To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Mark James Wattier entitled "Presidential Popularity and the Political Process: Public Opinion Polls as Linkage." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.

Dan D. Nimmo, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
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PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS: PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AS LINKAGE

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Arts

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Mark James Wattier

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1306260

To Al Newman

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Individuals, according to George Herbert Mead, come to know themselves through experiences with "significant" others. To a certain extent, a scholar knows his research through a similar process. Several actors played the role of significant other for this research. Joseph Koshansky performed the role of discussant for an earlier version of this thesis with a professional spirit other political scientists would be wise to emulate. George Elliott played the part of sympathetic critic with his usual style and acumen. The denouement benefited from the editorial assistance of Jan Trice, the colleague. As critic of behavioralism T. Alexander Smith has, by example if not instruction, demonstrated the place of values in research. David Welborn played the part of devil's advocate when this project first emerged. Our perspective on the relationship between "popular" opinion and governmental activity emerged from a variety of exchanges with the iconoclast, Dan Nimmo. And finally, these enlightening "experiences" would not have been possible if not for Al Newman, the gentleman to whom we have dedicated this thesis.

ABSTRACT

This research is concerned with linkage at a theoretical level, but at a substantive level it examines three relationships of central importance to the governmental process: the relationships between the President and Congress, the President and the public, and Congress and the public. In a strict sense, the research examined these relationships simultaneously by focusing upon a single problem: what, if any, relationship is there between a President's popularity and Congressional support for his policies? This question is approached with three general propositions: (1) a President's popularity varies directly with Congressional support for his policies, (2) a President's popularity varies more directly with Congressional support for his foreign than domestic policies, and (3) a President's popularity varies more directly with Congressional support for his policies among "attentive" than "non-attentive" groups. These propositions are tested with data from The Gallup Opinion Index and Congressional Quarterly Almanac for Presidential popularity and Congressional support, respectively. Only the first general proposition was supported by correlational analysis.

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CHAPTER I

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY: EXPLANATIONS AND STUDIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Social theorists have tried to explain fluctuations in the popularity of public figures for some time. These explanations range from Miachiavelli's prescriptions on "How A Prince Must Act In Order to Gain Reputation" to Klapp's discussions of social typing and symbolic leadership.[1] Leading "theories" for Presidential popularity, considered below, cross traditional areas of research, namely, political socialization and electoral behavior, but each has a counterpart in the literature on popularity. In addition, several studies specifically designed to explain popularity will be examined. And, finally, two reports by Edwards which shed light on the policy consequences of Presidential popularity will be reviewed.[2] Prior to these discussions, though, let us forward a working definition of popularity.

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[1]Niccolo Miachiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, with an introduction by Max Lerner (New York: Random House, 1950), pp. 81-85, and Orrin E. Klapp, Heroes, Villans, and Fools (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962) and Symbolic Leaders (Chicago: Aldine, 1964).

[2]George C. Edwards, III, "Presidential Influence in the Senate: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential

II. PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY: A WORKING DEFINITION

Presidential popularity like other social-psychological constructs can be defined in terms of three dimensions: (1) cognitive, (2) affective, and (3) conative.[3] The cognitive dimension refers to what is known or believed to be true or false about a President, e.g., a belief (or disbelief) in the legitimacy of his capacity to send American forces into combat without a Declaration of War from Congress. Positive or negative evaluations of a President or his policies refer to the affective dimension. General expressions of like or dislike, agreement or disagreement with him or his policies, characterize this dimension. And the conative dimension refers to proposed actions toward a President or one of his policies, e.g., intending to obey a President's request to conserve energy by altering certain driving habits. The leading assumption with respect to these dimensions is the consistency or

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Power," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, September 2, 1976 and "Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power," American Political Science Review 70 (March 1976): 101-113.

[3]See, for example, Martin Fishbein, "The Relationship Between Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behavior," in Cognitive Consistency, ed. Shel Feldman (New York: Academic Press, 1969), pp. 199-223.

balance principle: beliefs, feelings, and action tendencies toward an object of perception tend to be consistent with one another.[4] To illustrate the principle with a recent episode, someone who believed that President Ford's proposal to extend aid to the pro-American forces in Angola (cognitive) was in the "best interests" of this country (affective) might write his or her Congressman urging them to support Ford's position (conative). As this illustration further suggests, these dimensions are not mutually exclusive; rather, they overlap with one another along a continuum of activity.

III. GENERAL EXPLANATIONS

General explanations of Presidential popularity can be grouped into four categories: (1) the President as a national symbol, (2) the President as party symbol, (3) the media President, and (4) popularity as a dialectical process. The first explanation, the President as national symbol, maintains that the President is naturally popular because he represents, symbolizes, or stands for everything "American."

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[4]See Chester A. Insko and John Schopler, "Triadic Consistency: A Statement of Affective-Cognitive-Conative Consistency," Psychological Review 74 (September 1967): 361-376. For a review of a number of theories that employ this assumption, see Robert B. Zajonc, "The Concept of Balance, Congruity, and Dissonance," Public Opinion Quarterly 24 (Summer 1960): 280-291.

This perspective is best represented by Rossiter's discussion of the President's role as Chief of State.[5] In that role the President functions as the ceremonial head of government and, whether or not he enjoys it, is called on to perform a number of activities. Such activities range from periodic "state dinners" in honor of visiting dignitaries to lighting the nation's Christmas tree each December. These duties and their performance endear the President to the public who, according to Rossiter, regard him as a "combination of scoutmaster, Delphic oracle, hero of the silver screen, and father of the multitudes."[6] Support for this position was clearest in earlier studies of children's images of the President.[7] These studies found that the child's affective image of the President was positive

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[5]Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1956; Mentor Books, 1960). Rossiter's discussion of Presidential "roles" has so dominated writing on the subject as to warrant the "textbook Presidency" label it has acquired. Citations are from the Mentor Books edition.

[6]Ibid., p. 15.

[7]Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly 24 (Winter 1960): 632-644; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," American Political Science Review 54 (December 1960): 934-935, later expanded on in Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) chapter 3; Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); and Easton and Jack Dennis, Children and the Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

(quantitatively) and "benevolent" in quality.[8] Studies in subcultures and post-Watergate findings subsequently have qualified this generalization and suggested that the President's image among children was generally less positive than indicated by research in the early 1960s.[9] As these findings might suggest, the utility of the President as national symbol explanation may have diminished in light of recent events collectively referred to as Vietnam and Watergate.[10]

The second explanation, the President as party symbol, is a direct descendant of Lippmann's discussion of

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[8]See David O. Sears, "Political Socialization," in Handbook of Political Science, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Vol. 2 (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 93-153 for a cogent summary of these studies.

[9]See, for example, Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture," American Political Science Review 62 (June 1968): 564-575; Jaros and Kenneth L. Kolson, "The Multifarious Leader: Political Socialization of Amish, 'Yanks,' Blacks," in The Politics of Future Citizens, ed. Richard G. Niomi (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1974), pp. 41-62; F. Christopher Arterton, "The Impact of Watergate on Children's Attitudes Toward Political Authority," Political Science Quarterly 89 (June 1974): 269-324; Arterton, "Watergate and Children's Attitudes Toward Political Authority Revisited," Political Science Quarterly 90 (Fall 1975): 477-496; and the special issues devoted entirely to Watergate of the American Politics Quarterly 3 (October 1975) and Communications Research 1 (October 1974).

[10]See Erwin C. Hargrove, The Power of the Modern Presidency (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).

"stereotypes."[11] In that seminal work, Lippmann remarked, "For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see."[12] In terms of Presidential popularity, this view argues that public perceptions of the President are greatly influenced by "partisan" predispositions within the public. As the authors of a major voting study described this position, "The mirror the mind holds up to nature is often distorted in accordance with the subject's predispositions."[13] Simply put, Presidents are more likely to be popular among their party's followers.[14]

The third explanation, the media President, claims that "hit" performances in the media of mass communication enable a President to create or manufacture his own popularity.[15] Given the easy access a President has to the

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[11]Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1922), pp. 53-100.

[12]Ibid., pp. 54-55.

[13]Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, p. 216.

[14]See, for example, Stuart G. Brown, The American Presidency (New York: Macmillan, 1966). For evidence on office seekers, see Dan Nimmo and Robert L. Savage, Candidates and Their Images (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear, 1976), pp. 22-25 and for office holders, see The Gallup Opinion Index.

[15]For this argument, see Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969) and Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).

media, popularity is simply a matter of applying the appropriate techniques (of public relations) and "projecting" the desired image. This argument is shared, in principle, by Goffman.[16] In his theory of impression management individuals give off expressions in order to manage impressions others have of them. By doing this, Goffman argued, individuals can influence or control the conduct of others.

The fourth explanation, popularity as a dialectical process, stems from a theoretical perspective commonly referred to as symbolic interactionism.[17] From this perspective the popularity of a President emerges from a vast matrix of social interactions. Popularity, however defined, is not something "projected" by a President or independently "held" by the public in this view. Rather, as Nimmo and Savage suggested, "political images reflect continuing exchanges between leaders and followers in which the former not only project selected attributes but must imagine how followers perceive them; the latter perceive leaders and imagine how leaders perceive them."[18]

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[16]Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959).

[17]Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

[18]Dan Nimmo and Robert L. Savage, "Political Images and Political Perceptions," Experimental Study of Politics 1 (July 1971): 32. Neustadt's discussion of a President's "power to persuade" belongs to this category of explanations. See Richard Neusdadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 34-37.

IV. MACRO ANALYTIC STUDIES

These explanations do not exhaust all the possibilities, and, whether their implications are considered individually, comparatively, or collectively, they represent basic approaches to the question of Presidential popularity. Aspects of each appear in most discussions of popularity in one form or another since they seldom, if ever, enjoy the autonomy imposed upon them here. This section on macro analytic studies will review two approaches, the impact-of-events approach generally practiced by polling organizations[19] and Mueller's elaboration of this perspective.[20]

The Impact-of-Events Approach

The approach to Presidential popularity employed by polling organizations represents a quasi-experimental design where "events," variously defined, are the equivalent of the experimental or control variable of the lab and observations of (affective) popularity before and after (some event or events) are equal to experimental tests.[21] This approach

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[19]Typical of this approach are the speculations offered by the staff of The Gallup Opinion Index.

[20]John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley, 1973).

[21]This design is "quasi-experimental" in that control of the experimental variable (events) and random assignment of subjects to test and control groups is not possible.

assumes that events are the principal determinants of popularity. In practice, however, polling organizations are less explicit about these matters. The typical data display technique for this approach is the familiar "popularity chart" first developed by Gallup.[22] Since Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration Gallup has asked samples of the adult population the following question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of incumbent) is handling his job as President?" The popularity chart is based on data elicited by this question and constructed by plotting the distribution of those approving by events (e.g., the signing of a bill) across time. The analysis provided is principally descriptive as illustrated by the following discussion of President Gerald R. Ford's chart.

> Ford's high point, 71 percent approval, came one week after he assumed office. His rating declined drastically after he announced a pardon for former President Richard Nixon, and he has never rebounded to pre-pardon levels. He did make considerable gains, however, after the Mayaguez affair, but has since dropped back to a pre-Mayaguez level.[23]

This type of analysis leaves much to be desired in the way of explanation for the apparent shifts. Why, for example,

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[22]See Gallup International, "Campaign '76," The Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 125 (Princeton, New Jersey: The American Institute of Public Opinion, November-December, 1975).

[23]Ibid., p. 10.

did Ford's pardon of Nixon depress his popularity and his handling of the Mayaguez affair temporarily inflate it?

A variation of this approach which attempts to explain changes in popularity is the "news discrepancy" theory developed by Brody and Page.[24] News of events rather than events themselves affect popularity in their framework; perceptions of events are mediated by their reporting in the mass media. As Brody and Page explained their theory:

> . . . presidential popularity rises when the news is good; it falls when news is bad. When people get word that the President has acted successfully, to their benefit, they will tend to approve of his performance; when they learn that he has failed, or brought evil upon them, they will tend to disapprove. . . . More precisely, we expect Presidents to gain in popularity when people receive news of events which they believe advance their values and which they believe to be the responsibility of the President. Presidents lose popularity when people receive news of events which they believe thwart their values and which they believe to be the President's fault.[25]

Since Brody and Page lacked data on popular values and beliefs, they assumed that an individual's evaluation of the President was a product of the "balance" of good and bad news in the past. Subsequent evaluations were thus a product of the changing balance of news. In short, they

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[24]Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity: The Johnson and Nixon Administrations," in Perspectives on the Presidency, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 136-148.

[25]Ibid., pp. 140-141.

expected popular evaluations and the balance of news to vary in the same direction. In their words:

> As fresh news appears, if the balance of good news and bad news remains the same, there is no reason to change opinion; the level of evaluation stays constant. If, however, there is a discrepancy between current news and previous regard for the President, the individual reacts by bringing his opinion more into harmony with the current news. The level of evaluation changes as a direct linear function of the discrepancy.[26]

In order to examine this theory, Brody and Page performed a content analysis of the "most important story in each day's news" of the New York Times. This procedure yielded a measure of their independent variable, news discrepancy, defined as the balance of negative and positive news occurring between two successive Gallup poll dates. Their dependent variable, Presidential popularity, was indicated by changes in the distribution of positive affect measured by the Gallup question noted above (i.e., the percentage approving at time t + 1 minus the percentage approving at time t). Time series data for news and popularity were gathered for the Johnson (June, 1965 to April, 1968) and Nixon (January, 1969 to October, 1971) administrations.

"Presidential popularity," according to the news

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[26] Ibid., pp. 141-142. The Brody-Page theory, in previous terms, implies that changes in the cognitive dimension (news discrepancy) produce changes in the affective dimension (popularity), a restatement of the consistency principle.

discrepancy theory advanced by Brody and Page, "has great inertia; without a change in the balance of news, the level of popularity remains the same from one period to the next."[27] Since previous popularity accounted for half or more of the variance in levels of popularity measured in absolute terms (79 percent for Johnson and 51 percent for Nixon), Brody and Page concluded that the first aspect of their theory was confirmed. "The cause of change in popularity from one time point to the next," according to the second aspect of their theory, "is the discrepancy between the quality of intervening news and the level of past evaluation."[28] For the Johnson administration, news discrepancy account for 25 percent of the variance in popularity and 8 percent (non-significant) for Nixon's first term. Thus, news discrepancy considered alone was more important for Johnson than Nixon.[29] When previous popularity and news discrepancy were combined, the theory accounted for 84 percent and 55 percent of the variation in the level of popularity for Johnson and Nixon, respectively. The merits of the news discrepancy approach are demonstrated by these results. Let us now proceed to a discussion of a second macro analytic approach.

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[27] Ibid., p. 142.

[28] Ibid.

[29] A replication of their study extending the time frame to Nixon's truncated second term would probably alter this finding.

The Mueller Approach

Mueller has tried to explain Presidential popularity with four factors (variables) labeled coalition-of-minorities, rally-round-the flag, economic-slump, and war.[30] The "coalition-of-minorities" concept refers to the dissolution of a President's electoral coalition. As issues are confronted and debated in the course of an administration, the "coalition" that once propelled the President into office gradually dissolves. The transition from support to opposition characterized by a growing coalition-of-minorities is produced by a progression of irreconcilable defeats on major issues. As Mueller observed,

> . . . this concept would predict that a President's popularity would show an overall downward trend as he is forced on a variety of issues to act and thus create intense, unforgiving opponents of former supporters.[31]

Mueller hypothesized that the coalition-of-minorities variables (measured by the length of time, in years, since the incumbent was inaugurated or reelected) would be negatively correlated with popularity (measured by the distribution of positive affect). This expectation was supported with a bivariate correlation of -.48 for the Truman-Johnson period. When multivariate controls were introduced (regression),

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[30]Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, pp. 196-250.

[31]Ibid., p. 205.

Mueller observed that the popularity of Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson declined as expected but that Eisenhower's popularity declined only slightly during his second term and not at all during his first. This result Mueller attributed to a combination of factors: Eisenhower's personal appeal, his ending of the Korean War, his amatuer status, his domestic conservatism, and the nature of the times.[32]

Mueller's "rally-round-the flag" concept refers to the propensity of "intense international events" to boost a President's popularity. The conventional wisdom here invokes the metaphor of an aroused public "standing behind" the President in times of international crisis. In forwarding a perspective similar to the impact-of-events approach Mueller was careful to specify his criteria for selecting events. He defined intense international events as "rally points" and distinguished them by three characteristics: (1) they were international, (2) they involved the United States and the President directly, and (3) they were specific, dramatic, and sharply focused.[33] Mueller hypothesized that the rally-round-the flag variable (measured by the length, in years, since the last rally point) would be negatively correlated with popularity. A bivariate correlation of .-16 was reported indicating a slight relationship in the predicted

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[32] Ibid., pp. 233-237.

[33] Ibid., pp. 208-213.

direction. Multivariate analysis supported this result and suggested an average decline of about five to six percentage points for every year since the last rally point.

Mueller next hypothesized that a "slumping" economy would harm a President's popularity; he expected popularity to decline with an increase in the unemployment rate. The results failed to support the proposition initially because the economic-slump index was not sensitive to changes peculiar to each administration. Partially supportive results were obtained after the unemployment rate was set at zero whenever the rate was lower at the time of the survey than it was at the start of the incumbent's present term. As Mueller interpreted the results, ". . . an economy in slump harms a president's popularity, but an economy that is improving does not seem to help his rating."[34]

Mueller's final determinant of popularity, "war," was measured simply by the presence or absence of American involvement in armed conflict abroad (i.e., the wars in Korea and Vietnam). A bivariate correlation of -.67 supported the expectation that the presence of war contributes to the decline of a President's popularity. When multivariate controls were introduced Mueller reported,

> . . . the Korean War had a large, significant negative impact on President Truman's

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[34] Ibid., p. 215.

> popularity of 18 percentage points, but . . . the Vietnam War had no independent impact on President Johnson's popularity.[35]

Mueller explained this finding in terms of Truman's inability to keep the war above partisan politics and the domestic turmoil of the Johnson era.

Stimson recently reported a study which may be classified as a variation of the "Mueller" approach.[36] Where Mueller posited and demonstrated linear relationships between popularity and several variates, Stimson argued that, for the relationship between popularity and a single variate, time, a curvilinear model was more parsimonious. As Stimson explained:

> The curves that characterize approval rates for American Presidents can be modeled quite simply. They are parabolas, concave upward, with a focus in the latter half of the presidential term. . . . The model predicts that presidential approval peaks when a President takes office, and then slides downward at a declining rate over time until it reaches a point in the latter half of the

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[35] Ibid., p. 240. The conclusion that Vietnam had no independent impact on Johnson's popularity seems highly questionable. Was it possible to answer such a question since the war was a constant factor during Johnson's administration? Mueller's application of multivariate techniques, while it yielded a statistical yardstick, concealed the fact that the question was not applicable to the data.

[36] James A. Stimson, "Public Support For American Presidents: A Cyclical Model," Public Opinion Quarterly 40 (Spring 1976): 1-21. In fact, some of the data for this research was originally collected by Mueller.

> four-year term (the focus), when it bottoms out. After that point approval rises slightly until the end of the term, but never attains its original level.[37]

When Stimson's parabolic (curvilinear) model was compared to a linear one, somewhat better predictions, in the form of "explained" variation (r^2), were obtained from the curvilinear model. The improvement (the difference between r^2 quadratic and r^2 linear) for all terms was approximately 6 percent (.059) and, after means were standardized, nearly 14 percent (.139). As the analysis progressed from all terms to individual terms for each President from Truman to Nixon the parabolic model again proved to be the better predictor, except in the case of Kennedy where neither model was superior. In addition, the magnitude of the correlation between Stimson's model and popularity (for all terms) was an impressive .48. As he suggested,

> That a single model with only three parameters accounts for about a fourth of all variance, ignoring war and peace, boom and bust, and the impact of differing presidential personalities,

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[37] Ibid., pp. 5-6. Certain limitations prevented us from reproducing Stimson's remarks in their original form. His mathematical formula and parameters, omitted through the convention of the ellipsis, can now be displayed as,

$$\text{Relative Approval} = \text{minimum} + \underline{b}\,(\text{focus} - t)^2$$

where,

$\underline{b}$ is greater than 0,
focus is greater than 2 but less than 4, and
t = time, in years.

speaks well of the predictive power of time.[38]

But as Stimson later cautioned:

> "Time" is no more likely to cause presidential approval than to move the tides and the seasons. But, as with cylcical phenomena of the physical world, it makes sense to begin the search for explanation of time-related effects by searching for time-related causes.[39]

In the course of his analysis Stimson posed the rhetorical question: does anything else matter? That is, since time explains so much of the variation in popularity (86 percent with least squares) do other variables add enough to that explanation to warrant inclusion in some revised theoretical formula? Stimson's response was an emphatic "no." To demonstrate the predictive power of the model Stimson included Mueller's economic-slump, rally points, and war variables in a step-wise multiple regression equation. The multiple correlation coefficient for the basic model was .644. When rally points were added the coefficient increased slightly to .662. And when all three were added the coefficient again increased slightly to .666. Based on these results, Stimson concluded,

> . . . our finding that three . . . candidates for the explanation of presidential approval fail to disrupt the time/approval relationship and add little in addition leads naturally to the suspicion that nothing else matters much.[40]

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[38] Ibid., p. 7.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., p. 18. Stimson's exclusion of the coalition-of-minorities variable, defined in terms of time, fosters a

This review of macro analytic approaches has examined a number of explanations for the popularity of Presidents. These have included events, news of events, coalition-of-minorities, rally points, economic-slump, war, and time. The Brody-Page news discrepancy theory and Stimson's parabolic model proved to be the most parsimonious. Of these two explanations, the Brody-Page theory seemed to offer the better vehicle for theoretical development. Mueller's rally points, economic-slump, and war concepts may be classified as events and subsumed under their "news of events" concept. In addition, the balance of news may be expected to vary over time and with a growing coalition-of-minorities.

V. A MICRO ANALYTIC STUDY

Kernell, Sperlich, and Wildavsky tried to explain a "generalized disposition" to support Presidents in terms of individual characteristics.[41] Their findings are limited in generalizability since they were based upon a non-probability sample drawn from the Oakland-Berkely-Richmond area of California in the spring of 1966. Despite this

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number of suspicions. Has Stimson redefined the coalition concept or measured it differently? It is not readily apparent where the concept would fit in Stimson's scheme, but, obviously, time is measured in a different manner.

[41]Samuel Kernell, Peter W. Sperlich, and Aaron Wildavsky, "Public Support for Presidents," in Perspectives on the Presidency, pp. 148-181.

limitation their research is useful in that it identified several relationships worth noting, especially their findings with respect to social characteristics and support. They observed inverse relationships between two social characteristics, education and occupation, and support.

Kernell, Sperlich, and Wildavsky expected to find higher levels of support for Presidents among individuals with little political knowledge, authoritarian and rigid personality types, and highly "patriotic" sentiments. Support was defined and measured in terms of three dimensions: (1) obligation to support, (2) crisis support, and (3) personal affect.[42] "Obligation to support" refers to a general disposition (or belief) that a President ought to be supported. "Crisis support" refers to a general disposition (or belief) that a President should be supported in times of domestic or international crisis. And "personal effect" refers to an emotional bond with the President.[43]

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[42]It was apparent upon inspection of the indexes for these dimensions labeled, respectively, our Presidents right or wrong, rally round Presidents in a crisis, and I like Presidents, that the first two dimensions referred to cognitive aspects and the last to affective. Generally speaking, micro analytic studies tend to measure more than one dimension of popularity while macro analytic studies tend to operationalize a single dimension, the affective component.

[43]Kernell, Sperlich, and Wildavsky, "Public Support for Presidents," pp. 151-154. Research hypotheses were presented on p. 150. Obvious parallels exist between their crises support concept and Mueller's rally points.

The initial phase of their analysis involved the correlation of socio-demographic variables (education, religion, sex, age, class, and occupation) with each dimension of support. Education, class, and occupation were negatively correlated with each support measure while the remaining socio-demographic variables were positively correlated with each dimension. The next general phase of analysis involved the correlation of psychological variables (personal inflexibility, authoritarianism, acquiescence, and optimism) with each support dimension. Each of these was positively correlated with each of the support dimensions. In the final phase of analysis the socio-demographic and psychological variables (excluding authoritarianism) were included in a regression equation to determine their independent effect upon each support measure. In general, their analysis indicated that socio-demographic variables produce support primarily through their effects on psychological variables and that these, in turn, exert a strong (and direct) influence upon dispositions to support Presidents.[44]

The personality and patriotic sentiments hypotheses were supported by the analysis above. Later analysis supported the knowledge hypothesis; political knowledge and campaign activity were correlated negatively with each support

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[44] Ibid., pp. 162-164.

dimension. But for purposes of our research the findings with respect to socio-demographic variables, especially education and occupation, and support were noteworthy. We return to these results in Chapter III.

VI. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF POPULARITY

Studies reviewed in previous sections of this chapter were concerned with "why" Presidents were popular. In this section we review two studies that address the question whether a President's popularity makes a difference in terms of Congressional support for his policies.[45] Although Edwards elected to present these as separate studies, they can be summarized together since their theoretical frameworks were identical.

Edwards' studies were guided by a "role-incentive" theory linking Neustadt's paradigm with the concept of representation.[46] In short, if Congressmen adopt the "delegate" role (they view their role as discovering and representing popular opinion) then, as Edwards argued,

> It is reasonable to conclude that if congressmen respond to expectations . . . . they should increase their support for the President as the

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[45] Edwards, "Senate," and "House." For a suggestive series of case studies, see Neustadt, Presidential Power, pp. 108-151 and Brown, The American Presidency.

[46] Neustadt's paradigm is discussed further in Chapter II.

public increases its support for him.[47]

This conception was linked to Neustadt's paradigm in the following manner:

> Certain incentives appear to lead to the taking of roles such as responding to the public. Therefore, it may be that (Congressmen) respond to presidential prestige not because they feel they ought to but for political security. . . . If only for purposes of reelection, a (Congressman) may desire to remain close to or independent of the President, depending on the latter's popularity.[48]

Edwards' role-incentive theory predicted a direct relationship between popularity and Congressional support for a President's programs.[49] For the Senate Edwards reported bivariate correlations (Pearson r) of .54, .33,

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[47]Edwards, "House," p. 104. For a slightly different phraseology, see Edwards, "Senate," p. 4. Edwards cited two studies of representational roles to support the delegate-role assumption of his hypothesis: Roger Davidson, The Role of the Congressman (New York: Pegasus, 1968) and Davidson, David Kovenock, and Michael O'Leary, Congress in Crisis (New York: Wadsworth, 1966).

[48]Edwards, "Senate," p. 4 and "House," p. 104.

[49]Measures of popularity and Congressional support were taken from The Gallup Opinion Index and Congressional Quarterly Almanac, respectively. Edwards' measure of popularity, an average figure derived from all surveys within a calendar year, was the same as our measure except that we analyzed a larger number of cases. A major difference in our studies was in operational definitions of support. Edwards employed the "Presidential-Support-Opposition score" for each Congressman while we employed the score reported for each chamber of Congress and, in some cases, the score for party and policy area by chamber. In addition, we operationalized the concept of Congressional success with the "Presidential Boxscore." Each of these measures is discussed again in Chapter II.

and .29 between popularity and overall, domestic and foreign policy support, respectively. For the House bivariate correlations of .12, -.03, and .40 were reported for these same relationships. Thus, for the Senate, Edwards' role-incentive hypothesis was confirmed. But for the House support for the hypothesis was clear only in the case of foreign policy.[50]

When Edwards introduced social status and partisanship for popularity and political party for Congressional support as control variables, several inverse relationships were observed in both studies. In short, a number of relationships were observed that were contrary to the role-incentive hypothesis. In the Senate study negative correlations were reported between popularity among Republicans and overall support (-.11); between popularity among Independents (-.09), Republicans (-.70), and high scocial status groups (-.21) and support by Democratic senators; and between popularity among Democrats (-.84) and low social status groups (-.19) and support by Republican senators. In the House study, negative correlations were reported between popularity among Independents (-.12), Republicans (-.51), and high social status groups (-.22) and overall support; between Independents (-.32), Republicans (-.85), and high social status groups

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[50]The only explanation Edwards provided for this finding was technical; the overall measure of support was biased by a disproportionate number of domestic policies.

(-.44) and support by Democratic representatives; and between popularity among Democrats (-.93) and low social status groups (-.41) and support by Republican representatives. As Edwards interpreted these results, "Congressmen from each party respond to the President's prestige within their electoral bases."[51]

The same general patterns were observed for domestic policy in both studies. But in the case of foreign policy, several negative relationships returned to the positive column. In theoretical terms, in domestic policy the role-incentive hypothesis again held for "partisan" linkages; in foreign policy the hypothesis also held for "bi-partisan" linkages. In the case of foreign policy the typical shift was from previously negative to positive correlations between Independents, Republicans, and high social status groups and support by Democratic Congressmen. As Edwards suggested, "This may be because of diminished party salience in foreign policy or fewer divisive constituency cues, or both."[52]

Edwards also controlled for the party of the President in each of these studies. For Senate Democrats the simple correlations were reduced overall from .94 to .79, and in domestic policy from .91 to .74, but in foreign policy the

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[51]Edwards, "House," p. 108 and "Senate, " p. 9.

[52]Edwards, "House," p. 109.

partial correlation increased markedly from .07 to .40. For House Democrats the simple correlations were reduced overall from .92 to .61, in domestic policy from .85 to .49, and in foreign policy from .82 to .73. Edwards concluded, however, that "presidential prestige remains an important factor in explaining the variance in presidential support among . . . Democrats."[53] For House and Senate Republicans all the simple correlations were reduced in strength and, more importantly, several partial correlations were negative. As Edwards remarked,

> Clearly Republican congressmen are not responding in their support for presidential policies to presidential popularity among the mass of Republican party identifiers in the public.[54]

VII. SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed several general explanations, macro analytic approaches, a micro analytic study, and Edwards' studies of the policy consequences of popularity. Each of these approaches is related to a "linkage" or communication approach to politics. A communication theory was at the heart of the Brody-Page news discrepancy theory. Edwards' studies relied upon a familiar premise of democratic theory, the translation of public preferences into governmental policy by their representatives. A process that

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[53]Edwards, "Senate," p. 13 and House," p. 111.

[54]Edwards, "House," p. 111 and "Senate," p. 13.

assumes a communication link. In Chapter II, "Theoretical Framework and Design," our linkage approach to politics and this study's hypotheses are presented.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DESIGN

I. INTRODUCTION

The basic conceptualizations of our research are outlined in this chapter. Rather than including a separate section on hypotheses, we introduce them as the appropriate concepts are defined. But the purpose of this discussion is more than definitional. To be sure, a degree of arbitrariness is involved in defining concepts, yet it would be a mistake to let this conceal their larger purpose, the presentation of the researcher's interpretative framework and subsequent "view of the world." With this in mind, let us present the basic divisions to follow. In the first section, "Presidential Popularity and the Political Process," a number of concepts are discussed from an interactional perspective. The second section, "Domestic and Foreign Policy Processes," sets forth some assumptions about the differences between domestic and foreign policy processes and their relationship to popularity. The third section, "Characteristics of Popular Opinion," presents a typology designed to control for fluctuations in popularity. In the fourth section, "Attentive Publics," a variation of linkage theory is examined from a macro perspective. And the fifth and final section, "Research Design," reviews the methodology

of this report.[1]

II. PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Our approach to "politics" draws attention to patterns of interaction between actors usually in competition for the scarce resources (both instrumental and expressive) of a political system. We define the political process "as a continuum of interaction patterns between the individual citizen and the tension points of decision-making" and acknowledge with Garceau that "the important processes of democratic politics may paradoxically consist of a discontinuous continuum of relationships."[2] The following framework tries to develop a view of the relationship between Presidential popularity and the political process as one of interdependence.

The Concept of Linkage

We use the concept of linkage to refer to a two-way flow of communication between citizen and government, a

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[1]A system of abbreviations was developed for this thesis and has been employed in the research design section of this chapter. A key to these abbreviations has been presented in Appendix A.

[2]Oliver Garceau, "Research in the Political Process," in Political Behavior, eds. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956), pp. 43-44.

conception first developed by Key.[3] As he suggested, "Comprehension of the interaction of government and public opinion depends on an appropriate broad conception of the process."[4] In defining linkage from an interactional perspective we are accepting the framework outlined by Key below.

> Government . . . attempts to mold public opinion toward support of the programs and policies it espouses. Given that endeavor, a perfect congruence between public policy and public opinion could be government of public opinion rather than government by public opinion. One can never be certain of the extent to which the parallelism of governmental action and public preference results from governmental influence on opinion and to what extent it results from the adjustment of public policy to bring it into accord with public opinion. Yet it is plain that on the American scene congruence between action and public preference results from the flow of influence to as well as from government.[5]

Approaches to Linkage

The question of linkage has been approached from a number of theoretical and methodological perspectives. One approach is to focus on either pole of the citizen-government continuum. Studies of political socialization and voting behavior are prime examples. Another approach is to examine the various intervening processes of communication between citizen and government. That political parties, interest

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[3] V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

[4] Ibid., p. 412.

[5] Ibid., pp. 422-423.

groups, and the mass media perform such functions is obvious; the precise nature of that performance has been difficult to isolate. A third approach is to focus on the interaction between citizen and government. At the micro level, this approach usually involves some form of the belief-sharing model; if leaders and followers share similar attitudes and/or opinions then linkage is said to occur.[6] The research strategy in this case involves the observation, usually through some combination of survey research and elite interviewing, of the attitudes and/or opinions of leaders and followers and the eventual determination of the extent to which they are congruent. A more elaborate approach to this question includes a comparison of popular policy preferences with some action by leaders related to those preferences, typically a scale based on roll-call votes.[7] At the macro level, the interactional approach examines through correlational techniques the congruence between estimates of popular opinion or preference and public policy. The research strategy here usually involves the comparison of aggregate

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[6]See Norman Luttbeg, ed., Public Opinion and Public Policy, revised ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1974). The best example of this approach is Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 299-318.

[7]Here we are referring to the study by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review 57 (March 1963): 45-56.

characteristics of a Congressman's district (sometimes estimates of opinion but generally demographic features) and his voting record.[8] Our study approaches the question of linkage from a macro perspective.

Public Opinion Polls as Linkage

Political scientists typically conceive political parties, interest groups, and the media of mass communication as modes of interaction along the citizen-government continuum. Public opinion research is another mode of interaction, a position articulated by Davison.[9] He identified three functions of the "upward flow of communication" performed by public opinion research. It helps explain public opinion on any given issue, it provides a feedback mechanism to decision-makers, and on certain occasions, it may provide a substitute for public opinion.[10] This view of linkage of course assumes that public officials attend to published poll results.[11]

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[8]See, for example, John E. Jackson, Constituencies and Leaders in Congress (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

[9]W. Philips Davison, "Public Opinion Research as Communication," Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (Fall 1972): 331-332.

[10]Ibid., p. 313.

[11]See Leo Bogart, "No Opinion, Don't Know, and Maybe No Answer," Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (Fall 1967): 331-345 and Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

Thus, for the present study public opinion research and the subsequent reporting of results in the media of mass communication is conceived as a potential form of linkage between Congressmen and their constituents.

The Power Paradigm

Figure 1 presents one scholar's rendition of Neustadt's theory of Presidential power.[12] As indicated by the diagram, a President's success as a bargainer is dependent upon a number of relationships, in some of which a President has a hand, others over which he has little, if any, control. Our task in this research is to examine a relationship inferred from the model, the relationship between a President's popular prestige and his success as a bargainer. As posited by the model this relationship works through a series of intervening processes. In short, a President's popular prestige influences his success as a bargainer to the extent that it is perceived and enhances the responsiveness of other relevant political actors, namely, Washingtonians, to his leadership. That collective perception in turn influences his professional reputation among them which in turn affects the guarding of his power prospects and ultimately, his success as a bargainer. No single study could

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[12]Peter B. Sperlich, "Bargaining and Overload: An Essay on Presidential Power," in Perspectives on the Presidency, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), p. 411. This figure was the simplest of three diagrammatic representations of Neustadt's theory.




Figure 1. The Power Paradigm

Source: Sperlich, "Bargaining and Overload," p. 411.

hope to examine the entire range and implications of Neustadt's theory. To explore the relationship between a President's popular prestige and his success as a bargainer we elevated the other relationships to the level of axioms, a set of statements from which other propositions may be derived. If these assumptions hold, empirical validation of the inferred relationship will lend support for the former.

The model as presented would seem to predict a "direct" relationship between a President's popular prestige and success as a bargainer. But as Neustadt warned, "Rarely is there any one-to-one relationship between appraisals of his popularity in general and response to his wishes in particular."[13] In his study of the Presidential press conference and related activities Cornwell stated,

> The leverage the President has acquired in the lawmaking process has been indirect, based on his use of the arts of persuasion, and ultimately grounded in the popular support he can claim or mobilize.[14]

Koenig remarked in his text, "The built-in conflict between the President and Congress assured by checks and balances, the ease with which Congress can rebuff him, leaves the President dependent upon his ability to summon broad public

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[13]Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 87.

[14]Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 4.

support as his most substantial means of bringing Congress around to an accommodation productive of policy and action."[15] Burns, in his treatise on Presidential government, concluded,

> Stripped to its essentials, the Presidency requires two cardinal skills: the ability to appeal directly to mass publics, at home and abroad, and the ability to negotiate with rival leaders holding independent bases of power.[16]

And finally, Key noted, "In times of crises, domestic or international, the President may inform and reassure the people and thereby gain support for his policies or for himself."[17] Suffice to say here, the proposition that a President's popular prestige and success as a bargainer is expected to vary in the same direction was stated in "conventional wisdom" form.

The functional relationships we posit in this study are also direct relationships but, strictly speaking, a President's prestige and success as a bargainer are not defined operationally. Rather, these relationships are examined empirically with the concepts of Presidential popularity, Congressional success, and Congressional support. These concepts are sufficiently close to Neustadt's to

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[15]Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 92.

[16]James M. Burns, Presidential Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 299.

[17]Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, p. 415.

warrant an examination of the functional relationship implied by the paradigm without strictly employing his concepts. We do this in a conscious manner.

Presidential Popularity

Blumer's distinction between public opinion and mass or popular opinion seems well suited for this research.[18] He used the term mass "to denote an elementary and spontaneous collective grouping . . ." having four distinguishable features: (1) its membership may come from all walks of life, and from all distinguishable social strata; (2) it is composed of anonymous individuals; (3) there is little interaction between the members; and (4) it is very loosely organized.[19] He used the term public "to refer to a group of people who are confronted by an issue, who are divided in their ideas as to how to meet the issue, and who engage in discussion over the issue."[20] The distinguishable features of the public are two: (1) the existence of an issue brings the public into existence and (2) that public, instead of having its activity prescribed, is engaged in an effort to arrive at an act, and therefore

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[18]Herbert Blumer, "The Mass, the Public and Public Opinion," in Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, eds. Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 43-50.

[19]Ibid., p. 43.

[20]Ibid., p. 46.

forced to create its action.[21]

In Blumer's framework collective patterns of activity on the part of a public so defined emerge from the interaction of group members. In contrast, collective patterns of activity on the part of the mass depend on whether individual selections converge. In other words, collective behavior for a public is social, for the mass, it is entirely individualistic. From this, then, it is obvious that the measurement process known as survey research becomes by definition popular opinion. But this distinction is more than definitional for it acknowledges the caveat first suggested by Bogart when he said, "The process by which a group comes to take a position is not amenable to study by a technique that approaches people one by one."[22] These remarks serve to reinforce and make explicit our plan to view public opinion polls as linkage, but linkage between popular opinion and not public opinion as these terms have come to be defined.

Recall that Presidential popularity has been defined in terms of three dimensions: (1) cognitive, (2) affective, and (3) conative. The cognitive dimension refers to what is known or believed to be true or false about a President.

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[21] Ibid., p. 47.

[22] Bogart, "No Opinion, Don't Know, and Maybe No Answer," p. 335.

Positive or negative evaluations of a President or his policies refer to the affective dimension. And the conative dimension refers to proposed actions toward a President or one of his policies.

The empirical segment of this study is concerned exclusively with the affective dimension of popularity. The operational definition for this dimension is the question posed almost monthly to a sample of the adult population by Gallup: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of incumbent) is handling his job as President?" The proportion of those approving (i.e., the distribution of positive affect) is employed as the indicator of popularity.[23]

Congressional Success and Support

By Congressional success we refer to the degree of Congressional action in favor of legislation specifically requested by a President. This concept is defined operationally by the "Presidential Boxscore," the annual compilation published by the staff of the Congressional Quarterly. This measure indicates the proportion of Presidential requests which have received favorable action in Congress during a calendar year. The staff of the Congressional Quarterly constructs this measure by observing Congressional

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[23]This was essentially the only readily available data source on popularity; consequently, our research has been restricted to the affective dimension. See Appendix C for information on the sample size and accuracy of the Gallup surveys.

action on specific legislative requests contained in the President's messages to Congress and in other public statements (see Appendix B).

By Congressional support we refer to the degree of agreement between the President and Congress on legislative action. This concept is defined operationally by the "Presidential Support-Opposition score," another measure compiled by the staff of the Congressional Quarterly which indicates the proportion of roll-call votes in Congress that were congruent with the President's position at the time of their passage. Public statements by the President are again analyzed by the staff of Congressional Quarterly to determine his preference in the way of legislative action. One feature of this measure worth noting is that unlike the success measure, the President's position is determined at the time a vote is taken even though a previous or subsequent position differed. (see Appendix B).

Definitional matters aside, we may now formally present our first set of hypotheses:

H_1: A President's popularity varies directly with Congressional success.

H_o: A President's popularity is not related to Congressional success

H_2: A President's popularity varies directly with Congressional support.

H_o: A President's popularity is not related to Congressional support.

These research hypotheses rely on two fundamental assumpsions: (1) the validity of Neustadt's paradigm and, (2) the supposition that public opinion polls provide members of Congress with a point of reference when and if they come to judge whether a President enjoys public support and ultimately, whether based on such knowledge it is politically expedient for them to support him.

III. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY PROCESSES

Recall that we predict a direct relationship between a President's popularity and his success and support in Congress. Our discussion here attempts to make a similar prediction for domestic and foreign policy processes. This objective relies on two fundamental assumptions. First, although to a certain extent each policy creates its own process, there is a degree of similarity within each process. And second, we assume at the outset that these processes are legitimate "types"; they are empirically different.[24]

Domestic and foreign policies are related in many subtle ways and therefore empirical distinctions are difficult to make. For example, when Johnson announced on March 31, 1968 that he would not seek a second term and, at

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[24]See Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," in The Politics of U. S. Foreign Policy Making, ed. Douglas M. Fox (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear, 1971), pp. 175-186 and Donald A. Peppers, "'The Two Presidencies': Eight Years Later," in Perspectives on the Presidency, pp. 462-471.

the same time, a bombing halt in North Vietnam, were these "decisions" clearly domestic or foreign, neither domestic nor foreign, or a complicated mixture of both? We view these processes as conceptually distinct while realizing that in practice the lines between them are not so easily drawn. Thus, by domestic policies we refer to those governmental actions primarily concerned with the internal environment and relationships of the political system. And by foreign policies we refer to governmental actions primarily concerned with the external environment and relationships of the political system.

A Preliminary Statement

Figure 2 presents in summary fashion the distinctive characteristics of the domestic and foreign policy processes

Policy Process	Popular Opinion	Congress	Presidential Model
Domestic	Negotiable	Restrictive	Madisonian
Foreign	Persuadable	Facilitative	Hamiltonian

Figure 2. Domestic and Foreign Policy Processes

as we identify them. For the domestic policy process, popular opinion is described as negotiable, Congress as

restrictive, and the Presidential model as Madisonian. For the foreign policy process, popular opinion is described as persuadable, Congress as facilitative, and the Presidential model as Hamiltonian. These descriptions permit the presentation of our second set of hypotheses:

H_3: A President's popularity is more directly related to Congressional success for foreign than domestic policies.

H_o: A President's popularity is not related to differences between domestic and foreign policies for Congressional success.

H_4: A President's popularity is more directly related to Congressional support for foreign than domestic policies.

H_o: A President's popularity is not related to differences between domestic and foreign policies for Congressional support.

This second set of research hypotheses relies upon a number of assumptions presented above and articulated more fully below.

Popular Opinion and Public Policy

Our description of popular opinion on domestic policy as negotiable relies on Key's concept of a permissive concensus.[25] By negotiable we refer to a linkage relationship wherein the bargaining abilities and resources of the game are dispersed among a number of players (including Blumer's mass) and not concentrated solely in the hands of

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[25]Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, pp. 32-35.

the President. Governmental action thus requires the consent and acquiescence of a wide range of actors. Or as Key suggested, "the enactment of major attention-commanding measures tend to await the development of a predominant permissive opinion."[26]

Our description of popular opinion on foreign policy as persuadable relies on Almond's "mood" theory.[27] Here persuadable describes a linkage relationship wherein the bargaining abilities and resources of the game are limited to a few players (excluding Blumer's mass) and concentrated predominantly in the hands of the President. The consent of a few is required, the acquiescence of the rest is assured. As the foreign policy mood was discussed by Almond:

> The reaction of the general population to foreign policy issues has been described as one of mood . . . .
> . . . . . .
> The mood is . . . plastic and relatively passive. It is ready to support policy initiatives within the general limits of firm action. . . . The American foreign policy mood is permissive; it will follow the lead of the policy elites if they demonstrate unity and resolution.[28]

Popular opinion may be subject to Presidential leadership on matters of foreign policy, more so than on domestic

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[26] Ibid., p. 424.

[27] Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950).

[28] Ibid., pp. 69, 87-88.

matters. Consequently, we might expect a greater congruence between Presidential popularity and success and support in Congress on foreign than domestic policies. Then again, if Congressmen are more responsive to constituency opinion on domestic matters, the reverse might be true.[29]

Congress and Public Policy

Our description of Congress as restrictive on domestic policy and facilitative on foreign relies on that developed by James.[30] By restrictive we refer to the structural features of Congress that permit the blockage of Presidential requests, namely, the committee structure. By facilitative we refer to the inability of Congress to tamper with Presidential requests in matters of foreign affairs. If these observations are accurate, it follows that Presidential leadership would be more successful in foreign than domestic matters.

Presidential Models

Our description of the domestic policy process as reflecting the Madisonian model and the foreign policy process

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[29]On this point, see Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review 57 (March 1963): 45-56.

[30]Dorothy B. James, The Contemporary Presidency, 2nd ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974).

the Hamiltonian model is derived from Burns.[31] The Madisonian model protrays the President as constrained by a system of "checks and balances." In contrast, the Hamiltonian model is essentially one wherein a President, given the appropriate abilities and resources, has the power to mobilize diverse interests behind his causes. From these descriptions, we might again expect Presidential leadership to be more successful in foreign affairs. Given the above descriptions for the domestic and foreign policy processes, we might reasonably expect our second set of research hypotheses to be confirmed.

IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF POPULAR OPINION: A TYPOLOGY

The primary unit-of-analysis for our research is the calendar year. Our measures of Congressional success and support were both at that level originally (see Appendix B). Our measure of Presidential popularity was not; consequently, to insure comparability between concepts we arrived at a measure of popularity averaged across a number of surveys across time. This procedure involved a number of assumptions. First, Congressmen do not respond to "minor" fluctuations in popularity; they are more likely to respond to general trends.

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[31]Burns, Presidential Government and The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

This position seems reasonable given the length of time usually required to formulate and pass legislation. Second, Congressmen may not respond to Presidential popularity in any systematic way; therefore, a smaller unit-of-analysis would be less likely to capture general patterns of behavior. And we previously assumed that public opinion polls provide members of Congress with a point of reference when and if they come to judge whether a President enjoys public support and ultimately, whether based on such knowledge it is politically expedient for them to support him. Systematic information on these decisional processes was not available, but we can determine from the Gallup data whether or not a President enjoys widespread popular support.

These assumptions are incorporated in a typology of opinion displayed in Figure 3. We divided popular opinion along two dimensions, Presidential popularity (the directional aspect) and opinion variability (the stability aspect). Presidential popularity was divided into high and low categories and opinion variability into stable and unstable. We would expect the strength of the relationship between Presidential popularity and Congressional success and support to decline in the following order: high popularity and unstable opinion (type 2), low popularity and stable opinion (type 3), and low popularity and unstable opinion (type 4). This hypothesis is tested to determine

Opinion Variability	Presidential Popularity	
	High	Low
Stable	1	3
Unstable	2	4

Figure 3. Opinion Typology

whether our averaging techniques and assumptions were more or less valid. Support for the hypothesis would seem to suggest the futility of examining these relationships at the present level of analysis.

In order first to classify each unit-of-analysis we computed an average popularity figure (per year). Cases were then ranked from high to low (1 to 23), and quartiles were determined. We arbitrarily classified the first and second quartiles as "high" and the third and fourth as "low." We then computed a standard deviation to measure variability, cases were ranked and quartiles again determined. The first and second quartiles were classified as "unstable," the third and fourth as "stable." Figure 4 presents the outcome of this procedure.

V. ATTENTIVE PUBLICS: A MACRO ANALYTIC APPROACH

A growing body of research has concerned itself with Almond's "attentive public" theory.[32] In his formulation of the democratic policy-making process, Almond portrayed the public as hierarchially stratified by the unequal distribution of social and political influence. His

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[32]Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy. See, for example, Donald J. Devine, The Attentive Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970); G. R. Goynton, Samuel C. Patterson, and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Missing Link in Legislative Politics: Attentive Constituents," Journal of Politics 31 (August 1969): 700-721; and James N. Rosenau, Citizenship Between Elections (New York: Free Press, 1974).

Opinion Variability	Presidential Popularity	
	High	Low
Stable	1955	1958
	1956	1968
	1961	1970
	1964	1971
	1965	1974[a]
	1969	
Unstable	1954	1966
	1957	1967
	1959	1972
	1960	1973
	1962	1974[b]
	1963	1975

Figure 4. Classification of Units-of-Analysis

[a]Nixon's term of office.

[b]Ford's term of office.

formulation identified four principal factors or strata: (1) the legal or official policy leadership, (2) the policy and opinion elites, (3) the attentive public, and (4) the general public. Legitimate political actors--chief executives, legislators, civil servants, and the like--constitute the legal or official policy leadership. This stratum represents the apex of the pyramid. Policy and opinion elites--the next stratum--are "the articulate policy-bearing stratum of the population which gives structure to the public, and which provides the effective means of access to the various groupings."[33] The attentive public, the level below the elites, is the informed and interested stratum which "constitutes the audience for the . . . policy discussions among the elites."[34] At the base of the pyramid is the general public, the relatively passive and uniformed stratum with the smallest share of influence. Almond's theory or criteria of a democratic policy-making process--remembering the premise of stratified influence--has three requirements: (1) formal opportunity for mass participation, (2) autonomy and competition among the elites, and (3) an attentive public--an informed and interested stratum--before whom elite discussion and controversy take place.

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[33]Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, p. 138.

[34]Ibid.

Devine systematically examined this theory in The Attentive Public and concluded, "As a theory of democratic public opinion, Attentive Public theory seems to be the most explanatory for the American situation."[35] Our research examines this theory with the available data. We have no measures of "attentiveness" (Devine employed data from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research as well as Gallup), but we do have measures of Presidential popularity among both educational and occupational groups. The use of these indicators of "attentiveness" assumes that higher educational and occupational groups are more likely to be attentive. This assumption seems plausible in light of Devine's finding that, "The more attentive a person, the greater likelihood he will be in a higher status occupation category . . . and a higher educational category."[36] Given these assumptions, we may now present our third set of hypotheses:

H_5: A President's popularity varies more directly with Congressional success for "attentive" than "non-attentive" groups.

H_0: A President's popularity is not related to Congressional success for "attentive" groups

H_6: A President's popularity varies more directly with Congressional support for "attentive" than "non-attentive" groups.

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[35]Devine, The Attentive Public, p. 127.

[36]Ibid., p. 58.

H_0: A President's popularity is not related to Congressional support for "attentive" groups.

These research hypotheses will also be tested by controlling elections to examine Rosenau's remark that, "For all practical purposes the Attentive Public is the public between elections."[37] As he explained this point,

> . . . most citizens turn to other matters and away from public affairs after casting their votes. Those who remain attentive . . . comprise a small minority of the Mass Public (as we shall refer to the citizenry as a whole). Even if extremely loose criteria of attentiveness are used, the ranks of the Attentive Public do not constitute anything like a majority of the electroate. . . . Yet, despite its size, as the prime source of public support available between elections, the Attentive Public clearly plays a crucial role in the processes of democracy.[38]

VI. RESEARCH DESIGN

The design of this study was ex post facto and the analytical procedures were correlational. We collected data over time, but, strictly speaking, the design was not longitudinal as time (the calendar year) was the unit-of-analysis. These general points and the more technical matters of our research are discussed below.

Our operational definition for Presidential popularity is the question posed almost monthly by Gallup to a sample

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[37] Rosenau, Citizenship Between Elections, p. 4.

[38] Ibid.

of the American people: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of incumbent) is handling his job as President?" To arrive at a measure of popularity (since Gallup does not provide an N) we averaged the monthly "approval" rates. This procedure provided an "average yearly approval rate." Since 1966, Gallup has reported in cross-tabulation tables the approval rates for a number of demographic groups in its monthly publication, The Gallup Opinion Index. A yearly approval rate for educational, occupational, and partisan groups was calculated from these figures.

Our measures of Congressional success and support are the Congressional Quarterly's "Presidential Boxscore" and "Support-Opposition score," respectively. In most cases these measures are taken directly from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. To arrive at measures of Congressional success for domestic and foreign policies it was necessary to perform additional calcuations. We classified the "Foreign Policy" and "Natonal Security" categories employed by the Congressional Quarterly as foreign. All other categories were treated as domestic. A retabulation provided a measure of Congressional success for each category. The support measures were already divided into domestic and foreign policy categories.

We also collected data on Congressional support for each house (SUPH and SUPS), each house by party (SUPHDEM, SUPHREP, SUPSDEM, AND SUPSREP), and each house by party and

policy area (SUPHDEMD, SUPHREPD, SUPSDEMD, SUPSREPD, SUPHDEMF, SUPHREPF, SUPSDEMF, AND SUPSREPF, see Appendix A for abbreviations). All measures were expressed in percentage form by year, e.g., percentage approval for popularity and percentage of requests passed by Congress for the boxscore. During the course of the study, eight indexes of Congressional support were developed: (1) domestic policy support (SUPDOM), (2) foreign policy support (SUPFOR), (3) Democratic Party support (SUPDEM), (4) Republican Party support (SUPREP), (5) House foreign policy support (SUPHFOR), (6) House domestic policy support (SUPHDOM), (7) Senate foreign policy support (SUPSFOR), and (8) Senate domestic policy support (SUPSDOM). The following equations were employed to obtain these indexes.

SUPDOM = (SUPHDEMD + SUPHREPD + SUSDEMD + SUPSREPD)/4

SUPFOR = (SUPHDEMF + SUPHREPF + SUPSDEMF +SUPSREPF)/4

SUPDEM = (SUPHDEM + SUPSDEM)/2

SUPREP = (SUPHREP + SUPSREP)/2

SUPHFOR = (SUPHDEMF + SUPHREPF)/2

SUPHDOM = (SUPHDEMD + SUPHREPD)/2

SUPSFOR = (SUPSDEMF + SUPSREPF)/2

SUPSDOM = (SUPSDEMP + SUPSREPD)/2

We collected data for Presidential popularity for 1954 to 1975 and for demographic groups from 1966 to 1975. Data for the boxscore are from 1954 to 1974. Data for the overall support-opposition score are from 1954 to 1975 and for

domestic and foreign policies from 1955 to 1970. All other support measures, unless based upon some combination of the above, are for 1955 to 1975.

VII. SUMMARY

This chapter has presented our conceptual framework, theoretical and empirical assumptions, hypotheses, and research design. The central element of our framework is the conceptualization of linkage as an interactional process of communication between leaders and followers. Our most basic assumption is that public officials attend to published poll results. Two research hypotheses are derived from Neustadt's theory of Presidential leadership, two from a theoretical synthesis, and two from Almond's attentive public theory. In Chapter III the results of this investigation are analyzed.

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The relationships between popularity and Congressional success (hypotheses 1 and 3) and Congressional support (hypotheses 2 and 4) will be tested and analyzed in the following discussion. These relationships will be compared across opinion types to determine whether our averaging technique for popularity was appropriate empirically. If the magnitude of any relationship declines uniformly from type 1 (high popularity and stable opinion) to type 4 (low popularity and unstable opinion), we will consider this as evidence to suggest that our averaging procedures were questionable. In addition, partisanship and party of the President will be introduced as control or test variables because of their impact in previous research.[1] The Congressional support relationships will also be controlled by chamber of Congress and party for each chamber. Next, the

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[1]George C. Edwards, III, "Presidential Influence in the Senate: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, September 2, 1975 and "Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power," American Political Science Review 70 (March 1976): 101-113.

"attentive" public hypotheses (5 and 6) will be examined. These relationships will be controlled by election years to determine whether, as Rosenau has suggested, ". . . the Attentive Public is the public between elections."[2] And finally, we present evidence in support of the "partisanship as linkage" perspective of previous research.[3]

II. CONGRESSIONAL SUCCESS

The first research hypothesis of this study predicted a direct relationship between a President's popularity and Congressional success. As indicated by column 1 of Table I the correlations between overall popularity and Congressional success for overall (.28), domestic (.19), and foreign policy (.43) were all in the predicted direction. But only in the case of foreign policy were we able to reject the null hypothesis of no difference. In other words, there was a direct relationship between a President's popularity and Congressional success only in the case of foreign policy.

These findings vary when controlled by opinion type, party of the President, and partisanship. In the case of

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[2]James N. Rosenau, Citizenship Between Elections (New York: Free Press, 1974), p. 4.

[3]See, for example, Stuart G. Brown, The American Presidency (New York: Macmillan, 1966). This perspective is sometimes referred to as the responsible party doctrine.

TABLE I

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY BY CONGRESSIONAL SUCCESS FOR OVERALL, DOMESTIC, AND FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLLING FOR OPINION TYPE, PARTY OF PRESIDENT, AND PARTISANSHIP[a]

	Popularity									
						Party of President		Partisanship		
		Opinion Type				Demo-	Repub-	Demo-	Inde-	Repub-
Congressional Success	Overall (1)	1 (2)	2 (3)	3 (4)	4 (5)	cratic (6)	lican (7)	crats (8)	pendents (9)	lican (10)
Overall	.28	.27	.33	.15	.24	-.08	.45	.76*	.03	-.60*
Domestic Policy	.19	.43	.27	.00	.33	-.28	.35	.68*	-.10	-.66*
Foreign Policy	.43*	.53	.72	.48	-.08	.46	.38	.64*	-.04	-.56*
N	22	6	6	5	5	8	14	11	11	11

[a]All measures of association presented here and in subsequent tables are Pearson product-moment (Pearson r) correlation coefficients. For an explanation of this measure, see Dean J. Champion, Basic Statistics for Social Research (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler, 1970), pp. 194-204.

*Significant at .05.

opinion type (column 2 through 5) no systematic results were obtained to suggest that our averaging procedures were inappropriate. In fact, we were not able to reject a single null hypothesis.[4] Similar results were obtained for party of the President (columns 6 and 7). But in the case of partisanship several interesting (and statistically significant) relationships were observed. As the correlations in column 8 indicate, the relationships between popularity among Democrats and Congressional success for overall (.76), domestic (.68), and foreign policy (.64) were supportive of the first hypothesis. Substantially different relationships were observed for Independents (column 9) and Republicans (column 10). For Indpendents no significant relationships were observed and for Republicans inverse rather than direct relationships were found, i.e., negative rather than positive correlations. These results were similar to the findings reported by Edwards and subsequent analyses confirm the conclusion that, by and large, linkage was a partisan relationship.[5]

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[4]The heuristic value of this typology probably was not realized since these results, were, in part, a product of the diminishing number of cases for each type.

[5]This conclusion was also supported at a different level of analysis by Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton, 1963).

The third research hypothesis predicted that popularity and success would be more strongly related for foreign than domestic policy. The only instance where a significant difference[6] was obtained between domestic and foreign policy relationships is reported in column 1 of Table I. The correlation between overall popularity and Congressional success for foreign policy (.43) was significantly stronger than for domestic policy (.19). This hypothesis was not supported for any of the categories of control variables in Table I. Thus, the assumptions about differences between domestic and foreign policy processes appear to be valid only for Congressional success.

III. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

The second hypothesis of this study (like the first) predicted a direct relationship between popularity and Congressional support. The correlations in column 1 of Table II between overall popularity and Congressional support for overall (.48), domestic (.53), and foreign policy (.55) were all in the predicted direction and statistically significant. In short, the second research hypothesis was supported by the available evidence.

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[6]Significant differences between two r's were determined by Fisher's Z_f transformation. For a discussion of this statistic, see Dean J. Champion, Basic Statistics for Social Research (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler, 1970), pp. 203-204.

TABLE II

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY BY CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OVERALL, DOMESTIC, AND FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLLING FOR OPINION TYPE, PARTY OF PRESIDENT, AND PARTISANSHIP

	Popularity									
Congressional Support	Overall	Opinion Type				Party of President		Partisanship		
		1	2	3	4	Democratic	Republican	Democrats	Independents	Republican
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Overall	.48*	.05	.55	.95*	.16	.67*	.45*	.74*	.19	.37
Domestic Policy	.53*	.07	.04	.60	-.14	.06	.65*	.71*	.09	-.48
Foreign Policy	.55*	-.23	-.04	.62	-.12	.13	.67*	.69*	.13	-.43
N	23	6	6	5	6	8	15	12	12	12

*Significant at .05.

Moving to the first control variable, opinion type (columns 2 through 5), we again observed no systematic patterns in the correlations to suggest that our averaging technique was questionable empirically. Only one of 12 null hypotheses was rejected; the correlation for type 3 for overall support was .93. When party of the President (columns 6 and 7) was introduced as a control, two of six partial relationships proved to be non-significant. We see in column 6 of Table II that for Democratic administrations (Kennedy and Johnson) the second research hypothesis was not supported in the case of domestic (.06) or foreign policy (.13). For Republican administrations (Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford) each of the partial relationships supported the hypothesis. These results seemed to suggest that, at least for domestic and foreign policy, linkages were related to the party of the President. A partisan linkage theory would have predicted greater congruence during Democratic administrations because of the majority status of the party. Why, then, have we observed congruence between popular evaluations and Congressional support in these policy areas during Republican but not Democratic administrations? Democratic Presidents, since their party has been in the majority, should have been able to pass legislation simply by maintaining party unity in Congress. Hence, the success of the President's legislative program would not depend on his ability to mobilize popular support. Republican

Presidents usually have faced a different battle, that of creating a majority. In order to create that majority Republican Presidents may have resorted to a non-partisan mode of linkage, that of persuasive appeals to the public for support. In short, a President's ability to persuade may produce linkage relationships, especially for Presidents from a minority party.

When partisanship was introduced as a control (columns 8 through 10 of Table II) the original relationships were again altered, but not in the same manner as for Congressional success. The correlations in column 8 of Table II between popularity among Democrats and Congressional support for overall (.74), domestic (.71), and foreign policy (.69) were supportive of the second hypothesis. For Independents we found no significant relationships, findings similar to those observed for Congressional success. In the case of Republicans, in contrast to previous findings, we observed inverse relationships that were not significant. Thus, the proposition that a President's popularity would vary directly with Congressional support was supported only among Democrats in the public.

Before discussing our second hypothesis further, let us briefly examine the evidence for the expectation that a President's popularity would vary more directly with Congressional support for foreign than domestic policies. In 16 tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in

Tables II and III we found no significant differences. In short, we found no evidence to support the fourth hypothesis. These results raise serious questions about the validity of assumptions about differences in domestic and foreign policy processes.

Chamber of Congress and party by chamber are introduced as controls for the second hypothesis in Table III. (The overall relationships are reproduced in column 1.) When controlled by chamber the original relationships were altered drastically.[7] As revealed in columns 2 and 5, 5 of 6 correlations were substantially reduced in magnitude and one (popularity and overall Senate support for domestic policy) became negative. After controlling for chamber only one of six null hypotheses was rejected, the relationship between popularity and overall Senate support. Since members of the House stand for election every two years, we might have expected that chamber to be more "responsive;" apparently, however, representatives do not respond to a measure of national popularity.[8] These findings differed

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[7]These results were sufficiently different from those of Edwards to warrant further research into the consequences of employing individual versus aggregate support measures.

[8]This does not discount the possibility that representatives may respond to a localized popularity. Edwards examined this relationship using election returns by Congressional district as a measure of popularity. He found that Presidential electoral support has a significant impact on overall, domestic, and foreign policy support, especially

TABLE III

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY BY CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR OVERALL, DOMESTIC, AND FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLLING FOR CHAMBER AND PARTY BY CHAMBER

	Popularity						
		House			Senate		
Congressional Support	Overall (1)	Overall (2)	Democrats (3)	Republicans (4)	Overall (5)	Democrats (6)	Republicans (7)
Overall	.48*	.26	.40*	-.27	.47*	.42*	-.08
Domestic Policy	.53*	.00	.05	-.08	-.20	.05	.04
Foreign Policy	.55*	.01	.42*	.12	.04	.40*	-.17
N[a]	23	21/16	23/16	23/16	21/16	23/16	23/16

[a]The first N refers to overall Congressional Support; the second N refers to Domestic and Foreign Policy support.

*Significant at .05.

from those of Edwards for three relationships: (1) popularity and overall House support for foreign policy, (2) popularity and overall Senate support for domestic policy, and (3) popularity and overall Senate support for foreign policy.[9] For these relationships, respectively, we observed correlations of .01, -.02, and .04. Edwards reported correlations of .40, .33, and .29 for these same relationships.[10]

When party by chamber of Congress was introduced as a control for the second hypothesis we observed that, in general, Democratic Congressmen were responsive to overall popularity, except in the case of domestic policy. We were able to reject 4 of 12 null hypotheses: (1) popularity and support by House Democrats (.40), (2) popularity and support by House Democrats for foreign policy (.42), (3) popularity

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under Democratic Presidents. See his, "Presidential Electoral Performance as a Source of Presidential Power." (Mimeographed).

[9]Columns 2 through 4 can be reconstructed from Edwards "House," p. 106 and columns 5 through 7 from his "Senate," pp. 7 and 14.

[10]The case of domestic policy provides some clue to these differences. The original relationship was significant and the partials for each chamber were not. The domestic policy support measure was based on an average of four measures: (1) SUPHDEMD, (2) SUPHREPD, (3) SUPSDEMD, and (4) SUPSREPD (see Appendix A). It is possible that this approach to index construction biased the results.

and support by Senate Democrats (.42), and (4) popularity and support by Senate Democrats for foreign policy (.40). Our findings for the House were essentially the same as those of Edwards, except that the correlation between popularity and support by House Democrats was substantially larger in our study (.40 to .10). But in the case of the Senate, these similarities dissolved into differences on each of six relationships (column 6 and 7 of Table III). Edwards reported correlations of .94, .91, .07, .89, .84, and .87 for these relationships (in order from column 6, top to bottom, and column 7, top to bottom).[11] Obviously, as these differences confirmed, findings vary with respect to operational definitions of support.

IV. ATTENTIVE PUBLICS

Tables IV through IX display evidence with respect to our fifth and sixth research hypotheses. These "attentive" public propositions assumed that higher educational and occupational groups were likely to be attentive, an assumption based upon an empirical generalization forwarded by Devine. As he concluded, "The more attentive a person, the greater likelihood he will be in a higher status occupation category . . . and a higher educational category."[12] In

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[11]Edwards, "Senate," p. 14. Potential sources of bias were noted in footnotes 7 and 10.

[12]Donald J. Devine, The Attentive Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), p. 58.

TABLE IV

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AMONG EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS BY CONGRESSIONAL SUCCESS

	Popularity							
		Education			Occupation[a]			
Congressional Success	Overall (1)	College (2)	High School (3)	Grade School (4)	Professional & Business (5)	White Collar (6)	Manual (7)	Non-Labor Force (8)
Overall	.28	-.01	.25	.49	.02	.13	.50	-.15
Domestic Policy	.19	-.10	.12	.36	-.10	.01	.38	-.26
Foreign Policy	.43*	-.10	.16	.37	-.05	.05	.43	.18
N	22	11	11	11	11	11	11	11

[a]Prior to the December, 1973, Gallup Poll "non-labor force" was not employed as an occupational category. Prior to that time "farmers" had periodically appeared as a category. Since, as far as we could determine, no other categories have been altered, we have assumed for purposes of this analysis that since 1973 the Gallup organization has been classifying farmers under the non-labor force category.

*Significant at .05.

TABLE V

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AMONG EDUCATIONAL GROUPS BY CONGRESSIONAL SUCCESS CONTROLLING FOR ELECTIONS

	Popularity						
		Election Years[a]			Non-Election Years		
Congressional Success	Overall (1)	College (2)	High School (3)	Grade School (4)	College (5)	High School (6)	Grade School (7)
Overall	.28	-.07	.17	.37	.10	.46	.69
Domestic Policy	.19	-.31	-.07	.13	.18	.49	.71
Foreign Policy	.43*	.07	.28	.41	-.27	.10	.39
N	22	6	6	6	5	5	5

[a]Congressional and Presidential election years.

*Significant at .05.

TABLE VI

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AMONG OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS BY CONGRESSIONAL SUCCESS CONTROLLING FOR ELECTIONS

	Popularity								
		Election Years[a]				Non-Election Years			
Congressional Success	Overall (1)	Professional & Business (2)	White Collar (3)	Manual (4)	Non-Labor Force (5)	Professional & Business (6)	White Collar (7)	Manual (8)	Non-Labor Force (9)
Overall	.28	-.06	.11	.36	-.24	.14	.27	.83*	-.08
Domestic Policy	.19	-.30	-.14	.13	-.48	.17	.31	.95*	-.11
Foreign Policy	.43*	.09	.25	.38	-.03	-.20	-.14	.60	-.37
N	22	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5

[a]Congressional and Presidential election years.

*Significant at .05.

TABLE VII

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AMONG EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS BY CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT

	Popularity							
		Education			Occupation			
Congressional Support	Overall (1)	College (2)	High School (3)	Grade School (4)	Professional & Business (5)	White Collar (6)	Manual (7)	Non-Labor Force (8)
Overall	.48*	.22	.44	.61*	.21	.31	.65*	.09
Domestic Policy	.53*	.11	.34	.51*	.08	.22	.62*	-.05
Foreign Policy	.55*	.16	.37	.52*	.12	.26	.61*	.00
N	.23	.12	12	12	12	12	12	12

*Significant at .05.

TABLE VIII

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AMONG EDUCATIONAL GROUPS BY CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT CONTROLLING FOR ELECTIONS

	Popularity						
		Election Years[a]			Non-Election Years		
Congressional Support	Overall (1)	College (2)	High School (3)	High School (3)	College (4)	High School (5)	High School (6)
Overall	.48*	-.01	.20	.32	.46	.69	.83*
Domestic Policy	.53*	-.05	.14	.26	.37	.62	.74*
Foreign Policy	.55*	-.03	.16	.27	.44	.66	.75*
N	23	6	6	6	6	6	6

[a]Congressional and Presidential Election Years.

*Significant at .05.

TABLE IX

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AMONG OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS BY CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT CONTROLLING FOR ELECTIONS

	Popularity								
		Election Years[a]				Non-Election Years			
Congressional Support	Overall (1)	Professional & Business (2)	White Collar (3)	Manual (4)	Non-Labor Force (5)	Professional & Business (6)	White Collar (7)	Manual (8)	Non-Labor Force (9)
Overall	.48*	.00	.16	.33	-.12	.45	.51	.88*	.29
Domestic Policy	.53*	-.05	.06	.28	-.20	.29	.48	.97*	.15
Foreign Policy	.55*	-.03	.08	.30	-.17	.36	.55	.95*	.22
N	23	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6

[a]Congressional and Presidential Election Years.

*Significant at .05.

terms of the following analyses, then, we expected to find significant relationships for the college educated and professional and business groups.

The expectation that a President's popularity varies more directly with Congressional success for "attentive" than "non-attentive" groups is tested in Table IV, page 69. As the correlations in columns 2 and 5 indicate this proposition was not supported for either college educated or professional and business groups. In fact, we were not able to reject a single null hypothesis. Obviously, then, the fifth hypothesis was not supported.

But what of Rosenau's assertion that the attentive public is of primary importance between elections? We controlled for election years to determine whether there was greater congruence for the "attentive" public in non-election years. Non-significant correlations in column 5 of Table V, page 70 (education) and column 6 of Table VI (occupation) indicate that the data do not support Rosenau's argument. Even when election years were controlled, the fifth hypothesis was not supported.

The expectation that a President's popularity varies more directly with Congressional support for "attentive" than "non-attentive" groups is tested in columns 2 and 5 of Table VII. We again observed no significant relationships for college educated and professional and business groups. In fact, we found significant relationships among

"non-attentive" groups, the grade school educated (column 4) and manual workers (column 7). In sum, the sixth hypothesis was not supported. Empirically, the evidence suggested a prediction in the opposite direction, congruence among "non-attentive" groups.

Election years were again controlled in order to test Rosenau's argument. The results were similar to those obtained for Congressional success. Non-significant correlations in column 5 of Table VIII (education) and column 6 of Table IX (occupation) suggest that the data again fail to support Rosenau's assertion. Instead, we observed significant relationships among "non-attentive" groups, the grade school educated (column 7 of Table VIII) and manual workers (column 8 of Table IX). In sum, even when election years were controlled the sixth hypothesis was not supported and the evidence again suggested congruence among non-attentive groups. A closer inspection of Tables VIII and IX reveals several patterns potentially supportive of Rosenau's argument. When the correlations for the college educated are compared for election (column 2 of Table VIII) and non-election years (column 5) the latter relationships appear to be substantially stronger although still non-significant. A similar pattern was observed for professional and business groups (columns 2 and 6 of Table IX). But, in general, all correlations increased in magnitude from election to non-election years.

These negative results may be explained in terms of two general limitations: (1) the measures of attentiveness employed and (2) the Almond-Devine conception of public. We must first question whether attentiveness has been measured. The assumption that only the college educated and professional and business groups are attentive does not seem to be supported by the evidence. Even if these measures can be employed as crude indicators of attentiveness, it does not follow that the college educated and professional and business groups are more supportive. In fact, what evidence we have suggests that these groups are generally less supportive.[13] By most estimates the attentive public in the United States consists of no more than 10 to 15 percent of the adult population.[14] The Gallup sample (see Appendix C) has generally included about 30 percent college educated and 20 percent professional and business groups. This discrepancy along with our negative findings suggests that our measures of attentiveness may have produced the negative results.

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[13]Samuel Kernell, Peter W. Sperlich, and Aaron Wildavsky, "Public Support for Presidents," in Perspectives on the Presidency, ed. Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 148-181.

[14]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950); Devine, The Attentive Public; and Rosenau, Citizenship Between Elections.

A second potential source of error follows from the Almond-Devine conception of public.[15] Theirs was essentially a static one, an attentive public which exists across issue-areas, an assumption which has been questioned by several theoreticians.[16] These scholars have advocated the use of a dynamic conception of public, i.e., each issue creates its own public. The first (static) suggests that attentiveness is a general orientation; the second (dynamic) implies that it is a specific one. Our analysis suggests that either the attentive public is static but not confined to the higher educational and occupational groups defined by this study or the attentive public varies across issue-areas and, consequently, is not measurable at the present level of analysis.

V. PARTISANSHIP AS LINKAGE: A REPLICATION

The partisanship as linkage model or frame of reference assumes that the principal communication link between citizen

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[15]Although we previously defined "public" from a dynamic perspective, our analytical procedures assumed a static conception.

[16]John Dewey, The Public and its Problems (Chicago: Gateway Books, 1946); Herbert Blumer, "The Mass, the Public and Public Opinion," in Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, eds. Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 43-50; and W. Philips Davison, "Public Opinion Research as Communication," Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (Fall 1972): 331-332.

and official is through the political party. We would therefore expect to observe linkage relationships or congruence between partisans in the public and Congress. Data is presented in Table X which replicates previous research supportive of this proposition. As indicated by columns 1 and 3, we observed direct (positive correlations) intra-partisan relationships and inverse (negative correlations) inter-partisan relationships. In addition, we found no significant relationships for the non-aligned groups in the population, i.e., Independents (column 2). Results for the House (columns 4 through 6) and Senate (columns 7 through 9) were identical. These findings seem to imply that linkage or congruence flows through partisan channels, at least for Presidential popularity and Congressional support.[17]

VI. CONCLUSIONS

We conclude this study by summarizing the results presented and analyzed in the previous sections. In addition, several limitations and qualifications to these findings will be noted. And finally, the paradox of the partisanship as linkage perspective and recent research on the declining role of partisanship will also be mentioned.[18]

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[17]These findings were, for all practical purposes, a mirror-image of Edwards' results.

[18]Gerald M. Pomper, Voter's Choice (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1975); Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge:

TABLE X

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AMONG PARTISAN GROUPS BY CONGRESSIONAL PARTY SUPPORT CONTROLLING FOR CHAMBER

	Partisanship								
	Overall			House			Senate		
Congressional Support by Party	Democrats (1)	Independents (2)	Republicans (3)	Democrats (4)	Independents (5)	Republicans (6)	Democrats (7)	Independents (8)	Republicans (9)
Democratic	.81*	-.04	.69*	.78*	-.09	-.70*	.79*	.04	-.64*
Republican	-.82*	.09	.77*	-.86*	-.04	.70*	-.68*	.26	.79*
N	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12

*Significant at .05.

Summary of Findings

We observed that, by and large, the more popular a President the greater likelihood that Congress would act favorably upon his legislation. Several qualifications should be added to this general finding, however. In the first place, the relationship between popularity and legislative performance seemed stronger when a compromise measure of Congressional-Executive relations, the Congressional Quarterly's "Support-Opposition score," was employed. In the case of Congressional success, we observed that the popularity of the President was more strongly related to Congressional action for domestic and foreign policies were similar if not identical. Thus, our distinctions between domestic and foreign policy processes may not be empirically valid.

We failed to confirm either of our "attentive" public propositions; the popularity of the President among the college education and professional and business groups was not related to Congressional action. In fact, when Congressional performance was measured in terms of compromise, we observed significant relationships between the popularity

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Harvard University Press, 1976); Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Lebitin, Leadership and Change (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop, 1976); and Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds,, Controversies in American Voting Behavior (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976).

of the President among "non-attentive" groups, the grade school educated and manual workers, and Congressional action. Similar findings were obtained for election and non-election years.

Qualifications and Limitations

If Presidential popularity is to be conceived as a multidimensional construct, then studies (including our own) which limit inquiry to a single component must be suspect. A related problem arises from the conceptualization of popularity as general support and not specific support for either domestic or foreign policies. If support is limited to either foreign or domestic policy, failure to distinguish between the two may conceal or at least dilute the strength of potential linkage relationships. In addition to these conceptual limitations, analytical problems should be noted. The reader who examined our analysis from the perspective of a causal modeler would note the absence of references to "independent" and "dependent" variables. From that perspective one might legitimately ask: what is the direction of causality in the relationships between Presidential popularity and Congressional success and support? The unit-of-analysis employed in this study does not provide an answer to this question. From an "inter-actional" perspective, this is not a problem as causality is assumed to work in both directions. From the standpoint of

generalization, the analysis was based upon a limited number of cases. We introduced tests of significance to compensate for this problem but, admittedly, this procedure was not completely satisfactory.

The most serious limitation upon our research may be in the descriptive nature of our data base. The data collected by Gallup is primarily descriptive in the sense that it is employed to chart the distribution of positive affect across time. To Gallup the distribution is to be reported as a "fact" and not to be explained or employed to explain something else. The same is true of those measures compiled by the Congressional Quarterly. In sum, the descriptive nature of our data base may severely limit its utility as an explanatory tool.

Partisanship as Linkage: A Paradox

Our finding with respect to the "partisan nature of linkage" seems to correspond with Brown's argument. He suggested that:

> . . . a President whose popular following is a frankly partisan majority is likely to be effective in realizing his program, almost regardless of the merits of the program. If the popular majority identifies itself not only with a President but with his plans and proposals, it is less likely to disintegrate under the pressures and tensions of controversial decision-making. The President can more or less count upon it. Indeed, if he does not make use of it, he is likely to lose it. On the other hand, even very great unpartisan popularity is nearly useless when a President is faced by seriously divisive issues. If tested it seems

> likely by its nature to disintegrate; to be maintained it must be tested.[19]

This analysis obviously is contrary to popular conceptions of the President as "non-partisan" leader of the nation, but if linkage generally occurs through partisan channels, Brown's comments would seem to provide an accurate description of these relationships. But recent research indicates both that the number of partisans in the public is declining and that the explanatory power of the partisanship concept is also declining.[20] The logical consequence of these trends is a decline in the strength of partisan linkage relationships. Normative democratic theory assumes a link between public opinion and public policy. The question then arises: will new modes of linkage emerge to take the place of partisanship?

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[19]Brown, The American Presidency, p. 181.

[20]See the citations in footnote 18.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

POLICY SYMBOLS

BOX = Presidential Boxscore

BOXDOM = Presidential Boxscore-Domestic Policy

BOXFOR = Presidential Boxscore-Foreign Policy

SUP = Presidential Support Score

SUPH = Presidential Support Score-House

SUPS = Presidential Support Score-Senate

SUPHDEM = Presidential Support Score-House Democrats

SUPHREP = Presidential Support Score-House Republicans

SUPSDEM = Presidential Support Score-Senate Democrats

SUPSREP = Presidential Support Score-Senate Republicans

SUPHDEMD = Presidential Support Score-House Democrats-Domestic Policy

SUPHREPD = Presidential Support Score-House Republicans-Domestic Policy

SUPSDEMD = Presidential Support Score-Senate Democrats-Domestic Policy

SUPSREPD = Presidential Support Score-Senate Republicans-Domestic Policy

SUPHDEMF = Presidential Support Score-House Democrats-Foreign Policy

SUPHREPF = Presidential Support Score-House Republicans-Foreign Policy

SUPSDEMF = Presidential Support Score-Senate Democrats-Foreign Policy

SUPSREPF = Presidential Support Score-Senate Republicans-Foreign Policy

APPENDIX B

MEASURES OF CONGRESSIONAL SUCCESS AND SUPPORT

Presidential Boxscore[a]

The items tabulated in the Boxscore include only the specific legislative requests contained in the President's messages to Congress and other public statements during a calendar year.

Excluded from the Boxscore are proposals advocated by executive branch officials but not specifically by the President; measures endorsed by the President but not specifically requested by him; nominations, and suggestions that Congress consider or study particular topics when legislative action is not requested.

Except for major proposals, requests for District of Columbia legislation also are excluded from the Boxscore tabulation.

Routine appropriation requests, which provide funds for regular, continuing government operations, are excluded. Appropriation requests for specific programs, or requests for substantial budget increases, are included if the President indicated in special messages or other communications that they were important in his over-all legislative program.

Because the Boxscore fundamentally is a tabular checklist of the President's program, presented in neither greater nor less detail than is found in messages, the individual requests necessarily differ considerably from one another in their scope and importance.

Because Congress does not always vote "yes" or "no" on a proposal, the Congressional Quarterly evaluates legislative action to determine whether compromises amount to approval or rejection of the President's requests.

Legislative activity on an item must occur in the same year as the request in order to be credited in the Boxscore.

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[a] Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports (February 16, 1974), p. 331.

Presidential Support-Opposition Score[b]

Presidential issues. The Congressional Quarterly analyzes all messages, press conference remarks and other public statements of the President to determine what he personally, as distinct from other administration spokesmen, does or does not want in the way of legislative action.

Borderline cases. By the time an issue reaches a vote, it may differ from the original form on which the President expressed himself. In such cases, the Congressional Quarterly analyzes the measure to determine whether, on balance, the features favored by the President outweigh those he opposed or vice versa. Only then is the vote classified.

Some votes excluded. Occasionally, important measures are so extensively amended on the floor that it is impossible to characterize final passage as a victory or defeat for the President.

Motions. Votes on motions to recomit, to reconsider or to table often are key tests that govern the legislative outcome. Such votes are necessarily included in the support tabulation.

Rules. In the House, debate on most significant bills is governed by rules that restrict time and may bar floor amendments. These rules must be adopted by the House before the bills in question may be considered. Members may vote for the rule, in order to permit debate, although they intended to vote against the bill, and vice versa, since rejection of the rule prevents consideration of the bill. The Congressional Quarterly assumes that if the President favored the bill, he favored the rule unless it was a closed rule that would prevent amendments he wanted.

Appropriations. Generally, votes on passage of appropriation bills are not included in the tabulation, since it is rarely possible to determine the President's position on the over-all revisions Congress almost invariably

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[b]Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports (September 1, 1973), p. 4.

makes in the sums allowed. Votes to cut or increase specific funds requested in the President's budget, however, are included.

Failures to vote. In tabulating the Support or Opposition scores of members on the selected issue votes, the Congressional Quarterly counts "yea" and "nay" votes on the ground that only these affect the outcome. Most failures to vote reflect absences because of illness or official business.

Weighting. All issue votes have equal statistical weight in analysis.

Changed position. Congressional Support is determined by the position of the President at the time of a vote even though that position may be different from an earlier position, or may have been reversed after the vote was taken.

APPENDIX C

GALLUP POLL SAMPLE SIZE AND RECORD OF ACCURACY

TABLE XI

ESTIMATED SAMPLE SIZE BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS[a]

Demographic Groups	Estimated N
Sex:	
Male	750
Female	750
Race:	
White	1,335
Non-White	165
Education:	
College	450
High School	815
Grade School	230
Region:	
East	420
Midwest	420
South	405
West	225
Age:	
18-24 years	275
25-29 years	170
30-49 years	500
50 years & older	555
Household Income:	
$20,000 & over	265
$15,000-$19,999	230
$10,000-$14,999	380
$ 7,000-$ 9,999	200
$ 5,000-$ 6,999	165
$ 3,000-$ 4,999	160
Under $3,000	100

TABLE XI (continued)

Demographic Groups	Estimated N
Religion:	
Protestant	335
Roman Catholic	415
Jewish	35
All Other	160
Politics:	
Republican	335
Democrat	670
Independent	455
Other	40
Occupation:	
Professional & Business	310
Clerical & Sales	165
Manual Workers	630
Farmers	55
Non-Labor Force	300
City Size:	
1,000,000 & over	265
500,000-999,999	210
50,000-4999,999	385
2,500-499,999	385
Under 2,500, Rural	390

[a]Gallup International, "Campaign '76," The Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 125 (Princeton, New Jersey: The American Institute of Public Opinion, November-December, 1975).

TABLE XII

RECORD OF GALLUP POLL ACCURACY[a]

Year	Gallup Final Survey[b] (Percent)		Election Result[b] (Percent)	
1974	60.0	Democratic	58.9	Democratic
1972	62.0	Nixon	61.8	Nixon
1970	53.0	Democratic	54.3	Democratic
1968	43.0	Nixon	43.5	Nixon
1966	52.5	Democratic	51.9	Democratic
1964	64.0	Johnson	61.3	Johnson
1962	55.5	Democratic	52.7	Democratic
1960	51.0	Kennedy	50.1	Kennedy
1958	57.0	Democratic	56.5	Democratic
1956	59.5	Eisenhower	57.8	Eisenhower
1954	51.5	Democratic	52.7	Democratic

[a]Gallup International, "Campaign '76," The Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 125 (Princeton, New Jersey: The American Institute of Public Opinion, November-December, 1975).

[b]The figure shown is the winner's percentage of the Democratic-Republican vote except in the election of 1968. In 1968 Wallace's candidacy was supported by such a large minority that he was clearly a major candidate, and the 1968 percents are based on the total Nixon-Humphrey-Wallace vote.

APPENDIX D

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY

TABLE XIII

OPINION TYPOLOGY DATA[a]

Cases		Popularity			Standard Deviation		
Year	N[b]	$\bar{X}$	Rank	Quartile	S. D.	Rank	Quartile
1954	16	65	7.5	II	4.50	9.0	II
1955	12	71	5.0	I	3.15	16.5	III
1956	10	73	3.0	I	3.78	13.0	III
1957	10	65	7.5	II	5.62	4.0	I
1958	16	55	15.0	III	3.14	18.0	III
1959	14	63	10.0	II	4.74	7.0	II
1960	17	61	11.5	II	4.10	11.0	II
1961	14	76	1.0	I	3.09	19.0	IV
1962	13	72	4.0	I	5.94	3.0	I
1963	13	64	9.0	II	4.88	6.0	I
1964	14	75	2.0	I	2.99	20.0	IV
1965	18	66	6.0	I	5.60	21.0	IV
1966	17	51	17.0	III	3.79	5.0	I
1967	17	44	19.0	IV	3.30	12.0	II
1968	14	42	21.5	IV	3.15	15.0	III
1969	18	61	11.5	II	3.51	16.5	III

TABLE XIII (Continued)

Cases		Popularity			Standard Deviation		
Year	N[b]	$\bar{X}$	Rank	Quartile	S. D.	Rank	Quartile
1970	18	57	13.0	III	3.51	14.0	III
1971	14	50	18.0	III	1.95	22.0	IV
1972	9	56	14.0	III	4.27	10.0	II
1973	20	42	21.5	IV	11.95	1.0	I
1974[c]	14	26	23.0	IV	1.22	23.0	IV
1974[d]	8	54	16.0	III	9.24	2.0	I
1975	17	43	20.0	IV	4.64	8.0	II

[a]Gallup International, "Campaign '76," The Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 125 (Princeton, New Jersey: The American Institute of Public Opinion, November-December, 1975).

[b]Number of surveys within each year.

[c]Nixon's term in 1974.

[d]Ford's term in 1974.

VITA

The author of this thesis was born in Brookings, South Dakota on July 25, 1951 while his father, James Burton, and mother, Carol Mae, attended South Dakota State University. From there the family moved to Ames, Iowa and Iowa State University where a second son, Scott Kevin, was born. Upon receiving an advanced degree in statistics Jim Wattier moved his family to Fort Worth, Texas and an extended career with General Dynamics. The Lone Star state witnessed the final addition to the family, Cindy Lou.

Jim and Carol have since moved to Encinitas, California where the statistician of the family has continued his work with nuclear energy for General Atomics, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation. Scott has recently married the former Bonnie Stevens and will graduate from the University of Texas at Arlington in the fall with a Bachelor's degree in accounting. Cindy will graduate from Texas Wesleyan College of Fort Worth in the spring with a double major in business and psychology.

Mark James Wattier graduated from Arlington Heights High School in Forth Worth in 1969. While there he earned a number of athletic awards and played enough basketball to receive a scholarship to Memphis State University in Memphis, Tennessee. After a year, he transferred to Baylor University in Waco, Texas. While at Baylor Mark played three

years of varsity basketball. He graduated cum laude in 1974 with a Bachelor's degree in political science. In the fall of 1974 he returned to Tennessee to continue his study of political science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.