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HAWKS VERSUS DOVES: THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ON THE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF DEMOCRATIC STATES

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the influence of executive ideological orientation on state foreign policy behavior. I advance an analytical model which asserts that foreign policy decisionmakers act in a manner consistent with the ideological principles presented in their political platforms, party manifestos, and their voters' expectations. Thus, I assert that within developed democracies, the further right a government is, the higher the propensity to behave more aggressively. Oppositely, the further left a government is, the more likely it is to behave more cooperatively.

I empirically analyze this theoretical argument by developing three models where the foreign policy behavior is measured uniquely in each separate model. I estimate executive ideology by using two proxies: one which estimates the overall ideology of the executive while the other captures only the foreign policy dimension of executive ideology. To test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model, I create a new dataset of responses to international crises. Foreign policy behavior is operationalized as an ordinal variable which takes into account a complex range of actions that governments take in the international arena, such as providing aid, mediation, non intervention, condemnation, sanctions, and the use of force. I employ Logit and Orderd Logit statistical analyses on a large-N cross national model. My dissertation focuses on all 22 OECD countries, during the period 1977 to 2001.

The empirical findings partially support my theoretical argument, contingent upon the proxy used for executive ideology and the way state behavior is estimated. I find consistent support to my argument if executive ideology is estimated with the proxy which contains only the party manifestos' foreign policy variables.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> *The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil (Morgenthau 1967, 165).*
>
> *If society "forgets" what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist; if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, "the cold war is over." It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions (Wendt 1992, 397).*
>
> *Ideologies are important because they constitute the framework in which policymakers deal with specific issues and in which the attentive public understands those issues (Hunt 1987, 16).*

The post-Cold War security environment

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent developments associated with it, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the changing balance of power in the international system, the emergence of a new range of security challenges, and consequently, the push for a new set of responses to those challenges, marks a new stage in relationships among states. A number of events, among which, the first Gulf War, the war in the former

Yugoslavia, the ethnic conflicts in Africa, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, have contributed to the creation of a new international security environment, characterized by uncertainty, turbulence, and rapid change. The result is that the nature of the international system is changing and states are trying to adapt to these new conditions. In Henry Kissinger's words (2007),

> "the international system is in a state of upheaval, but there are different kinds of upheaval in different parts of the world. One characteristic is that the nation and the state, as we have known it, are in the process of transformation in most parts of the world. So some of what were thought of as universal principles of international relations are changing".

As the danger of nuclear confrontation between the two former enemies, the United States and Soviet Union, decreased significantly, the concept of balance of power decreased in relevance when it came to explaining international politics. In the present world, the main enemies of the developed countries are no longer states. The present unconventional dangers in the world, such as terrorism, can not be fought entirely with conventional militaries and nuclear weapons have lost much of their effectiveness and deterring power in the face of an enemy without precise coordinates. Under these new circumstances, the balance of power no longer provides the same leverage in explaining phenomena in world politics.

A new range of international security challenges emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. First, states' vulnerability, particularly that of the Western democracies, is on the rise due to an increasing wave of extremism and Islamic religious fundamentalism

(Tibi 1998, Neumann 2006). In strict connection with this Islamic religious fundamentalism, transnational terrorism poses a serious threat to the governments and societies of the West and is here to stay for a long time (Hoffmann 1998, Gunaratna 2004). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another international security threat which, if not contained, may have a serious impact on global stability (Betts 1998, Talbott 1999). The fluctuating tensions between the two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, the will of Iran to develop its nuclear program, and North Korea's ambitions to acquire more nuclear weapons and improve its arsenal, demonstrate the gravity of this threat. As dangerous as the previous challenges, nationalism and the outbreak of ethnic conflicts as a result of long ethnic tensions, poverty, and undemocratic rule, may have serious regional consequences (Lake and Rothchild 1996, Harff and Gurr 2004). The long war in the former Yugoslavia, the atrocities committed in Sudan, Rwanda, and Somalia, had a strong ethnic component and required outside interventions in order to end.

How do states react to these recent developments? Are military capabilities still the answer when dealing with these new threats? After half a century dominated by a conventional and nuclear arms race between East and West and with the Cold War's ideologically based polarization gone, most states changed their approaches on how to tackle the different security challenges they confront. The complexity and volatility of the new security environment reduced states' ability to resolve disputes and deal with crises just by using the military force (Nye Jr. 2002, 5-12). For instance, given the impressive economic and financial interdependence between China and the United States, a trade dispute between the two countries can not be settled by resorting to arms. Moreover. because wars are costly tools of foreign policy and many times they lead to significant

casualties and high political costs, governments are reluctant to use military force. As Haass asserts (1994, 22-23), "despite some predictions to the contrary, the passing of the Cold War has made intervention decisions more commonplace and complex... Military intervention in any form is expensive... There is the danger, too, that an intervention that fares poorly, particularly one that becomes a "quagmire," could sour Americans on their world role and trigger a renewed bout of isolationism at home, thereby leaving them unable to use force when they really should or need to".

Thus, wars between and among states became a rare phenomenon, but governments may resort to a wide range of foreign policy tools. They may engage in the world affairs by using various instruments, among which we can identify foreign aid, mediation, peacekeeping missions, sanctions, the threat of the use of force, and so on. When getting involved, they can choose to act either alone, with other countries under the auspices of international institutions, or along with allies, old or new.

Analyzing the determinants of state behavior

In this study, I address the determinants of state strategic behavior with a main focus on the political ideology of governments. Specifically, I analyze the way in which the ideological orientation of the foreign policy decisionmakers influence the way in which they engage their states in world affairs. Thus, I examine, primarily, if left wing governments differ from right wing ones in their propensity to act more hawkishly or dovishly in international arena. In order to do this, I propose a theoretical model and empirical test of the conditions, at both domestic and international level, which determine governments' ideological predispositions toward accommodationist or aggressive

behavior. I contend that political ideology of the executive, economic interdependence, and power status, are significant determinants of strategic behavior.

Research on state behavior (Mearsheimer 2001, Keohane 1984, Kissinger 1974, Organski 1968) has been mostly directed at material factors while ideational factors have been largely ignored. For a long while, state capabilities (Morgenthau 1967) and the distribution of power in the international system (Waltz 1979) have been prominent in discussions of international interactions. Then, as a reaction to this research agenda, it was the thesis that economics matter, namely, the nature of economic relationships between states shapes their behavior (Rosecrance 1986). This focus on material factors is partly explained by the fact that the material structure of the international system is more accessible to researchers and more amenable to measurement, not that ideational factors have no significant impact on foreign policy decisions.

More recently, IR scholars have come to challenge the preeminence of materialism, asserting the relevance of ideational determinants of state behavior (Wendt 1992, Hudson 1997). How is possible that similarly powerful states more often than not choose to react differently to the same international constraints? Their answer was that domestic politics plays an important role and that foreign policy decisions must be examined in such a way to take into consideration the socio-cultural and political environment in which decisionmakers operate. Among these ideational factors, it was conceived that decisionmakers' political ideologies, perceptions, and images play an essential role, and also, a nation's culture and the national identity may shape foreign policy (George 1979, Herman 1993, Rosen 1996).

Fundamental questions in international relations cannot not be entirely answered

without understanding the role played by foreign policy decionmakers' political ideologies. Ideologies are important because they explain and evaluate social conditions and provide a program for social action (Ball and Dagger 2004, 4). They simplify a vast and complex reality and limit the freedom of choice when action is required. Ideologies explain cause and effect and evaluate the social environment with approval and disproval. In the foreign policy domain, "ideological conviction ... is inherently revolutionary and aggressive because it transforms relations between states from a difference of interests, which it is right to seek to conciliate, into a conflict between philosophies in which to compromise is unrighteous" (Kissinger 1964, cited in Freeman 1994, p.173). Therefore, under similar circumstances, different political ideologies may demand their subscribers, foreign policy decisionmakers included, to act in different ways.

The post World War II period shows mixed results when it comes to explaining states' strategic behavior from the perspective of decisionmakers' ideology. There are instances when political parties' positions on some international politics issues are clearly defined by their location on the ideological left-right spectrum. For example, with regard to Iran's nuclear program, there were significant differences among different political groups in the European Parliament, when they were negotiating, in 2008, the further steps after the sanctions' failure imposed on Iran. Since UEN's (the Union for the Europe of the Nations) position did not exclude a military intervention against Iran, the Greens and GUE (European United Left) supported a negotiated solutions, while PPE (European People's Party) and PSE (Party of European Socialists) were pushing for further sanctions (Zanon 2009, 7). The same ideological demarcation lines are visible among Indian political parties on their stances regarding the territorial dispute over Kashmir and the

relationship with Pakistan (Kumar 2007). In contrast, in other instances, political ideology may not play such an important role. For example, before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the overwhelming majority of Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. Congress voted in favor of President Bush's decision to go to war. Then, ideology did not matter.

Regarding the impact of ideology on state behavior, the mixed evidence in the practice of international politics is accompanied by a lack of a unified approach in the International Relations literature. First, realists see international interactions as an expression of state capabilities and the distribution of these military capabilities more generally throughout the international system. They dismiss the role of ideology in foreign policymaking. Others, however, insist that political ideology does matter and helps explain variation in state foreign policy actions (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994, McCormick, Wittkopf, and Danna 1997, Therien 2002).

In this study, I plan to build on the ongoing analytical debate between materialists and ideationalists and identify the impact that political ideology has on foreign policy decisionmaking. I will address this relationship empirically by developing a statistical model which will test the correlation between partisanship and state strategic behavior. State behavior will be analyzed in a larger context than in the extant literature, which mostly focuses on the use or non use of force. In this dissertation, state behavior will cover a large variety of policy options that leaders have available, among which, providing foreign aid, mediation, and imposing sanctions.

Outline of the dissertation

My dissertation proceeds in five chapters following this introduction. In chapter II, I will

review the literature on foreign policy decisionmaking by broadly discussing the impact of material versus ideational forces on foreign policy behavior. On the material forces, I will focus on the role played by power and economic relationships and then discuss the evidence relating them to foreign policy behavior. On ideational forces, I will discuss the possible ways in which culture, norms, ideas and beliefs, can shape strategic behavior.

Chapter III explores the previous scholarship which addresses my research question. As underlined above, there are two opposing groups of International Relations scholars that tackle this issue. First, I will look at the literature which dismisses the role of political ideologies. Then, I will examine, both normatively and empirically, the literature which supports the thesis according to which decisionmakers' political ideology represents a causal factor of state behavior. I advance and then test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis sustains that the ideology of the government is not a causal factor of foreign policy behavior. Second, I hypothesize that ideology matters: more liberal governments are more likely to act cooperatively, and vice versa, more conservative governments show higher propensity toward more aggressive behavior.

In chapter IV, I will develop the empirical research design, needed to test the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. Here, I will explain the case selection procedure and the way in which each variable is measured. I will use International Crises Behavior dataset in order to identify the crises during 1990-2000 and then I will estimate the OECD countries' behavior by analyzing their involvement in each of those crises, as it is presented Keesing's Record of World Events. To test the hypotheses, I introduce a new categorical measure for state behavior, which captures the different ways in which a state can act in response to an international crisis.

In chapter V, I will test the hypotheses enunciated in chapter III by using the research design presented in chapter IV. I will introduce three empirical models where the foreign policy behavior is measured uniquely in each separate model. To examine these three models, I employ Logit and Orderd Logit statistical analyses on a large-N cross national model. Two different measures of executive ideology will be used: one which estimates the overall ideology of the executive, while the other captures only the foreign policy dimension of executive ideology. A number of domestic and systemic structure level variables will additionally be used in order to explain the changes in foreign policy behavior.

In chapter VI, I will conclude with an outline of what my study found out and propose suggestions on how this research can be developed in the future.

CHAPTER 2

MATERIAL FACTORS VERSUS IDEATIONAL FACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISON-MAKING

You have seen the war in Indochina described variously as an outgrowth of French colonialism and its French refusal to treat indigenous populations decently. You find it again described as a war between the communists and the other elements in southeast Asia. But ... you don't know, really, why we are so concerned with the far-off southeast corner of Asia... If Indochina goes... the tin and tungsten that we so greatly value from that area would cease coming (Eisenhower 1954).

Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas (Keynes 1936).

People act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not (Wendt 1992, 396-7).

The present international relations literature presents a clash between two camps of scholars, who dispute the origins of state strategic behavior: the materialist and the idealists. The mainstream international relations is dominated by those who argue that it is material forces which mainly determine foreign policy decisionmaking. Thus, a first

important weakness of the extant research is that the ideational forces are, to a large extent, ignored (Hudson 1997, Hopf 1998). A second major weakness is that the vast majority of studies fail to explore the full range of decisions states take. More precisely, they investigate the causes of war (Maoz and Abdolahi 1989, Levy 1993, Cashman 1993, Geller and Singer 1998, Van Evera 1999) which is just one of the multiple choices that states have when they engage in the international affairs.

As the two most relevant material determinants of state behavior, power and economic relationships have occupied the center stage of the international relations scholarship. Either because they were the most visible and significant attributes during the Cold War or because they are more amenable to quantification in comparison with their nonmaterial counterparts, power and economic relationships overshadow other causal factors of foreign policy such as culture, identity, norms, and ideology. However, that should not be the case. As stated by Ruggie (1998), “the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material” (p.879). Moreover, because "both actors' identities and interests are constituted by ideational structures... ideational factors do more than constrain behavior"; they constitute the rules of the game which define roles, identities, interests and criteria of legitimacy and justification" (Jackson 2003, 22-23). In this context, for a better understanding of state actions, there is a need to expand the range of possible causal factors and include ideational ones.

Regarding the second limitation in the international relations scholarship, as we see in the practice of international relations, wars are rare events in international relations and states can do more than just wage wars. Among others, they can help other states via foreign aid (Therien and Noel 2000), they can mediate conflicts (Bercovitch 1989,

Wallensteen 2002), contribute in peacekeeping operations, condemn states who violate the rights of other states, or impose sanctions on states which do not comply with international law (Drezner 1999; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). That is why reducing state behavior to the simple use of force does not offer leverage in explaining global politics.

In the present dissertation, I intend to address these two important limitations in the international relations literature by doing the following. First, I will examine analytically and empirically the causal influences of political ideology on foreign policy decisionmaking. Currently, scholarship in international relations does not properly address this relationship. Most studies analyze policy preferences by estimating programmatic positions of political actors, via elite surveys or content analysis to party policy documents or speeches of politicians, rather than actually examining the executives' foreign policy decisions (Debus 2009). Besides, little systematic attention has been paid to the empirical relationship between ideology and foreign policy (Schultz 2005, Schultz and Hall 2002). Second, this study will examine the way in which states interact with other states in a more comprehensive manner than the rigid and limited use of force/non use of force; one which will take into consideration a much wider range of state actions, from the most accommodationist to the most aggressive. The current status of international relations shows a predisposition toward the study of war. Most studies analyze the determinants of military conflicts at the expense of other possible types of state behavior, such as providing foreign aid, mediation, or imposing sanctions.

In the rest of this chapter I will discuss how material and ideational forces are evaluated in the present literature. On the material factors, I will refer to the empirical evidence that relates foreign policy behavior with two basic measures, power and

economic relationships.

State behavior and its material determinants

Many political scientists believe that political behavior is strictly determined by the physical world alone. Applied to the field of international relations, this approach delineates a line of inquiry which puts material matters at the core of international politics. In other words, the origins of state behavior in the international arena are best explained by material factors. It is not that ideational factors are totally irrelevant (Mearsheimer 2001, 58), but there is a logic in the hierarchy among various levels of causal factors. Material factors come first, then institutional factors and then the social environment (Searle 1995, 34-35). In the relationship material factors state behavior, the nature of the relationship is causal. That is, from a temporal perspective, material factors precede state behavior and are independent of it (Wendt 2000, 25).

Examining the present international relations literature, it would be fair to say that most contemporary theoretical work is focused on material explanations of state behavior, centered either at the individual, state, or the international system level. Alexander Wendt (2000, 23), clearly captures the essence of materialism, when he writes:

> "Materialists believe the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and organization of the material forces. At least five material factors recur in materialist discourse: (1) human nature; (2) natural resources; (3) geography; (4) forces of production; and (5) forces of destruction. These can matter in various ways: by permitting the manipulation of the world, by empowering some actors over others, by disposing people toward aggression, by creating threats, and so

on".

The two theoretical traditions in international politics that are most materialist in their ontology are realism and neoliberal institutionalism. Both theories place social issues and moral standards subordinate to the power concerns of states and international actors.

Material forces determine state foreign behavior at the individual, state, and system levels. At the individual level, most materialists assume that human beings have a selfish nature, are aggressive and power-seeking, and fear of death dictates their behavior (Hobbes 1996, Machiavelli 1988). At the core of the materialist argument is the assumption that people always act on material self-interest, as opposed to idealists' argument, according to which people's actions are best explained by norms and values. In order to create and maintain stability in society and peaceful coexistence among its members, there is a need for power and authority. But why is human nature important in the big picture of state strategic behavior? According to Carr (1939) and Morgenthau (1967), human nature is a fundamental determinant of the national interest. It is human nature which is the source of a state's quest for power. According to this view, the expansionist policies of states represent just an extension of the egoistic nature of rulers.

When it comes to the notion of security, it is the need for physical security which is paramount. Other types of needs are also important, but less important than physical security. Recognition from society, socialization, and self-esteem, are less visible than the physical security, but more ideational in character (Giddens 1984, Turner 1988, Honneth 1996). However, people need, first and foremost, basic things for survival, like food and water, and protection from threats. Consequently, according to materialists, the characteristics of human nature and people's basic needs require a focus on material

determinants when explaining human behavior.

At the state level, the main argument of the materialist school of thought is that material objects (e.g. territory, mountains, weapons, oil) have a direct impact on state behavior, which is not altered by the perceptions and ideas decisionmakers associate with those objects. Materialists assert that material power drives state behavior (Morgenthau 1967, Gilpin 1981). Materialists tend to assume preferences, arguing that the states' primary goal is to maintain their own security. In order to pursue their interests, states attempt to accumulate resources, and thus, relations among states are a matter of their relative levels of power.

Scholars like Joshua Goldstein and Robert Keohane (1993) insist both states' material interests and ideas about the political world belong to two distinct spaces. Even though ideas may play a role in affecting strategic behavior, the primary cause of state behavior has a material foundation. In the case of states' primary interests, many IR scholars and practitioners acknowledge that the content of those interests (such as wealth, power, and survival), are unchanging and have a material essence. Under these circumstances, they assert, it is reasonable to believe that the attributes which prefigure those interests, the material resources of states, are also material in character. Therefore, "states are either constructed by material forces or can be treated as if their construction is irrelevant to their interests and behavior" (Hurd 2008, 302).

As in the case of individuals, states also want to survive. In the materialist view, states' ability to survive is strictly determined by their material resources such as military and economic capabilities. In this way, international politics becomes the stage where states interact with each other, with the objective of enlarging their resources and

capabilities, for the purpose of maximizing their chances for survival. Above all, the struggle over territory is "one of the enduring features of international politics" (Huth 1996, 5). As asserted by Holsti (1991), during the period 1648-1989, territory was at the core of interstate wars. An overwhelming majority of wars entailed territory-related issues (Vasquez 1993, 1995).

On the quest for strategic raw materials, President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1954), referring to the "domino theory principle", emphasized the importance of Indochina's supply of tin, rubber, and tungsten, to U.S. strategic interests. More recently, China's present foreign policy shift toward the Third World shows an increasing interest for new sources of strategic raw materials (Eisenman, Heginbotham, and Mitchell 2007). Also, the access to new energy sources constitutes an important factor which determines the strategic behavior of states. The first Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. military invasion of Iraq are just two examples when the United States acted in such a way to secure its access to the oil resources in the Persian Gulf. Finally, the location of a country and its geography impact its behavior. For a long while, U.S. isolationism was the expression of its location on the globe. The two oceans made it difficult for the United States to interact with other countries, as opposed to European states, which have frequently been decimated by wars. The geographic location of a country, then, determines in part how accessible that country is to foreign invasion.

The preeminence of material factors is valid also at the international system level. When studying social phenomena and the constitution of the world in which states interact, materialists suggest that ideas do not constitute social reality, they just mirror the material world and help validate the material causes (Krasner 1993). Following the logic

of anarchy, in a world characterized by the lack of a supra-state authority, states are self-help actors, and from here, their tendency to perceive reality in terms of who has the material power to determine others' behavior (Waltz 1979). On this note, John Mearsheimer (1995, 91) says that "the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics". More precisely, “states are differently placed by their power, and differences in placement help to explain both the behavior and their fates. In any political system, the distribution of the unit’s capabilities is a key to explanation” (Waltz 1979, 75). Therefore, the character of the international system - if it is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar - determines state interactions.

Among the first neorealists to explain state behavior in terms of material polarity of the international system, Morton Kaplan (1957) and Robert Gilpin (1981) did not go farther to discuss how the relationship between poles affect the stability of the international system. The only thing which matters in neorealism is the number of major powers or poles, whereas perceptions that poles have about each other are not relevant. However, in reality, it makes a significant difference to how the relations among states evolve in the world arena, if the poles are friends or enemies. That is, on the role of system level factors on strategic behavior of states, neorealists stop short of bringing the idealist social theory in the international relations debate.

Keohane (1984) adds a new element in the discussion on the role of material factors at the international system level. Mostly realist in orientation, he argues that international institutions are global actors and considers them helpful in facilitating cooperation among states by providing information and reducing transaction costs:

"Institutions... could provide information, monitor compliance, increase iterations,

facilitate issue linkages, define cheating, and offer salient solutions... chiefly by providing information to actors (not by enforcing rules in a centralized manner), institutions could enable states to achieve their own objectives more efficiently" (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 662).

Addressing the role of material forces at the individual level and their impact on the behavior of states may be a difficult empirical task. For example, it is hard to make a plausible theoretical argument and then demonstrate the causal relationship between a president or prime minister's wealth and his or her foreign policy decision. Are richer foreign policy decisionmakers more likely than the less prosperous ones, to adopt more aggressive foreign policies? There is not much theoretic foundation for making such a case. Instead, international relations scholarship focuses more on the role of ideational factors rather than material factors at the individual level when explaining foreign policies. Among these ideational factors, leaders' perceptions and misperceptions, personalities, systematic set of beliefs, and psychological makeup (Keller 2005; Hermann and Hagan 1998; Jervis 1976) may predispose them toward certain kinds of foreign policies.

That leaves us with the alternative of concentrating on the material forces at the state and systemic levels. At these two levels, it is power and economic interdependence which constitute the most common material determinants of state strategic behavior. In a material world, according to realists, "power is central to international politics because it means bigness, and bigness means influence, and influence means affecting other nations... because power often equals the ability to be violent and impose one's will on others, then power is important" (Sullivan 1990, 76). The second material factor,

economic interdependence, is also important and represents one of the most debated research programs in the international relations field. In the view of Keohane and Nye (2000), interdependence among states generates sensitivities and vulnerabilities and may lead either to international conflict (Barbieri 1996) or peace (Russett and Oneal 2001).

In the following two sections of this chapter, I will analyze from a normative perspective power and economic interdependence and their role in shaping the foreign behavior of states. Also, I will discuss the evidence which points to the causal relationship between the two material factors and behavior.

Power and strategic behavior of states

Power is considered the central concept in the study of international politics. Most international interactions involve power relations, but power itself may have different forms. As maybe the most contested term in International Relations, power is a multifaceted concept and thus, difficult to define. However, no matter how comprehensive this concept, power comes to be perceived as the ability of state A to cause state B to act in a certain way that B otherwise would not have act (Dahl 1957).

One of the debates in the literature centers on how power is defined and understood. There are two approaches to this issue. First, power is viewed as an attribute of states, it is a possession or property of states. According to this view, military power, economic well being, country's size and population, geography, natural and human resources, the morale of the society, the quality of the political leaders, and so on, constitute power. Here, a state's power is assessed independent of the other states in the international system. This approach identifies power as potential, as if all dimensions of

power can be summed up and used against a potential enemy. One problem with this approach is that some power resources are useless in certain situations. For example, it is very unlikely that the United States will use its nuclear weapons against China or conventional weapons against a democratic country with which U.S. may have a trade dispute (Baldwin 2002, 178-179). Second, power can be thought of in terms of relational power. This approach conceives of power in a causal way, where power becomes a relationship. That is, behavior of actor A is partially determined by the power of actors B, C, and D, while actors may be persons, states, institutions, and so on, and behavior has a broad meaning, which includes, among others, beliefs, attitudes, and predispositions to act (Baldwin 2002, 178).

How important is power in determining strategic behavior of states? Realists Morgenthau (1967, 4), a classic realist, maintains that "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power". The realm of international politics becomes a confrontational arena where states seek power both as an end in itself as well as a means to all their other ends. In the hierarchy among different types of power, realists insist that it is military power which is most important. In Art's words (2009, 7),

> "Militarily powerful states have greater clout in world politics than militarily weak ones. Militarily strong states are less subject to the influence of other states than militarily weak ones. Militarily powerful states can better offer protection to other states, or more seriously threaten them, in order to influence their behavior than can militarily weak ones".

Further, as argued by Mearsheimer (1994/1995, 11-12), power is relative or relational:

"states in the international system aim to maximize their relative power position over other states". They choose to acquire more power because this is the surest way to guarantee survival. However, within the large group of realists, there is the group of so called "defensive" realists who argue that the costs of expansion might outweigh the benefits of such a behavior (van Evera 1999, Snyder 1991).

How do realists see the causal relationship between power and behavior? The general intuitive argument is that large, powerful states, are inclined to have a broader range of interests and more international commitments than small, less powerful states. In this way, major powers become more likely to get involved in world affairs. Besides, major powers have higher stakes in changing the international status quo or maintaining it, when challengers emerge. No less important, they simply may act as guarantors of the world order and, when in alliances, powerful countries are responsible for the protection of allies and from here, the necessity to act (Cashman and Robinson 2007, 10). The simple fact that powerful states act more often than less powerful states increases the odds that they may behave more aggressively than other states in the international system.

An alternate explanation is that not all countries can afford or have the ability to react or adapt to changing conditions in the international system. The existence of a certain interstate conflict (Sullivan 1976), the emergence of a troubling regional or international actor, or the intensification of domestic ethnic animosities in a failing state are instances which may require the intervention of third parties. As was the case in many regional or international crises, countries' involvement in conflict or the third party intervention require the use or the threat of using force. In this situation, national military

capabilities play a major role that automatically limits the number of actors which may get involved directly or indirectly in a conflict. Thus, power and capabilities act as filters, constraining the range of potential states which intervene in world affairs.

Liberals, neoliberal institutionalists, and constructivists distance themselves from the realist idea that power explains everything, trying to demonstrate that power-related variables are not the main variables responsible for changes in foreign policy outcomes. Liberals claim that the importance of power is no longer primarily military in nature, but rather economic in orientation today (Doyle 1997). Moreover, state behavior is not a matter of capabilities but a function of preferences. According to Moravcsik (1997, 522),

> "The capability-based power to threaten central to realism enters the equation in specific circumstances and only through linkage to threats and side-payments. Even where capability-based threats and promises are employed, preference-based determinants of the tolerance for bearing bargaining costs, including differential temporal discount rates, risk-acceptance, and willingness to accept punishment, remain central".

As an alternative to the power considerations, liberals propose that state behavior is better understood if taking into consideration, in addition to power, the presence of democratic regimes, particular arrangements of domestic interests, international institutions, or economic interdependence. Thus, the relationship between states and the domestic and transnational social context shape state preferences. As empirical evidence, the conflicts in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Chechnya come to support the liberal view on the relationship between power and state behavior. The overwhelming military advantage of the United States over Vietnam and the Soviet Union's over Afghanistan proved not to be

decisive factors in front of the strong will and determination of the Vietnamese and Afghan populations. Power by itself, then is insufficient in explaining the outcomes of these conflicts.

Neoliberal institutionalists, while arguing that power is essential in understanding international politics, consider that international institutions, viewed as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations” (Keohane 1989, 163), are able to promote cooperation among states (Keohane 1984, 9). According to North (1981, 1990) and Keohane (1984), institutions provide information and stabilize expectations which lead to less uncertainty and reduce transaction costs. Moreover, international institutions matter because “they could … monitor compliance, increase iterations, facilitate issue linkages, define cheating, and offer salient solutions” (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 662). A central concept to neoliberal institutionalism, which determines state behavior, is complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Viewed as interconnectedness among different societies, and formally defined as the “flows of money, goods, people, and messages across international boundaries” (Keohane and Nye 2000, 6-7) interdependence creates sensitivity and vulnerability, leads to cooperation and restricts autonomy simultaneously (Keohane and Nye 1977, 9-11).

For constructivism, power is not an attribute of particular actors, but is viewed as a "social process of constituting what actors are as social beings, that is, their social identities and capacities" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 42). As expressed by Wendt (1995, 73), "power and interest do not have effects, apart from the shared knowledge that constitutes them as such". Similarly, threats and opportunities, friends and foes, are also

understood as being a product of the same social structures of shared knowledge. That is why, all British nuclear weapons are less dangerous to the United States than the few weapons possessed by North Korea. But how does power shape behavior in constructivist theory? Constructivists argue that power concerns discourse, through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed. In this context, the notion of discourse "refers to how “microfields” or the quotidian (read "ordinary") define the impossible, the improbable, the natural, the normal, what counts as a problem, ... they define the social fields of action that are imaginable and possible” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 55).

Does power matter? Empirical evidence.

As we have seen in the previous discussion, power seems to be the most complex and multifaceted concept in international relations. In order to understand the empirical effect of power on state behavior, we need to study the relationship between power-related variables at the state, dyadic, and system level and the strategic behavior of states. The three power-related variables that I will look at are power status, capability balance, and system's polarity.

The research with a focus on the relationship between power status and state behavior show that more powerful states tend to behave more aggressively than less powerful countries (Geller and Singer 1998; Geller 1988; Small and Singer 1982, 1970). In their studies of wars during 1815-1965 and 1816-1980, Singer and Small (1967, 1982) demonstrate that powerful states are much more likely to engage in wars than are weak states. In terms of all battle deaths, 90% belong to eleven powerful states, among them,

Britain, France, the United States, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. At the opposite end, during the same period, 77 of the 144 less powerful states did not get involved in any military conflict. On a same note, Wright (1964) finds a positive relationship between national capabilities and the likelihood to behave aggressively. Similarly, Bremer (1980) concludes that countries with high CINC (composite index of national capability) scores tend to initiate and be involved in more wars than states with lower CINC scores. More recent studies also support the major powers' belligerency thesis. Geller and Singer (1998, 565-568) find that states with greater power capabilities are more likely than states with lesser capabilities to participate in and initiate wars, since Geller (1988) states that the powerful countries are more likely to get involved in severe military conflicts and less likely to fight moderate wars than are less powerful countries.

At the dyadic level, quantitative empirical research shows mixed evidence. In a study which covers the period 1816-1974, Bueno de Mesquita (1978) reports that in at least 65% of the cases war initiators are stronger than their targets and finds that capability balance is statistically significant in determining initiation of wars. Correspondingly, Siverson and Tennefoss (1984) demonstrate that, during the period 1815-1965, just a few disputes among relatively equally powerful countries escalate to military conflict while conflicts initiated by strong states against weak states are much more likely to lead to war. Also, there is empirical evidence which supports the thesis that equality of power leads to war. In a study which analyzes border disputes during 1945-1974, Mandel (1980) concludes that violent border disputes are more likely to take place when the fighting neighbors show parity of power. Consistent with these results, in a study which covers all COW dyads for the period 1816-1965, Bremer (1992) finds that

military conflict is more likely to occur in dyads where the difference between the two countries' capabilities are small or medium than between countries with large capability differences.

Finally, the importance of the international system's polarity was the focus of many international relations empirical studies. In a study which analyzes international wars from 1495 to 1980, Mansfield (1988) finds that the average annual number of wars initiated during times of unipolarity was higher than in times of bipolarity or multipolarity. Conversely, examining COW conflicts during the same time interval like Mansfield, Thompson (1986) suggests military conflicts were less likely to occur when the system was unipolar, whereas bipolar and multipolar international systems are similar in terms of war-proneness. The same mixed results were obtained when examining the bipolar and multipolar systems. According to Brecher et al. (1990), during the period 1929-1985, the bipolar system is more stable than multipolar one, if examining the major powers' involvement in ICB international crises. This study also concludes that war magnitude (total nation-months of war) is higher during bipolarity (1945-1962) than during multipolarity (1929-1939). However, opposite results show that for the temporal span of 1815-1965, major power war magnitude was higher for multipolar power systems than for bipolar ones (Wayman 1984).

Economic interdependence and strategic behavior of states

The second material determinant of state behavior, economic interdependence is widely used, mainly by scholars who subscribe to the international relations liberal tradition, to explain state behavior. Developed by neoliberal institutionalists, the concepts of

interdependence and complex interdependence function as bigger tents for the more specific notion of economic interdependence. The first, interdependence, is a broad term which refers to "situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries" (Keohane and Nye 2000, 8). More comprehensive than the first one, complex interdependence refers to a "situation among a number of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies (that is, states do not monopolize these contacts; there is no hierarchy of issues; and military force is not used by governments towards one another" (Keohane and Nye 1987, 731). The large number of state and private economic actors and the high stakes of economics in world politics bring economic interdependence closer to the second concept of the two, complex interdependence.

In studies on conflict, the notion of economic interdependence involves two different aspects. The first aspect, sensitivity interdependence, implies that a group of countries are interdependent if economic conditions in one country are influenced by those found in others. An example which fits this type of interdependence is the European Union, where rising inflation or unemployment in one country affects the economic conditions in another. Secondly, vulnerability interdependence, assumes that it would be too costly for a country to completely break up the trade with other countries, as it may be noticed in the case of Western countries' high demand of oil and their reliance on the OPEC countries' oil resources (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 11). In a more general sense, "states are economically interdependent when they are engaged in trade and investment relations which would be costly to break" (Ripsman and Blanchard 1996, 9).

The most common view in the scholarship on the conceptual links between economic interdependence and state behavior is that international markets and large economic exchanges hinder interstate conflict (Doyle 1997, chapter 8; Polachek 1992, 1980; Rosecrance 1986; Morse 1970; Mitrany 1964; Haas 1964). As stated by Blainey (1973, 18),"the long peace that followed the Battle of Waterloo was increasingly explained as a result of the international flow of commodities and ideas". Similarly, in Robert Art's words (1980, 16-17), a "nation whose economic interests are deeply entangled with another's cannot use force ... interests intertwined render force unusable".

This liberal argument can be explained in different ways. First, increasing trade and economic ties more generally facilitate contact and encourage a better communication, which ultimately improves the political climate and reduces the likelihood of war (Stein 1993, Doyle 1997). More profoundly, via trade, citizens from a country are exposed to the ideas and learn from perspectives of other countries. That leads to the creation of "security communities", wherein shared values are created and a sense of identity emerges (Deutsch et al, 1957). Second, economic interdependence strengthens the pacific benefits of democratic institutions and norms (Russett and Oneal 2001, 129). In this way, material incentives contribute to solidifying law and morality within domestic societies. Third, governments' main responsibility is to acquire the resources needed to promote their national security and economic growth. As trade and foreign investment increase, states' revenues increase and thus, the need for territorial expansion and conquest is significantly reduced (Rosecrance 1986). Fourth, even though benefits of trade are asymmetrical, trading partners have an interest in the economic well-being of the other. Due to this precise reason, they will avoid military conflict, because

otherwise they can not sell their goods and invest in the other country , and also obtain imports from it (Russett and Oneal 2001, 129). Finally, a vibrant international trade environment generates domestically a wealthy business community and a solid middle class who are interested in maintaining the status quo. When the economic relations are disrupted, political relations between states become strained and the gains from trade become questionable. Under these new circumstances, the domestic actors urge foreign policy decision makers to avoid military conflict. These public officials, who count on the political support of the business and middle class, respond to their demands and thus, the political tensions between the trading partners deescalate (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 3).

Second, an opposing view to the liberals' is expressed by those who emphasize that trade and economic ties do not necessarily promote peace, but even may create rivalry and finally, lead to conflict (Rosecrance 1986, Gilpin 1981, dos Santos 1970). Three lines of reasoning are present here. First, from the practice of trade among countries, it can be noticed the benefits from trade are not distributed symmetrically among the trading partners. As an example, the annual average trade deficit between the United States and China in the last five years is over a quarter of a trillion dollars (U.S. Census Bureau). The distribution of these gains influences the power relations among states. According to Gilpin (1981) and Levy (1989), the shifting power relations among major powers can lead to instability and military conflict. Further, in line with economic theories of imperialism, the growth of imperialism, the increasing need on the part of the great powers for access to new territories and foreign markets, leads to conflict among the great powers (Hobson 1965, Lenin 1939). Thus, international politics is just an

expression of how the governments of the wealthy nations defend and promote the interests of their economic monopolies and powerful corporations. Finally, according to dependistas, trade and investment produce dependency, exploitation, and military conflict, rather than interdependence (dos Santos 1970, Rubinson 1976). The trade between states of significantly unequal size and the subsequent domination by the more powerful country can increase popular resentment in the less developed one. This situation can enable nationalists or revolutionary to seize power, who may then implement retaliatory measures such as seizing assets owned by the nationals of the great power. Consequently, that may lead to rising tensions between the two states and possible retaliatory measures from the more powerful country.

The third conceptual avenue which links interdependence and state behavior reveals that trade is irrelevant to international conflict. According to realist theorists, economic issues are a matter of low politics and their influences are secondary to other considerations such as the distribution of political-military capabilities (Buzan 1984, Gilpin 1987). Power relations overshadow any possible effect of economic interdependence. However, protecting the national interest may imply the use of economic instruments (Morgenthau 1967). In this situation, trade does not have a beneficial effect toward the use of more accomodationist tools in foreign policy, but it is just a means for securing and increasing power. As evidence that economic ties have little systematic impact on state relations, it is pointed out that economic relations among the major powers before World War I were substantial, whereas prior to World War II, the same economic relations were less extensive (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 4).

Does economic interdependence matter? Empirical evidence.

Empirical research on the causal relationship between economic interdependence and state behavior is extensive (Polachek 1980, Barbieri 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999a; Russett and Oneal 2001). There is substantial empirical evidence (Russett and Oneal 2001; Bennett and Stam 2000; Oneal and Russett 1999, 1997a; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Mansfield 1994) which supports the liberal view, according to which interdependence inhibits conflict. Even conceptualized as openness and measured as the percentage of global output (Mansfield 1994), viewed as sensitivity and quantified as the ratio of trade flows between states to the national income of each partner (Hegre 2000), the connection with the global economy makes states less likely to go to war. Also, if analyzed as foreign investment, interdependence has the same beneficial effect, increasing the incentives for peace (Russett and Oneal 2001, 141). In a study from 1980, Polachek hypothesizes that potential welfare losses as a result of diminishing trade, deter conflict. Testing a model using a ten-year thirty-country cross section merged from four separate data source, he finds that countries with the greatest levels of economic trade engage in the least amount in hostility. Indeed, a doubling of trade on average leads to a twenty percent decrease of hostility. The same negative relationship between interdependence and behavior is obtained by Oneal and Russett (1997, 1999a). Using pooled-regression analyses of politically relevant dyads for the Cold War era, Oneal and Russett (1997) conclude that higher levels of economically important trade, as indicated by the bilateral trade-to-GDP ratio, are associated with lower incidences of militarized interstate disputes and war.

In contrast with the above considerations, other authors (Barbieri 1998, 1996,

1995) report that bilateral trade increases the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Barbieri (1996), for instance, shows that higher levels of commerce increased hostilities in the period 1875-1930, when controlling for the potentially confounding influences of contiguity, regime type (joint democracy), relative capabilities, and alliance commitments. She contends that economic relations determine the likelihood that dyads engage in militarized disputes but they do not influence the occurrence of wars. Most probable, trade leads to peace when trading partners are mutually dependent. However, the higher the degree of interdependence, the higher the likelihood of dyadic disputes. Extreme interdependence, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, has the greatest prospective for increasing the chance of conflict.

Finally, there are studies that found that the effect of trade on state behavior is conditioned by the presence of trading institutions and outside those institutions, trade does not affect significantly the security relations among the trading states (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000). Besides, a state's domestic regime is also important when studying the impact of interdependence on foreign policy decisionmaking. As expected, authoritarian leaders are normally not affected by to the costs of trade disruption associated with military disputes. Therefore, "trade acts as a powerful constrain on conflict within democratic dyads... [since]... for autocratic states, however, economic interdependence may actually increase the incidence of military conflict" (Gelpi and Grieco 2003, 54).

State behavior and the role of ideas

The post-war scholarship was mainly dominated by materialists, those who argue that it

is the material factors, such as military capabilities and economic relations, which shape the way states interact with each other, and that state interests are strictly determined by power, security, and wealth. However, their supremacy did not remain unchallenged. Multiple lines of inquiry and theorizing go beyond the material factors and focus on the ideational factors and their role in foreign policy making (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954; Katzenstein 1996; Hudson 1997, Wendt 1992 and 2000, Hopf 2002). Although material factors are important, leaving ideational factors out of the equation, it would be difficult to explain the contested nature of international relations. Questions such as why the nuclear weapons of Britain and France are less dangerous to the United States than those of North Korea and possibly Iran do not receive a definite answer if going only with the materialist approach.

The fundamental principle in the idealist line of inquiry is that world politics is socially constructed, that is, "people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them" (Wendt 1992, 396-397). This line of theorizing focuses on the primary role of ideas in foreign policy decision processes. Idealists "tend to emphasize the constitutive role of ideas, the ways in which ideas give other factors the explanatory role that they have by investing them with meaning and content" (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 60). In general, ideas refer to belief systems, perceptions, identity, ideology, discourse, and culture. To Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 6-7), more specifically, ideas represent particular beliefs, shared by large numbers of people, ranging from "general moral principles to agreement on a specific application of scientific knowledge".

The two main international relations theories which provide the normative

foundation for debating the role of ideas in state behavior are constructivism (Wendt 1995, Hopf 1998, Finnemore and Sikkink 2001) and liberalism (Moravcsik 1997, Ruggie 1982). In constructivism, the relationship ideas-behavior is constitutive since ideas are endogenous to interaction; there is no temporal disjunction between the two, they exist simultaneously (Wendt 2000, 25). In liberalism, societal ideas, interests, and institutions condition state behavior by shaping state preferences (Moravcsik 1997). One variant of liberal theory, ideational liberalism, contends that ideas about national, political, and socioeconomic public goods provision explain variations in state foreign policy preferences. Conflict and cooperation in world politics are largely determined by "the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences" (Moravcsik 1997, 514).

Regarding the importance of the material factors, the advocates of ideas' preeminence in foreign policymaking maintain that, in this socially constructed world, material factors matter, but the way they matter depends on ideas. In a departure from the realist perspective, according to which power and interest are material in character, idealists argue that the meaning of power and content of interests are largely a function of actors' ideas. Put differently, power and interest produce the causes they do because of the ideas that make them up. According to Wendt (2000, 115), "...only a small part of what constitutes interests is actually material. The material force constituting interests is human nature. The rest is ideational: schemas and deliberations that are in turn constituted by shared ideas and culture".

At its turn, power also becomes a matter of ideas. That is why Britain's nuclear

arsenal constitute an element of power in Iran's view, as opposed to the United States, a traditional ally of the first, which considers Britain's weapons as friendly, and thus, not a constitutive element in power relations between the two states. Further, the nature of state interactions between two democracies is not a result of the power relations. Similarly, "material polarity of the international system matters but how it matters depends on whether the poles are friends or enemies, which is a function of shared ideas" (Wendt 2000, 24). Even the nature of security challenges is shaped by the way states perceive those challenges. In Stephen Walt' view (1987) states' actions are determined by their will to balance threats rather than power, threats being socially constructed. "... if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, "the cold war is over." It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions (Wendt 1992, 397).

The ways ideas influence policy outcomes

As enunciated above, in constructivism, the structure of the international system has three components: material conditions, interests, and ideas. In this context, the relationship between ideas and strategic behavior is straightforward. As stated by Wendt (2000, 139), "without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all". Thus, ideas constitute the material base of social reality, while power and interests determine foreign policy outcomes. Essential to this theoretical approach, power and interests do not have an independent existence, unless they are given a meaning by actors' ideas and beliefs.

In the neoliberal institutionalist view, ideas help to order the social environment.

In this way, ideas may influence agendas and thus, they influence outcomes. Besides, ideas function as a selection process by reducing the number of plausible alternatives to a situation. There are three conceptual paths which link ideas with policy outcomes. In their attempt to explain political outcomes, Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 3) state: "our argument is that ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions".

Ideas as road map

The first pathway builds on the assumption that policy preferences for certain outcomes are gained, not prearranged. World views and principled beliefs condition people's views about the outside world, the nature of human beings, the major moral principles which guide our lives, what is right and wrong, and so on. Therefore, in order to decipher the causes which determine certain policy preferences, we need to understand what range of ideas are at hand and how policymakers select among different ideas. In this capacity, ideas help constitute goals and identify alternative strategies used to attain those goals. Furthermore, in conditions of uncertainty or incomplete information, the role of ideas and causal beliefs is reinforced when policymakers choose among different courses of action to reach the desired goals (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13). In the domain of foreign policy, ideas determine social reality and shape the way in which foreign policy actors perceive the security environment, the urgency of threats, and the means which will be used in order to face those threats (Alagappa 1998, 612).

Two examples come to support this view. First, after the World War II, many East European countries adopted the economic model of development of the Soviet Union the reason being that they were afraid of Soviet punishment. In the case of China, however, the power-based explanation does not work as well. China adopted the Stalinist model simply because of the power of Soviet ideas, not the power of Soviet tanks and artillery (Halpern 1993). Second, the timing and extent of decolonization in the 1950 was largely determined by the European states' new ideas about self-determination rather than changes in interests and power (Jackson 1993).

Ideas as focal points and glue

According to this view, ideas play a coordinating role among a certain number of participants. Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 12) state that "ideas affect strategic interactions, helping or hindering joint efforts to attain more efficient outcomes - outcomes that are at least as good as the status quo for all participants. Here ideas contribute to outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium". Consequently, ideas can function as focal points, "as solutions to problems associated with incomplete contracting, or as the means to counteract problems of collective action" (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 18). Shared cultural, religious, or ethnic beliefs of actors or decisionmakers can serve as a foundation for establishing alternative strategies in order to attain their goals.

An example which reflects this functional role of ideas is a study on constructing the European Community's internal market (Garrett and Weingast 1993). Due to the divergent interests of different countries and firms, the study's argument is that a

cooperative agreement in Europe was not possible to emerge without countries agreeing upon a common set of actions leading up to organizing market exchanges in the EC. What determined the agreement was the existence of a set of core ideas, such as the preeminence of EC laws over domestic laws and the principle of mutual recognition.

Institutionalization

The third pathway conceives that the use of ideas over time create changes in the present rules and norms, which constitute institutions. Once ideas become institutionalized, they restrain the decisionmakers' freedom to consider all possible paths of action in order to attain their goals. That is, "ideas embedded in institutions specify policy in the absence of innovation" (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 13). Here, political institutions may be viewed as governmental agencies, laws, norms, and operating procedures. In this sense, ideas have a long-lasting effect on policymaking, which may go from decades to generations. More precisely, disposing of an obsolete statute does not imply that the ideational foundation of that statute vanished; it still influences policymaking (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 20-21). Legal or military doctrines, and political ideologies, are types of institutionalized ideas which reflect this line of theorizing.

In a study focused on Germany and Japan, Katzenstein (1993) argues that these two countries' present politics are influenced by a complex range of ideas, with their roots in institutions which emerged in the past. In the case of Germany, its stance on international issues which is expressed by a belief in international community and non involvement in military aggressions, is a result of post World War II changes in social norms and the adoption of a new set of ideas on the relationship with the rest of the

world. Similarly, because of Japan's political norms and beliefs, there is a Hobbessian view of international politics. This is why Japanese policy makers reveal an unilateralist approach in international affairs and accept the economic and security vulnerabilities in the international system.

Conclusion

Substantial research has been dedicated to understanding the determinants of state behavior. Most studies on states' strategic behavior focused their attention on the material aspects of the relations among states. In contrast, the ideational determinants of foreign policy have been generally ignored. As one of the few ideational variables which have been mentioned in the international relations scholarship, partisanship, or political ideology of the decisionmakers, has received little theoretical and empirical attention.

The present literature on state behavior is characterized by two major weaknesses that this study will partially try to address. First, there is a normative and empirical predisposition toward the study of material factors while the explanatory role of ideational factors tends to be normatively minimized, and empirically almost ignored. Second, extant research fails to explore the full range of decisions states take. Indeed, most studies ignore most of the foreign policy of states, focusing on violent conflict.

The international relations research agenda is largely dominated by the study of material factors. Power relations, military capabilities, economic relationships, land and natural resources, geography and location, contiguity, have often been used to explain state interactions. Ideational factors, such as culture, identity, religion, and so on, became second hand objects of study, or factors of last resort (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 58). In

addition to this, there is no comprehensive empirical effort to test the causal effect ideational factors have in foreign policy decision-making. Understandably, it is much easier to count nuclear warheads and calculate the national GDP per capita than empirically assessing identity and culture. In reality, only a combination of material and ideational approaches can explain the full range of security concerns and the behavior of governments. With ideational factors left out, it would be difficult to explain the contested nature of international relations. Specifically, this study will address, from a normative and an empirical standpoint, the role played by government ideology in foreign policy decision making. I will test statistically if left wing governments or right governments are more likely to behave more aggressively in international politics.

The second major limitation of the present international relations scholarship is the narrow way in which state behavior is treated and analyzed. Most studies (Keohane 1984; James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Russett and Oneal 2001; Meernik 2004) trim down the wide range of state behavior to the use or non use of force in international politics. Only a limited number of studies assess other types of state behavior, such as mediation (Bercovitch 1989; Princen 1995; Bercovitch and Houston 1995) and sanctions (Nossal 1989; Drezner 1999; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). Since wars are rare events in international relations, I consider a new approach toward state's foreign behavior is appropriate to be empirically studied. This study will examine the way in which states interact with other states in a more comprehensive manner. Thus, in this dissertation state behavior will be expressed by a categorical indicator which goes from the most accommodationist to the most aggressive instances of behavior. Among these, condemnation, mediation, and the use of sanctions, are just a few.

CHAPTER 3

GOVERNMENT'S IDEOLOGY AND DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY

The westward expansion of the Russian frontier and of the Russian sphere of influence, though always a Russian aim, was accomplished when, as, and because the Red Army defeated the German army and advanced to the center of Europe. It was the mighty power of the Red Army, not the ideology of Karl Marx, which enabled the Russian government to expand its frontiers. It is the pressure of that army far beyond the new frontiers which makes the will of the Kremlin irresistible within the Russian sphere of influence (Lippman 1987, 874).

In contrast, the Sunni Arab guerrillas in Iraq lack a unifying ideology. They are either Baathists (discredited in most of the country) or Salafis (a hard line Sunni ideology with no appeal to Shiites in the south or to most Kurds in the north), or Arab nationalists. Arab nationalism is rejected by the Kurds and is increasingly seen by Shiites as having a subtle Sunni bias (Cole 2005).

In the Europe-centered nineteenth-century system, interstate conflict was for limited power, prestige, and profits, with exceptions - notably, Napoleonic France. The coming of Fascism, Nazism and Communism, however, sundered the value consensus of the international system... Ideology and power become intertwined, each strengthening the intensity of the other; the result was to aggravate the tendency of actors to seek unlimited power, now possible because of the technological revolution (Brecher 1969, 55).

The study of countries' foreign policies is at the core of international relations scholarship. Realists and neoliberal institutionalists argue that state behavior in international arena is strictly determined by material factors, such as military capabilities,

raw materials, and geography. Oppositely, liberals and constructivists emphasize the primary role of ideas in foreign policy decision processes, arguing that world politics is socially constructed. This scholarly debate is largely dominated by those whose research agenda focuses on the material factors, while ideational factors are for the most part disregarded. Further, among all types of state behavior, the study of the use of force dominates international politics scholarship. Thus, most state interactions are essentially ignored.

Post World War II international relations scholarship has become progressively open to explore the role of domestic-political conditions in determining the relationship between states. Factors such as government type - democratic versus nondemocratic -, the president's job approval, domestic economic conditions, the nature of the electoral system, presidential versus parliamentary government, the number of "veto points" in the political system, and the degree of consensus surrounding foreign policy, have been often used to explain foreign policy decisionmaking. However, the ideological orientation of decisionmakers, an ideational variable in nature, has yet to be fully explored.

The present international relations literature lacks an in-depth analytical debate on the relationship between a government ideology and a country's foreign policy. More importantly, there is little empirical evidence that shows whether or not government ideology influences foreign policy decisionmaking. In other words, it is not clear yet if right wing governments are more likely to adopt more aggressive foreign policies than left wing governments or vice versa.

A comprehensive examination of the relationship between executives' political ideology and governments' foreign policy decisions requires an understanding of the

concept of ideology in more general terms, its tenets and evolution. In the first part of this chapter, I will examine analytically the concept of ideology. Here, I will present some views on ideology and its characteristics. Then, I continue with a discussion about the relevance of political ideology, as a general concept, in political science. Next, I will review the analytical debate which focuses on the relationship between ideology and foreign policy. Here, I examine two sets of arguments. First, there is a group of international relations scholars who argue that the decisionmakers' ideology is not an important factor in both international and domestic politics. According to these scholars, power-related factors, both national and systemic, are solely responsible for changes in states' foreign policies (Kennan 1957, Morgenthau 1967) or ideology is just a pretext used by politicians who propose ideologically-motivated policies in order to win elections (Downs 1957). Second, there are a significant number of scholars who argue that ideology is an important determinant in foreign policymaking (Foster and Palmer 2006; Schultz 2005; Therien 2000; Holsti and Rosenau 1988, 1990; Klingemann et al. 1994). This second analytical argument is continued by a discussion of extant international relations literature which provides empirical evidence on the relationship between foreign policy decisionmakers' political ideology and state strategic behavior. In the next section, I will explore the differences between liberal and conservative ideologies in terms of their views on foreign policy. Following to this, I will advance a new foreign policy behavior model from which the study's main hypothesis will be drawn. Finally, this chapter will end with a section in which I will address the weaknesses present in the extant literature and how this study attempts to correct them.

Making sense of "ideology"

"Ideas do not flow freely" (Risse-Kappen 1994). Ideology is one of the most ambiguous concepts found in the social sciences; not only because of the variety of connotations and functions associated to it, but also because it is linked with political nuances and extensively used in everyday life with most various meanings. The origins of the concept of ideology are in anthropology. Generally viewed as a set of aspirations and ideas that guide one's goals, expectations, and actions, ideology is more precisely defined as "complex, dogmatic belief systems by which individuals interpret, rationalize, and justify behavior and institutions" (Hinich and Munger 1994, 10).

Important to notice, ideologies are economizing devices because they, concomitantly, simplify and modify reality. According to McCartney (2006, 12), "an ideology is a grid - a rigid, doctrinaire, way of thinking that ignores inconvenient truths and bends reality to its requirements". By filtering social phenomena through ideology, reality becomes more categorical and thus, more accessible to understanding:

> "Ideologies perform an important psychological service because without them people cannot know, assess, and respond to much of the most world of social relations. Ideology simplifies a reality too huge and complicated to be comprehended, evaluated, and dealt with in any purely factual, scientific, or other disinterested way" (Higgs 1987, 37-38).

On the emergence and evolution of ideologies, some portray them as having their roots in abstract ideas which are created out of culture, history, and emotion (Hinich and Munger 1994, 14). According to Boulding (1964), an ideology is determined by the existence of someone's image of the world:

> "An image of the world becomes an ideology if it creates in the mind of the person holding it a role for himself which he values highly... To create a role, however, an ideology must create a drama. The first essential characteristic of an ideology is then an interpretation of history sufficiently dramatic and convincing so that the individual feels that he can identify with it and which in turn can give the individual a role in the drama it portrays". (Boulding 1964, 39; quoted in Hinnich and Munger 1994, 14)

Besides, ideologies must express, validate and give legitimacy to someone's actions. In this context, behavior becomes partly a reflection of an initial set of abstract ideas which are now embodied in ideology. Maybe the most difficult test that an ideology must pass is the test of consistency. In its evolution and growth, an ideology must be consistent in two ways. First, it must justify the same behavior in all similar situations. Second, during its evolution, an ideology becomes more and more sophisticated in order to provide answers to new social dilemmas. Throughout this process, an ideology must avoid contradictions. Otherwise, its moral force can fade away and finally lead to a loss of its legitimacy base (Hinich and Munger 1994, 15).

Ideology in politics

In politics, ideology is a debated notion. As I will use this concept throughout this study, political ideology "is a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and provides a program for social and political action" (Ball and Dagger 2004, 4). The set of ideas and propositions which define or subscribe to a political ideology makes both proscriptive

and prescriptive demands on human behavior, in our case, political behavior. Based on the above considerations, all ideologies provide answers and then behavioral guidance related to (a) what is ethically good, and (therefore) what is bad; (b) how society's resources should be distributed; and (c) where power appropriately resides (Hinich and Munger 1994, 11).

Political ideologies perform four functions for their followers. They essentially cover the whole interaction between human beings and the social universe in which they live in (Ball and Dagger 2004, 4-6). First, the function of explanation, as its name suggests, ideologies explain why the social, political, and economic conditions are as they are. What causes unemployment? Why are there military conflicts? Why are some countries poor and others rich? These questions and many others receive different answers if approached through the lenses of various ideologies. For example, wars are viewed by Marxists as the result of competition for foreign markets, while fascists see military conflicts as tests of a nation's will against another's. Second, political ideologies provide standards for evaluating social conditions. This function goes further than just explaining social phenomena. More precisely, they create categories for those phenomena, if they are good or bad, desirable or undesirable. Are some wars just and others unjust? Is government intervention in people's lives desirable or undesirable? Are inequalities among people or nations acceptable or unacceptable? The ideology's function of evaluation offers standards that assist people to judge the social, political, and economic environment and also government's policies so that they to distinguish between good and bad policies.

Third, ideologies perform the function of orientation. Ideology serves as a

compass in the hands of the follower of a particular ideology and also provides a sense of identity. It helps people understand their social identity, the sense of belonging to a group - race, nation, ethnic group, and so on - and how they relate to the rest of the world. A communist will most likely see himself as a member of a party committed to liberating workers from capitalist exploitation and oppression. A Nazi would probably think of himself as a person whose duty is to maintain racial purity and eliminate the "inferior" races. Finally, ideologies offer a political program. An ideology prescribes a general program of social and political action. When societies are in disarray, political ideologies provide remedies on how to fix the problems and improve the social conditions. Similarly, they show how to maintain health in healthy societies. Specifically, they have proposals about how to improve economic conditions, how to address domestic social tensions, and how to approach international threats which endanger national security. Communism would tell its followers to prepare for the overthrow of capitalism and the seizure of state power, while libertarianism would propose policies aimed at reducing or eliminating the government's involvement in people's lives.

In order to carry out these four functions, a political ideology has to subscribe to a set of basic beliefs about human nature and also, to offer a view of freedom. Explicitly or implicitly, any political ideology provides a picture about human nature, which, at a minimum, explains human motivations, limitations, and possibilities. At one extreme, human beings can be cooperative with one another and share what they have with others, and, at the other extreme, human beings compete with one another in their quest for resources. The way in which a political ideology perceives human nature is particularly important because it sets the limits on what it considers to be politically desirable or

possible (Ball and Dagger 2004, 9).

Further, every political ideology asserts its commitment toward protecting and expanding "freedom". However, political ideologies differ from one another on their definitions of freedom, how to act in order to gain more freedom, and implicitly, which are the possible obstacles on the path toward freedom. For example, conservatism, liberalism, and libertarianism support different degrees of freedom in the relationship between individual and government. Moreover, various ideologies identify different obstacles in their pursue of freedom. Among the most common obstacles, ideologies find that poverty, crime, oppression, the presence of some social, ethnic, or racial groups, or even the existence of other ideologies hinder freedom. For communists, it is the wealth and the power of the capitalists which obstruct attaining freedom, while for fascists, it is the "inferior" races which constitute the problem (Ball and Dagger 2004, 9-11).

Political ideology and foreign state behavior

In this section, I present different theoretical bases which explain the relationship, or the lack of, between political ideology and foreign policy decisionmaking. Two types of arguments are found in the international relations scholarship. First, some theorists argue that the nature of the determinants of state behavior is material (Robinson 1995, Morgenthau 1967, Kennan 1957). Therefore, because of its idealistic nature, ideology is a non-factor. The second argument challenges the first one and contends that ideology influences the making of foreign policy (Noel and Therien 2008, London, Palmer, and Regan 2004, Schultz 2001b, Klingeman et al 1994).

Political ideology as a non-factor

A significant number of international politics scholars assert that domestic politics variables are not causal factors of foreign policy. Thus, foreign policy decisionmakers' political orientation is not a relevant feature in the big picture of global politics. In line with the realist theoretical tradition (Keohane and Nye 2000, Waltz 1979, Kennan 1957, Morgenthau 1967) states' foreign behavior is the result of their relative level of power. States are depicted as unitary, rational, power-seeking actors whose roles are determined by overall system structure, not by free will or by characteristics of particular states. More precisely, states' foreign policy is determined by their power, defined in military and economic terms (Waltz 1979).

As a leading proponent of the post war era realism, George Kennan (1957) claims that ideological dogma represents a barrier to clearly defining and successfully pursuing the national interest. Only by detaching themselves from ideological preconceptions, can decisionmakers comprehend the "realities" of international politics. In *American Diplomacy* (1957), Kennan writes about the legalistic-moralistic tendencies which had long damaged American diplomacy and asks policymakers to get rid of ideological lenses and adopt policies based upon calculations of interest. Analyzing the Soviet threat, he believes that it is the Soviet leadership, rather than its ideology, which makes the Soviet Union a security threat to the United States.

> "After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found

justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand" (Kennan 1967, 550).

In disagreement with Kennan's account of the Soviet threat, Lippmann (1987, 874) contends that "it was the mighty power of the Red Army, not the ideology of Karl Marx, which enabled the Russian government to expand its frontiers". More precisely, "it is to the Red Army in Europe, therefore, and not to ideologies, elections, forms of government, to socialism, to communism, to free enterprise, that a correctly conceived and soundly planned policy should be directed" (Lippmann 1987, 874). Thus, Lippmann discards the role of ideology in foreign policy, and argues that U.S. foreign policy should be explicit and concrete, without "vague" ideas of an "ideological crusade", but built upon a solid balance of power. That is, interventions justified by balance of power, not arbitrary interventions in favor of distant and shaky client regimes, were right and mandatory.

Another realist who subscribes to this view, Hans Morgenthau claims that the role of ideology in the substance of foreign policy is little more than a justification and a cover - a more or less deliberate camouflage "for the true nature of policy: while foreign policy ... is necessarily pursuit of power, ideologies render involvement in that contest psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors and their audience" (1967, 87). In the particular case of alliances, it is the community of interests rather than ideological commitment which fortifies the bonds among the members. "If, however, a community of interests is absent, an alliance based on ideology alone will be stillborn" (Robinson 1967, 147).

In addition to scholars who belong to the realist theoretical tradition, other authors offer different pictures in the non-relationship between ideology and foreign state behavior. In *Capital* (1967), Karl Marx considers that ideology has more to do with an ideal than with truth. After arguing that social reality is determined by material factors, more exactly economic structures, Marx says that ideologies offer a distorted view of reality and finally, they serve the interests of the ruling class, whether sovereigns or capitalists. Therefore, in Marxian tradition, political ideologies do not affect foreign policy, since all ideologies support the cause of the dominant classes in society.

On a similar note, but at a considerable distance from Marx's view, others point out that political parties, and implicitly the office holders, use political ideologies as a way to win elections, while political ideas are simply instruments for obtaining power (Downs 1957, Key 1961, Schultz 2001a). Politicians are primarily office-seekers and their main goal is to get elected or maintain power. If elected, ideas cease to be a guide anymore. Candidates thus position themselves so as to increase their prospect of election or reelection, based on their perception of voter preferences (Grofman 1995, 179). Succinctly stated by Anthony Downs (1957, 28), "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies". According to the supporters of this thesis, this principle is true not only for incumbents but also for the parties in opposition which circumstantially may support a foreign policy with which they do not identify or believe in, but they do that just in order to score electoral points and take advantage of their rivals' shaky situation (Schultz 2001b, 65-66). The same opposition parties may express foreign policy positions which do not have much to do with their ideological prescriptions because of other reasons also. Most commonly, they

behave as "yes men" and support government positions in international crises.

Closely related to the above view, the diversionary use of force thesis comes to emphasize that, regardless of government's ideology, foreign policy decisions are shaped by the decisionmakers' electoral calculations. A deteriorating national economy and/or a low president's political health are instances when executives choose to use force in order to divert public attention from their domestic distress. In these situations, the decisionmakers believe that an international conflict will generate a "rally round the flag" effect (Mueller 1973), their popularity normally increases (Brody 1991; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Mueller 1973), and with that, their chances of remaining in power (Morgan and Bickers, 1992; James and Oneal, 1991; Ostrom and Job 1986). Even though the empirical evidence is mixed, it is generally accepted that both, Democratic and Republican presidents use diversionary tactics (Foster and Palmer 2006).

Moreover, two more lines of inquiry, the "convergence" thesis (Finnemore 1996, Meyer et al 1997, Kerr 1983) and world society approach, ignore the role of political ideology in foreign affairs. According to the "convergence" thesis, as countries industrialize, they assimilate ideologically the Western ways of involving in business (Kerr 1983). Thus, countries found in similar stages of economic development are likely to deal with the same kind of challenges and use the same kind of solutions. The supporters of world society approach (Finnemore 1996, Meyer et al 1997) claim that policy convergence is driven by the spread of models and ideas through global cultural and associational processes. On one side, the phenomenon of cultural globalization helps the diffusion of political behaviors which proved to be successful. On the other side, international government organizations (IGOs) accelerate the spread of common

practices among the member states. Thus, in the area of international politics, these two approaches indicate that the relevance of the ideological commitment of decisionmakers to a specific set of foreign policy practices is limited.

Further, some scholars question the relevance of political ideology by pointing out that positions on foreign policy are not easy to define as liberal or conservative. Several examples show that liberals can behave hawkishly. "Liberals and Democrats have led the country aggressively through two world wars, Vietnam and Korea, the Cold War, and other international conflicts and foreign policy initiatives with support from Republicans. And Democrats have supported not only the first Republican-led war in Iraq but also the second invasion, as well as the foreign policies of Republican presidents" (Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon 2005, 4). Since states both compete and cooperate, and war is a permanent risk, decisionmakers need to find the appropriate measures in order to protect their country's national interest. Therefore, based on circumstances, political leaders may have to embrace policy prescriptions belonging to more than one ideology in order to respond to world politics' challenges. "The successful mixture will vary over time and circumstance" (Russett 1990b, 516).

Finally, current analyses of world politics show that the end of the Cold War and the increasing pace of globalization are questioning the appropriateness of maintaining the old paradigms and orthodoxies in the study of world politics (Held and McGrew 2002). In this new international politics environment, Anthony Giddens (1994, 251) argues, the terms "right" and "left" lost considerable meaning, this ideological approach being "in its own way exhausted". In the past, the international relations debate was constructed around dichotomies such as the North versus the South, East versus West,

and left versus right. Now, with these cleavages declining in relevance, social actors are in search of new identities and the international relations debate needs new paradigms (Laidi 1998).

This discussion above leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: Within developed democracies, the executive's political ideology does not play a significant role in determining state's foreign policy behavior.

Political ideology determines foreign policy behavior: an analytical view

Policies are an expression of ideologies. Due to the multitude of views, different political parties' ideologies define and defend the national interest in different ways (McCartney 2006, 15) and, as "policy-seekers", the elected officials in the executive and legislative, aim at implementing agendas which reflect different ideological values (Rathbun 2004, 2). As vehicles for ideology, parties via their policymakers, advance particular sets of policies, bring them before the electorate, and carry them out (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, 1994). Thus, policies are "packaged by ideology" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 3).

The left-right dichotomy occupies not only the domain of domestic politics but also the area of international affairs. The debate between the left and the right is central to global politics. "This is so because the left-right cleavage expresses enduring and profound differences about equality, and equality is one of the most fundamental issues of controversy in any political community" (Noel and Therien 2008, 3). As complex as it is, the central debate in the discussion on ideological divisions is whether one agrees or is in opposition with social change in an egalitarian direction (Inglehart 1989, 292-293),

within and among societies. Even though it is generally accepted that not every conflict and event has a precise location on an ideological continuum and also that the ideological debate changes in time, most disagreements in domestic and foreign policy may be placed in a coherent and structured left-right cleavage (Kanbur 2001).

A large group of international relations scholars (Delaet et al. 2005; Haas 2003; Klingemann et al. 1994; Hinich and Munger 1994; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Russett 1990b; Eichenberg 1989; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) argues that political ideology is an important determinant of foreign policymaking and sees foreign policy as subject to the same partisan and ideological clashes which take place in domestic policymaking. Thus, political ideology affects governments' view on the formation of alliances (Haas 2003), foreign aid policies (Therien and Noel 2000), cooperation and war (Schultz 2005, Prins 2001), treaty-making (Delaet and Scott 2006), the way to approach terrorism (Noel and Therien 2008), and so on. According to Almond (1950), a foreign policy consensus is built upon a consensus of basic attitudes and ideology, shared by both the public and political elite. The patterns of foreign policymaking are affected by the ideology of political elites. Ideology is essential because it affects policymakers' priorities and how they do and should look at the world. Important to notice, ideology plays a more important role in closed societies than in open societies (Farrell 1966).

Political ideology shapes foreign policy decisions at various levels. It is maybe Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington (1963, 56) who best capture the relationship between the two, claiming that:

> "Ideology and political beliefs play significant roles in the Soviet and American political systems. Ideology gives the Soviet leaders a framework for organizing

> their vision of political development; it sets limits on the options open to them as policy makers; it defines immediate priorities and long-range goals; and it shapes the methods through which problems are handled".

Similarly, Holsti (1974, 366) contends that "ideologies not only establish foreign policy goals, evaluative criteria, and justifications for actions, but have important effects on perceptual processes as well". On a similar note, Thompson and Macridis (1972, 12) write that ideology applies to both how goals are defined and shaped and then how particular goals will be pursued.

Hunt (1987, 16) stresses that foreign policy ideas are embedded during the course of nation building, in class and ethnic dissensions, and in domestic social arrangements broadly understood. Besides, those ideas are the product of a deep and comprehensive construction. Functioning as mediums for ideas, ideologies are essential because they establish the framework in which policymakers handle specific issues and in which the interested public understands those issues (Hunt 1987, 16). Ideology shapes the representations which elites create of reality and upon which they act, thereby constituting the primary pivot around which foreign policy decisions revolve (Brecher 1973, 1974). "Indeed, elite images are not less real than the reality of their environment and are much more relevant to an analysis of the foreign policy flow" (Brecher et al 1969, 87).

Political ideology determines foreign policy behavior: empirical evidence

To establish an empirical relationship between ideology and foreign policy has always been a difficult task and more importantly, it was never part of mainstream international

relations. However, there are a number of empirical studies which attempt to test the causal effect of partisanship and ideology, by employing various methods and techniques. First, certain studies estimate the relationship between ideology/partisanship and foreign policy by analyzing the legislative voting behavior of politicians (Delaet and Scott 2006; Delaet et al 2005; Bartels 2000, McCormick and Wittkopf 1990). Second, in order to study the connection between ideology and foreign policymaking, other studies do secondary analyses of elite surveys (Holsti 2004; Wittkopf 1990, 1986; Holsti and Rosenau 1988). Then, there is a third group of studies which do empirical analysis of political documents, such as political party manifestos (Schultz 2001a, Klingeman et al 1994). Finally, there are studies that use statistical models in order to determine the impact of ideology on state external behavior (Arena and Palmer 2009, Schultz 2005, London et al 2004, Fordham 1998). The overwhelming majority of these studies show that the left and right, at least in established democracies, reveal systematic differences over foreign policy behavior. That is, right leaning governments support more hawkish foreign policy actions than their left wing counterparts.

Although the executive branch of the government has the main responsibility for conducting foreign policy, legislatures are influential on a wide range of foreign policy issues. In a study which examines Senate and House votes on several strategic weapons systems, Lindsay (1990) shows that members of Congress generally vote in accordance with their policy views and not their constituency's economic interests. Studying how U.S. legislators voted, from 1969 to 1987, on five major defense initiatives - the B-1 bomber program, MX nuclear missile program, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) - Lindsay finds

that Republican senators were more inclined than their Democratic colleagues to support MX, B-1, and SDI. On ABM, partisanship did not have a significant influence on the vote. In both the House and Senate, party affiliation correlates highly with support for the five major defense initiatives, and partisan cleavages increased over time.

Two more empirical studies (Delaet et al 2005, Delaet and Scott 2006) offer support for the thesis that partisanship and ideology exert a growing impact on congressional behavior in foreign policy. The first study (Delaet et al 2005) looks at the Senate ratification votes on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (1968), Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1999) and concludes that that more liberal members were more likely to support the treaties while more conservative members were more likely to oppose the treaties. Significantly, partisanship increases substantially from the Cold War treaty votes to the post-Cold War votes. Extending the data set of votes that spans the 1960–2001 period, the second study (Delaet and Scott 2006) find also that partisanship determines foreign policy stances. "The change in predicted probabilities is more pronounced in the post-Vietnam period: moving from liberal to conservative in this era continues to make a member less likely to vote for an arms control treaty, but by 18.15 percentage points (as compared to 4.79 points in the Cold War)" (Delaet and Scott 2006, 191).

Elite surveys provide another method for testing the relationship between ideology and foreign policy positions of decisionmakers. Drawing on data on mass and four elite opinion surveys undertaken by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations (CCFR) from 1974 to 1986, Wittkopf (1990, 25-26) discusses the public and elites' attitudes toward internationalism and distinguishes between cooperative internationalism

and militant internationalism. Based on all four possible combinations of attitudes, Wittkopf identifies *internationalists*, as those who support both cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism, *isolationists*, or those who oppose both cooperative and militant internationalism and, *hardliners*, as those who support militant internationalism but oppose cooperative internationalism, and *accomodationists*, as those who oppose militant internationalism, but support cooperative internationalism. On issues such as expanding defense spending, assisting rebels with military aid, and using the CIA to assassinate terrorists and to intervene covertly in other countries, the study finds that Republicans embrace hardline policies while liberals embrace accomodationist policies. Correspondingly, conservatives lean toward hardline policies whereas Democrats toward internationalist or accomodationist policies (Wittkopf 1990, 132).

Similarly, in a later study which draws on six surveys conducted by the Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP) during the period 1976-1996, Holsti (2004, 156) notes that the large majority of domestic liberals are accomodationists, as opposed to domestic conservatives, who are mostly either hardliners or internationalists. As an explanation for these positions, Holsti believes that economic liberals support cooperative internationalism because they prefer government spending for domestic rather than defense purposes, and thus less excited about militant internationalism. In a more recent study, analyzing the data taken from the CCFR mass public and leader surveys in 1998, 2002, and 2004, Shapiro and Block-Elkon (2005, 27) find that Conservative or neoconservative positions emphasize the "need for a strong defense and support U.S.-initiated and largely unilateral military action abroad, especially in circumstances in which multilateral, diplomatic, and economic options may not be fully exploited".

Moreover, Democrats are more supportive than Republicans on cutting back military aid to other countries.

Further, some studies focus on the relation between ideology and decisionmakers' foreign policy views by analyzing party policy documents or speeches of politicians. Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994, 40, 274), via content analysis, conduct a comprehensive analysis of the party platforms in ten established democracies. The results offer support for the assertion that right-wing parties are "pro-military", and express "need for a strong military presence overseas and for rearmament and self-defense" since the left-wing parties are considered "anti-military" and "pro-peace", advocating "peaceful means of solving crises...and the desirability of the relevant country joining in negotiations with hostile countries".

In a similar fashion, Schultz (2001a) uses party manifestos in order to determine where political parties are located on the hawk-dove ideological continuum. He also takes a deep look at data from the United States in order to determine whether the declared positions in the party manifestos, actually predict defense spending as a percentage of gross national product. He finds first, that there is a tendency of right parties to become more hawkish and left parties to become more dovish in times of high conflict and second, that there is a robust relationship between the U.S. governing party's declared position and its preferred level of military spending.

Finally, there are more sophisticated empirical studies which discuss the conditions under which political ideology becomes a causal determinant of foreign policy. In a recent study, Arena and Palmer (2009) investigate if the political orientation of the government is a significant factor affecting the likelihood of international conflict

initiation. Analyzing 20 stable democracies for the period 1960-1996, they found that right governments, generally, have a higher probability of initiating international conflict than do left governments. That may be explained by the fact that "governments made up of right political parties are less likely than their left counterparts to be removed from office, should they use force" (London, Palmer, and Regan 2004, 5). The strength of the relationship between ideology and conflict initiation is influenced by domestic economic conditions, more precisely, the level of unemployment and inflation. Different results are obtained if studying the particular case of the United States. Exploring the association between US domestic conditions and whether the United States was an initiator or target of a MID, during the period 1870-1992, Prins (2001) finds that Democratic administrations are more likely to be challenged and then to reciprocate, than their Republican counterparts.

It is not only conflict initiation which is affected by government's ideology, but also conflict duration. Using a dataset of 20 democratic governments and militarized disputes between 1945 and 1992, Koch (2009) contends that governments of the left engage in shorter disputes than right wing governments. The relationship holds for parliamentary and presidential systems. Governments vary in dispute duration according to their removal costs. Thus, "high removal cost governments can allow disputes to persist. Conversely, low removal cost governments fight shorter disputes" (Koch 2009, 813). Besides, in addition to its influence on conflict initiation and duration, ideology may have an effect on cooperation. Schultz (2005) develops a two-level game that examines a government's decision to risk cooperation, taking into account the strategic interdependence of the international and domestic levels. He synthesizes the results,

arguing (Schultz 2005, 22):

> "When trust is lacking and the costs of continued conflict are relatively tolerable, then it takes a pacifist to attempt peace. Under these conditions, a soft-line Dove is the only type willing to take the risky steps that are needed to learn whether mutual cooperation is possible. On the other hand, when trust is low but costs of mutual defection are high, efforts to initiate cooperation are most likely to come from moderate Hawks. Moreover, mutual cooperation initiated by such a government has a better chance of enduring over the long run than does cooperation initiated by a Dovish government. Moderate Hawks enjoy greater electoral security when risking cooperation, and foreign states respond to their cooperative gestures in a way that promotes robust cooperation over the long term".

Dimensions of ideological conflict in foreign policy

In this section I address the nature of the relationship between political ideology and foreign policy actions[1]. More precisely, I will examine how liberal or left wing ideologies differ from conservative, or right wing ideologies, in their views on foreign policy. As noted by Rathbun (2004, 18-21), there are three dimensions on which liberals and conservatives differ in terms of foreign policy behavior. All these three foreign policy dimensions revolve around the fundamental values of equality and liberty. They are the

[1] In parliamentary systems, most of the time, it is a coalition of political parties which form the government, in which senior and junior partners share the power over the foreign policy decisionmaking. Even though conflicts over foreign policy often occur, it is the senior, larger coalition partner through the prime minister, which has the stronger say in these matters. The cabinet's prime minister, who is in most cases the leader of the larger party in the coalition, has a large autonomy on foreign policy issues. There are also exceptions, like in the case of Germany and Israel, where the junior parties have been able to significantly influence key foreign policy decisions (Kaarbo 1996, Hagan et al. 2001, Hermann 2001).

following: a) the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest; b) the appropriateness of using forceful measures for pursuing the national interest; and c) unilateralism versus multilateralism, or the way in which countries coordinate their actions with other countries in pursuing their interests. Based on these three dimensions, testable propositions can be generated in order to examine the ideological cleavages among various political parties in terms of foreign policy making.

Inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest

On this dimension, the basic question which needs to be answered is the following. "To what extent does an individual or a party believe its country should preoccupy itself with the internal processes of other countries when they have few tangible consequences for the country in question?" (Rathbun 2004, 19). An inclusive conception allows the promotion of the welfare of other countries to be part of the national interest while an exclusive conception focuses exclusively on a country's well being. Similar terms found in the literature which express this dimension are "multilateralism" (Chittick et al. 1995), "cooperative internationalism" (Wittkopf 1990), or "ethnocentrism" (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). On this scale, liberals are much more supportive of cooperative internationalism than conservatives (Holsti 2004, Wittkopf 1990).

On development assistance, it can be argued that its origins are in the left-wing ideology (Therien 2002). Three major developments, with a strong leftist ideological component, - the creation of the welfare state, the establishment of the U.N. system, and the launching of the Marshall plan - constitute the foundation of foreign aid, as a complex international institution. Further, in the period 1974-1986, liberals have been consistently

more sympathetic of foreign economic aid for economic development and technical assistance, in comparison with conservatives (Wittkopf 1990, 73). A similar perspective is expressed in the works of Lumsdaine (1993) and Noel and Therien (1995) who state that the left is a much stronger promoter of human rights, democracy, and international aid, than the right. Most notably, Noel and Therien (1995) find that "the level of foreign aid provided by a country varies with social spending, but even more so with the degree to which its welfare state embodies socialist attributes, defined on the basis of social program universalism and benefit equality". This tendency is partly due to liberals' ideological stress on equality and embrace of a broader conception of political community, which are mirrored by a foreign policy which shows concern for others, advocates abolishing hierarchies in the world, and supports better living conditions for citizens in developing countries.

Internationally, it is also the left-leaning governments, rather than their right wing counterparts, which tend to adopt an agenda oriented toward politics of identity and human rights. In the aftermath of the Cold War, ideologues on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum disputed their views on the role of identity in a world dominated by cultural conflicts. Prevalent on the right, is the view that international politics are marked by anarchy, the revival of ancient hatreds, or "clash of civilizations", which would lead to ethnic instability and civil wars in the developing world and former communist countries. Having a different focus, the ideological left sees the new politics of identity in the post Cold War era as a distraction from more vital debates about equality, redistribution, and justice (Noel and Therien 2008, 200).

In support of this argument, scholars distinguish between the right-wing

irredentist nationalism promoted by Nazis in Germany and fascists in Italy in the 1930s and 1940s and the left-wing antifascist message which also supported nationalistic sentiment. Further, the decolonization movement is debated through ideological lenses. Even though political actors and thinkers on both the left and the right accepted colonialism, there are some nuances which are worth to be mentioned:

> "First, in the era of the American and the French Revolutions, a strong anti-colonial current was already associated with the left's fight for democracy. Second, even when they supported colonialism, European socialists tended to do so for the sake of social progress more than in the name of an inherent inequality between races. Third, at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was the left that led the fight against colonialism" (Noel and Therien 2008, 101-102).

Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, decolonization was identified as a favorite theme of the left, which perceived it as a movement of national liberation, part of the bigger struggle for basic human equality.

Finally, the ideological dimension of the politics of identity is important when it comes to multiculturalism. It is again the left which is more inclusive, calling for change in the status quo of women, indigenous people, ethnic, racial, and cultural minorities everywhere. Left wing governments, it seems, are more concerned than the right wing ones, with issues which affect equality, within and among societies. Conservatives, in contrast, are more concerned with preserving national traditions and culture and believe that immigrants should be satisfied with the status of being accepted to live in the country they inhabit (Noel and Therien 2008, 202-204).

The appropriateness of using force in international affairs

The second dimension deals with attitudes toward the appropriateness of using forceful strategies for pursuing the national interest. Also, this scale may be called "militant internationalism" (Wittkopf 1990), "militarism" (Chittick et al. 1995), or "morality of warfare" (Horwitz and Peffley 1987). On this continuum, the decisionmakers on the left are more likely to pursue more dovish foreign and defense policies. That is, they are antimilitarist, advocate the peaceful methods of conflict resolution, such as diplomacy and sanctions, and tend to call for reduced military expenditures. They adopt this position because the use of force is dangerous and is neither a moral nor an effective tool of foreign policy. It only leads to tensions, arms races and escalations in violence. Besides, left wing government foreign policies are shaped by the belief that dialogue and negotiations are more effective tools of foreign policy (Beinart 2008; Noel and Therien 2008; Rathbun 2004, 19-20; Schultz 2001a). This position is the result of an ideological conviction which stresses equality, popular rule, national sovereignty, cooperation among free peoples, and peace (Noel and Therien 2008, 89).

Among the founders of the liberal ideological tradition, Montesquieu wrote in 1748 (25) that "peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic". For the ideological left, war is "rooted in the vested interests of the ruling class" (Howard 1978, 27) and that idea motivates Rousseau to assert that equality constitutes a precondition for peace. Here, equality among nations, no matter their power, is just an extension of the liberal principle than men are equal. Further, the importance of international law and institutions are also viewed by the left as helping to create peace and reduce the likelihood of war in world affairs. Militaries are not the ones which bring peace, but the free people have the power

to influence the destiny of their nations and the relations among them (Noel and Therien 2008, 93).

On the other side, right-wing scholars and politicians are more likely to embrace more hawkish stances in international affairs. They see the use of force as an acceptable and necessary instrument of foreign policy and consider that military superiority and willingness to take military action contribute greatly in reaching foreign policy and national security goals. For right wing governments, appeasement is not the solution; adversaries have to be met with credible threats and actual punishment. Also, they are the defenders of the status-quo; they "prefer a stable international order governed by the most powerful states, by military strength, and, when necessary, by war" (Noel and Therien 2008, 89).

The world, according to the conservatives, is not as ideal as liberals believe. The world is a dangerous place, marked by sharp inequalities among nations. As stated by Chancellor Metternich (quoted in Haslam 2002, 115),

> "In no epoch of modern history has society been presented with more dangers than in the present, because of the upheaval of France. The true... and last anchor left for the welfare of Europe lies in the understanding between the great powers, based on the conservative foundations of their happy and grand alliance".

In line with the right's ideology, reason and morality are not useful in a world which is anarchical. Thus, balance of power, military strength, and alliance making, are the strategies that states have at hand if they want to survive. The biggest danger of all is war. In Clausewitz' words (1982), war is just the continuation of politics by other means. War is possible because states have diverging political interests which can not be resolved by

using less bloodier instruments of foreign policy.

The practice of international affairs shows consistent differences between left and right wing governments. Ronald Reagan rejected detente by launching a massive defense buildup, and aided anticommunist governments and rebels from Central America to Afghanistan. In contrast, for Democrats, Communism in third world countries could not have been contained militarily, because the use of force was ineffective and immoral. The 1991 Gulf War shows a significant polarization between the two ideological camps. Republicans, both in the House and the Senate, supported the war almost with unanimity, while the Democrats opposed it with a large majority. Finally, although the 2003 Iraq war enjoyed significant bipartisan support at the beginning, a few years after the invasion, the partisan divisions between Democrats and Republicans were higher than ever (Beinart 2008, 151-158).

Ideological cleavages are also present if the foreign policies of other developed countries. The Green parties in Europe, among which Germany, Britain, Switzerland, and Finland, traditionally on the left ideological spectrum, invariably demanded a decreasing role for the militaries and adopted anti-nuclear positions. In France, starting with the end of 1970s, defense spending was, for a long time, a divisive issue among the main political parties. While the French Socialist Party (PSF) was advocating military budget cuts, the Gaullist Party (RPR), a right wing traditional party, was advocating the opposite. In 1987, in spite of the opposition of his conservative foreign and defense ministers, Francois Mitterrand, the first Socialist President of the Fifth Republic, endorsed the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty between the U.S. and Soviet Union, which required the elimination of all missiles with ranges between 625 and 3500 miles by June

1991 (Risse-Kappen 1991, 506).

On a smaller scale, the two main political parties or coalitions in Germany, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) had opposite stances on the issue of defense spending (Risse-Kappen 1991, 489). Another example of ideological divisions on security policy in German politics was the Christian Democrats' opposition to detente and the more pacifist positions of SPD, articulated by "disarmers" and the traditional arms control establishment. Traditionally, SPD was identified with antinuclearism in Germany. Premier Nakasone of Japan, the leader of LPD (Liberal Democratic Party), a long-time right wing party, took a courageous step in 1980s, proposing to make Japan an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" by adopting a more prodefence stance and initiating a major military buildup program (Risse-Kappen 1991, 505-508). More recently, the left wing prime minister Zapatero of Spain won the 2004 legislative elections by promising to pull out the country's military troops from Iraq, in a major foreign policy turn from its right wing predecessor, Jose Maria Aznar.

Unilateralism versus multilateralism

The third dimension looks at the way in which countries coordinate their actions with other countries in pursuing their interests (Rathbun 2004, 20). The extreme manifestations on this continuum are multilateralism and unilateralism. Multilateralism implies that states seek to form a coalition of support before they act and their actions are determined by some principles of conduct which go beyond the particular interest of the member parties. Ultimately, this approach to the international affairs has built confidence and understanding among the great powers. On the contrary, unilateralism entails that

states simply act alone, so that they preserve their freedom of action and avoid institutional binding commitments. Unilateral action may undermine international peace, welcome outside intervention in the domestic affairs of the smaller states and finally, can increase tensions among the great powers.

Quite predictably, the left-right cleavage has ramifications for how different decisionmakers view the way in which their countries direct their actions with other countries in following their interests. On this dimension, left governments tend to offer more support to multilateralist foreign policies than their right wing counterparts (Ikenberry 2004; Holsti 2004; Daalder and Lindsay 2001; Russett 1990). Left leaning governments are more supportive of multilateralism because of their ideological emphasis on equality. Russett (1990, 516) considers that "modern-day conservatives laud the possibilities of individual action by persons and, internationally, by nations acting alone. Political liberals decry unfettered individualism as destroying natural bonds of community and mutual aid".

Concern for others, at both domestic and international level, is mirrored by identification with a broader community. In line with this approach, states take into consideration the interests of other states and that consequently limits the adventurous unilateral foreign interventions and the discretionary use of forceful tools in global politics, regardless of the international community (Rathbun 2004). Conservatives have a different approach on this issue. Being less likely than liberals to recognize that foreign governments have legitimate security interests, conservatives tend to "see the demands of their states as more important and more justified than those of others" (Rathbun 2004, 22). Conservatives are skeptical of multilateralism as it restricts freedom of action in the

international arena and weakens state sovereignty.

The reactions of the Bush administration to recent international developments support the thesis that there are ideological divisions over the necessity of coordinating actions with other states in pursuing U.S. national interests. Referring to the first years of the Bush's administration Daalder and Lindsay (2001) argue that unilateralists who occupied top positions in the administration and in the US Congress supported self-reliance, discarding multilateralism and international treaties as unnecessary constraints on America's freedom to act. Specifically, before September 11th, President Bush showed hostility to existing multilateral policy instruments by not signing the Kyoto Protocol, refusing to ratify the treaty for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and treating harshly countries that did not sign immunity agreements[2] with the United States, and finally, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM).

The case of France also shows ideological divisions on the unilateralism - multilateralism dimension. Charles de Gaulle, conservative president of France during 1959-1969, with the support of the government, directed the development of France's nuclear weapons program, seeking independence from U.S. and British influence, and twice vetoed Britain's admission to the European Community. He withdrew from NATO's military command, although he opted to remain a member of the organization. In contrast, the Socialist President Francois Mitterrand largely embraced multilateralism, demonstrated by his consent to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. More recently,

[2] Known as the Nethercutt Amendment, President Bush signed into law, on December 2004, legislation which authorizes the loss of Economic Support Funds (ESF) to countries, including many key U.S. allies, that have not signed a BIA (bilateral immunity agreements). Threatened under the Nethercutt Amendment are: funds for international security and counterterrorism efforts, peace process programs, antidrug-trafficking initiatives, wheelchair distribution, human rights programs, economic and democratic development, and HIV/Aids education, among others (see http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=nethercutt)

the left leaning government of France harshly criticized U.S. unilateralism preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Furthermore, Germany and Britain illustrate similar ideological cleavages on this dimension. The foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, a representative of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), a classical liberal party in Germany, with the support of a ruling coalition with the Social Democrats, was the architect of the country's multilateral diplomatic approach during the 1970s and the 1980s (Krause 2004). The foreign policy response of Margaret Thatcher's conservative government to the 1982 Falkland crisis, arguably the most significant challenge during her prime ministership, was unilateral action via the use of military force. In Thatcher's own words, "I was presented with the dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in Argentina, problems about getting support in the UN Security Council, the lack of reliance we could place on the European Community or the United States, the risk of the Soviets becoming involved, the disadvantage of being looked at as a colonial power" (1993, 181). Before exhausting the more multilateral and accomodationist tools of resolving the conflict with Argentina, Britain resorted to unilateral action.

Advancing a new foreign policy behavior model

In order to explain the relationship between the executive's ideology and foreign policy behavior, I advance the following theoretical argument. According to their ideological preferences, conservative leaders have a more exclusive conception of the national interest than liberal leaders. An exclusive conception focuses on a country's well being rather than adopting the welfare of other countries as a part of a country's national

interest. Therefore, conservative leaders believe that their country should not preoccupy itself with the internal processes of other countries when they have few tangible consequences for the country in question. In the practice of foreign affairs, this belief of conservatives will be mirrored by a disregard of how their foreign policy actions affect the stability and internal processes of other countries, and moreover, the human rights and the living conditions of people living in those countries. In contrast, liberal leaders, due to their ideological predisposition to care about other countries' internal processes, will act more peacefully toward other countries. Consequently, in response to international crises, conservative governments, less worried about the repercussions of their actions, will be inclined to behave more aggressively than liberal governments.

The propensity toward more aggressive foreign policy actions of conservative governments can be explained also, by using the second ideological dimension discussed earlier in the chapter. Ideologically, conservatives believe in the appropriateness of using forceful strategies for pursuing the national interest. According to their views, the use of force is an acceptable tool of foreign policy because the world is a dangerous place and enemies have to be met with credible threats and actual punishment. In contrast, liberal leaders believe in peace and have antimilitarist ideological convictions. They advocate the peaceful methods of conflict resolution, such as diplomacy and sanctions. The use of force only leads to tensions, arms races and escalations in violence. In consequence, in response to crises, due to their ideological belief in the appropriateness of the use of force, conservative governments will be more likely than liberal governments to act aggressively in international arena.

Thirdly, the left-right ideological cleavage on the way in which countries

coordinate their actions with other countries in pursuing their interests impacts the type of actions governments engage in international affairs. Liberals view that multilateralist foreign policies are more appropriate than unilateral ones, because, when intervening, states have to consider the interests of other states. Besides, according to the liberal view, unilateral action may undermine international peace, welcome outside intervention in the domestic affairs of the smaller states and finally, can increase tensions among the great powers. Alternatively, conservatives consider that unilateral actions are appropriate because they preserve countries' freedom of action and avoid institutional binding commitments. Thus, when responding to crises, due to their ideological preference for unilateral action and dislike of binding commitments, conservative governments will be more likely than liberal governments to act aggressively.

This discussion leads to the second hypothesis:

H2: Within developed democracies, the further right a government is, the more likely it is to behave more aggressively. Oppositely, the further left a government is, the more likely it is to behave more peacefully.

The second hypothesis reflects the possibility that governments will act in a manner consistent with the ideological principles presented in their political platforms, party manifestos, and their voters' expectations. Specifically, when responding to international crises, right leaning governments, due to their ideological predisposition toward an exclusive conception of the national interest and belief in the appropriateness of using force and acting unilaterally, will be expected to act more aggressively than left wing governments. This expectation is also due to left wing governments' ideological

predilection toward multilateralism, an inclusive conception of the national interest, and reluctance of using force in international affairs.

Conclusion

The extant international relations literature which focuses on explaining state behavior has two important weaknesses. First, foreign policy behavior is most of the time reduced to the use of military force (Fordham 1998, Meernik 2004, Morgan and Bickers 1992, James and Oneal 1991, Ostrom and Job 1986). Second, the large majority of studies which examine state external behavior concentrate only on the U.S. case. Although an interesting case study, drawing general propositions from the U.S. case would be inaccurate.

Regarding the first weakness, the use of force, however, is just one area of foreign policymaking. Therefore, the present scholarship ignores most actions that governments take in the international arena. Among them, mediation, condemnation of other countries' behavior, use of sanctions, participation in peacekeeping missions, are examples of state behavior which are not taken into consideration. In my study, I advance a more comprehensive measure of state behavior which takes into account fourteen types of foreign policy actions, where the use of force is just one of them. This new proxy for state behavior incorporates two of the three dimensions of ideological conflict in foreign policy - the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest and the appropriateness of using force in international relations. In this way, my study helps to better understand the complex environment of foreign policymaking, where state behavior is described more precisely.

Second, most scholarship which studies the impact of the executive's ideological orientation on foreign policy decisions draws empirical generalizations from only the U.S. case (Schultz 2005, Fordham 1998, London, Palmer, and Reagan 2004). However, the United States is unique, due in part to being the superpower and thus, the most active actor in international affairs. Also true, is the fact that, the stakes that other major powers have in foreign affairs are much less than those of the United States. For instance, someone could argue that there are no very distinct demarcation ideological lines in terms of foreign policy among political parties within Western European countries and that the foreign policy interests of those countries do not go much further than the European integration. However, that does not mean that there is no need of more testable generalizations on a large pool of countries. The response of my study to this weakness in the present literature is to empirically test the relationship between ideology and state behavior on all twenty two OECD countries.

This study, then, attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by doing two things: develop a better measure of foreign policy behavior and test the relationship between the executive's ideology and foreign policy behavior by using a large-N cross national model. With the theoretical model presented in this chapter, my study attempts to test the consistency between the ideological believes of foreign policymakers and the state's actions in international arena. My study expands on the thesis regarding the right leaning governments' propensity of using force in international relations and tests if right wing governments are more likely to behave aggressively than left wing governments. I will test this hypothesis on the OECD countries and by using a broader measure of foreign policy behavior which takes into account multiple instances of external actions, not only

the traditional use or non use of force. This is particularly interesting in the context where, in average, in less than one percent of the situations, the OECD countries' response to international crises is the use of military force.

In the next chapter, I further discuss operational measures of the important variables and present preliminary descriptive statistics. That will be followed by a chapter where I will empirically test the hypotheses and then analyze the statistical results. These two chapters will create the premises to analyze if there is empirical support to the thesis that conservative governments are more likely to act aggressively than liberal governments.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, I will discuss the research design for empirically assessing the impact of executive political ideology on the foreign policy responses of governments in international crises. Here, my goal is to explain the manner in which I did the case selection, data collection, and variable operationalization and measurement. Various studies focused on foreign policy behavior produce conflicting results, partly due to the employment of different research designs. In consequence, I will compare my research design with other designs used to estimate states' foreign policy actions.

This chapter continues as follows. First, I will discuss the case selection method. Second, I will describe the dependent variable, which is an ordinal measure of foreign policy actions. Then, I present basic descriptive statistics for the dependent variable. Third, I will discuss the main independent variable, the executive's political ideology, and the key independent variables, power and economic interdependence, as used in the statistical analyses. Here, I will provide measurable proxies for these variables. Fourth, I will present a number of control variables which provide causal explanations for changes in foreign policy decisions. Finally, I will conclude by comparing the present research

designs with previous designs used to evaluate foreign policy behavior.

Data and unit of analysis

I analyze all international crises during the timeframe 1977-2001 using the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). There are 158 crises which started and ended during this period (see Appendix A). According to Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000, 3), a crisis is a "a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities". I chose ICB dataset because it includes not only militarized disputes but also crises short of war, which finally allows for a more nuanced analysis of states foreign policy decisions.

I will test my hypotheses on twenty two states, which are all OECD countries. They are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The reason for focusing on this group of countries is twofold. First, they are consolidated, well-established democracies, which make them more likely to have developed firm ideological cleavages among various political parties. Second, the most comprehensive source which provides measurable proxies (Klingeman et al. 2006) for the study's main independent variable, the executive's ideology, includes only the OECD countries.

The unit of analysis of this study is the dyad year. The first member of the dyad is an OECD country and the second member is a country involved in the ICB crisis. During my study's timeframe, there are twenty two crises in which one of the adversaries is an

OECD country. My study contains an initial number of 6,856 observations. In the present study, each observation aims at estimating the foreign policy action taken by every OECD country toward each state involved in the international crises or incident. For example, if there are three parties involved in an international crisis, none of them an OECD country, the resulting number of cases is sixty six (all 22 OECD countries paired against each country in the crisis). Every OECD country will be coded as having just one response per crisis, no matter the duration of the crisis. In the case when a country has more than a single response to the crisis, the response that I code is the most aggressive one. In this context, foreign policy action can be viewed as both third-party intervention and non intervention. For the purpose of this study, I will define a third-party intervention as "any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself" (Young 1967, 34).

This study analyzes three empirical models. While the independent and control variables remain constant, the dependent variable is measured uniquely in each separate model.

Dependent variable: foreign policy behavior

In order to evaluate the theoretical argument and test the hypotheses, I develop a new ordinal variable called foreign policy behavior, which represents the individual response of a country to an international crisis. This action can take one of fourteen possible outcomes. The two sources I have used in order to assess a country's foreign policy behavior are Keesing's Record of World Events, a monthly digest of worldwide political,

diplomatic and economic affairs, and the ICB crises summary, which present the evolution of the crisis and describe the response of third parties and regional and international organizations to a given crisis.

Most previous studies operationalized state behavior dichotomously by modeling only the use or non-use of force (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Meernik 1994; Gowa 1998; Fordham 1998). These studies either investigated states' annual or quarterly use of military force, or modeled the level of force used. Few studies, however, operationalize state foreign behavior as different degrees of aggressiveness or magnitude of engagement in world affairs (Rummell 1966, East 1973, Davis and Moore 1997; Clark 2001). In some cases state behavior may take into consideration trade disputes (Clark 2001) and in others foreign policy behavior may be much broader, including events ranging from meeting of officials and military and economic agreements to the imposition of economic and political sanctions, military clashes and war.

As a response to an international crisis, it may be the case that a country may choose to intervene in more than one way. For example, it may condemn one or both countries involved in the crisis, then it may impose sanctions, and finally, if sanctions do not have the intended effect, the third party may decide to engage its military forces. In those kinds of situations I will consider the most belligerent action taken by that state.

As mentioned above, I measure foreign policy behavior ordinally, from accommodation to aggression. I identify fourteen types of responses which will be grouped in five different categories of behavior. The underlying analytical concept that distinguish between these five categories of behavior is aggressiveness. Thus, the five categories of behavior are ordered on an aggressiveness scale. The first category,

accommodationist behavior, consists of actions or statements made by governments which aim at a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Three types of individual responses fall into this category: non military aid, adjudication/mediation/arbitration, and call for a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The second category, neutral behavior, consists of just one instance of state behavior, non intervention. I include just non intervention in this category, because the motives and circumstances of this type of response to the crisis are not made entirely clear by the third party. The third category, semi-accomodationist behavior, encompasses individual positions of states which consist of verbal statements, made in relation to the whole crisis or a particular actor directly involved in the crisis. These verbal statements do not include direct threats. The individual type of responses which fall into this category are express concern, call for withdrawal of troops, and condemnation.

The fourth category, semi-aggressive behavior, consists of actions taken by third parties aimed at putting an end to the crisis The intervention tools are more comprehensive and vigorous than those in the previous categories of behavior. Important to note, the various manners of intervention are short of the direct use of military force or threat of the use of force against one of the crisis actors. Participating in peacekeeping/peacemaking missions, sanctions, and military aid are the types of individual behaviors which comprise this category. Finally, the fifth category, aggressive behavior, contains those types of foreign policy behavior which directly involve the military forces of the OECD country or refer to the potential use of direct military force. Thus, the kinds of responses which fall into this category of state behavior are threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force.

Below, in table 4.1, I present the five categories of state behavior, from the most accommodationist to the most aggressive, and the correspondent values for each of them, resulted from collapsing the fourteen individual categories of foreign policy behavior.

Table 4.1. Instances of foreign policy behavior of OECD countries, as responses to crises

Type of foreign policy behavior	**Correspondent value for state behavior**	**Categories of behavior (accommodationist vs. aggressive)**	**Correspondent value for categories of state behavior**
Non military aid	1	Accommodationist	1
Adjudication, mediation, arbitration	2	Accommodationist	1
Call for a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict	3	Accommodationist	1
Non-intervention	4	Neutral	2
Express concern	5	Semi-accommodationist	3
Call for withdrawal of troops	6	Semi-accommodationist	3
Condemnation	7	Semi-accommodationist	3
Peacekeeping, peacemaking	8	Semi-aggressive	4
Sanctions	9	Semi-aggressive	4
Military aid	10	Semi-aggressive	4
Threat of force	11	Aggressive	5
Mobilization of troops	12	Aggressive	5
Peace enforcement	13	Aggressive	5
Use of force	14	Aggressive	5

Description of types of foreign policy behavior

For a better understanding of each category of behavior on the foreign policy continuum, below, I describe each instance of foreign policy behavior I have identified in studying the responses of OECD countries to international crises during 1977-2001. Again, the dependent variable's fourteen point scale consists of non military aid, adjudication/ mediation, call for a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict, no involvement, express concern, call for withdrawal of troops, condemnation, peacekeeping/ peacemaking, sanctions, military aid, threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force.

a. Financial, economic, humanitarian, medical aid

The dependent variable is coded as providing aid when the OECD country offers non-military assistance to one or more parties directly involved in the crisis. The aid may be given either on an international or an intergovernmental level and aims at reducing the population suffering affected by the crisis. For example, Norway announced on May 22 2007, its donation of 100 million dollars to boost the development and peace process in Sudan. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 1.

b. Mediation, arbitration, adjudication, negotiation

I code a foreign policy behavior as mediation, arbitration, adjudication, or negotiation when a third party gets involved in the dispute settlement, aiming at reducing the differences or seeking a solution. Jimmy Carter’s mediation of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict in 1979 at Camp David (Kleiboer 1998, 89-90) illustrates this kind of outcome. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 2.

c. Call for a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict

Individually, or along with other countries, members of various regional or international organizations, such as the European Union or United Nations, a country can call for a cease-fire among the warring parties and a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As an example, on January 8 2009, the United Nations Security Council via UN Security Council Resolution 1860 (www.un.org), called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza leading to a full Israeli withdrawal, the unimpeded provision throughout Gaza of food, fuel and medical treatment, and intensified international arrangements to prevent arms and ammunition smuggling. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 3.

d. No involvement

For various reasons, a third party may choose not to respond in any way to an international crisis. A significant number of European countries, for instance, chose not to get involved in the 2003 American led invasion of Iraq. Similarly, the involvement of an OECD country in crises geographically situated in Africa is a rare occurrence. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 4.

e. Express concern

As a result of unfolding human tragedies or situations which have the potential of leading to major regional conflicts, a country can show its anxiety by "expressing concern" toward a crisis. Throughout the crisis between India and Pakistan in July 1999, the international community (including the US, Russia, China, and France) expressed grave concerns about the escalating violence in Kashmir. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 5.

f. Call for withdrawal of troops

When a crisis leads to the dispatch of military forces across the border or military occupation, a third party may call for the withdrawal of troops. On 28 July 1993, as a result of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 852 (www.un.org), critical of Israel and called for its withdrawal from all Lebanese territory. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 6.

g. Condemnation

Via the practice of condemnation, a country shows its strong disapproval with an event or a foreign government's policy, practice, or action. France, Ireland, and Norway condemned the 2006 Qana airstrike by the Israel Air Force on a building in the small community of al-Khuraybah near the South Lebanese village of Qana on July 30, 2006, during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 7.

h. Peacekeeping, peacemaking, observers

The dependent variable is coded as peacekeeping, peacemaking, or observers when a country sends military troops overseas with the purpose of monitoring and observing peace processes, and more generally, in non-combat missions. Typically, soldiers sent on these missions are unarmed or only lightly armed. States such as Austria, Australia, Canada, and Denmark contributed military personnel to UNIIMOG (United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group) which was established in August 1988 to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement (www.un.org). I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 8.

i. Sanctions

I code a sanctions when a country, directly involved in the crisis or as a third party, individually or within a regional or international organization, imposes economic, political, financial, or military sanctions against one or more parties involved directly in the crisis. As an example, during 1998 and 1999 the European Union decided to take a range of measures against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because of its role in Kosovo (De Neuilly, 2001). Those sanctions included an arms embargo, travel restrictions, an oil embargo, and financial sanctions. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 9.

j. Military aid

The dependent variable is coded as military aid when a third party offers military aid to one or more parties directly involved in the crisis. By supporting militarily one side, I view this behavior as indirect military involvement in the crisis. As an example which illustrates this behavior, the United States government delivered precision-guided bombs to Israel, which were requested after beginning its air campaign against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon (The New York Times, July 21, 2006). I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 10.

k. Threat of force

I code the threat of force when a country, directly involved in a crisis or a third party, makes an express or implied promise that it will resort to force if certain demands of that government are not met. In January 1998, the United States and Britain threatened Iraq with the use of "substantial" force if this country would not comply with its obligations of cooperating with a delegation of UN inspectors. I code this type of foreign policy

behavior as 11.

l. Mobilization of troops

A mobilization of troops occurs when a government assembles, prepares, and places its military troops into readiness for war. As an example, on December 13, 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked by a group of militants allegedly belonging to Pakistan. The Indian Government responded with a massive troop mobilization along the India-Pakistan border[3]. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 12.

m. Peace enforcement

The dependent variable is coded as peace enforcement when a country involves its military troops in a mission which may require the application of military force, or the threat of its use, to ensure compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peace enforcement operations, where there is limited or no consent of the parties, are very close to actual combat. For example, since 2003, NATO countries, through the International Security Assistance Force, assist Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, in order to create the conditions for reconstruction and development (http://www.isaf.nato.int/). I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 13.

n. Use of force

The use of force, refers to a country's use of land, naval, or aerial military forces against another country in order to settle a dispute or abate a crisis. Far example, the intervention in Afghanistan initiated by the United States in response to the 9/11 attacks, falls into this category. I code this type of foreign policy behavior as 14.

[3] See the International Crisis Behavior Project, Indian Parliament Attack, crisis number 435. Http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/

Discussion of data

By the criteria enunciated above, out of 6,856 cases, 6098 of them resulted in non intervention on the part of the OECD countries (89%); there are 14 instances when OECD countries responded by providing non-military aid to one or more states involved directly in the crisis (0.2%); in 73 cases, they were involved in mediation (1%); in 77 cases, OECD countries called for a cease-fire and a peaceful resolution of the conflict (1%); in 46 instances, OECD countries expressed concern about the crisis (0.7%); in 12 cases, troops were asked to withdrawal (0.2%); in 212 cases, the actions of one or more of the direct participants in the crisis were condemned (3%); in 39 instances, OECD states participated in peacekeeping or peacemaking missions (0.6%); in 166 cases, they imposed economic, financial, political, or military sanctions (2.5%); in 24 instances they responded by offering military aid (0.4%); in 6 cases, OECD countries responded by threatening the use of force (0.1%); in 37 cases, OECD executives ordered the mobilization of troops (0.5%); in 11 instances, they engaged their troops in peace enforcement operations (0.2%); and finally, in 41 cases, leaders of certain OECD countries employed the use of military force (0.6%).

In figure 4.1, I present the frequency of each category of foreign policy behavior. Noticed that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, OECD leaders do not intervene in international crises.




Figure 4.1. Frequency distribution of foreign policy behavior, International Crisis Behavior Data

Regarding the duration of crises, out of the total number of 158 crises which started and ended during 1977 to 2001, 52 of them (32.9%) lasted less than a month. For example, Israel and Lebanon experienced a violent crisis on both sides of their border from 9 to 27 April 1996 (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 344). Then, 49 crises (31%), lasted between a month and three months, such as a long-standing border dispute which generated the first of several crises between Nigeria and Cameroon from 15 May to 24 July 1981 (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 328). 26 crises in my study's

timeframe (16.5%) lasted between three and six months. For instance, from 30 October 1978 to 10 April 1979, Tanzania, Uganda, and Libya were the actors in a crisis leading to the fall of Uganda's President Idi Amin (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 296). Further, 21 crises (13.3%) during 1977 to 2001, lasted between six and twelve months, such as the rebellion in eastern Zaire which led to another international crisis for Zaire and Rwanda, that escalated into an eight-month civil war in Zaire, from 8 October 1996 to 16 May 1997. Finally, 10 crises (6.3%) lasted more than a year. As an example, from 25 September 1992 to 8 October 1993, the newly independent state of Georgia experienced a crisis with Russia during its prolonged civil war against a separatist movement in Abkhazia (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 407).

In terms of the initial number of countries directly involved in a crisis, in 11 crises out of 158 (7%) the crisis took place within the territory of just one country. For example, the Polisario Front, a nationalist organization located in Morocco and supported by Algeria, whose main goal is the independence of Western Sahara, conducted an attack on the Moroccan town of Tan Tan triggered a crisis for Morocco on 28 January 1979 (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 299). The crisis was confined only within Morocco. However, in the vast majority of crises, 135 (85.4%), there are two adversaries. Finally, in 12 crises (7.6%), there were three or more countries directly involved in the crisis. As an example, the U.S. embassy bombings in August 1998 led to a crisis, pitting the US against both Afghanistan and Sudan (see ICB Project, summary of crisis # 427).

The average annual number of crises for the whole timeframe of the study (1977-2001) is 6.32. Important to note, during the Cold War years (1977-1991), the annual average number of crises was 8.3 per year, while the annual average in the post Cold War

(1992-2001) was 3.3 crises per year.

Key independent variable: executive's political ideology

I identify as the key independent variable the one which is explicitly discussed in the theoretical chapter. Thus, my study's key independent variable is executive political ideology. To account for political ideology, I use Klingemann et al.'s Manifesto dataset (2006) on policy preference estimates for parties, electors, and governments, which covers the period 1945-2003. This is the most comprehensive dataset on policy preferences available. The dataset estimates political parties and governments' policy preferences by doing a content analysis of the political parties manifestos/election programmes or their nearest equivalents. The Manifesto Data consist of at least 57 policy variables, with several leading indicators based on combinations of these. These policy variables are grouped into seven major policy areas: external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups. The data set further contains information on the ideological position of parties on a left-right scale, on their support or refusal for state intervention in the economy, on their acceptance of a market economy, on welfare state expansion, on European Integration and on international peace.

I will use two proxies for executive ideology. Both estimates are interval-level data. First, the Left-Right dimension (RILE), takes into consideration all 57 policy variables and covers all seven major policy areas. The Left-Right scale is made up by adding percentage references to the categories grouped as Left and Right, and subtracting the sum of the Left percentages from the sum of the Right percentages. Negative scores

represent Left positions and positive scores represent Right positions. At the extreme a political party devoting its entire programme on Left-wing issues would score -100; similarly a totally Right-wing programme would score +100 (Budge et al. 2001, 21). For the particular timeframe of my study (1977-2001) and the pool of countries (OECD countries) on which I will test my hypotheses, the range of the Left-Right ideological dimension is -39.2 to 48.46. Among the Right emphases, we find issues such as positive references about the use of military force, freedom, human rights, social services limitation, law and order, effective authority, and free enterprise. On the Left side, the emphasis is on issues such as negative references about the use of force, decolonization, peace, economic planning, regulate capitalism, labor groups, and expansion of social services and education.

The second proxy for executive ideology, international peace (INTPEACE), represents the scores concerning the policy preferences of government on foreign policy. Higher values on the international peace scale represent a more liberal ideological orientation expressed in the party manifesto. For the particular case of my study, the range of the international peace ideological dimension is 0 to 8.8. The international peace score is a composite score which takes into account references on three categories. The first category, *foreign special relationships,* looks for negative mentions of particular relationships between the manifesto country and other countries. For example, in the British case, this category seeks to identify if Britain still looks to control its former colonies. The second category, *military,* codes the favorable mentions of decreasing military expenditures, disarmament, "evils of war", and promises to reduce conscription. Finally, the third dimension, *peace*, codes the positive mentions of peace as a general

goal, declarations of belief in peace and peaceful means of solving crises, and desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile countries.

The choice of including two dimensions instead of one originates from the probable diminishing significance of the left-right cleavage (Giddens 1994). For instance, in practice, left wing political parties around the world increasingly have embraced new social and economic policies which traditionally belonged to right-wing parties, such as market liberalism and welfare reduction measures. However, at the theoretical level, the left-right position is still the central determinant factor for policy preferences (Klingemann et al., 2006).

For any given government, the government ideology is defined as:

$G.I. = \Sigma\{Ideology_i * (\#Posts_i/Total\ Posts)\}$

where: $Ideology_i$ = the ideology of party i

$Posts_i$ = the total number of cabinet posts controlled by party i

Total Posts = the total number of posts in the cabinet

In the case when there is just one political party which formed the government, $Posts_i$ = Total Posts, and thus government ideology is equal with the ideology of the party which formed the government, $G.I = Ideology_i$. When there is a coalition of parties which formed the government, then, the overall ideology of the government is assessed by looking at the political relevance of each party in the government[4]. The relevance of a party in the coalition government is given by the number of posts filled by that party as a

[4] In parliamentary systems, most of the time, it is a coalition of political parties which form the government, in which senior and junior partners share the power over the foreign policy decisionmaking. Even though conflicts over foreign policy often occur, it is the senior, larger coalition partner through the prime minister, which has the stronger say in these matters. The cabinet's prime minister, who is in most cases the leader of the larger party in the coalition, has a large autonomy on foreign policy issues. There are also exceptions, like in the case of Germany and Israel, where the junior parties have been able to significantly influence key foreign policy decisions (Kaarbo 1996, Hagan et al. 2001, Hermann 2001).

percentage of the total number of posts in the government. Therefore, the equivalent ideology of a coalition government is calculated with the formula presented above, which takes into account the relative importance of each party which formed the executive. In order to estimate a party's ideology, I use successively both measures of ideology. First, $Ideology_i$ is estimated with the overall measure of ideology (RILE), which contains all 57 policy variables. Second, $Ideology_i$ is estimated with the measure which takes into account only the policy preferences of government on foreign policy (INTPEACE).

There are other methods for estimating the ideological positions of political actors. However, alternate indicators of party ideology are not as rich and differentiated as the ones I use in this study. For example, Huber and Inglehart (1995) and Castles and Mair (1984) estimate party policy positions and ideologies by conducting surveys of political experts. In this case, the ideological party position is measured by the mean value of party activists or likely supporters. The main disadvantages of this method are first, that the correspondent indicators are formed by one or a limited number of static variables, generally a Left-Right scale, and second, the time period on which policy positions are based on is unclear (Budge 2000).

Another approach for estimating political actors' ideological location is based on an analysis of roll-call voting (Poole and Rosenthal 1985, 1997; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006). This is perhaps the most straightforward method, but, there are certain limitations associated with this approach. The most important limitation is that it is difficult to estimate a coalition government's ideology because political parties can vote in Parliament in such a way to keep the coalition together rather than voting according to their ideological principles (Debus 2009, 286).

Control variables

Besides executive ideology a number of other variables account for foreign policy behavior. Power parity, economic interdependence, contiguity and distance, similarity of foreign policy views, and regime type, all influence leader foreign policy decisions and will be included in the empirical models presented in the next chapter.

Power parity

Power parity is operationalized by accounting for the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states (Gilpin 1981, 33). In this study, the proxy for power parity is relative capabilities, operationalized as the OECD country's share of capabilities within the dyad. That is, I calculate relative capabilities, RELCAP1, as the ratio between the capabilities of country 1 and the sum of capabilities of country 1 and country 2, where country 1 is the OECD country and country 2 is a country directly involved in the crisis. Thus,

RELCAP1 = CAP1/(CAP1+CAP2)

An alternate proxy for power parity is the relative capability of the stronger state to the sum of capabilities in thy dyad. However, I use the first measure because I look for it to capture the increasing strength of the OECD country relative to the total power of the countries in the dyad.

I use the CINC score in order to estimate the national material capabilities, as found in the COW dataset (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). This is a multidimensional indicator which takes into consideration six factors: energy consumption, iron and steel consumption, military expenditures, military personnel, total and urban population.

The use of relative capabilities as a measure for military power parity between the two countries in the dyad has some limitations. Among those limitations, this measure does not take into account, for instance, the determination showed by the less powerful country during a military conflict or the resilience of a population, able to overcome the difficulties associated with the sanctions imposed by the international community. Similarly, as a proxy for military power parity, relative capabilities does not capture difficulty of terrain and tactics employed by the less powerful country, which finally may diminish the military superiority of the more dominant country. However, taking into account that concepts such as determination or population's resilience are difficult to be quantified, the use or relative capabilities remains the most appropriate measure for military power parity.

I expect that the larger the relative capability, in other words the stronger the OECD country and the weaker the crisis country, the more aggressive the OECD country will behave.

Economic interdependence

Multiple measures have appeared in the literature to operationalize economic interdependence (Barbieri 1995, 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999a). Two different variable constructions are commonly used to express the same concept. The basis of Barbieri's composite variable is trade share which is calculated as the proportion of bilateral trade to each state's total trade. In addition to trade share, among Barbieri's measures, we find: a) trade salience, which equals the square root of the product of trade share measures for both states in a dyad; b) trade symmetry which assesses the "balance" of the two trade share measures, and c) trade interdependence, which summarizes the

interaction of salience and symmetry (Gartzke and Li 2003, 555).

In contrast, Oneal and Russett's (1997, 1999a) core measure is trade dependence, measured as the ratio of bilateral trade to a state's gross domestic product (GDP). Trade dependence focuses on interdependence expressed as economic importance of a given bilateral trade relationship as a portion of the national economy, dismissing the role of the trade relationships with third parties. Further, two additional measures, derived from trade dependence, are operationalized as follows: a) trade interdependence, which equals the lower of the two dependence measures; and b) trade asymmetry, the higher economic dependence measure of the two.

In this study, as a proxy for trade interdependence, I will use Barbieri's trade share (TRADESHARE) measured as follows:

$TRADESHARE_i = (imports_{ij} + exports_{ij})/(imports_i + exports_i) = trade_{ij}/trade_i$

I use this measure because it better captures the significance of a given trading relationship, in relation to trade with a state's other partners.

The trade between two countries is defined as the annual levels of exports and imports of goods and services. In order to estimate countries' annual trade levels and the individual level of trade with particular countries, I use the Correlates of War Project's Trade Data. The data set covers the period 1870-2006 and uses data provided by multiple sources, including the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations' Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, and the World Bank.

I expect that, with the increase of trade share between the OECD and the crisis country, the propensity toward a more accommodationist behavior on the part of the OECD country increases.

Contiguity and distance

Contiguity and distance affect the relationships among states on various levels. According to Starr and Most (1978, 444), territory and borders "do not cause wars, they at least create structure of risks and opportunities in which conflictual behavior is apparently more likely to occur". Associated with Diehl's (1991) "facilitating condition for conflict", geography is important from two different perspectives. First, in line with the proximity perspective, closeness influences foreign policy behavior because it facilitates the ease with which states are able to reach to each other politically, militarily, or from a trade standpoint. Second, according to the interaction perspective the frequency with which states interact is influenced by their location.

When relating contiguity and distance with foreign policy behavior, the most common argument is that proximity increases the propensity toward more aggressive behavior. If two neighboring states have a history of disputes, proximity exacerbates the tensions between them, which may lead to more aggressive behavior toward each other (Hensel 1994; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1991). Political instability or revolutions should also concern policymakers if they take place in a neighboring country. Thus, threat perception is heightened and policymakers may overreact by responding more aggressively than necessary (Diehl 1985, 1991). On a similar note, Starr and Most (1978) believe that relations between neighboring states are marked by higher uncertainty than the relations between countries situated farther apart. This higher uncertainty can also lead to more confrontational behavior.

In order to capture the effects of these two influences, I include two proxies which operationalize distance and contiguity. First, DISTANCE is expressed as the distance in

miles between the capitals of the two states. Second, CONTIG is expressed as a dichotomous variable which equals 1 if the two countries share a land border or are separated by less than 150 miles of water, or 0 if they are not directly contiguous. The effect of distance in hindering aggressive behavior is less obvious for the powerful countries, which have the capacity to mobilize, deploy their troops worldwide, and use them if necessary. In this study, I expect that proximity will lead to more aggressive behavior.

Similarity of foreign policy views

Many researchers of international politics believe that the similarity of two states' foreign policy positions may impact the relations between them (Bueno de Mesquita 1975, 1981, Gartzke and Simon 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997b). That is, the more common their foreign policy views, the less room for disagreements and thus, a reduced likelihood for aggressive behavior toward one another. The pattern of alliances among states is generally considered to express the extent to which states have similar or diverging foreign policies or security interests (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979). More precisely, as Bueno de Mesquita (1975) suggests, states with similar alliance portfolios are likely to have similar foreign policy goals and vice versa.

In order to take into account the similarity of foreign policy views, I use a spatial measure, similarity of alliance portfolio (S), which evaluates the rank order correlation for two states' alliance portfolios. S considers both the presence and the absence of alliances in the correlation calculation (Bennett and Stam 2004, 237). The values for S are on the interval (-1, 1), where -1 represents totally opposite alliance agreement patterns between the two countries , and 1 indicates identical alliance agreement patterns

(Signorino and Ritter 1999). The Correlates of War COW Alliances Data Set provides the estimates for the policy portfolio.

An alternative measure for similarity of foreign policy views is Kendall tau-b. Like S, Kendall tau-b estimates the rank order correlation for two states' alliance portfolios. However, rather than considering both the presence and the absence of alliances, the latter takes into account only the existence of alliances in the correlation calculation (Bennett and Stam 2004, 237).

In this study, I expect that the more similar are the alliance portfolios of the two states in the dyad, the more likely the OECD country will act more cooperatively toward the crisis country.

Regime type

Regime type is an important attribute of states, which influences the relations with other actors in the international system. According to democratic peace theory, democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other, but they are just as bellicose as non-democracies (Maoz and Russett 1993, Russett 1993, Oneal et al. 1996). Thus, it is expected that an OECD country will act more aggressively toward countries with increasing levels of authoritarianism and oppositely, more peacefully toward more liberal countries.

The measure I use to take into account for regime type (POLITY) is the difference between the polity score of country 2 and the polity score of country 1, where country 1 is the OECD country and country 2 is a country directly involved in the crisis. The polity score is calculated as the democracy score minus the autocracy score. Thus,

$POLITY = POLITY_2 - POLITY_1$

$POLITY_i = DEMOC_i - AUTOC_i$

The intervals for democracy and autocracy scores are (0, 10). Therefore, the polity score captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity IV Project contains coded annual information on regime and authority characteristics for all independent states.

Models

This study addresses empirically the two hypotheses presented in the theory chapter, by using three different models. The difference between the three models is the manner in which the dependent variable is operationalized. The independent and control variables and their measures are the same in each of the three models. As I mentioned before, I started with 6,856 observations on Y. Missing data on the measures of power, trade interdependence, similarity of foreign policy views, distance and contiguity, and regime type, leaves me with 5,612 cases. That is, a number of 1,244 observations are missing. 479 observations were lost because of missing data correspondent to the flow of imports and exports between the two countries in the dyad and also the total trade of each of those two countries. Also, 444 observations were lost because of missing data on democracy and autocracy scores in the two countries. Thus, I excluded the observations which were coded in Polity IV as -66 (cases of foreign "interruption"), -77 (cases of "interregnum," or anarchy), and -88 (cases of "transition"). Finally, another 321 observations were dropped because of missing values associated with the polity scores of the two states in the dyad.

Model 1

In this model, foreign policy behavior is a two category variable. The two types of behavior are no intervention and intervention. I code 0 the instances of foreign policy behavior which consist of no intervention. All other instances are coded as 1. Noteworthy, the second category does not take into account the character of the behavior - aggressiveness/accomodationism. By these criteria, out of 5,612 observations, 5,023 of them are coded as no intervention (89.5%), while in 589 cases (10.5%), OECD countries intervened in one form or another. Figure 4.2 displays the frequency distribution of the two category dependent variable of model 1.




Figure 4.2. Frequency distribution of foreign policy behavior: two category dependent variable (Model 1)

Model 2

In this model, foreign policy behavior is a four category variable. The first category, which is more accomodationist than the following categories, is coded as 1, and is comprised of non-military aid, mediation, and call for a cease fire. There are 121 observations in this category (2.2%). The second category is coded as 2 and contains only the no intervention instances of foreign policy behavior. There are 5,023 observations in this category (89.5%). The third category of foreign policy behaviors, which is semi-accommodationist, is coded as 3, and is comprised of the categories express concern, call for troops withdrawal, and condemnation. 239 cases are found in this category (4.3%). The fourth category, which is semi aggressive, is coded as 4, and is comprised of peacekeeping, sanctions, and military aid. This category contains 157 instances of behavior (2.8%). Finally, the fifth category includes the more aggressive instances of foreign policy behavior, among which, threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force. There are 72 observations in this category (1.3%). Figure 4.3 displays the frequency distribution of the five category dependent variable of model 2.




Figure 4.3. Frequency distribution of foreign policy behavior: five category dependent variable (Model 2)

Model 3

In this model, foreign policy behavior is a four category variable, which excludes the instances of no intervention. I develop this model in order to explore the impact of government's political ideology on foreign policy decisionmaking in instances of intervention. The justification for including such a model is that no intervention, which accounts for more than ninety percent of the observations in my study, is not always the result of lack of power, economic sufficiency, or a location which hinders intervention in world affairs. For example, there are countries such as New Zealand and Switzerland which, in over 95 percent of the crises, do not intervene at all.

Various reasons are invoked when explaining no intervention. Generally, a country's security interests and behavior are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors (Katzenstein 1996). Expanding on this broad argument, Kal Holsti (1970) refers to what he calls "national role conception", a notion which sought to express how a nation views itself and its role in world affairs, when explaining differences in national behavior. In this context, no intervention does not imply lack of capabilities but it reflects the deep cultural beliefs of a nation and its leaders. On a similar note, Ball (1992) observes that Asian culture predisposes toward longer term approaches than other cultures. He quotes the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, as saying "We, the Indonesian people, have learned not to think in centimeters or meters, not in hours or days. We have learned to think in continents and decades" (Ball 1992, 5). Thus, a country's foreign policymaking that is influenced by this cultural approach would very likely be non interventionist rather than interventionist. Finally, through the concept of strategic culture[5], non-intervention receives a new meaning. Elaborating on the relationship between Chinese strategic culture and its use of military force, Johnston points out that "China has exhibited a tendency for the controlled, politically driven defensive and minimalist use of force that is deeply rooted in the statecraft of ancient strategists and a worldview of relatively complacent superiority" (1995, 1).

In practice, neutrality or "isolationism" refers to a government's deliberate policy of refraining from interfering in the affairs of other nations. It was not until December 7,

[5] Born at the intersection between history, geography, values, beliefs, and politics, strategic culture is labeled as "the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particularly geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience" (Gray 1999, 53). Therefore, as opposed to culture, which describes the society as a whole, strategic culture is an attribute of the security community elite.

1941, when Japanese naval forces attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, when the United States decided to change its approach toward intervening in world affairs on a larger scale. West German governments, during the Cold War, pursued a foreign policy consisting of a strong commitment to multilateral institutions and a innate skepticism of military power. Preferring a low international profile, they sought to create a reputation as an "honest broker". During the post World War II period, until the first Gulf War, Japan, forced by circumstances, became a pacifist and noninterventionist nation, with no military of its own, which allowed this country to focus entirely on economic development. From a different perspective, there are situations when countries are willing and ready to act but they chose not to. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11 it was just the US and Britain that attacked Afghanistan. Germany and France committed their countries to providing military support to the US-led war on terrorism if required.

This model includes 589 observations. The first category, which accounts for the more accomodationist foreign policy behaviors, is coded as 1, and is comprised of non-military aid, mediation, and call for a cease fire. This category includes 121 observations (20.5%). The second category includes 239 observations (40.6%) and consists of semi accomodationist behaviors, such as express concern, call for troops withdrawal and condemnation. I code this new category as 2. The third category is coded as 3 and includes 157 observations (26.7%). It is a semi aggressive type of foreign policy behavior and is made up by peacekeeping, sanctions and military aid. Finally, the forth category is the most aggressive one and is comprised of threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force. I code it as 4 and includes 72 observations (12.2%).




Figure 4.4. Frequency distribution of foreign policy behavior: four category dependent variable (Model 3)

Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the operationalization of the concepts in my model, in order to be able to test, in the next chapter, the influence of government's political ideology on foreign policy behavior. I discussed the measurement of these variables and then compared those measures with other measures of the same concepts, found in the literature. Further, I presented basic descriptive statistics related to the dependent variable. Finally, I examined the three empirical models which will be used to test the study's hypotheses.

There has been little empirical research directed toward understanding the role of executives' political ideology in foreign policymaking. Although there is scholarship

which analyzes both qualitatively and quantitatively the use of force in international politics, limited research examines the broader range of foreign policy behavior. Thus, this study aims at addressing an ignored area of foreign policy decisionmaking.

In the next chapter, I use ordinary least square regression to evaluate the role played by government's political ideology in influencing foreign policy behavior.

CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS

In the third chapter I reviewed extant research on the impact of political ideology on state foreign policy behavior. This literature suggests political ideology may or may not affect foreign policy decisionmaking. For example, realists insist that ideology does not influence the foreign policy decisions of governments. It is power relations which determine relations among states. In contrast, liberals, among others, maintain ideology directly influences the actions governments take in the international arena. Left wing governments are likely to act dovishly, while right wing governments are expected to behave more hawkishly. However, there is no significant empirical evidence which supports the thesis that left wing executives behave more dovishly, while right wing executives act more hawkishly. The sample of countries used in my analyses include all OECD states from 1977 to 2001.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the estimation technique utilized to assess the influence of the executive ideology on foreign policy decisions of the government. In the second part, I discuss the empirical findings characteristic to each of the three empirical models. Lastly, I conclude that executive ideology's role in

influencing foreign policy behavior is mixed, depending on the way ideology is estimated.

Model 1: binary dependent variable

Estimation technique

The dependent variable in all three models is discrete or categorical, rather than continuous. In the first model, the dependent variable is binary, where no intervention is coded as 0, while intervention is coded as 1. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use a logistic regression in order to estimate the relationship between executive ideology and foreign policy behavior, while controlling for power parity, economic interdependence, policy portfolio, regime type, distance, and contiguity. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate because, in my case, the dependent variable is not continuous and thus, I cannot assume a linear relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable (Long 1997).

The most common form of the logistic regression equation is

$$Y_i(x) = \frac{1}{1+\exp[-(a+bixi)]}, \text{ or alternatively,}$$

$\text{logit}[Y_i(x)] = \log\{Y_i(x)/[1- Y_i(x)]\} = a + b_1x_1 + b_2X_2 + ... + b_ix_i$

where a = the constant of the equation, and b_i = the coefficient of the predictor variables. Employing Agresti's formalization (2002), if the probability of a country to intervene (take on the value of 1) is $P(Y_i=1) = \pi_i$, then the probability of not to intervene is $P(Y_i=0) = 1 - \pi_i$, where $0 \leq \pi_i \leq 1$.

The probability mass function for the possible outcomes y for Y is

$$E(Yi) = p(y) = \pi^{y}(1- \pi)^{n-y} \frac{n!}{y!(n-y)!}$$

where y = 0 or 1, and n = number of binary observations (Agresti 2002, 5-6)

The general equation which describes this model and includes all independent variables assumed to influence foreign policy behavior is presented below.

$$\text{Ln (Foreign policy behavior)} = a + b_1\text{ideology} + b_2\text{relcapab} + b_3\text{ecinterdep} + b_4\text{regimetype} + b_5\text{policyviews} + b_6\text{distance} + b_7\text{contiguity}$$

The basic descriptive statistics for the variables in Model 1 is shown in Table B.1. (see Appendix B).

Empirical results

The results from model 1 provide solid support to the argument that executive ideology influences government's decision of intervening or not intervening in international crises. In table 5.1., I present the results of a Logit analysis, where executive ideology is expressed as both the overall ideology of the party or coalition of parties which form the government (the Left-Right dimension), and the ideology which refers to the specific area of foreign policy. I opt for using both measures of executive ideology because they express different ideological domains and besides, they are not highly correlated (-0.059). The dependent variable is dichotomous. The two categories are no intervention and intervention, where intervention refers to all possible instances of involvement, accomodationist or aggressive.

Both Logit models confirm that executive ideology influences the likelihood of a government to intervene in crises. However, depending on how executive ideology is

Table 5.1. Logit Estimates of Executive Ideology and International Influences on Foreign Policy Behavior, 1977-2001; two level dependent variable

Variable	Overall	International Peace
EXECUTIVE IDEOLOGY t	0.01*** (0.0025)	0.048** (0.023)
RELCAP1 (t - 1)	0.817*** (0.164)	0.845*** (0.164)
TRADESHARE1 (t - 1)	-11.48*** (2.92)	-11.56*** (2.93)
POLITY	0.065*** (0.007)	0.066*** (0.0066)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIOS (S) (t - 1)	-1.238*** (0.25)	-1.23*** (0.255)
DISTANCE	$-8.6e^{-05}$*** ($2e^{-05}$)	$-8.42e^{-05}$*** ($2.03e^{-05}$)
CONTIGUITY	0.57 (0.337)	0.573 (0.337)
Log likelihood	-1792.98	-1799.07
Chi-square	183.43	171.26
N	5,612	5,612

The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * $p<.10$; ** $p<.05$; *** $p<.01$; one-tailed test.

estimated, the two models show contrasting results. First, if I use the Overall Ideology estimate, the results show that the more conservative the ideological orientation of the government, the higher the likelihood of intervention. The relationship between the two is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Further, as shown in the second Logit model, if I estimate ideology with the international peace proxy, the relationship between executive ideology and foreign policy behavior is also positive and significant, but at the 0.05 level. However, the meaning of the relationship is different. The presence of a liberal government increases the likelihood of intervention. Important to emphasize, these results do not say anything about the type of intervention a state opted for. The coefficients in both cases are slightly positive. The effects I document are robust across the two measures of executive ideology. Thus, the empirical results strongly support the argument that the decisions of governments to respond or not to respond to international crises is highly influenced by their ideological views.

When using the overall right-left estimate of ideology, the results support the common view, according to which liberals are more isolationists and conservatives are more interventionist. Discussing bipartisanship in U.S. foreign policy, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, notes that "the Democratic Party, the party of internationalism, became increasingly prone to the appeal of neo-isolationism. And the Republican Party, the party of isolationism, became increasingly prone to the appeal of militant interventionism" (Brzezinski 1984, 15-16). At its core, a Republican foreign policy involves a strong commitment to a strong national defense, where force remains the first and last line of defense of U.S. freedom and security (Hagel 2004, 65). This reliance on force breathes a more proactive approach in

dealing with security challenges and thus more interventionism. Oppositely, the reluctance of the Left to invest in the military reduces the capacity to intervene abroad. That is the case because, frequently, the ability to intervene in international affairs, either peacefully or aggressively, requires military capabilities.

The use of the second proxy for executive ideology, international peace, leads to results which contradict the expected direction of the relationship. A possible explanation for the inverse relationship is that liberal governments, due to their inclusive conception of the national interest, will be more likely to respond to crises than conservative governments, so that equality prevails, human rights abuses and ethnic rivalries are stopped, dictators are removed from office, and people living in other countries enjoy better living conditions. Another possible reason is that liberal governments, as in the case of the United States, are challenged to a greater extent than conservative administrations (Prins 2001) and thus, liberal executives end up being more interventionist.

Few examples from the case of the United States are illustrative. Throughout the study's timeframe, the most tested U.S. President was Jimmy Carter (Democrat). During his four years in office, 45 international crises took place, and he responded to 23 of them (51.11%). The least tested one term U.S. President was George H. W. Bush (Republican), who responded to 10 of the 21 international crises (47.62%) which took place during his presidency. The most interventionist American President was Bill Clinton (Democrat), who responded to 20 of the 25 international crises (80%) taking place during his eight years in office. Lastly, as a two term president, Ronal Reagan (Republican) responded to 32 international crises out of the total number of 65 (49.23%).

With regard to the impact of relative capabilities and economic interdependence on foreign policy behavior, both relationships are robust and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. That is true for both models, no matters how executive ideology is measured. In the case of relative capabilities, the relationship coefficients are positive and relatively high. These estimates show that the OECD country's probability of intervention increases with increases in power. This outcome is in line with the realist argument that assumes that it is the more powerful countries that are more likely to intervene because they have the primary interest in maintaining or changing the status quo. Besides, they have the financial, political, diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities which allow them to intervene in international affairs (Waltz 1979, Morgenthau 1967, Kennan 1957).

The relationship between economic interdependence and state behavior is strongly negative, as shown by the coefficients presented in Table 5.1. These estimates strongly support the claim that the higher the trading relationship between an OECD country and another country, the lower the likelihood of engagement of the first toward the latter. The results come to expand on the liberals' argument, according to which open international markets and heightened economic exchange promote communication between governments and thus, inhibit political-military discord and hinder interstate hostilities (Doyle 1997, Rosecrance 1986). Besides, OECD countries are reluctant to intervene even cooperatively. The justification for such an argument is that crises take place mainly in developing areas, between countries which do not have large level of trades with the OECD countries. It may be the case that these crises do not disrupt in a major way the normal economic exchanges with the OECD countries and thus, there is no reason for them to intervene, even cooperatively. Therefore, OECD countries do not

have the incentives to intervene either belligerently or cooperatively.

The other control variables also have a significant effect on foreign policy behavior. As anticipated, the impact of the regime type of the state directly involved in a crisis influences the propensity of engagement of the OECD country. The relationship between the two is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. That is to say, the more democratic the target country, the more likely the OECD country will engage with it. These results come somehow to expand on the democratic peace thesis, which states that democratic countries do not fight one another (Maoz and Russett 1993, Gledistch 1992). However, the results go further than democratic peace theory, and show that OECD countries have more interactions with the more democratic countries than with less democratic ones.

Further, as with the impact of the pattern of alliances between states on foreign policy behavior, the coefficient on the relationship term is negative, fairly high, and significant at the 0.01 level. The significance of these estimates is that OECD countries are more likely to engage with or intervene against countries whose foreign policy positions are different than theirs. The possible explanation for such a behavior is that OECD countries form alliances mostly with other OECD countries, and since in approximately 85% of the total number of international crises the initial participants are non OECD states, the OECD countries can not respond to crises by engaging with their alliance partners. Thus, because OECD countries and crisis countries do not have similar pattern of alliances, it is improbable that the OECD country's response to crises will consist of engagement with another OECD country.

As one would expect, the distance between two countries influences the behavior

toward one another. Either they are far from each other and do not have the necessary capabilities to reach distant countries, or they are neighbors and have a history of previous disputes, my model estimates show that the probability of intervention decreases with distance. The coefficient on the *Distance* variable is slightly negative and significant at the 0.01 level. Finally, contiguity does not affect the OECD countries response to a crisis, if *Distance* is also present, as a variable. Most likely, the effect of contiguity is not significant because of the overwhelming majority of dyads whose members are not contiguous. At the same time the effect of contiguity may be insignificant due to the relatively high correlation between contiguity and distance (-0.21). However, if I take distance out and keep only contiguity as a measure of proximity, the effect of contiguity is statistically significant at the 0.05 level (almost at the 0.01 level). The relationship between contiguity and state behavior is positive, which means that contiguity increases the likelihood of OECD country's intervention.

Model 2: five level categorical dependent variable

The dependent variable in Model 1 is a dichotomous variable, where the two categories are intervention and non intervention. The first model's results indicate that the more conservative governments show a greater propensity toward intervention than the more liberal governments, if ideology is estimated with Overall Ideology. Oppositely, the more liberal executives are more likely to respond to crises than conservative executives, if the estimate for ideology is International Peace Ideology. However, this model is limited because it lacks information about the manner in which OECD countries respond to international crises. Intervention, in the previous model, meant both accommodationist

and belligerent behavior. Model 2 refines the dependent variable by expressing it on five categories of behavior, based on various levels of aggressiveness. The advantage of this model is that it offers a better picture of state strategic behavior and how executive ideology and other factors influence foreign policymaking.

Estimation technique

The dependent variable in the second model is a five level categorical variable. The first category is the most accomodationist of the five and includes financial/economic/humanitarian aid, mediation, and call for a cease fire. The second category is non intervention. The third category of foreign policy behavior is more aggressive than the previous two and consists of express concern, call for withdrawal of troops, and condemnation. The fourth category is comprised of peacekeeping, sanctions, and military aid. Finally, the fifth category, which is the most aggressive, is comprised of threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force. From the description of the five categories, it can be concluded that this is an ordinal variable, because the values can be ranked but the real distance between categories is unknown.

In this case, I evaluate the impact of the independent variables on foreign policy behavior using the ordered logistic regression (Long 1997). Ordered logit model has the form (see Menard 2001, Borooah 2001):

$$Y^*_i = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k X_{ki} + \varepsilon_i = Z_i + \varepsilon_i,$$

where Y^*_i is a continuous or discrete latent variable, whose values determine what the observed ordinal variable Y equals. More generally, Y is the collapsed version of Y^*. In

the case of my study Y^* can take on a range of 14 values which have been collapsed into 5 categories of Y. Specifically,

$Y_i = 1$ (accomodationist behavior) if $Y^*_i \leq 3$

$Y_i = 2$ (no intervention) if $Y^*_i = 4$

$Y_i = 3$ (semi-accomodationist behavior) if $4 < Y^*_i \leq 7$

$Y_i = 4$ (semi-aggressive behavior) if $7 < Y^*_i \leq 10$

$Y_i = 5$ (aggressive behavior) if $Y^*_i > 10$

The estimated probability that Y will take on a particular value is as follows:

$$P(Y_i=1) = \frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k1)}$$

$$P(Y_i=2) = \frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k2)} - \frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k1)}$$

$$P(Y_i=3) = \frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k3)} - \left(\frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k2)} - \frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k1)}\right)$$

$$P(Y_i=4) = \frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k4)} - \left[\frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k3)} - \left(\frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k2)} - \frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k1)}\right)\right]$$

$$P(Y_i=5) = 1 - \frac{1}{1+\exp(Zi - k4)},$$

where k_1, k_2, k_3, and k_4, are the threshold values.

The basic descriptive statistics for the variables in Model are shown in Table B.2. (see Appendix B).

Empirical results

Model 2 provides partial support for the theoretical expectations model presented in the theory chapter. These results are explained by the different ways in which government political ideology is measured. The proxies for the independent and control variables are the same as the ones in Model 1. The estimated coefficients are summarized in Table 5.2. Further, I explain the statistical analysis and discuss the results in greater detail.

The impact of executive ideology on foreign policy behavior varies, depending on the way the ideology is measured. If it is coded as right-left on a general ideological scale, the relationship factor with state behavior is negative, but not significant. In other words, if the measure of ideology takes into account, in addition to the domain of external relations, the other six dimensions - freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups - both, left and right governments do not differ in terms of how aggressive they act in foreign affairs. Therefore, in this case, the results offer empirical support for Hypothesis1. If I use the foreign relations measure of ideology, the relationship between executive ideology and foreign policy behavior however, is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The significance of these estimates is that left wing governments are more likely to act peacefully than right wing governments. In this case, the results support Hypothesis 2.

These results partially support my theoretical argument and are not unanticipated. They show support for the realist school of thought. According to the realist argument, the political orientation of the government is a non factor; it is only the power-related attributes of states which are the sole predictors of state behavior (Waltz 1979, Schuman 1969, Deutsch and Singer 1964). Alternatively, ideology is not relevant because both

Table 5.2. Ordered Logit Estimates of Executive Ideology and International Influences on Foreign Policy Behavior, 1977-2001; five level dependent variable

Variable	Overall	International Peace
EXECUTIVE IDEOLOGY	-0.017	-0.062**
t	(0.0026)	(0.026)
RELCAP1	0.242*	0.281*
(t - 1)	(0.146)	(0.146)
TRADESHARE1	-3.92***	-3.9***
(t - 1)	(1.16)	(1.17)
POLITY	0.036***	0.036***
	(0.0065)	(0.0064)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIOS (S)	-0.41	-0.51*
(t - 1)	(0.254)	(0.26)
DISTANCE	$-1.73e^{-05}$	$-1.93e^{-05}$
	$(1.87e^{-05})$	$(1.86e^{-05})$
CONTIGUITY	0.582*	0.588*
	(0.341)	(0.34)
τ_1	-4.2	-4.37
τ_2	2.08	1.92
τ_3	2.84	2.68
τ_4	4.03	3.87
Log likelihood	-2631.68	-2628.95
Chi-square	37.99	43.43
N	5,612	5,612

The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * $p<.10$; ** $p<.05$; *** $p<.01$; one-tailed test.

liberal and conservative governments do and should act in such a way to preserve and promote the national interest, regardless of their ideological convictions (Bliss and Johnson 1975, 83). Finally, as noted by Gowa (1998, 307), in foreign policymaking, it is a "partisan truce" between government and opposition, where the opposition parties defy ideology and support government foreign policies because they expect to get the same treatment when holding executive power in the future.

The second set of results confirm the theoretical argument described in Chapter 3. More explicitly, my study finds evidence that left leaning governments act less belligerent than conservative governments. That means that, when responding to crises, there is consistency between executive ideological orientation and foreign policy actions. Essentially, these results broaden the general claim in the extant literature, that conservative governments are more likely to use force than liberal governments (Arena and Palmer 2009, Schultz 2005, London, Palmer, and Reagan 2004, Fordham 1998, Wittkopf 1990).

As in the previous model, the relationship between relative capabilities and foreign policy behavior is positive and significant. Regardless the measure used for executive ideology, the results show that the relationship is both significant at the 0.10 level. According to these estimates, the more powerful the OECD country, the more likely it will behave aggressively. The results are in line with the realist thesis, that only powerful countries can afford to behave aggressively, because it takes financial, economic, and military capabilities in order to act belligerently.

The effect of economic interdependence on foreign policy behavior is also robust and significant. The relationship coefficients, regardless the measure for executive

ideology, are negative and significant at the 0.01 level. These estimates strongly indicate that the response of OECD countries to international crises is in strict correlation with the degree of economic interdependence with the countries directly involved in the crisis. The larger the amount of economic exchanges the more likely the OECD country will behave peacefully. These results refine the liberal argument, in the sense that they go beyond the assumption that increasing trade between two countries reduces the likelihood of war between them, and demonstrates that increases in trade reduces the likelihood of aggressive behavior.

Regime type of the crisis state influences the manner in which the OECD country gets involved in a crisis. As in the previous model, the relationship between the two variables is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, regardless the measure for executive ideology. The results suggest that, in response to international crises, the more liberal the crisis country, the more likely the OECD country will act hawkishly toward it. The same results are obtained if using alternate measures of regime type. For example, if the measure of regime type is a dichotomous variable (coded as 1 if crisis country's democracy score is equal or higher than 7 and 0 if democracy score is less than 7) the strength of the relationship increases and becomes significant at the 0.001 level. However different results are found if I express regime type with a three category polity score for the crisis country, coded as follows: polity2 = 2 if polity2 is equal to or greater than 4; polity2 = 1 if polity2 is equal to or greater than -3 but less than 4; polity2 = 0 if polity2 is less than -3. In this case, the coefficient on the regime type variable remains positive but fails short of achieving statistical significance at 0.1 level.

Surprisingly, the results partially challenge the democratic peace thesis, which

states that democratic countries do not fight one another (Maoz and Russett 1993, Gledistch 1992). However, these results may be influenced by the high number of non democracies and reduced number of full democracies, as the pairs of the OECD country in the dyad. It may be the case that, until the crisis state does not attain a certain threshold of liberalism, the OECD country's response is aggressive.

This relationship is explained mostly by the quasi cooperative response (no intervention) of the OECD countries to crises in which both actors are non democracies. Besides, there are instances when OECD countries acted aggressively against democratic countries involved in crises. Of the total number of 5,612 cases, in 31% of them, the target countries are democracies (polity score higher or equal to 4, on a scale from -10 to +10), while in 63.2% of the cases, the target countries are non-democracies (polity score equal to or lower than -4). The rest, 5.8%, are countries in transition, with the polity scores ranging from -3 to +3. For example, very often, OECD countries condemned and then imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as a result of the increasing tensions between the two countries. Similarly, various crises between Greece and Turkey, and Cypress and Turkey, led to the same aggressive response from the OECD countries. This aggressive reaction was justified by the danger of a possible confrontation between the two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, and also by the possible destabilization of the NATO space as a result of a potential conflict between Turkey and Greece.

Regarding the role of similarity of alliance portfolios between the two countries in the dyad in influencing the foreign policy behavior of the OECD country, as table 5.2. shows, when executive ideology is estimated with the overall measure of ideology, the relationship coefficient is negative and falls short of conventional threshold of statistical

significance. In the second case, when political ideology of the government is expressed by the international peace measure, then the relationship is significant at the 0.1 level. The significance of this second empirical result is that OECD countries are more likely to behave aggressively against countries with different policy positions. This comes to broaden the thesis that countries with similar policy views are less likely to confront each other (Gartzke and Simon 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997b).

Finally, in this model, the distance between the two countries in the dyad is not a factor which influences foreign policy behavior of states. The coefficient on the distance variable is slightly negative but, in contrast with the previous model, is not statistically significant. Thus, no matter how far the crisis state, distance does not play any role in shaping OECD countries response to the crisis. Further, contiguity with the crisis actors represents a significant factor in OECD countries foreign policy decisionmaking. Based upon the measure of executive ideology, in both cases, the coefficients are positive and significant at the 0.1 level. More specifically, contiguity with the crisis country increases the propensity toward more aggressive behavior. If I take out distance and maintain contiguity as the only measure of proximity, the strength of the relationship increases and becomes significant very close to the 0.05 level.

Model 3: four level categorical dependent variable

The results of Model 2 provide empirical support to both hypotheses. If estimated with Overall Ideology, the role of executive ideological orientation in shaping the response to international crises of OECD countries is not significant. Oppositely, if executive ideology is estimated with International Peace Ideology, government ideology influences

strategic behavior. Specifically, more conservative executives are prone toward increasing aggressive behavior at a larger extent than the more liberal executives. The main limitation of Model 2 is that the foreign policy behavior variable is very skewed: non intervention accounts for 89.5% of all instances of behavior. Importantly, non-intervention is not always the result of lack of power, economic sufficiency, or a location which hinders intervention in world affairs, variables which are accounted for in my three models. For example, there are countries such as New Zealand and Switzerland which, in over 95 percent of the crises, do not intervene at all. Thus, I introduce Model 3 which excludes the instances of no intervention. The main advantage of this model is that it explores the impact of government political ideology on foreign policy decisionmaking only in instances of intervention.

The basic descriptive statistics for the variables in Model 3 are shown in Table B.3. (see Appendix B).

Estimation technique

The dependent variable in the third model is a four level categorical variable. As explained in Chapter 4, this model excludes the instances of non intervention, as a type of response to international crises, on the part of the OECD countries. Thus, the number of cases in this model drops to 589. After collapsing the thirteen remaining types of foreign policy behavior, the dependent variable becomes a four category ordinal variable. The first category (AC), which is the most accomodationist, is comprised of financial, economic, and humanitarian aid, mediation, and call for a cease fire. Then, the second category of foreign policy behavior, semi-accommodationist (SAC), is more aggressive than the first and is comprised of express concern, call for withdrawal of troops, and

condemnation. The third category, semi aggressive behavior (SAG), is more belligerent than the previous two categories, and is comprised of peacekeeping, sanctions, and military aid. The fourth category (AG), is the most aggressive of the four and is comprised of threat of force, mobilization of troops, peace enforcement, and use of force. Because the dependent variable of this model is also categorical and ordinal, as in the previous model, I evaluate the impact of the independent variables on foreign policy behavior by using the ordered logistic regression.

Empirical results

As in the previous model, Model 3 provides partial empirical support for the theoretical expectations derived in the theory chapter. That is due again to the way in which executive ideology is measured. The estimated coefficients are summarized in Table 5.3. Further, I explain the statistical analysis and discuss the results in greater detail.

Table 5.3. Ordered Logit Estimates of Executive Ideology and International Influences on Foreign Policy Behavior, 1977-2001; four level dependent variable

Variable	Overall	International Peace
EXECUTIVE IDEOLOGY t	-0.0071* (0.0041)	-0.18*** (0.05)
RELCAP1 (t - 1)	-0.69** (0.273)	-0.56** (0.276)
TRADESHARE1 (t - 1)	-3.25 (2.59)	-2.42 (2.68)
POLITY	-0.084*** (0.012)	-0.083*** (0.012)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIOS (S) (t - 1)	-0.95** (0.42)	-1.66*** (0.47)
DISTANCE	$-6e^{-05}$* ($3.41e^{-05}$)	$-5.5e^{-05}$ ($3.42e^{-05}$)
CONTIGUITY	0.623 (0.546)	0.637 (0.54)
τ_1	-2.93	-3.67
τ_2	-0.95	-1.67
τ_3	0.78	0.078
Log likelihood	-726.16	-720.63
Chi-square	79.63	90.70
N	589	589

The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * $p<.10$; ** $p<.05$; *** $p<.01$; one-tailed test

When excluding the instances of non intervention in international crises, the role of government ideology in shaping foreign policy behavior is mixed. In the case when political ideology is estimated with overall ideological measure, the relationship between ideology and state behavior is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The relationship coefficient is negative, which means that, when responding to crises, conservative governments act more peacefully than liberal governments. Unexpectedly, these results basically contradict Hypothesis 2. The main explanation is that, out of the 5,023 observations of non intervention which were dropped, approximately two thirds of governments (66.57%) were liberal and very liberal. Therefore, in the new data set, a large number of governments which score very high on Overall Ideology in the first two categories of behavior (accommodationist and semi accommodationist) and scored relatively low in the third and forth categories of behavior (semi aggressive and aggressive). For example, approximately 50% of governments in the accommodationist behavior category are very conservative (they score 16 and higher on the overall ideological continuum of -31.6 to 33.6).

If using the international peace estimate of ideology, the coefficient on the ideology variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. As in the previous model, the results reveal that, when responding to crises, left wing governments are more likely to behave more cooperatively than right wing governments. This analysis provide full evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. The difference from the previous model is that in Model 3, the relationship between government ideology and foreign policy behavior is statistically stronger.

These empirical results entirely contradict the realist argument that government

ideology does not influence state external behavior. In the first case, with the use of the overall ideological estimate, the results show that liberal executives act more belligerently than conservative ones. If I use the international peace estimate of executive ideology, this empirical model provides evidence not only that liberal governments are less inclined to use military force in foreign affairs than conservative governments, but also they are more prone to act cooperatively than their conservative counterparts.

With regard to the impact of relative capabilities on foreign policy behavior, no matter the proxy used for executive ideology, the relationship between the two variables is robust and significant. As shown in Table 3, the coefficients on the power parity variable are both negative and significant at the 0.05 level. As opposed to the results in the previous two models, these estimates show that, when responding to international crises, the more powerful the OECD country the more likely it will behave peacefully. These results challenge the realist assumption, according to which the more powerful countries are more prone to belligerent actions (Waltz 1979, Morgenthau 1967, Kennan 1957). This happens because the observations which were dropped (the non intervention cases) consisted mostly of dyads with relatively powerful OECD countries (high relative capabilities scores) which acted more peacefully (non-intervention). Thus, Model 3 contains a higher number of weaker governments which act more aggressively, relative to Model 2.

On the influence of economic interdependence on state external behavior, regardless of the measure used for government ideology, the former does not predict the changes in the latter. The coefficients on the economic interdependence variable are negative but fall short of the conventional threshold of statistical significance. The results

are in opposition with the results obtained in the previous model, when an increasing trade led to a less belligerent response to the crisis on the part of the OECD country. Again, this happens because the elimination of non intervention cases leads to dropping relatively high trading dyads where OECD country behaved cooperatively. Thus, the strength of the negative relationship between trade and behavior from Model 2 decreases and the relationship between the two in Model 3 becomes not statistically significant. Specifically, this model's empirical results show that, when determined to intervene in international crises, the economic relations between the OECD and the crisis countries do not affect the manner in which the first intervenes in the crisis.

Regarding the role played by the target state's regime type in shaping the response of the OECD country to the crisis, the effect of the first is robust and significant, no matter the ideological measure for executive political orientation. In both cases, the relationship between regime type and state behavior is strongly negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In other words, when responding to international crises, the OECD countries are more inclined to act peacefully toward countries which increasingly embrace liberalism as a type of governance. These empirical results come to support and broaden the democratic peace argument that states that democratic countries do not fight each other (Maoz and Russett 1993, Owen 1994).

The similarity of alliance portfolios between the two states in the dyad also shapes the response of the OECD country to the crisis. The relationships between the two variables are robust and statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively, depending on the executive ideology estimate. As shown in Table 5.3, the coefficients on similarity of alliance portfolios variables are both negative. That is to say, similar with

the results in the previous model, when dealing with or responding to international crises, OECD countries are more likely to behave aggressively against countries with different foreign policy positions, manifested as dissimilar alliance portfolios. These findings come also to expand the thesis that countries with similar policy views are less likely to confront each other (Gartzke and Simon 1996, Oneal and Russett 1997b).

Finally, regarding the influence of distance between the two countries in the dyad on the foreign policy behavior of the OECD country, the relationship between the two variables is negative and statistically significant (at the 0.1 level), when using the overall measure of executive ideology. In this particular instance, OECD executives tend to behave less aggressively when crises actors are distant. If ideology is expressed with the international peace measure, the impact of distance on behavior in negligible. Contiguity is also a factor which does not have an influence on the response choice. OECD executives, when responding to crises, act in the same manner against both contiguous and non contiguous countries. This change in the impact of contiguity on state behavior, from positive and significant relationship at the 0.1 level (Model 2) to non significance (Model 3) is due to the elimination of non intervention as a category of state behavior. More precisely, the elimination of an accommodationist type of behavior weakens the relationship between contiguity and behavior, which becomes statistically insignificant.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I tested the relationship between executive political ideology and foreign policy behavior. The relationship between the two variables is analyzed by using three empirical models. While the independent and control variables remain constant, the

dependent variable is measured uniquely in each separate model. In each model I use two different measures for assessing the independent variable: overall ideology, which takes into account 57 policy variables, and international peace ideology, which considers only the policy preferences of government on foreign policy.

The empirical results outlined in this chapter partially support the analytical framework presented in the theory chapter. In the first model, the results suggest that, in OECD countries, conservative governments are more likely to respond to international crises than liberal governments, if ideology is estimated with the overall ideological measure. Oppositely, if executive ideology is estimated with the international peace proxy, it is the liberal governments which are more interventionist. Besides, the propensity toward intervention increases with the increase in relative capabilities between the OECD country and the target country, and also with the degree of liberalism in the latter. Further, the OECD country's likelihood of intervention decreases with the increase in trade with the target country, the distance to the target country, and with the increase in similarity of alliance portfolio between the two countries. Most of these relationships are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

In the second model, when foreign policy behavior is a five category variable which includes no intervention, partial support was found for the argument that executive ideology influences state behavior. Indeed, when ideology is estimated with Overall Ideology there is little evidence which indicates that executive ideology impacts foreign policymaking. The variable is not statistically significant and its substantive strength is negligible. Alternatively, when estimated with International Peace Ideology, the role of executive ideology is statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) in the sense that liberal

governments are more likely to act more cooperatively than conservative governments. In terms of relative capabilities, the results show that increasing levels in relative capabilities between the OECD country and the target country increase the likelihood of more aggressive response of the first against the latter (0.1 confidence level). Further, economic interdependence and regime type were found to be influential (at the 0.01 level) in the foreign policy decisionmaking. Specifically, high levels of trade with and decreasing levels of democracy in the countries directly involved in the crisis tend to dissuade OECD executives from acting aggressively. Similarity of alliance portfolios with the target country is influential only when executive ideology is estimated with International Peace Ideology. That is, the more similar the policy views between the dyad countries, the more likely OECD country will act peacefully. Finally, in this model, contiguity is responsible for increasing the propensity toward more aggressive responses to crises. Also, taken separately from contiguity, distance increases the propensity toward more accomodationist behavior.

In the third model, when I exclude the instances of non intervention, there is consistent empirical support to the argument that executive ideology systematically influences OECD executives' crisis response choices. In the case when executive ideology is measured with Overall Ideology, the results prove that right leaning governments act more peacefully than the left wing ones. The use of International Peace Ideology estimate for ideology leads to a more significant impact of this variable on state behavior. Specifically, conservative governments act more aggressively than liberal ones. In this case, not only was the substantive strength of ideology relatively high, but the variable was also highly significant. Regarding the roles played by relative capabilities

and regime type, their effects are both negative and significant. In other words, OECD executives are more likely to act peacefully when their relative capabilities are higher and when target countries experience increasing levels of democracy. Further, contiguity and the level of trade between the OECD and the crisis country do not have any impact on the foreign policy behavior of the former. The influence of similarity of alliance portfolios is negative and significant at both 0.05 and 0.01 confidence levels. OECD executives appear to reject the use of the more belligerent tools of foreign policy against countries with which they have an increasing similarity of foreign policy views. Lastly, distance to the crisis country is a significant factor of foreign policy behavior when executive ideology is estimated with the overall measure of ideology. If ideology is estimated with the international peace proxy, distance ceases to be a determining factor of behavior.

In the next chapter I will conclude by reviewing the theoretical argument and discussing the findings in quantitative analysis. Also, I will discuss the implications and contributions of this study.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Are Liberals and Conservative different species when it comes to international politics?[6] One can argue that we ask the wrong question. The proper question which needs to be answered first is if ideas and beliefs make a difference in foreign policymaking. In other words, do ideational factors coexist with material ones and both determine the strategic behavior of states? Ruggie's straightforward answer is yes (1998, 879), since "the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material". Wendt (1992) also concurs to this view by asserting that interests and preferences are constructed by ideas and therefore, material world may have different designs and meanings for different people. For example, in the practice of foreign affairs, it is the ideas which tells Western foreign policy makers that North Korea's nuclear weapons are dangerous while Great Britain's ones are not.

The post World War II era shows that similarly powerful states or states found in comparable phases of economic and political development behave differently by employing different tools of foreign policy in order to advance their interests. Some

[6] In part, this question has been asked by David Sloan Wilson in the article *Are Liberals and Conservatives Different Species? The Answer is Yes* published in The Huffington Post, on July 1, 2010. Http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-sloan-wilson/are-liberals-and-conserva_b_72044.html

countries may not hesitate to use military engagement as a means of conflict resolution, not necessary as the last resort, since others prefer to involve progressively more moderate means of foreign policy, such as aid, diplomacy, and economic sanctions before going to war. The wars in the former Yugoslavia, conflicts between Israel and Palestine, the second Gulf War, defiant North Korea and Iran, are just a few instances which point to the different strategic behaviors and approaches among the developed states on how to handle the international issues and crises.

What determines the response by OECD executives to international crises? Why did countries such as the United States, alongside the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, agree to use force against Iraq in 2003, while others, such as France, Belgium, and Germany, advocated the continuation of sanctions in parallel with aggressive diplomacy? The primary concern of this study is to analyze the influence of executive political ideology on foreign policy behavior of OECD states. More specifically, my dissertation examines if liberal governments differ from conservative governments in terms of how they respond to international crises.

Despite the comprehensive differences between left and right leaning political parties in terms of their foreign policy views and preferences, little attention has been devoted to understand how ideological preferences affect foreign policy choices. While right wing executives appear to be more prone to the use force than left wing executives, little is known about the impact of executive ideology in influencing strategic behavior, especially when behavior is viewed more comprehensively than the simple use of force. There is a need for a better understanding of the role played by ideology on the more general behavior of states, since wars are very rare events in international politics and

there are other tools of foreign policy that states make use of, among which, condemning behavior of other states, mediating crises, imposing sanctions, and providing aid.

Executive Political Ideology as an Ideational Cause of Behavior

This dissertation develops an analytical model which explains the role of executive political ideology in foreign policymaking. I assert that within developed democracies, the further right a government is, the more likely it is to behave more aggressively. Oppositely, the further left a government is, the more likely it is to behave more peacefully. For instance, in response to international crises, the more conservative executives are inclined to use the more belligerent foreign policy tools, such as imposing sanctions, providing military aid, mobilization of troops, and the use of military force. Oppositely, the more liberal executives are more prone to employ the more accomodationist foreign policy tools such as providing economic and financial aid, pursuing diplomatic efforts, calling for withdrawing of troops, condemning one or more actors involved in the crisis, or not intervening at all.

This claim is explained by the assumption that governments will act in a manner consistent with the ideological principles presented in their political platforms, party manifestos, and their voters' expectations. Specifically, when responding to international crises, right leaning governments, due to their ideological predisposition toward an exclusive conception of the national interest and belief in the appropriateness of using force and acting unilaterally, will be expected to act more aggressively than left wing governments. This expectation is also due to left wing governments' ideological predilection toward multilateralism, an inclusive conception of the national interest, and

reluctance of using force in international affairs.

The empirical evidence I find provides mixed support for the study's analytical argument, according to which executive ideology is an important determinant of foreign policy behavior. These empirical results both confirm and disprove my theoretical model and that is due to the different measures used to express the ideological orientation of the government. First, when using International Peace Ideology as a proxy for executive ideology, a measure which takes into account only the foreign policy variables present in the political parties' manifestos, the results show that more conservative governments act aggressively and more liberal governments act cooperatively. These results are true for both, Model 2 (foreign policy behavior is a five level ordinal variable, which includes no intervention as one of the five categories) and Model 3 (foreign policy behavior is a four level ordinal variable, which excludes no intervention).

Second, when executive ideology is estimated with Overall Ideology, a measure which takes into consideration 57 policy variables grouped in seven major policy areas (foreign policy, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups), the empirical evidence is mixed. That is, if state behavior is expressed with the five level ordinal measure which includes non intervention as one of the five categories of behavior (Model 2), executive ideology does not influence state behavior. Alternatively, if state behavior is expressed with the four level ordinal measure which excludes non intervention (Model 3), the relationship is negative and significant (at the 0.1 level).

In Chapter Two, I discuss the major debate in the present international relations literature about the clash between two groups of scholars who dispute the origins of state

strategic behavior: materialist and idealists. Mainstream scholars in the field of international relations, the materialists, view factors, such as power and economic relationships, are the primary determinants of state strategic behavior. Alternatively, idealists suggest that the state behavior is primarily influenced by ideational factors, such as belief systems, perceptions, identity, ideology, discourse, and culture.

I argued, contrary to materialists, such as realists and neoliberal institutionalists, that the security landscapes in which states interact are in significant part social, rather than just material. Thus, material explanations of state behavior, centered either at the individual, state, or the international system level, are insufficient to explain foreign policy decisionmaking. Specifically, there is a need in international politics scholarship for a better understanding of the role of ideational factors as determinants of state behavior. It is through ideas that decisionmakers make sense of social reality and also, ideas help define policymakers goals. Furthermore, it is ideas which serve as a foundation for establishing alternative strategies in order to attain those goals. Therefore, only a model of international behavior which includes both idealist and material factors will adequately explain foreign policy decisionmaking.

In Chapter Three, I develop an analytical model of foreign policy behavior which underlines the importance of political ideology as an ideational causal factor of foreign policymaking. I dispute the realist view (Waltz 1979, Morgenthau 1967) that states' foreign behavior is entirely explained by shifts in the balance of relative capabilities and that ideational factors have no independent explanatory power. Realists contend that policymakers adopt policies based upon calculations of interest (Kennan 1957) and that ideology in the substance of foreign policy is little more than a justification and a cover

for the true nature of policy which is the pursuit of power (Morgenthau 1967). Also, I reject other arguments which overlook the role of ideology, such as the premise that political ideologies are simply instruments for obtaining power (Downs 1957) or the thesis which asserts industrialized countries are likely to deal with the same kind of challenges and use the same kind of solutions (Kerr 1983).

I assert that, indeed, foreign policies are an expression of ideologies. Ideologies have an important role in policymaking because they explain and evaluate social conditions and provide a program for social and political action (Ball and Dagger 2004). I contend that more right leaning executives are inclined to behave more aggressively than more left wing executives. These differences in behavior between conservative and liberal governments are explained by the fact that they subscribe to fundamentally different values of equality and liberty, which revolve around three basic ideological dimensions: a) the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the national interest; b) the appropriateness of using forceful measures for pursuing the national interest; and c) unilateralism versus multilateralism, or the way in which countries coordinate their actions with other countries in pursuing their interests.

My dissertation builds on the works of Arena and Palmer (2009), Koch (2009), London, Palmer, and Regan (2004), Schultz (2005), who find that, generally, political ideology is a causal factor of the use of force. More precisely, conservative administrations are more prone toward the use of force than liberal administrations.

Findings

In Chapter Five, I employed statistical analyses to examine foreign policy behavior of all twenty two OECD countries as a response to the ICB crises during the period 1977-2001. I tested my hypotheses on three empirical models where the dependent variable is measured uniquely in each separate model while the independent and control variables remain constant. In Model 1, the dependent variable is dichotomous: intervention versus non intervention. The dependent variable in the Model 2 is a five level categorical variable, which includes non intervention as one of the five categories. The dependent variable in the Model 3 is a four level categorical variable, which excludes non intervention.

In each of the three models I use two distinct proxies of executive ideology: a) Overall Ideology, a measure which takes into consideration 57 policy variables grouped in seven major policy areas (foreign policy, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups); and b) International Peace Ideology, a measure which takes into account only the foreign policy variables.

The empirical results indicate that the ideological orientation of the government is associated with OECD executives' responses to international crises, when executive ideology is estimated with International Peace Ideology. Thus, more liberal governments show a greater propensity toward responding to international crises than more conservative governments, and, at the same time, they tend to use more cooperative tools of foreign policy. If executive ideology is assessed with Overall Ideology, the results are relatively mixed. First, it is the more conservative governments which are more

responsive to crises (Model 1) and also, when excluding non intervention as a response to international crises, they are more likely to respond more cooperatively (Model 3). In the case when all possible responses to a crisis are included in the model (Model 2), government ideology does not influence foreign policy behavior.

Of the two measures of ideology, International Peace Ideology seems to be more relevant to my study because it captures specifically the ideological views of an executive in the area of foreign policy. The other measure, Overall Ideology, takes into account a large number of policy measures, among which, technology and infrastructure, political corruption, education, and farmers, whose relevance for foreign policy actions is limited. Therefore, I consider that the results obtained with the use of International Peace Ideology measure are more meaningful to my study.

According to the results in Model 1, no matter the estimate for executive ideology, OECD country's aggressiveness toward the crisis country increases with increases in power, decreases in trade and distance between the two countries, decreases in liberalism in the crisis country, and a decrease in similarity of alliance portfolios. Contiguity with the crisis country does not affect the response of the OECD country.

Similarly, Model 2 shows that OECD country's aggressiveness increases with increase in power (although the margin of error is larger than in the first model), decreases in trade between the two countries, increase in liberalism in the crisis country, and contiguity. Distance between countries and similarity in alliance portfolios do not affect an OECD country's response to international crises. Finally, empirical results in Model 3 show that OECD country's belligerence increases with decreases in power, decreases in crisis country's degree of liberalism, and lowering similarity of alliance

portfolios. Distance and the amount of trade between the two countries, and also, contiguity, do not have a significant effect on foreign policy behavior.

Contributions

This dissertation has sought to contribute furthering our understanding about the role of ideational factors in foreign policymaking by examining the role of ideological orientation of governments in influencing the course of executives' responses to international crises. Towards this end, this study's contributions are threefold. First, I developed a new ordinal dependent variable, foreign policy behavior, which takes into account all possible instances of state behavior. This new operationalization better mirrors the complex range of actions that governments take in the international arena. This is a step further from the extant literature where state behavior is mostly operationalized dichotomously as use of force/no use of force.

Second, this dissertation analyzes the relationship between executive ideology and foreign policy behavior by using a large-N cross national model. Most empirical studies which test the possible impact of government ideological orientation on its foreign policy decisions focus on the particular case of the United States. Even though interesting and meaningful, such studies remain limited. By focusing on a larger pool of 22 countries, all OECD states, this study generalizes the posited relationships to a broad range of countries.

Third, by examining the influence of executive ideology in international crises response choice, this dissertation has the theoretical merit of revitalizing the general theoretical discussion about the role of ideational determinants in foreign policy decision

processes. Being marginalized in the mainstream international relations literature, which focuses mostly on the material factors, the ideational factors still have a lot to bring to the scholarship. This study shows that the accumulation of scientific knowledge on the state strategic behavior requires a better understanding of the role of both the material and ideational factors.

Implications

This dissertation presents a number of implications for the field of international relations. The analytical model advanced in this study primarily claims that decisionmakers' ideological views impact foreign policy decisions in the sense that the executives act consistent with their ideological preferences. Depending on the measure of political ideology and the way foreign policy behavior is operationalized, the findings illustrate that executive ideology influences foreign policymaking. These results refute other theoretical perspectives which assert that political ideology does not affect executive foreign policy decisions (Lippmann 1987, Morgenthau 1961, Downs 1957, Kennan 1957). The practical implication of these findings is that the domestic public and foreign governments and audiences know what to expect from the OECD governments in terms of how they behave in world affairs. From a financial standpoint, when ideology matters in foreign policymaking, the domestic public will know how the taxpayers money will be spent, on domestic or international projects, if certain political parties form or control the government.

The findings of this dissertation approach two other major debates in the scholarship of international relations. First, it addresses the core argument of democratic

peace thesis which states that democratic countries will not go to war against other democratic countries but they are prone to war as the non democratic countries (Maoz and Russett 1993, Russett 1993b, Oneal et al. 1996). However, according to my study, if state strategic behavior is assessed more comprehensively than the use of force/non use of force, the response of democratic leaders to international crises is more aggressive toward the more liberal countries than toward the more nonliberal ones. Thus, the OECD countries do not appear to behave friendly with countries whose regimes are increasingly liberal. Obviously, additional research is required to find out how these findings can enrich the democratic peace thesis.

The second major international relations debate that my dissertation speaks to is the relationship between economic interdependence and international conflict. Two major perspectives are present in the literature. The central argument is the liberals' claim that increasing economic exchange hinders interstate hostilities (Doyle 1997, Rosecrance 1986). Oppositely, others argue that the disproportionate distribution of gains from trade (Hirschman 1980), the shifting power as a result of trade (Levy 1989), and the incentives that states have to reduce their economic vulnerability by taking military actions (Gilpin 1981), are reasons which may encourage one of the trading partners to initiate hostilities. The results of my study, however, mostly support the liberal view. More specifically, my dissertation finds that at worst, economic relations do not affect OECD countries' strategic behavior, and at best, increasing economic relations lead to more accommodationist behavior. Thus, states involved in international crises which enjoy heightened economic exchanges with the OECD countries, should not expect an aggressive treatment from them.

In general, as the results of my dissertation suggest, the ideological label of decisionmakers represents an important factor in foreign policy decision process. Specifically, most of the time, political elites act in accordance with their ideological principles.

Limitations and Further Research

The role of executive political ideology in foreign policymaking is insufficiently explored by scholars of international relations. This dissertation has offered partial support to the thesis that decisionmakers' ideological views has a significant role in influencing the foreign policy decisions of states. For a better clarification of this relationship, a few research avenues can be further explored.

First, the two measures of political ideology in my dissertation capture only the ideology of the executive. However, in many OECD countries which have parliamentary systems, a relatively large responsibility for foreign affairs is in the hands of the legislatives. Therefore, a new composite measure of political ideology which takes into account the ideological orientation of both, the executive and legislative, would be a more appropriate estimation for ideology.

Besides, in this dissertation I emphasized the need for examining at a larger extent the influence of ideational factors in foreign policymaking. However, the only ideational variable I include in my study is executive ideology. Therefore, future studies may examine the role of other ideational variables, such as political culture, strategic culture, and national identity. Besides, the incorporation of other ideational variables can lead to better account for the high number of cases of non intervention.

Finally, my dissertation's timeframe ranges from 1977 through 2001. More meaningful inferences can be drawn if, further studies expand the timeframe to the entire Post-War period or longer. Besides, my study does not take into account any variables which describe the characteristics and nature of the international crisis that the OECD countries respond to. Future studies may incorporate variables such as crisis salience, ethnicity, gravity of value threat, or overall violence.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

ICB CRISES EXAMINED DURING 1977-2001

Table A.1. International Crises

Crisis Number	Crisis Name	Start Year	Primary Adversaries
277	Shaba I	1977	D.R. Congo, Angola
278	Mapai Seizure	1977	Zimbabwe, Mozamb.
279	Belize II	1977	Guatemala, UK
280	Nouakchott II	1977	Mauritania
281	Egypt-Libya Clashes	1977	Libya, Egypt
282	Ogaden II	1977	Ethiopia, Somalia
283	Rhodesia Raid	1977	Zimbabwe, Zambia
284	Vietnam Invasion of Cambod	1977	Cambodia, Vietnam
285	French Hostages Mauritania	1977	Algeria, France
286	Chimoio-Tembue Raids	1977	Zimbabwe, Mozamb.
287	Beagle Channel I	1977	Argentina, Chile
288	Chad-Libya II	1978	Libya, Chad
289	Litani Operation	1978	Israel, Lebanon
290	Chad-Libya III	1978	Chad, Libya
291	Cassinga Incident	1978	South Africa, Angola
292	Shaba II	1978	Angola, D.R. Congo
293	Air Rhodesia Incident	1978	Zimbabwe, Zambia
294	Nicaragua Civil War II	1978	Nicaragua, Costa Rica
295	Beagle Channel II	1978	Argentina, Chile
296	Fall of Amin	1978	Libya, Tanza., Ugand
297	Angola Invasion Scare	1978	South Africa, Angola
298	Sino-Vietnam War	1978	Vietnam, China
299	Tan Tan	1979	Morocco
300	Raids on Zipra	1979	Angola, Zamb, Zimb
301	North-South Yemen II	1979	Yemen Rep D.R Yem
302	Raids on Swapo	1979	South Africa, Angola
303	Afghanistan Invasion	1979	Soviet Union, Afghan
304	Chad-Libya IV	1979	Chad, Libya
305	Goulimime-Tarfaya Raid	1979	Morocco
306	Soviet Threat/Pak.	1979	Afghanistan, Pakistan
307	Rhodesian Settlement	1979	Zimb, Bots, Moz, Zim
308	Raid on Angola	1979	S. Africa, Angola
309	US Hostages in Iran	1979	Iran, US
310	Colombia-Nicaragua	1979	Nicaragua, Colombia
311	Raid on Gafsa	1980	Libya, Tunisia
312	Operation Iman	1980	Morocco
313	Operation Smokeshell	1980	Angola, S. Africa

Table A.1. (continued)

Crisis Number	Crisis Name	Start Year	Primary Adversaries
314	Libya Threat-Sadat	1980	Egypt, Libya
315	Solidarity	1980	Poland, Soviet Union
316	Libya Malta Oil Dispute	1980	Malta, Libya
317	Onset Iran/Iraq War	1980	Iran, Iraq
318	Libya Interv. in the Gambia	1980	Gambia, Libya
319	Jordan-Syria Confrontation	1980	Syria, Jordan
320	East Africa Confrontation	1980	Somalia, Ethi, Kenya
321	Chad-Libya V	1981	Libya, France
322	Ecuador/Peru Border II	1981	Peru, Ecuador
323	Mozambique Raid	1981	Mozamb, S. Africa
324	Iraq Nuclear Reactor	1981	Israel, Iraq
325	Essequibo II	1981	Guyana, Venezuela
326	Contras I	1981	Honduras, Nicaragua
327	Al-Biqa Missiles I	1981	Syria, Israel
328	Cameroon-Nigeria I	1981	Cameroon, Nigeria
329	Coup Attempt Gambia	1981	Gambia
330	Gulf of Syrte I	1981	Libya, US
331	Operation Protea	1981	Angola, S. Africa
332	Galtat Zemmour I	1981	Mauritania, Morocco
333	U-137 Incident	1981	Sweden, Soviet Union
334	Coup Attempt in Bahrain	1981	Bahrain, Saudi Arabia
335	Khorram Shahr	1982	Iran, Iraq
336	Falklands/Malvinas	1982	Argentina, UK
337	War in Lebanon	1982	Syria, Lebanon, Israel
338	Ogaden III	1982	Ethiopia, Somalia
339	Lesotho Raid	1982	South Africa, Lesotho
340	Libya Threat/Sudan	1983	Libya, Sudan
341	Chad-Nigeria Clashes	1983	Chad, Nigeria
342	Chad-Libya VI	1983	Libya, Chad
343	Invasion of Grenada	1983	US, Grenada
344	Able Archer 83	1983	Soviet Union, US
345	Maitengwe Clashes	1983	Botswana, Zimbabwe
346	Ethiopia-Sudan Tension	1983	Sudan, Ethiopia
347	Operation Askari	1983	South Africa, Angola
348	Basra-Kharg Island	1984	Iran, Iraq, Kuw, S. Ar
349	Aegean Sea II	1984	Greece, Turkey
350	Omdurman Bombing	1984	Libya, Sudan
351	Vietnam-Thailand	1984	Vietnam, Thailand
352	Sino-Vietnam Clashes	1984	Vietnam, China
353	Three Village Border I	1984	Thailand, Laos
354	Nicaragua MiG-21	1984	Nicaragua, US
355	Botswana Raid	1985	South Africa, Botsw

Table A.1. (continued)

Crisis Number	Crisis Name	Start Year	Primary Adversaries
356	Expulsion-Tunisians	1985	Libya, Tunisia
357	Al-Biqa Missiles II	1985	Syria, Israel
358	Egypt Air Hijacking	1985	Libya, Egypt
359	Burkina Faso-Mali Border	1985	Burkina Faso, Mali
360	Lesotho Raid II	1985	South Africa, Lesotho
361	Capture of Al-Faw	1986	Iran, Iraq
362	Chad/Libya VII	1986	Libya, Chad
363	Gulf of Syrte II	1986	Libya, US
364	Al Dibal Incident	1986	Bahrain, Qatar
365	South African Raid	1986	S. Africa, Bots, Zamb
366	Rebel Attack on Uganda	1986	Uganda, Sudan
367	Mozambique Ultimatum	1986	Malawi, Mozamb
368	Attempted Coup in Togo	1986	Togo, Ghana
369	Contras II	1986	Nicaragua, Honduras
370	Chad/Libya VIII	1986	Libya, Chad
371	Sino-Vietnam Border	1987	Vietnam, China
372	Punjab War Scare II	1987	India, Pakistan
373	Todghere Incident	1987	Somalia, Ethiopia
374	Syria Interv. in Lebanon	1987	Syria, Lebanon
375	Sand Wall	1987	Morocco, Maur, Alge
376	Aegean Sea III	1987	Turkey, Greece
377	Cameroon-Nigeria II	1987	Cameroon, Nigeria
378	India Interv. in Sri Lanka	1987	India, Sri Lanka
379	Mecca Pilgrimage	1987	Saudi Arabia, Iran
380	S. African Interv.-Angola	1987	Angola, S. Africa
381	Three Village Border II	1987	Laos, Thailand
382	Kenya-Uganda Border	1987	Kenya, Uganda
383	Contras III	1988	Nicaragua, Honduras
384	Spratly Islands	1988	Vietnam, China
385	Iraq Recapture-Al-Faw	1988	Iran, Iraq
386	Libyan Jets	1988	Libya, US
387	Mauritania-Senegal	1989	Mauritania, Senegal
388	Cambodia Peace Conf.	1989	Cambodia, Vietnam
389	Contras IV	1989	Nicaragua, Honduras
390	Galtat Zemmour II	1989	Morocco
391	Invasion of Panama	1989	Panama, US
392	Kashmir III-Nuclear	1990	India, Pakistan
393	Gulf War	1990	Iraq, Kuwait
394	Rwanda-Uganda	1990	Rwanda, Uganda
395	Liberia-Sierra Leone	1991	Sierra Leone, Liberia
396	Ghana-Togo Border II	1991	Ghana, Togo
397	Yugoslavia I-Croat./Sloven	1991	Serbia, Slovenia, Croa

Table A.1. (continued)

Crisis Number	Crisis Name	Start Year	Primary Adversaries
398	Bubiyan	1991	Iraq, Kuwait
399	Foreign Intervention Zaire	1991	Zaire, Belgium, Fran
400	Ecuador-Peru Border IV	1991	Ecuador, Peru
401	Nagornyy Karabakh	1991	Azerbaijan, Armenia
402	Egypt-Sudan Border II	1992	Egypt, Sudan
403	Yugoslavia II-Bosnia	1992	Serbia, Bosnia, Croa
404	Papua New Guinea-Solomon	1992	Pap New Gui, Solom
405	Sleeping Dog Hill	1992	Thailand, Myanmar
406	Iraq No-Fly Zone	1992	Iraq
407	Georgia-Abkhazia	1992	Georgia, Russia
408	N. Korea Nuclear I	1993	North Korea
409	Operation Accountability	1993	Lebanon, Israel
410	Cameroon-Nigeria III	1993	Cameroon, Nigeria
411	Haiti Military Regime	1994	Haiti, US
412	Iraq Deploy-Kuwait	1994	Iraq, US
413	Ecuador-Peru Border V	1995	Ecuador, Peru
414	Spratly Islands	1995	China, Philippines
415	Taiwan Strait IV	1995	China, Taiwan
416	Red Sea Islands	1995	Eritrea, Yemen
417	Aegean Sea IV	1996	Turkey, Greece
418	Operation Grapes of Wrath	1996	Lebanon, Israel
419	Desert Strike	1996	Iraq, US
420	N. Korea Submarine	1996	N. Korea, S. Korea
421	Zaire Civil War	1996	Zaire, Rwanda
422	UNSCOM I	1997	Iraq, US
423	Cyprus-Turkey Missiles	1998	Turkey, Cyprus
424	Eritrea-Ethiopia	1998	Eritrea, Ethiopia
425	Ind-Pak Nuclear Test	1998	India, Pakistan
427	US Embassy Bombings	1998	Afgh, Sudan, US
428	Syria-Turkey	1998	Syria, Turkey
429	Unscom II	1999	Iraq
430	Kosovo	1999	Yugoslavia
431	Kasmir IV Kargil	1999	India, Pakistan
432	East Timor II	1999	Indonesia, Australia
433	Caspian Sea	2001	Azerbaijan, Iran
434	Afghanistan-USA	2001	US, Afghanistan
435	Indian Parliament Attack	2001	India, Pakistan

APPENDIX B

BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR STUDY'S VARIABLES

Table B.1. Basic statistics for the variables included in Model 1

	Minim	Maxim	Mean	Std. Deviation
Variable				
Foreign Policy Behavior	0	1	0.105	0.31
Overall Ideology	-39.2	48.46	-0.597	17.22
International Peace Ideology	0	8.8	1.683	1.82
Relative Capabilities	0.003	0.999	0.572	0.33
Trade Share	0	0.74	0.01	0.043
Polity	-20	2	-12.25	7.04
Alliance Portfolios	0.097	1	0.72	0.182
Distance	0	11939	4442.01	2443.16
Contiguity	0	1	0.017	0.13

Table B.2. Basic statistics for the variables included in Model 2

	Minim	Maxim	Mean	Std. Deviation
Variable				
Foreign Policy Behavior	1	5	2.115	0.527
Overall Ideology	-39.2	48.46	-0.597	17.22
International Peace Ideology	0	8.8	1.683	1.82
Relative Capabilities	0.003	0.999	0.572	0.33
Trade Share	0	0.74	0.01	0.043
Polity	-20	2	-12.25	7.04
Alliance Portfolios	0.097	1	0.72	0.182
Distance	0	11939	4442.01	2443.16
Contiguity	0	1	0.017	0.13

Table B.3. Basic statistics for the variables included in Model 3

	Minim	Maxim	Mean	Std. Deviation
Variable				
Foreign Policy Behavior	1	4	2.305	0.932
Overall Ideology	-36.35	48.46	3.12	19.16
International Peace Ideology	0	8.7	1.98	1.897
Relative Capabilities	0.009	0.998	0.657	0.306
Trade Share	0	0.669	0.006	0.03
Polity	-20	2	-10.48	7.25
Alliance Portfolios	0.101	1	0.686	0.23
Distance	0	11406	4262.1	2370.17
Contiguity	0	1	0.02	0.14

APPENDIX C

OVERALL AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE IDEOLOGY, BY COUNTRY




Figure C.1. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Australia



Figure C.2. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Australia



Figure C.3. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Austria



Figure C.4. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Austria




Figure C.5. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Belgium



Figure C.6. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Belgium




Figure C.7. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Canada



Figure C.8. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Canada



Figure C.9. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Denmark



Figure C.10. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Denmark



Figure C.11. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Finland



Figure C.12. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Finland




Figure C.13. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: France



Figure C.14. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: France




Figure C.15. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Germany



Figure C.16. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Germany



Figure C.17. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Great Britain



Figure C.18. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Great Britain



Figure C.19. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Greece



Figure C.20. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Greece




Figure C.21. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Ireland



Figure C.22. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Ireland



Figure C.23. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Italy



Figure C.24. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Italy




Figure C.25. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Japan




Figure C.26. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Japan




Figure C.27. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Netherlands



Figure C.28. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Netherlands




Figure C.29. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: New Zealand



Figure C.30. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: New Zealand




Figure C.31. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Norway



Figure C.32. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Norway




Figure C.33. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Portugal



Figure C.34. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Portugal




Figure C.35. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Spain



Figure C.36. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Spain




Figure C.37. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Sweden



Figure C.38. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Sweden




Figure C.39. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: Switzerland



Figure C.40. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: Switzerland




Figure C.41. The Executive's Overall Ideology by Year: United States



Figure C.42. The Executive's International Peace Ideology by Year: United States

VITA

Costel Calin received his Bachelor's degree in Welding Technologies from Polytechnic University of Bucharest in 1995 and his Master's degree in Political Science from Jackson State University in 2003. Costel received his doctoral degree in Political Science from the University of Tennessee in August 2010.