in chapter 3.

Demographic Factors

The demographic structure of a country has the potential to increase the risk of domestic armed conflict and group-level violence. Specifically, increasing population growth and the existence of large youth cohorts make countries more prone to conflict/violence. The countries that have a higher total population are expected to be more prone to domestic armed conflict since it is hard to control people and deter insurgency in highly populated countries. Increasing population may also lead to resource scarcity, higher unemployment rates, and poverty. Moreover, the existence of a youth bulge– which is defined as the proportion of young males between the ages of 15-24 to total adult population– increases both grievances (especially when coupled with poverty, unemployment, and repressive regimes) and the supply of potential rebel

recruits (Urdal 2006). For example, some scholars argue that youth bulges have played a significant role during the recent uprisings in the Middle East; it is argued that those young people, dissatisfied with their oppressive regimes and frustrated with unemployment, rebelled against their governments (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; Mohammed 2011).

The findings from chapter 2 suggest that total population indeed increases the risk of domestic armed conflict, whereas the impact of youth bulge is inconclusive. While youth bulge is insignificant in most of the regressions, the Islam-youth bulge interaction in Model 8 is positive and significant, suggesting that Muslim-plurality countries with a higher proportion of young males are more conflict-prone than the rest of the sample. However, further analysis from the marginal effect of youth bulge suggests that Muslim-plurality states become more conflict-prone than non-Muslim countries for only extremely high values of youth bulges. While the impact of youth bulge in chapter 2 is puzzling, the findings from chapter 3 indicate that youth bulges significantly increase the probability of violence by ethno-political organizations. Youth bulge is positive and significant in all of the models in Chapter 3. I also interact youth bulge with several explanatory variables in chapter 3 to explore whether the positive influence of youth bulges is conditional on other socio-economic or political factors. I find that the youth bulges- autocracy interaction is positive and significant, whereas youth-democracy, youth-repression, youth-economic grievance, and youth-Islamist ideology interactions are all insignificant. Obviously, youth bulges create more problems in autocratic countries than democratic ones.

Future studies may focus on exploring the role of youth bulges in increasing the risk of domestic armed conflict in the Muslim world. What makes these youth population more prone to the use of violence and why are they more conflict-prone than other age cohorts? This is an

important research question which remains underexplored. Grievances that stem from unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions, such as high unemployment rate, high income inequality, and the existence of oppressive/ authoritarian regimes, may be mediating between the use of violence and youth bulges. Future research can test the conditional impact of youth bulges by interacting youth bulge with unemployment rate, education, or income inequality. Currently, I control for GDP per capita, regime type, and repression but existing data on education, income inequality, and unemployment have many missing observations.

Grievances

How significant are grievances in fostering violence and domestic armed conflict? According to Gurr (1970)'s relative deprivation theory, social, economic, and political grievances lead to feelings of relative deprivation and frustration, which in turn motivates individuals to resort to violence. Yet, there is no solid empirical support for the relative deprivation hypothesis; existing studies provide mixed evidence regarding the impact of grievances in fostering violence (Canetti et al 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Mousseau 2011; Regan 2009). I examine the impact of economic, political, and cultural grievances in fostering domestic armed conflict and group-level violence in chapters 2 and 3, respectively.

In chapter 2, I use GDP per capita to operationalize economic grievances. Higher values of GDP per capita indicate more economic development and hence fewer grievances. I rely on GDP per capita, which is a very crude proxy of economic grievances, due to limitations in data availability of better indicators at the cross-national level. Even though there is a negative relationship between GDP per capita and likelihood of domestic armed conflict, it reaches statistical significance in only Models 5 and 8. GDP per capita loses statistical significance

when oil dependence is added to the model. Oil dependence is known to increase risk of domestic armed conflict. Perhaps, oil-rich countries with high GDP per capita are still prone to conflict. In other words, the negative impact of GDP per capita may be overwhelmed by the positive influence of oil dependence in promoting domestic conflict. Political and cultural grievances are not tested in chapter 2 since there is no cross-national data available to measure these concepts.

In chapter 3, I use three ordinal variables from the MAROB organizational behavior data to test the impact of economic, political, and cultural grievances in promoting violence at the group-level. Unlike the previous chapter, the findings from chapter 3 suggest that economic grievances significantly increase the probability of adopting violent strategies by ethno-political organizations, whereas neither political grievances nor cultural grievances have any significant impact. However, caution is necessary when interpreting the insignificance of political grievances. All of the ethno-political organizations in the MAROB dataset have political grievances, which prevents controlling for the impact of this concept since there is little variation in this explanatory variable. I only compared conflict-proneness of separatist groups/ independence movements to those that have a less severe political grievance and the difference between the two was not statistically significant. In sum, even though grievances seem to increase the risk of violence, the findings from both chapters remain inconclusive. Future research can explore the conditional effect of grievances— such as interacting economic grievances with youth bulges – and use better indicators of socio-economic grievances such as income inequality or unemployment rate if data become available.

Political Opportunity Structure

Political opportunities and constraints available in a society significantly influence the decision to resort to violence. If political institutions give people the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction/frustration through nonviolent/conventional means, the likelihood of violence and conflict declines since rational individuals would prefer nonviolent options, which are less risky and proven to be more successful, compared to violent ones (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). In other words, to rebel, deprived groups should believe that violent action is the only option. Therefore, political opportunities play a significant role in transforming grievances into militant action. While exclusive and repressive regimes promote violence, inclusive regimes decrease the probability of use of violence (Hafez 2003).

State repression and regime type are used in both chapters to test the impact of political opportunities/constraints in fostering violence. Repression is a double edged sword; repression can deter rebellion by increasing the cost of collective action, but it can also increase risk of conflict through increasing grievances. In chapter 2, I use the CIRI integrity score to test the impact of repression. Repression was positive and significant, whereas its squared term was negative and significant in most of the models. Low levels of repression increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, whereas high levels of repression actually decrease the risk of conflict, since collective action becomes very costly under extremely repressive regimes. The findings from chapter 3 confirm that repression in general fosters violence; ethno-political organizations that are repressed by the state are more likely to use violent strategies than other organizations.

The literature on domestic armed conflict onset suggests that there is a curvilinear relationship between regime type and likelihood of domestic armed conflict; transitional regimes are expected to be more prone to domestic armed conflicts than both democracies and

autocracies since transitional regimes usually lack the capacity to deter insurgency as well as the nonviolent means to express frustration. I use the Polity score from the Polity IV project and create a dichotomous variable for autocracies to examine the impact of regime type in chapter 2. The empirical analysis confirms that transitional regimes are indeed more conflict prone; an autocracy dummy is positive and significant in three of the five models and barely loses significance in the remaining two models. However, unlike theoretical expectations, the findings from chapter 3 suggest that regime type does not seem to affect the decision to resort to violence by ethno-political organizations. I use a dichotomous variable for democracies and it was insignificant in all of the regressions. Alternatively, I include the polity score and its squared term in the analysis and it was also insignificant.⁴¹ One potential reason for insignificance of regime type at the group-level analysis could be selection bias; the dataset includes only Middle Eastern countries. Most Middle Eastern countries are non-democratic; there is little variation in regime type among Middle Eastern countries. Israel is the only country which is coded as 'free' by Freedom House and Israel has a long history of conflict with Palestinians, which makes it a democratic but violence-prone nation. Future studies may examine more countries, and test the impact of regime type in fostering violence by ethno-political organizations.

Resources

Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the importance of resources required to mobilize rather than grievances in promoting rebellion. It is argued that frustration is not sufficient for mobilization; groups need resources to transfer individual frustration into group mobilization. Therefore, both external and internal resources affect mobilization capacity and the probability of rebellion (McCarthy and Zald 1977). At the state level, the existence of oil or

⁴¹ The models with a continuous polity score are not reported here, but they are available upon request.

other natural resources are expected to increase the risk of domestic armed conflict. Ross (2006) claims that oil and other minerals increase the risk of conflict because they make independence more desirable for resource-rich regions. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) confirm that the existence of natural resources creates opportunities to rebel. However, oil money can also be used to co-opt potential dissidents, especially in politically corrupt regimes, thus reducing the risk of domestic conflict (Fjelde 2009). At the group-level, external support for an organization from diasporas or from other international actors and domestic support generally determine available resources to mobilize and capability to engage in collective action.

I control for both oil-dependence and natural resource-dependence in chapter 2 and find that countries that have a higher proportion of oil rents as well as other natural resource rents are at greater risk of experiencing domestic armed conflict. In chapter 3, I include two dichotomous variables from the MAROB data that measure internal and external support for the organization to proxy resources available to ethno-political organizations. While external support increases the probability of violence by these organizations, domestic support for the organizations does not have a significant impact. Overall, these findings indicate that resources are indeed crucial in promoting political violence.

In sum, the findings from chapter 2 and chapter 3 suggest that state repression, regime type, availability of resources, youth bulges, and grievances all affect the likelihood of domestic armed conflict as well as the decision to resort to violence by ethno-political organizations. While state repression, economic grievances, and resources are found to be significant in both chapters, the impact of other factors varies depending on the level of analysis. There is a curvilinear relationship between regime type and the risk of domestic armed conflict at the state-level of analysis, whereas regime type fails to reach statistical significance when the

analysis is conducted at the group-level. On the contrary, youth bulge is positive and statistically significant in all of the Models in chapter 3, whereas it is insignificant in most of the Models in chapter 2. Finally, religion fails to reach significance in all of the regressions in both chapters. One can conclude that socio-economic and political conditions rather than religion largely determine the decision to resort to violence.

Moderation of Islamist Parties

In chapter 4, I analyze the moderation of Islamist parties, which has been a common trend for many Islamist parties. By building on the findings of the Communist moderation literature, I introduce a two-stage framework to explain variation in Islamist moderation: tactical vs. ideological moderation. Tactical moderation occurs when radical parties renounce the use of violence and decide to accept electoral democracy as a means to achieve political goals without compromising their core ideology. Structural factors such as political liberalization, international factors such as failure of revolutionary tactics in other parts of the world, and state repression drive tactical moderation of radical parties. Some parties go beyond the tactical moderation and change their ideological positions on democracy, the economic system, and the political role of Islam, which I call Ideological moderation. Ideological moderation is largely driven by electoral motives. In other words, Islamist parties moderate their radical ideologies as a response to societal changes such as economic liberalization, economic growth, generational changes, electoral loss, and changing voter preferences to gain greater popular support.

Empirically, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco are analyzed in comparative perspective. PCI's tactical moderation was largely driven by its reaction to unsuccessful revolutionary experiences in Italy and the rest of the world, and the international context; moderation was undertaken to ensure

organizational survival. Likewise, the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco opted for tactical moderation in order to better serve *dawa* (religious mission) activities and to establish an Islamic state. In both cases, the fear of repression and the failure of non-democratic alternatives were the driving forces for tactical moderation. On the other hand, societal changes and electoral dynamics in Italy led to the ideological moderation of the PCI. Similarly, electoral participation, intraparty debates, societal changes, and organizational factors such as separation of the PJD from its founding organization fostered the ideological moderation process.

Policy Implications

The research questions explored in this dissertation are relevant for both scholars and policy makers. The findings of this research can help policy makers in developing strategies that will reduce the threat of religious extremism and domestic armed conflict. I did explore the role of religion and Islamist ideology in driving domestic armed conflict or lower level violence in the first two quantitative chapters whereas the qualitative chapter focused on Islamist party moderation. The overall findings indicate that religion by itself does not drive conflict; unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions explain the high hazard of domestic conflict in the Muslim world. This is good news for policy makers; it is possible to contain or decrease these domestic conflicts by implementing policies that will alleviate some of the social, economic, and political problems. Hypothetically, there would be little one can do to eliminate these conflicts if religion was the major cause since religious preference can hardly change.

Among all of the socio-economic and political factors analyzed in this dissertation, state repression is found to be significant in all of the regressions as well as in the qualitative analysis. While repression has the potential to deter insurgency, to foster insurgency, to motivate radicalization or moderation of Islamist parties, the overall findings suggest that repression

usually breeds more violence. Therefore, policy makers should reconsider the use of repressive measures to deter opposition groups. While spreading democracies may decrease the probability of conflict in the long run, transition periods are usually characterized with more violence and higher rates of domestic armed conflict. Even though the analysis is limited to the Middle East, the findings from chapter 3 suggest that regime type does not affect ethno-political organizations' decision to resort to violence. Perhaps, it is repressiveness of the regime rather than its autocratic nature that fosters violence. Arguably, even democratic countries could be repressive to a certain extent.

Finally, understanding the evolution of radical Islamist parties (the moderation process) is necessary for better policymaking in the Middle East. Islamist parties are key political actors, which are regarded as the only viable opposition group in many Muslim countries. Islamist parties won the most recent elections in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and in Morocco. Whether Islamist parties moderate or not—or, to what extent they moderate—may shape the course of transitions in the region. The preceding analysis suggests that Islamist parties act strategically and respond to societal changes. Participation in the political system fosters moderation and de-radicalization whereas exclusive and repressive policies lead to radicalization and violence. Therefore, developing policies that encourage Islamist parties' political participation may help to minimize threat of religious extremism.

Reference List

- Canetti, Daphna, Stevan E Hobfoll, Ami Pedahzur and Eran Zaidise. 2010. Much Ado About Religion: Religiosity, Resource Loss, and Support for Political Violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5): 575-587.
- Collier, Paul and A. Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50:563-73.
- Fearon, James D. and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97 (1): 75-90.
- Fjelde, Hanne. 2009. Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985—99. *Journal of Peace Research* 46(2): 199-218.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945.” *International Political Science Review*, 14: 161-201.
- Hafez, Mohammed M. 2003. *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Colorado: Rienner Publishers Inc.
- Hoffman, Michael and Jamal Amaney. 2012. The Youth and the Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and Similarities. *Middle East Law and Governance* 4: 168–188
- McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6):1212-1241.
- Mohammad, Al-Momani. 2011. The Arab “Youth Quake”: Implications on Democratization and Stability. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 3 (1-2): 159-170.
- Mousseau, Michael. 2011. Urban poverty and support for Islamist terror Survey results of Muslims in fourteen countries. *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (1): 35-47.
- Regan, Patrick M. 2009. *Sixteen Million One*, Paradigm Publishers.
- Ross, Michael. 2006. A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War. *Annual Review of Political Science*. 9: 265-300.
- Stephan, Maria J. and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security*. 33(1): 7-44.
- Urdal, Henrik. 2006. A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3): 607-629

VITA

Suveyda Karakaya received the B.A. degree in Business Administration from Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey in 2007 and the M.A. degree in Political Science from Kansas State University in 2009. To pursuit Ph.D., she joined the graduate program in the department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville in 2009. During her Ph.D., she worked as a Teaching Associate and taught introduction to Political Science course to undergraduate students. Mrs. Karakaya will complete the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science in Summer 2013.