

COMPARING NEWS FRAMES ABOUT THE SYRIAN CRISIS BETWEEN
THE KOMMERSANT AND THE FINANCIAL TIMES

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Dedicated to those who are curious and inquisitive, and to those who strive to broaden their
perspectives on the world in which we live.

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ABSTRACT

This is an exploratory comparative study aimed to examine media frames about ongoing civil war in Syria. The civil uprising started on March 15, 2011, and turned into a civil war after May 8, 2011. The conflict has lasted for more than four years, and more than 220,000 people have died since it began. During the conflict, both the Syrian government and military opposition were accused of extreme cruelty and of using chemical weapons. However, there was no official proof of using chemical weapons until the August 21, 2013, when Syrian government forces used chemical weapons during their attack on opposition forces.

After this attack, Russia and the United States of America reached an agreement on Syria. According to the agreement, the Syrian government was obligated to remove the whole chemical arsenal. If the condition was not met, the U.S. would intervene in the Syrian conflict.

The Syrian conflict is an international issue, and different media sources, journalists, political and international actors may have various interpretations of the conflict. There are several reasons that may cause differences in media coverage in events such as the Syrian crisis, with the cultural, professional, political, and ideological landscapes that the media operates within being among a few. This study is focused on the possible politico-ideological differences in the news coverage that can be found in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times* in regard to the event of the chemical attack that took place in Syria on August 21, 2013.

The study is based on the methodology for the framing analysis proposed by Robert Entman, however it offers some amendments to Entman's original framework. This study adds elements to Entman's methodology such as context, type of attitudes and judgments (personal vs. general), sources of personal attitudes and judgments, the type of news sources used, the amount of sources used for each story, and the length of the articles published by each newspaper.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE SUBJECT

Thesis statement

This thesis studies politico-ideological differences between the frames employed by two privately owned newspapers (*the Financial Times* and *the Kommersant*) in regard to the chemical attack that occurred on August 21, 2013 during the Syrian crisis.

Purpose of the study

This thesis seeks to participate in the discussion on framing and framing studies and on comparative framing studies in particular. This is an exploratory study that will lead to further reorganization of the proposed methodology to elaborate a more systematic approach. It employs Entman's methodology as a base when analyzing media, which first identifies the issue, event, and actors and then identifies the frame functions including problem, cause, remedy or solution, and judgment or attitude. The study also adds to the methodology proposed by Entman by employing the category of "context/rhetoric" to show the contextual environment or discourse in which the categories proposed by Entman may be found. Additionally, the study looks at the type of attitudes and judgment (personal vs. general) and the source of personal attitudes and judgment found in the news articles, as well as focusing on the type of news sources used, the amount of sources used for each story, and the length of the articles published both in *the Financial Times* and *the Kommersant*.

This thesis is meant to show whether there are any differences in the coverage of the same event by two newspapers located outside of the region where the event examined here took place, thus this study analyzes and compares media frames employed by two newspapers when reporting

on a distant international issue. The analysis in this study is based on the investigation of the similarities and differences used in the articles published by both newspapers.

This study does not seek to explain the reasons of frame-building and the reasons of employment of particular frames in any of the newspapers analyzed. However, using inductive approach, the thesis offers possible perspectives that may be taken into account when attempting to explain the way content was presented based on previous scholarly studies, and the political, professional, and cultural contexts in which newspapers operate, in addition to the data received during the analysis process.

Additional rationale

This thesis is meant to test the proposed framing analysis methodology in a comparative study on an international issue. If proved to properly function, the methodological approach employed in this study may be used for future comparative studies involving international conflicts and controversies. The methodology used in this study is used to investigate politico-ideological differences in the frames used by *the Financial Times* and *the Kommersant* in relation to the chemical attack in Syria occurred on 21st of August 2013. The study's focus on the Middle Eastern issue is explained by the cultural and political diversity of the region and by its high conflict rate. Additionally, a chemical attack is not an ordinary event and thus needs greater scrutiny and attention.

Theoretical background

A vast array of literature on framing is centered on frame-building (e.g. Neuman et al., 1992; Price et al., 1997; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Luther and Zhou, 2005; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011) and on framing effects (e.g. Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Simon, 1991; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Valkenburg et al., 1999; Zillmann et al., 2004). However, the reasons of frame-building may be different. Some aspects may be omitted or highlighted due to the cultural

background of a journalist or editor (e.g. Carey, 1989 about cultural aspects in communication). Another reason for differences in framing may be a result of the professional training of journalists in a given country and various professional practices accepted in that country (e.g. van Cuilenburg & van der Wurff, 2000). Also, ideological context may result in frame differences (about the role of an ideology see Lull, 2000 for an example). Thus, different frames may be built both advertently and inadvertently depending not only on the purpose of creating the story, but also on the context that may have influenced the way the story is told and created.

Multiple works focused on ideological context that may result in different framing of international issues exist today. Some of these works are centered on how ideological attitudes influence the eventual frames in the news stories (e.g. Dimitrova & Lee 2009; Becker, 2011; Goltz, 2012). Others show how ideological differences in frames used about a particular international event may evolve depending on changing context of an issue (e.g. Boaz, 2005; Parry, 2011). There are also studies that focus on the subjective attitudes of a journalist or reporter regarding an issue due to the ideological position of their information sources which results in eventual framing in media (Kioussis & Wu, 2008; Stromback, et al. 2008; Wessler & Adolphsen, 2008; Kumar, 2010).

Thus, ideological differences in the frames that appear in news stories are of intense interest to contemporary scholars in the field of media studies. One way to track possible ideological differences and to show how frames may evolve within an issue is to conduct a comparative study on framing using news created and published by media of different countries that may have distinct ideological contexts and attitudes.

The context and background of the case

The civil uprising in Syria started on March 15, 2011 with anti-government protests during the wave of the Arab Spring movement. In May 2011, the protests transformed into a full-scale

civil war. Since the conflict's start, more than 11 million people have been forced to leave their homes and more than 220,000 individuals have died. As of May 2015, the conflict is ongoing.

A United Nations commission of inquiry has reported multiple violations and war crimes committed by both opposition and official government forces during the conflict – including murder, torture, rape, and enforced disappearances.¹

On August 21, 2013 the chemical attack near the city of Ghouta occurred. UN military experts have since confirmed that the nerve agent sarin was used in the attack, which resulted in more than 1,300 people killed.²

Based on evidence gathered after the attack, the Human Rights Watch suggested that Syrian governmental forces were most likely responsible for the chemical attack.³ The coalition, which consisted of the U.S., United Kingdom, and France, leaned toward military response to the Syrian regime, while Russia and China were against the use of military measures.

On August 28, the UK Parliament voted against the military action toward Syria, forcing the UK Prime Minister David Cameron to withdraw from the coalition.⁴ As a result, France and the U.S. did not officially decide on military response, and on September 14, 2013 the United States and Russian Federation reached the agreement on destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal thus excluding direct military action against the Syrian government.⁵

¹ According to BBC conflict summary as of 05.2015: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868>

² According to BBC as of 05.2015: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399>

³ Human Rights Watch official website: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/dispatches-mapping-sarin-flight-path>

⁴ According to Reuters: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/30/us-syria-crisis-britain-idUSBRE97R1BD20130830>

⁵ According to the U.S. Department of State: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm>

Background on contemporary Russian and British political systems

Russian political background

Political background, as additional information, may be helpful for understanding the way each newspaper presents the news content in the articles.

In Russia, the executive power is divided between the President and Prime Minister, but the President is a dominant figure.⁶ The legislative branch in Russia is represented by the Federal Assembly of Russia which has two chambers – The State Duma (the lower house) and The Council of Federation (the upper house).⁷ The judicial power is administered by the Ministry of Justice.⁸

The president is the head of the state and is elected every 6 years, the government is split between the several ministries accountable to the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President and confirmed by State Duma. The Parliament is a bicameral assembly.⁹ The Council of Federation consists of the representatives of Russia's federal entities, while the State Duma consists of 450 deputies elected every five years through the proportional representation using party lists.¹⁰ Any bills, including the bills proposed by the Council of Federation, must be first considered by State Duma.¹¹

Currently, the State Duma consists of four parties with the party of power, United Russia, formally chaired by Dmitri Medvedev (previously was chaired by Vladimir Putin, before his presidential election), controlling the total majority of seats (315 of 450).¹² The other parties – Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR),

⁶ According to Russia Today as of 05.2015: <http://russiapedia.rt.com/basic-facts-about-russia/political-system/>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² See BBC website for a detailed description in English: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15939801>

and Just Russia¹³ – have 58, 40, and 32 seats accordingly.¹⁴ Thus, the State Duma in its present state may be seen as fully supportive of President Putin’s actions whose party is centrist and conservative with a doctrine that includes political and socioeconomic stability and revival of Russia as a world superpower.¹⁵

UK political background

The UK is a constitutional monarchy with the monarch being the head of state, but not the governor of the country.¹⁶ The Prime Minister is a leader of government in which she or he rules with the assistance of the Cabinet of Ministers.¹⁷ As a government head, the Prime Minister is responsible for all policy decisions, she/he also has the authority to oversee the Civil Service and government agencies, to appoint members of government, and is a principal figure in the House of Commons.¹⁸

The Parliament is separate from government and consists of the House of Commons and House of Lords.¹⁹ The Parliament is created for watching over the government and its actions, to serve as a ground for debates and passing new laws, and set state taxes.²⁰ The Members of the House of Commons (MPs) are elected publicly and the party that has the largest number of members elected forms the government.²¹ The members of the House of Lords are usually appointed by the Queen based on the advice of the Prime Minister and complement the work of

¹³ “Just” is derived from “Justice”

¹⁴ See BBC website for a detailed description in English: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-15939801>

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ See the official website of the British monarchy:

<http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/HowtheMonarchyworks/Whatisconstitutionalmonarchy.aspx>

¹⁷ See official UK government website for more details: <https://www.gov.uk/government/how-government-works>

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ See official UK Parliament website: <http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/system/>

the House of Commons in scrutinizing the work of government and in making and amending laws.²²

Currently, the majority in the House of Commons is divided between the Conservatives (330 seats out of 650), Labor Party (232 out of 650), and Scottish National Party (56 out of 650). This means that following the 2015 elections, the Conservative Party has the majority of the seats in parliament.²³ Compared to the previous Parliament composition from 2010 to 2015, the Conservatives have received more seats and influence in the current Parliament.

According to the official website of the UK Parliament, in 2010-2015 Conservatives had 306 seats out of 650, the Labor Party had 258 seats out of 650, and Liberal Democrats had 57 seats out of 650.²⁴ Thus, the Labor Party and Liberal Democrats had an opportunity to oppose Conservatives in the voting process at the House of Commons. This is important, because as mentioned previously, UK Parliament voted against the proposition by Prime Minister David Cameron in 2013 to use military measures against the Syrian government after the chemical attack. David Cameron has been the leader of the Conservative Party since 2005.²⁵

Short note on the freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights in the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom

The extent of the freedom of press, as well as of political and civil liberties in a given country or region may have an impact on the way international and national events are covered by media. In case of insufficient freedoms, press may experience significant influence from the government

²² See official UK Parliament website: <http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/system/>

²³ Ibid, <http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/mps/current-state-of-the-parties/>

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ According to the official website of the UK Conservative Party: <https://www.conservatives.com/OurTeam>

and dominant state ideology, as well as experience an extent of control and censorship employed by the state.

The 2015 Freedom House report argues that Russia has a rating of 6.0 regarding the freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights. According to the Freedom House, this is considered “not free.”²⁶ Compared to the 2013 report, the ratings for the freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights were higher, but still showed that the country was “not free” according to the Freedom House: the ratings were 5.5, 5, and 6 points accordingly.²⁷

On the contrary, UK had a rating of 1.0 for the freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights both in 2013 and 2015.^{28, 29} If taken into account, this may mean that the press in the UK may experience much less influence from the state and from the dominant state ideology. In essence, this could mean that UK press experiences a lesser extent of control and censorship by state than media in Russia.

Even in the event that the Freedom House ratings and reports are not completely accurate in the evaluation, this information should still be taken into consideration when interpreting and analyzing the data collected during the study.

²⁶ 2015 Freedom House report: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/russia#.VVpH2PIViko>

²⁷ 2013 Freedom House report: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/russia#.VVpINflViko>

²⁸ 2013 Freedom House report: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/united-kingdom#.VVpLWvlViko>

²⁹ 2015 Freedom House report: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/united-kingdom#.VVpLFvlViko>

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY BACKGROUND

Background on framing

When studying framing in media, researchers mostly understand it as a “salience” of certain ideas or aspects of the topic (Entman, 2007; De Vreese, 2012). In addition, according to Chong & Druckman (2007), the major premise of framing theory is that a certain issue may be perceived from various perspectives and may also be “constructed as having implications for multiple values or considerations” (p. 104). Thus, individuals may develop a certain conceptualization of an issue or may change their ideas of an issue due to the framing process (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). This may be true both for those who build and set the frames and for those who interpret the frames that have been already offered. It is assumed by most framing studies that communicators are elite actors, such as media, political actors, and experts, and that the audience consists of the general public. However, it is unlikely that there is exclusively one-way influence from the frames used and offered (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 117).

It is important to point out two frame types: “generic frames” and “issue-specific frames” (De Vreese, 2012, p. 368). According to De Vreese (2012), issue-specific frames are related to specific news events or topics, while generic frames may be found in broad topics, which may persist over time and relate to multiple countries and cultures.

The sociological theoretical background of framing derives from Goffman (1974). The concept of framing was first introduced into media studies in U.S. by Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980). Later, the concept of framing was discussed by Gamson & Modigliani (1987) and Entman (1991).

Scheufele (2009) mentions macroscopic (sociological) and microscopic (psychological) approach to framing. A macroscopic approach that is focused on studying “media frames as

outcomes of journalistic norms or organizational constraints” is most commonly linked to the attribution theory and frame analysis (p. 300). A microscopic approach to framing is focused on studying the “individual means of processing and structuring incoming information” and is most commonly found in the works on frames of reference and prospect theory (Scheufele, 2009, p. 301).

There are two concepts of framing that should be specified: media frames and audience frames (Scheufele, 2009, p. 306). According to Gamson & Modigliani (1987), media frames refer to “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events... The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143). Scheufele (2009) also mentions that “media or news frames serve as working routines for journalists, allowing them to quickly identify and classify information and to package it for efficient relay to their audiences” (p. 306). According to this concept of media framing the process of framing may be both intentional and unintentional (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106). Audience frames are defined by Entman (1993) as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (p. 53).

According to Scheufele (1999) there are two distinct frames of reference that may be used for information interpretation and processing: “global and long-term political views and short-term, issue related frames of reference” (p. 107). Continuing this thought, Scheufele (1999) argues that global political views have rather limited influence on the perception and interpretation of the political problems due to the fact that they are a result of certain personal characteristics of an individual (p. 107). On the contrary, short-term, issue-related frames of reference may have significant effects on how the incoming information is perceived, organized, and interpreted by

individuals, as well as on how the inferences from this information are derived (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107).

In his article, Scheufele (1999) argues that frames may be seen as independent and dependent variables (p. 107). In cases when frames are studied as dependent variables, various factors that may impact the modification or creation of frames are analyzed (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). Framing of an issue by journalists may be influenced by various social-structural or organizational variables, as well as by ideological and individual variables at the media level; while frames as dependent variables at the audience level may be analyzed as a result of how mass media frame an issue (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107).

In cases where frames are studied as independent variables, the focus usually is directed toward the effects of framing (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). When considering media frames in this case, scholars usually look on the relation of media frames to audience frames (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). When studying individual frames as independent variables the analysis focuses on whether the individual framing of issues has an impact on how the issues or actors are evaluated and whether the way individuals frame the issues themselves has an impact on the willingness of the individuals to engage in action or participation (Scheufele, 1999, pp. 107-108).

Similar to the agenda-building, agenda-setting, and priming research, framing studies are usually focused on one of the following processes: “frame-setting, frame-building, and individual-level outcomes of framing” (Scheufele, 2009, p. 306). Frame-building is of a particular interest here considering the media frame focus of this study and possible ideological differences between the newspapers analyzed. Scheufele (2009) describes five different factors that may influence how a particular issue is framed by journalists: “social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political

orientations of journalists” (p. 307). To be more precise, journalists may construct frames based on their attitudes, ideology, and organizational norms which may eventually be reflected in the way news coverage is framed by journalists (Scheufele, 1999, p. 115). The political orientation of the medium itself may also have an impact on how the news information is framed, and various external sources (e.g. political actors, authorities, interest groups and other elites) may impact the way the information is framed in media (Scheufele, 1999, p. 115). Scheufele (1999) also argues that such influence on the frame-building process is mostly true for the new and recent issues for which no particular frames have yet been established (p. 116). It is not yet clear whether journalists simply reflect the frames offered by elites or various sources or whether journalists interpret the issues themselves based on the information received from the news sources used (Scheufele, 1999, p. 117).

According to Entman (1993), framing involves selection and salience. The researcher argues that to frame means to select some aspects of the reality we perceive and to make them more salient in a specific context promoting particular interpretations of an issue or problem (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Thus, any issue may be constructed based on various values and may be viewed from multiple perspectives (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 104). Some scholars argue that when presented in a message, different frames might lead individuals to understanding and interpreting the issue differently, because the frames highlight some aspects of reality while omitting others (Borah, 2011, p. 248). Following this logic, frames may encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way (Entman, 2007, p. 164). For instance, Dimitrova and Lee (2009) say that “framing of international events is especially important since the audience has no direct experience with those events and, therefore, has to rely on media accounts to learn what happens in remote places” (p. 538). According to Becker (2011) media usually report on distant foreign countries

when “outstanding events are involved” and “when their foreign image undergoes historical change” (Becker, 2011, p. 496). Thus, the way international issues are framed may impact public opinion and audience cognitions (Dimitrova & Lee, 2009, p. 538). However, subtle nuances in words and syntax may also have unintentional effects or effects that may be difficult to predict and control by journalists (Scheufele, 2009, p. 309).

Druckman (2001) argues that in most cases scholars tend to find framing effects when they are looking for them in their studies (p. 1061). However, there is “clear and systematic limit to framing” which depends on the information source credibility, and according to Druckman (2001), who described framing process in the context of audiences seeking guidance from credible elites, credibility is a prerequisite element of successful framing (p. 1061). Thus, the information received from a particular source may also influence how journalists and media present it in news offered to general public.

According to Matthes (2009), there are several problems with the current work on framing that should be considered before conducting a framing study. A few include a lack of operational precision, descriptive focus of most studies, neglect of visual items, and insufficient reliability reporting (p. 349). Matthes (2009) has undertaken a content analysis of 131 framing studies published in major scholarly journals to show how frames are operationalized in the framing literature and what frame really is. In his work, Matthes (2009) addresses four aspects of conceptualizing and coding frames: “(1) definitions and how they are used for operationalization, (2) the type of frames, (3) use of theory, and (4) the methods of frame analysis” (p. 350).

It is important to note, that for several units of analysis the scholars have used single or multiple frames (Matthes, 2009, p. 350). Thus, one or several frames may be coded per single article for the analysis purposes. For example, a single article may be used as separate discourse

unit, but may have one or more frames that are coded depending on the particular methodology used in a study. Also, as was mentioned above, frames have been conceptualized at different abstraction levels: issue-specific or generic frames (Matthes, 2009, p. 350).

There are several points in the framing research that Matthes (2009) suggested researchers critically reflect.

His first point was that framing definitions were not concrete as operational steps and were not transparent in most of the literature. He stated that some of definitions offered were too general and provided little information on how the frames should be operationalized (Matthes, 2009, p. 359). Also, some of the definitions were operationalized more precisely, but were not always completely followed, which was mostly true for Entman's definition where he suggests pointing out such frame elements as problem definition, cause, moral judgment, and/or remedy (Matthes, 2009, p. 359).

Second, there is a conceptual divide between the generic and issue-specific frames, thus it is necessary to specify how generic the frame should be to be classified as a generic frame: "Some generic frames describe structural features of news items, such as conflict or personalization. Others are related to features of topics and issues, such as the economic or the morality frame" (Matthes, 2009, p. 360).

Matthes' third point was that most framing studies are descriptive and do not test any hypothesis in regard to the framing theory, which is mostly true for the studies analyzing issue-specific frames (Matthes, 2009, p. 360). In addition, there is a lack of reliability reporting in multiple framing studies which may affect the validity of the results (Matthes, 2009, p. 360).

Recent comparative framing studies on the Middle East

The tendency toward descriptiveness in comparisons of issue-specific frames was also found in the recent comparative framing studies focused on the Middle East (e.g., Kara & Atabey, 2013; Greenwood & Jenkins, 2013; Ha, 2015; Zeng & Tahat, 2012; Sheaffer & Dvir-Girsman, 2010). The information presented in the articles tended to be qualitative describing certain trends found in the sources of information analyzed. However, some works employed a mixed qualitative-quantitative approach to data analysis (e.g., Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007; Evans, 2010).

The works also focused on how the information was presented and whether it contained any comments from the local journalists. Mostly, the studies analyzed the differences between either the U.S. and Middle Eastern media (e.g., Melki, 2014), the media from the same country (U.S., Cyprus, Korea, and others) (e.g., Kara & Atabey, 2013; Ha, 2015; Zeng & Tahat, 2012; Evans, 2010), or the differences between various types of media (newspapers vs magazines) on the international conflict in the Middle East (e.g., Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2007). No comparisons between Russian and the UK newspapers were found in recent articles about Middle Eastern conflicts.

The studies employed different methodological approaches to analyze the frames and mostly used methods that may not be employed for analyzing other events. Thus, they are single event focused. On the contrary, the present study aims to test the methodology that may be used to analyze other international conflicts as well, making it multi-event focused in the methodology it offers.

Below is a brief overview of some recent studies related to the conflicts in the Middle East to show what has been researched by scholars previously.

Nurten Kara & Melek Atabey (2013) analyzed how North Cypriot press reported on the Iraq and Lebanon wars. The authors analyzed two local newspapers *Kibris* and *Afrika* and showed that although most of the information was sourced from the news agencies (the author did not specify what news agencies were used), journalists used local context and local focus to frame the issues in the local media (Kara & Atabey, 2013). The author emphasized the dependence of news coverage about the international conflicts and issues on the local context (Kara & Atabey, 2013, p. 174).

Keith Greenwood & Joy Jenkins (2013) studied visual framing of international news in news and public affairs magazines and argue that international news is frequently visually framed in terms of violence and disaster. The researchers also argue that visual framing on war and peace may reflect differing political orientations among various publications based on editorial/political positions of each medium (Greenwood & Jenkins, 2013). This trend was also mentioned in the article by Jae Sik Ha (2015), who compared the frames on the Arab Spring uprising in the major South Korean newspapers.

Ha (2015) qualitatively analyzed the difference between the frames offered by liberal and conservative newspapers on the issue in Korea and suggested that ideological differences of news outlets had a significant influence on the opinion discourses. The author argues that ideological orientation of media outlets that show distinct ideological positions and perspectives on the same issue may also impede the objective presentation of issues on the international events such as Arab Spring, even within the same country (Ha, 2015). The author argues that factors such as dominant ideologies, national or economic interests, national history and context, and international relations that may have an impact on the media representation of a social movement are still not well-studied (Ha, 2015, p. 1). Probably, this is also true for the representation of a distant social movement as

well as for the representation of other distant international issues, such as international and military conflicts, civil wars, terrorist attacks, or even political processes that occur in other countries and are reported in media of foreign countries.

According to Ha (2015) newspaper companies in South Korea are mostly private and are outside the direct governmental influence. However, Ha argues that starting in the 1980s newspapers in Korea began framing events based on different ideologies. Ha says this could be the result of media owners and journalists having had considered themselves enablers of political power rather than watchdogs of government and corporations (Ha, 2015, p. 4). The author reflected a trend of Korean media narratives reflecting the content based on Korean national interests, dominant ideology, and the orientation of news organizations, thus “domesticating the world” (pp. 14-15).

Zeng & Tahat (2012) analyzed the coverage of terrorism on Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya websites. The study found that terrorism was mostly framed as a “Muslim” phenomenon even by the two major Arabic websites, although terrorists are not necessarily are Muslims (Zeng & Tahat, 2012, p. 444). The authors also found that Al Arabiya mostly relied on government officials as news sources when covering the events (thus being closer to the Western standards of media coverage according to authors) while Al Jazeera used other sources as well and tended to cover more regions of the world in relation to the terrorism issues, not only the Middle East and North America (Zeng & Tahat). The authors also argue that insufficient media coverage on terrorism was presented from the humanitarian perspective, and that the media employed mostly military and official frames to cover the issues related to terrorism (Zeng & Tahat, 2012, p. 445).

Dimitrova & Konnolly-Ahern (2007) have examined the coverage of the Iraq war in the U.S., UK, Qatar, and Egyptian media and have shown that the “tale of war” was constructed differently

by the distinct international media (p. 153). The researchers argue that Arab media employed mostly military conflict and violence of war frames, while the Coalition media mostly used the rebuilding of Iraq frame (Dimitrova & Konnolly, 2007, p. 153). The authors argue that media institutions operate based on the sociopolitical environment in which they are rooted, as well as the differences in the tone of media coverage in regard to a certain issue may be a result of dominant journalistic values that prevail in a certain region (Dimitrova & Konnolly, 2007, pp. 162-163).

Evans (2010) compared the frames in *the New York Times* on two international conflicts (one in the town of Jenin in the West Bank in 2002 and another in Nahr al-Bared in Lebanon in 2007). The author employed the methodology proposed by Robert Entman (2004) that suggests analyzing issues in terms of events that took place, the actors involved, and the moral judgments conveyed (Evans, 2010, p. 2013). In his article Evans (2013) argues that media affects policy-makers both indirectly and directly (p. 226). According to Evans (2013), media affects policy-makers indirectly through its impact on public opinion and directly “by structuring their perceptions of reality” that are based on the information received through the elite media publications such as *the New York Times* (Evans, 2013, pp. 225-226). However, the author focuses on media affecting foreign policy and does not entirely assume that the frames offered by the media publications may also be affected directly and indirectly by policy-makers, various information sources used for the stories, as well as by ideological orientations of journalists and editors, and by the social, political, historical, and cultural context in which these elite publications are rooted.

Similarly to the studies mentioned above, the study by Jad Melki (2014) reflected the differences and strong regional trends in media coverage of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war among 11 networks from the U.S., Israeli, and Arab world (p. 177). Melki focused on the media framing

effects on public opinion arguing that the way information is presented in media may have an impact on how the audience thinks of the events (Melki, 2014, p. 165). The study has shown the strong concordance between the frames found in the U.S. and Israeli media reflecting Israeli national interests, while showing the Arab networks offering framing generally supportive to Hezbollah, although there were differences in the way the information was presented in the Arab media (Melki, 2014, p. 177). The author explains the existence of distinct regional trends by the interplay of political, cultural, and economic factors that confined journalistic practices of each television network analyzed in regard to the conflict (Melki, 2014, p. 165).

As can be seen from the short review presented here of the recent articles related to media framing in regard to the Middle East region, most studies have focused on possible framing effects or biases (such as national interests, culture, socio-economic context, “domestication of news”, and others), as well as on frame types that might be found in the sources. However, in every study little attention was paid to deeply analyzing the possible factors for explaining the ideological differences between the sources or the reasons why the information is presented in a particular way. The ideological profiles of the newspapers were sometimes predefined and the assumption that the information was often presented based on the national interests and based on the official governmental position, or on the position of the editor which can be concordant with one of the political forces in the country was taken for granted, although this may be just one of the possible reasons that might or might not influence the eventual representation of the information in media. Based on these studies, the question remains of why exactly the information was presented in each news source in one way or another. Additionally, the studies mostly focused on the comparison itself, but not directly on the factors that might have an impact on the media frame-building.

It may be inferred from recent works on media framing of the Middle Eastern events, that there may be some regional trends in reporting that are based on local ideological, political, cultural, and professional context. To explain the way the news is framed by a particular medium, further research should probably consider analyzing to what extent media frames in regard to a particular event are affected by one of the regional factors and trends. However, this is out of the scope of this study.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This is an exploratory comparative study of framing in media which is aimed to test the proposed methodology in order to reorganize it and to come up with a more systematic approach for the future studies. The focus of this study is on media frames and politico-ideological differences between two newspapers. This study is focused on analyzing ideological differences in the frames used in news about the Syrian crisis. For the purpose of the study, two newspapers have been chosen. One newspaper is Russian – *the Kommersant* and the other is British – *the Financial Times*. Both newspapers specialize reporting about financial markets, international and national politics, and international issues. Both newspapers are privately owned, which is thought to reduce the effects of political parallelism and intervention of any particular political actors in the news creating process. Both newspapers have comparable circulation and are published daily. In 2013, *the Financial Times* had a daily circulation of approximately 275,000 copies, while *the Kommersant* maintained a daily circulation between 120,000 and 130,000 copies.

To analyze frames, the methodology proposed by Robert Entman (2004) was used. Entman (2004) suggests analyzing events within the issue by identifying functions of frames. In his book, Entman (2004) suggests analyzing frames identifying an issue, event, and actors (e.g. individuals, groups, nations, etc.). After each is identified, Entman (2004) suggests identifying frame functions to analyze the frame. Frame functions consist of four steps: defining problematic effects/conditions (Problem / What is going on?); identifying cause/agent (Why? / Who?); endorsing remedy (What to do? / How to resolve? / What is suggested?); conveying moral judgment (Evaluation. Who is good, bad, neutral, etc.? What is right and wrong? Why is it right or wrong?) (see. Entman, 2004, p. 23-24).

The study employed both inductive and deductive approach to identify and to analyze the frames. The frames were analyzed using manual coding.

According to Semetko & Valkenburg (2000), “the inductive approach involves analyzing a news story with an open view to attempt reveal the array of the possible frames” (p. 94). On the contrary, the deductive approach involves using a predefined set of frames to measure to what extent these frames may be found in the news stories (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). Thus, it is necessary to have a clear idea regarding the kind of frames that might be present in the news stories if employing a deductive approach (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). Otherwise, any frames that may not have been defined earlier in the process could be overlooked during the analysis process (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). The authors (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) argue that the deductive approach may be easily replicated and may cope with large samples (p. 94).

In regard to the predefined frames, Semetko & Valkenburg (2000) offered five different frames that were found in the previous studies on framing: attribution of responsibility, conflict, human interest, economic consequences, and morality (p. 93). Notwithstanding the possibility that these frames may be generic and found in most of the news stories, the present study did not use the categorization offered by Semetko & Valkenburg. The reason for choosing the inductive approach and for refusing to employ the above categorization is explained by the nature of the topic chosen for the analysis.

First, the Syrian crisis was a recent issue by the time the analysis was performed and required more scrutiny and flexibility in analyzing it. Second, the Syrian crisis is a separate type of event – it is an international conflict and thus the categorization offered by Semetko & Valkenburg does

not fully suit the purposes of analysis due to the fact that some important frames may have been overlooked when adhering strictly to the existing categories.

This study employs Entman's methodology as a starting point and a base, but adds some additional elements to it. In addition to the elements offered by Entman, this study also employs the category of "context/rhetoric" to show the contextual environment or discourse in which the categories proposed by Entman may be found. The study also looks at the type of attitudes/judgments (personal vs. general) and the source of personal attitudes/judgments found in the stories; as well as on the type of news sources used, the amount of sources used for each story, and the length of articles published both in *the Financial Times* and *the Kommersant*.

In addition, this study adheres to the recommendations offered in the article by Chong & Druckman (2007) where the scholars describe several steps necessary to measure media frames. According to Chong & Druckman (2007), first, an issue or an event should be identified, because it is only possible to identify a frame in communication in relation to a particular issue, event, or political actor (p. 106). After the issue or event is identified, it is necessary to "isolate a specific attitude" in case the study aims to understand how the frames affect public opinion (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 106). Then, to create a coding scheme, an initial set of frames of an issue may be identified inductively and after the initial set of frames is identified, the sources for the content analysis should be selected (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 107). Most typically, the sources for the content analysis are articles or stories that are identified via searches using key words and are usually used as units of analysis (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 107). Manual coding allows greater flexibility and makes it possible to discover new frames that were not identified during the initial manual coding scheme (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 108).

In this case, government officials representing predefined international actors (USA, UK, EU, Russia, and China) were set as units of analysis, thus allowing for analyzation of several different frames per article, if present. The officials representing these particular international actors were chosen during the preliminary stage of the analysis using inductive approach.

The issue for the analysis was civil war in Syria and the event chosen for the analysis was the chemical attack that occurred on August 21, 2013. This study analyzes and compares what information was used to describe the same events by *the Financial Times* and by *the Kommersant*.

The time frame for the analysis is set from the day of the chemical attack on August 21, 2013 to the beginning of the G-20 summit in Russia on September 4, 2013. As a result of the summit, which ended on September 14, 2013, the Syrian government was obliged to remove the whole chemical arsenal.

The articles for analysis were selected using the search word “Syria” (English) and “Сирия” (Russian). To find *the Financial Times* articles, Lexis Nexis Academic English language online archive was used. To find *the Kommersant* articles, the Russian version of the newspaper’s website was used.

The preliminary stage of the analysis showed that these international actors were the major political players in regard to the chemical attack in Syria. The U.S., UK, and EU as political actors represented the coalition against the official Syrian regime, while Russia and China as political actors became the main antagonists to the coalition after imposing veto on the UN Security Council’s resolution on Syria supported by the coalition. For this reason, the officials representing the USA, UK, EU, Russia, and China were chosen as the units of analysis.

After the international actors were chosen, deductive approach was employed to analyze the articles (news stories and analyses excluding comments and editorials). During this stage, the

researcher first looked for such search elements as predefined international actors involved in the event (USA, UK, EU (excluding UK), Russia, and China), the chemical attack of August 21, 2013 mentioned in the stories, and international decisions regarding the chemical attack described in the article. According to these search elements, a set of articles from each newspaper was chosen for the analysis.

When the set of articles was chosen, the analysis was performed for each government official and international actor (i.e. USA, UK, EU (excluding UK), Russia, and China) found in a given article. Some articles contained several international actors and government officials mentioned in the text and thus required a separate analysis for each of the actors mentioned which may lead to a more accurate data and interpretation.

During the analysis process, the researcher looked for such additional elements and categories as:

1. The context used to describe the international actors and government officials affiliated to the event
2. The information emphasized in the articles in regard to the chemical attack
3. The sources used in the articles
4. The characteristics of the people mentioned in the articles
5. Whether there are any attitudes in the article and whether the attitudes are negative, positive, neutral, or balanced. Whether there are any personal attitudes in the article. Whether there is a source of the personal attitudes (e.g. journalist, expert, official, etc.) Whether any particular officials are used as sources of personal attitudes (UK, EU, U.S., Russian, Chinese)

The study employed manual coding to allow greater flexibility during the analysis process. A coding sheet that may be found in the appendix was created to facilitate the data gathering process. The data gathered during the analysis was coded in the SPSS. After all variables were entered, a set of tables and figures showing descriptive statistics of the data collected was created in SPSS.

This study used no inter-coder reliability and is considered a pilot exploratory study; it was necessary first to test the methodological approach employed in this work to see to what extent it may be used for the data collection and what should be amended in the methodological tool for the use in further studies.

To compare the frames in two newspapers, the study used the following research questions:

RQ1: Will *the Financial Times* frame Syrian opposition in a more positive way than *the Kommersant*?

RQ2: Will *the Kommersant* frame Syrian authorities in a more positive way than *the Financial Times*?

RQ3: Will *the Kommersant* frame Russian and Chinese officials in a more positive way than *the Financial Times*?

RQ4: Will *the Financial Times* frame U.S., UK, and EU officials more positively than *the Kommersant*?

RQ5: Which of the newspapers will emphasize sanctions and military measures toward Syrian authorities among the possible solutions to the issue?

RQ 6: Is there any information covered by one newspaper and that is not covered by the other?

Conceptualization

There were several concepts used in the analysis process that should be explained and defined to set the scope of their meanings in relation to this study:

Negative involves words, statements, and attitudes that describe an international or individual actor, situation and/or event, or a particular solution or action in an unkind way or are directed against the particular outcome, actor, or solution (e.g. direct accusations; obscene vocabulary; caustic wordings; calls against the particular actor and/or solution; opposition to a certain action, proposition, or solution).

Example: “A senior western official told *the Financial Times* that the U.S., Britain and France were strongly of the view that they needed to deliver a military response to the attack in order to deter the Assad regime from using chemical weapons again” (*the Financial Times*, 08.25.2013).

Positive involves words, statements, and attitudes that describe an international or individual actor, situation and/or event, or a particular solution or action in a kind or supportive way or are directed in favor of the particular outcome, actor, or solution (e.g. direct acclaims; polite and friendly vocabulary; soft and supportive wordings; calls in favor of a particular actor and/or solution; support for a certain action, proposition, or solution).

Example: “Mr. Hollande told his US counterpart that “everything was consistent with naming the Damascus regime as the author” of the chemical attacks, according to a statement by the French government on Sunday. The statement said that the two presidents “agreed to stay in close contact to arrive at a joint response to this unprecedented aggression” (*the Financial Times*, 08.25.2013).

Neutral involves no particular tone or wordings that are supporting or blaming either of the sides or actors mentioned in the article, and involves no direct endorsement or condemnation of a

particular attitude or solution; this means being impartial in presenting the content in the article thereby reflecting the information without emotional or ideological connotation.

Example: “The U.S. does not plan to involve in a large-scale operation in Syria in case the evidence of using the chemical weapons by the official forces will be provided. According to *the Washington Post*, the authorities may use missile strikes that will last no more than two days. According to the source, U.S. military forces are ready for the operation and are awaiting for the corresponding order” (translated from Russian from *the Kommersant*, 08.27.2013).

Balanced means taking several perspectives into account, fairly judged or presented. This means not endorsing a particular attitude or solution, but mentioning several solutions to the problem; presenting information considering various points of view, but not simply neutrally reflecting the fact.

Example: “In the next few days, the U.S. is likely to find itself in a new war of words with the Assad regime over what happened last week. After days of stalling, the regime looks likely to give UN inspectors access to the site in eastern Damascus. On the other hand, the US will argue that this is too late because evidence of a chemical attack on the ground has degraded” (*the Financial Times*, 08.25.2013).

General attitude means that no particular individual (e.g. government official, journalist, or expert) can be identified as a source of expression, and is thus non-personal.

Example: “The UK is to present a draft resolution to the UN Security Council on Wednesday condemning an alleged chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime in eastern Damascus and authorizing “necessary measures to protect civilians” (*the Financial Times*, 08.28.2013).

Personal attitude means that a particular individual (e.g. government official, journalist, expert) may be identified as a source of expression.

Example: “After careful deliberation I have decided the United States should take military action against Syrian targets,” Mr. Obama said” (*the Financial Times*, 08.30.2013).

Political rhetoric/context implies the description of the events, attitudes, and solutions in the article where international actors, government officials, journalists, and/or experts are shown in the situation of external and/or internal governmental solutions and/or competition in regard to the issue.

Example: “Mr. Kerry is spearheading the administration's lobbying effort, at home and abroad, even though Mr. Obama did not consult him before deciding at the weekend to take the issue to Congress for a vote” (*the Financial Times*, 09.02.2013).

Militaristic rhetoric/context implies the description of the events, attitudes, and solutions in the article where international actors, government officials, journalists, and/or experts are shown in the situation of discussing or endorsing the aggressive measures toward the cause of the problem.

Example: “Mr. Hollande said: “The chemical massacre in Damascus cannot remain unpunished. If not, it would risk an escalation that would trivialise the use of these weapons and would threaten other countries.” He said he did not favour a military operation to overthrow Mr. Assad but a deterrent strike to punish” (*the Financial Times*, 08.30.2013).

Diplomatic rhetoric/context implies the description of the events, attitudes, and solutions in the article where international actors, government officials, journalists, and/or experts are shown in the situation of discussing or endorsing the conciliatory measures toward the cause of the problem.

Example: “It is not beneficial for the Syrian government from the political and also from the military point of view to use chemical weapons. When the UN experts were working there (in

Syria – *the Kommersant*) the military state was in favor of the government, and the U.S. - Russian meeting for the preparation of the “Zheneva-2” conference should take place, – Mr. Lavrov specified” (*the Kommersant*, 08.27.2013).

Humanitarian rhetoric/context implies the description of the events, attitudes, and solutions in the article where international actors, government officials, journalists, and/or experts are shown in the situation describing war suffering of the civil population and/or solutions to resolve this suffering.

Example: “The plane with humanitarian aid was sent to Syria by the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations. Russian citizens who are willing to leave the country will be able to use the plane on its way back” (*the Kommersant*, 08.27.2013).

Local journalist/correspondent refers to the content author employed by or affiliated with one of the newspapers analyzed who resides in the country where the newspaper originates from and/or creates news content not leaving the country of residence, either UK or Russia.

Foreign journalist/correspondent refers to the content author employed by or affiliated with one of the newspapers analyzed who resides outside the country where the newspaper originates from and creates news content while staying outside the newspaper’s country of origin, either UK or Russia.

Local expert a person with an in-depth knowledge in one of the fields who is based and/or resides in the newspaper’s country of origin, either UK or Russia.

Foreign expert a person with an in-depth knowledge in one of the fields who is not based and/or does not reside in the newspaper’s country of origin, either UK or Russia.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

A total of 361 articles from *the Financial Times* (further in text as *FT*) and 332 articles from *the Kommersant* (further in text as *K*) were analyzed during this study to answer the research questions. There were a total of 938 references in both newspapers in all articles analyzed that corresponded with the defined criteria. The criteria included predefined international actors involved in the event (USA, UK, EU (excluding UK), Russia, and China), the chemical attack of August 21, 2013 mentioned in the articles, and international decisions regarding the chemical attack described in the article. In order to address the research questions, it is necessary first to show the general information about the issue and actors involved in the issue and the extent to which these actors were mentioned in each newspaper.

General context

It may be seen from *Figure 1* in the appendix³⁰ that both newspapers have two similar time periods within the analysis time frame when the number of articles related to the issue of the chemical attack in Syria increased. These periods lasted from August 26, 2013 until August 30, 2013 and from September 1, 2013 to September 4, 2013.

According to *Figures 2* and *3*, both newspapers mentioned USA more frequently than other international actors (44.34% in *K* and 35.81% in *FT*). Second position among the most mentioned international actors in *K* is given to Russia (17.92%) and in *FT* to the UK (32.1%). Both USA and UK in *FT* have approximately 70% combined. Both newspapers mentioned EU with an almost equal rate – 16.67% in *K* and 17.9% in *FT*. The fourth position is allocated to the UK in *K* with 15.72% and to Russia in *FT* with 9.335% being the number of times mentioned in the articles related to the chemical attack in Syria. There is almost a 30% difference between the most

³⁰ This and all other figures may be found in the appendix.

frequently mentioned international actor and the second most popular one in *K*, while the difference between the first two actors in *FT* is less than 4%. The difference between the second and fourth most popular actors in *K* is less than 3%. *K* introduces a “collective” actor named “West” which is on the 5th place with approximately 3.5% of times mentioned. China is placed on the 5th position in *FT* (4.839%) and on the 6th position in *K* (1.887%).

Figures 4 and 5 show the total amount of international actors per article mentioned in each newspaper. *FT* and *K* differ significantly by these criteria. In *FT*, in 28.91% of cases there was only one international actor mentioned per article, while in *K* the sole international actor was found in 60.49% of all articles analyzed. The appearance of two, three, four, or five actors per article in *FT* has almost the same frequency. The difference between the most frequent cases (two or three actors per article) and the least frequent cases (four or five actors per article) is within 2.5% starting from 18.75% of cases with two and three actors and ending with 17.19% and 16.41% with four and five actors. On the contrary, the difference between the first and second position in *K* is more than 35% and the difference between the second and third position is more than 15%. Two and three actors were mentioned in *K* 24.07% and 8.642% of times correspondingly.

The *Figures 6 and 7* show what members of the European Union except the UK were mentioned in both newspapers in relation to the chemical attack in Syria. France and Germany were among the first two most frequently mentioned EU members in both *FT* and *K*. France was mentioned in 66.67% of cases in *K* and in 67.27% of cases in *FT*. Germany was mentioned in 19.61% of cases in *K* and in 25.45% of cases in *FT*. Italy is on the third position in *FT* with 7.273% of cases, while Greece is on the third position in *K* with less than 4% of cases. There were also other EU members mentioned in *K*, however each of them was mentioned in less than 2% of cases (see *Figure 6* for more details).

Figures 8 and 9 reflect the context found in all articles analyzed from both newspapers. Militaristic context was found most frequently both in *FT* and *K* with 48.53% and 57.55% of cases accordingly. The second position in both newspapers is allocated to political context with 45.26% of cases in *FT* and 28.93% of cases in *K*. Diplomatic context was found on the third position with 6.046% of cases in *FT* and in 13.52% of cases in *K*. Thus, militaristic context/rhetoric was found in approximately 7% more cases in *K* than in *FT* (see *Figures 8 and 9* in the appendix for more details).

Figures 10 and 11 reflect the number of persons mentioned per article in *K* and *FT* accordingly. There is a drastic difference in both newspapers as shown on the diagrams. Approximately 70% of *the Kommersant* articles have none or only one person mentioned in the text. Two persons were mentioned in approximately 17% of cases while three persons were mentioned in less than 6% of articles in *The Kommersant*. Combined, the above numbers make more than 90% of all cases analyzed in *K* for the purposes of this study.

On the contrary, one or no persons were mentioned in *The Financial Times* in approximately 17% of cases, while four, two, and six persons per article were mentioned in 19.08%, 16.7%, and 13.74% of cases accordingly. Both three and five persons per article appeared in 10.69% each in all cases analyzed.

Responsibility for the attack

There is also a significant difference in each newspaper reflecting who was responsible for the chemical attack. Thus, almost 86% of articles from *FT* name Syrian official forces as a cause of the attack, while *K* mentions Syrian official forces as a cause of the attack in 58.49% of cases. In almost 40% of cases *K* does not define who exactly was responsible for the accident, while *FT* does not name the responsible party in less than 15% of articles. Syrian rebels are mentioned as

responsible for the attack in less than 2% of cases in both newspapers (see *Figures 12 and 13* for details).

Figures 14 and 15 show overall attitudes toward the cause of the attack. More than 40% of articles show balanced attitude toward the possible cause of the attack in *K*, while neutral and negative attitudes are expressed toward the cause of the accident in approximately 30% of cases each.

Of all attitudes toward the case of the attack in *FT*, 55.81% are negative, while approximately 44% of cases show balanced attitudes toward the party responsible for the chemical attack.

Personal attitudes were found in 77.26% of cases in *FT*, while in *K* personal attitudes toward the cause of the attack were found in 47.48% of all articles. General attitudes constitute 22.74% of all cases in *FT* and 52.52% of cases in *K*. For both variables, there was approximately a 30% difference in the type of attitudes between two newspapers. This information is shown on *Figures 16 and 17* in the appendix.

There were several categories describing the personal attitudes toward the cause of the attack in both newspapers which are shown on *Figures 18 and 19* in the appendix. According to *Figure 18* the following categories of actors expressed personal attitudes in *the Kommersant*: U.S. official (46.41%), Russian official (22.22%), UK official (14.38%), EU official (9.8%), Russian expert (6.536%), Russian journalist (less than 1% of cases). In *the Financial Times* (*figure 19*), there were a total of 10 different categories of actors expressing personal attitudes toward the cause of the attack: U.S. official (36.25%), UK official (31.88%), EU official (16.04%), Russian official (6.667%), foreign journalist (3.333%), UK expert (less than 3%), UK journalist (less than 2%), foreign expert (less than 1,5%), Chinese official (less than 1.5%), Russian expert (less than 1%).

Solutions to the situation and information sources

There were several solutions to the situation mentioned in both newspapers. *Figures 20 and 21* show the solutions described in *FT* and *K*. Among the most frequently mentioned solutions in *FT* are the following: “Military measures” (54.35%), “Postpone or abandon military measures” (21.29%), “Discuss the situation in Syria” (15.16%), and “Check the evidence of attack” (6.13%). The most frequently described solutions in *K* were the following: “Military measures” (49.69%), “Discuss the situation in Syria” (12.89%), “No solution” (12.58%), “Postpone or abandon military measures” (8.18%), “Check the evidence of attack” (7.55%), “Find a diplomatic solution” (7.23%).

Figures 22 and 23 show breakdown by the type of personal attitudes toward all solutions mentioned in both newspapers. For the purposes of more detailed explanations, it might be important to understand who exactly expressed personal attitudes toward the solutions to the situation in each newspaper.

According to the data gathered from *FT*, 36.01% of personal attitudes about the solutions were given by U.S. officials, 30.45% of personal attitudes were given by UK officials, 15.84% were provided by EU officials, 7.4% were given by Russian officials, and 4.53% of attitudes were expressed by foreign journalists. Other categories, such as UK experts, UK journalists, Chinese officials, foreign experts, or Russian experts were found in less than 2% of cases each.

In *K*, U.S. officials expressed their attitudes toward the solutions to the situation in 45.78% of cases, Russian officials expressed their attitudes in 21.69% of cases, personal attitudes given by UK officials were found in 13.86% of cases, EU officials expressed their personal attitudes in 12.05% of cases, while Russian experts gave their attitudes for a solution of the situation in 6.02% of cases. Russian journalists expressed their attitudes in less than 1% of articles analyzed.

It is important to understand the sources of information provided in the articles in both newspapers for data explanation purposes. According to *Figure 24*, most of the information in *K* came from a Russian news agency (43.21%), Russian correspondent (27.16%), U.S. news agency (11.11%), secondary information source (9.88%), and the EU news agency (4.98%).

Most popular information sources in *FT*, according to the *Figure 25*, were a UK correspondent (62.32%), U.S. correspondent (23.91%), EU correspondent (5.79%), and Middle East correspondent (4.34%).

It is also important to understand how many sources were used per article in both newspapers. According to *Figure 26*, one source of information was used in 44.2% of cases in *FT*, three information sources were used in 25.36% of cases, and two information sources were used in 24.64% of all articles analyzed. Four, five, and six information sources were used in less than 3% of articles each.

Figure 27 shows the amount of information sources used in *K* per article. One information source was used in 70.99% of articles, two information sources were used in 24.07% of cases, and three information sources were used in 4.32% of all articles analyzed. Four information sources were used in less than 1% of all articles analyzed in *K*.

Article length is also an important factor to consider when analyzing the information presented in each article.

Figure 28 shows that 52.5% of all articles analyzed in *K* consisted of less than 100 words, 17.5% of articles had 100-200 words in the text, while articles with more than 500 words were found in 10.63% of cases, and those consisting of 300-400 words were found in 7.5% of cases. *K* articles consisting of 400-500 words equated to 6.87% and those consisting of 200-300 were 5 percent.

In *FT*, 93.48% of articles consisted of more than 500 words, 4.35% consisted of 400-500 words, and 2.17% of articles had 300-400 words in the text. This can be seen in *Figure 29*.

Actors and attitudes toward the solutions to the situation

At this point, it is important to show who were the international officials mentioned in the articles of both newspapers. According to *Figure 30*, there were thirty different officials mentioned in *the Kommersant* articles. The most popular among them were: Barack Obama (23.41%), John Kerry (9.76%), David Cameron (9.27%), Chuck Hagel and Sergei Lavrov (8.29% each), Vladimir Putin (5.85%), Alexandr Lukashevich and an “undefined actor” (3.9% each). Other actors were found in less than 3% of cases.

Figure 31 shows the most popular officials mentioned in *FT*. The officials mentioned in most articles were Barack Obama (15.63%), David Cameron (14.65%), Francois Hollande (8.98%), John Kerry (7.03%), William Hague (5.08%), and with less than 4 percent each, Ed Miliband, Chuck Hagel, Vladimir Putin, John Boehner, and Douglas Alexander.

Further data show the attitudes toward the particular cause of the chemical attack mentioned in both newspapers.

It may be seen from *Table 1* in the appendix³¹, that in 55.3% of cases there were negative attitudes toward the Syrian official forces found in *FT*, while negative attitudes toward the same possible cause of the attack were found in 26.4% of cases in *K*. Both newspapers show similar numbers with balanced attitudes to all possible causes of the attack (42.5% in *K* and 43.7% in *FT*). It may also be seen that there were only a few attitudes toward the Syrian rebels (less than 2% of cases in *K* and less than 1% of cases in *FT*), which are not statistically significant values. More than 35% of attitudes combined in *K* were toward the “undefined” cause of the attack, while *FT*

³¹ This and all other tables may be found in the appendix

only had more than 13% of attitudes combined toward the “Undefined” cause. The “Undefined” cause of the attack had mostly neutral (14.5%) and balanced (23.3%) attitudes in *K*.

Table 2 shows the attitudes to the military measures as the possible cause of the attack offered by each international actor. According to the table, the U.S., EU, and UK expressed positive attitudes toward the military measures in 81.1%, 82%, and 71.4% of cases in *FT*. The same actors expressed positive attitudes toward the military measures in fewer cases in *K*. The numbers were 46.2%, 54.8%, and 57.7% accordingly. There was an additional international actor “West” introduced in *K* with 20% of positive, 60% of neutral, and 20% of balanced attitudes toward the military measures against the cause of the attack. It is also important to mention that there were no neutral attitudes toward this type of solution in *FT*.

Table 3 below shows the data on the attitudes toward checking the evidence of attack. There were only 64 of valid cases in all data set related to this solution, which is 6.6% of all the cases analyzed in both newspapers.

In *K*, Russia was the actor who expressed most of the positive attitudes toward this type of solution (61.5%). There were even more positive attitudes toward this solution expressed by Russia in *FT* (92.3%). The UK and China also expressed mostly positive attitudes to this solution with 80% and 100% correspondingly. The U.S. (71.4%), UK (100%), and EU (100%) expressed mostly balanced attitudes in *K*, while only the EU showed similar numbers for the balanced attitude in *FT* (75%). The total amount of balanced attitudes in *K* was 58.3%, while they constituted 18.4% in *FT*. Positive attitudes combined constituted 71.1% in *FT* and 41.7% in *K*.

Table 4 provides the data regarding the solution to postpone or abandon military measures toward the possible cause of the chemical attack.

Most of the attitudes toward this solution in *K* were balanced (69.2%) while in *FT* most of the attitudes were positive (71.2%). Positive attitudes toward abandoning or postponing military measures in *K* were expressed by EU (20%) and Russia (14.3%). Most of the neutral attitudes toward the solution in *K* were expressed by China (100%), EU (40%), and Russia (28.6%). The U.S. (100%), UK (88.9%), and Russia (57.1%) mostly expressed balanced attitudes toward the solution in *K*.

In *FT*, there were no neutral attitudes expressed by the international actors. Negative attitudes were expressed by the UK (7.4%) and Russia (2.9%). Positive attitudes in *FT* were expressed mostly by China (100%) and Russia (94.3%), as well as by the EU (64.7%) and UK (51.9%). There were also 80% of balanced attitudes toward this solution expressed by the U.S. The UK and EU expressed 40% and 35.3% of balanced attitudes toward the solution.

Table 5 shows the attitudes that were expressed by international actors in both newspapers toward the solution to discuss the situation in Syria.

Thus, 71.4% of attitudes toward this solution in *K* expressed by Russia where positive while the amount of positive attitudes expressed by EU was 40%. Combined, positive attitudes constituted 17.1% of all attitudes expressed by the international actors in *K*. Neutral and balanced attitudes were expressed in 43.9% and 39% of cases in *K* correspondingly. Neutral attitudes in *K* were expressed by all actors: China (100%), UK (50%), USA (40%), EU (40%), and Russia (28.6%). Among the international actors who showed balanced attitudes in *K*, were the USA (60%), UK (50%), and EU (20%).

The total amount of positive attitudes toward discussing the situation in Syria in *FT* was 22.3% while all other attitudes expressed by the international actors were balanced (77.7%).

All attitudes expressed in *FT* by Russia and China were positive. USA showed 19.5% of positive attitudes toward discussing the situation in Syria while UK expressed 9.5% of positive attitudes toward the solution. EU (100%), UK (90.5%), and USA (80.5%) mostly expressed balanced attitudes to the solution in *FT*.

Table 6 shows the information regarding the attitudes expressed both in *K* and *FT* toward the solution to discuss the situation in Syria. It is important to note that there were only 36 valid cases that show the information related to this solution, which is 3.8% of all the cases presented in the dataset.

According to the table, 34.8% of attitudes expressed in *K* were positive, while 65.2% of all attitudes shown in *K* were balanced. Positive attitudes were provided by EU (50%) and Russia (42.9%). All attitudes toward this solution provided in *K* by the USA and UK were balanced, while Russia and the EU expressed 57.1% and 50% of balanced attitudes, correspondingly.

In *FT*, all attitudes expressed by Russia were positive, while all attitudes expressed by the EU and UK were balanced.

Table 7 shows the attitudes to the cases with no solution provided to the situation. There were only 43 cases that corresponded to this in the dataset, which is 4.6% of all 938 cases. It is important to note that this solution was found mostly in *K*, while *FT* had less than 1% of corresponding cases (see *Figure 20*, mentioned previously).

Most of the attitudes to the situation with no remedy provided were neutral (69.2%) while the remaining attitudes were balanced (32.5%). EU, China, and “West” expressed 100% of neutral attitudes, while USA, Russia, and UK showed 69.2%, 68.8%, and 20% of neutral attitudes correspondingly. Balanced attitudes were expressed by UK (80%), Russia (31.3%), and USA (30.8%).

International actors and proposed solutions

Table 8 shows what solutions the U.S. offered to the situation in both newspapers. The three most popular solutions offered by the U.S. in *K* were “military measures” (64.5%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (14.2%), and “no solution” (9.2%). The most popular solutions offered by the USA in *FT* were “military measures” (73.9%) as well as to “discuss the situation in Syria” (18.5%).

The solutions provided by the UK are shown on the *Table 9* in the appendix. The most popular solutions provided by the UK in *K* were “military measures” (52%), “postpone or abandon military measures” (18%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (12%), and “no remedy” (10%).

The most popular solutions provided by the UK in *FT* were “military measures” (56.3%), “postpone or abandon military measures” (27.1%), and “discuss the situation in Syria” (10.6%).

Table 10 shows the solutions provided by the EU toward the situation in Syria. According to the table, the most popular solutions provided by the EU in *K* were “military measures” (58.5%), “postpone or abandon military measures” (9.4%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (9.4%), and “find a diplomatic solution” (7.5%).

In *FT*, the most common solutions offered by the EU were “military measures” (55%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (18.9%), “postpone or abandon military measures” (15.3%), and “find a diplomatic solution” (7.2%).

Table 11 shows the data on solutions provided by Russia both in *K* and *FT*. The three most frequent solutions found in *K* were “no solution” (28.1%), “find a diplomatic solution” (24.6%), and “check the evidence of attack” (22.8%). Such solutions as “discuss the situation in Syria” and “postpone or abandon military measures” were found in 12.3% of cases each.

The most frequent solutions offered by Russia in *FT* were “postpone or abandon military measures” (60.3%), “check the evidence of attack” (22.4%), and “discuss the situation in Syria” (12.1%).

Table 12 provides data on the solutions offered by China. The amount of valid cases for this category was 36, as shown in the table. There were three different solutions provided by China in *K*: “discuss the situation in Syria” (50%), “no solution” (33.3%), and “postpone or abandon military measures” (16.7%). There were also three different solutions provided by China in *FT*: “postpone or abandon military measures” (70%), “check the evidence of attack” (16.7%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (13.3%).

The solutions provided by the collective actor “West” may be found in the *Table 13*. It is important to take into account that the amount of valid cases for this category was only 11, which is 1.2% of all cases in the dataset. The solutions provided by this actor were found in *K* only. This actor offered “military measures” in 90.9% of cases and “no solution” in 9.1% of cases.

France and Germany as EU members offered slightly different solutions to the situation. *Table 14* shows the data on the solutions offered by France. The most frequent solution provided by France in *K* was “military measures” (70.6%). The next most popular solutions were “postpone or abandon military measures” (8.8%), “discuss the situation in Syria” (5.9%) and “no solution” (5.9%).

The most frequent solutions in *FT* were “military measures” (73%) and “discuss the situation in Syria” (18.9%). Other solutions have been found in less than 3% of cases.

Table 15 shows the information on the solutions offered by Germany. According to the table, there were only 38 valid cases related to the categories analyzed, which is 4.1% from all the cases in the dataset.

There were a total of six different solutions offered by Germany in *K*: “discuss the situation in Syria” (30%), “find a diplomatic solution” (20%), “postpone or abandon military measures” (20%), “military measures” (10%), “check the evidence of attack” (10%), and “no solution” (10%).

In *FT*, there were a total of four different solutions offered by Germany: “postpone or abandon military measures” (50%), “find a diplomatic solution” (21.4%), “military measures” (21.4%), and “check the evidence of attack” (7.1%).

International actor attitudes and context

Table 16 provides the information on how the international actor was portrayed in both newspapers. According to the table, there were approximately 35% of cases in *K* when the international actors in the articles analyzed were portrayed neutral and approximately 63% of cases when the international actors were portrayed balanced. In *FT*, the international actors were mostly portrayed balanced (93.2%).

Russia was portrayed balanced in 78.9% of cases in *K*, while UK was portrayed balanced in 70% of cases. USA (64.5%) and EU (49.1%) were also among the most frequent cases when the international actor was portrayed balanced in *K*. China (83.3%), “West” (63.6%), and EU (49.1%) were portrayed neutral in most cases in *K*, while USA (33.3%), UK (26%), and Russia (21.1%) were portrayed neutral in fewer cases than other actors. It is also important to note that “West” was portrayed negative in 9.1% of cases in *K*.

In *FT*, all international actors except China were portrayed balanced in more than 90% of cases. China was portrayed balanced in 46.7% of cases and neutral in 53.3% of cases.

Table 17 shows how each particular actor within EU was portrayed in the articles.

According to the table, France was shown as balanced in 50% of cases and neutral in 47.1%, Germany was shown as balanced in 70% of cases and neutral in 30% of cases, while Greece was shown 50% of the time as balanced and 50% of the time as neutral. All other actors in *K* were portrayed neutral.

In *FT*, France, Germany, and Italy were portrayed balanced in 97.3%, 92.9%, and 87.5% of cases correspondingly. Italy and Germany were also portrayed neutral in 12.5% and 7.1% of cases in *FT*.

Tables 18-22 show the context found in the articles where each international actor considered for the analysis was present. According to the *Table 18*, political context was found in 34% of cases when USA was mentioned in the articles in *K*. Military context was found in 58.9% of cases when USA was mentioned in *K*, while diplomatic context was observed in 7.1% of cases when USA was mentioned in *K*.

In 56.5% of cases in the *FT*, USA was mentioned in the political context and in 41.2% of cases, the USA was mentioned in the military context. Diplomatic context in relation to USA was observed in less than 3% of cases analyzed.

Context found in relation to the UK is shown in the *Table 19*. According to the table, military context in relation to the UK was observed in 66% of cases and political context was found in 30% of cases in *The Kommersant*. In *The Financial Times*, political context in relation to UK was observed in 52% of cases and military context was found in 44.4% of cases.

The context found in relation to the EU is described in the *Table 20* in the appendix. According to this table, military, political, and diplomatic context in relation to the EU in *K* was observed in 60.4%, 22.6%, and 17% of cases correspondingly. Military and political context in relation to the EU in *FT* was found in 66.1% and 30.3% of times from all the cases observed.

Table 21 shows what context was observed in relation to Russia in both newspapers. In *K*, Russia was found in the military context in 40.4% of cases observed. Diplomatic context in connection to Russia was observed in 33.3% of cases, while political context was found in 26.3% of cases observed in *K*. Similar numbers were found in *FT*: diplomatic context was observed in

37% of cases, military context was observed in 35.2% of cases, and political context was observed in 27.8% of cases.

Table 22 shows the information on the context observed in relation to each particular EU member in the dataset. In *K*, military context was observed in 100% of cases in relation to all EU members analyzed except of France, Germany, and Greece. Military context in the cases when France was mentioned in the article was observed in 61.8%, the same context was observed in relation to Germany in 40% of cases, and in relation to Greece in 50% of cases. In 40% of cases, diplomatic context was found in the articles where Germany was mentioned and in 50% of articles where Greece was mentioned, as well as in 8.8% of cases mentioning France. Political context in relation to France and Germany was found in 29.4% and 20% of cases correspondingly.

Military context in *FT* was observed in all cases when Italy was mentioned, as well as in 67.9% and 61.1% of cases when Germany and France were mentioned in the articles.

The attitude toward the official Syrian forces by each particular international actor is shown in the *Table 23*. According to the table, negative attitudes toward the official Syrian forces were found in 45.2% of all cases observed in *K*, balanced attitudes were found in 30.1% of cases, and neutral attitudes were found in 24.7% of cases observed in *The Kommersant*. In *The Financial Times*, negative attitudes were found in 64.5% of cases, balanced attitudes were found in 38.7% of cases, and neutral attitudes were found in less than 1% of all cases observed.

Negative attitudes in *K* were expressed by the UK (51.4%), USA (46.6%), EU (44.1%), and “West” (40%). Neutral attitudes in *K* were expressed by China (100%), “West” (60%), Russia (50%), EU (35.5%), USA (21.4%), and UK (13.5%). Balanced attitudes in *K* were expressed by Russia (50%), UK (35.1%), USA (32%), and EU (20.6%).

In *FT*, negative attitudes were expressed by USA (74.8%), EU (59.5%), and UK (55.8%). Balanced attitudes in *FT* were also expressed by UK (44.2%), EU (38.7%), and USA (25.2%)

Table 24 shows the attitudes toward Syrian rebels. This data may not be taken into consideration due to the low amount of valid cases (N=7), which is not a statistically significant value. The total amount of cases that contained the necessary categories was 0.7% of all the cases observed.

Individual actor attitudes and context

Table 25 shows the data on how the individual actors are portrayed in the articles analyzed.

According to the table, individual actors were portrayed neutral in more than 25% of articles in *K* while in *FT* individual actors were portrayed neutral in less than 5% of cases observed. The actors were portrayed balanced in 73.5% of cases in *K* and in 95.3% of cases in *FT*.

Actors such as Barack Obama, John Kerry, William Hague, Alexander Lukashevich, Francois Hollande, and “Undefined actor” were portrayed neutral in more than 30% of cases in *The Kommersant*. In *The Financial Times*, John Kerry was shown neutral in approximately 20% of cases, while similar percentage was found in *K* for Chuck Hagel (23.5%) and John Boehner (20%).

Table 26 shows the information on the context where each actor was found in both newspapers.

According to the figure, the actors in *K* were found in the political context in 29.5% of cases, in militaristic context in 59% of cases, and in diplomatic context in 11.4% of cases. The actors who were most commonly found in the political context were Vladimir Putin (58.3%), Francois Hollande (50%), Barack Obama (39.6%), and David Cameron (36.8%). The actors most commonly found in the militaristic context were “Undefined actor” (100%), Chuck Hagel (94.1%), William Hague (83.3%), Alexandr Lukashevich (75%), John Kerry (65%), David Cameron

(63.2%), Barack Obama (56.3%), and Francois Hollande (50%). Sergei Lavrov (52.9%) was found most commonly in the diplomatic context. Less commonly, Alexander Lukashevich (25%), John Boehner (20%), Vladimir Putin (16.7%), and John Kerry (15%) were observed in the diplomatic context in *K*.

In *FT*, political context was observed in 47.7% of cases, militaristic context was observed in 46% of cases, and diplomatic context was found in 6.1% of cases. Most commonly found in the political context were actors such as Ed Miliband (94.7%), John Boehner (76.5%), Barack Obama (57.5%), David Cameron (52%), Francois Hollande (45.7%), Vladimir Putin (44.4%), and John Kerry (41.7%). In the militaristic context, the most common actors were William Hague (80.8%), Douglas Alexander (76.5%), Chuck Hagel (72.2%), John Kerry (58.3%), Francois Holland (54.3%), David Cameron (44%), Vladimir Putin (38.9%), and Barack Obama (36.3%). Most commonly, Sergei Lavrov (72.7%) and Vladimir Putin (16.7%) were found in the diplomatic context in *FT*.

Table 27 shows what cause of the chemical attack was mentioned in the articles by each particular individual actor. There were four different causes of the attack found in both newspapers according to the table: Syrian official forces, Syrian rebels, “Undefined” cause, and Third Party Radical Islamists.

In *FT*, all actors except of Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov were certain that the only cause of the chemical attack were Syrian official forces. Both Russian officials did not define the cause of the attack in the articles analyzed.

In most cases (63.9%) in *K* individual actors named Syrian official forces as the cause of the attack, however there were 33.1% of cases where the cause of the attack was not defined by the individual actors mentioned in the articles observed. Thus, Sergei Lavrov (88.2%), Vladimir Putin

(58.3%), Alexandr Lukashevich (50%), and “Undefined” actor (50%) were among those who did not name the cause of the chemical attack. Each individual actor except the four mentioned above named Syrian official forces as the cause of the attack in more than 70% of cases in *K*.

Table 28 shows what attitudes toward the Syrian official forces were expressed by each particular individual actor mentioned in the articles in both newspapers.

In 43.4% of cases in *K* the actors expressed negative attitudes toward the Syrian official forces, while in *FT* negative attitudes were expressed by actors in 74% of cases. In approximately 18% of cases there were neutral attitudes expressed by the actors in *K*. Balanced attitudes were found in 38.7% of cases in *K* and in 26% of cases in *FT*.

Except Vladimir Putin (0%), Sergei Lavrov (0%), Barack Obama (29.7%), and William Hague (40%), all actors expressed more than 50% of negative attitudes toward the Syrian official forces in *K*. Vladimir Putin (60%), John Boehner (25%), Barack Obama (21.6%), and Francois Hollande (20%) were among those who expressed most of the neutral attitudes toward the Syrian official forces in *K*. Sergei Lavrov (100%), William Hague (60%), Barack Obama (48.6%), and Vladimir Putin were among those who expressed most of the balanced attitudes toward the cause in *K*.

In *FT*, all actors except Douglas Alexander (23.5%), and John Boehner (47.1%) expressed more than 75% of negative attitudes toward the Syrian official forces.

Figures 60 and 61 show how the individual actors were portrayed in both newspapers.

According the *Table 29*, the individual actors were mostly portrayed balanced in *FT* (95.2%). John Kerry, Chuck Hagel, and David Cameron were portrayed neutral in 19.4%, 11.1%, and 8% of cases correspondingly.

Table 31 shows the data on how the individual actors were portrayed in *K*. According to the table, in 26.2% of cases the actors were portrayed neutral, while in 73.8% of cases the actors were portrayed balanced. Barack Obama (37.5%), Alexander Lukashevich (37.5%), “Undefined” actor (37.5%), and John Kerry (35%) were portrayed neutral in more than 30% of all cases analyzed. Sergei Lavrov (100%), David Cameron (89.5%), Vladimir Putin (83.3%), and Chuck Hagel (76.5%) were mostly portrayed balanced in *K*.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

This section contains interpretation of the data collected during the analysis and answers the research questions of this exploratory study. Prior to discussing research questions it is helpful to discuss the general information received from both newspapers.

General context data discussion

The information in *Figure 1* shows that both newspapers had similar periods when the number of articles describing the situation in Syria increased. There is a possible explanation for these dynamics. From the day of the chemical attack on August 21 and lasting until August 26 it remained unclear who was responsible for the action and there were no possible solutions for the situation yet offered by government officials. After August 26, when it became clear that more time was necessary to determine the reason and the source of the chemical attack, government officials from the U.S., UK, EU, Russia, and China started offering solutions to the situation. This may have led to the increase in the amount of articles published between August 26 and August 30.

After August 30, a slight switch from a militaristic to a political context was observed due to the political discussions of the situation in the U.S., UK, and France. The question of whether to use military measures against Bashar al Assad's regime was being discussed among the political representatives from these countries. As a result, on August 29, UK's parliament voted against any military measures which switched the focus to the U.S. and to a lesser extent to French political arena, where the president did not require consultation with parliament to decide whether to use a military response to the situation. During the period from August 31 to September 1 both the U.S. and France reorganized their cooperation and took into account that the UK was not able to assist with military response to the chemical attack. After September 1 and until September 4, the day

when the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg began, the question about the military response to the situation was discussed in the context of political competition in both the U.S. and France. However, no solution was found until September 14 when the U.S. secretary of state John Kerry and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov reached an agreement on eliminating the Syrian chemical arsenal.

Figures 2 and 3 show that the U.S. was mentioned in most of the cases in both newspapers. A possible explanation for this information is that after the UK Parliament voted against the military measures, the main focus switched to the U.S. However, there is no significant difference in how frequent the U.S. and UK were mentioned in *The Financial Times*. Since *FT* is a British newspaper, it has paid significant attention to the political discussion of the situation before August 29, when Members of Parliament voted against any military response. This scrutiny in covering the political competition and debates within the UK Parliament may be the reason why the difference in frequency of the information about the U.S. and UK in *The Financial Times* was not significant.

On the other hand, in *The Kommersant*, Russia was mentioned approximately 25% less than the U.S. Compared to *The Financial Times*, Russian political competition was not covered by the newspaper during this time span and in relation to the situation. Moreover, the Russian Parliament did not vote and did not discuss any particular solutions to the situation. Even though Russia is shown in the second position on *Figure 2*, most of the attention in the newspaper was paid to the U.S.

There was also a tendency observed in *The Kommersant* to show one, and less often, two international actors per article, while there were no sharp differences in how frequently *The Financial Times* mentioned one, two, three, four, or five international actors per article. There is a possible explanation to this data. The articles in *FT* were significantly longer than the articles in

K. According to *Figures 28* and *29*, approximately 70% of all articles in *K* contained less than 200 words, while more than 90% of articles in *FT* contained more than 500 words.

There is a similarity in how frequently EU members such as France and Germany were mentioned in both newspapers. France was found in the articles in both newspapers more than twice as much as Germany. A possible explanation is that Germany decided to take a neutral position in the situation by refusing to use military measures against the Syrian official political regime. As a result, Germany did not vote on the question regarding military response and was not mentioned in the articles as frequently as France, who planned the military response in coalition with the U.S. and the UK before it voted against.

Figures 8 and *9* show the context that was used in both newspapers to describe the situation. *The Financial Times* has an almost equal divide between the military and political context. This may be explained by its focus on the political debates in UK, France, and the U.S. where military response to the situation was discussed. *The Kommersant* tended to show not only military and political context, but also the diplomatic context. The reason for this may be Russia's position on the situation, which leaned toward a diplomatic solution to the problem. *The Kommersant* did not cover political debates in the U.S., UK, and France with the same scrutiny as *The Financial Times* did. The length of its articles may be one of the main indicators supporting this explanation.

The Kommersant also tended to mention none, one, or two government officials per article, while *The Financial Times* mentioned up to six officials per article. One explanation to this is article length, which was mentioned previously in the text. Another explanation is an article's main information source. Most of the articles in *K* were simply short paragraphs taken from Russian news agencies and based on a single information source, while most of the articles in *FT* were journalist articles based on more than one information source.

Responsibility for the attack discussion

When describing the cause of the chemical attack, *The Kommersant* tended to be more neutral than *The Financial Times* and did not define a particular cause. *Figure 13* shows that the cause was not defined in approximately 40% of cases in *K*, while in 85.5% of cases in *FT* it was clear that the cause of the attack was Syrian official forces (see *Figure 12*). The cases where the cause in *FT* was not defined refer to the cases when Russia or its officials were mentioned in the articles and did not name a specific party responsible for the action. This might be seen as one of the ideological differences between the two newspapers, because *The Kommersant* tends not to state that a particular side is responsible.

The question is whether *K* tried not to show who is responsible, because it is not politically “comfortable” distributing such content, or whether *K* was simply trying to be as neutral in covering the event as possible and for this reason tended not to name any side as responsible until proper evidence was available.

Further, there were mostly balanced and neutral attitudes toward the possible cause of the attack found in *K*, while mostly negative and balanced attitudes were found in *FT*. This shows another ideological difference between the two newspapers. Again, it is not clear whether *K* tried to be neutral or whether such topics as the chemical attack in Syria were are not “comfortable” topics for a media in Russia to discuss. Considering the fact that mostly Russian news agencies and Russian journalists were the main information sources of the articles in *K* and that the articles were rather short in length, it might seem that there are certain rules on how the information related to the issues where Russian national interest is involved should be presented in the local media. However, there is not enough evidence to claim this based just on the data collected from a single Russian newspaper.

In addition, *The Kommersant* tended to show mostly general attitudes toward the possible cause of the attack, thus providing the attitudes without any relation to a particular official. *The Financial Times*, on the other hand, tended to relate particular attitudes to particular officials and was thus more personal in content than *K*.

This is a significant difference in how the story is told and it also may fall under the ideological explanation that some solutions to particular situations involving Russian national interests, as well as attitudes toward these solutions, should not be related to any particular person to reduce the responsibility and to disclose less information on what exactly is happening; this could be seen as both state and media “restraint” or “aloofness” from the situation to reduce the responsibility for any statements, propositions, or actions. However, on the other hand, it may be a sign indicating that the newspaper is trying to be neutral in covering complex international issues, as well as a sign indicating that *The Kommersant* may not be completely under government control due to the fact that it may publish information that is neutral and not be affected by the official government position in Russia.

In cases where personal attitudes toward the particular cause of the attack were expressed, the U.S. officials were mentioned more frequently than others in both newspapers. There was a significantly larger amount of various sources of personal attitudes found in *FT* than in *K*. Second position in *K* and *FT* was allocated to Russian officials and UK officials accordingly. The possible explanation to this is that both *K* and *FT* may have been covering the issue in the context of their own domestic political environment and for this reason local officials were found in the articles more frequently than other sources of personal attitudes, except of the U.S. officials. This may be explained similarly to the explanation offered previously in the text in regard to the international actors mentioned in the articles. It is assumed that the U.S. and U.S. officials were mentioned more

frequently due to the fact that main focus switched to the U.S. political arena in the context of the situation in Syria after the UK Parliament voted against military measures against Syria.

Discussing solutions to the situation and article information sources

Military measures as a solution to the situation were mentioned more frequently in both newspapers (approximately 50% of all cases according to *Figures 20 and 21*). However, there is one significant difference between the solutions offered in both newspapers. According to *Figure 21*, there were no particular solutions offered in *the Kommersant* in 12.58% of cases, while there were less than 0.5% of cases where no solution was offered in *the Financial Times*.

There might be several reasons for this. From the ideological perspective, this may mean that *K* is trying not to mention any particular solutions when possible, thus avoiding responsibility for publishing information that might not be concordant with Russian state interests thereby reducing the amount of information that does not coincide with the official government position on the issue.

Alternatively, this may be explained by the type of information sources and by the type of content used in the news articles in *K*. According to the *Figure 24*, approximately 70% of all the information used in the articles originated from the Russian news agency or from Russian journalists. In addition, nearly 10% of the information was taken from various secondary sources, such as other newspapers, news channels, social media accounts, and other sources. In approximately 70% of cases, only one information source in *K* was used; and in approximately 24% of cases two sources of information were used. In addition, almost 70% of all articles in *K* consisted of less than 200 words, which does not allow for describing the situation, the problem, the actor involved, the attitudes, and solutions in deep detail. As a result, some articles may not contain some parts of the information in the text. On the contrary, *FT* articles originate mostly

from journalists, use more information sources per article, and are significantly longer (93.48% of articles were longer than 500 words). Probably, due to this difference the situation was described in a more detailed form in *FT* than in *K*.

It is not clear, however, what the reason is for using short articles to describe an important international issue based on the information taken from the local sources. It seems that this form of news presentation in relation to Syria may be some form of ideological restriction which imposes a certain way of content delivery by the newspaper to the general public. On the other hand, this may be a professional and cultural norm for the news coverage in Russia and also a way in which the newspaper tries to lean toward neutrality in the information delivery. In this case, an ideological explanation is not enough.

Based on the data received during the analysis, there are probably a combination of ideological, cultural, and professional reasons that explain why the information in *K* was presented in this form. For a deeper analysis it might be helpful to look into previous political, social, cultural, and geopolitical contexts in which Russia has been embedded, starting from the 1917 revolution or earlier when 19th century brought with it various reforms introduced by the Russian imperial government.

Discussing actors and attitudes toward solutions for the situation

Prior to discussing the attitudes expressed by the international and individual actors toward solutions for the situation, it is important to take a look at the sources of personal attitudes found in both newspapers. It may be seen from *Figures 22* and *23* that ten different sources of personal attitudes were found in *FT*, while only six sources of personal attitudes were found in *K*.

The sources of personal attitudes found in *FT* include officials from USA, UK, EU, Russia, and China, as well as local and foreign journalists and experts. In *the Kommersant*, personal attitudes from the U.S, Russian, UK, and EU government officials were found, as well as personal

attitudes from Russian experts and Russian journalists. No personal attitudes from the Chinese officials, or foreign journalists or experts were found in the articles in *K*.

Taking into account that more than 50% of all attitudes expressed in *K* were non-personal attitudes and that there were no references to any foreign experts or journalists, as well as the fact that most of the articles in *K* contained less than 200 words, originated from the local information sources, and leaned toward neutral and short factual description of the situation rather than in-depth coverage showing various points of view on the issue, brings the same conclusions and possible explanations provided earlier.

This means at least four possible explanations: 1) *K* may be avoiding publishing certain information regarding the situation and relating it to particular individuals, 2) *K* may be avoiding showing the points of view alternative from the official Russian position on the situation, 3) *K* may be trying to be neutral and unbiased toward the situation and thus is mostly describing facts and official statements made by international actors, 4) there might be a combination of ideological, cultural, and professional reasons and factors that lead to a certain way of presenting the information on international issues in Russia, especially where the national interests are involved.

It is interesting, that there were no EU government officials among the most frequently mentioned individuals in *K*, while *FT* mentioned the leaders of the U.S., UK, and France more frequently than others. This may be explained by the way the information was presented in *K* and also by the greater presence of the U.S. and UK in the articles.

According to *Table 1*, *FT* tended to show Syrian authorities and official forces in a more negative way than *K* did. Syrian authorities were framed as negative in 26.4% of cases in *K* and in 55.3% of cases in *FT*. There is a difference of almost 30% between the two newspapers in regard to this category.

There is also a similar tendency toward neutrality that was already mentioned previously found in *the Kommersant*. Syrian official forces were shown as neutral in approximately 30% of cases, which is the same amount as the difference between the two newspapers in regard to the negative attitudes toward the Syrian authorities. As was offered earlier in the text, this may be explained from the ideological perspective, that *the Kommersant* may be avoiding showing any particular attitudes and thus leans toward neutrality due to the ideological restrictions in Russia that might influence how the content is presented in the articles. However, this also might be a result of cultural or professional reasons in covering international issues in Russia or a result of *the Kommersant* trying to be unbiased and not provide any attitudes and judgements regarding the situation.

There are also differences in attitudes toward various solutions to the situation offered in both newspapers. According to *Table 2*, almost 80% of all attitudes toward the military measures in *FT* were positive, while approximately 50% of all attitudes toward the military measures in *K* were positive. There is a similar tendency toward neutrality observed in *K* – approximately 18% of all attitudes were neutral and approximately 34% of all attitudes were balanced. It seems, that *the Kommersant* used an indirect form of reflecting the information on the issue, while *the Financial Times* used a direct form of reflecting the information in the articles analyzed. The information provided in the *K* articles tended to be non-personal, more abstract, and obscure, while the information provided by the *FT* was to a large extent personal, more detailed and transparent.

According to the *Tables 2-7*, in approximately 70% of cases there were positive or balanced attitudes in regard toward the possible solutions to the situation found in *FT*. In *K*, the attitudes varied depending on the solution offered. Thus, for solutions such as “military measures”, “postpone or abandon military measures”, “discuss the situation in Syria”, and “no solution” the

element of neutrality was observed during the analysis. At the same time, for solutions such as “check the evidence of attack” and “find a diplomatic solution” the element of neutrality was not observed in *the Kommersant*. It should be noted, that the attitudes of the international actor Russia toward these two latter solutions in *FT* were close to 100% positive, which may be seen on *Tables 3 and 6*.

This leads to the possible explanation that positive or negative attitudes in *K*, i.e. direct rather than indirect type of presenting the information in the articles, were found specifically for those types of solutions which were concordant with the Russian foreign policy and official position. At the same time, the element of neutrality in *the Kommersant* articles may have been found in regard to the solutions which were non-concordant or not completely concordant with the Russian foreign policy and official position. This may be either an ideological restriction that leads to this way of presenting the information in regard to this issue, or the result of the journalistic standards for the international issue coverage in Russia. However, more information is necessary to support each assumption.

Tables 8-15 show the percentage of each solution offered by a particular international actor in both newspapers. It may be seen from the diagrams, that both newspapers show similar numbers for each type of solution offered by the international actors. The only significant difference is between the solutions offered by Russia and China. In both cases, *FT* emphasizes the solution to postpone or abandon military measures, while *K* emphasizes the solutions to check the evidence of attack, find a diplomatic solution, or “no solution” for Russia, and to discuss the situation in Syria and “no solution” for China.

What is important, is that the same tendency of not offering direct and transparent information in regard to the situation by providing no particular solution was observed in approximately 30% of cases for both Russia and China in *the Kommersant* (see *Tables 11* and *12*).

In addition, a collective actor “West” was mentioned in *the Kommersant* and was not mentioned in *FT*. However, this actor was observed in only 11 cases, which is 1.2% from all the cases analyzed and is not a statistically significant value. Nevertheless, the fact that this actor was mentioned in *the Kommersant* suggesting military measures in approximately 90% of cases and was not mentioned in *the Financial Times* needs more attention. The focus of this study does not allow for making any conclusions related to this fact, however it may be assumed, that this may be an ideological “trick” which may be used by local journalists and experts to frame the information in a particular way. To find out how western countries and government officials are described and whether the same collective actor “West” is mentioned in each international issue involving these countries it is necessary to analyze articles about other international issues involving the USA and European countries in Russian newspapers.

Another detail that needs attention is the difference between the international actors within the European Union. The positions of France and Germany on the issue were significantly different (see *Tables 14* and *15*). According to the figures, in approximately 70% of cases France offered military measures, while Germany offered a combination of various non-military measures which also constituted approximately 70% combined in both newspapers. The scope of this study does not allow making any conclusions based on this information, however it may be interesting to conduct a separate study comparing the positions and attitudes between members of the European Union on various international issues. Such a study may show whether the difference in the

positions of certain international actors within the EU toward certain international issues persists over time and in regard to different international issues.

Discussing attitudes toward the international actors and context

Tables 16 and 17 show the attitudes toward the international actors in both newspapers. According to the diagrams, *the Kommersant* tends to frame international actors as neutral in more than 30% of cases and balanced in more than 60% of cases, while *the Financial Times* tends to show the international actors as balanced in more than 90% of cases.

It should be noted, that most of the neutral attitudes toward the international actors in *K* were given to EU (49.1%), “West” (63.6%), and China (83.3%). Within the EU, France has received 47.1% of neutral attitudes and Germany has been mentioned in a neutral manner in 30% of cases. On average all international actors including Russia and China have been portrayed neutral in approximately 34% of cases.

Taking into account the previous explanations about the tendency to neutrality in *the Kommersant*, it may be assumed that this neutrality is based on the form in which the content is provided in the articles by *the Kommersant*. A significant number of articles were general, non-personal, and consisted of less than 200 words which may not be enough to describe each international actor and their attitudes toward the situation in a more detail. This may be the reason why the actors were portrayed neutral – most of the articles simply mentioned the basic facts, the problem, and the actors involved without describing what the actors proposed and how they tried to manage the situation in Syria. There might be an ideological (avoiding responsibility due to ideological restrictions) or a professional (trying to be unbiased in covering the issue) reason for presenting the information in this way in *the Kommersant*. In addition, China and “West” have been mentioned only 1.89% and 3.46% of times among all the cases observed in *K*, which is

probably an additional reason why they were portrayed neutral in relatively more cases than other international actors. The actors who were mentioned more frequently were portrayed neutral in fewer cases than China and “West”.

The reason for *the Financial Times* to portray the international actors as balanced may be related to the way in which the content was presented in the articles analyzed. Most of the articles were longer than 500 words which allows for describing each actor and its position in regard to the situation in more detail and providing balanced attitudes and evaluations to the solutions and recommendations proposed.

It might be also important to look into the context in which international actors were mentioned in both newspapers. *Tables 18-22* show the context for each international actor analyzed.

Thus, the USA was mentioned mostly in militaristic context in *K*, while it was mostly mentioned in political context in *FT*. This may be explained by the fact that *the Financial Times* covered the inside political debates regarding the solutions toward the situation in Syria in more detail, while *the Kommersant* did not focus on the inside political process neither in the U.S., UK, or EU. Moreover, from *Figure 49* it may be seen that *FT* mentioned USA in the military context in approximately 40% of cases which is approximately 18% less cases than in *K*. Taking into account that *K* did not focus on the political competition within the U.S., but rather focused on the solutions that the U.S. offered, it may explain this difference.

Similar explanations may apply to the UK and EU as both these actors were also mentioned mostly in the militaristic context in *K* and mostly in political context in *FT*.

As for Russia, it was portrayed almost identically in both *K* and *FT*, according to the *Table 27*. *FT* paid more attention to both national and international context in which each actor was

mentioned, while *K* did not pay significant attention to the national context of each actor except Russia due to the fact that *K* is a Russian newspaper and local context probably was described more precisely for this reason. As for China, it was decided not to consider the context in which it was mentioned due to the low amount of total cases where it was observed (N=36 of 938).

There were also some differences in the context where Germany and France were mentioned in both newspapers. France was portrayed in the political context in 29.4% of cases in *K* and in 38.9% of cases in *FT*, which makes approximately 9% difference between *K* and *FT*. There were almost identical numbers found for France being mentioned in the militaristic context in both newspapers. Probably, this high number is a result of the French position on Syria. France took the place of the UK in promoting military response toward the Syrian government after the UK Parliament voted against any military involvement in the situation on August 29.

Germany was found in the political context in approximately 20% of cases in both newspapers, although there were differences between the militaristic and diplomatic context between *K* and *FT*. *The Financial Times* tended to show Germany mostly in militaristic context (approximately 70% of cases), while *K* showed Germany equally both in militaristic and diplomatic context (40% of cases for each category).

Probably, in this case, *FT* may have been avoiding showing Germany in a diplomatic context while leaning toward mentioning it in the military context instead. There is not enough evidence to make any sound conclusions based on this data, however it might be interesting to analyze whether there might be some ideological biases or preferences in *FT*. *The Financial Times* is a British newspaper and due to the cultural and ideological preferences of journalists or editors some content involving the U.S., UK, and EU in relation to the similar international issues may be presented through the similar frame for each of these actors. All EU members that were analyzed

in *FT* were mentioned mostly in the militaristic context, according to *Figure 53*, which “blurs” the difference between them by making similar to each other as members of the European Union.

Table 23 shows the attitudes toward the Syrian official forces by each international actor. It may be seen that *FT* tends to show Syrian authorities in a more negative way than *K* does. There were 65.5% of cases in *FT* and 45.2% of cases in *K* where Syrian authorities were shown as negative. Most negatively Syrian authorities were described by the U.S. in *FT* (74.8% of cases). Even though Syrian authorities were framed more negatively in *the Financial Times*, *the Kommersant* showed them as neutral in 24.7% of cases which is close to the difference in the negative attitudes between *K* and *FT*. The Syrian authorities were shown balanced in 30.1% and 35.2% of cases in *K* and *FT* accordingly.

The trend toward neutrality was observed in multiple instances in *K* and was already mentioned previously in the text. Based on *Table 23* it is not possible to conclude that *K* is avoiding presenting some part of the information that may be “uncomfortable” according to the Russian political interests and political context, however this data provides additional argument toward this direction of thought. In order to make a sound conclusion it is necessary to analyze more articles related to other similar international issues published in *the Kommersant* to support this assumption.

Table 24 shows the attitudes toward the Syrian forces, however only 7 cases were observed, which is not a statistically significant value and is not enough to provide any interpretations.

Tables 25-31 show how the government officials were portrayed in the articles and in what context they were mentioned both in *The Kommersant* and in *The Financial Times*.

Both newspapers did not show any positive or negative attitudes toward the government officials, however both neutral and balanced attitudes were observed. There was a similar trend

toward neutrality observed in *the Kommersant* (26.5% of cases) as in previous instances. Neutral attitudes in *FT* were observed in 4.7% of cases. All U.S., UK, and EU officials in *K* were shown more neutral than in *FT*. This may be explained in a similar manner as the explanations given previously regarding the content in *the Kommersant*: 1) this may be due to the form in which content is presented in *K* (short non-personal articles repeating the facts from the news agencies, thus not providing detailed information with several perspectives on the position of each government official); 2) this may be a result of ideological constraints in Russia in relation to the international issues where Russian foreign policy is involved affecting the way information is presented in *K*; 3) this may be a result of cultural and professional journalistic norms in Russia (*K* is trying to be unbiased and thus the trend toward neutrality is observed in approximately 30% of cases related to this international issue).

Table 26 shows that approximately 60% of all government officials were mentioned in the militaristic context in *K*, while the government officials in *FT* were mentioned approximately 45% of the time each in the political and militaristic context. This may be explained by the in-depth coverage of the political debates in *FT* involving each individual actor, while *K* did not thoroughly cover political debates in the U.S., UK, and EU countries. As a result, *K* tended to show individual actors in the militaristic rather than the political context compared to *FT*.

It is also important to consider the difference between *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times* in regard to the cause of the attack. All of the most mentioned actors, except Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lavrov, and Alexander Lukashevich tended not to name any particular cause of the attack or, in the case of Alexander Lukashevich to blame Syrian rebels (37,5%) or third party radical Islamists (12,5%). It may be assumed that since both Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov are international public figures, they probably represent the official Russian position on the situation.

Especially when taking into account the difference between Putin and Lavrov, it may be assumed that as a president, Putin tended to be more balanced in finding one party or the other responsible for the attack (in approximately 40% of cases Syrian official forces were named as responsible). On the contrary, Lavrov, as a Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs tended not to point at any side and probably for this reason did not define who exactly was responsible for the attack in approximately 88% of cases.

There is not enough evidence to make any sound conclusions to explain the reason of this behavior, however it may be assumed that Lavrov, similarly to Putin, also avoids naming any side as responsible and is trying to be neutral and unbiased. This is very similar to the tendency to neutrality previously found in *the Kommersant*. It is not very clear whether this is a style of reporting in *K* aimed to reduce bias, whether this is a result of the ideological preferences of the Russian official government position, or whether this is a result of the ideological restrictions for the media when covering international issues similar to the Syrian crisis.

In *the Financial Times*, both Putin and Lavrov did not name any side responsible for the attack, while the actors from USA, UK, and EU did name Syrian official forces responsible for the chemical attack. Thus, based on the result of both newspapers, it may be assumed that the result of Russian officials being neutral is rooted in the Russian government position on Syria and in this way may be seen as an ideological issue. To confirm this assumption and also to compare whether similar uniformity of the U.S., UK, and EU officials will be present in other newspapers it may be necessary to compare these data with the information presented on the same international issue in the EU and U.S. newspapers that cover similar topics as *K* and *FT*.

According to *Table 28*, the government officials in *K* tend to be neutral and balanced toward the Syrian government (more than 55% of cases combined), while the government officials in *FT*

tend to be negative toward the Syrian government (74% of cases). This is similar to the general attitudes found in both newspapers, which is shown in *Figures 12 and 13*.

Comparing *Table 28* and *Figure 13* one may see approximately a 20% difference in neutral attitudes. Based on this data, it may be assumed that the tendency toward neutrality in *K* may be a result of the ideological restraints originating from the Russian political environment. The data presented here does not allow for making any sound conclusions on this matter, however it seems based on the findings that the less foreign international actors are mentioned in the articles the more a tendency toward neutrality prevails, which seems to be in concordance with the position of the Russian government officials toward the cause of the attack shown in the *Table 27*. To check this assumption, more international issues should be analyzed and compared in both newspapers to see whether this assumption stays true.

Answering the research questions

The first research question (RQ1) asked whether *the Financial Times* would frame Syrian opposition in a more positive way than *the Kommersant*. According to the data gathered during the analysis, it may be said that there were not enough cases found in the articles to answer this question. The total amount of cases that contained the information on the Syrian opposition was 7 out of 938 which does not allow for comparing two newspapers on this issue. However, the focus of this study looked on the international actors from the U.S., UK, EU, Russia, and China involved into the issue, but did not focus on the cases when other actors were present. If analyzing the cases where international actors from other regions, as well as local and Middle Eastern authorities, international agencies, and other international and supranational bodies are involved, the analysis may render a different result. This may be a focus that further research on the issue may be employed for analysis purposes.

The second research question (RQ2) asked whether *the Kommersant* would frame Syrian authorities in a more positive way than *the Financial Times*. Based on the results, it may be said that *the Kommersant* framed Syrian authorities in a less negative way rather than in a more positive one. According to the findings, attitudes toward the Syrian authorities in *FT* were more negative than in *K*. The Syrian authorities were framed as negative in *the Kommersant* in approximately 45% of all the cases where attitudes toward this category were expressed, while the same category was framed as negative in *the Financial Times* in approximately 65% of cases according to *Table 1*. No positive attitudes were found in both newspapers. *K* tended also to frame the Syrian authorities as neutral or balanced (approximately 55% combined), while *FT* also framed Syrian authorities as balanced (in approximately 35% of cases). Thus, the answer that *K* framed the Syrian authorities less negatively than *FT*, rather than more positively, better suits this case.

The third research question (RQ3) asked whether *the Kommersant* would frame Russian and Chinese officials in a more positive way than *the Financial Times*. In regard to this question, it may be stated that it is not possible to evaluate the attitudes toward the Chinese officials in the articles due to the fact that less than 1% of corresponding cases was observed during the analysis. On the other hand, it is possible to respond to this question in regard to how Russian officials were framed in both newspapers.

There were two Russian officials found in *FT* (Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov) that were mentioned in more than 3% of cases, others were not considered for the purpose of this study. Both officials were portrayed balanced in 100% of cases, thus not being framed either in a positive or a negative way. In *K*, three Russian officials who were mentioned more than 3% of times were found (Vladimir Putin, Sergei Lavrov, and Alexander Lukashevich). Sergei Lavrov was portrayed balanced in 100% of cases, while Vladimir Putin was portrayed balanced in 83.3% of cases and

neutral in 16.7% of cases, according to *Table 25*. Aleksandr Lukashevich was portrayed balanced in *the Kommersant* in 62.5% of cases and neutral in 37.5% of cases.

Thus, in regard to this question it may be said that Russian officials were framed more neutral rather than more positive in *the Kommersant* than in *the Financial Times*, where they were framed as balanced in 100% of cases. The results may not be completely accurate due to the possibility of sampling and methodology errors and restrictions, however they show the tendency toward neutrality that was observed previously for the data received from *the Kommersant* articles. Both newspapers did not show negative or positive evaluations of the government officials. It might be interesting, however, to analyze the same officials in the context of other international issues covered by both newspapers to see whether the same tendency prevails.

Additionally, it is important to note, that the USA, UK, EU, and “West” as international actors in general were framed less positively in *K* than in *FT* according to the *Table 2*. As mentioned previously in the discussion, a significant amount of articles in *K* mentioned none or only few international actors, as well as officials per article. The articles in *K* were also rather short compared to *FT*, which may not allow thorough description of the issue compared to *FT* where the articles contained information on more actors and officials due to the fact that they were significantly longer.

RQ4 asked whether *the Financial Times* would frame the U.S., UK, and EU officials in a more positive way than *the Kommersant*. According to the *Table 25*, *the Kommersant* tended to frame the U.S., UK, and EU officials in a more neutral way than *the Financial Times*. Thus, *FT* framed the officials in a more balanced, rather than in a more positive way than *K*. The number of neutral evaluations in *K* varied from 10.5% (David Cameron) to 37.5% (Barack Obama), while in *FT* there

were only two categories with more than 10% of neutral evaluations found for the U.S., UK, and EU officials: Chuck Hagel (11.1%) and John Kerry (19.4%).

It should be noted that only the officials who were present in 3% or more cases were considered, while other officials were not considered for the analysis. The figures might be slightly different if considering all the officials and if analyzing other international issues in both newspapers. However, the present data indicates the trend toward neutrality in *the Kommersant* that was mentioned previously in the discussion section. Additionally, the article length and the total amount of international actors and officials mentioned per article in both newspapers should be considered in regard to this research question.

RQ5 asked which of the newspapers will emphasize sanctions and military measures toward Syrian authorities among the possible solutions to the issue.

It may be seen from *Figures 20 and 21* that military measures as a solution in *K* were mentioned in 49.69% of cases while 54.35% of cases in *FT* showed this solution, thus it may be assumed based on this information that neither newspapers directly avoided mentioning this solution in the articles. However, *the Kommersant* provided no solution to the situation in 12.58% of cases and offered non-military solutions in approximately 35% of cases. *FT* mentioned no solution to the situation in less than 1% of cases and non-military measures as a solution in approximately 44% of cases. The fact that no remedy was mentioned in *K* may be seen as a tendency to avoid emphasizing any solutions, but it may not be stated what exact type of solutions was avoided to emphasize by the newspaper. On the other hand, this may also be seen as a result of how the content was presented in *the Kommersant*. As was mentioned above, the articles were rather short and general in the description of the events, while *the Financial Times* tended to provide a more detailed coverage of the events in longer articles.

Additionally, if broken down by particular international actors, it may be seen that *the Kommersant* tended to be more neutral and balanced when mentioning military measures than *the Financial Times*. According to *Table 2*, military measures were framed as positive in 48.1% of cases in *K*, while this solution to the situation was framed as positive in 78% of cases by *FT* in the cases when international actors were mentioned. No negative attitudes toward military measures were observed in *K*, while negative attitudes were observed in *FT* in 0.6% of cases analyzed. It is also important to note, that neither Russia nor China suggested military measures as a solution to the situation. This information may be seen as an indirect argument toward the assumption that *the Kommersant* avoided emphasizing military measures as a solution to the situation in the articles analyzed. However, it is not enough to affirmatively answer this question based on the data gathered from this study.

To support this assumption, it is necessary to compare the content of both newspapers on other international issues where Russian national interests were involved. For example, the recent conflict in Ukraine, the conflicts in Chechnya, and the war in Georgia in 2008 may be a good way to test this assumption and to show whether the numbers show similar results on this matter.

RQ6 asked whether any information covered by one newspaper was not covered by another newspaper.

According to the findings, *FT* did cover with great scrutiny the political processes related to the issue that took place in UK, the U.S., and France, while *K* did not pay significant attention to the political processes in any of these countries. A few short notes mentioning that some political actions took place in these countries were present in *the Kommersant*, however this information did not mention particular actions and processes taking place, as well as it did not show the political debates from the insider perspective as *FT* did.

Additionally, *K* added more of the Russian political context when covering the issue than *FT* where Russian political decisions and processes related to the issue were not discussed to such extent. *The Kommersant* covered more Russian officials than *FT* did, similarly to how *FT* covered more American and European officials in relation to the issue than *K*. This may be seen concordant with the concept of “domestication of news” that was mentioned in the literature review and theory section of this work.

Also, *K* introduced a new collective actor “West” which was used as a very broad term to address the countries that were not on the Russian side of the spectrum in regard to the situation. However, it was interesting that in one article this term was used to address allies, but at the same time left Germany as an international actor aside from the definition due to the fact that Germany proposed diplomatic rather than military solution to the situation.

Compared to *the Kommersant*, *the Financial Times* in approximately 99.5% of cases offered some solutions while *the Kommersant* described no solutions in more than 12% of cases. This may be seen as a way of not completely covering the issue by *K*, as a way of being partly “aloof” from the problem that is mentioned in the article. Similarly, this “aloofness” may be seen in the tendency to neutrality in coverage and in the way the content was presented (i.e. the presence of short general articles with no or few international actors mentioned).

Thus, while covering the issue, each newspaper added more of local political context and sometimes used slightly different focus in relation to the situation in the news coverage.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This work was intended to compare media frames between *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times* regarding the chemical attack that took place in Syria on August 21, 2013. It was an exploratory study that should allow reorganizing the methodology in order to come up with more systematic approach. The analysis focused on the possible politico-ideological differences between the two newspapers as well as tested the methodology for the comparative framing analysis that may be employed for further comparative studies in media framing on international issues.

As a result, 938 references that fall into the defined criteria were observed and analyzed using the proposed methodological tool. The criteria included predefined international actors involved in the event (USA, UK, EU (excluding UK), Russia, and China), the chemical attack of August 21, 2013 mentioned in the articles, and international decisions regarding the chemical attack described in the article. Some important trends in the news coverage used by both newspapers were found during the analysis that may be helpful for future studies.

First, the tendency toward neutrality in presenting the information was observed in the articles published by *the Kommersant* while *the Financial Times* tended to be more balanced in presenting the information on the issue. Second, the majority of the articles in *the Kommersant* were less than 200 words, while the articles in *FT* mostly contained more than 500 words. Third, *the Kommersant* used one, and less frequently, two information sources in the articles analyzed, while *FT* tended to use more sources for the publication. Fourth, the *K* articles were mostly written by journalists who stayed in Russia, rather than by foreign correspondents who were based in the regions where the events took place; the articles published in *FT* were written both by local and foreign

correspondents. Fifth, the articles in *K* tended to be general and non-personal, while the articles published in *FT* tended to be more personal and more detailed in presenting the information.

This tendency toward neutrality combined with the way the information was presented in the articles creates the base for several assumptions. Taking into account the abovementioned factors, it may be assumed that *K* tended to either avoid publishing some information, or to be as neutral in the news coverage as possible.

If aligning with the first explanation, this may mean that *K* was avoiding publishing some information due to the possible ideological restrictions or political context in Russia. This may be true in case that some type of censorship on the international issues involving Russian national interest may exist in Russia and thus may be a part of the local political environment. This may explain the reason why mostly Russian news agencies and local journalists were used as news sources for the stories. However, the scope of this study does not allow for confirmation of this assumption and more research on the Russian political and ideological context in relation to the media coverage is necessary to support this assumption.

On the contrary, if aligning with the second explanation, this may mean that there might be some professional or cultural journalistic norms in the country that impose certain way of the information representation on the international issues that is considered to be unbiased. This may explain the tendency of mentioning plain facts from the news agencies without providing various perspectives on the issue from multiple sources in a single article by *the Kommersant*. In this case, more research on the Russian professional journalistic routines and cultural norms of the news coverage in historical perspective may be necessary to provide some sound conclusions.

In regard to the research questions, the study showed that both newspapers tended not to give negative or positive evaluations to international actors and officials when covering the issue, thus

being mostly neutral or balanced in the way they framed the actors. Also, the study showed that *the Kommersant* tended to frame Syrian authorities in a less negative way than *FT*, rather than framing them in a more positive way. Instead of showing them in a more positive way, *K* tended also to show them more in a neutral or balanced way.

Additionally, based on the results, it may be assumed that neither *FT* nor *K* tended to directly emphasize or avoid emphasizing certain types of solutions toward the situation, such as military or non-military measures. However, this is only true if considering all the cases from the dataset. If looking more precisely at the breakdown of the solutions offered by each international actor per newspaper, it may be seen that the same solutions are ascribed to a particular actor with a difference in their attitudes toward these solutions. This means that the international actors in *FT* tended to be more positive toward the military measures, while the same international actors in *K* tended to be more neutral and balanced in attitudes toward the military measures as a solution to the situation.

The results also showed that some information that was covered by one newspaper was not covered by another. Thus, *FT* tended to cover with a great scrutiny the political processes related to the issue that took place in the UK, U.S., and France and to the officials from these regions, while *K* did not pay significant attention to the political processes in either of these countries. Conversely, *K* tended to pay more attention to the political events in Russia than *FT* did. Additionally, *the Kommersant* mentioned more Russian officials in regard to the issue, similarly to *the Financial Times* who published more information on the officials from the U.S., UK, and EU. These findings are concordant with the concept of “domestication of news” which may be used to explain the reason why the information was presented in this particular way.

Also, *the Kommersant* used a collective actor “West” that had a broad meaning, but presumably was introduced to address the U.S., UK, and EU allies that were not on the Russian side of the spectrum in regard to the situation. Finally, a certain share of “aloofness” was observed in the articles published by *the Kommersant* due to the fact that the information in some cases tended to be incomplete when no solutions to the problem were provided in the text. In contrast to *the Kommersant*, *the Financial Times* provided at least one solution in approximately 99.5% of cases.

In regard to the methodological approach, it may be said that with minor changes and amendments this methodology may be used to gather the information in the future comparative framing studies on international issues and conflicts. Compared to the original methodology provided by Entman (first, identifying issue, event, and actors; second, identifying frame functions: problem, cause, remedy/solution, judgment/attitude), this study also employed the category of “context/rhetoric” to show the contextual environment or discourse in which the categories proposed by Entman may be found. The study also looked at the type of attitudes/judgments (personal vs. general) and the source of personal attitudes/judgments found in the stories; as well as on the type of news sources used, the amount of sources used for each story, and for the length of articles published both in *the Financial Times* and *the Kommersant*.

Thus, based on the Entman’s methodology, the proposed analytical tool allows more scrutiny by providing additional insights on the context and type of content used by a medium. Thus, it may also be helpful not only for comparing the content, but also for deriving certain assumptions that tend to explain the reasons why the content is presented in each medium in one way or another.

This tool, however was designed to analyze the text, not visual or audial content. However, it may be used as a base for creating a tool for analyzing both audial and visual content as well.

There are some additional limitations to this study and methodology. First, the study lacks intercoder reliability and thus should be considered a pilot. Second, this study analyzed a single issue, chemical attack in Syria, which is not enough to generalize the results and to claim that the way information was presented in regard to this issue in each newspaper is generally presented this way both in *FT* and *K*. To make this claim it is necessary to analyze how both newspapers cover other conflicts where Russian or UK national interests are involved. Such issues as the war in Iraq in 2003, the wars in Chechnya, the war in Georgia in 2008, and the present civil war in Ukraine may be good cases to compare.

Also, to make claims that political, ideological, cultural, or professional environment in either the UK or Russia may have an impact on the way information is presented in the articles, it may be necessary to provide a more detailed background on the historical, cultural, and professional context that may influence the work of media, journalists, or editors in a given country. In addition, a detailed background on the political systems and processes, media environment, geopolitical orientation and ideological doctrines of each country should be thoroughly considered to make claims whether any element of a particular environment may affect media coverage and to what extent it may be true.

Moreover, performing comparative studies on international issues, especially on war conflicts such as the Syrian Crisis, may be beneficial not only to the scientific pull of knowledge, but may also be a means of decreasing subjectivity and ideological stereotypes of both readers and journalists. Showing discrepancies in story frames on the same issue may help in explaining how various factors, such as different ideological, cultural, and professional contexts may decrease objectivity and thus reinforce stereotypes and limited perceptions toward particular political, social, or cultural groups to a wider audience.

Substantial amount of research on international issues already exists. However, the process of informing a wider audience all over the world is gradual and the eventual purpose may not be achieved by conducting a single study. The research on the crossroads of different ideological, cultural, and professional attitudes is a way to compare these attitudes and to explain why such attitudes exist, what logic is inherent to them. Comparative studies in communication are mirrors of a contemporary, multifaceted world and they help to bring awareness and understanding of the same events from multiple perspectives.

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APPENDIX




Figure 1. Number of articles per day³²

³² The figure shows the amount of articles published in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times* during August 21st and September 4th were selected for the analysis




Figure 2. Breakdown by international actor in *the Kommersant*³³




Figure 3. Breakdown by international actor in *the Financial Times*³⁴

³³ Figure 2 shows what international actors were found in *the Kommersant* during the analysis

³⁴ Figure 3 shows what international actors were found in *the Financial Times* during the analysis




Figure 4. Number of actors per article in *the Financial Times*³⁵




Figure 5. Number of actors per article in *the Kommersant*³⁶

³⁵ Figure 4 shows how many international actors per article were found in *the Financial Times* during the analysis

³⁶ Figure 5 shows how many international actors per article were found in *the Kommersant* during the analysis




Figure 6. Breakdown by the EU members in *the Kommersant*³⁷




Figure 7. Breakdown by the EU members in *the Financial Times*³⁸

³⁷ Figure 6 shows what members of the EU were found in the *the Kommersant* articles during the analysis

³⁸ Figure 7 shows what members of the EU were found in the *the Financial Times* articles during the analysis




Figure 8. Context in *the Financial Times*³⁹




Figure 9. Context in *the Kommersant*⁴⁰

³⁹ Figure 8 shows the context that was observed regarding the chemical attack in Syria in *the Financial Times*

⁴⁰ Figure 9 shows the context that was observed regarding the chemical attack in Syria in *the Kommersant*




Figure 10. Number of officials in *the Kommersant*⁴¹




Figure 11. Number of officials in *the Financial Times*⁴²

⁴¹ Figure 10 shows how many government officials per article were found in *the Kommersant*

⁴² Figure 11 shows how many government officials per article were found in *the Financial Times*




Figure 12. Cause of the attack in *the Financial Times*⁴³




Figure 13. Cause of the attack in *the Kommersant*⁴⁴

⁴³ Figure 12 shows what cause of the attack was mentioned in *the Kommersant* articles analyzed

⁴⁴ Figure 13 shows what cause of the attack was mentioned in *the Financial Times* articles analyzed




Figure 14. Attitude toward the cause of the attack in *the Financial Times*⁴⁵




Figure 15. Attitude toward the cause of the attack in *the Kommersant*⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Figure 14 shows what attitudes toward the cause of the attack were found in *the Financial Times*

⁴⁶ Figure 15 shows what attitudes toward the cause of the attack were found in *the Kommersant*




Figure 16. Type of attitude toward the cause in *The Financial Times*⁴⁷




Figure 17. Type of attitude toward the cause in *The Kommersant*⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Figure 16 shows how many personal and general attitudes were found in *the Financial Times* articles

⁴⁸ Figure 17 shows how many personal and general attitudes were found in *the Kommersant* articles




Figure 18. Personal attitude toward the cause in *The Kommersant*⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Figure 18 shows what government officials and individual actors provided attitudes toward the cause of the attack in *the Kommersant*




Figure 19. Personal attitude toward the cause in *The Financial Times*⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Figure 19 shows what government officials and individual actors provided attitudes toward the cause of the attack in *the Financial Times*




Figure 20. Solutions offered in *The Financial Times*⁵¹

⁵¹ Figure 20 shows what solutions were offered in *the Financial Times* in regard to the chemnical attack in Syria




Figure 21. Solutions offered in *The Kommersant*⁵²

⁵² Figure 21 shows what solutions were offered in *the Kommersant* in regard to the chemical attack in Syria




Figure 22. Personal attitudes toward the solutions in *The Financial Times*⁵³

⁵³ Figure 22 shows what individual actors provided personal attitudes in regard to the solutions to the situation offered after the chemical attack in Syria in *the Financial Times*




Figure 23. Personal attitudes toward the solutions in *The Kommersant*⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Figure 23 shows what individual actors provided personal attitudes in regard to the solutions to the situation offered after the chemical attack in Syria in *the Kommersant*




Figure 24. Primary information sources in *The Kommersant*⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Figure 24 shows what were the primary information sources that were used in *the Kommersant*




Figure 25. Primary information sources in *The Financial Times*⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Figure 25 shows what were the primary information sources that were used in *the Financial Times*




Figure 26. Number of sources in *The Financial Times*⁵⁷




Figure 27. Number of sources in *The Kommersant*⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Figure 26 shows how many sources per article were used in *the Financial Times*

⁵⁸ Figure 27 shows how many sources per article were used in *the Kommersant*




Figure 28. Article length in *The Kommersant*⁵⁹




Figure 29. Article length in *The Financial Times*⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Figure 28 shows how long were the articles in *the Kommersant* that were analyzed

⁶⁰ Figure 29 shows how long were the articles in *the Financial Times* that were analyzed




Figure 30. Government officials in *The Kommersant*⁶¹

⁶¹ Figure 30 shows what government officials were found in *the Kommerasnt* articles in regard to the chemical attack in Syria




Figure 31. Government officials in *The Financial Times*⁶²

⁶² Figure 31 shows what government officials were found in *the Financial Times* articles in regard to the chemical attack in Syria

Table 1. Cause * Attitude toward the cause * Newspaper crosstabulation⁶³

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Cause_agent * Attitude_toward_the_cause_agent * Newspaper	938	100.0%	0	0.0%	938	100.0%

Cause_agent * Attitude_toward_the_cause_agent * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% of Total

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_the_cause_agent			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	Cause_agent	Syrian official forces	26.4%	14.5%	17.6%	58.5%
		Syrian rebels		0.6%	1.3%	1.9%
		Undefined	1.6%	14.5%	23.3%	39.3%
		Third Party (Radical Islamists)			0.3%	0.3%
	Total		28.0%	29.6%	42.5%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Cause_agent	Syrian official forces	55.3%	0.3%	30.2%	85.8%
		Syrian rebels	0.2%			0.2%
		Undefined	0.3%	0.2%	13.5%	14.0%
	Total		55.8%	0.5%	43.7%	100.0%
Total	Cause_agent	Syrian official forces	45.5%	5.1%	25.9%	76.5%
		Syrian rebels	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%
		Undefined	0.7%	5.0%	16.8%	22.6%
		Third Party (Radical Islamists)			0.1%	0.1%
	Total		46.4%	10.3%	43.3%	100.0%

⁶³ Table 1 shows what attitudes toward each particular potential cause of the chemical attack in Syria were mentioned in both *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 2. International actor * Attitude toward military measures * Newspaper crosstabulation⁶⁴

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor * Attitude_toward_the_military_ measures* Newspaper	495	52.8%	443	47.2%	938	100.0%

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_the_military_measures * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_the_military_measures				Total
			Negative	Positive	Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	International_Actor	USA		46.2%	14.3%	39.6%	100.0%
		UK		57.7%	19.2%	23.1%	100.0%
		EU		54.8%	12.9%	32.3%	100.0%
		West		20.0%	60.0%	20.0%	100.0%
	Total			48.1%	17.7%	34.2%	100.0%
The Financial Times	International_Actor	USA		81.1%		18.9%	100.0%
		UK		71.4%		28.6%	100.0%
		EU	3,3%	82.0%		14.8%	100.0%
	Total		0,6%	78.0%		21.4%	100.0%
Total	International_Actor	USA		68.6%	5.1%	26.3%	100.0%
		UK		68.8%	3.6%	27.5%	100.0%
		EU	2,2%	72.8%	4.3%	20.7%	100.0%
		West		20.0%	60.0%	20.0%	100.0%
	Total		0,4%	68.5%	5.7%	25.5%	100.0%

⁶⁴ Table 2 shows what attitudes toward military measures against the Syrian regime were expressed by each international actor both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 3. International actor * Attitude toward checking the cause of attack * Newspaper crosstabulation⁶⁵

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor * Attitude_toward_ Check_the_evidence* Newspaper	62	6.6%	876	93.4%	938	100.0%

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_Check_the_evidence * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_Check_the_evidence				Total
			Negative	Positive	Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	International_Actor	USA		28.6%		71.4%	100.0%
		UK				100.0%	100.0%
		EU				100.0%	100.0%
		Russia		61.5%		38.5%	100.0%
		Total		41.7%		58.3%	100.0%
The Financial Times	International_Actor	USA	16.7%	33.3%	16.7%	33.3%	100.0%
		UK		80.0%	10.0%	10.0%	100.0%
		EU			25.0%	75.0%	100.0%
		Russia		92.3%		7.7%	100.0%
		China		100.0%			100.0%
		Total	2.6%	71.1%	7.9%	18.4%	100.0%
Total	International_Actor	USA	7.7%	30.8%	7.7%	53.8%	100.0%
		UK		66.7%	8.3%	25.0%	100.0%
		EU			16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
		Russia		76.9%		23.1%	100.0%
		China		100.0%			100.0%
		Total	1.6%	59.7%	4.8%	33.9%	100.0%

⁶⁵ Table 3 shows what attitudes toward the solution to check the evidence of the chemical attack in Syria were expressed by each international actor both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 4. International actor * Attitude toward postponing/abandoning military measures * Newspaper crosstabulation⁶⁶

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor * Attitude_toward_Postpone/ abandon_military_measures* Newspaper	158	16.8%	780	83.2%	938	100.0%

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_Postpone/abandon_military_measures * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor

			Attitude_toward_Postpone/ abandon_military_measures				Total
			Negative	Positive	Neutral	Balanced	
Newspaper							
The Kommersant	International_Actor	USA				100.0%	100.0%
		UK			11.1%	88.9%	100.0%
		EU		20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	100.0%
		Russia		14.3%	28.6%	57.1%	100.0%
		China			100.0%		100.0%
	Total			7.7%	23.1%	69.2%	100.0%
The Financial Times	International_Actor	USA		20.0%		80.0%	100.0%
		UK	7,4%	51.9%		40.7%	100.0%
		EU		64.7%		35.3%	100.0%
		Russia	2,9%	94.3%		2.9%	100.0%
		China		100.0%			100.0%
	Total		3,8%	71.2%		25.0%	100.0%
Total	International_Actor	USA		11.1%		88.9%	100.0%
		UK	6,3%	44.4%	1.6%	47.6%	100.0%
		EU		54.5%	9.1%	36.4%	100.0%
		Russia	2,4%	81.0%	4.8%	11.9%	100.0%
		China		95.5%	4.5%		100.0%
	Total		3,2%	60.8%	3.8%	32.3%	100.0%

⁶⁶ Table 4 shows what attitudes toward the solution to postpone or abandon military measures against the Syrian regime were expressed by each international actor both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

**Table 5. International actor * Attitude toward discussing the situation
* Newspaper crosstabulation⁶⁷**

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor * Attitude_toward_discussing_the_situation * Newspaper	135	14.4%	803	85.6%	938	100.0%

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_discussing_the_situation * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_discussing_the_situation			Total
			Positive	Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	International_Actor	USA		40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
		UK		50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		EU	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%	100.0%
		Russia	71.4%	28.6%		100.0%
		China		100.0%		100.0%
	Total		17.1%	43.9%	39.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	International_Actor	USA	19.5%		80.5%	100.0%
		UK	9.5%		90.5%	100.0%
		EU			100.0%	100.0%
		Russia	100.0%			100.0%
		China	100.0%			100.0%
	Total		22.3%		77.7%	100.0%
Total	International_Actor	USA	13.1%	13.1%	73.8%	100.0%
		UK	7.4%	11.1%	81.5%	100.0%
		EU	7.7%	7.7%	84.6%	100.0%
		Russia	85.7%	14.3%		100.0%
		China	57.1%	42.9%		100.0%
	Total		20.7%	13.3%	65.9%	100.0%

⁶⁷ Table 5 shows what attitudes toward the solution to discuss the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were expressed by each international actor both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 6. International actor * Attitude toward diplomatic solution * Newspaper crosstabulation⁶⁸

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor * Attitude_toward_finding_a_dip lomatic_solution * Newspaper	36	3.8%	902	96.2%	938	100.0%

International_Actor * Attitude_diplomatic_solution * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_the diplomatic_solution		Total
			Positive	Balanced	
The Kommersant	International_Actor	USA		100.0%	100.0%
		UK		100.0%	100.0%
		EU	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		Russia	42.9%	57.1%	100.0%
	Total		34.8%	65.2%	100.0%
The Financial Times	International_Actor	UK		100.0%	100.0%
		EU		100.0%	100.0%
		Russia	100.0%		100.0%
	Total		23.1%	76.9%	100.0%
Total	International_Actor	USA		100.0%	100.0%
		UK		100.0%	100.0%
		EU	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
		Russia	52.9%	47.1%	100.0%
	Total		30.6%	69.4%	100.0%

⁶⁸ Table 6 shows what attitudes toward the diplomatic solution to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were expressed by each international actor both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 7. International actor * Attitude toward no solution * Newspaper crosstabulation⁶⁹

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor * Attitude_toward_no_solution * Newspaper	43	4.6%	895	95.4%	938	100.0%

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_no_solution * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_no_solution		Total
			Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	International_Actor	USA	69.2%	30.8%	100.0%
		UK	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		EU	100.0%		100.0%
		Russia	68.8%	31.3%	100.0%
		China	100.0%		100.0%
		West	100.0%		100.0%
	Total		67.5%	32.5%	100.0%
The Financial Times	International_Actor	USA	100.0%		100.0%
	Total		100.0%		100.0%
Total	International_Actor	USA	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%
		UK	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		EU	100.0%		100.0%
		Russia	68.8%	31.3%	100.0%
		China	100.0%		100.0%
		West	100.0%		100.0%
	Total		69.8%	30.2%	100.0%

⁶⁹ Table 7 shows what attitudes toward the situation in Syria were expressed by each international actor both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times* in cases when no particular solutions were offered

Table 8. International actor * Attitude toward diplomatic solution * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷⁰

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Remedy*International_ActorUSA * Newspaper	363	38.7%	575	61.3%	938	100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_USA * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_USA

Newspaper			International_Actor_USA	Total
			USA	
The Kommersant	Remedy	Military measures	64.5%	64.5%
		Check the evidence of attack	5.0%	5.0%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	2.8%	2.8%
		Move marine forces to the Mediterranean	2.1%	2.1%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	14.2%	14.2%
		Find a diplomatic solution	2.1%	2.1%
		No remedy	9.2%	9.2%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Remedy	Military measures	73.9%	73.9%
		Check the evidence of attack	2.7%	2.7%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	2.3%	2.3%
		Supply rebels with defence weapons	1.4%	1.4%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	18.5%	18.5%
		No remedy	1.4%	1.4%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁷⁰ Table 8 shows what attitudes toward the diplomatic solution after the chemical attack in Syria were expressed by each international actor both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 9. Solution* International actor UK * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷¹

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Remedy*International_Actor_UK*Newspaper	249	26.5%	689	73.5%	938	100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_UK * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_UK

Newspaper			International Actor_UK	Total
			UK	
The Kommersant	Remedy	Military measures	52.0%	52.0%
		Check the evidence of attack	4.0%	4.0%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	18.0%	18.0%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	12.0%	12.0%
		Find a diplomatic solution	4.0%	4.0%
		No remedy	10.0%	10.0%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Remedy	Military measures	56.3%	56.3%
		Check the evidence of attack	5.0%	5.0%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	27.1%	27.1%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	10.6%	10.6%
		Find a diplomatic solution	1.0%	1.0%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Remedy	Military measures	55.4%	55.4%
		Check the evidence of attack	4.8%	4.8%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	25.3%	25.3%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	10.8%	10.8%
		Find a diplomatic solution	1.6%	1.6%
		No remedy	2.0%	2.0%
		Total	100.0%	100.0%

⁷¹ Table 9 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offered by the UK

Table 10. Solution* International actor EU * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷²

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Remedy*International_Actor_EU*Newspaper	164	17.5%	774	82.5%	938	100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_EU * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_EU

			International_Actor_EU	
Newspaper			EU	Total
The Kommersant	Remedy	Military measures	58.5%	58.5%
		Check the evidence of attack	3.8%	3.8%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	9.4%	9.4%
		Supply rebels with defence weapons	1.9%	1.9%
		Move marine forces to the Mediterranean	1.9%	1.9%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	9.4%	9.4%
		Find a diplomatic solution	7.5%	7.5%
		No remedy	5.7%	5.7%
		Impose sanctions on Syrian regime	1.9%	1.9%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Remedy	Military measures	55.0%	55.0%
		Check the evidence of attack	3.6%	3.6%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	15.3%	15.3%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	18.9%	18.9%
		Find a diplomatic solution	7.2%	7.2%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁷² Table 10 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offered by the EU

Table 11. Solution* International actor Russia * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷³

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Remedy*International_Actor_Russia*Newspaper	115	12.3%	823	87.7%	938	100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_Russia * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_Russia

Newspaper			International Actor_Russia	Total
			Russia	
The Kommersant	Remedy	Check the evidence of attack	22.8%	22.8%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	12.3%	12.3%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	12.3%	12.3%
		Find a diplomatic solution	24.6%	24.6%
		No remedy	28.1%	28.1%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Remedy	Check the evidence of attack	22.4%	22.4%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	60.3%	60.3%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	12.1%	12.1%
		Find a diplomatic solution	5.2%	5.2%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁷³ Table 11 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offered by Russia

Table 12. Solution * International actor China * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷⁴

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Remedy * International_Actor_China * Newspaper	36	3.8%	902	96.2%	938	100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_China * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_China

			International Actor_China	Total
			China	
Newspaper				
The Kommersant	Remedy	Postpone/abandon military measures	16.7%	16.7%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	50.0%	50.0%
		No remedy	33.3%	33.3%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Remedy	Check the evidence of attack	16.7%	16.7%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	70.0%	70.0%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	13.3%	13.3%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁷⁴ Table 12 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offered by China

Table 13. Solution * International actor “West” * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷⁵

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Remedy * International_Actor_West * Newspaper	11	1.2%	927	98.8%	938	100.0%

Remedy * International_Actor_West * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_West

Newspaper			International_Act or_West	Total
			West	
The Kommersant	Remedy	Military measures	90.9%	90.9%
		No remedy	9.1%	9.1%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
Total	Remedy	Military measures	90.9%	90.9%
		No remedy	9.1%	9.1%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁷⁵ Table 13 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offered by the collective actor “West”

Table 14. Solution * International actor France * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷⁶

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Remedy * EU_France * Newspaper	108	11.5%	830	88.5%	938	100.0%

Remedy * EU_France * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within EU_France

Newspaper			EU_France	Total
			France	
The Kommersant	Remedy	Military measures	70.6%	70.6%
		Check the evidence of attack	2.9%	2.9%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	8.8%	8.8%
		Supply rebels with defence weapons	2.9%	2.9%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	5.9%	5.9%
		No remedy	5.9%	5.9%
		Impose sanctions on Syrian regime	2.9%	2.9%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Remedy	Military measures	73.0%	73.0%
		Check the evidence of attack	2.7%	2.7%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	2.7%	2.7%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	18.9%	18.9%
		Find a diplomatic solution	2.7%	2.7%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁷⁶ Table 14 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offered by France

Table 15. Solution * International actor Germany * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷⁷

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Remedy * EU_Germany * Newspaper	38	4.1%	900	95.9%	938	100.0%

Remedy * EU_Germany * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within EU_Germany

Newspaper			EU_Germany	Total
			Germany	
The Kommersant	Remedy	Military measures	10.0%	10.0%
		Check the evidence of attack	10.0%	10.0%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	20.0%	20.0%
		Discuss the situation in Syria	30.0%	30.0%
		Find a diplomatic solution	20.0%	20.0%
		No remedy	10.0%	10.0%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Remedy	Military measures	21.4%	21.4%
		Check the evidence of attack	7.1%	7.1%
		Postpone/abandon military measures	50.0%	50.0%
		Find a diplomatic solution	21.4%	21.4%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁷⁷ Table 15 shows what solutions to the situation after the chemical attack in Syria were offered by Germany

Table 16. International actor * How the actor is portrayed * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷⁸

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor * How_the_int_actor_is_portayed * Newspaper	938	100.0%	0	0.0%	938	100.0%

International_Actor * How_the_int_actor_is_portayed * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor

Newspaper			How_the_int_actor_is_portayed			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	International_Actor	USA	2.1%	33.3%	64.5%	100.0%
		UK	4.0%	26.0%	70.0%	100.0%
		EU	1.9%	49.1%	49.1%	100.0%
		Russia		21.1%	78.9%	100.0%
		China		83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
		West	9.1%	63.6%	27.3%	100.0%
	Total		2.2%	34.6%	63.2%	100.0%
The Financial Times	International_Actor	USA		2.3%	97.7%	100.0%
		UK		5.5%	94.5%	100.0%
		EU		5.4%	94.6%	100.0%
		Russia	1.7%	5.2%	93.1%	100.0%
		China		53.3%	46.7%	100.0%
	Total		0.2%	6.6%	93.2%	100.0%

⁷⁸ Table 16 shows how each particular international actor was portrayed in each newspaper

Table 17. EU member * How the actor is portrayed * Newspaper crosstabulation⁷⁹

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
EU_Member*How_the_int_actor_is_portayed*Newspaper	161	17.2%	777	82.8%	938	100.0%

EU_Member * How_the_int_actor_is_portayed * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within EU_Member

Newspaper			How_the_int_actor_is_portayed			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	EU_Member	France	2.9%	47.1%	50.0%	100.0%
		Germany		30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
		Greece		50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		Denmark		100.0%		100.0%
		Croatia		100.0%		100.0%
		Romania		100.0%		100.0%
		Latvia		100.0%		100.0%
		Cyprus		100.0%		100.0%
Total			2.0%	49.0%	49.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	EU_Member	France		2.7%	97.3%	100.0%
		Germany		7.1%	92.9%	100.0%
		Italy		12.5%	87.5%	100.0%
	Total				4.5%	95.5%

⁷⁹ Table 17 shows how each particular EU member was portrayed in each newspaper

Table 18. Context * International actor USA * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸⁰

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Context_words_category * International_Actor_USA * Newspaper	362	38.6%	576	61.4%	938	100.0%

Context_words_category * International_Actor_USA * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_USA

			International_Act or_USA	Total
			USA	
Newspaper				
The Kommersant	Context_words_category	Political_rhetoric	34.0%	34.0%
		Militaristic_rhetoric	58.9%	58.9%
		Diplomatic_rhetoric	7.1%	7.1%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Context_words_category	Political_rhetoric	56.6%	56.6%
		Militaristic_rhetoric	41.2%	41.2%
		Diplomatic_rhetoric	2.3%	2.3%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁸⁰ Table 18 shows in what context was international actor USA found in each newspaper

Table 19. Context * International actor UK * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸¹

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Context_words_category * International_Actor_UK * Newspaper	248	26.4%	690	73.6%	938	100.0%

Context_words_category * International_Actor_UK * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_UK

			International_Act or_UK	Total
			UK	
Newspaper				
The Kommersant	Context_words_category	Political_rhetoric	30.0%	30.0%
		Militaristic_rhetoric	66.0%	66.0%
		Diplomatic_rhetoric	4.0%	4.0%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Context_words_category	Political_rhetoric	52.0%	52.0%
		Militaristic_rhetoric	44.4%	44.4%
		Diplomatic_rhetoric	3.0%	3.0%
		Humanitarian_rhetoric	0.5%	0.5%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁸¹ Table 19 shows in what context was international actor UK found in each newspaper

Table 20. Context * International actor EU * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸²

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Context_words_category * International_Actor_EU * Newspaper	162	17.3%	776	82.7%	938	100.0%

Context_words_category * International_Actor_EU * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_EU

			International_Act or_EU	Total
			EU	
The Kommersant	Context_words_category	Political_rhetoric	22.6%	22.6%
		Militaristic_rhetoric	60.4%	60.4%
		Diplomatic_rhetoric	17.0%	17.0%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Context_words_category	Political_rhetoric	30.3%	30.3%
		Militaristic_rhetoric	66.1%	66.1%
		Diplomatic_rhetoric	3.7%	3.7%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁸² Table 20 shows in what context was international actor EU found in each newspaper

Table 21. Context * International actor Russia * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸³

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Context_words_category * International_Actor_Russia * Newspaper	111	11.8%	827	88.2%	938	100.0%

Context_words_category * International_Actor_Russia * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor_Russia

			International_Act or_Russia	Total
			Russia	
The Kommersant	Context_words_category	Political_rhetoric	26.3%	26.3%
		Militaristic_rhetoric	40.4%	40.4%
		Diplomatic_rhetoric	33.3%	33.3%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%
The Financial Times	Context_words_category	Political_rhetoric	27.8%	27.8%
		Militaristic_rhetoric	35.2%	35.2%
		Diplomatic_rhetoric	37.0%	37.0%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%

⁸³ Table 21 shows in what context was international actor Russia found in each newspaper

Table 22. EU member * Context * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸⁴

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
EU_Member*Context_words_category*Newspaper	159	17.0%	779	83.0%	938	100.0%

EU_Member * Context_words_category * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within EU_Member

Newspaper			Context_words_category			Total
			Political rhetoric	Militaristic rhetoric	Diplomatic rhetoric	
The Kommersant	EU_Member	France	29.4%	61.8%	8.8%	100.0%
		Germany	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	100.0%
		Greece		50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		Denmark		100.0%		100.0%
		Croatia		100.0%		100.0%
		Romania		100.0%		100.0%
		Latvia		100.0%		100.0%
		Cyprus		100.0%		100.0%
	Total		23.5%	60.8%	15.7%	100.0%
The Financial Times	EU_Member	France	38.9%	61.1%		100.0%
		Germany	17.9%	67.9%	14.3%	100.0%
		Italy		100.0%		100.0%
	Total		30.6%	65.7%	3.7%	100.0%

⁸⁴ Table 22 shows in what context was each particular EU member found in each newspaper

Table 23. International actor * Attitude toward Syrian official forces * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸⁵

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor * Attitude_toward_Syrian official_forces * Newspaper	718	76.5%	220	23.5%	938	100.0%

International_Actor * Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within International_Actor

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	International_Actor	USA	46.6%	21.4%	32.0%	100.0%
		UK	51.4%	13.5%	35.1%	100.0%
		EU	44.1%	35.3%	20.6%	100.0%
		Russia		50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		China		100.0%		100.0%
		West	40.0%	60.0%		100.0%
	Total		45.2%	24.7%	30.1%	100.0%
The Financial Times	International_Actor	USA	74.8%		25.2%	100.0%
		UK	55.8%		44.2%	100.0%
		EU	59.5%	1.8%	38.7%	100.0%
	Total		64.5%	0.4%	35.2%	100.0%

⁸⁵ Table 23 shows the attitudes expressed by each particular international actor toward official Syrian forces in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 24. International actor * Attitude toward Syrian rebels * Newspaper⁸⁶

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
International_Actor*Attitude_toward_Syrian_rebels*Newspaper	7	0.7%	931	99.3%	938	100.0%

⁸⁶ Table 24 shows the attitudes expressed by each particular international actor toward Syrian rebel forces in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 25. Government official * How the actor is portrayed * Newspaper crosstabulation

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall *	529	56.4%	409	43.6%	938	100.0%
How_the_actor_is_portayed * Newspaper						

% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall

			How_the_actor_is		
			portrayed		
Newspaper			Neutral	Balanced	Total
The Kommersant	Actor_Person_shortlist_ overall	Vladimir Putin	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
		Barack Obama	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
		Sergei Lavrov		100.0%	100.0%
		John Kerry	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%
		David Cameron	10.5%	89.5%	100.0%
		Chuck Hagel	23.5%	76.5%	100.0%
		William Hague	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
		Alexandr Lukashевич	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
		Francois Hollande	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
		John Boehner	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	Undefined	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%	
Total		26.5%	73.5%	100.0%	
The Financial Times	Actor_Person_shortlist_ overall	Vladimir Putin		100.0%	100.0%
		Barack Obama	1.3%	98.8%	100.0%
		Sergei Lavrov		100.0%	100.0%
		John Kerry	19.4%	80.6%	100.0%
		David Cameron	8.0%	92.0%	100.0%
		Chuck Hagel	11.1%	88.9%	100.0%
		William Hague	3.8%	96.2%	100.0%
		Francois Hollande		100.0%	100.0%
		Douglas Alexander		100.0%	100.0%
		John Boehner		100.0%	100.0%
	Ed Miliband		100.0%	100.0%	
Total		4.7%	95.3%	100.0%	

Table 26. Government official * Context * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸⁷

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall *	529	56.4%	409	43.6%	938	100.0%
Context_words_category * Newspaper						

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Context_words_category * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall

Newspaper			Context_words_category				Total
			Political rhetoric	Militaristic rhetoric	Diplomatic rhetoric	Humanitarian rhetoric	
The Kommersant	Actor Person	Vladimir Putin	58.3%	25.0%	16.7%		100.0%
		Barack Obama	39.6%	56.3%	4.2%		100.0%
		Sergei Lavrov	17.6%	29.4%	52.9%		100.0%
		John Kerry	20.0%	65.0%	15.0%		100.0%
		David Cameron	36.8%	63.2%			100.0%
		Chuck Hagel	5.9%	94.1%			100.0%
		William Hague	16.7%	83.3%			100.0%
		Alexandr Lukashevich		75.0%	25.0%		100.0%
		Francois Hollande	50.0%	50.0%			100.0%
		John Boehner	80.0%		20.0%		100.0%
		Undefined		100.0%			100.0%
	Total		29.5%	59.0%	11.4%		100.0%

⁸⁷ Table 26 shows in what context was each particular government official found both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 26. Continued: Government official * Context * Newspaper crosstabulation

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Context_words_category * Newspaper Crosstabulation							
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall							
Newspaper			Context_words_category				Total
			Political rhetoric	Militaristic rhetoric	Diplomatic rhetoric	Humanitarian rhetoric	
The Financial Times	Actor Person	Vladimir Putin	44.4%	38.9%	16.7%		100.0%
		Barack Obama	57.5%	36.3%	6.3%		100.0%
		Sergei Lavrov	27.3%		72.7%		100.0%
		John Kerry	41.7%	58.3%			100.0%
		David Cameron	52.0%	44.0%	4.0%		100.0%
		Chuck Hagel	27.8%	72.2%			100.0%
		William Hague	7.7%	80.8%	7.7%	3.8%	100.0%
		Francois Hollande	45.7%	54.3%			100.0%
		Douglas Alexander	17.6%	76.5%	5.9%		100.0%
		John Boehner	76.5%	23.5%			100.0%
		Ed Miliband	94.7%	5.3%			100.0%
	Total		47.7%	46.0%	6.1%	0.3%	100.0%

Table 27. Government official * Cause of the attack * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸⁸

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Cause_agent * Newspaper	529	56.4%	409	43.6%	938	100.0%

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Cause_agent * Newspaper Crosstabulation							
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall							
Newspaper			Cause_agent				Total
			Syrian official forces	Syrian rebels	Undefined	Third Party (Radical Islamists)	
The Kommersant	Actor_Person	Vladimir Putin	41.7%		58.3%		100.0%
		Barack Obama	77.1%		22.9%		100.0%
		Sergei Lavrov	5.9%	5.9%	88.2%		100.0%
		John Kerry	85.0%		15.0%		100.0%
		David Cameron	73.7%		26.3%		100.0%
		Chuck Hagel	82.4%		17.6%		100.0%
		William Hague	83.3%		16.7%		100.0%
		Alexandr Lukashevich		37.5%	50.0%	12.5%	100.0%
		Francois Hollande	83.3%		16.7%		100.0%
		John Boehner	80.0%		20.0%		100.0%
		Undefined	50.0%		50.0%		100.0%
	Total		63.9%	2.4%	33.1%	0.6%	100.0%

⁸⁸ Table 27 shows what cause of chemical attack was suggested by each particular government official both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 27. Continued: Government official * Cause of the attack * Newspaper crosstabulation

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Cause_agent * Newspaper Crosstabulation							
% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall							
Newspaper			Cause_agent				Total
			Syrian official forces	Syrian rebels	Undefined	Third Party (Radical Islamists)	
The Financial Times	Actor_Person	Vladimir Putin			100.0%		100.0%
		Barack Obama	100.0%				100.0%
		Sergei Lavrov			100.0%		100.0%
		John Kerry	100.0%				100.0%
		David Cameron	100.0%				100.0%
		Chuck Hagel	100.0%				100.0%
		William Hague	100.0%				100.0%
		Francois Hollande	100.0%				100.0%
		Douglas Alexander	100.0%				100.0%
		John Boehner	100.0%				100.0%
		Ed Miliband	100.0%				100.0%
	Total		92.0%		8.0%		100.0%

Table 28. Government official * Attitude toward Syrian official forces * Newspaper crosstabulation⁸⁹

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces * Newspaper	440	46.9%	498	53.1%	938	100.0%

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Balanced	
The Kommersant	Actor_Person_shortlist_overall	Vladimir Putin		60.0%	40.0%	100.0%
		Barack Obama	29.7%	21.6%	48.6%	100.0%
		Sergei Lavrov			100.0%	100.0%
		John Kerry	58.8%	11.8%	29.4%	100.0%
		David Cameron	57.1%	14.3%	28.6%	100.0%
		Chuck Hagel	57.1%	14.3%	28.6%	100.0%
		William Hague	40.0%		60.0%	100.0%
		Francois Hollande	60.0%	20.0%	20.0%	100.0%
		John Boehner	50.0%	25.0%	25.0%	100.0%
		Undefined	50.0%		50.0%	100.0%
Total			43.4%	17.9%	38.7%	100.0%

⁸⁹ Table 28 shows what attitudes toward official Syrian forces were expressed by each particular government official both in *the Kommersant* and *the Financial Times*

Table 28. Continued: Government official * Attitude toward Syrian official forces * Newspaper crosstabulation

Actor_Person_shortlist_overall * Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces * Newspaper Crosstabulation

% within Actor_Person_shortlist_overall

Newspaper			Attitude_toward_Syrian_official_forces			Total
			Negative	Neutral	Balanced	
The Financial Times	Actor_Person_shortlist_overall	Barack Obama	78.8%		21.3%	100.0%
		John Kerry	91.7%		8.3%	100.0%
		David Cameron	78.7%		21.3%	100.0%
		Chuck Hagel	88.9%		11.1%	100.0%
		William Hague	84.6%		15.4%	100.0%
		Francois Hollande	91.3%		8.7%	100.0%
		Douglas Alexander	23.5%		76.5%	100.0%
		John Boehner	47.1%		52.9%	100.0%
		Ed Miliband			100.0%	100.0%
		Total	74.0%		26.0%	100.0%

Table 29. Government official * How the actor is portrayed * *The Financial Times*⁹⁰

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Actor_Person_FT_shortlist_analysis * How_the_actor_is_portayed	352	37.5%	586	62.5%	938	100.0%

Actor_Person_FT_shortlist_analysis * How_the_actor_is_portrayed Crosstabulation

% within Actor_Person_FT_shortlist_analysis

		How_the_actor_is_portrayed		Total
		Neutral	Balanced	
Actor_Person_FT_shortlist_analysis	Vladimir Putin		100.0%	100.0%
	Barack Obama	1.3%	98.8%	100.0%
	John Kerry	19.4%	80.6%	100.0%
	David Cameron	8.0%	92.0%	100.0%
	Chuck Hagel	11.1%	88.9%	100.0%
	William Hague	3.8%	96.2%	100.0%
	Francois Hollande		100.0%	100.0%
	Douglas Alexander		100.0%	100.0%
	John Boehner		100.0%	100.0%
	Ed Miliband		100.0%	100.0%
Total		4.8%	95.2%	100.0%

⁹⁰ Table 29 shows how each particular government official was portrayed in *the Financial Times*

Table 30. Government official * How the actor is portrayed * *The Kommersant*⁹¹

Case Processing Summary						
	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Actor_Person_K_shortlist_analysis * How_the_actor_is_portrayed	149	15.9%	789	84.1%	938	100.0%

Actor_Person_K_shortlist_analysis * How_the_actor_is_portrayed Crosstabulation

% within Actor_Person_K_shortlist_analysis

		How_the_actor_is_portrayed		Total
		Neutral	Balanced	
Actor_Person_K_shortlist analysis	Vladimir Putin	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
	Barack Obama	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
	Sergei Lavrov		100.0%	100.0%
	John Kerry	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%
	David Cameron	10.5%	89.5%	100.0%
	Chuck Hagel	23.5%	76.5%	100.0%
	Alexandr Lukashevich	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
	Undefined	37.5%	62.5%	100.0%
Total		26.2%	73.8%	100.0%

⁹¹ Table 30 shows how each particular government official was portrayed in *the Kommersant*

Table 31. Data collection coding sheet⁹²

1. Newspaper	2. Event	3. International actor	4. N of actors
Kommersant=1	Chemical attack=1	USA=1	1=1
The FT=2		UK=2	2=2
		EU=3	3=3
		Russia=4	4=4
		China=5	5=5
		"West" (collective actor)=6	
6. Actor Person	6. Actor Person	6. Actor Person	
Vladimir Putin=1	Emma Bonino=23	Hillary Clinton=45	
Barack Obama=2	John Baron=24	Keith Ellison=46	
Sergei Lavrov=3	John Boehner=25	Bob Corker=47	
John Kerry=4	Vladimir Titov=26	Marie Harf=48	
James Cameron=5	Sarah Wollaston=27	Gennadiy Gatilov=50	
Angela Merkel=6	Ed Miliband=28	Alain Vidlies=51	
Steffen Seibert=7	David Davis=29	Philip Hammond=52	
Guido Westerwelle=8	Douglas Carswell=30	Vladimir Chizhov=53	
Chuck Hagel=9	John McCain=31	Alexei Pushkov=54	
Nick Clegg=10	Sir Malcolm Rifkind=32	Valentina Matvienko=55	
William Hague=11	Tim Farron=33	Xi Jinping=56	
Alexandr Lukashevich=12	Robert Menendez=34	Denis McDonough=57	
Joe Biden=13	Ron Johnson=35	Jean-Marc Ayrault=58	
Susan Rice=14	John Day=36	Undefined=99	
John Brenann=15	Wang Yi=37		
Martin Dempsey=16	Maajid Nawaz=38		
Samantha Power=17	Nancy Pelosi=39		
Francois Holland=18	Jean-Louis Borloo=40		
Laurent Fabius=19	George Osborne=41		
Josh Earnest=20	Manuel Valls=42		
Douglas Alexander=21	Jean-Marc Ayrault=43		
Lord Ashdown=22	Eric Cantor=44		

⁹² Table 31 shows the coding sheet that contains the categories used during the data collection process

Table 31. Continued: Data collection coding sheet

5. EU Member	9. Context/rhetoric	13. Attitude toward the cause/agent
EU as a whole=1	Political context/rhetoric=1	
France=2	Militaristic context/rhetoric=2	Negative=1
Germany=3	Diplomatic context/rhetoric=3	Positive=2
Italy=4	Humanitarian context/rhetoric=4	Neutral=3
Greece=5		Balanced=4
Denmark=6		
	10. N of actor persons in the article	14. Type of attitude cause/agent
Croatia=7	1=1	General=1
Romania=8	2=2	Personal=2
Latvia=9	3=3	
Cyprus=10	...	15. Personal attitude cause/agent
7. How the actor person is portrayed	12=12	UK journalist=1
	...	Russian journalist=2
	None=99	Foreign journalist (other)=3
Negative=1		UK expert=4
Positive=2		Russian expert=5
Neutral=3	11. Problematic effects/conditions	Foreign expert (other)=6
Balanced=4	Use of chemical weapons=1	U.S. official=7
		Russian official=8
8. How the international actor is portrayed	12. Cause/agent	UK official=9
	Syrian official forces=1	EU official=10
	Syrian rebels=2	Chinese official=11
Negative=1	Undefined=3	
Positive=2	Third party (Radical Islamists)=4	
Neutral=3		
Balanced=4		

Table 31. Continued: Data collection coding sheet

16. Solution to the situation	19. Personal attitude solution	21. Number of sources	23. Date
Military measures=1	UK journalist=1		August 21=21
Check the evidence of attack=2	Russian journalist=2	1=1	August 22=22
Destroy Syrian chemical arsenal=3	Foreign journalist (other)=3	2=2	August 23=23
Postpone/abandon military measures=4	UK expert=4	3=3	August 24=24
Supply rebels with defense weapons=5	Russian expert=5	4=4	August 25=25
Move marine forces to the Mediterranean=6	Foreign expert (other)=6	5=5	August 26=26
	U.S. official=7	6=6	August 27=27
Discuss the situation in Syria=7	Russian official=8	...	August 28=28
Find a diplomatic solution=8	UK official=9	22. Article length	August 29=29
No remedy=9	EU official=10	Under 100 words=1	August 30=30
Impose sanctions on Syrian regime=10	Chinese official=11	100-200 words=2	August 31=31
17. Attitude toward the solution		200-300 words=3	September 1=111
Negative=1	20. Primary information source	300-400 words=4	September 2=222
Positive=2	Middle East correspondent=1	400-500 words=5	September 3=333
Neutral=3	Russian correspondent=2	Above 500 words=6	September 4=444
Balanced=4	UK correspondent=3		
	U.S. correspondent=4		
18. Type of attitude toward the solution	China correspondent=5		
	EU correspondent=6		
General=1	EU news agency=7		
Personal=2	Russian news agency=8		
	U.S. news agency=9		
	Middle Eastern news agency=10		
	British news agency=11		
	Chinese news agency=12		
	Secondary information source (e.g. TV (Al Arabiya))=13		
	Expert article=14		

VITA

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