


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
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Mark Kenneth Williams entitled "The Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Philippine-American War." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in history.



Russell D. Buhite, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:





Accepted for the Council:



Associate Vice Chancellor
and Dean of The Graduate
School

**THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL
AND THE
PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR**

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Arts

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Mark Kenneth Williams

December, 1994

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ABSTRACT

This thesis uses the Philippine-American War as a test case through which to examine the validity and utility of the bureaucratic politics explanatory model. The model seeks to provide an interpretive framework for the study of United States foreign relations. Its two main contentions are that individual policy preference is predictable from bureaucratic position and that bureaucratic factors have an adverse effect on policy implementation. These assertions were analyzed through an examination of United States policy regarding the Philippine-American War.

The research relied mainly on primary sources, such as diplomatic and military correspondence, as well as presidential papers. It was concluded that although bureaucratic position is not a reliable indicator of policy preference, bureaucratic factors do seem to hinder the implementation of American foreign policy.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

During the 1970s, criticism that the study of America's diplomatic history had become a stale, one dimensional analysis of "what one diplomat said to another" spurred the development of new foreign relations methodologies such as corporatism, dependency theory, and the national security model. Influenced by the works of Roger Hilsman and Richard Neustadt, which emphasized internal bargaining in the governmental policy making process, Graham Allison's Essence of Decision (1971) challenged the prevailing assumption that a nation's foreign policy is fashioned in a unified, consistently rational manner intended to further its goals and interests.¹

Allison's bureaucratic politics model holds that foreign policy is the product of competition and bargaining between bureaucrats and organizations of unequal rank and power within the decision-making establishment. Policy advisors and presidents seek to promote and protect their personal and organizational interests and are not guided by conscious consideration of what would be the most rational course for the nation. According to Graham Allison, an

¹J. Garry Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," The Journal of American History 77 (1990): 161-168.

individual's policy preferences reflect, and are predictable from, his or her bureaucratic position. Thus, the secretary of defense will prefer military solutions to foreign policy problems and the secretary of state will advocate a negotiated settlement. While the bureaucratic politics model acknowledges the importance of other factors, such as personality, it contends that bureaucratic position is the ascendant influence shaping an individual's policy views and decisions.²

The bureaucratic politics perspective also addresses policy implementation. It suggests that political actors engage in intramural struggles and rivalries which often take precedence over primary concerns and responsibilities. It also contends that organizations cope with different situations and new policy guidelines by employing established doctrines and standard operating procedures. The failure of a bureaucracy to successfully adapt to changing circumstances and directives can thus hinder policy implementation.³

Although widely accepted as a method for explaining routine aspects of policy formation, the bureaucratic politics model's usefulness as a means of examining major foreign policy decisions has been questioned by several

²Steve Smith, "Policy preferences and bureaucratic position: the case of the American hostage rescue mission," International Affairs 61 (1984-85 #1): 9-15.

³Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," 161-163.

writers. Desmond Ball has attacked the model's efficiency as a mechanism for predicting policy preference and contends that Graham Allison fails to demonstrate the model's utility in Essence of Decision. Robert Art has also assailed the model, arguing that it is impractical because it must be qualified with numerous "amendments" before it can be used effectively.⁴

This thesis uses the Philippine-American War as a prism through which to examine the validity of the bureaucratic politics explanatory model. Part I deals with the formulation of American policy toward the Filipino nationalists. It analyzes bureaucrats and their policy preferences and attempts to answer two main questions: Are policy preferences predictable from bureaucratic position? Do bureaucratic factors provide the best means of accounting for an individual's policy recommendations? Part II examines the implementation of United States Philippine policy and seeks to determine what effect, if any, bureaucratic factors have on the fulfillment of American policy objectives.

Most studies of the bureaucratic politics model have focused on post-1940s diplomatic crises, but using the Philippine-American War to assess the model's validity provides several advantages. Some of the participants in the formulation of American policy were career bureaucrats

⁴Steve Smith, "Policy preferences and bureaucratic position: the case of the American hostage rescue mission," 10.

who held their positions for years, affording an opportunity to examine the effects of a lengthy tenure in the same organization on policy preference. Although not as large as their post-World War II counterparts, the War, Navy, and State departments were organizations of sufficient size to facilitate the examination of the bureaucratic politics model. Moreover, there is a sizable amount of evidence available regarding the policy positions of both high and low level bureaucrats, including two presidents, to investigate the bureaucratic politics perspective. Analyzing foreign policy decision-making in the pre-nuclear weapons age also offers the chance to assess the views of presidents and policy advisors who were not influenced by the fear that their decisions could decimate large portions of the Earth's land and population.

On the evening of February 4, 1899, twenty-three year old Private William Walter Grayson and his friend Orville Miller of the United States Nebraska Volunteers left their base camp to begin a routine patrol of the Santa Mesa suburb of Manila. As they approached a bridge spanning the San Juan River, they heard several low whistles. Suddenly, four Filipino nationalists staggered from the underbrush in front of the bridge. The nervous American soldiers panicked, shot two of the Filipinos, and then ran quickly back to their camp screaming "Line up, you fellows, the niggers are

in here all through these lines!"⁵

The hostilities initiated by Private Grayson marked the beginning of America's first land war in Asia. At the peak of United States involvement in the Philippines, 76,000 American military personnel were attempting to pacify an army of Filipino nationalists in a conflict with striking parallels to the Vietnam War. In the three years from 1899 to 1902, an estimated 176,000 Filipino civilians, 20,000 Filipino nationalists, and 4,000 Americans died as a result of United States efforts to suppress the Philippine independence movement. America's presence in the Philippines was not a spasmodic reaction to Filipino provocations, but was the culmination of a policy of expansion that began twenty years earlier.⁶

A lengthy period of quiescence in United States foreign relations came to an end during the 1880s. The nation began to look outward and eagerly sought to fulfill its "manifest destiny" by increasing its political and economic influence in international affairs. As Americans' desire to become a great power increased, they began to demand the trappings of a mighty nation. Such demands resulted in the development of an improved merchant marine, as well as the modernization of the American navy and bellicose demands for its use to

⁵Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 139-140.

⁶Ibid.; Paul Boyer et al., The Enduring Vision, 2nd ed. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1933), 717.

facilitate the acquisition and defense of overseas territory.⁷

In 1893, American expatriates overthrew the government of Queen Liliuokalani in Hawaii and requested that the United States annex the islands. Two years later, Secretary of State Richard Olney boldly asserted the Monroe Doctrine in a dispute with Great Britain concerning the location of Venezuela's national borders.⁸

On February 25, 1898, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt took advantage of his temporary status as acting secretary to fulfill his expansionist designs. He ordered the navy's Asiatic squadron, anchored in Hong Kong and commanded by Admiral George Dewey, to prepare for offensive operations in the Philippines in the event of war with Spain. Roosevelt's order was based on navy contingency plans that mandated the capture of the Philippine capital of Manila. Control of the archipelago would destroy the Spanish Pacific fleet and provide a bargaining chip for use during peace negotiations.⁹

Jingoist fever, demands for agricultural and commercial markets, a missionary zeal to "Christianize" and "civilize" other lands, and the explosion of the American battleship

⁷Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy: The Twentieth Century (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1988), 22-23.

⁸H.W. Brands, The United States and the Philippines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 17-18.

⁹Ibid., 22-23.

Maine in Havana precipitated the United States's entry into war with Spain in Cuba during April, 1898. On April 25, Dewey was promptly dispatched to Manila and defeated the Spanish fleet five days later. The American army's efforts in Cuba were likewise successful. By December 10, 1898, the United States and Spain were concluding peace negotiations in France. The Treaty of Paris ended the Spanish-American War, ceded all of the Philippines to the United States, and ultimately proved to be the beginning step towards American involvement in the archipelago for years to come.¹⁰

President and commander-in-chief of the Filipino provisional government seeking to overthrow Spanish rule, Emilio Aguinaldo was living in exile in Hong Kong when Admiral Dewey first attacked Manila. Assured by American diplomats that the United States intended to grant the Philippines its independence after defeating Spain, Aguinaldo returned to his homeland on May 19, 1898. He quickly reorganized his nationalist army and aided the United States in its efforts to defeat Spain. Aguinaldo became increasingly suspicious of American intentions after the Spanish forces surrendered the Philippines to the United States on August 13, 1898. He reluctantly complied with the requests of American commanders to remove his forces from Manila in the fall of 1898 and his attempts to secure

¹⁰Ibid., 20-26.

American recognition of his government were rebuffed by the McKinley administration. After the Treaty of Paris, Aguinaldo began to lose all hope of gaining United States recognition. By February, 1899, he had prepared his troops for the seemingly inevitable outbreak of hostilities between his forces and the American army.¹¹

¹¹Ibid., 45-49.

PART I:
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND POLICY PREFERENCE

CHAPTER II

WILLIAM MCKINLEY AND AMERICAN PHILIPPINE POLICY

William McKinley entered the presidency in 1897, a seemingly passive and disinterested foreign policy neophyte whose public career had focused primarily on domestic political concerns. Although lacking practical experience in the workings of foreign policy, McKinley was well informed about diplomatic issues, such as international bimetallism, and had focused on commercial reciprocity as a Congressman. He supported the expansionist Republican platform of 1896 and upon taking office moved swiftly to annex Hawaii and lay the diplomatic groundwork for American political and economic ascendancy in the Caribbean.¹

McKinley pursued a cautious and basically conservative foreign policy formulated with the aid of his cabinet, which met every Tuesday and Friday.² McKinley exercised a powerful influence in cabinet meetings, but nearly always let cabinet members debate issues freely.³ He sometimes allowed his advisors to believe that his ideas were their

¹Lewis L. Gould, The Spanish-American War and President McKinley (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1982), 10.

²Ibid., 16.

³John Dobson, Reticent Expansionist: The Foreign Policy of William McKinley (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1988), 25.

own and according to Secretary of War Elihu Root "His great desire was to get it done. He cared nothing about the credit, but McKinley always had his way."⁴ President McKinley often sketched the broad guidelines and goals of his policies for intelligent and resourceful advisors, such as John Hay, Elihu Root, and William Howard Taft, and he often allowed them tremendous latitude in the implementation of his programs.⁵ Such advisors supported and respected President McKinley and his policies and usually performed their numerous duties with a high degree of efficiency and competence.⁶

Soon after the Spanish army surrendered Manila to United States forces on August 12, 1898, American commander General Elwell Otis cabled Washington that Aguinaldo expressed a "strong desire to maintain friendly intercourse with the United States government."⁷ American officials formulating United States policy toward the Philippine nationalists faced three main options. They could negotiate with the Filipinos to establish a protectorate relationship, withdraw American troops, civil officials, and their dependents from the archipelago, or employ United States

⁴Gould, Spanish-American War and McKinley, 5.

⁵Dobson, Reticent Expansionist, 207.

⁶Gould, Spanish-American War and McKinley, 5.

⁷U.S. Army, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1933), 791.

military forces to subjugate the nationalists.⁸

McKinley was in the midst of treaty negotiations with Spain when he received Emilio Aguinaldo's request for United States recognition of an independent Filipino government on September 20, 1898. The president decided that he needed time to assess Aguinaldo and establish American policy regarding the nationalists. Accordingly, he announced that the United States would not grant immediate independence to the Filipino leader's self-proclaimed government or establish a protectorate relationship with the archipelago.⁹

After acquiring the Philippines from Spain in December 1898, McKinley developed and implemented a "carrot and stick" approach toward Aguinaldo's government in order to render it amenable to negotiations and the subsequent disbanding of its military. The "carrot" was repeated assurances of America's "friendly and benevolent" intentions along with explicit orders to United States commanders to avoid conflict with the Filipino forces.¹⁰ McKinley cabled General Elwell Otis on January 8, 1899 stating, "Am most desirous that conflict be avoided. Time given the insurgents can not hurt us and must weaken and discourage

⁸H.W. Brands, The United States and the Philippines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 40-46.

⁹Gould, Spanish-American War and McKinley, 103, 873.

¹⁰U.S. Army, Correspondence, 873.

them. They will come to see our benevolent purpose."¹¹ McKinley also established the Philippine Commission under the direction of Cornell University president Jacob Schurman and instructed it to begin establishing civil government and to emphasize the "beneficent intentions" of the United States.¹² The "stick" in American policy was McKinley's orders to Otis to inform the Filipinos of the legality and necessity of American sovereignty and to occupy as much territory as quickly as possible.¹³

Once hostilities erupted between the Filipinos and American troops, McKinley adopted and maintained a policy of using the military to subjugate Aguinaldo's forces.¹⁴ He also allowed the Philippine Commission and the army to continue their work of "improving" the education, transportation, and sanitation facilities of the Philippines.¹⁵ McKinley was willing to negotiate with the nationalists, but only on his terms. Talks between Americans and the Filipinos in the spring of 1899 broke down when the president reminded Aguinaldo that the Philippines had been acquired through treaty and insisted that his

¹¹Ibid., 873.

¹²U.S. Philippine Commission, Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), 186.

¹³U.S. Army, Correspondence, 858-859.

¹⁴Gould, Spanish-American War and McKinley, 123.

¹⁵Ibid.

forces surrender and acknowledge American sovereignty and authority.¹⁶

According to the bureaucratic politics model, the president's foreign policy preferences are determined mainly by role-governed factors such as a concern for the effects of foreign policy upon domestic politics and a desire to defend and maintain the "national honor" of the United States.¹⁷ Examination of the historical evidence reveals that these factors influenced President McKinley's decisions regarding the Filipino nationalists.

McKinley believed that the national honor of the United States was at stake when American military forces were engaged in combat operations. During the Spanish-American War, he rejected the advice of his entire cabinet and the military commanders in Cuba and refused to allow the Spanish garrison at Santiago to rejoin other Spanish forces after its surrender to the American army.¹⁸ President McKinley feared that to do so would make the United States appear weak to rival nations such as Germany.¹⁹

¹⁶ Ibid., 124.

¹⁷ Steve Smith, "Policy preferences and bureaucratic position: the case of the American hostage rescue mission," *International Affairs* 61 (1984-85): 14; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971), 167.

¹⁸ Gardner Webb Allen, Papers of John Davis Long 1897-1904 (Norwood: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939), 369.

¹⁹ Ibid.

The desire to defend America's national honor affected McKinley's decision to use military force against the nationalists instead of withdrawing from the archipelago. McKinley's friend Charles Clarke wrote to him expressing his concerns regarding American Philippine policy, stating that "England, Germany, or France would not retreat in the face of the enemy."²⁰ McKinley's acceptance speech to the Republican National Convention on September 10, 1900 reflects Clarke's counsel. In the speech, McKinley enthusiastically endorsed a Philippine Commission report which stated that "obligations" to the American flag required the use of military force against the nationalists until they were "reduced to submission" and argued that to withdraw United States troops would be an "ignominious retreat."²¹

During the late 1890s, the American public was engaged in a heated and multifaceted debate over the necessity, legality, and morality of United States foreign policy. Expansionists advocated aggressive military action to suppress the Filipino nationalists and anti-imperialists demanded the withdrawal of American troops. Theodore Roosevelt's friend Henry Adams recoiled at the prospect of war in the Philippines "where we must slaughter a million or

²⁰Charles Clarke to McKinley, 8-26-99, Reel 8, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

²¹"William McKinley Acceptance Speech," 9-10-1900, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

two of foolish Malays in order to give them the comforts of flannel petticoats and electric railways."²² Woodrow Wilson supported American military action in the islands and praised the "young men who prefer dying in the ditches of the Philippines to spending their lives behind the counters of dry goods stores in our eastern cities."²³

Anti-imperialists and their expansionist opponents utilized organizations and newspapers to pressure Congress and President McKinley for action. The conservative veterans organization Grand Army of the Republic sent McKinley a copy of one of its resolutions which declared that anti-imperialists were "guilty of treason" and "unworthy the name of American citizens" because their efforts were "giving aid and comfort to the enemy."²⁴ Helen Goregar, of La Fayette, Indiana, wrote to McKinley warning that an "army" of voters would rebuke him for his "senseless" Philippine policy, which she predicted would lead to a "costly war, with bloodshed and loss of treasure."²⁵ Boston anti-imperialist leader Moorfield

²²Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 195.

²³John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 57.

²⁴Anson Wood, Department Commander Grand Army of the Republic to McKinley, 5-18-99, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁵Goregar to McKinley, 2-7-99, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

Storey expressed the sentiments of many of his followers when he angrily denounced the McKinley administration's Philippine policy declaring, "we have made a desert of their fertile plains and have laid their towns in ashes."²⁶

Congress was also divided over American Philippine policy. In 1899, the Treaty of Paris ceding the Philippines to the United States was ratified in the Senate by only one vote and the 1900 Democratic campaign platform contained an anti-imperialist plank.²⁷

McKinley was an astute politician sensitive to the popular will.²⁸ Already committed to using military force against the nationalists and assured by army commanders that Aguinaldo did not represent the sentiments of the majority of Filipinos, McKinley responded to domestic political pressure. He insisted that the army take aggressive action to defeat the nationalists swiftly, reminding General Otis of "the impatience of the public."²⁹ Although he later changed his mind, McKinley initially planned to make his advisors the scapegoats for Philippine policy decisions that proved to have damaging domestic political consequences.

²⁶"Mr. Storey Is Heard," Boston Herald, 10-27-1900.

²⁷Paul Boyer et al., The Enduring Vision, 2nd ed. (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1993), 718.

²⁸Dobson, Reticent Expansionist, 24.

²⁹Wheeler to McKinley, 8-23-99, Reel 7, Vol.164, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1051.

After informing Elihu Root that the War Department's request for troop increases in the Philippines had been approved, the president warned that "If we have too many troops [in the Philippines] it would be my fault and if we have too few it would be yours."³⁰

After war with the Filipinos began, McKinley rejected forming a protectorate relationship with the Philippines and domestic politics might have played a role in his decision. Many Americans resented paying taxes to support the cost of extending American government to islands they considered to be of peripheral security interest to the United States and McKinley realized that the public probably would have resisted paying to support a self-governing Philippines.³¹

McKinley's decision not to withdraw troops and terminate direct American military and political influence in the Philippines was molded by a variety of determinants other than his bureaucratic position. A devout Methodist, McKinley was convinced that America was obligated to "Christianize" the Philippines, even though most Filipinos were already Catholic.³² He also believed that God had given the United States victory over the Spanish at Manila

³⁰McKinley to Root, 8-19-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

³¹Brands, The United States and the Philippines, 25.

³²Gould, Spanish-American War and McKinley, 109; Dean Worcester, The Philippines: Past and Present (New York: MacMillan Company, 1930), 798.

and had placed the islands under American "sovereignty and protection."³³

McKinley subscribed to a paternalistic racism influenced by the doctrine of Social Darwinism. Developed and refined by British philosopher Herbert Spencer, Social Darwinism was a popular justification for the dislocations and inequities of mid to late nineteenth century industrial America. It contended that individuals, groups, or nations failed to prosper and/or flourish because they were genetically, morally, or racially inferior. McKinley believed that the Filipinos' "racial diversities" rendered them incapable of self-government and he possessed a "civilizing" zeal, common to many Americans of the period, to extend the "blessings of liberty, education and free institutions" to the people of the Philippines.³⁴

President McKinley also had strategic and economic reasons for not heeding Aguinaldo's pleas for independence and the withdrawal of American troops from the Philippines. Aware of the American military's need for a coaling station in East Asia and the persistent demands of some businesses for increased access to foreign markets, he concluded that American control of the Philippines was important to the future strategic and economic interests of the United

³³Ibid.

³⁴"William McKinley Acceptance Speech," 9-10-00, Reel 308, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

States.³⁵ In a statement that foreshadowed the "Open Door" policy of his administration, McKinley wrote in 1898 that "Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others."³⁶

Although he professed that economic opportunities in East Asia should be "open" to all nations, McKinley did not intend to share the Philippines with anyone. Aware that Germany was supplying the nationalists with arms and ammunition, McKinley rejected the option of establishing an American protectorate in the archipelago because he feared that the islands would be seized by Japan or a European power.³⁷

McKinley's easy-going personality often led him to compromise on minor issues as long as his major goals and desires were not threatened.³⁸ During his pre-political career as a lawyer in Ohio, he negotiated a settlement

³⁵Tourgee to McKinley, 8-19-00, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁶U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1898 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903), 907.

³⁷U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1116; "William McKinley Acceptance Speech," Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁸Dobson, Reticent Expansionist, 25-27.

agreement with striking workers who had "rebelled" against their employers' and their local government's authority.³⁹ McKinley's conciliatory nature might therefore account for his initial willingness to negotiate with the Philippine nationalists until it became clear that they would not yield to his key demands.

President McKinley's policy toward the Filipino nationalists was influenced by his bureaucratic position and the bureaucratic politics model is particularly useful in understanding his decision to use military force. But McKinley's policy was also shaped by other factors which were at least as important as his position in determining his hawkish views and decisions. Moreover, although McKinley's actions reflect his bureaucratic position, knowledge of his religious beliefs, racial attitudes or strategic/economic concerns could also provide accurate predictions of many of his policy preferences.

³⁹H.Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and his America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), 50-51.

CHAPTER III

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN PHILIPPINE POLICY

Theodore Roosevelt served as vice-president from March to September, 1901, becoming president upon McKinley's assassination. Roosevelt quickly pledged to continue McKinley's domestic and foreign policies and retained his predecessor's cabinet.¹ Roosevelt conducted a sophisticated and occasionally aggressive foreign policy designed to promote international stability, increase the power and prestige of the United States, and fashion a larger political and economic role for America in world affairs.² The new president was young, energetic, and much less reliant on his cabinet for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy decisions than McKinley.³

As governor of New York and vice-president, Roosevelt supported McKinley's policy of remaining in the Philippines and was a strong advocate of the use of military force to defeat the Philippine nationalists. He favored sending "a few tens of thousands" of troops to the islands and believed

¹Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1991), 15-18.

²Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 232-35; John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 74.

³Gould, The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, 15-18.

that if American soldiers would only "stand firm and take a little punishment" the archipelago could be permanently pacified in a short period.⁴ In a letter written July 1, 1899 to Secretary of State John Hay, Roosevelt recommended that American army commanders "harass and smash the insurgents in every way until they are literally beaten into peace; entertaining no proposition whatever from them save that of unconditional surrender."⁵ Roosevelt frequently recommended officers for service in the Philippines. He considered General Otis too cautious in confronting the Filipinos and he urged Elihu Root to replace him with a more "hard hitting" officer.⁶ Roosevelt even had the temerity to lecture McKinley about Otis, stating that if the general had to be retained he should be "given everything" needed to defeat the nationalists.⁷

After assuming the office of president, Roosevelt continued McKinley's policy of using the army to subjugate the nationalists and using the American civil government to redesign the judicial system and modernize the islands'

⁴Elting Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 994.

⁵Roosevelt to Hay, 7-1-99, Reel 321, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

⁶Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol. 2, 1067-68, 1075; Roosevelt to Root, 9-25-99, Reel 322, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

⁷Henry Cabot Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), 413.

infrastructure. Roosevelt routinely approved the military's requests for supplies and troops and publicly attempted to justify the army's efforts and conduct when it was accused of employing tactics of torture, brutality, and destruction in the Philippines. Most armed resistance to American authority had been suppressed by the summer of 1902 and Roosevelt declared United States military operations against the nationalists a success, officially terminating them on July 4, 1902.⁸

The bureaucratic politics model contends that the vice-president is a loyal supporter of the president's policies whose primary concern is the effect of such policies on the president's domestic political standing.⁹ As a vice-presidential candidate and as vice-president, Roosevelt supported McKinley's Philippine policy and was concerned that "mutterings of discontent" among the American public and a failure to suppress the Philippine independence movement quickly with military force would lead to Republican defeats in the elections of 1900 and/or 1904.¹⁰ Roosevelt anxiously revealed to John Hay his fear that "a series of disasters at the very beginning of our colonial

⁸U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1352-53.

⁹Steve Smith, "Policy preferences and bureaucratic position: the case of the American hostage rescue mission," International Affairs 61 (1984-85): 17.

¹⁰Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 406.

policy would shake this administration."¹¹

Roosevelt's bureaucratic position also informed his decisions as president. He was convinced that the swift suppression of the nationalists was the best way to silence critics of his Philippine policy and he urged the military to continue aggressive operations against the Filipinos.¹² As charges of the army's misconduct in the Philippines increased, the Senate convened public hearings in January, 1902 to investigate American involvement in the archipelago.¹³ Testimony from enlisted men, officers, and civil government officials began to reflect badly upon the administration. Roosevelt felt compelled to "leak" to the press an April 16, 1902 directive warning General Adna Chaffee that "cruelty or brutality" would not be tolerated and that no man would be "favored or shielded" from punishment.¹⁴ Roosevelt was a master at manipulating the press and the directive was leaked mainly to assuage his domestic political critics.¹⁵ The president also ordered Root to "silence" General Frederick Funston who was touring

¹¹Ibid., 406.

¹²Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2, 1437.

¹³Henry Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969), xx.

¹⁴U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1328; Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 237.

¹⁵Gould, The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, 20.

the United States publicly advocating the use of torture and brutality against Filipino nationalists and civilians.¹⁶

Roosevelt's anxiety over placing the success of his political career above what he considered the army's best interests is illustrated in a letter to his friend H.H. Kohlsaatt. The president lamented that "It is getting to be the case as to whether I can longer permit great damage to be done to the army for the sake of avoiding trouble to myself."¹⁷

Although President Roosevelt never ordered the use of torture, he did not caution or reprimand the army until forced to by domestic political pressures. Roosevelt was willing to scold the army publicly when political expediency demanded it, but he clearly sympathized with the military during the controversy over alleged atrocities. The day after his April 16 directive to General Chaffee, Roosevelt cabled General Franklin Bell congratulating him on the completion of one of the most brutal and bloodiest campaigns of the Philippine-American War.¹⁸ Later that year, Roosevelt informed the military that he was "not in the least sensitive about killing any number of men if there

¹⁶Roosevelt to Root, 4-21-02, Reel 328, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁷Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.3, 248.

¹⁸U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1327; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 237.

is adequate reason."¹⁹ Moreover, Roosevelt considered the exceedingly painful and occasionally deadly "water cure" used by American soldiers against Filipinos "mild torture."²⁰ Roosevelt also worked to ensure that those accused of atrocities would not be severely punished. During the spring and summer of 1902, he directed Secretary of War Root to consider the good service record of a soldier accused of atrocities. He also commuted the sentence of a soldier convicted of murdering a Filipino prisoner from dismissal and five years hard labor to the forfeiture of pay and promotion seniority.²¹

In addition to providing favorable information to the press, Roosevelt launched an aggressive public relations campaign designed to bolster the army's reputation. Dozens of administration officials gave speeches and wrote articles emphasizing army successes in the face of dangerous "provocations" and they rarely neglected an opportunity to imply that those Americans who did not support the administration were unpatriotic.²²

¹⁹Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.3, 298.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Roosevelt to Root, 7-10-02, Reel 328, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 218.

²²Oscar Alonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines 1897-1909 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1970), 105.

Roosevelt's bureaucratic position was not the sole factor affecting his Philippine policy. The president was eager for the United States to claim its place among the powerful countries of the world and believed that it was America's duty as a "great nation" to retain the territories acquired by expansion.²³ Roosevelt posited that there were "exact" parallels between his colonial policy and the American administration of the Louisiana Purchase and Native American territories and wrote that if the United States withdrew from the Philippines it would have to abandon Alaska and leave New York to the Native Americans.²⁴ Like McKinley, Roosevelt rejected forming a protectorate relationship with the Philippines because it would not provide sufficient security against "outside aggression" by European powers.²⁵ Influenced by the Progressive impulse that was sweeping America, Roosevelt believed that it was incumbent upon the United States to restructure the Philippines into an "organized" society and provide the Filipinos the "benefits" of American government and culture.²⁶ Less concerned than McKinley about economic

²³Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol. 2, 1068.

²⁴Ibid., 1400-1401, 1092.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid., 1404-1405; Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), 503.

reasons for retention of the Philippines, Roosevelt maintained that they held strategic value as naval and coaling stations and he refused to withdraw from the archipelago.²⁷

Roosevelt was convinced that Filipinos were inherently inferior to Americans and he frequently employed racial epithets, such as "Tagal bandits" and "Chinese halfbreeds," to describe them.²⁸ Influenced by Social Darwinism, Roosevelt believed that Western nations were locked into competition for survival and that Caucasians were engaged with people of color in a "contest for civilization."²⁹ To Roosevelt, the Filipinos were "unfit" for self-government and the survival of the "white race" justified and required American pacification and colonization of the Philippines.³⁰ Roosevelt considered Chinese Boxers and American Apaches the "precise analogues" of the Filipino nationalists and believed that conflicts involving "savages" required the United States to display firm resolve.³¹ In a speech in

²⁷Roosevelt to Root, 11-11-01, Reel 327, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁸Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise to World Power (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1956), 72.

²⁹Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 126; Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2, 990-91.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Reel 6, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress; Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2, 990-91.

St. Paul, Minnesota, he warned that if the United States adopted a "policy of scuttle" and withdrew from the Philippines, Asians intent on disorder and bloodshed would ransack the streets of Manila just as they had Peking during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.³²

President Roosevelt's personality also shaped his Philippine policy. Struggling to overcome the insecurity and frailties caused by ill health as a child, Roosevelt became obsessed with sports and constant physical and mental self-improvement. Throughout his life, Roosevelt struggled to prove his courage, maturity, and vitality to himself and to others.³³ Roosevelt was convinced that like individuals, nations could only improve, prosper, and endure if they chose to tackle "dangerous and difficult tasks" and he predicted that the United States would occupy an "ignoble place" in the world if it allowed itself to become "soft and easy."³⁴ Roosevelt was determined to do everything within his power to improve the nation's stature in the world community. He often argued passionately that although it might prove extremely difficult, the United States had to counter nationalist provocations with force in order

³²Sixto Lopez to Roosevelt, 8-13-00, Reel 6, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

³³John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 5-13.

³⁴Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2, 1068.

to retain its self-respect and its credibility with other nations.³⁵

Such attitudes of belligerent nationalism, combined with his father's avoidance of military service during the Civil War, fostered an innate militarism in Roosevelt.³⁶ He advocated a modernized navy, volunteered for service in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, called for military action to avenge the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, and attempted to persuade President Wilson to let him command a division of American troops during World War I.³⁷ William Howard Taft was familiar with Roosevelt's militarism and commented to a friend that Roosevelt "loves war" and "believes in forcible rather than peaceful means."³⁸ Roosevelt's fondness of war for its own sake was an important factor in his advocacy of the use of the military to achieve American objectives in the Philippines.

The bureaucratic politics explanatory model stresses that the vice-president and president are primarily concerned with the effects of foreign policy decisions on the president's domestic political standing. Although influential in determining Roosevelt's decision to use military force and his official position regarding alleged

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest, 283-284.

³⁷Ibid., 324.

³⁸Ibid.

army atrocities, domestic politics was clearly not Roosevelt's foremost concern when formulating his foreign policy views.

Vice-President Roosevelt's loyal support of the McKinley administration's hawkish Philippine policy is predictable from his bureaucratic position, but Roosevelt discredits the bureaucratic politics model because he would have favored the use of military force in any advisory position that he occupied. As vice-president and president, Roosevelt's personality, militarism, expansionist outlook, and racism ensured his support of a military solution to the problem posed by the Philippine nationalists, even when alleged army atrocities made the use of force extremely controversial.

CHAPTER IV

CABINET OFFICERS AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

The secretaries of state, war, and navy formed the core of McKinley's and Roosevelt's top level advisors on American Philippine policy. They exercised great influence on policy formation and were largely responsible for implementing both presidents' decisions.

John Hay, Secretary of State 1898-1905

A former historian, poet, journalist, and diplomat, sixty-one year old John Hay was appointed secretary of state by William McKinley in 1898.¹ Secretary of State John Hay envisioned a world in which the United States occupied a prominent political and economic position.² He enjoyed good working and personal relationships with both McKinley and Roosevelt and felt secure enough in his position to politely disagree with each when he found their policies objectionable.³

¹Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 165.

²Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 232-35.

³Kenton Clymer, John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), 132; Lewis Gould, The Spanish-American War and President McKinley (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1982), 5.

According to the bureaucratic politics model, the State Department is primarily concerned with negotiating treaties, maintaining good relationships with allies, and formulating the nation's diplomacy.⁴ The model implies that since the secretary of state represents an organization focused on such concerns, he or she will seek to solve foreign policy problems through negotiation.⁵

Secretary of State John Hay's views and decisions regarding the Filipino nationalists do not reflect his bureaucratic position and do not fit the bureaucratic politics model. Instead of urging conciliation and negotiation, Secretary Hay consistently advised President McKinley and President Roosevelt to use the American military to suppress the Philippine independence movement. On December 30, 1898, the ubiquitous Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey Adee urged Hay to implement "coercive action against Aguinaldo as a disturber of our peace."⁶ After the outbreak of hostilities between the American army and the Philippine nationalists in February 1899, the secretary of state became firmly committed to the

⁴Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971), 165-66; Steve Smith, "Policy preferences and bureaucratic position: the case of the American hostage rescue mission," International Affairs 61 (1984-85): 18-21.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Samuel Flagg Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy Vol. IX (New York: Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1963), 127.

use of military force against the Filipinos. Confident of the American army's prospects for victory, Hay wrote President McKinley on April 25, 1899 that "the news from Manila is splendid. We can see light at last."⁷

On June 3, 1899, Philippine Commission Chairman Jacob Schurman urged an end to American military involvement in the Philippines and the establishment of a protectorate relationship with the archipelago.⁸ Hay quickly rejected Chairman Schurman's recommendation and cabled him that "there is no excuse for further resistance by the Filipinos and if it continues the President will send all the force necessary to suppress insurrection."⁹ Hay's contempt for Schurman and his suggestion is illustrated by Hay's comments when forwarding Schurman's message to McKinley. Hay remarked, "Here is a long disquisition from Dr. Schurman. If he had given the money this cable cost to Aguinaldo he might have ended the war."¹⁰

Secretary Hay was determined to dampen any effect that Schurman's advice might have had and he again urged President McKinley to use military force to establish

⁷Hay to McKinley, 4-28-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

⁸Schurman to Hay, 6-3-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

⁹Clymer, John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat, 137.

¹⁰Hay to McKinley, 6-3-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

American authority on August 23, 1899.¹¹ In a speech at Quincy, Illinois, he pronounced critics of the McKinley administration's Philippine policy unpatriotic and declared American objectives in the islands "worthy to die for."¹² Hay continued his avid support for aggressive military action during Theodore Roosevelt's administration and wrote Roosevelt that he was deeply moved by one of the president's speeches defending the administration's Philippine policy.¹³

Secretary of State Hay's policy preferences were a product of his personal hatred of Aguinaldo, his racial attitudes, and his belief in the Philippines's strategic value to the United States. Hay considered the Filipino nationalists dangerous impediments to the establishment of United States sovereignty, which had been secured legally by treaty. Convinced that Emilio Aguinaldo was a puppet of the German government, Hay harbored a strong dislike for the Philippine leader. He considered Aguinaldo no different from other "rebels," such as striking workers and agrarian radicals, whom he believed were misguided and foolishly flaunting order and lawful authority without significant

¹¹Hay to McKinley, 8-23-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

¹²Hay to McKinley, 8-23-99, Reel 7, Hay speech at Quincy, Illinois, 10-6-99, Reel 83, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

¹³Hay to Roosevelt, 6-29-02, Reel 27, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

popular support. According to Hay, the United States should employ force to deal with troublesome "rebels" abroad just as it did with unruly domestic agitators such as striking workers in Homestead, Pennsylvania.¹⁴

Hay served as Abraham Lincoln's private secretary during the American Civil War and he had great respect for Lincoln's efforts to preserve the American republic, writing in 1864 that Lincoln "is the greatest character since Christ."¹⁵ Such personal involvement with a previous president's efforts to suppress a rebellion against the authority of the United States might well have influenced Hay's views regarding the Filipino nationalists.

Hay shared Roosevelt's racial prejudices and employed slurs such as "Chinks" and "Dagoes."¹⁶ Certain that the Filipinos' racial inferiority rendered them unsuitable for self-government, Hay refused to recommend the withdrawal of American troops or the granting of protectorate status to the Philippines.¹⁷

Hay also feared that Germany would harass and ultimately seize the Philippines if the American military presence in the archipelago was limited by a protectorate

¹⁴Clymer, John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat, 33, 133-34.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Wiebe, The Search For Order, 234.

¹⁷Ibid.; Clymer, John Hay :The Gentleman as Diplomat, 90-91.

relationship.¹⁸ Hay reasoned that the Philippines could not be allowed to fall under the influence of a European power because he considered them a valuable springboard for military operations and trade in East Asia.¹⁹ In a letter praising President McKinley for his prescience and tenacity in endeavoring to retain American control of the Philippines, Secretary Hay argued that maintaining an ample American military force in the islands would enable the United States to protect Americans in China and insist upon "an open door to all that vast market for our fast growing commerce."²⁰

Elihu Root, Secretary of War 1899-1904

Although he had no practical foreign policy experience upon entering government service as President McKinley's secretary of war in 1899, Elihu Root was an "arm chair" diplomatist who had for years advocated increasing the regional and global political influence of the United States.²¹ Secretary Root was an extremely efficient administrator and advisor who enjoyed the friendship and confidence of Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, and

¹⁸Clymer, John Hay :The Gentleman as Diplomat, 126-27.

¹⁹Hay to McKinley, "Suggested Remarks," 7-8-00, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Wiebe, The Search for Order, 232-35.

William Howard Taft.²² Root later served as secretary of state, United States senator, and special ambassador to Russia and had a profound effect on many of the internationalist mainstays of the American foreign policy establishment, particularly Henry Stimson and John McCloy.²³

As head of the War Department, Root administered military and civil government operations in the Philippines and was probably Roosevelt's most important advisor on affairs in the archipelago.²⁴ When he deemed it necessary, Root confidently disagreed with his superiors and subordinates and occasionally poked fun at them. When the rotund William Howard Taft wrote that he had recently enjoyed a horseback ride in the Philippine mountains, Root responded by cabling "How's the horse"?²⁵

The bureaucratic politics model suggests that the secretary of defense, or in this period secretary of war or navy, will prefer military solutions to foreign policy problems because of frequent contact with military personnel

²²Gould, The Spanish-American War and McKinley, 5; John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 75.

²³Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 180.

²⁴Oscar Alonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines 1897-1909 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1970), 32.

²⁵Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Archon Books, 1938), 363.

and constant immersion in the military "world view."²⁶ Such a "view" contends that military force is the most efficient and effective means of achieving the foreign policy objectives of the United States.²⁷ Bureaucratic position had a stronger influence on Root than on the rest of McKinley or Roosevelt's high level policy advisors. Several of Root's policy recommendations regarding the Philippines were shaped by his bureaucratic position and are predictable from his bureaucratic base.

One of Secretary of War Root's major goals upon taking office was to pacify the Filipino nationalists.²⁸ Root advised President McKinley to use military force against the Filipinos, pressured the military to take aggressive action, and informed American generals that the War Department would "rather err on the safe side in sending too many troops than too few."²⁹ Although Root declared military authority in the Philippines subordinate to the American civil government on July 4, 1902, he privately assured General Chaffee that the substitution of civil for military control in the islands would be a slow, "gradual" process and warned the

²⁶Steve Smith, "Policy preferences and bureaucratic position" International Affairs 61 (1984-85): 13, 16-17.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Elting Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1048.

²⁹Adjutant General to Otis, 8-15-99, McKinley to Root, 8-19-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

general to always be prepared to "exert force."³⁰

Root was pleased that President Roosevelt made no major changes in McKinley's foreign policy upon his ascension to the presidency. Root was a vigorous supporter of Roosevelt's Philippine policy and loyally defended the army when it was accused of atrocities.³¹ Charges of torture and wanton destruction of property reflected badly on the army, Root, and the administration. Despite evidence to the contrary, Root assured Roosevelt that continued use of military force was justified and that the war had been "conducted with marked humanity and magnanimity."³² The secretary of war was the administration's main champion of the army's tactics. In his speeches he challenged every "true American" to put aside partisan politics, as well as charges of atrocities, and "stand behind the men of all parties and all creeds who today lie in the trenches of Luzon."³³

Root failed to discourage, and perhaps initiated, a plot to have alleged war criminal General Jacob Smith declared insane in order to protect the reputation of the

³⁰Root to Chaffee, 2-26-01, Reel 5, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

³¹Root to Roosevelt, 3-5-02, Reel 25, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

³²Jessup, Elihu Root, 329-33, 339-41.

³³Ibid., 339; Speech at Quincy, Illinois, 10-6-99, Reel 83, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

War Department and avoid the negative publicity and damage to army morale involved with court-martialing an army commander.³⁴ Although Root did not order the use of torture, he knew that questionable tactics had been used and did nothing to stop them until the charges of atrocities became too numerous and controversial to ignore.³⁵

Root was a former corporate lawyer, but pressure from the business community does not seem to have influenced his desire to retain the Philippines. He was instrumental in securing legislation to prevent the commercial exploitation of the Philippines by American companies and his reluctance to withdraw completely from the archipelago stemmed more from his commitment to American political expansion than sympathy with business interests.³⁶ The secretary of war opposed granting the Philippines protectorate status because he believed that the Filipinos were racially inferior and incapable of self-government.³⁷

Root was unfamiliar with many of the issues confronting the American military before his appointment as secretary of

³⁴U.S. Army, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Vol.2 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1993), 1333, 1335, 1347; Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 238.

³⁵Wright to Root, 7-18-02, Reel 28, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress; Jessup, Elihu Root, 340.

³⁶Jessup, Elihu Root, 359.

³⁷Ibid., 332; Speech at Quincy, Illinois, 10-6-99, Reel 83, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

war and was selected mainly for his administrative ability. Surprised at his appointment, Root did not harbor a military mindset before taking office.³⁸ Governor of New York when Root was appointed, Theodore Roosevelt maintained a keen interest in military affairs and was shocked at Root's selection. He wrote Root a letter of congratulations in which he stated that "Your appointment was an utter surprise to me, because it had never entered my head to think of you in connection with the War Department."³⁹ A successful corporate lawyer before entering government service, Root thought of the War Department as a client whose interests he assiduously promoted and protected.⁴⁰ He was convinced that suppressing the Philippine independence movement with military force was the most effective means of protecting the interests of the army and the War Department while fulfilling the administration's objective of establishing American civil government in the archipelago.⁴¹

Working constantly with military personnel probably contributed to Secretary of War Root's desire to defend the

³⁸Root to Roosevelt, 7-26-99, Reel 2, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁹Roosevelt to Root, 7-25-99, Reel 321, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

⁴⁰Jessup, Elihu Root, 329-33, 339-41.

⁴¹Speech at Quincy, Illinois, 10-6-99, Reel 83, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 1048; McKinley to Root, 8-19-00, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

conduct of American soldiers and protect the interests of the War Department.⁴² Although Root's bureaucratic position was not the sole determinant of his decisions, the bureaucratic politics explanatory model is very useful for explaining and predicting Root's policy preferences, particularly his advocacy of the use of military force.

John Long, Secretary of the Navy 1897-1902

A former governor of Massachusetts and member of Congress, John Davis Long was not well qualified for his position as secretary of the navy and his staid manner stood in marked contrast to the zealous Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt.⁴³ John Long's views regarding the Philippine nationalists are predictable from his bureaucratic position because he supported using military force against the nationalists during his tenure in office.⁴⁴

Sources relating to the reasons for Long's policy preferences are scarce, but the available evidence suggests that his recommendations were influenced by his bureaucratic position. Long deemed bases in the Philippines essential to

⁴²Jessup, Elihu Root, 340.

⁴³Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 87.

⁴⁴Speech at Quincy, Illinois, 10-6-99, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; William Braisted, The U.S Navy in the Pacific (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), 119-122.

American naval capability in the Pacific, leading him to oppose withdrawing troops from the islands.⁴⁵

Long's views were also shaped by other factors. He believed that employing military force against the Filipinos was the only way that the United States could continue "upholding its honor and maintaining its flag" and he was also anxious for the United States to extend "its institutions and its civilization" to the Filipinos, whom he considered inferior.⁴⁶ In 1899, Long publicly assured the nationalists and the American public that the United States was "good to everyone who gets under the protecting folds of its banner," and implied that the McKinley administration would continue to deal forcefully with those who did not accept American sovereignty.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Braisted, The U.S. Navy in the Pacific, 119-122.

⁴⁶Speech at Quincy, Illinois, 10-6-99, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

⁴⁷Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE VIEW FROM THE CIVIL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

William Howard Taft had been opposed to the American acquisition of the Philippines, but after it became clear that the United States was determined to retain the archipelago he supported American efforts to pacify resistance and establish a colonial government.¹ Taft accepted President McKinley's request to head the Second Philippine Commission in February, 1900 and he was appointed civil governor of the Philippines in July, 1901.²

Taft exhibited efficiency and optimism in handling the difficult task of establishing American civil government in the Philippines while competing with the American military government for authority and resources.³ Governor Taft's immediate superior in Washington was Secretary of War Elihu Root and Taft routinely advised Root, McKinley, and Roosevelt on Philippine affairs. Although they feuded later, Taft and Roosevelt were especially close during Taft's tenure as governor and Roosevelt often began

¹Henry Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969), 48-49.

²Ralph Minger, William Howard Taft and U.S. Foreign Policy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 5.

³Ralph Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government in the Philippines," The Ohio Historical Quarterly 70 (1961): 309-31.

his letters to the civil governor with "My Dear Will."⁴

Upon assuming office, Taft received advice from many people, including Harvard president Charles Eliot. Eliot congratulated Taft on his appointment and argued that the United States should occupy Manila and abandon the rest of the islands.⁵

Taft supported the army's initial efforts at pacification, but as the Philippine-American War dragged on he became convinced that using the United States military was an ineffective means of dealing with the nationalists. Taft urged a gradual reduction of American troops in the Philippines, arguing that native troops loyal to the United States were "more effective for detecting and harassing guerrillas, assassins and Ladrones, than Americans."⁶ Taft opposed granting the Philippines protectorate status and favored direct American rule of the islands supported by native troops and a small garrison of United States forces.⁷

⁴Oscar Alonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines 1897-1902 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1970), 34-35.

⁵Eliot to Taft, Series 3, Reel 30, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

⁶Philippine Commission to Secretary of War, 1-4-01, Taft to Root, 1-2-01, Reel 14, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

⁷Ibid.; Elting Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 1396.

Although Taft thought that charges of United States army cruelties were exaggerated for domestic political purposes, he acknowledged that atrocities did occur and argued that they hampered American efforts to pacify the Filipinos and establish a civil government.⁸ Taft recommended swift punishment for acts of brutality stating, "the severity with which the inhabitants have been dealt with would not look well if a complete history were written out."⁹

William Howard Taft's recommendation to reduce the number of American troops in the Philippines reflects the influence of his bureaucratic position. Although the bureaucratic politics model does not deal specifically with the position of civil governor, it does suggest that the head of a civil bureaucracy competing with a rival military organization for authority and resources would urge a reduction of military forces.¹⁰ The bureaucratic politics model also implies that heads of organizations not directly concerned with military affairs will prefer non-military options to achieve American objectives. The civil governor's recommendation to reduce the American military presence

⁸Taft to Root, 7-5-02, Reel 28, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress; Alonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines 1897-1909, 98.

⁹Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Archon Books, 1938), 341.

¹⁰Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Little Brown and Company 1971), 162.

in the Philippines reflects this assumption.¹¹

The bureaucratic politics model does not prove fully useful in predicting and accounting for Taft's opposition to establishing a protectorate and it only partly explains his attitudes toward army atrocities. Taft referred to the Filipinos as America's "Little Brown Brothers" and considered them ignorant, "lazy," "lacking in moral character," and "ambitious as Satan."¹² Such attitudes were common to many Americans of the period and Taft's paternalistic racism convinced him that the Filipinos would remain unqualified for self-rule for a long period of time and that the United States was obligated to extend American government and culture to the islands for the good of the indigenous population.¹³ Ultimately, Taft hoped to "elevate" the Filipinos to an "appreciation" of Western democracy.¹⁴

Taft's racism shaped his opposition to the immediate establishment of a protectorate for the archipelago, but he

¹¹Ibid., 165-66; Steve Smith, "Policy preferences and bureaucratic position," International Affairs 61 (1984-85): 12-21.

¹²Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection, 46-47; Oscar Alonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines 1897-1909, 46; Taft to Root, 7-14-00, 8-18-00, Series 8, Reel 463, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

¹³Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection, 46-49, 95.

¹⁴Ibid.

also feared that the islands would be acquired by a European nation if such a relationship were established too quickly. Taft advised Theodore Roosevelt of his opinion, writing that a protectorate would mean "perpetual war" for the Philippines.¹⁵

A former Solicitor General of the United States and federal circuit court judge, Taft was a nationally famous jurist and legal scholar whose professional life was devoted to the study and upholding of American law.¹⁶ Taft's legal background and dedication to the furtherance of the principles embodied in the United States Constitution probably influenced his recommendations regarding the fair treatment of Filipinos by the American army and the punishment of American soldiers guilty of torture and brutality.

¹⁵Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2, 1396.

¹⁶Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection, 35.

CHAPTER VI

THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

Like the cabinet members, the officers of the United States military served the two-fold purpose of aiding in policy formulation and implementation. Directly responsible for prosecuting the war against the Filipinos, they reported their observations and recommendations to Washington and also served as diplomats who negotiated with the nationalists. The bureaucratic politics model argues that military personnel are concerned with defending the national honor and security interests of the United States and prefer military solutions to foreign policy problems.¹

Nelson Miles, Army Chief of Staff 1898-1903

General Nelson Miles was a career army officer and Civil War hero who was instrumental in the capture of the Apache chief Geronimo. Miles served as army chief of staff under Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt and was a reformer who advocated the army's experimentation with bicycles and automobiles. Although courageous, Miles was politically ambitious, naive, and conceited. General Miles's views and decisions regarding the Philippine nationalists do not reflect his bureaucratic position because he frequently

¹Steve Smith, "Policy preferences and bureaucratic position," International Affairs 61 (1984-85): 13, 15.

urged McKinley and Roosevelt to adopt a policy of conciliation and negotiate with the Filipinos.²

Nine days after a report by Major Cornelius Gardener detailing the American army's alleged use of torture and "scorched earth" tactics arrived at the War Department, General Miles requested an appointment with President Roosevelt.³ Miles met with Roosevelt on February 17, 1902 and the general expressed his concern and outrage over alleged army "brutalities."⁴ Miles also recommended that the administration negotiate with the nationalists and he asked to be given command of the American army in the Philippines. An incredulous Roosevelt quickly rejected the general's advice, declared Major Gardener's allegations "false," and angrily reminded Miles of the 1890 "Wounded Knee massacre" of Native Americans which occurred under the general's command.⁵

Miles was stunned by Roosevelt's rejection of his counsel. The general was possibly the victim of the "group think" phenomenon, in which those who differ substantially with their fellow advisors and the president are often

²Graham Cosmas, An Army for Empire (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 59-62.

³Oscar Alonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines 1897-1909 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1970), 97.

⁴Elting Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.3 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 232-33.

⁵Ibid.

ostracized and/or circumvented in the policy planning process.⁶ Since 1898, Miles's somewhat abrasive personality and his disagreements with McKinley and Roosevelt over policy issues caused him gradually to be phased out of the decision-making process.⁷ Moreover, Roosevelt had disliked Miles for years because the general had hinted publicly that the president had not seen significant combat action during the Spanish-American War. Wary of the general, Roosevelt and Root suspected that Miles's actions and policy recommendations were politically motivated.⁸

A review of the historical evidence suggests that Miles's foreign policy advice was guided in part by his political ambitions. While governor of New York, Roosevelt had a long conversation with Miles concerning the Philippine independence movement and national politics. Miles stated that the McKinley administration's policy of using force to deal with the nationalists was futile, that the army and the nation would suffer disgrace, and that President McKinley's chances for re-election would be severely impaired.⁹ Miles

⁶Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 2-13.

⁷U.S. Army, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Vol.1 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1993), Intro.

⁸Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root (Archon Books, 1938), 245; Root to McKinley, 7-26-00, Reel 11, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

⁹Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.3, 240-241.

then informed the governor of his intention to become a presidential candidate in the election of 1900 and he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Roosevelt to run as his vice-presidential partner.¹⁰

Miles also hoped to be the Democratic presidential candidate in 1904, and his request to assume direct command in the Philippines might have been motivated by his desire to portray himself as a military hero in the future electoral contest with Roosevelt. When Roosevelt refused to send Miles to the Philippines, the general quickly called a press conference and announced that he could end the war swiftly through a policy of conciliation "if he were in a position to do so."¹¹ Miles also leaked the Gardener report to the press, which embarrassed the Roosevelt administration and fueled the army atrocities controversy.¹² Root expected army officers to remain loyal to their bureaucracy and found it "curious" that the army would be attacked by one of its own.¹³

Miles's policy recommendations were also influenced by his conviction that the Philippines held little or no strategic value for the United States. In contrast to his

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 257.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Root to Taft, 3-28-02, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

fellow officers, Miles favored limiting the army's field of operations to the city and harbor of Manila and opposed retention of the entire archipelago.¹⁴ Miles was convinced that China held far greater strategic importance to United States than the Philippines. During the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Miles urged Root to send 15,000 American troops and all available transports from the Philippines to China to protect American interests and the lives of United States citizens.¹⁵ This recommendation illustrates the low priority the Philippines occupied in Miles's conception of American-East Asian relations. Withdrawing 15,000 troops from the Philippines would probably have ensured the failure of United States military operations in the islands and endangered the American soldiers and civilians remaining in the archipelago.¹⁶ Root wrote McKinley advocating the rejection of Miles's advice, adding that "Nevertheless, if we don't whip all of China or another American dies there it will be because we didn't follow these [Miles's] recommendations."¹⁷

Miles had never hesitated to differ with his superiors over military policy. Charged with dispersing Pullman strikers in Chicago in 1894, Miles disagreed with his orders

¹⁴U.S. Army, Correspondence Vol.2, 649.

¹⁵Root to McKinley, 7-20-00, Reel 11, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

and suggested that use of the army would exacerbate tensions and that the strikers would grow weary and return home if the government simply left them alone.¹⁸ Similarly, General Miles was convinced that the Philippines were unimportant to the United States and was confident that military force would not prove effective against the nationalists. Much to President Roosevelt's and Secretary Root's chagrin, the general warned the Roosevelt administration that all of his unheeded policy opinions would eventually be "vindicated" by the "disasters" sure to befall the American army's efforts in the islands.¹⁹ General Miles's policy views were a product of his political ambitions and his low regard for the Philippines as an important strategic asset to the United States and were not determined by his bureaucratic position.

Elwell Otis, Arthur MacArthur, and Adna Chaffee, Army Commanders in the Philippines 1898-1902

Of all the presidential advisors examined, the American army commanders in the Philippines provide the best fit with the bureaucratic politics model. Each army general frequently and consistently urged the use of military force to subjugate the Filipino nationalists and aggressively defended the American army's interests, rendering their

¹⁸Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 60-61.

¹⁹Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.3, 232-33.

policy preferences predictable from their bureaucratic position.²⁰

Fresh from fighting Native Americans in the western United States, Elwell Otis, Arthur MacArthur, and Adna Chaffee were career army officers who applied tactics of destruction used during their campaigns to warfare in the Philippines.²¹ Each commander believed that the use of force was the quickest and most effective means of accomplishing American objectives in the Philippines. They were also eager to demonstrate the American army's strategic, tactical, and logistical competence and utility in one of its first major overseas assignments.²²

Although the commanders did not officially sanction the use of torture and execution of prisoners, they loyally defended the American army against charges of torture and brutality and were often slow to investigate offenses allegedly committed by their troops.²³ General Chaffee warned an inquisitive Atlanta Constitution correspondent "not to grow too sentimental" if he heard the screams

²⁰Otis to McKinley, 11-13-00, MacArthur to War Department, 10-4-00, Reel 13, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1204, 1331.

²¹Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 196.

²²Otis to McKinley, 11-13-00, MacArthur to War Department, 10-4-00, Reel 13, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; U.S. Army, Correspondence Vol.2, 1204, 1331; Vol.1, Intro.

²³Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 196-217.

of Filipinos "being put away."²⁴ Each commander also sought to protect the army's image through the censoring of the American press and each quarreled with United States civil government officials to maintain the army's authority and defend its interests in the Philippines.²⁵

Racism was common among American enlisted men and officers during the late nineteenth century and soldiers' letters home were frequently laced with references to Filipinos as "niggers" and "gu-gus."²⁶ Chaffee declared the Filipinos guilty of "savagery" and Otis and MacArthur testified that all "Aryans" were superior to Filipinos and that "military despotism" and "chaos" would prevail if the United States abandoned the archipelago.²⁷ Although the army commanders would have recommended the use of force even if they had not been racists, their prejudices reinforced their conviction that aggressive military action was the solution to America's Philippine problems. Chaffee wrote Secretary of War Root in 1901 that "the average Filipino's heart appears to be a dark hue . . . human life all over the

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Collins to Deihl, 6-30-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government in the Philippines," Ohio Historical Quarterly 70 (1961): 309-333; U.S. Army, Correspondence Vol.2, 1221.

²⁶Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 188-199.

²⁷U.S. Army, Correspondence Vol.2, 1336; Henry Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969), 50, 135-137, 141.

East is cheap . . it is only the fear of prompt, immediate and unfailing punishment that holds the population in check."²⁸

George Dewey, Navy Commander in the Philippines 1898-1899

According to the bureaucratic politics model, career naval officer Admiral George Dewey should have favored dealing with the Philippine nationalists through military force. Dewey's policy recommendations do not reflect his bureaucratic position because he advocated conciliation with the Filipinos.

On May 15, 1898, Dewey cabled Secretary of the Navy Long that only 5,000 troops would be needed to maintain American authority in the Philippines.²⁹ Dewey also advised McKinley to establish a civil commission to "adjust differences" with the nationalists through negotiation and the admiral wrote Senator Redfield Proctor that "this appears to me an occasion for a triumph of statesmanship rather than of arms."³⁰ As tensions increased between American forces and Filipinos during January 1899, Dewey wrote to his son that "we may be fighting with the

²⁸Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Archon Books, 1938), 341.

²⁹Dewey to Long, 5-15-98, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁰George Dewey, Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 285.

insurgents at any moment" and added that he would rather abandon the Philippines than "have a war with them."³¹

It is unlikely that Dewey favored a policy of negotiation because he desired to protect his bureaucracy (the navy) from the heavy casualties and tarnished images that could possibly result from a protracted struggle in Philippines. The nationalists had only a few small boats and the American navy's main function was to provide tactical and logistical support to army operations, resulting in little loss of navy life or prestige.³²

Instead, George Dewey's policy views regarding the nationalists were influenced by his belief that the retention of Manila alone would satisfy the navy's need for a coaling station in the region.³³ Admiral Dewey was convinced that the Filipinos were simple "children" who should be "treated kindly" and such paternalistic racism also shaped his policy views.³⁴ Moreover, Dewey had served as a United States naval officer during the Civil War and did not enjoy the "bitterness" he encountered while dealing with enemy civilians and soldiers who considered him an

³¹Stanley Karnow, In Our Image (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 135.

³²William Braisted, The U.S. Navy in the Pacific (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1958), 71.

³³John Dobson, Reticent Expansionist (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1988), 89.

³⁴Dewey, Autobiography, 285.

"invader."³⁵ Dewey's Civil War experience might well have affected his reluctance to assume the role of "invader" in the Philippines.

³⁵Ibid.

PART II:
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

CHAPTER VII

**ORGANIZATIONAL PROCEDURES
AND
AMERICAN PHILIPPINE POLICY**

Once policy decisions have been made, they need to be implemented. The bureaucratic politics model contends that bureaucratic rivalry, personal goals, and a reliance on established organizational procedures often impede the fulfillment of policy objectives and produce unintended results.¹ Analysis of the United States army's efforts to engage and defeat the Filipino nationalists demonstrates that bureaucratic factors played an important role in the disruption of the implementation of American Philippine policy.

As Spanish military forces began leaving the Philippines in the fall of 1898, United States soldiers under the command of General Elwell Otis occupied Manila, the Philippine capital. They soon found themselves surrounded by Aguinaldo's nationalist troops encamped on the outskirts of the city. President McKinley did not desire conflict with the nationalists and he anxiously appointed the Philippine Commission whose initial duties included assessing the progress of the Philippine independence movement and negotiating with Aguinaldo's Filipino

¹J. Garry Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," The Journal of American History 77 (1990): 162-63.

government.² He also ordered General Otis to extend American authority outward from Manila while shunning conflict with Aguinaldo's forces, emphasizing that the army was to avoid "discord and friction" and to "find means to save bloodshed."³

Despite President McKinley's explicit orders, by January, 1899, most American enlisted men and officers were eager for combat with the nationalists and were, in the words of one private, "just itching to get at the 'niggers'."⁴ General Otis recklessly sent troops into areas claimed by the nationalists and such aggressive action combined with the American army's standard practice of establishing wide perimeters of patrol and reconnaissance placed United States soldiers in direct contact with Aguinaldo's forces.⁵ Once they were in close proximity to the nationalists, the American soldiers' restlessness and racial attitudes took over, leading to many altercations with the Filipinos. Filipino nationalists and civilians were harassed, beaten, and "accidentally shot" for merely

²H.W. Brands, The United States and the Philippines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 51.

³U.S. Army, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Vol.2 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1993), 873.

⁴Stuart Miller, Benevolent Assimilation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 58; Stanley Karnow, In Our Image (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 40-43; Collins to Deihl, 6-28-99, 6-30-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers.

⁵Ibid.

"seeming disrespectful" or "looking suspicious."⁶

Otis believed that war with Aguinaldo was inevitable and that the army was losing strategic positions to the Filipinos by following McKinley's policy.⁷ Fond of censoring the press in order to protect the army's reputation, Otis was eager to demonstrate his bureaucracy's effectiveness with a victory over the Filipinos.⁸ Accordingly, he took actions designed to produce friction with Aguinaldo's forces.⁹

In a highly provocative move that Private Willie Grayson later termed "damned bull headedness," Otis ordered the Nebraska regiment of volunteers into the Santa Mesa suburb of Manila on January 21, 1899.¹⁰ The area was claimed by the nationalists and Aguinaldo repeatedly protested the move, but to no avail. Otis assured the Filipino leader that the Mesa would be used for "sanitary," not military, purposes and then promptly transferred an artillery battery to the area.¹¹ Once the American troops had assumed their new positions, army officers, following the usual army practice, developed contingency plans for a

⁶Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 58-59

⁷Karnow, In Our Image, 139.

⁸Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 59.

⁹Ibid., 59-63.

¹⁰Karnow, In Our Image, 139.

¹¹Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 59.

well coordinated assault on Filipino positions in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.¹² Such plans involved the movement of artillery, supplies, and thousands of troops to American lines bordering the Filipinos.

Army intelligence had informed General Otis that most of Aguinaldo's officers would be in the neighboring town of Malolos on February 4 attending a lengthy formal celebration. On February 2, Otis authorized his troops to use force to defend themselves, placed them on "full alert," and fired all Filipinos working on American army installations. He also notified American army troops anchored off the nationalist fortress of Iloilo to restrain themselves "until something happened."¹³

When fighting broke out between Private Grayson and Filipino nationalists in Santa Mesa on February 4, the army's pre-arranged contingency plans were immediately implemented. The utilization of the plans ensured that the conflict would not be an isolated incident, but a full scale battle difficult for President McKinley to ignore. What followed was a massive American assault on the nationalists' positions that would have been extremely difficult to stop once it had begun, even if Otis had so desired.¹⁴ The attack left 3,000 Filipinos dead and was described

¹²Ibid., 59-63.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

by a British civilian residing in Manila as a "simple massacre."¹⁵ Aguinaldo wished to avoid war with the United States and his emissaries met with Otis the next day. They offered to establish a truce, peace talks, and a neutral buffer zone between the two armies. Otis refused, stating that once fighting had begun "it must go on to the bitter end."¹⁶

Although war with the Philippine nationalists was perhaps inevitable, Otis had been ordered to avoid conflict. Instead, many of the army's actions were in direct violation of McKinley's directives and helped initiate hostilities that the president did not desire. The army's standard practices of securing perimeters, reinforcing troop positions, and developing contingency plans created an organizational momentum that coalesced with General Otis's overeagerness and sabotaged American Philippine policy.

The implementation of United States Philippine policy was also impeded by the American army's adherence to standard methods and tactics in its efforts to subjugate the Filipino nationalists. Most United States enlisted men and officers considered the Filipinos an inferior, uncivilized people racially equivalent to African-Americans and Hispanics.¹⁷ General Otis believed that their aim was to

¹⁵Karnow, In Our Image, 144.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 59.

"drive Americans into the sea and kill every white man in Manila."¹⁸

When Aguinaldo shifted his military strategy from conventional to guerrilla warfare in November 1899, the American army implemented counter-insurgency tactics of aggressive pursuit of the enemy, destruction, and reconcentration of civilians.¹⁹ Such methods had become standard army practice when confronting guerrillas deemed uncivilized and racially inferior and had recently proven effective in its efforts to subjugate Native Americans. Most of the United States high command in the Philippines had spent a good portion of their careers fighting Apache, Sioux, and Kiowa and believed that "Injun warfare" was necessary when combatting "savages" in America's "new frontier."²⁰ One Kansas enlisted man expressed the sentiments of many of his comrades when he told a reporter that the Philippines would not be pacified until "the niggers are killed off like the Indians."²¹

Similar to the Vietcong during a later war in Southeast Asia, the Philippine nationalists often blended effortlessly

¹⁸Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 59; Henry Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969), 33.

¹⁹Brands, The United States and the Philippines, 49; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 59, 208-209.

²⁰Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 195, 179.

²¹Ibid.

into the civilian population and were adept at constructing hazardous jungle traps for United States civilians and military personnel.²² Determined to engage the enemy and frustrated by the difficulty in determining friend from foe, General Arthur MacArthur and General J. Franklin Bell invoked Civil War era General Order Number 100. The statute prescribed harsh punishments for civilians suspected of aiding an enemy. Loosely interpreted, it was used to justify the destruction of private property and acts of brutality.²³ Seeking to employ the scorched earth tactics used by General Sherman in the Civil War, General Bell ordered the burning of villages and crops and moved almost the entire province of Batangas into concentration camps.²⁴ General Smith admitted to ordering his troops to transform the interior of the island of Samar into a "howling wilderness" by executing prisoners, burning villages, and killing every Filipino male over the age of ten years capable of bearing arms.²⁵

Many American soldiers also resorted to acts of torture against Filipino nationalists and civilians suspected of aiding them. The most common means of torture was the

²²Karnow, In Our Image, 178.

²³Ibid. 179; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 207-208; Graff, American Imperialism, 87.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1336.

infamous "water cure," which was usually employed during interrogations of prisoners. In testimony before a Senate committee investigating the conduct of the war, former volunteer infantryman Charles S. Riley described one instance of administration of the water cure. Riley explained that upon entering a town suspected of aiding the nationalists, the mayor was captured and interrogated. When he refused to answer questions he was placed under a water tank and water was forced into his mouth until he became bloated. The Americans then stomped on his stomach until the water spewed out of his mouth. The mayor finally began answering the soldiers' questions after they had squirted salt water in his nose with a syringe.²⁶

Although McKinley and Roosevelt never ordered the use of "Injun warfare" against the Filipinos, they did encourage the army to take aggressive actions to defeat them and were not very concerned about isolated incidents of torture.²⁷ Roosevelt believed that the military situation faced by the army in the Philippines was "precisely parallel" to earlier efforts to subjugate Native Americans, but neither he nor McKinley ever intended for widespread destruction and massacres of children to occur.²⁸

²⁶Brands, The United States and the Philippines, 56; Henry Graff, American Imperialism, 77-79.

²⁷Elting Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt Vol.2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 990-91.

²⁸Ibid., 298.

The army fought the Philippine-American War the same way it had fought its wars against Native Americans and its methods disrupted the implementation of American Philippine policy and embarrassed the Roosevelt administration. News of the army's counter-insurgency tactics shocked many Americans, added fuel to the fires of anti-imperialist protests, and prompted a Senate investigation into American Philippine policy. Moreover, such tactics probably stiffened Filipino nationalist resistance and created much doubt about America's "benevolent purpose."²⁹

²⁹Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, The Philippines (New York: The Outlook Company, 1902), 83-86; U.S. Army, Correspondence, 873.

CHAPTER VIII

BUREAUCRATIC RIVALRY AND AMERICAN PHILIPPINE POLICY

Taft v. the Army

A basic premise of the bureaucratic politics model is that bureaucrats, constrained by the structure and parameters of a state's policy making apparatus, strive to advance and increase their personal and organizational influence. Such efforts inevitably lead to conflict and competition between political actors and organizations, disrupting policy implementation and producing results far different from what policy decision makers originally intended.¹ American attempts to establish a civil government in the Philippines while concurrently pursuing military operations against the Filipino nationalist forces afford an excellent opportunity to examine bureaucratic rivalry and its effects on policy implementation.

On April 17, 1900, Judge William Howard Taft, head of the Second Philippine Commission, sailed from San Francisco, California bound for the Philippine islands armed with his instructions from President McKinley. The original Philippine Commission, or Schurman Commission, had been

¹J. Garry Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," The Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 162-63.

mainly an investigative body observing conditions in the archipelago and making recommendations. After a year of fighting in the Philippines, McKinley decided that it was time to begin in earnest the work of exposing the Filipinos to the "beneficent intentions" of the American people.²

Drafted with the aid of Secretary of War Elihu Root, Taft's instructions constituted a framework for American civil government in the Philippines.³ The instructions mandated the establishment of American military and civil governments in the islands as two separate, concurrent, and contiguous jurisdictions under the direct supervision of the War Department. The military governor retained chief executive authority with responsibility for prosecuting military action against the Filipino nationalists and maintaining law and order. The commission was given all judicial, legislative, and appointive authority and was charged with establishing municipal and provincial governments as quickly as possible throughout the archipelago.

The Second Philippine Commission was to prepare the islands for eventual complete civilian control. President McKinley directed the members of the commission to remember

²Ralph Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government in the Philippines," The Ohio Historical Quarterly 70 (1961): 308; U.S. Philippine Commission, Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), 186.

³Phillip Jessup, Elihu Root (Archon Books, 1938), 354.

that "the welfare of the people should be the paramount consideration."⁴ Accordingly, the instructions extended to the Philippine people all the guarantees found in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution, except for the right to a jury trial and the right to bear arms.

When the commission determined that central government administration of the Philippines could be transferred safely from military to civilian control, it was instructed to report to Root with its recommendations regarding the nature of the civil government. President McKinley realized the potential difficulties inherent in the transition from government by military fiat to government of civil law and he emphasized to the commission and the military governor that the success of American objectives in the Philippines required the "most perfect cooperation" between military and civil authorities.⁵

Upon embarking for the Philippines, William Howard Taft knew as much as the average American about the islands, but he was confident in his abilities and was determined not to return to the United States until he had accomplished his mission. Taft realized that his work in the archipelago could take years and he predicted that the Philippine people

⁴Ibid.; Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government", 314-15; McKinley to Root, 4-17-00, Reel 9, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

⁵McKinley to Root, 4-17-00, Reel 9, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

would never welcome Americans until the United States demonstrated that it could give them tangible benefits. As for his relationship with the American military, Taft was confident that it would cooperate as fully as possible with the commission.⁶

The civil governor's hopes of full cooperation were dashed as soon as the commission arrived in the harbor of Manila. The commissioners were surprised when they were not met by an honor guard, but were instead greeted by a junior army officer who escorted them to military governor General Arthur MacArthur's office. The members of the commission were each greeted coolly by MacArthur. When Taft attempted to assure the general that he would retain all of his military authority MacArthur replied "that would be all right if I had not already been exercising so much more power before you came."⁷

Taft's initial meeting with the general lasted a mere thirty minutes. The commission members were quickly informed by the general's staff that MacArthur refused to share his spacious status symbol Malacanang Palace residence. This left the civil governor no choice but to rent a substandard

⁶Henry Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (Hamden: Archon Books, 1964), 157; Taft to E.B. McCagg, 4-16-00, Series 3, Reel 30, William Howard Taft Papers; Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government," 311.

⁷Stanley Karnow, In Our Image (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 170-71; Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 312.

house in the sprawling suburbs surrounding Manila.⁸

As Taft settled into his new position, he found that MacArthur was quickly becoming his most intractable obstacle to establishing civil government. Fifty-five year old Major General Arthur MacArthur was a condescending, stocky, vain man with a taste for flamboyant military dress and a penchant for bombastic pronouncements on the effectiveness of United States foreign policy.⁹ Successful in combat, he led most of the major campaigns against Aguinaldo's forces and was a military hero to much of the American public. MacArthur was accustomed to wielding almost unlimited personal power in the Philippines and seemed to want the Filipinos to view him as an omnipotent "emperor" figure.¹⁰

Wary of any actual or perceived diminution of his authority and/or status, MacArthur soon began to quarrel with Taft over a number of issues. Taft was successful in recruiting and training a substantial number of Filipinos to assume positions in a native militia and constabulary, which he hoped to use to fight Aguinaldo and maintain law and order in cities and villages. MacArthur refused to consider Taft's bill establishing a native militia and informed Taft that the commission was interfering in a "purely military

⁸Ibid.

⁹Karnow, In Our Image, 170-71.

¹⁰Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government," 312-313.

question" and that the introduction of a militia would prompt Washington to leave him with an insufficient number of American troops with which to pacify the islands.¹¹

Distrustful of Filipinos, MacArthur was convinced that most native troops and officials would act "openly in behalf of the Americans and secretly in behalf of the insurgents."¹²

Although he agreed to the appointment of a small native police force, MacArthur refused to reprimand army officers who harassed the native police and civil officials and usurped their authority.¹³

MacArthur also disputed Taft's right to appoint civil officials and petitioned the War Department in an unsuccessful attempt to decrease Taft's power of appointment.¹⁴ The general deeply resented the commission's criticism of military censorship of the press, which Taft characterized as "utterly un-American", and objected to the governor's efforts to build a hospital for Filipinos and American soldiers.¹⁵

¹¹Taft to Root, 10-31-00, Series 8, Reel 63, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

¹²Karnow, In Our Image, 171.

¹³Taft to MacArthur, 5-24-01, Series 3, Reel 32, Taft to Root, 9-13-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁴Taft to Root, 10-31-00, 8-6-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol. 1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁵Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government," 318; Taft to Root, 9-20-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers.

The main point of contention between MacArthur and Taft was the question of when the complete transition from military to civil rule should occur.¹⁶ Ever cognizant of McKinley's instructions to portray the United States as a "liberating" rather than a "conquering" nation, Taft began to write Root urging him to mandate complete civil control of the islands.¹⁷ Taft was convinced that most Filipinos were tired of military rule and that a native militia would prove more effective against the nationalist forces because it would engender popular support among the Philippine people.¹⁸ He was also deeply committed to his work of "uplifting" the indigenous population through education, new infrastructure, and a reformed political system, and he believed that the military was hindering his efforts.¹⁹ Taft was clearly frustrated by his relationship with MacArthur, writing to Root in December, 1900 that "it is exceedingly disagreeable to fuss and fuss with a man who resents your presence and who is on the keen watch to detect some usurpation of jurisdiction."²⁰

¹⁶Ibid., 321.

¹⁷Taft to Root, 12-14-00, 1-9-01, 1-31-01, Series 8, Reel 463, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁸Ibid.; Taft to Root, 11-14-00, Reel 14, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁹Taft to Root, 12-14-00, 1-13-01, 5-24-01, Series 8, Reel 463, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁰Taft to Root, 12-14-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

Wary of the Taft Commission and believing that use of the American army was the best way to achieve United States objectives in the archipelago, MacArthur favored postponing the transition to civil government until the Filipino nationalists had been completely subjugated.²¹ According to Taft, MacArthur regarded all Filipinos as opponents of the American army and viewed his mission simply as one of "conquering" eight million people.²² Many military personnel shared General MacArthur's feelings toward the commission, as well as his assessment of the army's mission in the islands. The sentiments of many United States soldiers toward the average Filipino are expressed in this line from an enlisted man's song: "He may be a brother of Big Bill Taft, but he ain't no friend of mine".²³

MacArthur also viewed the commission's presence in the islands as a serious personal humiliation and he complained to Taft that the office of the military governor had been "mediatized".²⁴ Taft's attempts to use qualified army officers to fill temporarily vacant civil positions were

²¹Taft to Root, 10-31-00, 8-18-00, Series 8, Reel 463 Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

²²Taft to Root, 8-18-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

²³Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government," 321; Karnow, In Our Image (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 174.

²⁴Taft to Root, 9-18-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

thwarted by MacArthur. The general felt it degrading and improper for military personnel to hold civil positions, a view characterized by Taft as "military etiquette gone mad."²⁵

Taft was puzzled that MacArthur felt humiliated by a partial loss of power because as the commander of 65,000 United States troops engaged in overseas combat, the general occupied one of the most important positions in the American military.²⁶ Taft's understanding of MacArthur became clear when the general informed him that he had always viewed President McKinley's original instructions to the commission as "an unconstitutional interference" with his prerogative as military commander in the Philippines.²⁷ Apparently, MacArthur considered himself a type of American proconsul whose power could not be constitutionally diminished, even by his commander-in-chief.²⁸

Although MacArthur's unbridled hubris and unorthodox constitutional opinions played a role in his difficult relationship with Taft, the civil governor bore a degree of responsibility for their various disputes. Taft admitted that he too "loved the exercise of power," and like General

²⁵Taft to Root, 10-10-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁶Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government," 327.

²⁷Ibid., 326.

²⁸Ibid., 326-27.

MacArthur the civil governor aggressively defended and promoted his personal authority and the interests of his bureaucracy.²⁹

Whereas General MacArthur was often unable to communicate directly with Root and was forced to go through standard War Department channels, Root had invited Taft to write and he fully exploited his unique access to the secretary of war.³⁰ A voluminous correspondent, Taft frequently sent lengthy cables to Root in which he urged the establishment of civil government, complained about MacArthur, and defended the commission's motives, objectives, and actions.³¹

Taft lamented to Secretary Root that General MacArthur was a "weather-cock" who harbored a "jealous disposition" and he accused the general of frequently employing the "shibboleth of military necessity" to justify his opposition of the Taft Commission.³² Governor Taft also speculated that MacArthur's constant immersion in military affairs and "life long training as a soldier" caused the general's

²⁹Taft to Root, 8-18-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁰Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government," 324.

³¹Ibid.; Taft to Root, 1-13-01, 1-9-01, 8-31-01, 12-14-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, 5-24-01, Series 3, Reel 32, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

³²Taft to Root, 12-14-00, 5-24-01, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

extreme sensitivity to perceived encroachments on military authority.³³

Taft's power to raise taxes and appropriate funds proved to be the one advantage which allowed him to keep MacArthur constantly in check during their bureaucratic chess game. Taft controlled \$2.5 million collected by the army in taxes and customs duties. During September, 1900, he began to limit MacArthur's appropriations after subjecting the general to a humiliating investigation of military expenditures.³⁴ Realizing that he had been beaten, MacArthur confessed to Taft that the "strain" of losing some of his authority was too much to bear and Taft crowed to a friend that the general's power had been "cut down to almost nothing."³⁵

Wisconsin Republican Senator John Spooner proposed a bill during the winter of 1900 granting the president full authority to administer the Philippines.³⁶ Secretary Root took advantage of the passage of the Spooner Amendment in March, 1901 and ended the squabbling between Taft and MacArthur. He appointed Taft civil governor of the islands on July 4, 1901 and relieved General MacArthur of his

³³Taft to Root, 8-18-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁴Karnow, In Our Image, 173.

³⁵Minger, "Taft, MacArthur, and the Establishment of Civil Government," 327-29; Karnow, In Our Image, 173.

³⁶Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 159.

command. In addition to Taft's cables on affairs in the Philippines, Root had received reports from his own private observer in the islands who described Taft and MacArthur as "irritable" children who continually had "chips on their revered shoulders".³⁷ Root's observer recommended the replacement of MacArthur with an officer who had not served in the Philippines and he commented that Taft's rivalry with the general had removed the governor's former poise and tact.³⁸

Root selected General Adna R. Chaffee, commander of United States forces in China, as MacArthur's replacement. Before Chaffee arrived in the Philippines, Root sent him a lengthy letter marked "personal and confidential" which outlined the general's new position and duties in the archipelago.³⁹ Root related Taft's and MacArthur's bureaucratic quarrels and informed Chaffee that he had been chosen because of his experience and tact. He also stated that since Chaffee had never wielded power in the Philippines, the general would not feel that his authority was being eroded by the civil government. Root and the president believed that governing had been a distraction for the military and that the establishment of civil government

³⁷Rutherford to Root, 1-9-01, Reel 14, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Root to Chaffee, 2-26-01, Series 3, Reel 32, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

would hasten pacification of the islands. The secretary added that the administration planned eventually to render the military completely subordinate to the civil government, similar to its position in the United States. However, since nationalist forces remained strong, the transition to complete civil control would be postponed indefinitely.⁴⁰

Instead, Chaffee's tenure in the Philippines would constitute an "intermediate stage" in which the general retained the power to declare martial law and was expected to help maintain law and order while aggressively combating the Filipino nationalists. Root warned that such a situation could potentially place a "severe burden" upon the general and Taft and emphasized that maintaining "harmony and perfect cooperation" was of the "highest importance" to the success of American Philippine policy.⁴¹

Taft fared no better at achieving cooperation with Chaffee than he had with MacArthur. Three months after Chaffee arrived in the islands, he and Taft were embroiled in a dispute over the legality of the establishment of military commissions in provinces under civil control. The argument confirmed Chaffee's suspicions that the actions of Taft and the commission were detrimental to the army's efforts. Like MacArthur, General Chaffee quickly came to

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Root to Chaffee, 6-20-01, Series 3, Reel 15, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

view Governor Taft as rival and a continual nuisance.⁴²

Emboldened by his new status as civil governor and MacArthur's removal from power, Taft subtly warned Chaffee that he had been successful in previous disputes with the military and implied that he would not hesitate to submit conflicts to Root for resolution.⁴³ This veiled threat further embittered and hardened Chaffee toward the civil governor, so much so that the general began to charge that Taft's policies were contributing to American army defeats.

On September 27, 1901, fifty-nine members of United States Army Company C were massacred in the town of Balangiga on the island of Samar. The village's inhabitants had posed as helpless townspeople needing the army's protection, but in reality were Filipino nationalists intent on bloodshed. The Filipinos attacked on a Sunday morning, killed most of the Americans as they slept, and mutilated their bodies.⁴⁴

The Balangiga massacre shocked the American public like no other event in the Philippine War and led to widespread charges of army ineptitude.⁴⁵ At a press conference

⁴²Taft to Chaffee, 9-6-01, Chaffee to Adjutant General, 7-11-01, Series 3, Reel 33, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress; U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1289.

⁴³Taft to Chaffee, 9-6-01, Series 3, Reel 33, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

⁴⁴Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 201-203.

⁴⁵Ibid., 204

shortly after the massacre, an indignant Chaffee declared that "it was foolish to pretend that the war was over" and he assured the reporters that the army was "not to blame for Balangiga."⁴⁶ He continued venting his anger and charged that the real fault for the massacre lay with Governor Taft and his commission, whose "silly talk of benevolence and civilian rule" was interpreted as American "weakness."⁴⁷

Such accusations greatly increased the tension between Chaffee and Taft and the pair clashed again a month later over the civil courts' authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to military prisoners. Angry with each other and unable to settle their dispute, they presented the matter to Secretary Root for a ruling. Both were shocked at the reply. Instead of the expected message from Root, they received a harsh reprimand from President Roosevelt which directed them to reach an agreement and stated that the president was "deeply chagrined, to use the mildest possible term," by their conduct.⁴⁸

Despite such an order, Taft and Chaffee's relationship deteriorated further. During the winter of 1902, General Chaffee discussed the extent of their rift with an American official in charge of the Philippine constabulary. Exasperated, Chaffee stated that "we don't agree, and when

⁴⁶Ibid., 205.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1297.

we agree we don't agree."⁴⁹ The bureaucratic bickering between Chaffee and Taft continued until Roosevelt officially ended American military operations in the archipelago on July 4, 1902.

The constant competition for power, status, and resources exhibited by the military and civilian branches of American government in the Philippines is a classic example of bureaucratic rivalry as defined by proponents of the bureaucratic politics methodology. Differences in personalities and the enormous power and latitude McKinley allowed subordinates responsible for policy implementation were important but secondary factors in the clashes between Taft, MacArthur, and Chaffee. Clearly, the most important force behind their bureaucratic conflicts was their belief that aggressive promotion and tenacious defense of their personal and organizational interests were essential to the success of their respective careers and bureaucracies.

Instead of furthering the realization of American objectives, efforts to advance organizational goals hampered the implementation of United States Philippine policy and produced results unintended by McKinley or Roosevelt. Taft and the military had been ordered to cooperate fully with each other and their bureaucratic squabbles diverted time, attention, and resources from their primary duties of

⁴⁹Head of Constabulary to Taft, 1-31-02, Series 3, Reel 34, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

establishing civil government and prosecuting the war. Taft complained to Secretary Root, writing that MacArthur spent "too much time defending his own jurisdiction" instead of devoting his attention to military matters, thus slowing the transition to civil government and perhaps prolonging the necessity for an American military presence in the Philippine islands.⁵⁰ Moreover, Root and Roosevelt were distracted from their duties in Washington and were forced to intervene to settle disputes.

Taft and the military's inability to get along and the continual shifting of power in towns and provinces between military and civil control confused the Filipinos and presented an image of a disunified United States command.⁵¹ Such actions provided a poor example of the merits and effectiveness of American government, possibly producing sympathy for the Filipino nationalists' cause and damaging United States efforts to promote an "appreciation" for American democracy.⁵²

Besides possibly engendering enmity toward American efforts, stories of bureaucratic quarreling made their way to the United States and endangered the Roosevelt

⁵⁰Taft to Root, 1-13-01, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

⁵¹Taft to Root, 7-30-00, 12-14-00, 10-10-00, Series 8, Reel 463, Vol.1, William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress.

⁵²Ibid.

administration's domestic political standing. Governor Taft's complaints of military obstructionism and General Chaffee's counter charges of meddling by the commission were damaging the administration at a time when the effectiveness and conduct of American Philippine policy was being debated by the public and the Senate. Dismayed by his colonial administrators' endless troubles and worried over the political fallout they were causing, an angry President Roosevelt cabled Taft and Chaffee in the fall of 1901, ordering them to avoid any action "which produces friction and which may have serious effect both in the Philippines and here at home."⁵³ Root's and Roosevelt's experiences with bureaucratic rivalry were not limited to disputes between civil and military officials. During the late 1890s, they were both increasingly involved in interservice competition between the American army and navy.

Army v. Navy

America's overseas expansion during the late nineteenth century forced its army and navy to reevaluate their respective positions, goals, and needs vis-a-vis each other and the nation's political and defense structures. The military's mission to extend and maintain United States hegemony in the Caribbean and Pacific required that the American army and navy secure adequate Congressional appropriations, large

⁵³U.S. Army, Correspondence, 1297.

numbers of personnel, and new methods of procurement in order to ensure the success of the first large scale American expeditionary forces. The deployment and provisioning of thousands of troops across vast distances was the catalyst for the development of a new, more intimate inter-service relationship between the army and navy. Such a relationship mandated close coordination and cooperation, but also bred numerous bureaucratic rivalries.

During the years 1897 to 1909, the American navy matured into a powerful global military force as expansionists and naval enthusiasts, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, promoted it as a vital means of fulfilling the objectives of the nation's enlarged diplomacy.⁵⁴ Roosevelt was an effective and consistently vociferous champion of a modern navy who argued that the army had taken precedence over the navy for years. Roosevelt complained to John Hay in 1898 that the army had "galloped ahead" of the navy while the navy "at best" stood still because "anybody in the country who had any influence treated it as a service that did not matter."⁵⁵

Navy advocates and their allies in Congress worked closely with the Navy Department to formulate and implement plans which eventually transformed an ill-equipped Atlantic

⁵⁴William Braisted, The U.S. Navy in the Pacific (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), 4.

⁵⁵Roosevelt to Hay, 9-1-98, Reel-416, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

based navy into a large, modern, battleship centered force with capable Atlantic and Pacific fleets.⁵⁶ Battleships were expensive and the navy's initial problem was acquiring sufficient appropriations to fund additional construction. Fortunately for the navy, Dewey's defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay made the admiral a national hero and helped ensure public and Congressional support for the funding of its building programs.⁵⁷

The army was not as well funded during the 1890s as Roosevelt assumed. By 1898, it had achieved only moderate success at securing appropriations to modernize its equipment, training programs, and educational facilities.⁵⁸ Ill-prepared at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, most of the American army's 26,000 enlisted men had only limited combat experience and it was forced to grapple with the seemingly overwhelming problems of training and supplying thousands of volunteers for service in tropical climates.⁵⁹

Aware that their respective reputations and capacities for successfully implementing reform programs could be affected by their performance during the Spanish-American

⁵⁶Braisted, The U.S. Navy, 4-7.

⁵⁷Ibid.; Graham Cosmas, An Army for Empire (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 36; Stanley Karnow, In Our Image (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 106.

⁵⁸Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 53.

⁵⁹Karnow, In Our Image, 107.

War, the army and navy were sensitive to any perceived loss of power or status. The army became embroiled in a damaging scandal involving charges that War Department corruption and logistical mismanagement had led to starvation, food poisoning, and the spread of disease among United States troops in Cuba. American newspaper speculation and exaggeration fueled the scandal and an incensed United States public demanded a scapegoat. President McKinley quickly yielded to the requirements of domestic politics and replaced Secretary of War Russell Alger with Elihu Root.⁶⁰ Many army personnel were embarrassed by their organization's scandal tainted tenure in Cuba and were well aware of the navy's almost flawless conduct of operations during the war, as well as naval strategists' well publicized opinions that the army should play only a very limited role in overseas offensives.⁶¹

During and immediately after the Spanish-American War, navy officers and navy supporters began to complain to Secretary of the Navy John D. Long that the army was trying to diminish navy achievements. They also lamented that the navy was being blamed for army mishaps. Alfred Mahan and Admiral W.T. Sampson charged that Generals Nelson Miles and William Shafter had publicly attempted to downplay the navy's role in supporting army operations at Santiago,

⁶⁰Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 287-294.

⁶¹Ibid., 38.

Cuba.⁶² According to Captain W.C. Wise, army machinations went far beyond diminishing navy accomplishments. He complained to Secretary Long that army officers were engaged in an organized effort to "unload" the blame for the "gross neglect, incompetency, and selfishness" of the Alger scandal upon the navy.⁶³ Long was also advised by Captain C.F. Goodrich, who wrote that the army was a "spoiled child" that considered the navy its "handmaid."⁶⁴ Goodrich stated that communication with army officers was often difficult and added that employing the answer "no" provided army personnel with the much needed experience of having their requests denied.⁶⁵

Although they constantly complained of army scheming, the navy and its supporters were not above discrediting the army's accomplishments. Improved navy advocate Alfred Mahan suggested that Secretary Long work to ensure that General Miles and Admiral Dewey were not promoted concurrently for their Spanish-American War successes because such a promotion would imply that army and navy achievements had been equal.⁶⁶

⁶²Gardner Webb Allen, The Papers of John Davis Long 1897-1904 (Norwood: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939), 276-277.

⁶³Ibid., 233.

⁶⁴Ibid., 154-155.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., 210.

The Philippine-American War only served to exacerbate the bureaucratic squabbles between the two sister branches of the military. Admiral Dewey cabled Secretary Long in May, 1899 complaining that General Otis was "fitting out navy gunboats in spite of my protests."⁶⁷ Otis soon became a persistent nuisance to the navy. Its officers were very disturbed by the general's habit of routinely censoring reporters' stories of United States army combat defeats while publicly minimizing the importance of naval operations in the Philippines.⁶⁸

Interservice difficulties also extended to the highest administrative levels in Washington, D.C. Secretaries Long and Root became engaged in a bitter feud in which Root accused the navy of maintaining an air of superiority and using army bases without permission.⁶⁹ In addition to leveling accusations, Root also employed subterfuge. In an effort most likely designed to shift embarrassing charges of atrocities onto the navy, he succeeded in having a marine corps major prosecuted for the unauthorized execution of prisoners.⁷⁰ Perhaps jealous of Secretary Root's national

⁶⁷Dewey to Long, 5-13-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

⁶⁸Dewey to Long, 5-13-99, Collins to Deihl, Associated Press Report, 6-30-99, Reel 7, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress; Karnow, In Our Image, 171.

⁶⁹Long to Roosevelt, 1-11-02, Reel 24, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

⁷⁰Miller, Benevolent Assimilation , 218.

reputation as an efficient administrator and his powerful influence within the McKinley administration, Secretary Long unsuccessfully attempted to convince President McKinley to replace the secretary of war when Root missed work because of illness.⁷¹

In addition to fostering a spirit of competition and surreptitious attempts to sabotage reputations, the rivalry between the army and navy also hampered the army's efforts to extend American hegemony in the Philippines. As the American military commanders in the islands, General Otis and Admiral Dewey were under orders to expand American authority over territory that could be acquired peacefully.⁷² In December, 1898, Otis decided to occupy the strategically located town of Iloilo, which had recently been abandoned by the Spanish military. Dewey disapproved of the operation and General Otis sent Lieutenant Fredrick Sladen to negotiate with the admiral for the use of navy ships to transport and supply army troops. Lieutenant Sladen pleaded with Dewey, predicting that either German or Filipino nationalist troops would soon occupy the town if American soldiers were not transported there quickly. Admiral Dewey demurred, stating that he would not move

⁷¹Long to McKinley, 9-23-00, Reel 12, William McKinley Papers, Library of Congress.

⁷²U.S. Army, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, 858-859, 873; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 46-48, 66.

without specific orders from superiors in Washington.⁷³

Admiral Dewey's intransigence was largely due to the United States navy's strategic conception of the Philippines. Whereas the army believed that it was necessary to pacify all of the islands as soon as possible, the navy was convinced that the occupation of Manila for use as a naval base would satisfy American tactical and strategic requirements in the Philippine archipelago.⁷⁴

Having failed to convince Dewey to participate in the operation, Otis was forced to cable Washington for permission to take Iloilo, and received an affirmative reply ten days later. After securing the cooperation of a reluctant Dewey, the army troops arrived in the waters off Iloilo only to learn that the town had already been occupied by Filipino nationalist forces who refused the Americans permission to land. American army troops remained floating off Iloilo until hostilities with the Filipino nationalists erupted on February 4, 1899. A contingent of navy marines then rushed ashore and captured the town, robbing the army troops of their glory and outraging General Otis.

Governor William Howard Taft's and the American military's infighting hindered policy implementation, but bureaucratic rivalry also abounded within the United States

⁷³Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 50-53.

⁷⁴Braisted, The U.S. Navy, 52; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 50; Allen, Papers of John Davis Long, 188-190.

armed forces. Quarreling between the army and the navy distracted officers and administrators, increased interservice tensions, and needlessly delayed the fulfillment of American policy objectives.⁷⁵

⁷⁵Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 50-53.

CHAPTER IX

THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL: AN APPRAISAL

An examination of the views and decisions of the officials formulating United States policy toward the Philippine nationalists reveals that bureaucratic position is probably not a reliable indicator of policy preference. Secretary of State Hay's, Army Chief of Staff Miles's, and Admiral Dewey's policy preferences do not reflect, and are not predictable from, their bureaucratic positions. Miles and Dewey were career military officers whose lengthy tenure in the same bureaucracy does not seem to have influenced their recommendations. Although portions of McKinley's, Roosevelt's, Root's, Long's, Taft's, and the army commanders' decisions are predictable from their bureaucratic position, their preferences are also predictable from other factors such as their racial attitudes. Moreover, Roosevelt's policy views probably would have been the same in any position that he occupied.

Bureaucratic factors clearly were not dominant in shaping American policy planners' recommendations. Strategic/economic concerns, racial attitudes, and personality were at least as influential as bureaucratic position in determining policy preferences. Bureaucratic factors were the most ascendant in Root's and the army commanders' decision-making, but even their recommendations

were partially shaped by other important determinants.

Geographic proximity does not seem to have affected policy recommendations. Policy advice flowing from the Philippines was a mixture of calls for military action and pleas for negotiation and McKinley and Roosevelt received both belligerent and conciliatory advice from bureaucrats located in Washington.

Although the Philippine-American War occurred during a period when the possibility of nuclear conflict was not present in policy planners' considerations, the bureaucratic politics model is of minimal usefulness in explaining and predicting their policy preferences. The shortcomings of applying the bureaucratic politics approach to the Philippine-American War illustrate the danger inherent in fitting evidence into a preconceived model which rests on the assumption that such evidence can be objectively evaluated and that the evaluation will always yield the same results.

The model also contains several other flaws which limit its usefulness as a means of predicting an individual's policy preference. The bureaucratic politics perspective assumes that organizations will always act in their own interests but it does not allow for changes in departmental goals over time. The model also does not address the possibility that a bureaucracy's interests might conflict with the assumptions and descriptive attributes used to

predict that organization's policy preferences. For example, the model assumes that the military will always recommend the use of force and that the State Department will urge negotiation.

This was not the case in the United States's decision to enter the Korean War. The military advised conciliation because it decided that it was not in its best interests to urge intervention in an Asian peninsula with extremely cold winters and rugged terrain. Conversely, the State Department wished to maintain the credibility of its carefully formulated policy of containment and urged military intervention to defend South Korea. Perhaps the model would be more effective if based upon the assumption that bureaucrats' policy recommendations are role-governed only to the extent that they promote organizational interests.

The bureaucratic politics model also implies that a policy planner's strong personal views will remain subordinate to the role-governed tendencies attributed to the position that he or she occupies. This is not always true, as illustrated by John Hay's belligerent recommendations while secretary of state.

The availability of evidence is also a difficulty that historians seeking to employ the bureaucratic politics approach might encounter. The model requires a significant number of sources relating to an individual's policy preferences and a paucity of declassified documents may

force students of recent history to rely on self-serving anecdotal memoirs and oral remembrances.

The bureaucratic politics model seems to be the most useful when applied to the study of policy implementation. Although an examination of United States policy regarding the Philippine nationalists suggests that there is not a strong relationship between bureaucratic position and policy preference, bureaucratic factors do appear to affect policy implementation to some degree. The actions of William Howard Taft and American military personnel were heavily influenced by their ties to their respective organizations. The army's reliance on standard organizational procedures, Governor Taft's conflicts with the army, and army-navy rivalry disrupted the implementation of American Philippine policy. While policy might be developed in a unified, rational fashion, the actions of Taft and the American military suggest that the chances of its implementation in such a manner are slim.

The model is very useful in highlighting bureaucratic conflicts and the influence of domestic politics upon presidents and presidential supporters. However, it downplays the power of the president to control organizations by selecting policy advisors and establishing the parameters of the decision-making process.¹

¹J. Garry Clifford, "Bureaucratic Politics," The Journal of American History 77 (June 1990): 163.

Sifting through the nebulous factors affecting foreign policy formulation is a complex process that is best undertaken by employing a variety of methodologies, and it is dangerous to rely upon the bureaucratic politics model as the sole means of analysis. Although the bureaucratic politics model's validity and utility as a means of predicting and accounting for policy preference are severely limited, it appears to be a useful and innovative paradigm for examining policy implementation.

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