

**THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE
ON THE ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF POLITICAL OUTGROUP MORAL DEROGATION**

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Phillip P. McGarry
May 2024

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Timothy Hulsey, Dr. Peter Hampson, and Dr. Robert Corwyn for their guidance and encouragement throughout my academic career. I would also like to thank Charles Darwin for contributing the single most important idea to my thinking about psychology and human nature. I would also like to thank that Athenian hero from the battles of Delion and Potidaea, and his students Aristocles and Xenophon, for setting an example to me of independent thought, courage, and true virtue, without which I would have remained clouded by dogma. Lastly, I would like to thank my research assistants Daniel Daws, Joshua Cortez, Gabby Guy, Alex Stephens, Emory Wallace, Vivian Hastings, Hailey Christiansen, Lexi Justus, Annaliese Custer, Callie Genovese, Asal Alkhuwaiter, Naomi Murgolo, Deana Bushnag, Jayden Tillery, Nathan Day, Evelin Felipe-Diaz, Colin Ross, Aaron Wilkerson, Mathew Gibbs, Kaylee Woods, Meg Haynes, Kat Moody, Jackson Parham, Eric Jones, Ali Bhimani, Hana El-Messidi, and Sarah Grace Parker.

PREFACE

*“But this war was a fearful lesson, and should
teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the
future.”*

~ Ulysses S. Grant (1886, p. 774),

Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant

ABSTRACT

Political polarization in the United States has continually increased at least across the past 40 years. Political partisans now regard out-party members as immoral. I employed three experiments (Experiment 1: $n = 1070$; Experiment 2: $n = 402$; Experiment 3: $n = 392$) to explore the antecedents and consequences of moral derogation in an inter-party context using the Ultimatum Game (UG) paradigm. Psychological distance was manipulated in Experiment 3, by randomly assigning participants to play the UG either in the same room or an adjacent room as a confederate. Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were conducted online and served as ancillary comparisons, albeit with important caveats. Political extremity led to out-party moral derogation in conditions of psychological distance, rather than psychological proximity, across all experiments. A trend towards individual moral actions (fair, unfair, or kind actions) moderating the effect of out-party status on moral derogation appeared in a condition of psychological proximity in Experiment 3, but not in a condition of psychological distance in Experiment 3, nor in Experiment 1 or Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, evidence suggested that moral derogation elicits harm in a condition of psychological proximity, not psychological distance. However, evidence from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 conflicted with this finding, as moral derogation elicited harm in both experiments. Limitations and future directions are discussed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Political Polarization.....	1
Psychological Distance	4
Social Categorization, Moral Judgment, and Psychological Distance	6
Psychological Distance and Harm	9
Psychological Proximity and Harm	11
Current Programme of Research.....	13
CHAPTER 2 METHOD	17
Experiment 1	17
Participants.....	17
Procedure	18
Measures	19
Experiment 2	20
Participants.....	20
Procedure	21
Measures	21
Experiment 3	22
Participants.....	22
Procedure	23
Measures	24
CHAPTER 3 RESULTS	26
Experiment 1	26
Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Political Extremity on Moral Derogation.....	26
Psychological Distance and Moral Derogation on Rejection	27
Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Offer Fairness on Moral Derogation	27
Experiment 2	28
Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Political Extremity on Moral Derogation.....	28
Psychological Distance and Moral Derogation on Rejection	28
Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Offer Fairness on Moral Derogation	29
Experiment 3	29
Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Political Extremity on Moral Derogation.....	29
Psychological Distance and Moral Derogation on Rejection	31
Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Offer Fairness on Moral Derogation	33
CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION.....	36
REFERENCES	38
VITA.....	56

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	32
Figure 2	35

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Political Polarization

Political polarization in the United States has continued to rise across the past four decades (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016; Boxell et al., 2020; Finkel et al., 2020; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2016). Political partisans in the United States increasingly view one another as socially distant, dangerous, and immoral (Finkel et al., 2020; Huber & Malhorta, 2017; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2016). Though political polarization in the United States was likely at its peak during the American Civil War, psychology as a science had yet to be established.

Just as political affiliates were divided by geography during the American Civil War (i.e., North and South), political partisans today are increasingly residing in geographical areas occupied by in-party members and moving away from residential areas occupied by out-party members (i.e., *political self-sorting*; Lang & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2015). Political partisans also increasingly refuse to date, marry, or maintain online correspondence with out-party members (i.e., *social distance*; Huber & Malhorta, 2017). Physical distance and social distance have been shown to be correlated (Abrams, 1943; Bossard, 1932; Latané et al., 1995; Kennedy, 1943; Nguyen et al., 2013; Shin et al., 2013) and are both similarly mentally represented as *psychological distance*, as demonstrated by multiple studies using implicit association tasks (in addition to temporal distance and greater hypotheticality and abstraction; Bar-Anan, Lieberman, & Trope, 2006). Social categorization of others into ingroups and outgroups also elicits

psychological distance between the self and outgroup members (Bar-Anan, Lieberman, & Trope, 2006). As political polarization today entails more ideologically consistent parties (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2014) and partisans are becoming more politically extreme (Brandt et al., 2014; Harris & Van Bavel, 2021; Toner et al., 2013), so too does the psychological distance increase between the in-party and out-party (or political ingroups and outgroups).

Consistent with the evidence that partisans increasingly construe out-party members as *immoral* (Clifford, 2018; Finkel et al., 2020; Garrett & Bankert, 2018; Tappin & McKay, 2019), research has shown that the moral qualities (rather than qualities such as competence or sociability) of ingroups and outgroups are the most fundamental dimension by which groups are judged (Brambilla et al., 2012; Brambilla et al., 2013a, Brambilla et al., 2013b; Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Leach et al., 2007). However, partisans morally judge individual out-party members based on a prior moral judgment of the social category (the out-party), rather than the individual moral actions of out-party members (McGarry et al., 2023). For example, political partisans morally derogate out-party members compared to in-party members despite being treated fairly or generously by them, especially when partisans are more politically extreme (McGarry et al., 2023). Increasing political extremity may exacerbate political polarization through greater psychological distance between the in-party and out-party, as greater psychological distance involves abstraction of out-party members as representatives of their social category, rather than as individuals.

Social categorization is domain-general because it can be based on random, arbitrary, or realistic characteristics, such as a coin flip, preference for abstract art, or

religious affiliation. Moral categorization, however, is based on domain-specific characteristics, namely whether someone is *moral* or *immoral*. Whether ingroup or outgroup members, those psychologically constituted as *moral* are deemed worthy of help and affection while those psychologically constituted as *immoral* are deemed worthy of hostility and aggression. Thus moral categorization is expressed by harsher moral judgments of out-party members based on their political affiliation (their social category) alone without regard for their individual actions.

Understanding the role of psychological distance on moral derogation of out-party members (and the consequences of that moral derogation) may be key to forecasting and ameliorating ongoing political polarization, political conflict, and perhaps political violence. For example, psychological distance reduces moral obligation and willingness to help someone in need (Musen, 2011), while psychological distance increases willingness to harm (punishment: Milgram, 1974; killing: Grossman, 1995; Tenenbaum, 1955). On the other hand, a moral categorization mechanism evolved to address adaptive needs to maintain social cohesion and out-compete rival groups in pre-history suggest that moral derogation elicits harm as a result of psychologically proximity, rather than distance, to those categorized as *immoral*.

In this dissertation, I hypothesize that psychological distance will play a unique role on the antecedents and consequences of moral derogation in a political intergroup context. As an antecedent of moral derogation, I hypothesize that greater psychological distance will increase out-party moral derogation for those more politically extreme. As a consequence of moral derogation, I offer alternative hypotheses: (a) that greater psychological distance will elicit greater harm as a consequence of moral derogation (due

to diminishing moral obligation and empathic concern) or (b) that greater psychological proximity will elicit greater harm as a consequence of moral derogation (due to an evolved moral categorization mechanism designed to maintain social cohesion and out-compete rival groups).

Psychological Distance

Americans increasingly self-sort politically by relocating to residential areas with those with whom they are politically aligned, and increasingly communicate online, maintain friendships, and form romantic relationships with the politically like-minded (Huber & Malhorta, 2017; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Lang & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2014). Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) were among the first psychologists to show that physical distance (or spatial distance) and functional distance (distance between doorways) was related to feelings of social closeness or friendship formation by studying social relationships within an apartment complex. Originally referred to as *propinquity*, sociologists found a similar relationship between spatial distance and social distance (e.g. an inverse relationship between geographical distance and marriage selection; Abrams, 1943; Bossard, 1932; Kennedy, 1943). Latané and colleagues (1995) investigated this finding approximately 50 years later, wondering if rapid development of mobility and tele-communications or culture (US versus China) might account for this effect. On the contrary, Latané and colleagues (1995) showed that the number of social interactions reported as important to the participants decreased with greater physical distance of the

interlocutor.¹ Likewise, Nguyen and colleagues (2013) used geo-located tags and friendship in social media data ($n = \sim 400,000$) to reveal a strong relationship between friendship and spatial proximity. Experimental evidence too suggests that it is the case that physical or spatial proximity elicits greater interpersonal liking and social closeness (Shin et al., 2019). Across three experiments (in person, photo appearance, and video appearance), Shin and colleagues (2019) showed that physical proximity, versus even slight physical distance, resulted in more interpersonal liking. In addition, they included a study that had participants draw circles of themselves and three friends on a blank sheet of paper, the proximity between which later correlated with reported social closeness (Shin et al., 2019). Thus, the self-sorting of Americans into geographic regions in order to be closer to ingroup political partisans (Lang & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2015) reflects the increasing perceived psychological distance between in-party and out-party members. This increase in physical distance between partisans also reflects an increase in social distance between partisans, in an unwillingness to date or marry, or even maintain social media contact with, out-party members (Bogardus, 1947; Huber & Malhorta, 2017; Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012).

The term *psychological distance* first appeared in Lewin (1935, p. 86), where he argued that psychological distance is a mental representation of the time, effort, and obstacles separating an agent from a desired goal. Psychological distance since has been defined more broadly (Hansen & Genshow, 2020; Liberman et al., 2002; Liberman & Trope, 2014; McDonald et al., 2015; Shin et al., 2019; Soderberg et al., 2015; Trope et

¹ Latané and colleagues specifically emphasize that this cannot be due to the mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968), by explaining that chance contact is unlikely in the 10 to 1000 mile range.

al., 2007). Time, space, hypotheticality, and social distance are all associated, representing different manifestations of psychological distance (Liberman & Trope, 2014). Indeed, across eight experiments using implicit association tasks, Bar-Anan and colleagues (2007) showed that spatial distance, temporal distance, hypotheticality, and social distance are all psychologically related and can be characterized singularly as psychological distance. For example, participants are more likely to conceptualize objects in terms of broad categories (i.e. camping gear) rather than more individualized categories (i.e. tents and sleeping bags, etc.) when planning for events in the distant (versus the near) future (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). Likewise, Liberman and colleagues (2007) too characterize ingroup versus outgroup in terms of psychological distance, consistent with the tendency to conceptualize outgroup members in terms of the attributes of their social category, rather than more individualizing attributes (Fiske et al., 1987; Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982).

Social Categorization, Moral Judgment, and Psychological Distance

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), made an important contribution to psychology by suggesting and demonstrating that interaction with outgroup members is often psychologically constituted as an intergroup rather than an interpersonal phenomenon. Social categorization can elicit outgroup hostility and ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). From this perspective, mere social categorization of self and others in terms of political affiliation or political identity is central to political polarization. Indeed, mere social categorization elicits psychological distance between the ingroup and the outgroup (Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006). However, mere social categorization has been insufficient to explain instances of hostility towards

ingroup members (*black sheep effect*, Marques & Paez, 198) as well as instances of help extended to outgroup members (Smith et al., 2014). Mere social categorization is also insufficient to induce outgroup hostility (Allport, 1954, p. 42; Brewer, 1979; Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002; Mummendey et al., 1992; Turner & Tajfel, 1979) and does not elicit ingroup favoritism when participants are interdependent with an outgroup member for a monetary outcome (Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Rabbie et al., 1989). Likewise, helping outgroup members is elicited by positive *moral* evaluations and hostility toward ingroup members is elicited by negative *moral* evaluations (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Marquez & Paez, 1994; Smith et al., 2014). That political polarization now entails construing out-party members as *immoral* (Finkel et al., 2020) indicates that moral judgment plays a major psychological role in out-party hostility.

While earlier research showed that sociability (warmth) and competence were universal characteristics of ingroup and outgroup evaluation (Cuddy et al., 2008), more recent research has shown that moral evaluation supersedes evaluation of sociability and competence of groups (Brambilla et al., 2012; Brambilla et al., 2013a, Brambilla et al., 2013b; Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Leach et al., 2007). Brewer (1999) anticipated such findings, by hypothesizing that an essential feature of outgroup hostility is a sense of *moral superiority* of the ingroup over the outgroup.

Psychological distance reduces the likelihood of construing outgroup members as individuals, rather than as representatives of the outgroup. Therefore, moral derogation directed at a psychologically distant outgroup should attenuate the actions of individual outgroup members when morally judging them. Political discourse increasingly occurs online, primarily through social media, and political information about out-parties is

mediated through often biased sources. Thus physical and psychological distance from out-party members may increase the likelihood of morally judging the out-party as a social category, based on abstracted information about the out-party as a whole, rather than the individual actions of out-party members. Construal of ingroups and outgroups occurs in the abstract when information about them is mediated rather than direct, including information by which to morally categorize (i.e. categorize them as *moral* or *immoral*). Psychological distance increases the abstraction of ingroups and outgroups, making it more difficult to separate individual members of the group from their social category. This is especially relevant when social categories become indicators of moral categories.

Political polarization also involves both the political left and the political right becoming more extreme ideologically. Political extremity promotes dogmatism (Harris & Van Bavel, 2021), certainty surrounding the superiority of in-party beliefs (Harris & Van Bavel, 2021), and intolerance of outgroups (Brandt et al., 2014). Political extremity now also entails ideological consistency within political parties (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2014). While in earlier decades, Democrats endorsed some conservative policies, and Republicans endorsed some liberal policies, Democrats and Republicans increasingly no longer share views that cross ideological boundaries (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Pew Research Center, 2014). Political extremity then increases psychological distance between the in-party and the out-party (i.e., *polarization*), and thus between the self and the out-party, through reduction in ideological overlap and through increased hostility toward the out-party.

Hatemi and colleagues (2019) also found that political ideology informs moral evaluation, suggesting political extremity elicits more extreme moral judgments. Therefore, both psychological distance in the form of physical distance (e.g., *political self-sorting*) and psychological distance in terms of the ideological distance between the in-party and the out-party may contribute to out-party moral derogation in a reciprocal manner (i.e, a positive feedback loop) because psychological distance reduces the impact of individual actions in moral judgment while increasing the impact of out-party membership (McGarry et al. 2023). Political extremity should lead to greater out-party moral derogation in conditions of psychological distance, rather than psychological proximity (Hypothesis 2).

Psychological Distance and Harm

Thus far, there has been an elucidation of the role of psychological distance on the antecedents of moral derogation, specifically that psychological distance should enhance out-party moral derogation for those more politically extreme. But what are the consequences of moral derogation and what role does psychological distance play on these consequences? For example, does psychological distance play a role on when moral derogation elicits harm? Inspired by the moral philosopher Peter Singer (1972), an experiment by Musen (2011) asked participants to report their moral obligation and willingness to help a foreign victim (of either a rockslide or a hit-and-run) randomly assigned to a condition where they either imagined they were staying in a timeshare in that foreign country or imagined they were residing at home (in the United States). Participants imagining they were closer in proximity to the victim felt more morally obligated to help (see also Greene, 2013, p. 260). Musen (2011) argues that this is due to

the evolution of moral cognition in humans, particularly moral cognition which elicits altruistic behavior, based on kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), and indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1979). Kin selection promoted altruism towards close relatives in order to increase the likelihood of passing on identical genes (Hamilton, 1964). Reciprocal altruism promoted cooperation by naturally selecting individuals who expected that altruistic behavior would be reciprocated between non-relative dyads (given benefit to recipient outweighed cost to altruist; Trivers, 1971). Lastly, indirect reciprocity promoted group cooperation by natural selection for individuals who would act altruistically to gain reputation (Alexander, 1979), thereby increasing access to resources and reproduction. These three adaptations evolved psychologically under circumstances involving face-to-face contact and close proximity to others, and are therefore difficult to extend to physically and psychologically distant others (Musen, 2011).

In the classic Milgram (1964) obedience experiments, physical distance between the teacher and the learner, across different variants of the experiment (Milgram, 1974, p. 34), had a dramatic effect on how much violence (in the form of increasing voltage of electrical shocks) the teacher was willing to inflict on the learner for incorrect answers (i.e. physical distance increased willingness to harm). Milgram (1964) stated that his interest in these experiments were driven by a desire to understand the systematic murder of civilians and noncombatants by the Nazi *Schutzstaffel* during World War II. Physical and psychological proximity makes it more difficult to inflict violence, as evidenced by the changing nature of the aforementioned killing methods as a result of declining morale of the those tasked with the murders (i.e., from face-to-face shooting in the

einsatzgruppen, to the rear cab trucks pumped with carbon monoxide exhaust, and finally to gas chambers which were completely removed from view; Russell, 2018; Tenenbaum, 1955). Likewise, Grossman (1995, p. 97) uses historical accounts to draw a direct connection among the physical distance between killers and victims in war and the psychological impact, specifically recounting how American World War II bombers felt no guilt at killing civilians, while many soldiers who killed at close range felt sick with remorse.

The relationship between physical distance and psychological distance has thus far been delineated in this manuscript. Thus less moral obligation is elicited and greater harm allowed for those who are more psychologically distant. Does this then mean that greater psychological distance should increase the willingness to do harm as a result of moral derogation (Hypothesis 3a)?

Psychological Proximity and Harm

From an evolutionary perspective, when violence becomes necessary to solve adaptive problems of intergroup competition and intragroup cooperation, violence against those that are physically proximal must be motivated in such a way that empathy and remorse are down-regulated and disgust and anger are up-regulated. Moral categorization is the psychological feature which enables this. Thus, those who are morally derogated or categorized as *immoral* can be coerced, punished, ostracized, or killed, even when they are physically and psychologically proximal.

Opatow (1995) and Staub (1990) argue that violence towards outgroup members occurs due to *moral exclusion*, a social category defined by moral derogation. Social

categories are defined by group boundaries (Brewer, 2011; Campbell, 1958; Ellemers et al., 1988; Horwitz & Berkowitz, 1975), and moral exclusion establishes those boundaries by moral evaluation. The morally excluded are categorized as *immoral*, and therefore deemed worthy of punishment, ostracism, and violence, while those who are morally included are categorized as *moral*, and therefore deemed worthy of help, cooperation, and affection. Categorization based on moral criteria, or *moral categorization*, can explain (1) when hostility and violence is directed at outgroups or outgroup members, (2) when hostility and violence is directed at ingroup members, and (3) when help is extended to outgroup members. Willingness to help outgroup members, for example, is predicted by judgments of moral qualities assigned to (by prior subjective basis or by experimental manipulation) the outgroup, but not by judgments of competence or warmth (Brambilla & Leach, 2014). In a study by Smith and colleagues (2014), condemnation of the torture of outgroup members (i.e., terrorists) and willingness to help outgroup members (i.e., foreign language speakers after being stranded) was predicted by a larger *circle of moral regard* (Aquino & Reed, 2002), even among those whose moral foundations were oriented towards ingroup loyalty (Graham et al., 2009).

Wilson and Wilson (2007) argued that human cognition is biased towards social categorization, ingroup favoritism, and outgroup hostility due the adaptive advantage of cooperation in cohesive groups in competition with rival groups over resources and territory in our evolutionary past. Extending this argument, Haidt (2012) argues that the evolution of moral intuitions in our species was necessary to provide this adaptive advantage. Moral intuitions are based on five sub-component foundations which evolved to address five specific adaptive challenges (Graham et al., 2013). The harm/care

foundation was adaptive in the protection and attachment to children, the fairness/cheating foundation was adaptive in forming cooperative partnerships, the loyalty foundation was adaptive in maintaining cohesive coalitions, the authority foundation was adaptive in coordinating collectives through hierarchies, and the purity/sanctity foundation was adaptive in avoiding pathogens (Graham et al., 2013). Though the environmental pressures under which these foundations evolved are quite different than in our modern era, we still intuit these foundations as the basis of determining whether a moral violation has occurred or not. Goodwin and colleagues (2014) emphasize that moral judgment is for determining the moral character of others. Thus, using information about whether or not others have violated any of these moral foundations (i.e., harmed, cheated, betrayed, disobeyed, or degenerated) we categorize others as being *moral* or *immoral*. Furthermore, using information about whether or not *groups* have violated any of these moral foundations, we categorize *groups* as being moral or immoral. Therefore, continuing studies on political polarization reveals that political outgroups are now characterized as immoral in the United States (Finkel et al., 2020), and therefore deserving of harm. Moral categorization of political groups would also explain why partisans would ignore the moral actions of political opponents, and rather morally judge them based on their political affiliation (McGarry et al., 2023). Therefore, because moral categorization is an evolved psychological mechanism designed to foster social cohesion and out-compete rival groups, moral derogation should elicit harm towards those more psychologically proximal, rather than psychologically distant (Hypothesis 3b).

Current Programme of Research

This programme of research involves a series of experiments (three experiments) investigating the role of psychological distance on the moral derogation of political outgroups in light of the moral actions of individual out-party members. I argue that ongoing political polarization has fostered psychological distance between opposition political parties in the United States, such that moral derogation toward abstracted out-parties entails neglect of the actions of individual out-party members when making moral judgements of them. Furthermore, because political polarization entails greater ideological separation and increased political extremity, this programme of research investigates whether political extremity represents greater psychological distance, such that I predict the effects of political extremity on out-party moral derogation should disappear in psychological proximity to the target out-party member (Hypothesis 2). Additionally, this programme seeks to explore the role of psychological distance in the behavioral consequences of moral derogation, such that I predict harm is elicited in psychologically proximal conditions rather than psychologically distant conditions (Hypothesis 3b). However, an alternative hypothesis is put forward which could plausibly entail that harm is elicited from moral derogation in conditions of psychological distance rather than proximity, due to lack of moral concern (Hypothesis 3a).

To investigate the role of the individual actions and out-party status on moral derogation we manipulated the fairness of an offer a participant received by out-party versus in-party members in the Ultimatum Game (UG; Güth et al., 1982). Previous research within the UG paradigm has shown that participants are morally motivated to sacrifice their material self-interest to punish unfair behavior (Chapman et al., 2009),

therefore, the UG paradigm is well-suited to examining whether and how outgroup status interacts with individual moral actions (i.e., fairness or unfairness; Haidt, 2012) to produce moral derogation. In the UG, an experimenter allots one player (the proposer) an amount (usually \$10) that must be divided between themselves and another player (the responder). The responder can either accept or reject the proposed division (the offer). If the responder accepts the offer (for example, a proposed 9:1 split) then the responder receives \$1 and the proposer keeps \$9. If the responder rejects the offer, then both players receive nothing.

Furthermore, political extremity will be recorded by participant self-report to investigate the role of political extremity on out-party moral derogation. Experiment 1 considered only the role of fair versus unfair moral actions of the UG partner on out-party (vs. in-party) moral derogation, therefore to further investigate the role of individual moral actions, kind or generous actions were included in Experiment 2 in comparison to fair and unfair actions. Results from out-party status and political extremity on moral derogation in light of the individual moral actions of the UG partner from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are reported in McGarry et al. (2023). However, the role of psychological distance was not examined in these two experiments. Experiment 3 specifically investigated the role of psychological distance, by randomly assigning UG partners (confederates) to play the game in the same room as the participant or an adjacent room, therefore the results of Experiment 3 are reported here first. However, the first two experiments can shed light on our hypotheses, as they were conducted online (an even more psychologically distant condition), so they will be compared to the results of Experiment 3 in an ancillary results section and discussed thereafter. Therefore,

psychological proximity (in these studies represented by physical proximity) should lead to individual moral actions superseding out-party status in predicting moral derogation (Hypothesis 1). In summation, I hypothesize that:

H₁: Offer fairness will interact with out-party status to predict moral derogation when UG partner is psychologically proximal, but not psychologically distant.

H₂: Political extremity will interact with out-party status to predict moral derogation when the out-party member is psychologically distant, but not psychologically proximal.

H_{3a}: Moral derogation will lead to harm (as rejection in the UG) when the UG partner is psychologically distant, but not psychologically proximal (the moral carelessness hypothesis).

H_{3b}: Moral derogation will lead to harm (as rejection in the UG) when the UG partner is psychologically proximal, but not psychologically distant (the evolutionary hypothesis).

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Experiment 1

Participants

Undergraduate psychology students from the University of Tennessee participated ($n = 1230$). Power analysis was estimated using the *pwr* package (Champely, 2017) in R, version 3.6.2, suggesting ~1200 participants were necessary using degrees of freedom (15; based on a four-way interaction) to detect a small-to-medium effect size with 80% power (Cohen's $d = .25$; $\beta = .20$; $\alpha = .05$). Recruiting of participants was conducted through the participant pool in the University of Tennessee Department of Psychology. Participants were compensated with course credit. Missing data due to lack of participant response was handled using list-wise deletion (sec., the default setting in SPSS). One-hundred sixty (160) participants were excluded, leaving a final total of 1070 ($M_{\text{age}} = 18.81$; $SD_{\text{age}} = 1.26$; Female = 670; White or Caucasian = 834, Black or African American = 67, Asian = 53, Latino or Latina = 31, Arab or Persian = 14, Native American, Alaskan Native, or Pacific Islander = 1, Other = 27). Five-hundred seventy-eight (578) self-identified as conservatives, and 492 as liberals. Random assignment resulted in 536 receiving offers from out-party members and 534 from in-party members. Random assignment to three fairness conditions also occurred: 5:5 (fair; $n = 359$), 6:4 (unfair; $n = 352$), and 7:3 (very unfair; $n = 359$).

Procedure

The experiment was conducted through an online survey platform (i.e., Qualtrics). After giving initial consent, random assignment to one of six conditions occurred. This resulted in a 2 (Democrat or Republican partner) $\times$ 3 (5:5, 6:4, or 7:3 UG offer) between-subjects design. Participants selected an avatar to reflect their political affiliation, and were then presented with an avatar supposedly representing their UG partner's political affiliation. Deception was used in this study to maintain experimental realism, therefore the participant was led to believe that their UG partner was another student.

Participants were then presented with a screen describing the rules of the UG and designated as the responder (instead of the proposer). A screen appeared shortly indicating that their UG partner (the proposer) was deciding on an offer. A screen with a UG offer was then presented with options to accept or reject. Based on whether the participant accepted or rejected the offer, the next screen showed the appropriate dollar amounts received by the UG partner and the participant. After the game, participants made a moral judgment of their UG partner .

Measures

Political Affiliation. One item had participants self-report their political affiliation by indicating on a 10-point scale whether they were slightly to extremely liberal or conservative. For this measure, both slight and extreme conservatives were coded as merely conservative (and likewise for liberals). This resulted in 578 conservatives and 492 liberals.

Political Extremity. The same item used for the political affiliation measure was used to measure political extremity. Participants indicated whether they were: “slightly,” “somewhat,” “moderately,” “very,” or “extremely,” liberal or conservative. For this measure, whether the participant indicated liberal or conservative was ignored, and only their degree of political affiliation was coded. For example, participants indicating they were “slightly conservative” and “slightly liberal” were both coded similarly as “slightly” (and likewise for the other degrees of political affiliation), with “slightly” coded as “1,” and “extremely” as “5,” $M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.22$.

Outgroup Status. Participants were randomly assigned to be presented with a partner avatar representing either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. Using participants’ self-reported political affiliation, outgroup status was coded based on the partner avatar. This resulted in 534 participants presented with an ingroup party image (liberals, $n = 244$; conservatives, $n = 290$), and 536 presented with an outgroup party image (liberals, $n = 248$; conservatives, $n = 288$).

Fairness. Participants were also randomly assigned to respond to different offers allegedly proposed by their partners. Three-hundred fifty-nine (359) participants responded to a 5:5 offer (fair; liberals, $n = 165$; conservatives, $n = 194$; ingroup, $n = 180$; outgroup, $n = 179$), 352 responded to a 6:4 offer (unfair; liberals, $n = 162$; conservatives, $n = 190$; ingroup, $n = 175$; outgroup, $n = 177$), and 359 responded to a 7:3 offer (very unfair; liberals, $n = 165$; conservatives, $n = 194$; ingroup, $n = 179$; outgroup, $n = 180$).

Moral Derogation. Participants responded to an item with instructions, “Please answer the following questions *about your partner in this study* using the scale below. Please guess to the best of your ability.” A Likert-scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7

(Strongly Agree) was provided alongside the statement, “My partner is a moral person.”

The response was then reverse coded to provide the score for moral derogation ($M = 3.82$, $SD = 1.36$).

Rejection. This measure reflects whether a participant chose to reject (rather than accept) the offer in the UG ($n = 493$).

Experiment 2

Participants

Participants were anonymous U.S. residents ($n = 402$; $M_{\text{age}} = 34.87$; $SD_{\text{age}} = 11.06$; Female = 211; White or Caucasian = 273, Latino or Latina = 37, Black or African American = 31, Asian, 44, Native American, Alaskan Native, or Pacific Islander = 7, Arab or Persian = 1, Other = 8). Participants were recruited through the online survey platform, Prolific (though the experiment was conducted through Qualtrics, as in Experiment 1). Power analysis was conducted using the *pwr* package (Champely, 2017) in R, version 4.1.1, suggesting ~400 participants were required using numerator degrees of freedom (15) and the effect size (outgroup status $\times$ political extremity) from the prior experiment (Cohen’s $d = .44$; power = .80; $\alpha = .05$). Informed consent was obtained before data collection commenced. Participants were compensated \$4.80 per half hour, through a University of Tennessee Department of Psychology Grant. One-hundred thirteen (113 self-identified as conservatives, and 289 as liberals. Random assignment resulted in 201 receiving offers from out-party members and 201 from in-party members. Additionally, random assignment to three fairness conditions occurred: 3:7 (overly fair or kind; $n = 134$), 5:5 (fair; $n = 135$), and 7:3 (very unfair; $n = 133$. Note that the 6:4

(unfair) condition from the previous experiment was removed and the 3:7 (kind) condition was included.

Procedure

After initial consent, random assignment to six conditions occurred. This resulted in a 2 (Democrat or Republican opponent) $\times$ 3 (5:5, 3:7, or 7:3 UG offer) between-subjects design. Procedures then occurred exactly as in Experiment 1. Participants were compensated for their participation at the end of the study.

Measures

With the noted exception of the fairness condition, all measures were the same as in Experiment 1. The relevant descriptive statistics of responses and the outcome of random assignment for each measure are as follows: *Political Affiliation* (see above), *Political Extremity* ($M = 2.79$, $SD = 1.47$), *Outgroup Status* (random assignment resulted in participants presented with an ingroup party partner avatar [liberals, $n = 144$; conservatives, $n = 57$], and an outgroup party partner avatar [liberals, $n = 145$; conservatives, $n = 56$], *Fairness* (random assignment resulted in 135 participants responding to a 5:5 offer [fair; liberals, $n = 96$; conservatives, $n = 39$; ingroup, $n = 68$; outgroup, $n = 67$], 133 responding to a 7:3 offer [very unfair; liberals, $n = 96$; conservatives, $n = 37$; ingroup, $n = 66$; outgroup, $n = 67$], and 134 responding to a 3:7 offer [kind; liberals, $n = 97$; conservatives, $n = 37$; ingroup, $n = 67$; outgroup, $n = 67$]), *Moral Derogation* ($M = 3.45$, $SD = 1.51$), *Rejection* ($n = 47$).

Experiment 3

Participants

Participants were undergraduate students from a major public university in the southeastern United States ($n = 392$; $M_{\text{age}} = 19.00$; $SD_{\text{age}} = 1.59$; Female = 266; White or Caucasian = 321, Asian = 22, Black or African American = 21, Latino or Latina = 20, Arab or Persian = 2, Other = 7). Power analysis was conducted using the *pwr* package (Champely, 2017) in R, version 4.1.1, suggesting ~400 participants were required using numerator degrees of freedom (15) and the effect size (outgroup status $\times$ political extremity) from Experiment 1 (Cohen's $d = .44$; power = .80; $\alpha = .05$). Informed consent was obtained from all participants before data collection commenced. Participants were recruited through the participant pool in the Department of Psychology. Participants were compensated with course credit for participation. Data that was missing on key variables due to lack of participant response was handled using list-wise deletion (the participant's data was excluded; sec., the default setting in SPSS). Two-hundred eleven (211) self-identified as conservatives, while 181 self-identified as liberals. Random assignment resulted in 198 receiving offers from outgroup party members and 194 from ingroup party members. Additionally, random assignment to three fairness conditions occurred: 3:7 (overly fair or kind; $n = 129$), 5:5 (fair; $n = 136$), and 7:3 (very unfair; $n = 126$). Note that the 6:4 (unfair) condition from Experiment 1 was removed and the 3:7 (kind) condition was included (as in Experiment 2).

Procedure

The experiment was conducted in-person at the Group Attention & Behavior Lab at the University of Tennessee. After initial consent, random assignment to one of twelve conditions occurred: a 2 (Democrat or Republican partner) $\times$ 3 (5:5, 3:7, or 7:3 UG offer) $\times$ 2 (playing in the same room or an adjacent room) between-subjects design. The participant was led to believe that their UG partner was another student, though this was a deception. In fact, their UG partner was a research assistant acting as a confederate. Participants were led to a computer and the confederate was led to either a computer in the same room (separated by a divider) or an adjacent room. Participants chose an avatar to reflect their political affiliation, and were subsequently presented with an avatar representing their UG partner's political affiliation. Participants were then presented with the rules of the game and that the game would be played only once, and designated as the responder (rather than the proposer). A screen appeared for 15 seconds indicating that their partner (the proposer) was deciding on an offer, after which an offer was presented with options to accept or reject. The next screen showed received amounts of partner and participant, based on the decision to accept or reject. Participants then made a moral judgment of their partner after the game. Participants were compensated with class credit for their participation at the cessation of the study.

Measures

Psychological Distance. Participants were randomly assigned to play the game in either the same room as their partner ($n = 221$) or an adjacent room as their partner ($n = 173$).

Political Affiliation. One item had participants self-report their political affiliation by indicating on a 10-point scale whether they were slightly to extremely liberal or conservative. For this measure, both slight and extreme conservatives were coded as merely conservative (and likewise for liberals). This resulted in 211 conservatives and 181 liberals.

Political Extremity. The same item used for the political affiliation measure was used to measure political extremity. Participants indicated whether they were: “slightly,” “somewhat,” “moderately,” “very,” or “extremely,” liberal or conservative. For this measure, whether the participant indicated liberal or conservative was ignored, and only their degree of political affiliation was coded. For example, participants indicating they were “slightly conservative” and “slightly liberal” were both coded similarly as “slightly” (and likewise for the other degrees of political affiliation), with “slightly” coded as “1,” and “extremely” as “5,” $M = 2.41$, $SD = 1.11$.

Outgroup Status. Participants were randomly assigned to be presented with a partner avatar representing either the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. Using participants’ self-reported political affiliation, outgroup status was coded based on the partner avatar. This resulted in 194 participants presented with an ingroup party image (liberals, $n = 89$; conservatives, $n = 105$), and 198 presented with an outgroup party image (liberals, $n = 92$; conservatives, $n = 106$).

Fairness. Participants were also randomly assigned to respond to different offers allegedly proposed by their partners. One-hundred thirty-six (136) participants responded to a 5:5 offer (fair; liberals, $n = 64$; conservatives, $n = 72$; ingroup, $n = 68$; outgroup, $n = 68$), 129 responded to a 3:7 offer (kind; liberals, $n = 60$; conservatives, $n = 69$; ingroup, $n = 69$; outgroup, $n = 60$).

= 63; outgroup, $n = 66$), and 126 responded to a 7:3 offer (very unfair; liberals, $n = 57$; conservatives, $n = 69$; ingroup, $n = 62$; outgroup, $n = 64$).

Moral Derogation. Participants responded to an item with instructions, “Please answer the following questions *about your partner in this study* using the scale below. Please guess to the best of your ability.” A Likert-scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) was provided alongside the statement, “My partner is a moral person.” The response was then reverse coded to provide the score for moral derogation ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.27$).

Rejection. This measure reflects whether a participant chose to reject (rather than accept) the offer in the UG ($n = 72$).

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Analyses were conducted using SPSS v. 29.0.0. Statistical analyses were performed as multiple regressions where effect sizes are expressed as b values, ANOVA where effect sizes are expressed as η_p^2 values, and logistic regressions where effect sizes are expressed as odds ratios (OR).

Experiment 1

Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Offer Fairness on Moral Derogation

In Experiment 1, there was a main effect of outgroup status on moral derogation ($F(1, 1068) = 13.854, p < 0.001, \eta_p^2 = 0.013$; McGarry, 2022). Participants morally derogated out-party members ($M = 3.974, SD = 0.058$) more than in-party members ($M = 3.667, SD = 0.058$). Given that Experiment 1 was conducted online, it is plausible that psychological distance moderates the effect of outgroup status on moral derogation (Hypothesis 1).

In Experiment 1, there was no two-way interaction of outgroup status and fairness on moral derogation when fairness was dummy-coded as fair versus very unfair ($b = 0.014, SE = 0.193, t(1064) = 0.071, p = 0.944$), and when dummy-coded as fair versus unfair ($b = -0.345, SE = 0.194, t(1064) = -1.776, p = 0.076$; McGarry et al., 2023). Therefore, individual actions (offer fairness) seem to moderate the effect of outgroup status on moral derogation in conditions of psychological distance (Hypothesis 1).

Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Political Extremity on Moral

Derogation

There was a significant two-way interaction between political extremity and outgroup status on moral derogation in Experiment 1 ($b = 0.400$, $SE = 0.067$, $t(1066) = 5.931$, $p < 0.001$; McGarry et al., 2023). Likewise, analyses of simple slopes revealed that for those playing with an outgroup partner, the effect of political extremity on moral derogation was significant in Experiment 1 ($b = 0.256$, $SE = 0.048$, $t(1066) = 5.291$, $p < 0.001$). Given that Experiment 1 was conducted online, it involved greater psychological distance than an in-lab study. Therefore, Experiment 1 provides evidence for Hypothesis 2.

Psychological Distance and Moral Derogation on Rejection

The main effect of moral derogation on rejection of offer in the UG was significant in Experiment 1 (odds ratio (OR) = 1.458, 95% CI = [1.323, 1.608], $p < 0.001$). Because Experiment 1 was conducted online, a more psychologically distant circumstance than an in-lab study. Therefore, the results of Experiment 1 provide evidence for the moral carelessness hypothesis (Hypothesis 3a).

Experiment 2

Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Offer Fairness on Moral Derogation

In Experiment 2, there was also a main effect of outgroup status on moral

derogation ($F(1, 400) = 6.238, p = 0.013, \eta_p^2 = 0.015$). Participants morally derogated out-party members ($M = 3.632, SD = 0.106$) more than in-party members ($M = 3.259, SD = 0.106$). Given that Experiment 2 was conducted online, psychological distance plausibly moderates the effect of outgroup status on moral derogation (Hypothesis 1).

In Experiment 2, there was also no two-way interaction of outgroup status and fairness on moral derogation when fairness was dummy-coded as fair versus very unfair ($b = 0.315, SE = 0.316, t(396) = 0.998, p = 0.319$), and when dummy-coded as fair versus kind ($b = 0.099, SE = 0.315, t(396) = 0.316, p = 0.752$; McGarry et al., 2023). Therefore, individual actions (offer fairness) seem to moderate the effect of outgroup status on moral derogation in conditions of psychological proximity and not psychological distance (Hypothesis 1).

Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Political Extremity on Moral Derogation

There was a significant two-way interaction between political extremity and outgroup status on moral derogation in Experiment 2 ($b = 0.328, SE = 0.100, t(398) = 3.270, p = 0.001$; McGarry et al., 2023). Likewise, analyses of simple slopes revealed that for those playing with an outgroup partner, the effect of political extremity on moral derogation was significant in Experiment 2 ($b = 0.309, SE = 0.074, t(398) = 4.161, p < 0.001$). Given that Experiment 2 was conducted online, it involved greater psychological distance than an in-lab study (Hypothesis 2).

Psychological Distance and Moral Derogation on Rejection

The main effect of moral derogation on rejection of offer in the UG was significant in Experiment 2 ($OR = 1.920$, 95% $CI = [1.542, 2.389]$, $p < 0.001$). Experiment 2 was conducted online, therefore psychological distance was greater in this study than in an in-lab study. Therefore, the results of Experiment 2 provide evidence for the moral carelessness hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a).

Experiment 3

Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Offer Fairness on Moral Derogation

The two-way interaction of outgroup status and fairness on moral derogation for those in the psychologically distant condition (other room) was non-significant when offer fairness was dummy-coded as fair (5:5) versus very unfair (7:3; $b = 0.281$, $SE = 0.441$, $t(171) = 0.693$ $p = 0.524$), and when dummy-coded as fair (5:5) versus kind (3:7; $b = 0.215$, $SE = 0.448$, $t(171) = 0.481$, $p = 0.631$). However, the two-way interaction of outgroup status and fairness on moral derogation for those in the psychologically proximal condition (same room) was marginally significant when fairness was dummy-coded as fair versus very unfair ($b = 0.790$, $SE = 0.402$, $t(218) = 1.964$ $p = 0.051$), but not significant when dummy-coded as fair versus kind ($b = 0.618$, $SE = 0.398$, $t(218) = 1.552$, $p = 0.122$). Therefore, participants playing in the same room (psychologically proximal), who received very unfair offers ($M_{Outgroup} = 3.500$, $SD_{Outgroup} = 0.218$; $M_{Ingroup} = 3.611$, $SD_{Ingroup} = 0.199$) morally derogated their ingroup and outgroup partner similarly, while those who received fair offers ($M_{Outgroup} = 3.279$, $SD_{Outgroup} = 0.182$; $M_{Ingroup} = 2.600$, $SD_{Ingroup} = 0.182$) and kind offers ($M_{Outgroup} = 2.793$, $SD_{Outgroup} = 0.222$;

$M_{Ingroup} = 2.732$, $SD_{Ingroup} = 0.186$) morally derogated their outgroup (vs. ingroup) partner more. This provides some evidence that individual moral actions supersede out-party status in predicting moral derogation when in psychological proximity rather than psychological distance (Hypothesis 1; though this is only a trend [$p = 0.051$]). Analyses of simple slopes revealed that for those playing with an outgroup partner, the effect of political extremity on moral derogation was significant in Experiment 1 ($b = 0.256$, $SE = 0.048$, $t(1066) = 5.291$, $p < 0.001$), Experiment 2 ($b = 0.309$, $SE = 0.074$, $t(398) = 4.161$, $p < 0.001$), and in Experiment 3 in the psychologically distant condition (other room; $b = 0.424$, $SE = 0.105$, $t(171) = 4.038$, $p < 0.001$; reported above), but not in the psychologically proximal condition (same room; $b = -0.014$, $SE = 0.116$, $t(219) = -0.121$, $p = 0.904$; reported above). Given that Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were conducted online, they involve greater psychological distance than even the psychologically distant condition in Experiment 3 (i.e, playing in an adjacent room). Therefore, because the interaction effect of political extremity and outgroup status on moral derogation were found in Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and the psychologically distant condition in Experiment 3, but not the psychologically proximal condition in Experiment 3, greater support for Hypothesis 1 can plausibly be inferred. However, each experiment was not conducted concurrently, therefore history is also a plausible confound.

Psychological Distance, Out-Party Status, and Political Extremity on Moral

Derogation

A significant two-way interaction emerged between political extremity and outgroup status on moral derogation ($b = 0.251$, $SE = 0.114$, $t(388) = 2.195$, $p = 0.029$).

However, there was no interaction effect of political extremity and outgroup status on moral derogation in the psychologically proximal condition (i.e., same room; $b = 0.061$, $SE = 0.156$, $t(219) = 0.392$, $p = 0.696$), but only in the psychologically distant condition (i.e., other room; $b = 0.376$, $SE = 0.173$, $t(171) = 2.175$, $p = 0.031$). Interactions were probed by conducting simple slope analyses and by plotting the interaction (see Figure 1). Analyses of simple slopes revealed that for those playing with an outgroup partner, the effect of political extremity on moral derogation was significant in the psychologically distant condition (i.e., other room; $b = 0.424$, $SE = 0.105$, $t(171) = 4.038$, $p < 0.001$). Political extremity, therefore, had an effect on out-party moral derogation in the psychologically distant condition (see Figure 1). For those playing with an ingroup partner, there was no effect of political extremity on moral derogation in the psychologically distant condition ($b = 0.048$, $SE = 0.137$, $t(171) = 0.352$, $p = 0.725$; see Figure 1). In the psychologically proximal condition (i.e., same room), there was no effect of political extremity on moral derogation for either the ingroup ($b = -0.075$, $SE = 0.104$, $t(219) = -0.720$, $p = 0.472$) or outgroup ($b = -0.014$, $SE = 0.116$, $t(219) = -0.121$, $p = 0.904$) partner (see Figure 1). In all, greater political extremity led to greater out-party moral derogation only in the psychologically distant condition (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, because the interaction effect of political extremity and outgroup status on moral derogation were found in Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and the psychologically distant condition in Experiment 3, but not the psychologically proximal condition in Experiment, greater support for Hypothesis 2 can be inferred. However, each experiment was not conducted concurrently, therefore history is also a plausible confound.




Figure 1. Interaction of out-party status and political extremity on moral derogation for psychologically proximal (same room) versus psychologically distant (other room) conditions.

Additionally, a four-way interaction emerged between outgroup status, political extremity, psychological distance, and offer fairness when dummy-coded as fair vs. unfair ($b = -1.139$, $SE = 0.570$, $t(368) = -1.998$, $p = 0.046$), but not when dummy-coded as fair vs. kind ($b = -0.146$, $SE = 0.552$, $t(368) = -0.264$, $p = 0.792$).

Psychological Distance and Moral Derogation on Rejection

The main effect of moral derogation on rejection of offer in the UG was significant (odds ratio (OR) = 1.276, 95% CI = [1.040, 1.564], $p = 0.019$). Notably, the effect of moral derogation on rejection in the psychologically proximal condition (i.e., same room) was significant ($OR = 1.375$, 95% CI = [1.045, 1.810], $p = 0.023$), while the effect of moral derogation on rejection in the psychologically distant condition (i.e., other room) was not significant ($OR = 1.158$, 95% CI = [0.852, 1.575], $p = 0.348$; see Figure 2). Therefore, moral derogation led to harm (rejection) for those in psychological proximity rather than psychological distance, providing support for Hypothesis 2b (the evolutionary hypothesis) and not for Hypothesis 2a (the moral carelessness hypothesis).




Figure 2. The effect of moral derogation on rejection in the UG game for psychologically proximal (same room) versus psychologically distant (other room) conditions.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

Psychological distance played a role in both the antecedents and consequences of moral derogation. As antecedents of moral derogation, political extremity led to out-party moral derogation in conditions of psychological distance, but not psychological proximity in Experiment 3 (Hypothesis 2). Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 provided ancillary support for this hypothesis, but should be compared cautiously, as history could be a plausible confound. Future studies should compare in-lab to online studies concurrently to rule out the possible confound of history. Also individual moral actions (fair, unfair, and kind) did not moderate the effect of out-party status on moral derogation in the psychologically distant condition, but revealed a trend of moderation in the psychologically proximal condition (Hypothesis 1). Thus weak support for this hypothesis was revealed. It is possible that weak support, rather than strong support, was found due to smaller than expected effect size in the psychologically proximal condition and thus the sample was under-powered. Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 provided some ancillary support for this hypothesis as well, but again should be referenced cautiously, as history could provide a plausible confound.

Lastly, support for the evolutionary hypothesis (Hypothesis 3b) was found in Experiment 3, such that moral derogation elicited harm in the psychologically proximal condition but not the psychologically distant condition. However, moral derogation elicited harm in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. As both experiments represent more psychologically distant conditions (online) than the psychologically proximal condition in Experiment 3 (UG partner in adjacent room), this comparison seems to provide evidence

for the moral carelessness hypothesis (Hypothesis 3a). However, again, history should be considered a potential confound in making comparisons between Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and Experiment 3, as they were not conducted concurrently. Another possibility for the conflicting results lies in my interpretation of rejection in the UG as harm. While UG players respond with moral disgust when treated unfairly (Chapman et al., 2009) and while they act against their self-interest when they reject a non-zero offer (Camerer, 2003), Eriksson and colleagues (2017) question whether rejection in the UG can be construed as punishment. Eriksson and colleagues (2017) found that participants rejected offers less often when rejection was framed as a reduction of a payoff to the proposer. Reinforcing this idea, participants indicated that they rejected unfair offers to promote fairness rather than punish. With this in mind, other paradigms which can more effectively measure the effect of moral derogation on harm might be better employed to investigate the role of psychological distance on this effect.

REFERENCES

- Abrams, R. H. (1943). Residential propinquity as a factor in marriage selection. *American Sociological Review*, 8.
- Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2008). Is polarization a myth? *The Journal of Politics*, 70(02), 542–555.
- Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of US elections in the 21st century. *Electoral Studies*, 41, 12-22.
- Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (1988). Comments on the motivational status of self esteem in social identity and intergroup discrimination. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 18(4), 317-334.
- Alexander, R. D. (1979). *Darwinism and human affairs*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Garden City, NY: Addison-Wesley.
- Amira, K., Wright, J. C., & Goya-Tocchetto, D. (2019). In-group love versus out-group hate: Which is more important to partisans and when? *Political Behavior*. doi:10.1007/s11109-019-09557-6
- Aquino, K., & Reed II, A. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83(6), 1423.
- Baxter, R. R. (1951). So-called unprivileged belligerency: Spies, guerrillas, and saboteurs. *Brit. YB Int'l L.*, 28, 323.
- Bettencourt, B. A., Brewer, M. B., Croak, M. R., & Miller, N. (1992). Cooperation and the reduction of intergroup bias: The role of reward structure and social orientation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 28(4), 301-319.

- Billig, M. G. (1996). Remembering the particular background of social identity theory. *Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy of Henri Tajfel*, 337-358.
- Billig, M. G., & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 3(1), 27-52.
- Bliuc, A. M., Bouguettaya, A., & Felise, K. D. (2021). Online intergroup polarization across political fault lines: An integrative review. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 12, 641215.
- Bogardus, E. S. (1947). Measurement of personal-group relations. *Sociometry*, 10(4), 306-311.
- Bossard, J. H. (1932). Residential propinquity as a factor in marriage selection. *American Journal of Sociology*, 38(2), 219-224.
- Boxell, L., Gentzkow, M., & Shapiro, J. M. (2020). Cross-country trends in affective polarization (No. w26669). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Brambilla, M., Sacchi, S., Rusconi, P., Cherubini, P., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2012). You want to give a good impression? Be honest! Moral traits dominate group impression formation. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 51(1), 149-166.
- Brambilla, M., Hewstone, M., & Colucci, F. P. (2013a). Enhancing moral virtues: Increased perceived outgroup morality as a mediator of intergroup contact effects. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 16(5), 648-657.
- Brambilla, M., Sacchi, S., Pagliaro, S., & Ellemers, N. (2013b). Morality and intergroup relations: Threats to safety and group image predict the desire to interact with outgroup and ingroup members. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 49(5), 811-821.

- Brambilla, M., & Leach, C. W. (2014). On the importance of being moral: The distinctive role of morality in social judgment. *Social Cognition*, 32(4), 397-408.
- Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The ideological-conflict hypothesis: Intolerance among both liberals and conservatives. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 23, 27–34.
doi:10.1177/0963721413510932
- Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 86(2), 307.
- Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate? *Journal of Social Issues*, 55(3), 429-444.
- Brewer, M. B. (2001). Ingroup identification and intergroup conflict: When does ingroup love become outgroup hate? In R. Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), *Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction* (pp. 17– 41). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brewer, M. B. (2011). Optimal distinctiveness theory: Its history and development. In Van Lange, P. A. M., Kruglanski, A.W., Higgins, E. T. (Eds.) *Handbook of theories of social psychology* (pp. 81–98). London: Sage.
- Brewer, M. B., & Caporael, L. R. (2006). An evolutionary perspective on social identity: Revisiting groups. *Evolution and Social Psychology*, 143, 161.
- Brewer, M. B., & Miller, N. (1984). Beyond the contact hypothesis: Theoretical perspectives on desegregation. In N. Miller & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), *Groups in contact: The psychology of desegregation* (pp. 281–302). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

- Brewer, M. B., & Silver, M. (1978). Ingroup bias as a function of task characteristics. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 8, 393-400.
- Brown, R. (2020). The social identity approach: Appraising the Tajfellian legacy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 59(1), 5-25.
- Butynski, T. M. (2003). The robust chimpanzee *Pan troglodytes*: taxonomy, distribution, abundance, and conservation status. In R. Kormos, C. Boesch, M.I. Bakarr, T.M. Butynski (eds). *West African chimpanzees Status survey and conservation action plan*, 5-12.
- Caesar, G. J. (56 BCE/1951). *The conquest of Gaul*. Trans. by Handford, S. A. London: Penguin.
- Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioural studies of strategic thinking in games. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences.*, 7(5), 225–231. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613\(03\)00094-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00094-9)
- Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities. *Behavioral Science*, 3, 14– 25.
- Campbell, D. T. (1967). Stereotypes and the perception of group differences. *American Psychologist*, 22(10), 817.
- Cartwright, D. (1968). The nature of group cohesiveness. In: D. Cartwright and A. Zander (Eds) *Group Dynamics*, 3rd edn, Tavistock, London.
- Chambers, J. R., Schlenker, B. R., & Collisson, B. (2013). Ideology and prejudice: The role of value conflicts. *Psychological Science*, 24, 140–149
- Chapman, H. A., Kim, D. A., Susskind, J. M., & Anderson, A. K. (2009). In bad taste: Evidence for the oral origins of moral disgust. *Science*, 323(5918), 1222-1226.

- Clifford, S. (2019). How emotional frames moralize and polarize political attitudes. *Political Psychology*, 40(1), 75-91. doi: 10.1111/pops.12507
- Cosmides, L., Guzmán, R. A., & Tooby, J. (2018). The evolution of moral cognition. In A. Zimmerman, K. Jones, & M. Timmons (Eds.), *The routledge handbook of moral epistemology* (pp. 174– 228). New York: Routledge.
- Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2008). Warmth and competence as universal dimensions of social perception: The stereotype content model and the BIAS map. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 40, 61-149
- Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2004). Aversive racism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 36, 1-52.
- Ellemers, N., Van Knippenberg, A., De Vries, N., & Wilke, H. (1988). Social identification and permeability of group boundaries. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 18(6), 497-513.
- Feinberg, M., Willer, R., Antonenko, O., & John, O. P. (2012). Liberating reason from the passions: Overriding intuitionist moral judgments through emotion reappraisal. *Psychological Science*, 23(7), 788–795.
- Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations*, 7, 117–140.
- Festinger, L., Schachter, S., & Back, K. (1950). *Social pressures in informal groups: A study of human factors in housing*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., Mason, L., McGrath, M. C., Nyhan, B., Rand, D. G., Skitka, L. J., Tucker, J. A., Van Bavel,

- J. J., Wang, C. S., & Druckman, J. N. (2020). Political sectarianism in America. *Science*, 370 (6516), 533-536. doi: 10.1126/science.abe1715
- Fiske, S. T., Lin, M., & Neuberg, S. (1999). The continuum model: Ten years later. In Y. Trope & S. Chaiken (Eds.), *Dual-process theories in social psychology* (pp. 231–254). New York: Guilford Press.
- Fiske, S. T., Neuberg, S. L., Beattie, A. E., & Milberg, S. J. (1987). Category-based and attribute-based reactions to others: Some informational conditions of stereotyping and individuating processes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 23(5), 399-427.
- Gaertner, L., & Insko, C. A. (2000). Intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm: Categorization, reciprocation, or fear?. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79(1), 77.
- Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 4(1), 1-26.
- Garrett, K. N., & Bankert, A. (2018). The moral roots of partisan division: How moral conviction heightens affective polarization. *British Journal of Political Science*. Advance online publication. doi:10.1017/S000712341700059X
- Goodwin, G. P., Piazza, J., & Rozin, P. (2014). Moral character predominates in person perception and evaluation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 106(1), 148.

- Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(5), 1029.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. *In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 47, pp. 55-130). Academic Press.
- Grant, U. S. (1886). *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant: In Two Volumes* (Vol. 2). Charles L. Webster.
- Greene, J. (2013). *Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them*. New York: Penguin.
- Greene, S. (1999). Understanding party identification: A social identity approach. *Political Psychology*, 20(3), 393.
- Grossman, D. (2014). *On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society*. New York: Little, Brown and Company.
- Grigoryan, L., Seo, S., Simunovic, D., & Hofmann, W. (2023). Helping the ingroup versus harming the outgroup: Evidence from morality-based groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 105, 104436.
- Guala, F. (2012). Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 35(1), 1-15.
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. Pantheon/Random House, New York, NY.

- Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 7(1), 17-52.
- Hamilton, A., Jay, J., & Madison, J. (1788/2009). *The Federalist papers: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay*. Shapiro, I. (Ed.) Yale University Press.
- Hansen, J., & Genschow, O. (2020). Psychological distance and imitation. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 14(11).
- Harris, E., & Van Bavel, J. J.(2021). Preregistered replication of “Feeling superior is a bipartisan issue: Extremity (not direction) of political views predicts perceived belief superiority”. *Psychological Science*, 32(3), 451–458.
- Hassan, F. A. (1981). *Demographic archaeology*. New York: Academic Press.
- Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. *Annual review of psychology*, 53(1), 575-604.
- Hewstone, M., & Swart, H. (2011). Fifty-odd years of inter-group contact: From hypothesis to integrated theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 50(3), 374-386.
- Hogg, M. A. (2000). Subjective uncertainty reduction through self-categorization: A motivational theory of social identity processes. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 11(1), 223-255.
- Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1990). Social motivation, self-esteem and social identity. In D. Abrams, & M. A. Hogg (Eds), *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances* (pp. 28-47). London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

- Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1985). Interpersonal attraction, social identification, and psychological group formation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 15(1), 51-66.
- Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A historical review. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 2(1), 204-222.
- Horwitz, M., & Berkowitz, N. (1975, September). Attributional analysis of intergroup conflict. In *Meeting of the American Psychological Association*, Chicago (Vol. 111).
- Horwitz, R. & Rabbie, J. M. (1982). Individuality and membership in the intergroup system. In *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* by H. Tajfel (ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Huber, G. A., & Malhotra, N. (2017). Political homophily in social relationships: Evidence from online dating behavior. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1), 269–283.
- Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 76(3), 405-431.
- Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(3), 690–707.
- Kennedy, R. (1943). Premarital residential propinquity. *American Journal of Sociology*, 48.
- Lang, C., & Pearson-Merkowitz, S. (2015). Partisan sorting in the United States, 1972–2012: new evidence from a dynamic analysis. *Political Geography*, 48, 119-129.

- Latané, B., Liu, J. H., Nowak, A., Bonevento, M., & Zheng, L. (1995). Distance matters: Physical space and social impact. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21(8), 795-805.
- Leach, C. W., Ellemers, N., & Barreto, M. (2007). Group virtue: The importance of morality (vs. competence and sociability) in the positive evaluation of in-groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93(2), 234-249. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.2.234
- Lewin, K. (1935). *A dynamic theory of personality*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Lewin, K. (1948). *Resolving social conflicts*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2014). Traversing psychological distance. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 18(7), 364-369.
- Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Stephan, E. (2007). Psychological distance. In Kruglanski A.W., Higgins E.T., (Eds.) *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles*. (Vol. 2) (pp. 353–383). New York: Guilford Press.
- Liberman, N., Sagristano, M. D., & Trope, Y. (2002). The effect of temporal distance on level of mental construal. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 38(6), 523-534.
- Locke, J. (1689/1996). *An essay concerning human understanding*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Lopez, L. D., Moorman, K., Schneider, S., Baker, M. N., & Holbrook, C. (2021). Morality is relative: Anger, disgust, and aggression as contingent responses to sibling versus acquaintance harm. *Emotion*, 21(2), 376.

- Marques, J. M. & Paez, D. (1994). The “black sheep effect”: social categorization, rejection of ingroup deviates, and perception of group variability. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 5, 37–68.
- Marchal, N. (2020). The polarizing potential of intergroup affect in online political discussions: Evidence from reddit r/politics. *Politics* (July 10, 2020).
- Mason, L., & Wronski, J. (2018). One tribe to bind them all: How our social group attachments strengthen partisanship. *Political Psychology*, 39, 257-277.
- McDonald, R. I., Chai, H. Y., & Newell, B. R. (2015). Personal experience and the ‘psychological distance’ of climate change: An integrative review. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 44, 109-118.
- McGarry, P. P. (2022). Politically moral: Moderate partisans morally derogate out-party members, even when treated fairly (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee).
- McGarry, P. P., Shteynberg, G., Hulse, T. L., & Heim, A. S. (2023). The great divide: Neither fairness nor kindness eliminates moral derogation of people with opposing political beliefs. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 19485506231194279.
- McGarty, C., Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., David, B., & Wetherell, M. S. (1992). Group polarization as conformity to the prototypical group member. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 31(1), 1-19.
- Milgram, S. (1964). Some conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority. *Human Relations*, 18(1), 57-76.
- Milgram, S. (1974) *Obedience to authority*. New York: Harper & Row.

- Molho, C., Tybur, J. M., Güler, E., Balliet, D., & Hofmann, W. (2017). Disgust and anger relate to different aggressive responses to moral violations. *Psychological Science*, 28(5), 609-619.
- Moss, J. T., & O'Connor, P. J. (2020). Political correctness and the alt-right: The development of extreme political attitudes. *PLoS One*, 15(10).
- Mummendey, A., Simon, B., Dietze, C., Grünert, M., Haeger, G., Kessler, S., Lettgen, S., & Schäferhoff, S. (1992). Categorization is not enough: Intergroup discrimination in negative outcome allocation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 28(2), 125-144.
- Musen, J. D. (2011). *The moral psychology of obligations to help those in need* (Undergraduate Honors Thesis, Harvard University).
- Nguyen, T., Chen, M., & Szymanski, B. K. (2013, December). Analyzing the proximity and interactions of friends in communities in Gowalla. In *2013 IEEE 13th International Conference on Data Mining Workshops* (pp. 1036-1044).
- O'Mara, E. M., Jackson, L. E., Batson, C. D., & Gaertner, L. (2011). Will moral outrage stand up?: Distinguishing among emotional reactions to a moral violation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 41(2), 173-179.
- Opatow, S. (1995). Drawing the line: Social categorization, moral exclusion, and the scope of justice. In B. B. Bunker & J. Z. Rubin (Eds.), *Conflict, cooperation, and justice* (pp. 347–369). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Otten, S., Mummendey, A., & Blanz, M. (1996). Intergroup discrimination in positive and negative outcome allocations: Impact of stimulus valence, relative group

- status, and relative group size. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 22(6), 568-581.
- Park, B., & Rothbart, M. (1982). Perception of out-group homogeneity and levels of social categorization: Memory for the subordinate attributes of in-group and out-group members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 42(6), 1051.
- Pew Research Center. (2014). Political polarization in the American public: How increasing ideological uniformity and partisan antipathy affect politics, compromise and everyday life. Retrieved from <https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/>
- Pew Research Center. (2016). Partisanship and political animosity in 2016: Highly negative views of the opposing party and its members. Retrieved from <https://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/>
- Plutarch. (75/1975). *The rise and fall of Athens: Nine Greek lives*. Trans. by Scott-Kilvert, I. Harmondsworth, Eng: Penguin.
- Prüfer, K., Munch, K., Hellmann, I., Akagi, K., Miller, J. R., Walenz, B., Koren, S., Sutton, G., Kodira, C., Winer, R., Knight, J. R., Mullikin, J. C., Meader, S. J., Ponting, C. P., Lunter, G., Higashino, S., Hobolth, A., Dutheil, J., Karakoç, E., Alkan, C., Sajjadian, S., Catacchio, C. R., Ventura, M., Marques-Bonet, T., Eichler, E. E., André, C., Atencia, R., Mugisha, L., Junhold, J., Patterson, N., Siebauer, M., Good, J. M., Fischer, A., Ptak, S. E., Lachmann, M., Symer, D. E., Mailund, T., Schierup, M. H., Andrés, A. M., Kelso, J. & Pääbo, S. (2012). The

- bonobo genome compared with the chimpanzee and human genomes. *Nature*, 486(7404), 527-531.
- Rabbie, J. M., Schot, J. C., & Visser, L. (1989). Social identity theory: A conceptual and empirical critique from the perspective of a behavioural interaction model. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 19(3), 171-202.
- Royzman, E., Atanasov, P., Landy, J. F., Parks, A., & Gepty, A. (2014). CAD or MAD? Anger (not disgust) as the predominant response to pathogen-free violations of the divinity code. *Emotion*, 14(5), 892.
- Rozin, P., Lowery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76(4), 574-586.
- Rubin, M., & Hewstone, M. (1998). Social identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis: A review and some suggestions for clarification. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 2(1), 40-62.
- Russell, L. (2018). Evil and the unforgivable. In S. Harrash, R. Crisp (Eds.) *Moral evil in practical ethics*. New York: Routledge.
- Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral judgment. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 34(8), 1096-1109.
- Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1969). *Interdisciplinary relationships in the social sciences*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.

- Shin, J. E., Suh, E. M., Li, N. P., Eo, K., Chong, S. C., & Tsai, M. H. (2019). Darling, get closer to me: Spatial proximity amplifies interpersonal liking. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 45(2), 300-309.
- Shteynberg, G., Hirsh, J. B., Bentley, R. A., & Garthoff, J. (2020). Shared worlds and shared minds: A theory of collective learning and a psychology of common knowledge. *Psychological Review*, 127(5), 918.
- Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affluence, and morality. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 229-243.
- Skarżyńska, K., & Radkiewicz, P. (2015). Politicians and citizens: Cognitive and dispositional predictors of approval of aggression in political life. *Československá Psychologie: Časopis Pro Psychologickou Teorii a Praxi*, 59, 36-46.
- Smith, I. H., Aquino, K., Koleva, S., & Graham, J. (2014). The moral ties that bind... even to out-groups: The interactive effect of moral identity and the binding moral foundations. *Psychological Science*, 25(8), 1554-1562.
- Soderberg, C. K., Callahan, S. P., Kochersberger, A. O., Amit, E., & Ledgerwood, A. (2015). The effects of psychological distance on abstraction: Two meta-analyses. *Psychological Bulletin*, 141(3), 525.
- Staub, E. (1990). Moral exclusion, personal goal theory, and extreme destructiveness. *Journal of Social Issues*, 46(1), 47-64.
- Stone, C. H., & Crisp, R. J. (2007). Superordinate and subgroup identification as predictors of intergroup evaluation in common ingroup contexts. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 10(4), 493-513.

- Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific American*, 223(5), 96-103.
- Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1(2), 149-178.
- Tajfel, H., & Billig, M. G. (1974). Familiarity and categorization in intergroup behavior. *Journal of experimental social psychology*, 10(2), 159-170.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations*, (pp. 33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Tappin, B. M., & McKay, R. T. (2019). Moral polarization and out-party hostility in the US political context. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 7(1), 213-245.
doi:10.5964/jspp.v7i1.1090
- Tenenbaum, J. (1955). The Einsatzgruppen. *Jewish Social Studies*, 43-64.
- Toner, K., Leary, M. R., Asher, M. W., & Jongman-Sereno, K. P. (2013). Feeling superior is a bipartisan issue: Extremity (not direction) of political views predicts perceived belief superiority. *Psychological Science*, 24, 2454–2462.
doi:10.1177/0956797613494848
- Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2015). Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology. *The handbook of evolutionary psychology*, 5-67.
- Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. *The Quarterly Review of Biology*, 46(1), 35-57.

- Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Wakslak, C. (2007). Construal levels and psychological distance: Effects on representation, prediction, evaluation, and behavior. *Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17*(2), 83-95.
- Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorization and the self-concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior. In E. J. Lawler (Ed.), *Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research, vol. 2*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Turner, J. C. & Oakes, P. J. (1989). Self-categorization theory and social influence. In P. Paulus (Ed.), *The Psychology of Group Influence, 2nd ed.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell.
- Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and social context. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20*, 454 – 463.
- Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2010). The story of social identity. In *Rediscovering social identity: Key readings*. Psychology Press, Taylor & Francis.
- Tybur, J. M., Molho, C., Cakmak, B., Cruz, T. D., Singh, G. D., & Zwickler, M. (2020). Disgust, anger, and aggression: Further tests of the equivalence of moral emotions. *Collabra: Psychology, 6*(1).
- Wildschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea, J. L., Insko, C. A., & Schopler, J. (2003). Beyond the group mind: a quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. *Psychological Bulletin, 129*(5), 698.

- Wilson, A. E., Parker, V. A., & Feinberg, M. (2020). Polarization in the contemporary political and media landscape. *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, 34, 223-228.
- Wilson, D. S. & Wilson, E. O. (2007) Rethinking the theoretical foundation of sociobiology. *The Quarterly Review of Biology*, 82(4), 327.
- Wilson, M. I., & Daly, M. (1996). Male sexual proprietariness and violence against wives. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 5(1), 2-7.
- Wrangham, R. & Peterson, D. (1997). *Demonic males: Apes and the origins of human violence*. New York: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Yamagishi, T., Jin, N., & Kiyonari, T. (1999). Bounded generalized reciprocity: Ingroup boasting and ingroup favoritism. *Advances in group processes*, 16(1), 161-197.

VITA

Phillip Paul McGarry is a native of Little Rock, Arkansas, and graduated from Bryant High School in Bryant, Arkansas. He was awarded a Bachelor of Arts in History, with a minor in Social Studies Secondary Education, from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock in 2011. While attending university, Phillip earned recognition on the Dean's List for the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, was inducted into Phi Alpha Theta, the international honor society for history, and earned the ETA Praxis Recognition of Excellence. After licensure through the Arkansas Department of Education, he taught high school history and psychology, primarily College Board Advanced Placement (AP) classes, in the Little Rock School District for over five years. In 2017, he pursued a Post-Baccalaureate Degree in Psychology at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, during which time he was inducted into Psi Chi, the international honor society for psychology, and tutored statistics in the Department of Psychology. In 2022, he was awarded a Masters of Arts in Experimental Psychology (Social) from the University of Tennessee. Since admission as a graduate student in the Experimental Psychology program at the University of Tennessee in 2018, Phillip has been an instructor of Research Methods (PSYC 295) in the Department of Psychology for five years. Notable publications include (with G. Shteynberg, T. L. Hulsey, & A. S. Heim), "The Great Divide: Neither Fairness Nor Kindness Eliminates Moral Derogation of People With Opposing Political Beliefs" in *Social Psychological and Personality Science* (2023), (with P. J. Hampson & T. L. Hulsey), "Moral Affordance, Moral Expertise, and Virtue" in *Theory and Psychology* (2021) and (with R. F. Corwyn), "An Expectancy

Value Theory Predicts Achievement in Undergraduate Statistics Through Academic Delay of Gratification” in *Statistics Education Research Journal* (2020).