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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Rebecca Ann Bennett entitled "Albert Schweitzer's Ethic of Reverence for Life: Analysis, Defense, and Applications to the Veterinary Profession." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Philosophy.

Glen Graber, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Associate Vice Chancellor and
Dean of The Graduate School

ALBERT SCHWEITZER'S ETHIC OF REVERENCE FOR LIFE: ANALYSIS, DEFENSE, AND APPLICATIONS TO THE VETERINARY PROFESSION

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
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ABSTRACT

As we approach the new millenium, the world faces tremendous problems in human efforts to rectify past and present abuses caused by the anthropocentric valuation and treatment of the non-human living creation. Albert Schweitzer's ethic of Reverence for Life, with its emphasis on the innate value of all living beings, the spirituality of human beings, and the personal responsibility which each human being has for the lives around him/her, thus becomes a relevant and contemporary philosophy of life.

This paper provides an explication and analysis of Schweitzer's ethic, with particular emphasis on Schweitzer's use of reason/thought, and on the primacy of the knowledge of the internal will over external knowledge of the world. The ethic is explicated from its initial premise - that "I am life that wills to live in the midst of life that wills to live" - to its conclusion that we must revere all life, and actively aid all life within our sphere of influence in its pursuit of its own self-realization.

The ethic's relevance is defended through current research in the fields of sociobiology, anthropology, and psychology. It is further assessed and defended against charges of subjectivity, lack of rules, and guilt-mongering.

The ethic is then applied to the veterinary profession in terms of both animal welfare theory and specific applications to pet, wild, research, and food animals in contemporary

western culture. Such application necessitates the acknowledgment and provision of species-specific interests to animals, as well as the acknowledgment that death itself is a harm. Radical changes in the way we value and treat animals in each of these categories are required if we adhere to Schweitzer's ethic of Reverence for Life. The feasibility of implementation of such an ethic is suggested to be difficult but not impossible. Such a gestalt shift in western moral thinking about animals may come about, however, not from the necessity of thought of Schweitzer's internal will-to-live, but from the necessity imposed externally on the human race to salvage the rest of creation if it wishes to salvage itself.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Overview and Objectives

Albert Schweitzer is internationally recognized for his contributions to medicine and humanitarianism, theology, and music, but he considered his primary contribution to the world to be his philosophy. That his philosophical work has been so little studied and acknowledged, particularly by the English-speaking western world, is quite puzzling, but appears to be the result of two distinct factors.

The first is simply that many scholars, in the often misguided attempt to separate and alienate the fields of philosophy and theology, have categorized Schweitzer's philosophy as theology. Schweitzer studied, wrote, and spoke extensively in both domains, but was extraordinarily careful to avoid religious terminology, dogma, and abstraction in his philosophical endeavors. It is certain, however, that Schweitzer believed that the *purpose* of both is the same: from distinct starting points, both seek answers to the question of human beings' spiritual relationship to/within themselves and to the world in which they exist. Whether we seek through philosophy, theology, or, more recently, through science, Schweitzer is correct: we are trying

> to find an answer to the elementary question with which each one of us is newly confronted every morning, namely, what meaning and what value is to be ascribed to our life. What am I in the world? What is my purpose in it? What may I hope for in this world? I do not want to consider my existence merely as one which rises and perishes among the billions of billions of

> beings which constitute the universe, but as a life which has a value, if I comprehend it and live it according to true knowledge. (qtd. in Joy 210)

All thought, he said, "...is really concerned with the great problem of how man can attain to spiritual union with infinite Being" (Indian Thought vi). The distinction between theology and philosophy, as Jackson Ice suggests (20), may well be of importance only to scholars; for the rest of humanity, the two are fused in the reflection on the meaning of our lives in this very real and concrete world.

The second factor motivating the silence of academic philosophy to Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life is the unpalatability of its scope. Schweitzer makes two unequivocal assertions which enlarge the arena of moral accountability tremendously. One concerns the necessity and legitimacy of the place of man's innate spirituality in the philosophical enterprise; that is, the personal will-to-live of each being is a manifestation of the Universal Will-to-live, with the consequences which result therefrom. No dogmatic religious belief nor abstract mysticism is involved, though Schweitzer has been so interpreted more often than not.

The second, related philosophical expansion reflects Schweitzer's determination, based on rational thought, that the scope and object of ethics is far wider than that of human-human interactions, and must encompass *all* of life, that is, *all* will-to-live in the world. Certainly, the implications of human ethical obligations to all other life are infinitely staggering. Such responsibility, however, is not nearly so implausible as has been thought in the past, as witnessed by the recent work of such authors as Peter Singer (Animal Liberation), Tom Reagan (The Case for Animal Rights), Christopher Stone (Should Trees

Have Standing?), and Bernard Rollin (The Unheeded Cry), to name but a few.

The goal of this dissertation is threefold. The first is to explicate and defend, in the philosophical forum, Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life, with particular attention to the fundamental elements of the will-to-live and the meaning and use of reason/thought in the ethic's development. I am indebted to Benjamin Hall ("Reverence for Life") in particular for his recent elucidation of these concepts. The second is to strengthen the argument for the ethic through ongoing research in both philosophy and in other academic fields - including sociobiology, anthropology, and psychology. The third is to address the adequacy and feasibility of the ethic in regard to its application to human valuation and treatment of animals today. Perhaps the gravest charge leveled against Schweitzer has been the accusation that his ethic is completely subjective in both theory and application, and is thus impractical if not unrealizable in the world. I believe that the ethic can be defended against the allegation that because it delineates no rules of hierarchy of valuation of the different life forms, reverence for life is simply not a workable philosophy. Though difficulties certainly abound, the fundamental theory can be applied in both general and in very specific contexts.

Finally, I will address what seems to me to be the major difficulty of Schweitzer's ethic: the potential (or lack thereof) of (most) human beings to acknowledge and accept the responsibilities and the limitations of an ethic which is so universal and so absolute.

Constraints, Considerations, and Influences

A number of considerations and constraints which occur in the research and elucidation of Schweitzer's philosophy must be noted. These include the limitations of

availability of original works, and also of prior investigation of Schweitzer's work - much of it blatantly biased and incorrect; and the context within which Schweitzer's thought developed. Because Schweitzer is so little known in philosophical circles, a brief discussion of these contextual elements is warranted, including the role of childhood experiences in the perceived subjectivity of his philosophy; Schweitzer's own extensive historical research into the contributions of religion and philosophy in the search for a rational foundation for ethics; and the social and political milieu in which he wrote.

Original Sources

Schweitzer's philosophical work is incomplete; of the four volumes of Kulturphilosophie which he intended to write, only the first two are complete: The Decay and Restoration of Civilization and Civilization and Ethics, published together as The Philosophy of Civilization. Both have been translated from the original German into English. Portions of the third volume, to have been titled The World-View of Reverence for Life, were written, but none of the original manuscripts have been fully researched or translated to date. According to Schweitzer, the fourth volume was to have dealt with the civilized state, but no writing was ever done on it. A very limited number of his speeches, articles, and correspondence are available in English translation; most exist only in original manuscript form in German and French in the archives at Schweitzer's home in Gunsbach, Alsace.

In those writings which have been translated into English, there are clearly difficulties in rendering particular German words and their meanings into English equivalents.

Schweitzer's terminology in regard to world-view (*weltanschauung*), life-view (*lebensanschauung*), and world and life affirmation (*welt-undlebensbejahung*) deserve careful analysis; so too do his application of reason (*verundt*) and thought (*denken*). Many passages in his work are quite confusing and liable to misinterpretation due to Schweitzer's failure to delineate the sort of reason or thought he is referring to - reason/thought in the standard, traditional sense, or in the much wider sense in which he defines it.

Secondary Sources

Secondary sources on Schweitzer and his work are limited. Schweitzer is, of course, a relatively recent author; and many sources are available only in the original German outside this country. Further, of available sources, there has been a misplaced emphasis - by advocates and detractors alike - on facets of Schweitzer's personality as the primary motivating factor in the development of his philosophy, with little effort placed on analysis and evaluation of his work on purely philosophical standards. Hall (4-30) discusses this problem in some detail, and notes that all four of the major prior works on Schweitzer's ethic are investigations of the ethic as a facet of his psychological character rather than as philosophy. I do not wish to deny that Schweitzer's personality played a role in the development of his ethic - and I will in fact note several key elements shortly - but this is surely true of all philosophers to varying degrees; Schweitzer would correctly claim that his own character is representative of what is normal and possible for human beings. Edward O. Wilson's biophilia hypothesis (Biophilia) and Lawrence Kohlberg's theories on moral development in human beings (Essays on Moral Development) will be discussed in order

to defend this claim. In researching secondary sources, including some very recent ones, I have been struck again and again by the assumptions and biases of the authors critiquing Schweitzer, and in particular the religious prejudices which appear to motivate those who attack Schweitzer's supposed subjectivity.

Psychological and Social Influences on Schweitzer

Of the psychological framework within which Schweitzer's philosophy developed, two childhood influences stood out in his own mind, and he described them simply and eloquently. The first was his awareness of, and empathy with, the pain and suffering of other creatures - from horses and birds to fish and worms:

> As far back as I can remember I was saddened by the amount of misery I saw in the world around me. Youth's unqualified *joie de vivre* I never really knew, and I believe that to be the case with many children, even though they appear outwardly merry and quite free from care.
>
> One thing that specially saddened me was that the unfortunate animals had to suffer so much pain and misery. The sight of an old limping horse, tugged forward by one man while another kept beating it with a stick to get it to the knacker's yard at Colmar, haunted me for weeks...I used to add silently a prayer that I had composed myself for all living creatures. It ran thus: "O, heavenly Father, protect and bless all things that have breath; guard them from all evil, and let them sleep in peace". (Memoirs 39-40)

> Twice in the company of other boys, I went fishing with a rod. But then my horror at the mistreatment of the impaled worms - and at the tearing of the mouths of the fishes when they were caught - made it impossible for me to continue. Indeed, I even found the courage to dissuade others from fishing. (qtd. in Free 4)

> This was a horrible proposal to me, but I dared not refuse for fear he would laugh at me. So we came to a tree which was still bare, and on which the birds were singing out gaily in the morning, without any fear of us. Then stooping over like an Indian on the hunt, my companion placed a pebble in the leather of his sling and stretched it. Obeying his peremptory glance I did

> the same, with frightful twinges on conscience, vowing firmly that I would not shoot when he did. At that very moment the church bells began to sound, mingling with the song of the birds in the sunshine. It was the warning bell that came a half-hour before the main bell. For me it was a voice from heaven. I threw the sling down, scaring the birds away, so that they were safe from my companion's sling, and fled home. And ever afterwards when the bells of Holy Week ring out amidst the leafless trees in the sunshine I remember with moving gratitude how they rang into my heart at that time the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill"...From that day on I have had the courage to free myself from all fear of men. Whenever my deepest convictions were involved I paid less attention than before to the opinions of others. I tried to escape from the dread of being laughed at by my comrades. The great experience of my childhood and youth was the influence of the commandment that we should not kill or torture. All other experiences pale before it. (qtd. in Free 4-5)

And from his awareness of human thoughtlessness and blatant cruelty to other creatures came Schweitzer's sense of justice and of happiness, and his belief in our responsibility towards those around us - even to the point of an individual's duty to atone for the pain and suffering inflicted by *other* human beings:

> From experiences like these, which moved my heart and often made me feel ashamed, there slowly grew up in me an unshakeable conviction that we have no right to inflict suffering and death on another living creature unless there is some unavoidable necessity for it, and that we ought all of us to feel what a horrible thing it is to cause suffering and death out of mere thoughtlessness...I have grown more and more certain that at the bottom of our heart we all think this, and that we fail to acknowledge it and to carry our belief into practice chiefly because we are afraid of being laughed at by other people as sentimentalists, though partly also because we allow our best feeling to get blunted. (Memoirs 44)

> Here, then, was the second great experience of my life, viz. this question about the right to happiness. As an experience it joined itself to that other one which had accompanied me from my childhood up; I mean my deep sympathy with the pain which prevails in the world around us...Whoever is spared personal pain must feel himself called to help in diminishing the pain of others. We must all carry our share of the misery which lies upon the world. (Memoirs 81-2)

Schweitzer's intense awareness of the pain and suffering of others, both human and animal, occurred within the context of his family background; his genealogy was saturated with teachers, musicians, and Lutheran ministers. He obtained doctorates in music, theology, and philosophy prior to his decision in 1905 at the age of 30 to become a physician and to devote his life to the medical service of African natives - to practice his belief in Jesus' ethic of love - not through the preaching of missionary dogmatism to save souls, but through the alleviation of human pain and suffering. Having been blessed with good health, family, and friends, he believed that he owed a debt of service to others less fortunate; because so much harm had been inflicted upon the Africans by the Europeans, Schweitzer chose the west African region of Gabon to do his life's work. Though he believed that he was giving up his teaching, preaching, and organ playing when he left Europe in 1913, he would return to teach, speak, and play for significant periods of time throughout his life due to war and to the necessity of raising funds for his hospital.

The driving social impetus for his major work, The Philosophy of Civilization, was World War I. The horror of that war seemed to much of the world to be a crisis of civilization itself, but Schweitzer disagreed; the crisis, he said, was not due to the war: the war was merely a symptom of the crisis. "The war...is only a phenomenon of the condition of uncivilization in which we find ourselves" (Philosophy 85). Schweitzer began searching for the *cause* of Europe's social and political disaster, and, more importantly, for a solution to it. A solution was critical to *all* of humanity, since "All of the peoples of the earth have been in large measure under the influence both of our civilization and of our lack of it, so that they more or less share our fate" (Philosophy 85-6). Civilization Schweitzer defined "...in

quite general terms as spiritual and material progress in all spheres of activity, accompanied by an ethical development of individuals and of mankind" (Out 198). The very foundation of civilization lies in its ethical character:

> Entering on the question as to what is the real essential nature of civilization, I come to the pronouncement that this is ultimately ethical...I have come to the conviction that the aesthetic and the historical elements, and the magnificent extension of our material knowledge and power, do not themselves form the essence of civilization, but that this depends on the mental disposition of the individuals and nations who exist in the world. All other things are merely accompanying circumstances of civilization, which have nothing to do with its real essence...Civilization, put quite simply, consists in our giving ourselves, as human beings, to the effort to attain the perfecting of the human race and the actualization of progress of every sort in the circumstances of humanity and of the objective world. This mental attitude, however, involves a double predisposition: firstly, we must be prepared to act affirmatively toward the world and life; secondly, we must become ethical.
>
> Only when we are able to attribute a real meaning to the world and to life shall we be able also to give ourselves to such action as will produce results of real value. (Philosophy xi-xiii)

No civilization can advance, Schweitzer believed, without an adequate theory of the universe; "The real fact is that all human progress depends on progress in its theory of the universe, whilst, conversely, decadence is conditioned by a similar decadence in this theory. Our loss of real civilization is due to our lack of a theory of the universe" (Philosophy xii). Schweitzer called life "without a theory of things" a "pathological disturbance of the higher capacity for self-direction" (Philosophy 53).

A theory of the universe is an explanation, a set of perceptions and beliefs which answer the question of man's meaning in the world and the meaning of the world itself. The German word is *weltanschauung*; it is often translated as world-view:

> The greatest of all the spirit's tasks is to produce a theory of the universe *(Weltanshauung)*...What is meant by a theory of the universe? It is the content of the thoughts of society and the individuals which compose it about the nature and object of the world in which they live, and the position and destiny of mankind and of individual men within it. What significance have the society in which I live and I myself in the world? What do we want to do in the world, what do we hope to get from it? What is our duty to it? The answer given by the majority to these fundamental questions about existence decides what the spirit is in which they and their age live. (Philosophy 49)

The character of an adequate theory of the universe, and hence of civilization, must be optimistic, that is, world and life affirming; ethical; and based on rational thought.

> That theory of the universe is optimistic which gives existence the preference as against non-existence and thus affirms life as something possessing value in itself. From this attitude to the universe and to life results the impulse to raise existence, in so far as our influence can affect it, to its highest level of value. Thence originates activity directed to the improvement of the living conditions of individuals, of society, of nations and of humanity, and from it spring the external achievements of civilization, the lordship of spirit over the powers of nature, and the higher social organization.
>
> Ethics is the activity of man directed to secure the inner perfection of his own personality. In itself it is quite independent of whether the theory of the universe is pessimistic or optimistic. But its sphere of action is contracted or widened according as it appears in connection with a theory of the first or the second type...
>
> But the scope of ethics is extended in proportion as it develops and strengthens a connection with a theory of the universe which is affirmative toward the world and life. Its aim is now the inner perfection of the individual and at the same time the direction of his activity so as to take effect on other men and on the objective world. (Philosophy 57-8)

European thought has consistently held to a positive, life-affirming world-view, within a narrowly delineated ethical range, but Schweitzer thought that the connection between world and life affirmation and ethics is grounded in the experienced convictions of the will rather than in intellectual thought and knowledge of the world. What was lacking was a basic ethical principle to validate human ideals and connect ethics with the universe.

The final blow to development of an adequate theory of the universe came with the ascendancy of scientific thought and technological progress:

> What is the nature of this degeneration in our civilization, and why has it come about?
>
> To begin with, there is one elementary fact which is quite obvious. The disastrous feature of our civilization is that it is far more developed materially than spiritually. Its balance is disturbed...
>
> The essential nature of civilization does not lie in its material achievements, but in the fact that individuals keep in mind the ideals of the perfecting of man...Its fate depends on whether or not thought keeps control over facts...Paradoxical as it may seem, our progress in knowledge and power makes true civilization not easier but more difficult...Our spiritual dependence increases at the same rate as our material dependence...In every respect, therefore, our individual existence is depreciated. It is becoming ever more difficult to be a personality. (Philosophy 86)

Schweitzer's descriptions of the "unfree man" at the turn of the century have striking parallels to our more current industrial society; he bemoans the mindless, noncreative factory environment, the loss of family units, friends, and the small farming community, and the thoughtless killing and maiming of untold numbers of human beings and animals in the World War.

The problem with civilization was not, however, scientific progress per se; Schweitzer never denied the legitimacy and indispensability of technological improvement. Schweitzer's concern lay with the unthinking use people made of material progress; the root of the problem lay in the failure of mechanical progress to occur within the context of ethical progress. And education-as-scientific-advancement had failed civilization: "We learn from our century that even while scientific thought is advancing, the number of educated persons may diminish" (qtd. in Clark 15):

> We live in a time completely lacking in philosophical culture. The separate

> sciences have emancipated themselves. Either they do not feel the need of a unified world view or they insist upon shaping their own philosophies. Knowledge is might: this is the expression that dominates our era. People forget, however, to add that knowledge is not culture...Education consists in this, that the entire domain of human knowledge is comprehended in its basic outlines and that this should form a single world view bringing the individual into conscious relationship with his surroundings and determining his opinions and his activities. Deep in the heart of man lies this yearning for a world view. The sciences as such can never free him; only philosophy has this possibility. It summarizes the actual condition of the sciences and brings the resulting picture into harmony with the ethical and religious interests of the individual and society. So it is wholly false to say that philosophy has outlived its day. Without philosophy no education is possible and without education there can be no ethics and no religion in a scientific era. (qtd. in Joy 305)

The Search for a World-View in Religious and Philosophical Thought

If the sense of optimism of the modern age was due to a false reliance on the power which man acquired through scientific discovery and invention, what was a proper foundation for an ethical, world and life affirming view of the universe upon which to give civilization a firm foundation? Schweitzer searched both world-religions and philosophies for an answer. Over one-half of Civilization and Ethics is devoted to summaries of prior religious and philosophical thought. Schweitzer eventually wrote Indian Thought and Its Development to further evaluate the East Indian religions, though he never found the time to complete in book form his studies of the great Chinese thinkers.

In his consideration of the great religious traditions, particularly Christianity and the eastern Indian religions, Schweitzer developed and confirmed his own thought regarding the roles of world and life affirmation and world and life negation in the search for a fundamental ethical principle to guide civilization: "There are two great fundamental

problems common to all thought: (1) the problem of world and life affirmation and world and life negation, and (2) the problem of ethics and the relations between ethics and these two forms of man's spiritual attitude to Being" (Indian Thought vii). He defines and elucidates the concepts:

> World-and life-affirmation consists in this: that man regards exisence as he experiences it in himself and as it has developed in the world as something of value *per se* and accordingly strives to let it reach perfection in himself, whilst within his own sphere of influence he endeavours to preserve and to further it.
>
> World and life negation on the other hand consists in his regarding existence as he experiences it in himself and as it is developed in the world as something meaningless and sorrowful, and he resolves accordingly (a) to bring life to a standstill in himself by mortifying his will-to-live, and (b) to renounce all activity which aims at improvement of the conditions of life in this world.
>
> World and life affirmation unceasingly urges men to serve their fellows, society, the nation, mankind, and indeed all that lives, with their utmost will and in lively hope of realisable progress. World and life negation takes no interest in the world, but regards man's life on earth either merely as a stage-play in which it is his duty to participate, or only as a puzzling pilgrimage through the land of Time to his home in Eternity...The difficulty of the world-view of world and life negation consists in the fact that it is impracticable. It is compelled to make concessions to world and life affirmation...
>
> It really ought to demand of man that, as soon as he reaches the conviction that Non-Being is to be regarded as higher than Being, he shall quit existence by a self-chosen death. It gives a reason for not demanding this of him by explaining that it is not so important to make an end of life as soon as possible as it is to mortify as thoroughly as we can the will-to-live in our hearts. The world-view of world and life negation is therefore in contradiction with itself in that it does want to be lived. With this desire it enters on the path of concession to world and life affirmation which it must then follow to the end...the decision is reached that what really matters is not so much actual abstention from action as that men should act in a spirit of non-activity and in inner freedom from the world so that action may lose all significance...
>
> But the greatest difficulty for the world-view of world and life negation comes from ethics. Ethics demand of man that he should interest himself in the world and in what goes on in it; and what is more, simply

> compel him to action. So if world and life negation really becomes concerned with ethics at all, it is driven to make such great concessions to world and life affirmation that it ceases to exist.
>
> To escape this fate it has to try to confine itself to a non-active ethic. This ethic which keeps within the bounds of world and life denial can only demand two things of man, namely that in a spirit of kindliness completely free from hatred he should seek true inner perfection, and that he should show forth this by refraining from destroying or damaging any living thing, and in general by abstaining from all acts not inspired by love and sympathy. Active love it cannot demand of him. (Indian Thought 1-9)

In Christianity, Schweitzer found elements of world and life affirmation side-by-side with elements of world and life negation:

> And Christianity also brought European thought into relationship with world and life negation. World and life negation is found in the thought of Jesus in so far as He did not assume that the Kingdom of God would be realized in this natural world. He expected that this natural world would very speedily come to an end and be superseded by a supernatural world in which all that is imperfect and evil would be overcome by the power of God.
>
> But this form of world and life negation found in Jesus is different from that of India. Instead of denying the material world because its gaze is directed to pure Being, it only denies the evil, imperfect world in expectation of a good and perfect world which is to come...(Jesus) does not preach the inactive ethics of perfecting the self alone, but active, enthusiastic love of one's neighbor. It is because His ethics contains the principle of activity that it has affinity with world and life affirmation...both in Indian and in European thought world and life affirmation and world and life negation are found side by side; but in Indian thought the latter is the predominant principle and in European the former. (Indian Thought 4-6)

In his later years much debate about Schweitzer hinged upon whether this Lutheran pastor was really a Christian or not. Christianity for Schweitzer was not religious dogma, not an iron-clad set of doctrinal beliefs, but a way of living: if you believe in the ethics of love Jesus preached, go out and *do* something for others in the world. Christianity's failure to provide an adequate world-view, and its elements of world and life negation, occurred because it rooted ethics outside of being; that is, in an abstract and supranatural concept of

being-as-the-Christian-God rather than in *real* being - i.e., in other lives, other will-to-live in this world. This kind of mysticism is truly the enemy of ethics, because ethics requires affirmation of life and of the world. (Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, those interested in Schweitzer's theological perspective will find fertile material in Jackson Ice's portrayal of Schweitzer as a radical theologian ahead of his time in Schweitzer: Prophet of Radical Theology.)

The fault of the Indian religious traditions lay in the overwhelming emphasis on world and life negation; Indian thought correctly perceived that no meaning for man's life was to be found in the meaninglessness of the natural world (in the sense that nature is not kind, loving, or in any way ethical), but its solution - to abandon the world and the other lives in it and to pursue solely one's own spiritual perfection - was clearly incorrect. Buddhism was not so much *un*ethical as it was *an*ethical: "In the consistently pessimistic theory of the universe, as we have it in the thought of the Brahmans or of Schopenhauer, ethics has nothing whatever to do with the objective world. It aims solely at securing the self-perfection of the individual as this comes to pass in inner freedom and disconnection from the world and the spirit of the world" (Philosophy 57). In Schweitzer's view, ethical behavior does involve one's own self-perfection, but by its very nature self-perfection compels man to strive to help *other* will-to-live attain self-perfection also. The difference between nonmaleficence and beneficence is absolutely crucial to ethics:

> But the Buddha's ethic on compassion is incomplete. It is limited by world and life negation. Nowhere does the Master demand that because all life is suffering man should strive, in so far as is possible, to bring help to every human being and to every living thing. He only commands the avoidance of pitiless actions. Of sympathetic helping he takes no account. It is excluded

> by the principle of non-activity which derives from world and life negation. (Indian Thought 103)

The lesson of Indian thought and of much of Christianity, then, is that ethics cannot exist within the confines of world and life negation. The two are antithetical, because

> World and life negation cannot become anything else than what it essentially is, namely a state of exaltation above the world and indifference towards the world. Ethics can never derive from it. The ethical premises the taking of interest in the welfare of beings that belong to this world, and this regard for terrestrial affairs points to world and life affirmation, however slight the tendency towards it may be. (Indian Thought 117)

In his analysis of philosophical thought from the time of the Greeks to the present, Schweitzer found little more consolation, yet he owed and acknowledged a debt to Rationalism, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Arthur Schopenhauer in particular. He began from the premise that "The object of all philosophy is to make us, as thinking beings, understand how we are to place ourselves in an intelligent and inward relation to the universe, and how we are to be active under the impulses which come to us from it" (qtd. in Seaver 329). Western philosophy's partial success was due to its automatic assumption of a world and life affirming view; yet it had failed to provide civilization with a firm foundation due ultimately to a misplaced emphasis: a neglect of values and an abdication to the sciences. Modern philosophy had believed that in the search to solve the mystery of man's place in the universe it would automatically discover ethical ideals grounded there. But science, while breaking the cosmos up into ever smaller and smaller pieces, is still incapable of telling us what we are and why we are here. Tying philosophy to the scientific endeavor is a doomed effort because in science there is no end-point and there are no final answers. Further, our beliefs and activities in this world are motivated by other, non-rational

(i.e., non-scientifically logical) factors. Thus Schweitzer concluded that it is impossible to base an optimistic world and life affirming ethical theory of the universe on any sort of philosophy of nature: "...to gain from contemplation of the universe and on the basis of natural science an inductive knowledge of the existence of a perfect creative First Cause of the universe and a world-plan with unending [human] progress as its ultimate aim" (qtd. in Kraus 5).

> The greatness of European philosophy consists in its having chosen the optimistic-ethical world-view; its weakness in its having again and again imagined that it was putting that conception on a firm foundation, instead of making clear to itself the difficulties of doing so. The task before our generation is to strive with deepened thought to reach a truer and more valuable world-view, and thus bring to an end our living on and on without any philosophy of life at all...salvation is not to be found in active measures but in new ways of thinking...The one serviceable world-view is the optimistic-ethical. Can we prove it to be true?...How logical and natural it seems to tune the meaning of life and the meaning of the world to the same key! How invitingly the path opens out to explaining our own existence from the nature and significance of the universe! (Philosophy 271-2)

Schweitzer found no solutions in the abstractions of Plato or the "negative quietism" of the Stoics. By the Rationalism of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, however, he was passionately influenced. Its belief that mankind's progress depended upon the use of reason and its ability to accede to the truth became a tenet of Schweitzer's own philosophy. He believed that the way to an adequate "theory of things" required that we skip all of the dogma and start only with those facts which are immediately present to consciousness or which can be ascertained by rational inquiry. Thus, from the naturalistic and social ethics of the Nineteenth Century, Schweitzer accepted very little. To Schweitzer's mind, explanations of altruistic behavior as predicated upon society or biology were clearly false ethics. Ethics is

not derived from law, or custom, or survival of the fittest. Ethics is not pragmatism, which leads to relativism; nor is it socially derived in any other way. A societal "ethic" is regulated, relative, and suprapersonal, whereas a true personal ethic is incapable of regulation, absolute, and personal. Hume and Smith based ethics on matters of feeling, or sympathy, but failed to develop a complete ethic because they limited the meaning and range of sympathetic feelings to human beings. Darwin was obsessed with ethics-as-herd-instinct. Despite his rejection of these ethical theories, Schweitzer did find much of the foundation of his own thought in the writings of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche.

Schweitzer's dissertation for the Ph.D. in Philosophy was written from original sources only; it examined the evolution of Kant's philosophy of religion and its link to the Kantian notion of freedom. He agreed with Kant's initiation of the downfall of ethics-as-sentiment, and his assertion that ethics comes from "inward compulsion," from a priori, given convictions of the will. A fundamental principle of ethics exists and is based on inner justification and not on external circumstances. Schweitzer agreed with Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason, and believed that practical reason, intellect, and will all play vital roles. Yet, Kant failed to satisfy Schweitzer on several counts. Schweitzer abandoned the Categorical Imperative because he found it to be more form than substance; it lacked concrete content and failed to provide true wisdom-for-life. In fact, Schweitzer believed that Kant's destroying ethics-as-sympathy, and replacing it with ethics-as-duty, was an inadequate and constrictive trade-off. Above all, the Categorical Imperative and thus one's duties were restricted to the human sphere. All direct duties are to one's fellow man; toward all other life we have only indirect duties. Finally, Kant built his ethics on a not

rationally justified theory of knowledge, leaving morality as well as free will dependent on the abstractions of God and immortality.

Of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer Schweitzer wrote that "I have nothing to object if my philosophy of reverence for life is presented as a synthesis of Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's thought...Somehow all significant thought must be viewed as a synthesis of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche" (qtd. in Hall 42). From Schopenhauer, Schweitzer absorbed the idea that everything in the phenomenal world is a manifestation of blind noumenal Will; though there are many and diverse manifestations, the noumenal Will is a unitary principle, at variance with itself. For Schopenhauer, the conclusion was a metaphysical pessimism, with the phenomenal self-conscious human will dominated by pain and suffering though its desire is for existence and happiness - thus the moral human reduces suffering by negating his own will. Though Schweitzer rejected the life-negation of Schopenhauer's theory, he embraced the phenomenal will as the personal "will-to-live," and the noumenal Will as the "Universal Will-to-live" of which all phenomenal will-to-live are manifestations.

To Nietzsche Schweitzer owed a great deal of the impetus for his examination of a philosophy of civilization, because "I had expected that religious and philosophical thinkers together would powerfully engage Nietzsche and refute him. But this did not happen" (qtd. in Hall 87). Schweitzer agreed with Nietzsche's theory of the striving for self-fulfillment, his optimistic and life-affirming attitude, but he disputed the characterization of the will as a disciplined will-to-power. Such unbridled egoism is not ethics; the will-to-self-perfection is a striving to improve both oneself *and* the world one lives in.

If religion and philosophy had failed to provide an ethical, world and life affirming

theory of the universe, so too had the sciences:

> In science man observes and describes the course of nature, and tries to penetrate its mysteries. In practical matters he uses and moulds it by applying what he has grasped of it outside his own person. But in his moral and artistic activities he uses knowledge and obeys impulses, perceptions, and laws which originate in himself...Ethics and aesthetics are not sciences. Science, as the description of objective facts, the establishment of their connection with one another, and the drawing of inferences from them, is only possible when there is a succession of similar facts to be dealt with, or a single fact in a succession of phenomena, when, that is to say, there is subject matter which can be reduced to order under a recognized law. But there is no science of human willing and doing, and there never can be. Here there are only subjective and infinitely various facts to be studied, and their mutual connection lies within the mysterious human ego. (Philosophy 102)

The Outcome: The Ethic of Reverence for Life

Schweitzer turned to investigation of the will-to-live, which

> ...is based on the mystery of what we call "taking an interest". We cannot live alone. Though man is an egoist, he is never completely so. He *must* always have some interest in life about him. If for no other reason, he must do so in order to make his own life more perfect. Thus it happens that we want to devote ourselves; we want to take our part in perfecting our ideal of progress; we want to give meaning to the life in the world. This is the basis of our striving for harmony with the spiritual element...When we consider the immensity of the universe, we must confess that man is insignificant...Life has existed in the universe but a brief second. And certainly man's life can hardly be considered the goal of the universe. Its margin of existence is always precarious. Study of the geologic periods shows that. So does the battle against disease. When one has seen whole populations annihilated by sleeping sickness, as I have, one ceases to imagine that human life is nature's goal. In fact the Creative Force does not concern itself about preserving life. It simultaneously creates and destroys. Therefore, the will-to-live is not to be understood within the circle of Creative Force. Philosophy and religion have repeatedly sought the solution by this road; they have projected our will to perfection into nature at large, expecting to see its counterpart there. But in all honesty we must confess that to cling to such a belief is to delude ourselves. (Christendom 225-6)

Within the will-to-live, unencumbered by the vagaries of nature, Schweitzer sought the connecting link between life affirmation and ethics:

> In every effort of thought about ethics there is to be seen, distinctly or indistinctly, the search for a basic principle of morality, which needs no support outside itself, and unites in itself the sum total of all moral demands...The ethical problem, then, is the problem of a basic principle of morality founded in thought. What is the common element of good in the manifold things which we feel to be good? Is there such a universally valid conception of the good? (Philosophy 104-5)

This was an endeavor with a rigidly non-relativistic goal: a fundamental principle which - arising within the commonality of each human being's own will-to-live - each and every one of us is capable and desirous of understanding and developing. Schweitzer demanded of such a principle that it meet a number of requirements:

- it must be world and life affirming; that is, optimistic;
- it must be a product of reason and thus a necessity of thought;
- it must be active as well as passive, and combine egoism and altruism in a "forceful and natural" way (Ice 120);
- it must be universal, encompassing *all* forms of life; and
- it must be absolute, resulting in an unlimited responsibility for other life. "The true basic principle of the ethical must be not only something universally valid, but something absolutely elementary and inward, which, once it has dawned on a man, never relinquishes its hold...and which continually challenges him to try his conclusions with reality" (Philosophy 107).

The conclusion to Schweitzer's search for this basic ethical principle was reverence for life: "The basic principle of ethics, that principle which is a necessity of thought, which

has a definite content, which is engaged in constant, living, and practical dispute with reality, is: Devotion to life resulting from reverence for life" (Philosophy 306). Schweitzer summed up reverence for life in the *Preface* to Philosophy of Civilization:

> ...I describe the road along which thought has led me to world and life affirmation and to ethics. The root-idea of my theory of the universe is that my relation to my own being and to the objective world is determined by reverence for life. This reverence for life is given as an element of my will-to-live, and becomes clearly conscious of itself as I reflect about my life and about the world. In the mental attitude of reverence for life which should characterize my contact with all forms of life, both ethics and world and life affirmation are involved. It is not any kind of insight into the essential nature of the world which determines my relation to my own existence and to the existence which I encounter in the world, but rather only and solely my own will-to-live which has developed the power of reflection about itself and the world.
>
> The theory of the universe characterized by reverence for life is a type of mysticism arrived at by self-consistent thought when persisted in to its ultimate conclusion. Surrendering himself to the guidance of this mysticism, man finds a meaning for his life in that he strives to accomplish his own spiritual and ethical self-fulfillment, and simultaneously and in the same act, helps forward all the processes of spiritual and material progress which have to be actualized in the world. (xv)

CHAPTER II

EXPLICATION AND ANALYSIS

The Role of Skepticism

Explication, analysis, and defense of Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life hinges upon elucidation of the concepts of the will-to-live and of reason/thought, because the life-view of reverence for life is seen as a rational and necessary consequence of the fundamental nature of the personal will-to-live as a manifestation of the Universal Will. The interplay between these two concepts necessitates a joint analysis of reason and the will, despite the difficulties inherent in such an endeavor. Motivating the primacy of the will-to-live and the expansion of the rational into the so-called non-rational is the certainty of the uncertainty of knowledge about the world, which leads to skepticism, and, ultimately, to resignation.

Schweitzer is adamant about the misplaced search for a world and life affirming foundation for ethics, and the absolute impossibility of finding an adequate life-view within a world-view based on knowledge and control over the universe; following Kant, he claimed that ethical thought could not be based "on any perception whatever concerning the existing world, as it is" (qtd. in Spear 217). (In this determination to assert the supremacy of the will's knowledge over intellectual knowledge, Schweitzer stretched the dichotomy to a justly-criticized breaking point - I shall return to this problem.) The issue is not with the validity of scientific facts as such but with the object of the scientific quest. "Desire for knowledge! You may seek to explore everything around you, you may push to the farthest

limits of human knowledge, but in the end you will always strike upon something that is unfathomable. It is called life" (Sermons 9-10). Schweitzer has no quarrel with the investigation of natural processes or with using such knowledge (thoughtfully and appropriately) to improve lives; but the ultimate human search is an effort to find the meaning of one's own life and other lives, and thus one's place in the universe - and knowledge of the universe, rather than providing us with answers, leads us straight into the jaws of skepticism - and potentially, pessimism and despair:

> What our thinking tries to proclaim as knowledge is never anything but an unjustifiable interpretation of the world...What meaning can we give to human existence, if we must renounce all pretense of knowing the meaning of the world?
>
> The hopelessness of the attempt to find the meaning of life within the meaning of the universe is shown first of all by the fact that in the course of nature there is no purposiveness to be seen in which the activities of men, and of mankind as a whole, could in any way intervene. On one of the smaller among the millions of heavenly bodies there have lived for a short space of time human beings. For how long will they continue to live?...We are entirely ignorant of what significance we have for the earth. How much less then may we presume to try to attribute to the infinite universe a meaning which has us for its object, or which can be explained in terms of our existence!
>
> It is not, however, merely the huge disproportion between the universe and man which makes it impossible for us to give the aims and objects of mankind a logical place in those of the universe. Any such attempt is made useless beforehand by the fact that we fail to succeed in discovering any general purposiveness in the course of nature. Whatever we do find of purposiveness in the world is never anything but an isolated instance.
>
> In the production and maintenance of some definite form of life, nature does sometimes act purposively in a magnificent way. But in no way does she ever seem intent on uniting these instances of purposiveness which are directed to single objects into a collective purpose. She never undertakes to let life coalesce with life to form a collective life. She is wonderfully creative force. We face her absolutely perplexed. What is full of meaning within the meaningless, the meaningless within what is full of meaning: that is the essential nature of the universe. (Philosophy 27)

The crux of the problem, then, lies in the insoluble contradiction between our moral impulses and our inability to justify those impulses through any knowledge of the world:

> Scientific research has been compelled to admit the evidence that ethics can expect no help from a true acquaintance with nature. The advances of science bring us an ever more exact knowledge of the processes of nature. They permit us to utilize the energies found in the universe. But at the same time they oblige us to renounce more and more our desire to understand its purposes. The world offers us the disconcerting spectacle of a will to live in conflict with itself. One life is sustained at the expense of another. The world is truly nothing but horror in the midst of magnificence, absurdity in the midst of intelligence, suffering in the midst of joy. (qtd. in Joy 316)

If we can find no world purpose within which our own lives will be justified, then we must abandon our attempts to find a satisfactory life-view through any interpretation of a simultaneously creative and destructive universe. And

> This renunciation of world-view in the old sense, that is of a unitary world-view which is complete in itself, means a painful experience for our thought. We come hereby to a dualism against which we at every moment instinctively rebel. But we must surrender to facts. Our will-to-live has to accommodate itself to the inconceivable truth that it is unable with its own valuable convictions to discover itself again in the manifold will-to-live which is seen manifested in the world. We wanted to form a philosophy of life for ourselves out of items of knowledge gathered from the world. But it is our destiny to live by means of convictions which an inward necessity makes a part of our thought. (Philosophy 276-7)

There is, then, no ethical purpose, no intellectual validation for our being in the world - or at least if there is, we cannot perceive it. This absolute skepticism requires of the enlightened mind resignation, but the realization that we cannot predicate an optimistic, ethical life-view on a world-view founded upon knowledge of the universe need not lead to pessimism and despair. The dualism of (ethical) willing and (intellectual) knowing, of life-view and world-view, while not resolvable, is nonetheless not harmful either - "The solution is, not to try to

get rid of dualism from the world, but to realize that it can no longer do us any harm" (Philosophy 78). What we must do is find our life-view within our will-to-live, and to base a limited world-view upon a life-view, not vice-versa.

> As we cannot harmonize our life-view and our world-view, we must make up our minds to put the former above the latter. The volition which is given in our will-to-live reaches beyond our knowledge of the world. What is decisive for our life-view is not our knowledge of the world but the certainty of the volition which is given in our will-to-live...The will-to-live is not restricted to maintaining its existence on what the ever unsatisfying knowledge of the world offers it; it can feed on the life-forces which it finds in itself. The knowledge which I acquire from my will-to-live is richer than that which I win by observation of the world. There are given in it values and incitements bearing on my relation to the world and to life which find no justification in my reflection upon the world and existence. Why then tune down one's will-to-live to the pitch of one's knowledge of the world, or undertake the meaningless task of tuning up one's knowledge of the world to the higher pitch of one's will-to-live ? The right and obvious course is to let the ideas which are given in our will-to-live be accepted as the higher and decisive kind of knowledge.
>
> My knowledge of the world is a knowledge from outside, and remains for ever incomplete. The knowledge derived from my will-to-live is direct, and takes me back to the mysterious movements of life as it is in itself.
>
> The highest knowledge , then, is to know that I must be true to the will-to-live...every depreciation of the will-to-live is an act of insincerity towards myself, or a symptom of unhealthiness. (Philosophy 78,281-2)

This solution to the dualism of knowing and willing - to consider it "harmless" and to place the certain truths of the will above the ever-changing and pessimistic facts of the world - is highly unpalatable to many philosophers (though hardly a less compelling solution than those offered throughout the often muddled history of philosophy). As J.S. Bixler notes, it is at least intellectually consistent to acknowledge the dualism and the impossibility of complete unity between fact and value (79); to resolve it with a wide sweep of the broom across the realm of fact, however, can be disastrous epistemologically, as Ice points out (90).

But does Schweitzer really mean to "cut the tow-rope" between life-view and world-view, as he claims, presumably leaving us free to interpret the world as we each see fit? Ice (90) defends Schweitzer's intent: what Schweitzer means is that we ought not let the forces of the world destroy our natural moral impulses and intuitions, or allow ourselves to be misled by the "exaggerated" claims of scientific "objectivity" into the belief that someday a total world-view joining fact and value will be found.

While the acknowledgment of the dualism of knowing and willing is not of itself inconsistent, the more critical issue is surely Schweitzer's seemingly absolute insistence that knowledge of the world plays no role whatever in the personal will's search for the meaning of its existence in the world. In a number of passages Schweitzer reiterates this: "In the world we can discover nothing of any purposive evolution in which our activities can acquire a meaning. Nor is the ethical to be discovered in any form of the world-process" (qtd. in Ice 90-1). Insofar as Schweitzer is excluding factual knowledge of the world from the will's search for the meaning of its ethical impulses, he is to be justly criticized. Schweitzer's intent, clearly, was to radically separate innate from intellectual knowledge, inner from outer experience, because he wanted to assure the legitimacy of the will's convictions over the realities of the world. He wanted to stop permitting objective thought to negate the reality and value of the human moral experience.

To elevate the one does not require denying the other, however. Human beings cannot be separated from their world. The very existence of the will-to-live and of all other wills-to-live is itself a fact of the cosmos, and since the ethical impulse is inherent in the will-to-live, ethics *is* ultimately discovered within the world process (though we don't know

why). And the further consequence of the will to revere its own and other lives is predicated to a great extent upon developmental striving, and pain and suffering - facts of the universe - within nature. Schweitzer wants to protect the impetus toward ethical behavior from the realities of the world, but it is those harsh realities upon which the will-to-live exerts activity and finds meaning for itself.

In actuality, and in defense of Schweitzer, there are a number of instances when he acknowledges the role of external knowledge in the search for an ethic. He says that

> If knowledge answers solely with what it knows, it is always teaching the will one and the same fact, namely, that in and behind all phenomena there is will-to-live. Knowledge, though ever becoming deeper and more comprehensive, can do nothing except take us ever deeper and ever further into the mystery that all that is, is will-to-live. Progress in science consists only in increasingly accurate description of the phenomena in which life in its innumerable forms appears and passes, letting us discover life where we did not previously expect it, and putting us in a position to turn to our own use in this way or that way what we have learnt of the course of the will-to-live in nature. But what life is, no science can tell us. (Philosophy 308)

> Having reached this point, then, I am in a position to look at the world. I ask knowledge what it can tell me of life. Knowledge replies that what it can tell me is little, yet immense. Whence this universe came, or whither it is bound, or how it happens to be at all, knowledge cannot tell me. Only this: that the will-to-live is everywhere present, even as in me. I do not need science to tell me this; but it cannot tell me anything more essential. Profound and marvelous as chemistry is, for example, it is like all science in the fact that it can lead me only to the mystery of life, which is essentially in me, however near or far away it may be observed. (Christendom 230)

In the final analysis, I think that we must recall what Schweitzer is claiming: not that our knowledge of the natural world is unnecessary or useless, but that such information cannot ever tell us the one thing we most want to know - *why* we exist, *why* we strive to fulfill ourselves, *why* we must endure pain and suffering. While we are forced to resign ourselves

to the inexplicability of the universe and of our place in it, we *can* know ourselves; and within the personal will-to-live can be found an optimistic and ethical life-view - a spirituality - which is validated whenever we experience and partake of the world around us.

Reason and the Will-to-Live

In demanding that we acknowledge the inability of knowledge of the world to provide us with a life-view, Schweitzer effectively removes (epistemologically) the cosmos as a foundation for ethics, leaving us with the initial problem of why we are driven to find a meaning for our lives in the face of our apparent meaninglessness in and to the universe. Why do we instrinctively affirm life as valuable? Why do we have an instinctive reverence for life, such that suicide is an unknown act except in aberrant situations?

Schweitzer started with "elemental thinking"; that is, thinking which is free from dogma and assumption. He refutes Cartesian theory immediately and forcefully:

> Descartes makes thinking start from the sentence "I think; so I must exist" (*Cogito; ergo sum)*, and with his beginning thus chosen he finds himself irretrievably on the road to the abstract. Out of this empty, artificial act of thinking there can result, of course, nothing which bears on the relation of man to himself, and to the universe. Yet in reality the most immediate act of consciousness has some content. To think means to think something...Surely, that is the stupidest primary assumption in all philosophy! Who can establish the fact that he thinks, except in relation to thinking *something?* And what that something is, is the important matter. (Out 157; Christendom 228)

That something is the first fact of consciousness:

> ...if we ask, "What is the immediate fact of my consciousness? What do I self-consciously know of myself, making abstractions of all else, from childhood to old age? To what do I always return?" we find the simple fact of consciousness is this, *I will to live.* Through every stage of life, this is the one thing I know about myself. I do not say, "I am life", for life continues to be a mystery too great to understand. I only know that I cling to it. I fear its cessation - death. I dread its diminution - pain. I seek its enlargement - joy. (Christendom 227-8)

The first and the most immediate fact of thought is that "I am will-to-live"; I am alive and I want to go on living. Thought is thus a function of an object, and that object is the will. Thought's first perception is of existence itself, and this is intuitively experienced within the will.

Thought for Schweitzer is thus to be viewed as means to an end; his primary focus is on the object of thought, an ethical and optimistic life-view; on experiential rather than intellectual thought. The convictions of the will-to-live are 'a priori' in that they are present in the will prior to reflection by conscious thought. Schweitzer says that "Instinct, thought, the capacity for divination, all these are fused with the will-to-live" (qtd. in Hall 122). The origin of the will-to-live with its instinctive desires to survive and develop is not known: "How this striving originated within us, and how it has developed, we do not know, but it is given with our existence" (Philosophy 282). Schweitzer distinguishes a dualism of thought: instinctive thought is comprised of the "experienced convictions" of the will-to-live; conscious thought is derived from cognition and aids the development and understanding of the inherent convictions of the will by supplying information from the external world. Hall translates a fragment from Schweitzer's unfinished III Kulturphilosophie: "It is not correct to say that the ideas by which we are to live and which will determine the way we shall

develop must first be discovered and determined by thought. Such ideas are already in our will-to-live. We carry them inside us. In thought we do nothing more than try to develop, deepen and comprehend these ideas" (qtd. in Hall 123). While Schweitzer's instinctive thought has significant similarity to Kant's practical reason, and his conscious thought to Kant's theoretical reason, the will's thought is elevated above intellectual reason. The intellect assists the will in confirming and elucidating its own innate convictions, such that theoretical reason is held accountable to the will and not vice versa. Schweitzer clarifies the hierarchy in his critcism of Kant:

> (Kant's) doctrine of the "Postulates of the Practical Reason" means just this: that the will claims for itself the decisive word in the last pronouncements of the world-view. Only Kant manages to arrange the matter so cleverly that the will never forces its supremacy on knowledge, but receives it from the latter as a free gift, and then makes use of it in carefully chosen parliamentary phrases. It proceeds as if it had been invoked by the theoretical reason to provide possible truths with the reality belonging to truths which are necessities of thought. (Philosophy 274-5)

Given in the will-to-live, then, is the knowledge that "I am life that wills to live." This bit of knowledge, Schweitzer says, results in an "instinctive reverence for life...within us, for we are will-to-live" (Philosophy 279). And once the will begins to understand itself through thought, it knows that it reveres itself not simply in the determination to survive, but also in its need to live life, to experience life, to seek self-development and self-fulfillment. This instinctive reverence for life in this wider sense is the primary motivating factor of existence.

Since the will-to-live never exists in a lifeless world, its first effort once it is conscious of itself in thought is to understand its meaning and place in the world. And what

conscious thought perceives and offers the will is the information that "...the will-to-live is everywhere present, even as in me" (qtd. in Hall 131-2). The will cannot know *why* there are other wills-to-live, but it does know *that* there are other wills-to-live. This knowledge is gained, not through theoretical deduction or abstract thinking, but analogically, by perception and comparison of other wills-to-live to the internal experience of the personal will-to-live: "The nature of the manifestations I do not know, but I form a conception of it in analogy to the will-to-live which is within myself" (qtd. in Hall 132).

Thus the first fact of the conscious will is that "'I am life that wills to live"; the first comprehensive fact, discovered when instinctive thought first experiences the world, is that "'I am life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live,' and it is as will-to-live in the midst of will-to-live that man conceives himself during every moment that he spends meditating on himself and the world around him" (Out 157). And the will-to-live is integrated with other wills-to-live precisely because the personal will-to-live does not exist in a world devoid of other life; thus, the personal will-to-live which seeks survival and self-fulfillment knows that other wills-to-live seek the same thing: "As in my will-to-live there is ardent desire for further life and for the mysterious exaltation of the will-to-live which we call pleasure, while there is fear of destruction and of that mysterious depreciation of the will-to-live which we call pain: so too are these in the will-to-live around me, whether it can express itself to me, or remains dumb" (Out 157).

Through this reflection on its own instinctive reverence for life, and analogical extension to other wills-to-live, we must conclude that "Ethics consists, therefore, in my experiencing the compulsion to show to all will-to-live the same reverence as I do to my

own. There we have given us that basic principle of the moral which is a necessity of thought. It is good to maintain and encourage life; it is bad to destroy life or to obstruct it" (Philosophy 309). It is this union of the will-to-live with other manifestations of will-to-live through the "volitional commonality" shared by all wills-to-live that leads us to the ethic of reverence for life. The ultimate and absolute value, then, shared by humans and all other existing wills-to-live, is life itself.

The concept of ethics as inherent in the will-to-live necessitates adequate clarification of the role of reason which it entails. Schweitzer says that "The essential thing to realize about ethics is that it is the very manifestation of our will-to-live. All of our thoughts are given in that will-to-live, and we but give them expression and form in words. To analyze Reason fully would be to analyze the will-to-live" (Christendom 227). He might just as accurately have rephrased the last statement as "To analyze the will-to-live fully would be to analyze Reason." Schweitzer creates numerous instances of confusion in his use of the terms "reason" and "thought" which allow his opponents ample opportunity to criticize his claims that the ethic of reverence for life is a "necessity of thought" and that it reaches beyond reason into the realm of mysticism. Both issues necessitate analysis prior to further elucidation of the will-to-live and the consequent ethic of reverence for life.

Both Hall and James Brabazon agree that Schweitzer uses "*denken*", translated as "thought", and "*vernunft*", translated as "reason", interchangeably. Brabazon points out that "*denken*" has a much wider, deeper meaning than its English equivalent: it harbors "...connotations of meditation, or brooding absorption in a subject..." (244). Schweitzer himself defines reason as

> no dry intellectualism which would suppress all the manifold movements of our inner life, but the totality of all the functions of our spirit in their living action and interaction. In it our intellect and our will hold that mysterious intercourse which determines the character of our spiritual being. The ideas about the world which it produces contain all that we can feel or imagine about our destiny and that of mankind, and give our whole being its direction and its value. (Philosophy 54)

Brabazon quotes D. H. Lawrence to emphasize the point:

> Thought, I love thought.
> But not the jaggling and twisting of already existent ideas,
> I despise that self-important game.
> Thought is the welling up of unknown life into consciousness,
> Thought is the testing of statements on the touchstone of the consciousness,
> Thought is gazing on the face of life, and reading what can be read,
> Thought is pondering over experience, and coming to conclusion.
> Thought is not a trick, or an exercise, or a set of dodges.
> Thought is a man in his wholeness wholly attending. (244-5)

The claim that Schweitzer is making is that reason/thought in its traditional sense of emotionless intellectualization has blinded our ability to find a satisfactory world-view and life-view. Reason today refers to the scientific, technological intellect and its proclaimed objectivity, and specifically excludes any emotional or spiritual dimension as being too subjective; therefore man's essential quest for solidarity with and meaning in the world is banished to the realm of the irrational. Schweitzer finds himself forced to claim that "If rational thought thinks itself out to a conclusion, it arrives at something non-rational which, nevertheless, is a necessity of thought. This is the paradox which dominates our spiritual life. If we try to get on without this non-rational element, there result views of the world which have neither vitality nor value" (Philosophy 80). And "...it is only in proportion as we all become less rational, in the meaning given it by ordinary calculation, that the ethical disposition develops in us, and allows problems to become soluble which have hitherto been

insoluble" (Philosophy 321). In expressing "rational" in its traditional and limited sense, Schweitzer sets himself up for a volley of criticism when he refers to the ethic of reverence for life as a "necessity of thought." If the will's thinking, from which reverence for life originates, is non-rational in the standard sense of the term, then clearly its convictions are not a necessity of thought in any traditional intellectual sense. For Schweitzer, thinking is a dialogue between the will and the intellect, "the argument between willing and knowing which goes on within me" (qtd. in Picht 119), whose purpose is to find answers to the fundamental question of a human being's relationship to the world and the meaning of his or her life. There is an unceasing conflict between the two, but it is not an irreconcilable dualism because the innate convictions of the will are thought's ultimate authority. Those convictions are "necessities of thought" because of their "unavoidable presence within us" (Hall 178). Reverence for life is not a necessity of thought in a logically deductive way, but intuitively, as a hypothesis which is verified through the will's experiencing of the world. The ethic of reverence for life is a necessity of thought not logicomathematically, but, in Heidegger's words, as a "matter of compelling personal urgency" (qtd. in Ice 138). The will-to-live's instinctive thought is not, then, simply a method of reasoning but a depth of experience (Hall 161) whose legitimacy rests upon its experienced state of inner necessity. I shall return to consideration of a scientific defense of this thesis shortly.

In conjunction with the expansion of the terms "reason" and "thought" which allow him to claim that reverence for life is a "necessity of thought," Schweitzer's ethic is also correlatively based upon the extension of thought into the realm of "mysticism":

> In the disposition to Reverence for Life we possess a life view founded on itself, in which there stands, firm and ready for us, the ethical world view we are in search of. It renews itself in us every time we look thoughtfully at ourselves and the life around us.
>
> It is not through knowledge, but through experience of the world that we are brought into relation with it. All thinking which penetrates to the depths ends in ethical mysticism. What is rational is continued into what is nonrational. The ethical mysticism of Reverence for Life is rationalism thought to a conclusion. (Out 201)

In order to respond adequately to charges of the corruption of "reason" which such a magnification of the term connotes, it is of vital importance to understand what Schweitzer's mysticism is *not*. Schweitzer insists, again and again, that because "The tendency of mysticism to become supra-ethical is quite natural...Mysticism is not a friend of ethics but a foe. It devours ethics... Abstraction is the death of ethics, for ethics are a living relationship to living life" (Philosophy 302-4). Ethics for Schweitzer is characterized by its *activity in the world;* hence any sort of mystic contemplation which leads to life-negation - to withdrawl from the world - is the antithesis of ethics. Plato was wrong in his insistence that the natural is a reflection of the supra-natural, that life-view is a pale copy of a transcendental world. Kant is wrong in claiming that the natural and supra-natural are parallels that meet in infinity (Seaver, A Vindication 32). In The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle , Schweitzer says:

> The great danger for all mysticism is that of becoming supra-ethical, that is to say, of making the spirituality associated with the being-in-eternity an end in itself. This valuation of the spiritual in and for itself is found among the Brahmans, the Buddhists, and in Hegel. And the mysticism of Hellenistic personal religion is, it might almost be said, without ethical interests. Its efforts are directed only towards attaining for the individual man, through initiation, the assurance of immortality. It does not urge the man, born again to new life, to live as a new person an ethical life in the world. How difficult it is for the intellectual mysticism of the being-in-God to reach an ethic is

> seen in Spinoza. Even in Christian mysticism, whether medieval or modern, it is often the semblance of ethics rather than ethics itself which is preserved. There is always the danger that the mystic will experience the eternal as absolute impassivity, and will consequently cease to regard the ethical existence as the highest manifestation of spirituality. (qtd. in Joy 235)

That we automatically imbue mysticism with abstraction is seen in William Frankena's comments on grounding holistic ethics in mysticism; he says

> What worries me about mysticism...is its insistence that, ultimately at least, all the differentiation and variety of nature is mere appearance and unreal. This makes it hard to see how there can be any reason for treating it one way rather than another...Maybe the moral of mysticism is that one should not do anything - or even appear to do anything - except to contemplate the One... (17)

This is precisely what Schweitzer is also objecting to. Ethics is based on reality, on a sense of solidarity with other beings here on earth - ethics is action, not abstraction.

In order to understand the mystical component of ethics, we must understand what Being, the Universal Will-to-live, actually is, and what its relationship is to concrete, real beings in the world: the Universal Will-to-live is the noumenon of which all wills-to-live are phenomenal manifestations. According to Schweitzer:

> The Essence of Being, the Absolute, the Spirit of the Universe, and all similar expressions denote nothing actual, but something conceived in abstractions which for that reason is also absolutely unimaginable. The only reality is the Being which manifests itself in phenomena...reality knows nothing about the individual being able to enter into connection with the totality of Being. As it knows of no Being except that which manifests itself in the existence of individual beings, so also it knows of no relations except these of one individual to another. If mysticism, then, intends to be honest, there is nothing for it to do but to cast from it the usual abstractions, and to admit that it can do nothing rational with this imaginary essence of Being...
>
> There is no Essence of Being, but only infinite Being in infinite manifestations. It is only through the manifestations of Being, and only through those with which I enter into relations, that my being has any intercourse with infinite Being. The devotion of my being to infinite Being

> means devotion of my being to all the manifestations of Being which need my devotion, and to which I am able to devote myself. (Philosophy 304-5)

The Universal will-to-live is a dynamic *force*, not a static, abstract essence. Schweitzer says that the universal will "...meets me in a twofold way: as creative will outside me, and ethical will within me" (qtd. in Ice 67-8). The Universal Will is *not* 'God' in any sense because it is not a metaphysical abstraction and is not arrived at by faith but by reason; it is *not* a *moral* entity of any sort. Despite Schweitzer's insistence on Being-as-force, others persist in anointing his Universal Will with abstract, supranatural qualities. Mike Martin, in an article in Between the Species, bases his criticism of the necessity of the Universal Will in Schweitzer's ethic on just such a typical misinterpretation: he claims that Schweitzer's metaphysical framework is the Universal Will-to-live viewed as "...a cosmic and semi-deified will-to-live that can be said to act creatively in the universe" (205). And since each phenomenal will-to-live is a part of the Universal Will-to-live, Schweitzer's metaphysic is really not pantheism but biotheism (i.e., God as manifested in and constituted by all life; the divine as immanent in, rather than transcendant over, nature). Martin's insistence on conferring the status of a quasi-Christian God on Schweitzer's Universal Will in effect renders subsequent interpretation illegitimate, in particular his branding of Schweitzer's ethic as "anthropomorphic," which I shall address shortly.

Ethical mysticism in its proper understanding is a result of the thinking experience of the will-to-live and its comprehension of its spiritual relationship to the Universal Will as manifested in other phenomenal will-to-live. Schweitzer expresses this relationship and its ramifications:

> The mysticism which derives from ethics on the other hand is completely in touch with reality. It can reconcile itself to the fact that the World-Spirit and world events remain to us incomprehensible. Since it need not make trial of any kind of explanation of the Universe, it engages in no conflict with the knowledge gained by experience...this ethical mysticism recognizes the importance of that knowledge. It knows that all knowledge grounded in experience only leads deeper and deeper into the great mystery that all that is is Will-to-Live...
>
> The enlightened ignorance of ethical mysticism is ignorance in so far as it admits how absolutely mysterious and unfathomable are the world and life. It is knowledge in so far as it does know the only thing which we can and must know in the sphere of this mystery, namely that all Being is Life, and that in loving self-devotion to other life we realise our spiritual union with infinite Being.
>
> Ethical mysticism humbly leaves unanswered the question in what manner the World-Spirit exists within the poor human spirit and in it attains to consciousness of itself. It holds only to the fact that the poor human spirit, by leaving behind its existence for itself alone, in the devotion of service to other life experiences union with the World-Spirit and thereby becomes enriched and finds peace. (Indian Thought 263-4)

Thus solidarity - as spiritual unity - with the Universal Will-to-live occurs through our union with individual manifestations of the Universal Will-to-live, even though we will never achieve complete union due to the conflict of wills-to-live in the struggle for survival. In the traditional sense of "rational" and "irrational," Schweitzer describes the role of mysticism in thought as a circle:

> What a remarkable circle! Rational thought which thinks itself out arrives at something non-rational and subjective which is a necessity of thought, namely the ethical affirmation of world and life. On the other hand, what for the purpose of moulding the conditions of existence for individual men and mankind as a whole is rational, that is to say, what is objectively practical in this regard, can only be brought about by individuals perseveringly putting into action the above-mentioned non-rational and subjective. The non-rational principle underlying our activity, a principle which is provided for us by rational thought, is the sole rational and practical principle underlying all the happenings which are to be produced through human action. Thus the rational and the non-rational, the objective and the subjective, proceed each from the other, and return each into the other again. (Philosophy 83)

And the circle of the rational and non-rational, resulting in the ethic of reverence for life as a "necessity of thought," he acknowledges as a "paradox":

> The restoration of our world-view can come only as a result of inexorably truth-loving and recklessly courageous thought. Such thinking alone is mature enough to learn by experience how the rational, when it thinks itself out to a conclusion, passes necessarily over into the non-rational. World-and life-affirmation and ethics are non-rational. They are not justified by any corresponding knowledge of the nature of the world, but are the disposition in which, through the inner compulsion of our will-to-live , we determine our relation to the world.
>
> What the activity of this disposition of ours means in the evolution of the world, we do not know. Nor can we regulate this activity from outside; we must leave entirely to each individual its shaping and its extension. From every point of view, then, world-and-life-affirmation and ethics are non-rational, and we must have the courage to admit it.
>
> If rational thought thinks itself out to a conclusion, it arrives at something non-rational which, nevertheless, is a necessity of thought. This is the paradox which dominates our spiritual life. If we try to get on without this non-rational element, there result views of the world and of life which have neither vitality nor value.
>
> All valuable conviction is non-rational and has an emotional character because it cannot be derived from knowledge of the world but arises out of the thinking experience of our will-to-live, in which we stride out beyond all knowledge of the world. This fact it is which the rational thought that thinks itself out to a conclusion comprehends as the truth by which we must live. The way to true mysticism leads up through rational thought to deep experience of the world and of our will-to-live. We must all venture once more to be 'thinkers', so as to reach mysticism, which is the only direct and the only profound world-view. We must all wander in the field of knowledge to the point where knowledge passes over into experience of the world. We must all, through thought, become religious. (Philosophy 80-1)

It is therefore correct to interpret Schweitzer as claiming that the non-rational, subjective will is an "inescapable element" of rational thought, as does Hall (188); but, like many others, Hall wants Schweitzer to separate the will from the intellect and give it "independent force," because the potential success of reverence for life will be, he thinks, a result of its "intuitive appeal" rather than its rationality. Yet the paradox is only a paradox

when we refer to "reason" and "thought" in the traditional, Cartesian sense. Schweitzer exacerbates the confusion and begs for the criticism by using the terms in this old sense, when his *aim* is to fuse the reason of the will with that of the intellect and legitimize reason in this comprehensive sense. (Indeed, as Ice (89) points out, Schweitzer does lay claim to a rational-as-scientific process of thought, in that Schweitzer's rational thought leaves itself fully open to "the whole influence of the world of fact" - including the existence of the will and not excluding scientific fact.) There is no paradox where there is no division. The merging of will and intellect negates the paradox, and therefore the criticism. If we accept the validity of the innate convictions of the will, then, as Hall acknowledges, thought necessarily involves mysticism (in Schweitzer's sense) because it is in the will-to-live that the intellect confronts the life-force which is behind all phenomena - the life-force which *is* reality. In reflecting upon the mystery of the life-force which makes up all phenomena, thought engages in a mystical experiencing of reality. Mysticism - and thus reason - provides us with the "spiritual union with infinite Being" which is our goal. "The deeper we look into nature, the more we recognize that it is full of life, and the more profoundly we know that all life is a secret and that we are united with all life that is in nature. Man can no longer live his life for himself alone. We realize that all life is valuable and that we are united to all this life. From this knowledge comes our spiritual relationship to the universe" (qtd. in Joy 248).

> Any profound view of the world is mysticism, in that it brings men into a spiritual relation with the Infinite. The view of Reverence for Life is ethical mysticism. It allows union with the infinite to be realized by ethical action. This ethical mysticism originates in logical thinking. If our will-to-live begins to think about itself and the world, we come to experience the life of the world, so far as it comes within our reach, in our own life, and to devote our will-to-live to the infinite will-to-live through the deeds we do. Rational

> thinking, if it goes deep, ends of necessity in the nonrational of mysticism. It has, of course, to deal with life and the world, both of which are nonrational entities (Out 235).

The Human Will-to-Live

The essential nature of Schweitzer's will-to-live is

> determination to live itself to the full. It carries within it the impulse to realize itself in the highest possible perfection. In the flowering tree, in the strange forms of the medusa, in the blade of grass, in the crystal; everywhere it strives to reach the perfection with which it is endowed. In everything that exists there is at work an imaginative force...the whole world of the senses is a manifestation of forces, that is to say of mysteriously manifold will-to-live. (Philosophy 282,290)

This "essence of things in themselves...is to be accepted as underlying all phenomena" (Clark 24).

In human beings, the will-to-live has several dimensions which compose the impulse to perfection. These are usually referred to by Schweitzer as the will to self-perfection and the will to self-devotion. Vernon Bourke (41) describes Schweitzer's will-to-live as a "polyvalent" term; Ice (101) calls it a "holophrastic" term. Schweitzer says that

> In us beings who can move about freely and are capable of pre-considered, purposive activity, the craving for perfection is given in such a way that we aim at raising to their highest material and spiritual value both ourselves and every existing thing which is open to our influence...Nature knows only a blind affirmation of life. The will-to-live which animates natural forces and living beings is concerned to work itself out unhindered. But in man this natural effort is in a state of tension with a mysterious effort of a different kind. Life-affirmation exerts itself to take up life-negation into itself in order to serve other living beings by self-devotion, and to protect them, even, it may be, by self-sacrifice, from injury or destruction. (Philosophy 282,290)

The craving for self-perfection (the pursuit of one's own life-affirming egoistic concerns), and self-devotion (the promotion of other life through one's life-denying, or sacrificial, altruistic tendencies), are *both* innate drives of the will-to-live. Schopenhauer perceived the personal will-to-live as a blind, purposeless drive, to be escaped by denying the world; Schweitzer avoids Schopenhauer's pessimistic will by not allowing the will to be molded and determined by the external world. Nietzsche's will, on the other hand, is a drive to be and to be fulfilled, but Nietzsche failed to relate the personal will as will-to-power to the rest of the phenomenal world: the will is not will-to-live *alone;* it is will-to-live *in the midst of* other wills-to-live. Schweitzer's will is a synthesis of the optimistic and pessimistic wills of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer: it has a lower material dimension, a will to survival and self-preservation (as do all manifestations of will-to-live) but also a higher spiritual element. The will which seeks its own self-perfection and self-fulfillment also, via the analogical thought through which it experiences other wills-to-live as also striving for self-survival and self-perfection, takes up life-negation into its innate life-affirmation. That is, self-devotion as the furthering of the maintenance of other life at its highest level is a component, an extension, of the personal will's own striving for self-perfection. Sincerity towards oneself - reverence for one's own life - "passes imperceptibly into that of self-devotion to others" (qtd. in Ice 122-3). Personal life-negation, the sacrifice of oneself to other wills-to-live, is, though "irrational," the higher life-affirmation and the very essence of ethics:

> In some way or other the *role* of thought lies in the fulfilment of life-affirmation. It rouses the will-to-live, in analogy with the life-affirmation which shows itself in the manifold life which is everywhere around it, and to join in its experiences. On the foundation of this world-affirmation, life-negation takes its place as a means of helping forward this affirmation of

> other life than its own. It is not life-denial in itself that is ethical, but only such as stands in the service of world-affirmation and becomes purposive within it. (Philosophy 291)

Self-devotion, that is, the devoting of oneself to the nurture of others, is *not* to surrender oneself, as Schweitzer believed Nietzsche claimed, but is rather an expansion of one's own drive for self-perfection:

> In the profoundest form of world and life affirmation, in which man lives his life on the loftiest spiritual and ethical plane, he attains to inner freedom from the world and becomes capable of sacrificing his life for some end. This profoundest world and life affirmation can assume the appearance of world and life negation. But that does not make it world and life negation: it remains what it is - the loftiest form of world and life affirmation. He who sacrifices his life to achieve any purpose for an individual or for humanity is practicing life-affirmation. He is taking an interest in the things of this world and by offering his own life wants to bring about in the world something which he regards as necessary. The sacrifice of life for a purpose is not life-negation, but the profoundest form of life-affirmation placing itself at the service of world affirmation. World and life negation is only present when man takes no interest whatever in any realisable purpose nor in the improvement of conditions in this world. (Indian Thought 6-7)

How much self-devotion the personal will projects upon the world of other wills-to-live, relative to how much egoistic self-perfection the will strives for, is an individual determination:

> It is important, further, to know what is to be gathered from ethical enquiry down to the present time about the intensity and the extension of the life-negation which stands in the service of world-affirmation. Again and again the attempt has been made to establish this objectively. In vain. It belongs to the nature of self-devotion that it must live itself out subjectively and without reservations.
>
> In the history of ethics there is downright fear of what cannot be subjected to rules and regulations. Again and again thinkers have undertaken to define altruism in such a way that it remains rational. This, however, is never done except at the cost of the naturalness and living quality of ethics. Life-denial remains an irrational thing, even when it is placed at the service of a purposive aim. A universally applicable balance between life-

> affirmation and life-negation cannot be established. They remain in a continual state of tension. If any relaxation does take place, it is a sign that ethics are collapsing, for in their real nature they are unbounded enthusiasm. They originate indeed in thought, but they cannot be carried to a logical conclusion.
> (Philosophy 291-2)

The root of self-devotion to others lies in the concept of the Universal Will-to-live as the fundamental reality underlying all phenomena; that is, all wills-to-live are united as manifestations of the Universal Will, though they are separate and often in conflict in the struggle for survival. Through self-devotion man attains union with Being, with the Universal Will: not union through the passive self-perfecting of "spiritual inward devotion to...an abstract totality of Being," but union through active self-devotion to "real Being," that is, to other wills-to-live in the world:

> Only an infinitely small part of infinite Being comes within my range. The rest of it passes me by...But by devoting myself to that which comes within my sphere of influence and needs me, I make spiritual, inward devotion to infinite Being a reality and thereby give my own poor existence meaning and richness.
>
> From self-devotion to the Absolute there comes only a dead spirituality. It is a purely intellectual act. No motives to activity are given in it...in the mysticism of reality self-devotion is no longer a purely intellectual act, but one in which everything that is alive in man has its share. There is therefore dominant in it a spirituality which carries in itself in elemental form the impulse to action. The gruesome truth that spirituality and ethics are two different things no longer holds good. Here the two are one and the same.
>
> Now, too, the ethics of self-perfecting and the ethics of altruism can interpenetrate each other. They now become cosmic in nature-philosophy, which leaves the world as it is. Hence they cannot but meet each other in a thought, which satisfies in every direction the laws of thinking, of living devotion to Being which lives. In this thought lie passive and active self-perfecting in mutual agreement and perfect union. They comprehend each other as the working out of one and the same inner compulsion. (Philosophy 305-6)

In Schweitzer: Prophet of Radical Theology, Jackson Ice provides an analysis of Schweitzer's personal will-to-live as holophrastic, that is, as meaning and representing many things (101). He distinguishes three major divisions: the will-to-survival; the will-to-self-realization; and the will-to-relatedness. The will-to-relatedness encompasses two dimensions: cosmic relatedness and human relatedness.

The will-to-survival is the 'prima facie' sense of the will-to-live. It is the first fact of consciousness; I will to live; I want to live. It is, of course, possessed by all wills-to-live and not merely human beings. The will-to-self-realization is described variously by Schweitzer as "the craving for perfection," "the will to progress," "the will to realization of ideals," and "the will to civilization." It is the instinctive force or energy within each organism which seeks actualization of its telos. While all wills-to-live have the will-to-self-realization, in humans (and some other animals) the instinctive striving is magnified by conscious thought. Through self-consciousness, language, and imagination, the human will strives to be more than it actually is at any given moment. The human urges for goodness, truth, and beauty are not, however, so obvious in everyone - they can be ignored, distorted, or atrophied. We see the creative urge to self-realization in art, literature, music, science, philosophy, and religion, though "How this striving originated in us, and how it has developed, we do not know, but it is given with our existence. We must act upon it, if we would not be unfaithful to the mysterious will-to-live which is within us" (Philosophy 282).

The will-to-relatedness is the desire to experience union with the infinite will which is both within and without. In its active human form, it is manifested outwardly as the struggle for personal and social solidarity - through friendships and other personal

relationships, and through culture and social organization (Ice 105). In its inner form, it encompasses the passive desire for reunion in a universal sense - i.e., as communication with nature, or as religion; and also as will-to-meaning - i.e., a quest for intellectual understanding of the world. Like Schweitzer, Ice cautions that intellectualism as manifested solely through objective scientific pursuits is a misdirected and deceptive form of relatedness:

> ...modern man thought he could enter into relatedness with the world only passively, that is, only intellectually. His success in accurately describing, measuring, calculating, manipulating, and predicting natural phenomena as a scientific spectator gave him confidence that such an approach was entirely sufficient, not only for understanding reality, but for knowing how to live meaningfully in the world. In this manner the quest for relatedness became sidetracked into a stockpiling of information facts and technological techniques that were not only mute about the richness of the qualitative aspects of human life, but eventually worked toward the discrediting of those valuable insights and meanings which were basic to an optimistic world view. Such a tack has led contemporary man into a false relatedness, not only with his fellow men, but, many feel, with the essential character of existence itself...Schweitzer insists that cosmic relatedness fails if it becomes abstract and seeks only intellectual union. (113)

In the practical application of reverence for life to ourselves and to others, we strive to attain self-perfection and self-devotion; self-realization and relatedness. The will-to-live has a "built-in definition" of what self-perfection encompasses, such that the existing self, once it becomes conscious of itself and of the world around it, strives to become the "essential self," the ideal fulfillment of the self's highest potentialities (Clark 123). In the concept and exercise of reverence for life, Schweitzer fuses the "is" with the "ought", the empirical, existing self with the essential, potential self.

The Ethic of Reverence for Life

The ethic of reverence for life is ultimately the acknowledgment that the will-to-live's fundamental nature compels it to seek solidarity with other manifestations of the Universal Will despite the divisiveness of life which we see in nature. Given within the will-to-live is simple world and life affirmation - it is not a choice; we *do* exist, we *do* want to survive, we *do* seek self-realization - and this same force is all around us. Yet experience of the world tells us that complete union with other wills-to-live is not possible:

> In my will-to-live the universal will-to-live experiences itself otherwise than in its other manifestations. In them it shows itself in a process of individualizing which, so far as I can see from the outside, is bent merely on living itself out to the full, and in no way on union with any other will-to-live. The world is a ghastly drama of will-to-live divided against itself. One existence makes its way at the cost of another; one destroys the other. One will-to-live merely exerts its will against the other, and has no knowledge of it. But in me the will-to-live has come to know about other wills-to-live. There is in it a yearning to arrive at unity with itself, to become universal.
>
> Why does the will-to-live experience itself in this way in me alone? Is it because I have acquired the capacity of reflecting on the totality of Being? What is the goal of this evolution which has begun in me?
>
> To these questions there is no answer. It remains a painful enigma for me that I must live with reverence for life in a world which is dominated by creative will which is also destructive will, and destructive will which is also creative. (Philosophy 312)

This "painful enigma," this dualism of what we will versus what we know, is *the* dilemma of the will-to-live. "Our will-to-live has to accomodate itself to the inconceivable truth that it is unable with its own valuable convictions to discover itself again in the manifold will-to-live which is seen manifested in the world" (qtd. in Ice 115). The enigma of life against itself has two results. The first is that we understand that our life-view cannot be predicated upon our world-view, because the will-to-live instinctively confirms its own

existence despite the pain and meaninglessness of the world - and thus the essential meaning of human existence must come from the innate convictions of the will, and must, in an experiential rather than a scientifically logical way, be a necessity of thought.

The second result of the will's convictions in the face of the pessimism of external knowledge is resignation. There are two discrete components to resignation: resignation in regard to skepticism about knowledge of the world providing us with a life-view, and resignation in regard to the pain and suffering we see around us.

The skepticism of knowledge and the misery of the world can, of course, lead to pessimism and despair. It is through resignation that the will-to-live avoids such a path:

> ...I am ...absolutely skeptical about our knowledge of the world without at the same time renouncing belief in world-and life-affirmation and ethics. Resignation as to knowledge of the world is for me not an irretrievable plunge into a scepticism which leaves us to drift about in life like a derelict vessel. I see in it that effort of honesty which we must venture to make in order to arrive at the serviceable world-view which hovers within sight. Every world-view which fails to start from resignation in regard to knowledge is artificial and a mere fabrication, for it rests upon an inadmissible interpretation of the universe...Resignation is the vestibule through which we enter ethics. Only he who in deepened devotion to his own will-to-live experiences inward freedom from outward occurrences, is capable of devoting himself in profound and steady fashion to the life of others. (Philosophy 76,314)

Resignation thus provides us with the spiritual freedom to acknowledge life's suffering and yet to strive to alleviate what we can of it:

> The idea of Reverence for Life offers itself as the realistic answer to the realistic question of how man and the world are related to each other. Of the world man knows only that everything which exists is, like himself, a manifestation of the Will-to-Live. With this world he stands in a relation of passivity and of activity. On the one hand he is subordinate to the course of events which is given in this totality of life; on the other hand he is capable

> of affecting the life which comes within his reach by hampering or promoting it, by destroying or maintaining it.
>
> The one possible way of giving meaning to his existence is that of raising his natural relation to the world to a spiritual one. As a being in a passive relation to the world he comes into a spiritual relation to it by resignation. True resignation consists in this: that man, feeling his subordination to the course of world happenings, wins his way to inward freedom from the fortunes which shape the outside of his existence. Inward freedom means that he finds strength to deal with everything that is hard in his lot, in such a way that it all helps to make him a deeper and more inward person, to purify him, and to keep him calm and peaceful. Resignation, therefore, is the spiritual and ethical affirmation of one's own existence. Only he who has gone through the stage of resignation is capable of accepting the world. (Out 230-31)

The purpose of Schweitzer's emphasis on resignation as a key component of ethics is to counteract and defuse the painful dualism we encounter in our lives every day: that what we will cannot be reconciled with what we experience in the world. In the suffering and pain of animate life, there simply is no purpose nor intellectual justification to be found, and yet we perceive the trend toward cooperation and union among manifestations of will-to-live. Man's very essence is, as Ice so aptly phrases it, as "he-who-hopes" (168); and while we can neither understand nor prevent most pain, suffering, and death, still we can actively participate in its alleviation around us. Far from resulting in the passivity of pessimism and despair, resignation allows us a practical solution - to take ethical action within our own small but significant spheres of influence. Schweitzer makes no claim that resignation is an *easy* task for the will - only that it is a *necessary* one:

> True resignation is not a becoming weary of the world, but the quiet triumph which the will-to-live celebrates at the hour of its greatest need over the circumstances of life. It flourishes only in the soil of deep world-and-life-affirmation.
>
> In this way our life is a coming to an understanding between our will-to-live and the world, along with which we have continually to be on our

> guard against allowing any deterioration in our will-to-live. The struggle between optimism and pessimism is never fought to a finish within us...the will-to-live can be shattered in suffering or in spiritual night. This enigma, too, before which our will-to-live shudders as before the most inexplicable of all inexplicable things, we must learn to leave unsolved. (Philosophy 284-285)

Let us now recapitulate the "epiphany of reverence for life" and further address its ethical implications. Instinctive thought says that "I am life that wills to live." Through analogical thinking, the will-to-live experiences the world as other manifestations of the Universal Will, that is, as other phenomenal wills-to-live which have the same will to survival and self-realization: "I am life that wills to live, in the midst of life that wills to live." If *I* desire life and self-fulfillment, then so also must other life.

"Life" in Schweitzer's sense is more than a biological phenomenon; it is a "designation of that inexplicable force, [or] energy... which causes things to 'exist', to be a part of being as opposed to non-being" (Hall 131). It is, in short, the idea of the will-to-live itself.

And by "reverence" - *ehrfurcht vor dem leben* - Schweitzer is referring to a great deal more than the English connotation of respect. 'Reverence' connotes a sense of mystical awe; it is an acknowledgment of the "immensity and overwhelming power of the force of life in nature" (Brabazon 243). In reverencing one's own life, one seeks a great deal more than mere survival of the physical organism; one seeks self-perfection, self-realization, self-fulfillment. Analogically, other life seeks the same thing; first, survival (life itself), and second, self-realization (the pursuit and attainment of its telos, its species-way). In no way does this imply that owls, trout, earthworms, and oak trees strive for the same things that

human beings do; there are obviously wide variations in physical, mental, and emotional capacities and needs. Still, because other wills-to-live strive for species-specific self-development, their lives are also to be revered, and the scope of ethical thought and behavior is unlimited responsibility towards all that lives:

> What shall be my attitude toward this other life? It can only be of a piece with my attitude towards my own life. If I am a thinking being, I must regard other life than my own with equal reverence. For I shall know that it longs for fulness and development as deeply as I do myself. Therefore, I see that evil is what annihilates, hampers, or hinders life. And this holds good whether I regard it physically or spiritually. Goodness, by the same token, is the saving or helping of life, the enabling of whatever life I can to attain its highest development.
>
> This is the absolute and reasonable ethic...I know that it is given inherently in the will-to-live. (Christendom 230-1)

> I can do nothing but hold to the fact that the will-to-live in me manifests itself as will-to-live which desires to become one with other will-to-live. That is for me the light that shines in the darkness...I am thrown, indeed, by reverence for life into an unrest such as the world does not know, but I obtain from it a blessedness which the world cannot give. If in the tenderheartedness produced by being different from the world another person and I help each other in understanding and pardoning, when otherwise will would torment will, the division of the will-to-live is at an end. If I save an insect from a puddle, life has devoted itself to life, and the division of life against itself is ended. Whenever my life devotes itself in any way to life, my finite will-to-live experiences union with the infinite will in which all life is one, and I enjoy a feeling of refreshment which prevents me from pining away in the desert of life.
>
> I therefore recognize it as the destiny of my existence to be obedient to this higher revelation of the will-to-live in me. I choose for my activity the removal of this division of the will-to-live against itself, so far as the influence of my existence can reach. Knowing now the one thing needful, I leave on one side the enigma of the universe and of my existence in it. (Philosophy 312-13)

The ethic of reverence for life is thus truly universal in scope:

> The great fault of all ethics hitherto has been that they believed themselves to have to deal only with the relations of man to man. In reality, however, the question is what is his attitude to the world and all life that comes within his reach. A man is ethical only when life, as such, is sacred to him, that of plants and animals as that of his fellow men, and when he devotes himself helpfully to all life that is in need of help. Only the universal ethic of the feeling of responsibility in an ever-widening sphere for all that lives - only that ethic can be founded in thought. The ethic of the relation of man to man is not something apart by itself: it is only a particular relation which results from the universal one. (Out 158-9)

And when Schweitzer says "all life", he means *all* life:

> The basic principle of the moral which is a necessity of thought means, however, not only an ordering and deepening, but also a widening of the current views of good and evil. A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life which he is able to assist, and shrink from injuring anything that lives. He does not ask how far this or that life deserves one's sympathy as being valuable, nor, beyond that, whether and to what degree it is capable of feeling. Life as such is sacred to him. He tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and takes care to crush no insect. If in summer he is working by lamplight, he prefers to keep the window shut and breathe a stuffy atmosphere rather than see one insect after another fall with singed wings upon his table.
>
> If he walks on the road after a shower and sees an earthworm which has strayed on to it, he bethinks himself that it must get dried up in the sun, if it does not return soon enough to ground into which it can burrow, so he lifts it from the deadly stone surface, and puts it on the grass. If he comes across an insect which has fallen into a puddle, he stops a moment in order to hold out a leaf or a stalk on which it can save itself.
>
> He is not afraid of being laughed at as sentimental. It is the fate of every truth to be a subject for laughter until it is generally recognized. Once it was considered folly to assume that men of colour were really men and ought to be treated as such, but the folly has become an accepted truth. To-day it is thought to be going too far to declare that constant regard for everything that lives, down to the lowest manifestations of life, is a demand made by rational ethics. The time is coming, however, when people will be astonished that mankind needed so long a time to learn to regard thoughtless injury to life as incompatible with ethics. (Philosophy 310-11)

The ethic of reverence for life thus provides Schweitzer with the solution to the

problem of finding an adequate world-view: found by the rational thought of the will-to-live which dares to embrace the spirituality of mysticism and acknowledge itself as one of an infinite number of manifestations of the Universal Will; found by the will-to-live which has the courage to assert the truth of its innate convictions in the face of the inadequacy of intellectual knowledge of the world:

> Reverence for life, *veneratio vitae*, is the most direct and at the same time the profoundest achievement of my will-to-live .
>
> In reverence for life my knowledge passes into experience. The simple world-and life-affirmation which is within me just because I am will-to-live has, therefore, no need to enter into controversy with itself, if my will-to-live learns to think and yet does not understand the meaning of the world. In spite of the negative results of knowledge, I have to hold fast to world-and life-affirmation and deepen it. My life carries its own meaning in itself. This meaning lies in my living out the highest idea which shows itself in my will-to-live , the idea of reverence for life. With that for a starting-point I give value to my own life and to all the will-to-live which surrounds me, I persevere in activity, and I produce values.
>
> Ethics grow out of the same root as world-and life-affirmation, for ethics, too, are nothing but reverence for life. That is what gives me the fundamental principle of morality, namely, that good consists in maintaining, promoting, and enhancing life, and that destroying, injuring, and limiting life are evil. Affirmation of the world, which means affirmation of the will-to-live that manifests itself around me, is only possible if I devote myself to other life. From an inner necessity I exert myself in producing values and practicing ethics in the world and on the world even though I do not understand the meaning of the world. For in world-and life-affirmation and in ethics I carry out the will of the universal will-to-live which reveals itself in me...which I do not know as such in the world, but only experience as mysterious Will within myself.
>
> Rational thinking which is free from assumption ends therefore in mysticism. To relate oneself in the spirit of reverence for life to the multiform manifestations of the will-to-live which together constitute the world is ethical mysticism. All profound world-view is mysticism, the essence of which is just this: that out of my unsophisticated and naive existence in the world there comes, as a result of thought about self and the world, spiritual self-devotion to the mysterious infinite Will which is continuously manifested in the universe. (Philosophy 78-9)

CHAPTER III

CORROBORATION AND DEFENSE

The Biophilia Hypothesis: Reinforcement for the Ethic in Other Academic Disciplines

In 1984, Pulitzer Prize winning sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson published a book titled Biophilia. Nine years later, in 1993, Wilson and Stephen R. Kellert edited a book called The Biophilia Hypothesis. The motivation of both books is to assess whether the perceptions of the so-called biophilia hypothesis are strong enough on which to build a conservation ethic: Kellert suggests that

> Our modern environmental crisis - the widespread toxification of various food chains, the multifaceted degradation of the atmosphere, the far-ranging depletion of diverse natural resources, and, above all, the massive loss of biological diversity and the scale of global species extinctions - is viewed as symptomatic of a fundamental rupture of human emotional and spiritual relationships in the natural world. (Kellert and Wilson 26)

The concepts and research suggested and presented in these volumes, and in other related literature, offer the potential of exciting and extraordinary scientific legitimacy for Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life as an innate function of, and the very essence of, being human. I will in fact suggest that the biophilia hypothesis lends credence to Schweitzer's assertions that all wills-to-live are manifestations of the Universal Will, and that the concept of biophilia may well confirm Schweitzer's contention that human beings seek fulfillment ultimately through spiritual union with "infinite being" - that is, through union with other manifestations of the Universal Will-to-live which they encounter and

experience in the natural world. Schweitzer said that the human impulse to solidarity with other creatures is profound; inborn; discovered (not invented!); and undeniable; the biophilia hypothesis expands upon this very idea.

Wilson defines biophilia as "the innate tendency to focus on life and lifelike processes" (1), and suggests that

> to explore and affiliate with life is a deep and complicated process in mental development. To an extent still undervalued in philosophy and religion, our existence depends on this propensity, our spirit is woven from it, hope rises on its currents. There is more. Modern biology has produced a genuinely new way of looking at the world that is incidentally congenital to the inner direction of biophilia. In other words, instinct is in this rare instance aligned with reason. The conclusion I draw is optimistic: to the degree that we come to understand other organisms, we will place a greater value on them, and on ourselves...The distinction between the two cultures of science and the humanities...persists. Until that fundamental divide is closed or at least reconciled in some congenial manner, the relation between man and the living world will remain problematic. (Wilson 1-2, 49)

Wilson's thesis, then, is that the human tendency to relate to other life and life processes may be an expression of a biologic need - a need which is fundamental to human physical and mental development. We depend on nature for physical, material, aesthetic, intellectual, and spiritual fulfillment (Kellert and Wilson 20); Kellert says that it is "critical to human meaning and fulfillment at both the individual and societal level" (Kellert and Wilson 25). Biophilia is proposed as a *tendency* to respond positively to nature; this tendency has a partly genetic basis which is positively or negatively developed within a given cultural/environmental context. Wilson admits that

> The evidence for the proposition is not strong in a formal scientific sense: the subject has not been studied enough in the scientific manner of hypothesis, deduction and experimentation to let us be certain about it one way or the other. The biophilic tendency is nevertheless so clearly evinced in daily life

> and widely distributed as to deserve serious attention. It unfolds in the predictable fantasies and responses of individuals from early childhood onward. It cascades into repetitive patterns of culture across most or all societies...These processes appear to be part of the programs of the brain. They are marked by the quickness and decisiveness with which we learn particular things about certain kinds of plants and animals. They are too consistent to be dismissed as the result of purely historical events working on a mental blank slate. (85)

As a scientific hypothesis, the concept of biophilia requires valid inquiry, but Wilson and Kellert agree that "...the richness and depth of the subject preclude the possibility of achieving any definitive "proof" (Kellert and Wilson 21) - a brave admission from the scientific world and an admission which confirms Schweitzer's belief that intellectual knowledge is not in itself sufficient to confirm or explain the purpose of life itself. Schweitzer's "painful enigma" is acknowledged by Wilson:

> Let us imagine that we can avert nuclear war, feed a stabilized population, and generate a permanent supply of energy - what then? The answer is the same all around the world: individuals will strive toward personal fulfillment and at last realize their potential. But what is fulfillment, and for what purpose did human potential evolve?
>
> The truth is that we have never conquered the world, never understood it; we only think we have control. We do not even know why we respond a certain way to other organisms, and need them in diverse ways, so deeply ... The more the mind is fathomed in its own right, as an organ of survival, the greater will be the reverence for life for purely rational reasons. (Wilson 139-40)

The biophilia hypothesis makes five parallel assertions:

- that biophilia is (at least partially) inherent; that is, biologically/genetically based;

- that it is part of the human species' evolutionary heritage;

- that biophilia is related to genetic fitness and competitive advantage;

- that the affiliation with other life increases the potential for self-realization and individual meaning;

- and that biophilia may provide a "self-interested basis for a humane ethic of care and conservation of nature, most especially the diversity of life" (Kellert and Wilson 21).

Biologist Karl von Frisch, asked why he devoted so many years of his life to the study of bees, said that "*every single species of the animal kingdom challenges us with all, or nearly all, the mysteries of life*" (Kellert and Wilson 11). It is no mystery, however, that we are truly kin to other organisms, and that this evolutionary kinship is in all probability the root of the biophilia tendency. According to Wilson:

> We are literally kin to other organisms. The common and pygmy chimpanzees constitute the extreme case, the two species closest to human beings out of the contemporary millions. About 99 percent of our genes are identical to the corresponding set in chimpanzees, so that the remaining 1 percent accounts for all the differences between us. (Wilson 130)

And thus "...we are human in good part because of the particular way we affiliate with other organisms. They are the matrix in which the human mind originated and is permanently rooted, and they offer the challenge and freedom innately sought" (Wilson 139).

Since the 1970s, Stephen Kellert has done extensive research on the human perceptions and valuations of nature, and of animals in particular. He identifies nine fundamental aspects of the presumably biological basis for valuing and affiliating with nature, which are clearly delineated in the biological, anthropological, and psychological literature. These traits are a cluster of learning rules which he has studied by age, gender, occupation, socioeconomic status, and place of residence (Kellert and Wilson 43-4). These

nine dimensions occur across all of the aforementioned cultural boundaries (though there is variation in intensity and content). Thus Kellert concludes that they are probably "universal and functional" (Kellert and Wilson 44) expressions of the human species' dependence on nature, crossing taxonomic, demographic, behavioral, cultural, and historical lines. Some, any, or all of the nine attitudes can contribute constructively to survival and personal fulfillment; and any given attitude can be viewed contextually as either constructive or destructive. In brief, they are as follows (Kellert and Wilson 44-58):

Utilitarian: Nature provides physical benefits which are the basis of human survival, sustenance, and security.

Naturalistic: Direct contact with nature provides mental/emotional satisfaction (i.e., wonder, awe, curiosity, the urge to explore nature).

Egoistic/Scientific: Though the egoistic perspective is more integrative and less reductionistic than the scientific, nature provides the urge for "precise study and systematic inquiry of the natural world and the related belief that nature can be understood through empirical study;" the satisfaction derived is independent of utility considerations.

Aesthetic: The beauty of nature provides aesthetic appeal and benefits. One of the clearest findings in the literature is that people universally prefer natural designs and patterns over urban/artificial ones.

Symbolic: Nature facilitates thought and communication, as seen in the use of symbolism and metaphor in linguistic development. For example, over 90% of the characters employed in language acquisition and counting in children's preschool books are animals.

Humanistic: There is a deep emotional attachment to particular elements of nature (often to sentient animals, especially the larger vertebrates). The result may be the care and nurture of individual aspects of nature; love for domesticated animals; and/or an enhanced capacity for sharing and altruism.

Moralistic: There are strong feelings of ethical responsibility, affinity, and perhaps reverence for the natural world. This may include attribution of spiritual meaning to nature;

such an attitude may confer biological advantage via psychological well-being (as in the well known historical relationship of Native Americans to their environment).

Dominionistic: The desire is to master the natural world; to control any and all aspects of it.

Negativistic: The feelings toward aspects of nature are of antipathy, fear, and/or aversion. Though often viewed as a destructive and unacceptable attitude today, this is, of course, a basic constructive motivating force for survival (i.e., fear of predators or fire).

As evidenced in research in the fields of evolutionary biology, genetics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology, these various aspects of the valuation (and therefore treatment) of nature obviously occur in differing combinations and intensities depending upon cultural and environmental contexts.

From an evolutionary perspective, biophilia is seen not as a single instinct or a single gene to be expressed or suppressed, but as the sort of "complex of learning rules" referred to by Kellert (Kellert and Wilson 31) - and the feelings molded by the culturally-driven learning rules vary "from attraction to aversion, from care to indifference, from peacefulness to fear-driven anxiety" (Kellert and Wilson 31). And Wilson contends that the biophilic learning rules are *not* replaced by adaptation to modern artifactual versions; rather, they persist, albeit in an atrophied state, in artificially constructed environments (Kellert and Wilson 31-2). After all, more than 99 percent of all human beings have been hunter-gatherers, crucially involved with and dependent on other living organisms, plant and animal - as Wilson puts it, "the brain evolved in a biocentric world, not a machine-regulated world" (Kellert and Wilson 32).

Wilson's hypothesis is that, from an evolutionary standpoint, biophilia evolved in a "biocultural" setting:

> ...a certain genotype makes a behavioral response more likely, the response enhances survival and reproductive fitness, the genotype consequently spreads through the population, and the behavioral response grows more frequent. Add to this the strong general tendency of human beings to translate emotional feelings into myriad dreams and narratives, and the necessary conditions are in place to cut the historical channels of art and religious belief. (Kellert and Wilson 32)

A compelling example he cites is that of the human species' relationship of fear of, and fascination with, snakes. Many snakes are dangerous, causing illness and death; our evolutionary companions, the apes and Old World monkeys, are both fearful of and fascinated by them. So, too, are humans throughout history and today; further, people in diverse cultures dream more of snakes than any other animal, and also attribute magical and symbolic significance to them in art, mythology, and religion.

In the field of behavioral psychology, Roger Ulrich argues that

> ...theoretical propositions for an innate predisposition for biophilia gain plausibility and consistency if they also postulate a corresponding genetic predisposition for adaptive biophobic responses to certain natural stimuli that presumably have constituted survival-related threats throughout human evolution. (Kellert and Wilson 75)

That is, a partly genetic basis for biophilia *and* biophobia should be reflected in biologically prepared learning. Ulrich defines biophobia as "a partly genetic predisposition to readily associate, on the basis of negative information or exposure, and then persistently retain fear or strong negative/avoidance responses to certain natural stimuli that presumably have constituted risks during evolution" (Kellert and Wilson 76). This would include such things as snakes and spiders, closed spaces, and heights. The existence of and distinction between

biophilia and biophobia correlates well with Dorion Sagan and Lynn Margulis' idea of prototaxis: they suggest that "there is no simple biophilia, no unconditional, unchanging love for members of other species...Perhaps it would be better to speak of prototaxis - the gereralized tendency of cells and organisms to react to each other in distinct ways" (Kellert and Wilson 346-7). And David Orr has expanded the term biophobia to mean "...the culturally acquired urge to affiliate with technology, human artifacts, and solely with human interests regarding the natural world...[it] include[s] as well those who regard nature 'objectively' as nothing more than 'resources' to be used any way the favored among the present generation see fit" (Kellert and Wilson 416) .

Through laboratory conditioning experiments and behavior-genetic studies, biophobia is postulated by Ulrich and others to involve a partly genetic basis as well as a component of prepared learning; this implies that biophilia as positive responsiveness to advantageous natural stimuli is also a tenable proposition. For example, numerous studies involving diverse individuals and groups such as prisoners, hospital patients, and outdoor recreation enthusiasts support the stress-reducing effects of viewing nature; other findings suggest that exposure to positive (non-threatening) natural environments facilitate creativity and "high order" cognitive functioning (Kellert and Wilson 100, 113). Studies of landscape preferences are particularly compelling; across individuals, groups, and cultures today (American, European, and Asian), preferred landscapes are savanna-like. A propensity is seen for portraits and paintings with green vegetation, open spaces, and non-turbulent water; these same features are chosen in landscape design. People prefer parks and pastures to deep forest; thus landscape architects work on the premise of opening up closed woods, adding

refuges (i.e., gazebos), paths and bridges for a sense of security and ease of movement, and water, large grazing (non-threatened and non-threatening) animals, and flowers (Kellert and Wilson 154). The clear implication is that we still like what our ancestors liked: savanna-like areas which offered food, water, and security. Ulrich also suggests that one of the impediments to protecting biodiversity in nature is related to this preference: much of the biodiversity of the world is in the upper canopy of the rain forest, an area historically inaccessible and thus unknown to humans; the forest floor was better known, but was perceived negatively - as a dangerous place - no view, closed in, full of spiders, snakes, and disease.

Aaron Katcher and Gregory Wilkens describe ongoing studies of the biophilic aspect of nature having the properties of psychological association with safety or comfort and a Heraclitean notion of changing-yet-always-remaining-the-same. Aside from savanna-like landscapes, this could include such environments as seeing horses/cows grazing on pasture; feeding birds, or watching fish in an aquarium (Kellert and Wilson 175).

Katcher and Wilkins also discuss psychological studies involving interactions between animals (domesticated pets) and children with attention-deficit-hyperactive disorder or autism, and adults with chronic brain disease such as Alzheimer's or cerebral arteriosclerosis. Such studies show that the children and adults become much more responsive, focusing on the animals, interacting with them by stroking and hugging, and smiling, laughing, and talking to the animals and volunteers (Kellert and Wilson 178).

Anthropologist Richard Nelson suggests that biophilia - "a deep, pervasive, ubiquitous all-embracing affinity with life" (Kellert and Wilson 224) lies at the very core

of traditional hunting-fishing-gathering cultures. For the Kuyukon people of Alaska, whom he has studied extensively, nature has great power, and they humble themselves to this power. "The key to this humility is respect...A strict code of morality extends beyond the enclave of human society to include the entire community of life" (Kellert and Wilson 216). He cites an incident when a tribal member saw an unfamiliar bird perched in a tree; he spoke to the bird:

> "*Who are you? And what are you saying to us*?" He paused, watched, then added "*Wish us good luck, whoever you are...Wish us well and surround us - your grandchildren - within a circle of protection*". (Kellert and Wilson 216)

Nelson notes that the world of the Kuyukon is one

> pervaded with dimensions unknown among contemporary western peoples, specifically denied in our modern traditions of science, philosophy, and religion. Through cultural learning, we acquire a particular world view that becomes the bedrock of our minds, as deep inside us as language, as far beyond conscious thought as the act of breathing, as potent as our involuntary emotional responses. (Kellert and Wilson 216)

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Nelson suggests that, based on the anthropological literature, most of humanity has conceptualized the world through principles and beliefs similar to those of the Kuyukon and other Native Americans. According to anthropologist Robert Redfield (Kellert and Wilson 223-4), this world-view has three fundamental components:

1. It thoroughly conjoins humanity, nature, and the sacred; human beings are *in* nature.
2. Human-nature relationships are based on orientation, not confrontation; coercion and appeal, not mastery and dominion.
3. The universe is perceived as morally significant, and man's actions toward nature are limited by moral considerations.

Redfield suggests that the abandonment of this world-view "represents one of the greatest transformations of the human mind" (Kellert and Wilson 224). As Nelson expresses it in reference to today's technological culture:

> Probably no society has been so deeply alienated from the community of nature, has viewed the natural world from a greater distance of mind, has lapsed to a murkier comprehension of its connection with the sustaining environment. Because of this, we are greatly disadvantaged in our efforts to understand the basic human affinity for nonhuman life. (Kellert and Wilson 203)

As eminent biologist Claude Levi-Straus said, animals are "good to think as well as good to eat" (Kellert and Wilson 302). The significance of the natural world, and of animals in particular, to linguistic development and the use of symbolism in developmental cognition is well delineated. Paul Shepard says that

> Human intelligence is bound to the presence of animals. They are the means by which cognition takes its first shape and they are the instruments for imagining abstract ideas and qualities...Animals are used in the growth and development of the human person, in those most priceless qualities we lump together as 'mind'...Animals...are basic to the development of speech and thought. (Kellert and Wilson 51)

Elizabeth Atwood Lawrence, a veterinarian and anthropologist, says that

> the human need for metaphorical expression finds its greatest fulfillment through reference to the animal kingdom. No other realm affords such vivid expression of symbolic concepts...it is remarkable to contemplate the paucity of other categories for conceptual frames of reference, so preeminent, so widespread, and enduring is the habit of symbolizing in terms of animals. (Kellert and Wilson 301)

Lawrence (Kellert and Wilson 303-31) provides a provocative account of three creatures which are used linguistically and symbolically to reflect 'good' and 'bad' human qualities. Each represents the human need to cope with the cultural dilemmas of the human

social order. The 'sacred bee', provider of 'pure' honey, is a creature of the air who represents the 'good' human quality of responsibility toward one's group. The 'filthy pig', a creature of and on the earth, is vilified for its presumed antisocial characteristics and its impurity as a scavenger. Pigs are too individualistic; they are too much like us in 'bad' ways. (Interestingly, pigs are known today to be relatively intelligent, clean, and physiologically similar enough to humans to warrant their use in medical research and potential organ transplantation). Lawrence's third creature is the 'bat out of hell' - a creature despised for its nocturnal habits, its avoidance of humans, and its 'abnormal' way of hanging upside down - hence its connotations of Satan and the underworld. This is a beast whose unfamiliar habits defy human order.

Lawrence sees animal symbolism as biophilia in its quest for and explanation of the eons-old human search for "man's place in nature" (Kellert and Wilson 334). Through the use of symbolism we attempt to identify ourselves and our place in the world. Shepard suggests that

> primal peoples kept their distance from animals except for their in-taking as food and prototypes - and could therefore love them as sacred beings and respect them as other 'peoples' while we, with the animals in our laps and our mechanized slaughterhouses, are less sure who they are and therefore who we are. (Kellert and Wilson 289).

Thus nature is *more* rather than *less* distanced from us. Indeed, Shepard is concerned that the focus of Western culture today on replacement of wild animals with domesticated ones has signaled the end of human respect for the "other"; it is a blurring - perhaps almost an eradication - of the so-called Levi-Strauss line between nature and culture. "The loss of the

wild others leaves nothing but our own image to explain ourselves by - hence empty psychic space" (Kellert and Wilson 294).

Lawrence characterizes the "love for animals" professed by many in the veterinary profession in terms of the type of Greek love called "philia" - i.e., the love between friends. This holds well for our relationships with pets in particular, and for animals which work for us (i.e., the pastoral Nuer of Africa and their cattle), as these relationships are in some sense reciprocal. As anthropologist Roy Willis notes, the essential feature of friendship is likeness - there is a minimalization of otherness, and a friend is valued as "an interpreter of the world and a mediator between it and the self" (Lawrence 971). On the other hand, Orr sees Schweitzer's reverence for life as "agape", the type of Greek sacrificial love which asks nothing in return - and suggests that it is this kind of love which is required of us if we are to adequately address our relationship to the environment today: "Would not respect for nature do as well? I think not: it is just too bloodless, too cool, too self-satisfied and aloof to cause us to do much to save species and environments" (Kellert and Wilson 427). (Of course, Orr completely misinterprets Schweitzer's ethic as originating in external knowledge when Schweitzer in fact is in complete agreement with Orr's assessment of reverence for life as innate:

> ...for Schweitzer reverence for life originated in large measure from the intellectual contemplation of the world...We have reason to believe that this intellectual striving is aided by what is already innate in us and may be evident in other creatures...It would be the worst kind of anthropocentrism to [believe] that the capacity for biophilia and awe is a human monopoly. (Kellert and Wilson 423))

The biophilia hypothesis echoes Schweitzer's philosophy through a variety of scientific disciplines in an exciting and long-overdue way. Schweitzer might have written Kellert's words:

> Our development as individuals and as a species constitutes more than just the struggle for physical survival. We aspire to something called fulfillment, as well, perhaps a striving after an ideal which every species, especially the more complex forms, appears to manifest as a kind of unrealized potential. The notion of biophilia suggests that this possibility for fulfillment and self-realization may be found in our relationship with the diversity of life around us. (Kellert and Wilson 456)

And even Holmes Rolston, the environmental philosopher whom one can think might not wish to be closely affiliated with Schweitzer's individualistic (as opposed to holistic) philosophy, says:

> Maintain your distance from the other creatures as you wish, insist that the self is over against the world. But you cannot take the self out of the world...The planet loves life and so do we. This is the evolutionary epic and we are this love of life become conscious of itself ...We want to respect the life that has so marvelously expressed itself over evolutionary history, and reaching that respect will itself be an elevating moral achievement. (Kellert and Wilson 407, 413)

The Accusation of Anthropomorphism

The biophilia hypothesis provides crucial support for another aspect of Schweitzer's philosophy, that of the use of analogy by which the will-to-live perceives other wills-to-live as also "life which wills to live":

> All true knowledge passes on into experience. The nature of the manifestations I do not know, but I form a conception of it in analogy to the will-to-live which is in myself. Thus my knowledge of the world becomes experience of the world...It is not by informing me what this or that manifestation of life means in the sum-total of the world that knowledge

> brings me into connection with the world...From within outwards it puts me in relation to the world by making my will-to-live feel everything around it as also will-to-live. (Philosophy 308-9)

Schweitzer's use of "analogical thought" has led to the dreaded charge of anthropomorphism. There are three distinct but interrelated concerns here: the first is whether "analogical thought" is itself a valid methodology; the second is whether such thought in Schweitzer's work is indeed anthropomorphic; and the third is whether the attribution of anthropomorphism to thought is itself an invalid mode of thought.

Wilson notes that analogical thinking is *the* "common human origin" of thought, utilized in both the arts and the sciences; he says that "On one point both psychologists and successful voyagers agree. The key instrument of the creative imagination is analogy...the criterion of principal metaphor used...[is] one commanding image synthesized from several units, such that a single complex idea is attained not by analysis but by the sudden perception of an objective relation" (Wilson 66-7). Surely this is exactly what Schweitzer is doing when "thinking experience" leads him from "I am life that wills to live" to "in the midst of life that wills to live." By what other possible route could the human brain come to know and understand other life - either human or nonhuman? We apply the concept of analogy to perceive similarity in physical *and* mental states, certainly in regard to other humans and also in regard to other nonhumans. Merriam-Webster defines analogy as " a resemblance in some particulars between things otherwise unlike: SIMILARITY"; or "comparison based on such resemblance" (41). If analogical thought in regard to animals is valid in cases involving similarity in physical characteristics, it is equally valid in cases involving mental characteristics - and it is only the synthesis of Christian and dualistic

Cartesian thought which attempts to render such analogy impotent via the charge of anthropomorphism.

Anthropomorphism is defined by Merriam-Webster as "an interpretation of what is not human or personal in terms of human or personal characteristics" (49). Note that on this definition it is anthropomorphic to attribute to a pig the *physical* characteristic of having two ears, a trait which humans possess. This we do all the time, with no negative connotations whatever, because the having of two ears is a scientifically objectively provable attribute. The charge only acquires its unsavory quality when we ascribe a *mental* state to a nonhuman, as in claiming, for example, that a pig feels pain when it is castrated without anesthesia.

Rollin discusses the "anthropomorphic fallacy" in The Unheeded Cry. He asks:

> How bad is it to be guilty of attributing human traits to non-humans?...must any such attribution be *logically* fallacious? Clearly not, for a logical fallacy would arise only if one were attributing human traits to the sort of thing which could not conceivably bear them...But are animals the sorts of things to which human characteristics could not possibly apply? Certainly no one objects to attributing traits which we normally attribute to human bodies or biological processes to animal bodies or processes. In fact, if we did not feel that there was some commonality of biological characteristics between animals and humans, there would be no point doing biological and biomedical research on animals and extrapolating the results to humans...Indeed, built into animal research is a presupposition of anthropomorphism, the assumption that many human traits are portrayed in some relevant fashion in animals.
>
> The response of scientific ideology to my point seems obvious: that anthropomorphism is a fallacy only when it attempts to apply human *mental* states to animals...But how well does this response withstand scrutiny? Such extrapolation would indeed constitute a fallacy if we knew with total certainty that animals were not the sorts of things to which mental predicates could be applied. But we have no such certainty...many sane, rational, and intelligent people in most cultures and during most historical periods have applied mental-state terms to animals. It is possible that they have been wrong in so doing; but it is certainly not a fallacy unless one begs the question by

> assuming what one needs to prove: namely, that animals are the sorts of thing to which such terms cannot sensibly be applied. (25)

It seems, then, that the underlying assumption in use of the term anthropomorphism is that a nonhuman being cannot possess mental states which are specifically and solely the domain of human beings. The underlying assumption is indeed stronger than that - it is the Cartesian assumption that nonhumans cannot possess mental states *at all.* Scott McVay, in The Biophilia Hypothesis, suggests that

> Part of the cannon of peer-reviewed science is the assumption that the scientist is a 'disinterested' observer who seeks to describe natural phenomena as objectively as possible...As a consequence, even the notion of biophilia smacks of the 'anthropomorphism' that custom has also sought to exclude from what is considered acceptable science. Yet...any kind of deeper truth about the fellow organisms with whom we share space may require the shucking of this shibboleth if we are to understand the intricacies of other life-forms and how we may fit in. To advance our understanding, a greater intimacy in observation and reporting may be required. (Kellert and Wilson 16-17)

And Katcher and Wilkens contend that

> The creation of ...anthropomorphic inference was one of the central events in human evolution. The first time one of our ancestors said 'If I were a turtle where would I hide my eggs?' or 'The sky looks angry, I'd better go back to my cave' he began to use a whole new pattern of inference in environmental investigation. Anthropomorphic inference may deserve its bad reputation within the narrow confines of Cartesian science, but it is a highly useful tool in negotiating difficult and sometimes unfriendly natural environments. Lockwood...has described 'applied anthropomorphism' as 'the use of our own personal perspective on what it's like to be a living being to suggest ideas about what it is like to be some other being of either our own or some other species. This process is a form of projection, and it is a process that makes our life on earth as social beings possible. (Kellert and Wilson 187)

Lest there be any doubt about the convoluted thinking and continued Cartesian influence evoked by the term "anthropomorphism", consider a recent article in a relatively

new philosophical journal devoted to the elucidation of the role of animals in the human ethical endeavor. In the Fall 1993 volume of Between the Species, Mike Martin attacks Schweitzer in an article titled "Rethinking Reverence for Life". He claims that Schweitzer's will-to-live argument is permeated with anthropomorphism, and seems to "depend on attributing human features to all living things" (206). He quotes Schweitzer in The Philosophy of Civilization: "As in my own will-to-live there is a longing for...pleasure, with dread of annihilation and wider life and for...pain; so is it also in the will-to-live all around me."; and again, that I must value other life, "for I shall know that it longs for fulness and development as deeply as I do myself" (206). (The full quotation actually reads: "As in my own will-to-live there is a longing for wider life and for the mysterious exaltation of the will-to-live which we call pleasure, with dread of annihilation and of the mysterious depreciation of the will-to-live which we call pain; so is it also in the will-to-live all around me, whether it can express itself before me, or remains dumb" (Philosophy 309). Martin asserts that "most organisms do not have desires like mine, whether for gaining pleasure and avoiding pain or for self-survival and self-perfection" (206). His analysis relies on the assumption that some sort of conscious mental state is required for the possession of pleasure and pain; Martin's definition of a " 'will', at least in a literal sense, implies conscious intentions, desires, and beliefs" (207). While I will discuss the issue of what it is to hold interests shortly, the key point here is that we must remember that Schweitzer's will is a *force*; he never claims that *all* wills-to-live are conscious, let alone self-conscious; nor that all wills-to-live have desires, beliefs, etc. in Martin's sense. Will-as-force, as the striving for survival and self-development, need not encompass anything *remotely like* consciousness or human

self-consciousness. The possession of desires, beliefs, etc. are not *necessary criteria* of having a will, but rather *attributes of particular wills*, including (at least) human wills. To ascribe via analogical thought a will-to-live in other organisms is *not* to attribute to them any and all physical and/or mental traits possessed by humans. It *is* to ascribe to any and all will-to-live the force which directs survival and self-perfection in the sense of striving to attain one's telos: in Rollin's words, that "unique, evolutionarily determined, genetically encoded, environmentally shaped set of needs and interests which characterize the animal in question - the 'pigness' of the pig, the 'dogness' of the dog" (The Unheeded Cry 46). Of course, nonanimate beings also possess a telos; i.e., the oak tree is characterized by its 'oak treeness', the characteristics which make it a member of the species *Quercus*.

Martin's real agenda, indeed, is to attack Schweitzer's anthropomorphism because he believes it to be a necessary consequence of Schweitzer's Universal Will-to-live - and Martin finds the Universal Will-to-live to be highly unpalatable. He claims that Schweitzer's defense of his metaphysical Universal Will-to-live requires anthropomorphism: "If each organism is literally part of a universal will-to-live, and if the basic features of that universal will are uniform in all living organisms, then anthropomorphism is virtually inevitable, especially if we begin by reflecting on our own will-to-live...There is little temptation to make literal ascriptions of human properties to algae and protozoa if they are no longer regarded as instantiations of a universal and personified will-to-live" (207). But it is Martin's blatantly incorrect interpretation of Schweitzer's Universal Will that leads him astray: he refers to "...each organism [as] a sacred part of a universal and semi-deified Will-to-live" (209), and claims that anthropomorphism (and the further refusal to rank various life

forms in a valuational hierarchy) is thus a necessary consequence. As has been discussed previously, Schweitzer is *adamant* that the Universal Will is not sacred nor semi-deified in any way; that is *exactly* the sort of mystical abstraction which Schweitzer takes pains to avoid at all cost. To misrepresent Schweitzer's Universal Will is surely also to misrepresent its manifestations. I do not mean to imply that Schweitzer's thought is not anthropomorphic. If anthropomorphism, as defined, is to interpret what is not human in terms of human characteristics, then to attribute a will-to-live, which is possessed by humans, to nonhumans is anthropomorphic. But why is the ascription of the striving for survival and self-development a negatively charged criticism? Schweitzer does not, it is true, delineate *exactly which* organisms are capable of pain and suffering; or *how much* pain and suffering they may undergo, qualitatively or quantitatively; or whether it is *exactly like* the pain and suffering of human beings (whose pain and suffering varies widely among individuals). Still, when Schweitzer says that "In everything you recognize yourself again. The beetle that lies dead in your path - it was something that lived, that struggled for its existence like you, that rejoiced in the sun like you, that knew anxiety and pain like you. And now it is nothing more than decomposing material - as you, too, shall be sooner or later" (Sermons 10), I think that we perceive the application and/or metaphor if we put aside our own biased agendas.

Martin's solution to the problem of Schweitzer's anthropomorphism is twofold: to retain the idea of the individual will-to-live as a "literal reference to genetically driven instincts to survive and develop" (207) - a suggestion remarkably similar to what Schweitzer himself said and to Wilson's biophilia hypothesis!; and to replace "analogy" with "empathy." He suggests an "empathy" thesis: that "I experience empathy with other life as

I reflect on its similarity to my life" (207). I fail to see that the exchange of terminology has changed the meaning at all. Similarity *is* analogy; it is still the common striving to survive and develop according to one's species' telos. Martin says, in fact, that "Empathy does not imply sharing the feelings and desires of the organism we empathize with, and hence it is not based on anthropomorphic ascriptions of feelings and desires to all life...Empathy means identifying with other life, at least at the level of shared tendencies to survive and develop within the range of possibilities made possible by circumstances and genetic inheritance" (208). This appears to be either a semantic quarrel or a misinterpretation of Schweitzer, who does not ask that we *share* the desires and feelings of other wills-to-live, but that we *respect* those desires and feelings. To compare one's own will-to-live to other wills-to-live based on a "resemblance in some particulars between things otherwise unlike" - the definition of analogy - *is* to perceive other wills-to-live as manifestations of the same creative force which defines all life.

CHAPTER IV

THREE PROBLEMS

The Problem of Subjectivity

Perhaps the most voluble criticism leveled at Schweitzer's ethic is that reverence for life is simply not practical nor even practiceable: if we attempt to further our own as well as all other lives around us, we face nothing but unrelenting conflict in our decision-making. If I want to eat to survive, I have to destroy other life, plant or animal, and in so doing I am eternally ethically guilty. And how do I know *which* life to choose? It would seem that beetles, birds, and bobcats are equally valuable, and, heaven forbid, that the dog in Regan's lifeboat is as worthy of consideration as the humans. The cry is raised: This is too hard! We must have rules! We must have a hierarchy of values (with human beings at the top, of course)! We must, in other words, have some objective criteria, else we sink into the dreaded morass of utter personal subjectivity, there to wallow in Guilt until we finally suffocate in the quicksand of unrequited Responsibility.

There are several interrelated issues at stake here. First and foremost is that of the universality and absoluteness of Schweitzer's ethic. Can we defend the *scope* of the ethic? If we can, how do we, in a practical fashion, go about valuing the multitude of life forms around us? And to what *extent* are we responsible for the lives around us? Do we have obligations of beneficence or only of nonmaleficence? Are we all equally responsible - i.e., does the ethic apply to all humans in the same way, or is there room here for a touch of

relativism and tolerance for different moral outlooks? And finally, how do we live with the dual burdens of the enormous responsibility and guilt which the ethic appears to entail?

Schweitzer is insistent on the necessity and interrelatedness of the universality and the absoluteness of his ethic; the two concepts are fused:

> ...the mistake of all previous ethics has been the failure to recognize that life as such is the mysterious value with which they have to deal. All spiritual life meets us within natural life...If the sphere of the ethical is limited to the relations of man to man, then all attempts to reach a basic principle of the moral with an absolutely binding content are rendered hopeless in advance. The absolute demands the universal. If there really is a basic principle for the moral, it must be concerned in some way or other with the relations between man and life as such in all its manifestations. (Out 232; Philosophy 184)

Through the universalization of the ethic of reverence for life, Schweitzer believes that the conflict between self-perfection and self-devotion is exaggerated but also resolved:

> Why do [the ethics of altruism and the ethics of self-perfecting] not succeed in mutual interpenetration of thought?
>
> On the side of the ethic of self-devotion the fault must somehow lie in the fact that it is too narrow. As a matter of principle, social utilitarianism is concerned only with the self-devotion of man to man and to human society. The ethic of self-perfecting on the other hand is universal. It has to do with the relation of man to the world. If the ethic of self-devotion, therefore, is to agree with the ethic of self-perfecting, it too must become universal, and let its devotion be directed not only towards man and society but somehow or other towards all life whatever in the world.
>
> But ethics hitherto have been unwilling to take even the first step in this universalizing of altruism.
>
> Just as the housewife who has scrubbed out the parlour takes care that the door is kept shut so that the dog may not get in and spoil the work she has done by the marks of his paws, so do European thinkers watch carefully that no animals run about in the fields of their ethics. The stupidities they are guilty of in trying to maintain the traditional narrow-mindedness and raise it to a principle border on the incredible. Either they leave out altogether all sympathy for animals, or they take care that it shrinks to a mere afterthought which means nothing. If they admit anything more than that, they think themselves obliged to produce elaborate justifications, or even excuses, for so doing.

> It seems as if Descartes with his dictum that animals are mere machines had bewitched the whole of European philosophy...
>
> Thus it ranks with European thought as a dogma that ethics properly concerns only a man's relations to his fellows and to society...
>
> Let ethics, then, venture to accept the thought that self-devotion has to be practiced not only towards men but towards all living creatures, yes, towards all life whatever that exists in the world and is within the reach of man. Let them rise to the conception that the relation of men to each other is only an expression of that in which they all stand to Being and to the world in general. Having thus become cosmic, the ethic of self-devotion can hope to meet the ethic of self-perfecting, which is fundamentally cosmic, and unite with it. (Philosophy 296-9)

As Brabazon notes, we can only *understand* life if we *share* it, if we *experience* our own and other lives; the one value which all humans - and other creatures - share is *life itself* (254-5); our consideration for other non-human life does not, contrary to some Christian dogma, diminish but rather enhances our own self-respect and that which we feel for other humans.

The absoluteness of reverence for life is a striving for an ideal, a goal which can never be fully realized; the ethic is absolute as opposed to practical. In the Kantian sense, its absoluteness means that it has compelling authority for all rational agents, resulting in unlimited concern, unhindered by rules of expediency, for *all* living beings:

> Kant defines absolute ethics as that which is not concerned with whether it can be achieved. The distinction is not one of *absolute* as opposed to *relative*, but *absolute* as distinct from *practicable* in the ethical field. An absolute ethic calls for the creating of perfection in this life. It cannot be completely achieved; but that fact does not really matter. In this sense, reverence for life is an absolute ethic. It does not lay down specific rules for each possible situation. It simply tells us that we are responsible for the lives about us. It does not set either minimum or maximum limits to what we must do...It demands of one what is actually beyond his strength. (Christendom 232)

The "lives about us" include leaves, flowers, insects, and earthworms:

> The basic principle of the moral which is a necessity of thought means, however, not only an ordering and deepening, but also a widening of the current views of good and evil. A man is truly ethical only when he obeys the compulsion to help all life which he is able to assist, and shrink from injuring anything that lives. He does not ask how far this or that life deserves one's sympathy as being valuable, nor, beyond that, whether and to what degree it is capable of feeling. Life as such is sacred to him. He tears no leaf from a tree, plucks no flower, and takes care to crush no insect. If in summer he is working by lamplight, he prefers to keep the window shut and breathe a stuffy atmosphere rather than see one insect after another fall with singed wings upon his table.
>
> If he walks on the road after a shower and sees an earthworm which has strayed on to it, he bethinks himself that it must get dried up in the sun, if it does not return soon enough to ground into which it can burrow, so he lifts it from the deadly stone surface, and puts it on the grass. If he comes across an insect which has fallen into a puddle, he stops a moment in order to hold out a leaf or a stalk on which it can save itself.
>
> He is not afraid of being laughed at as sentimental. It is the fate of every truth to be a subject for laughter until it is generally recognized. Once it was considered folly to assume that men of colour were really men and ought to be treated as such, but the folly has become an accepted truth. To-day it is thought to be going too far to declare that constant regard for everything that lives, down to the lowest manifestations of life, is a demand made by rational ethics. The time is coming, however, when people will be astonished that mankind needed so long a time to learn to regard thoughtless injury to life as incompatible with ethics. (Philosophy 310-11)

Can we justify such boundlessness, such widening of the scope of moral considerability and accountability? Certainly we have made progress in this direction since J. Middleton Murray condemned Schweitzer in his 1948 book The Challenge of Schweitzer, insisting that "Ethics is the declaration that there is a right relation between persons and the recognition that we are obliged to pursue it...Those tender souls who are impelled to rescue the bird from the cat, or the rat from the terrier, are not behaving ethically, or non-ethically for that matter, but only emotionally" (113,49). Schweitzer protested the theologically-based dogmatism of Murray and his kind:

> One thinks less about what we ought to be toward the poor creatures than again and again about how one can make the most of the difference between man and them. Man should not experience the inner-relatedness that exists among all living things, we say, but, rather, ought always to prompt himself: "You have an immortal soul. The animal does not. An unbridgeable chasm lies between us,"...as if we really knew something about it. (Sermons 24)

The issue of where to draw the line of moral concern has been much debated in recent years, and boundaries have been delineated along the entire spectrum of life: from humans to mammals, to oysters, trees and ecosystems. Through a synopsis of Kenneth Goodpaster's seminal article "On Being Morally Considerable," and with reference to a number of other philosophers, I will pursue a defense of Schweitzer's insistence that "Ethics are boundless in their domain and limitless in their demands. They are concerned with all living things that come within our sphere" (Indian Thought 260).

The question we are asking is: To whom do moral principles apply? The issue here is not who qualifies as a moral agent (I shall return to this topic); I think that Schweitzer and virtually all philosophers limit this class to so-called rational human beings - no one has yet seriously demanded that bears, beetles, and bushes can or should act as moral agents. The question is: Who is a moral patient? To whom do moral agents have obligations of beneficence and/or nonmaleficence? G. J. Warnock asks "What...is the condition of moral *relevance*? What is the condition of having a claim to be *considered*, by rational agents to whom moral principles apply" (148)? That is, in Goodpaster's terms, given that "For all A, X deserves moral consideration from A," what are the necessary and sufficient conditions on X (309)? Goodpaster finds it "distressingly uncritical" to frame the issue in terms of an "agent's self-interested concern" (310), and suggests that while rationality and sentience may

be *sufficient* conditions of moral considerability, they are not *necessary* ones - "And only hedonistic and concentric forms of ethical reflection keep us from acknowledging this fact" (310). To limit moral considerability to human individuals is inadequate, and Goodpaster suggests that the only "plausible and nonarbitrary" criterion is the condition of *being alive* (310). His defense of broadening the scope of moral concern rests on four distinctions:

-1- Moral rights versus moral considerability: Moral rights are much narrower in content and application than is moral considerability; rights usually and traditionally are restricted to human relationships.

-2- Moral considerability versus moral significance: I believe that this distinction is absolutely crucial. Moral significance governs comparative judgments in cases of moral conflict. Goodpaster says that "We should not expect that the criterion for having 'moral standing' at all will be the same as the criterion for adjudicating competing claims to priority among beings that merit that standing" (311). It is precisely in the never-ending cases of conflict engendered by the universalization of reverence for life that the presumed need for a hierarchy of values, i.e., a ranking of moral significance, arises. Goodpaster astutely suggests that

> In fact, it may well be an insufficient appreciation of this distinction which leads some to a preoccupation with rights in dealing with morality. I suspect that the real force of attributions of "rights" derives from comparative contexts, contexts in which moral considerability is presupposed and the issue of strength is crucial. (312)

-3- Logical intelligibility versus normative substance: This is a conceptual versus a substantive distinction; in Joel Feinberg's terms, it is a question of whether we can separate who logically can be said to deserve moral consideration from who as a "matter of 'ethical

fact'" deserves moral consideration; it is difficult to separate the two (312).

-4- Operative versus regulative moral considerability: This is also a crucial distinction. Goodpaster suggests that we have thresholds of moral sensitivity just as we have limitations to our cognitive or perceptual abilities; beyond the threshold, an individual is "morally blind" or gets "information overload" (313). What is ideal morally may not be possible practically. (Lawrence Kohlberg's theories of moral development would come into play here.) Thus

> the moral considerability of X is *operative* for an agent A if and only if the thorough acknowledgment of X by A is psychologically (and in general, causally) possible for A. If the moral considerability of X is defensible on all grounds independent of operativity, we shall say that it is *regulative*. (313)

The result is that

> An agent may, for example, have an obligation to grant regulative considerability to all living things, but be able psychologically and in terms of his own nutrition to grant operative consideration to a much smaller class of things (though note that capacities in this regard differ among persons and change over time). (313)

The original formulation of "For all A, X deserves moral consideration from A" becomes:

> ...a concern for a relatively substantive (vs. purely logical) criterion of moral considerability (vs. moral significance) of a regulative (vs. operative) sort. As far as I can see, X's being a living thing is both necessary and sufficient for moral considerability so understood, whatever may be the case for the moral *rights* that rational agents should acknowledge. (313)

To assert that the cut-off point of moral considerability is at the boundary of being a living thing as opposed to a non-living thing is, of course, essentially what Schweitzer did some fifty years earlier. The objections by other contemporary philosophers to such a boundary hinge to a large extent on the concepts of sentience and interests (and their relationship to the concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness). Warnock uses

sentience - the capacity to suffer, in particular - as the criterion of moral considerability:

> "...the condition of being a proper 'beneficiary' of moral action is the capability of *suffering* the ills of the predicament - and for that reason is *not* confined to rational beings, nor even to potential members of that class...How far down the scale, so to speak, of the brute creation should moral relevance be taken to extend?...just as far as does the capacity to suffer - though in practice we seem to be conscious of moral claims in non-humans in some sort of proportion, partly to the degree of their actual involvement (as with domestic animals and pets) in human communities, and partly perhaps to the degree to which they are, crudely, 'like us' - mammals in this way outranking birds and fishes, snakes and insects scarcely counting at all. But no doubt natural feelings on such a point are often largely irrational; and certainly they seem to differ widely from one person to another. (151-2)

W. K. Frankena concurs; he says that an ethic such as Schweitzer's holds

> ...that we should have respect for persons, human beings, animals, and plants just because they are alive...The difficulty about it, to my mind, is that I can see no reason, from the moral point of view, why we should respect something that is alive but has no conscious sentiency and so can experience no pleasure or pain, joy or suffering, unless perhaps it is potentially a consciously sentient being, as in the case of a fetus. Why, if leaves and trees have no capacity to feel pleasure or to suffer, should I tear no leaf from a tree? Why should I respect its location any more than that of a stone in my driveway, if no benefit or harm comes to any person or sentient being by my moving it?...I do not see...how anything can have *intrinsic* value except the activities, experiences, and lives of conscious, sentient beings (persons, etc.). (11,17)

Utilitarian animal philosopher Peter Singer also settles on the sentiency criterion in his principle of equal consideration of interests: "...the only legitimate boundary to our concern for the interests of other beings is the point at which it is no longer accurate to say that the other being has interests. To have interests...a being must be capable of suffering or of experiencing pleasure...If a being is not capable of suffering, or of enjoyment, there is nothing to take into account" (Animal Liberation 76). Indeed, to have an interest requires consciousness, i.e., the capacity for subjective experiences - and this is both a necessary and

a sufficient condition for having interests ("Not for Humans Only"194). Singer goes a (practical) step further: he attempts to define the point at which living beings do or do not suffer. He suggests that there are two criteria for the assessment of suffering: behavior (writhing, screaming, etc.), and the similarity of the nervous system to that of human beings (Animal Liberation 176). The upshot of applying these criteria is that "...somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster seems as good a place to draw the line as any, and better than most" (Animal Liberation 179).

Within the deontological camp, the demarcation of the moral boundary is more restrictive. Tom Regan sets the necessary conditions of moral concern as those applied to beings who are the "subjects-of-a-life". These individuals

> ...have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychological identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests. (243)

Regan's conclusion is that "...normal mammalian animals, aged one or more, as well as humans like these animals in the relevant respects, can intelligibly and nonarbitrarily be viewed as having inherent value" (247) - and therefore are worthy of moral concern. Thus sentience composes only a portion of Regan's equation, and other aspects of consciousness and self-consciousness play a larger role. From a biological/physiological perspective, Regan's cutoff is assuredly less defensible than Singer's, since we simply cannot compare a mammal which lives out its life span in little more than a year (i.e., a mouse) to one which develops and matures over a span of decades (i.e., a human being or an elephant). Surely a

one-year-old human infant has not yet acquired all of the subject-of-a-life criteria, while a mouse has - if one even initially accepts the plausibility of the subject-of-a-life criteria as necessary. Because Regan's conditions are necessary but not sufficient ones, he must backpedal furiously to allow the rest of sentient creation - mammals less than one year of age, birds, reptiles, fish, comatose humans, fetuses, etc. - back into the moral fold. The exceptions appear to outnumber the rule by quite a large margin.

Goodpaster agrees that sentience, in Singer's, Warnock's, and Frankena's terms, is a *sufficient* criterion of moral considerability, but he questions the assumption that it is a *necessary* one. He says that "...it is so clear that there *is* something to take into account, something that is not merely "potential sentience" and which surely does qualify beings as beneficiaries and capable of harm - namely, *life*..." (316). Goodpaster correctly argues that sentience is a biologic adaptation for survival; pleasure and pain are indicators which tell a sentient creature whether it is adapting in a satisfactory or unsatisfactory way to its environment, and hence whether it will meet its goals of survival and self-realization. Thus sentience is *not* an adequate criterion of moral considerability but "ancillary to something more important" (316) - that is, *living itself.*

Goodpaster's criterion of moral considerability - that of *being alive* - does hinge on the concept of having interests, but not in the constricted sense in which Singer defines interests (i.e., interests in pleasure and in avoidance of suffering). Nor does he view interests in Joel Feinberg's sense, as predicated upon wants and desires. He says that

> The truth seems to be that "interests" that nonsentient beings share with sentient beings (over and against "mere things") are far more plausible as criteria of *considerability* than the "interests" that sentient beings share (over

> and against "mindless creatures"). This is not to say that interests construed in the latter way are morally irrelevant - for they may play a role as criteria of moral *significance* - but it is to say that psychological or hedonistic capacities seem unnecessarily sophisticated when it come to locating the minimal conditions for something's deserving to be valued for its own sake. (320)

I interpret Goodpaster's perspective to be that "having interests" involves the interest in *being* and *staying* alive, because the having of *any* interests *at all* is predicated on the condition of *being alive*; the dead have no interests. Even nonsentient living things have needs and capacities for benefit and harm which are related to the fulfillment of the individual's telos. All living things have importance/inherent value in and of themselves as wills-to-live; all living things have certain imperatives and biological, evolutionarily based means to satisfy those imperatives; and those imperatives/needs define each being's interests in terms of its own life. It is Schweitzer's view of the phenomenal will-to-live which strives for survival and self-fulfillment. There is no necessary condition of sentience or consciousness here; there is no projection of sentience onto plants or bacteria or oysters because sentience is *not a criterion* of moral considerability. To be a will-to-live is to have interests in respect to fulfilling whatever it is that makes one a member of a species; it is not to say that the interests of any given will-to-live are identical, or expressed in the same way or to the same degree, as they are in human beings.

W.M. Hunt asked Goodpaster why he stopped at the criterion of "being alive"; "...if ...rationality, the capacity to suffer and to enjoy, and having interests, are all arbitrary stopping points for determining moral considerability, why is not stopping at "being alive" also an arbitrary stopping point? Why should not the condition of *being in existence* be the criterion of moral considerability?" (Hunt 61). Goodpaster's answer was that

> ...living things deserve moral consideration and inanimate objects do not precisely because living things can intelligibly be said to have interests (and inanimate objects cannot intelligibly [be] said to have interests). Interests are crucial because the concept of morality is noncontingently related to beneficence or nonmaleficence, notions which misfire completely in the absence of entities capable of being benefited or harmed. ("On Stopping at Everything" 281)

That is, the concept of morality itself has as central tenets the ideas of *good* and *harm;* and these concepts require the holding of interests - that is, of an interest in being benefited or at least not being harmed. Schweitzer, Goodpaster, and Stone are correct: all living things can be benefitted or harmed. (Contrary to R.G. Frey's conceptual distinctions regarding 'having an interest in', 'in the interest of', and 'taking an interest in' (78-100,139-167), which I shall discuss further under the concept of the welfare interests of animals, the concept of interests as applying inherently to all living things in any one or more of the three senses is the concept I am supporting through Schweitzer and Goodpaster.) For every will-to-live there exists the potential for enhancement of the individual's telos, for advancement of self-realization and self-perfection; and also the potential for injury and destruction. The basic interest in the continuation of one's life in a reasonably noninjurious manner is the one interest shared by *each and every* will-to-live, regardless of the degree of consciousness, self-consciousness, or sentience possessed by that individual.

The Problem of No Rules

Given the scope of expansion of moral considerability inherent in Schweitzer's ethic, we must turn to consideration of Schweitzer's refusal to adjudicate among different life

forms via a set of rules, regulations, guidelines, or codes. Schweitzer is adamant on this point: he says of reverence for life that

> ...thought fears such an ethic. What it wants is to impose regulations and order that can be duly systematized. This ethic is not subject to such bounding. Therefore, when modern thought considers such an ethic it fears it, and tries to discredit it, by calling it irrational. In this way its development has been long delayed...It is impossible to frame a natural system of ethics in clearly formulated commandments and prohibitions. It is entirely subjective. The individual must decide for himself how far he will go in self-sacrifice that he may regard as excessive, even if such acts should bring him dire disadvantages. His conscience is never allowed to rest. (Chistendom 231, qtd. in Winston 21)

And it is the subjectivity and arbitrariness resulting from the absence of a valuational hierarchy - apparently confirmed by Schweitzer himself - to which critics point in dismay. Schweitzer's own description, with its application of the slippery-slope argument, is telling:

> The ethic of Reverence for Life is found particularly strange because it establishes no dividing line between higher and lower, between more valuable and less valuable life. For this omission it has its reasons.
>
> To undertake to lay down universally valid distinctions of value between different kinds of life will end in judging them by the greater or lesser distance at which they seem to stand from us human beings - as we ourselves judge. But that is a purely subjective criterion. Who among us knows what significance any other kind of life has in itself, and as a part of the universe?
>
> Following on such a distinction there comes next the view that there can be life which is worthless, injury to which or destruction of which does not matter. Then in the category of worthless life we come to include, according to circumstances, different kinds of insects, or primitive peoples.
>
> To the man who is truly ethical all life is sacred, including that which from the human point of view seems lower in the scale. He makes distinctions only as each case comes before him, and under the pressure of necessity, as, for example, when it falls to him to decide which of two lives he must sacrifice in order to preserve the other. But all through this series of decisions he is conscious of acting on subjective grounds and arbitrarily, and knows that he bears the responsibility for the life which is sacrificed...it is a special joy to me that the universal ethic of Reverence for Life shows the sympathy with animals which is so often represented as sentimentality, to be

> a duty which no thinking man can escape. Hitherto ethics have faced the problem of man and beast either uncomprehending or helpless. Even when sympathy with the animal creation was felt to be right, it could not be brought within the scope of ethics, because ethics were really focused only on the behavior of man to man. (Out 233-4)

Herewith follows a representative sample of the objections to Schweitzer's insistence that every life has inherent value - "...I'll be damned if I recognize any *objectively valid* quality distinctions in life. Every life is sacred!...Value judgments are made out of subjective necessity, but they have no validity beyond that. The proposition that every life is sacred is absolute" (qtd. in Bahr 124):

> But Schweitzer's vitalistic philosophy cannot set up a standard of values within the various manifestations of life; and here, in fact, lies one of its greatest difficulties...once the ethic of reverence for life has deprived human life of the special sanctity which previously protected it, there is no reason why this argument should not be applied to unloved races and peoples; since, despite its radical nature, this ethic cannot provide absolute protection for life, only a protection qualified by human judgment. (Picht 24,123)

> Every system of ethics needs a table of values something like that which Plato attempted and Aristotle drew up..."reverence for life" expresses much more than the mere literal meaning of the words implies. It includes the realisation and enhancement of values. Thus it presupposes a knowledge of what is of value and what is most excellent: it postulates a hierarchy of values and preference, a code of values. If it is to be our task to "raise human life to its highest value," this task can only be fulfilled if we have a table of values by which we can, as it were, estimate their respective worth. Schweitzer does not seem to realise this. (Kraus 48,47)

> If each organism is a sacred part of a universal and semi-deified Will-to-live, then it would seem blasphemous to grade or rank them, either as individuals or as members of species. It would also follow that killing any life is sacrilegious...This spirit of flexibility is attractive, but can an environmental ethic reasonably forgo all rankings of life forms? I do not see how. (Martin 209-10)

> [Schweitzer's] ethic is too simplistic and too egalitarian...some life is more valuable than other life...because not all interests are equivalent...The

> reverence for life ethic cannot provide grounds for ever refusing to kill. If we do not kill, we cannot live...If ethical matters are wholly subjective, then washing one's hands might be as bad as Hitler's extermination programs - and the latter might be no worse than the former. (Johnson 135-6)

The fundamental problem which Schweitzer is compelled to address is the division of the will-to-live which we see in nature, the necessity of thwarting, damaging, and/or killing some wills-to-live in order that others may survive; this may occur within the sphere of human-human interactions; human-animal/plant interactions; and animal-animal/plant interactions:

> The difficulty that is given in nature through its *self-division of the will to live* emerges. Man cannot take his nourishment from the air and the earth as the plants do. He needs the plants in order to be able to live. The higher form of life destroys the lower in order to live from it...When necessity leads us, we arrogate to ourselves the right to wreak massive destruction, and we can do no other. (Sermons 26)

> Anyone who seriously studies the question of sympathy with animals knows that it is easy to preach such sympathy in general, but extraordinarily difficult to lay down rules for making it effective in individual cases. Not only does there come into consideration here the question of when the existence or the welfare of an animal may be sacrificed to the existence or the needs of man, but also the question of how we are to decide whether the life or well-being of one animal may be sacrificed to the life or well-being of another. How is it justifiable for us to catch insects to give them as food to preserve the life of a poor, helpless little bird which has lost its mother? By what principle do we decide to destroy a multitude of other lives so that we may preserve the one? (qtd. in Joy 87)

> In the matter also of our relation to other men, the ethics of reverence for life throw upon us a responsibility so unlimited as to be terrifying.
>
> Here again they offer us no rules about the extent of the self-maintenance which is allowable; again, they bid us in each case to thrash the question out with the absolute ethics of self-devotion. I have to decide in accordance with the responsibility of which I am conscious, how much of my life, my possessions, my rights, my happiness, my time, and my rest I must devote to others, and how much I may keep for myself. (Philosophy 320)

We human beings are enmeshed in what Warnock (12ff) calls the "human predicament" - we have genuine needs, as well as wants and desires, but resources, knowledge, skills, intelligence, and information to acquire our needs and wants are limited, as are rationality and sympathy. In the attempt to satisfy those needs and wants, we are dependent upon and in competition with others (human and non-human). Thus it would seem that Schweitzer's critics are correct: we require some means of adjudicating among competing needs, both our own and others. What Schweitzer claims is that we are not to do this by following rules or regulations; we are, rather, under the auspices of reverence for life, to thoughtfully, contemplatively, and in deep awareness, make decisions in each individual situation or case. Reverence for life is the "...adequate standard of value" (Sermons 12), the "...highest court of appeal" (Philosophy 321). Reverence for life demands an extraordinary degree of *personal* responsibility. To make decisions rather than to follow a rule or custom extracts formidable costs but also yields tremendous benefits to the ethical human being: "Existence will thereby become harder for him in every respect...but at the same time it will be richer, more beautiful, and happier. It will become, instead of mere living, a real experience of life" (Out 231).

Schweitzer was convinced that the loss of sensitivity and the avoidance of ethical issues through dogmatic rule-following was what had led civilization astray, and thus "We must never let ourselves become blunted. We are living in truth, when we experience these conflicts more profoundly. The good conscience is an invention of the devil" (Philosophy 318). Henry Clark suggests that moral decisions are occasions for "growth in spirituality on the part of the agent concerned" (56); he says that Schweitzer's ethic has "no casuistry of

specific rules for every foreseeable situation, no maximum or minimum limits to what we must or must not do. His ethics simply confront us with the fact that "we are responsible for the lives about us" (36). Biographers George Marshall and David Poling concur in Clark's interpretation: "...one is compelled to make decisions to kill at times; life must be sacrificed for other life...*but never without the realization that there is a great chain of life from which we are not separate, and that in the death of any life, we too suffer a loss* (190-191). And Brabazon explains Schweitzer's refusal to lay out a scale of values succinctly:

> To ask for a scale of values in fact implies a considerable misunderstanding of the whole idea of Reverence for Life. Reverence is an attitude of mind, not a set of rules. Schweitzer was asking that people should follow him in sinking into their own minds and hearts and finding there, as he was convinced they would, a place where separateness from other life ceased and solidarity began. Once there, they would not need rules. Each person would have to make decisions from time to time, about the relative importance to him or to her of different creatures...Each decision must be personal, but must be taken under the overall guidance of Reverence for Life. Nothing must be arbitrary or irresponsible. The moment you publish a list of priorities you take away that personal responsibility, that fresh openness of heart and spontaneity of reaction that is of the essence of Schweitzer's thinking. (257)

It is true that a given ethical decision is made "subjectively" and "arbitrarily," in that each moral agent has the responsibility of choosing one way or another in each case. But the subjectivity and arbitrariness occur *only within the boundaries of reverence for life*; thus it *cannot happen* that we ethically choose to injure or eradicate unloved races or people, or rats and mosquitos, simply because we are prejudiced against them. Reverence for life *denies the very possibility* of such behavior:

> It says of no instance of life, "This has no value." It cannot make any such exceptions, for it is built upon reverence for life as such. It knows that the mystery of life is always too profound for us, and that its value is beyond our capacity to estimate. We happen to believe that man's life is more important

> than any other form of which we know. But we cannot prove any such comparison of value from what we know of the world's development. True, in practice we are forced to choose. At times we have to decide arbitrarily which forms of life, and even which particular individuals, we shall save, and which we shall destroy. But the principle of reverence for life is none the less universal. (Christendom 233)

It is a subjective decision to provide earthworms to the orphaned robin, to take the rabbit from the cat, to sacrifice mice in the search for a cure for human diabetes, or to risk one's own life to save a child in a burning building - but each choice is made within the confines of a belief in the absolute value of each and every life involved.

Warnock says that "...to hold moral views, to make moral judgments and moral decisions and so on, is not appropriately to be regarded as a matter of accepting and applying moral *rules*...For to 'follow a rule', as we have seen, is...to turn away from consideration of the particular merits of particular cases..." (68,66). This is, I think, precisely Schweitzer's view of the matter; Warnock continues:

> ...if the exercise of moral judgement, the holding of moral views, is to be the reasonable affair which it is surely ideally supposed to be, there should not occur any simplifying, undiscriminating, rather child-like acceptance of rules; for there is nothing to make such acceptance really reasonable. Rather, there should occur the constantly repeated attempt to achieve the best judgement on the full concrete merits of each individual case. One should thus consider what there is reason to do or not do, or what view there is reason to take, rather than, less discriminatingly, what is required by some rule, or permitted or ruled out by some rule. (67)

To have rules is ultimately to be allowed, if one so chooses, a *shirking* of responsibility; one need not *think through the consequences* of his actions if he simply obeys the rule. To have no concrete set of rules is to force us to *accept* responsibility for our behavior and actions; to contemplate and weigh the good and bad results when we must rank the moral significance

of competing individuals. Reverence for life *is* a practical philosophy of life - not because it gives us a *set of rules* we can thought*lessly* follow, but because it provides us with a *principle* we can thought*fully* follow.

We can look to Goodpaster for further support of Schweitzer's refusal to lay down rules. One of the potential objections to a "life principle" of moral considerability which Goodpaster raises is that it "suggests that conscious, feeling beings have no more central role in the moral life than vegetables, which is downright absurd - if not perverse" ("On Being Morally Cosiderable" 322). His response is that we must recall the distinction between moral considerability and moral significance; i.e., we can and should acknowledge the moral considerability of both humans and green beans, but we can choose human beings as of greater moral significance due to sentience, self-consciousness, rationality, etc. And Goodpaster notes that "...as far as perversion is concerned, history will perhaps be a better judge of our civilization's treatment of animals and the living environment on that score" ("On Being Morally Considerable" 323).

Goodpaster follows up on the correlative objection that we simply can't live by a life principle, and that nature doesn't intend for us to anyway - because we have to eat, protect ourselves from predators, etc. to survive, as does the rest of nature. Here he suggests that we distinguish operative and regulative moral considerability:

> It seems to me that there clearly are limits to the operational character of respect for living things. We must eat, and usually this involves killing (though not always). We must have knowledge, and sometimes this involves experimentation with living things and killing (though not always). The regulative character of the moral consideration due to all living things asks, as far as I can see, for sensitivity and awareness, not for suicide (psychic or otherwise). But it is not vacuous, in that it does provide a *ceteris paribus*

> encouragement in the direction of nutritional, scientific, and medical practices of a genuinely life-respecting sort. ("On Being Morally Considerable" 324)

(Goodpaster also notes that the implied claim that "nature doesn't respect life, so why should we?" is not self-evident. Unnecessary killing in nature is quite uncommon; and more importantly, the demand is made on rational moral agents alone - "...the objection would tell equally against any criterion of moral considerability...if the suggestion is that nature is amoral" ("On Being Morally Considerable" 325).)

Even if we make distinctions in Goodpaster's sense - between moral considerability and moral significance, and between operative and regulative moral considerability - it is nonetheless clear that for Schweitzer the ethic of reverence for life forbids any sort of "relativism" whatsoever. He says that "For decades we have been accustoming ourselves increasingly to measure with relative ethical standards, and no longer to allow ethics to have their say in all questions alike. We regard this renunciation of consistent ethical judgment as an advance in practicality" (Philosophy 92). His concern lay in the attempt commonly made to separate what is ethical from what is necessary; that is, in the claim that the injury and destruction to some life which is necessary for one's own or another's survival is a non-ethical proposition, and thus that we need not consider such behavior as having an ethical component at all. For Schweitzer, it is *never* practically or pragmatically justifiable ethically to take a life - even for the benefit of one's own survival or that of another: guilt is still incurred by such action.

> How can ethics be maintained in face of the horrible necessity to which I am subjected through the division of my will-to-live against itself? Ordinary ethics seek compromises. They try to dictate how much of

> my existence and of my happiness I must sacrifice, and how much I may preserve at the cost of the existence and happiness of other lives. With these decisions they produce experimental, relative ethics. They offer as ethical what is in reality not ethical but a mixture of non-ethical necessity and ethics. They thereby bring about a huge confusion, and allow the starting of an ever-increasing obscuration of the conception of the ethical.
>
> The ethics of reverence for life know nothing of a relative ethic. They make only the maintenance and promotion of life rank as good. All destruction and injury to life, under whatever circumstances they take place, they condemn as evil. They do not keep in store adjustments between ethics and necessity all ready for use. Again and again and in ways that are always original they are trying to come to terms in man with reality. They do not abolish for him all ethical conflicts, but compel him to decide for himself in each case how far he can remain ethical and how far he must submit himself to the necessity for destruction of and injury to life, and therewith incur guilt. It is not by receiving instruction about agreement between ethical and necessary, that a man makes progress in ethics, but only by coming to hear more and more plainly the voice of the ethical, by becoming ruled more and more by the longing to preserve and promote life, and by becoming more and more obstinate in resistance to the necessity for destroying or injuring life.
>
> In ethical conflicts man can arrive only at subjective decisions. No one can decide for him at what point, on each occasion, lies the extreme limit of possibility for his persistence in the preservation and furtherance of life. He alone has to judge this issue, by letting himself be guided by a feeling of the highest possible responsibility towards other life. (Philosophy 317-8)

The attempt to "unite the ethical and the necessary to form a relative ethical" is not allowed even if we are acting unegoistically. The researcher who injures and kills his research subjects in the effort to alleviate disease in human beings still incurs guilt, even if he is not causing harm for his own personal benefit; from the ethical standpoint, what he does is *still wrong*:

> Only the most universal and absolute purposiveness in the maintenance and furtherance of life, which is the objective aimed at by reverence for life, is ethical. All other necessity or expediency is not ethical, but only a more or less necessary necessity, or a more or less expedient expediency. In the conflict between the maintenance of my own existence and the destruction of, or injury to, that of another, I can never unite the ethical and the necessary to form a relative ethical; I must choose between

ethical and necessary, and, if I choose the latter, must take it upon myself to incur guilt by an act of injury to life. Similarly I am not at liberty to think, that in the conflict between personal and supra-personal responsibility I can balance the ethical and the expedient to make a relative ethical, or even annul the ethical with the purposive; I must choose between the two. If, under the pressure of the supra-personal responsibility, I yield to the expedient, I become guilty in some way or other through failure in reverence for life.

The temptation to combine with the ethical into a relative ethical the expedient which is commanded me by the supra-personal responsibility is especially strong, because it can be shown, in defense of it, that the person who complies with the demand of this supra-personal responsibility, acts unegoistically. It is not to his individual existence or his individual welfare that he sacrifices another existence or welfare, but he sacrifices an individual existence and welfare to what forces itself upon him as expedient in view of the existence or the welfare of a majority. But ethical is more than unegoistic. Only the reverence felt by my will-to-live for every other will-to-live is ethical. Whenever I in any way sacrifice or injure life, I am not within the sphere of the ethical, but I become guilty, whether it be egoistically guilty for the sake of maintaining my own existence or welfare, or unegoistically guilty for the sake of maintaining a greater number of other existences or their welfare.

This so easily made mistake of accepting as ethical a violation of reverence for life, if it is based upon unegoistic considerations, is the bridge by crossing which ethics enter unawares the territory of the non-ethical. The bridge must be broken down. (Philosophy 324-5)

The Problem of Guilt

Schweitzer's overwhelming emphasis on the absoluteness and non-relativism of the ethic of reverence for life - and his claim, again and again - that we are "guilty" every time we destroy life, however noble or necessary our motives may be - is very, very unpalatable to many of his adherents and detractors alike. Picht says that "The ethic of reverence for life places a human being in a permanent condition of guilt from which there is no escape and for which there is no absolution" (116): we are guilty a priori, because we can't correct nature but are forced to participate in it, and this includes injuring and destroying life. Hall

claims that survival itself is impossible for those of us who wish to be ethical, if consistent thought requires us to take other will-to-live which we must destroy into account. He terms it a conflict between biology and ethics, and finds it to be too inclusive and "oppressive" (198); it leads to perpetual guilt because biological necessity forces us to harm other life forms. Ethical guilt is discredited because it is impractical: we can't spend our lives worrying about every insect we may inadvertently crush under our feet (197).

Martin calls Schweitzer's non-relativism "guilt-mongering," and says that Schweitzer's reference to us as "mass murderers" of bacteria is an "extraordinary claim" (211). What we should feel, at most, he thinks, is "regret": "*Regret* is the appropriate emotion when we reasonably wish we did not have to take life, by contrast with guilt for unjustified killing. Regret can be mild or intense, and it can be accompanied by strong feelings of sadness, grief, and even horror" (212). The distinction, I suppose, is one between guilt as culpability and regret as sorrow. The two are not so easily separated, however. Martin's ultimate solution is that "To be consistent, Schweitzer should say that the ethical includes necessary killing, not contrasts with it" (212). I fail to see that this could be consistent with Schweitzer's own argument, though it may make Martin feel better. We are still left with the ethical question of what constitutes "necessary killing" - the slaughter of cows because we like the taste of their flesh (though it is clearly not good for us in many ways), or the killing of mice to study cigarette-smoking-induced lung cancer in humans, or the death of a rabbit caught and eaten by someone lost in the wilderness. The necessity for making value judgments has not disappeared.

Let me first defend Schweitzer's *ethic* on the issue of guilt - difficult as this task may

seem - and suggest that while it does entail a significant amount of guilt, it does not in and of itself necessitate an *unbearable burden* of guilt. Then I will focus on Schweitzer's own *personal application* of his ethic, which pretty clearly does fall within the boundaries of "guilt-mongering".

The word "*schuld*" means both "guilt" and "debt" in German, so immediately we have a problem in translation: when did Schweitzer mean guilt and when did he mean debt? The difference is significant: a debt is repayable, forgiveable in some sense; guilt, in the standard Western sense, is a sort of (potentially) unhealthy self-debasement for having done wrong; the notion lends itself to the idea of abusive culpability in deserved as well as undeserved situations. As Brabazon notes, we are used to the idea of guilt in the post-Freudian sense of its purely destructive qualities (258). What exactly *is* Schweitzer signifying in his use of the term?

It is clear that Schweitzer intends for each of us to *be aware* every time some living thing is injured or killed in our behalf; some living creature has to pay, usually with its life, for our choices, and therefore we owe a debt which we cannot ignore. We cannot bring back *that particular creature*, but we *can* do two things: we can avoid injuring and killing *any other* living things unless it is truly necessary for our survival, and we can actively aid other creatures who are in need. We may have been forced by biological necessity to harvest the wheat to make bread, but that does not give us equal license to thoughtlessly pluck wildflowers for the dining room table. We may have taken antibiotics to kill bacteria in our lungs, or killed fish to eat when we were lost in the wilderness; but that does not give us license to raise millions of animals in factory farming conditions and slaughter them for food

which we do not need to eat to survive. And when we do destroy plants, insects, and animals to meet our own needs, we can in some sense repay the debt we owe them for their loss of life by saving other insects from puddles, earthworms from the pavement, dogs hit by cars, and drowning humans. The idea is one of atonement:

> Each of us must therefore decide whether to condemn living creatures to suffering or death out of inescapable necessity, and thus to incur guilt. Some atonement for that guilt can be found by the man who pledges himself to neglect no opportunity to succor creatures in distress. How much further along would we be if men showed some concern for other forms of life and renounced all the evils they inflict upon so many living creatures from sheer thoughtlessness. (qtd. in Winston 23)

Steeped in Lutheran tradition from the moment of his birth, I think that Schweitzer *does* exaggerate - deliberately at times - the idea of guilt-as-Christian-sin, with the consequence that we must (attempt to) atone for our sins. He *is* guilty of "guilt-mongering". Yet as we all know, it is also often the case that in exaggerating the point we are trying to make we increase the chances of being heard; Schweitzer's talk of mass murder of bacteria and saving insects from puddles forces *us* to think about our personal decision-making processes (or the lack thereof) in regard to other life. We may consider Schweitzer's concerns about bacteria to be excessive, and we may make a personal choice to reject claims of moral considerability or significance for bacteria, but perhaps we will at least start to think about the moral claims of tigers or cows or rain forests. Schweitzer *did* choose, always, to alleviate pain and suffering in human beings over any other life, and to do the same for other sentient, conscious, or self-conscious life over non-sentient, non-conscious, or non-self-conscious life. Even if he says that "all life is sacred" - i.e., has inherent value - clearly in his own rational reflection within the auspices of reverence for life, sentiency played a

primary role in the determination of moral significance. As Martin puts it:

> ...Schweitzer himself sometimes implies there are good reasons for valuing organisms differentially according to the forms of life possible for them. He clearly implies that sentient creatures have a moral status unlike that of plants and nonsentient animals. He devotes special attention to arguing against killing sentient creatures for pleasure: bull fighting, cock fighting, and hunting for sport. And he inveighs against misuse of sentient animals in medical experiments and in teaching science. No similar pronouncements are made about experiments on plants. Even if we avoid saying sentient animals have greater inherent worth than other animals, clearly the implication is that sentient animals make special claims on us (as do humans). (210)

Now it seems to me that we need to turn back to Goodpaster and his distinctions between moral considerability and moral significance, and between operative and regulative moral considerability, to explain Schweitzer's rankings: all beings may have inherent moral worth or considerability, but operatively (due to biological necessity at the very least), we are forced to choose which beings are owed the greater moral significance. I think that Schweitzer did what the rest of us (thinking) humans do, ethically speaking - we cannot get away from ranking sentience, and the correlative traits of consciousness and self-consciousness, above the *lack* of these qualities, and I do not see that anything either *can* or *should* be done about this. Most of the larger moral issues involve debate and conflict over and between sentient creatures. What Schweitzer fails to do is to give us some breathing room as regards our guilt over causing injury and death; there are surely levels or degrees of guilt which are both tolerable and acceptable, and these levels will be based on criteria of moral significance, particularly the criterion of sentience. We can and should distinguish between mowing (with a tractor) a field of grass and mowing down (with a machine gun) a field of human beings. That is an easy example, however, and it is less clear how much guilt

or responsibility we should incur in cases involving the killing of animals in research or for food; an adherent of Frey's viewpoint would undoubtedly rank the killing of these sorts of animals at the lower end of the spectrum of ethical guilt, down toward the mowing of grass, since for Frey neither grass nor animals have interests of any kind. Schweitzer would argue, and I would agree, that these sorts of cases ought to involve a great deal more guilt and responsibility than that, or than they have traditionally engendered, precisely because animals do have interests in senses in which nonsentient beings do not (at the very least, the interest in not suffering and not being in pain). Schweitzer would thus rank them at a much higher level of moral significance. We must be cautious, however, that we make no hard and fast rule that sentient interests always take precedence over nonsentient interests; issues in environmental ethics demonstrate this point - we may decide, for example, that the interests of native plant species in the Great Smokey Mountains National Park take precedence over the interests of wild boar, and thus a higher level of responsibility and guilt would be incurred if we did nothing to protect these plant species even though the wild boar will suffer for it.

Schweitzer indeed seems mentally possessed by the "painful enigma" of willing and knowing, of nature's pain and destruction versus our desire for "solidarity." He certainly refers to conflict - the "division of the will-to-live" - and its "ghastly drama" much more than he refers to cooperation in nature. Yet at times he acknowledges the cooperation in nature:

> ...nature compels us to recognize the fact of mutual dependence, each life necessarily helping the other lives which are linked to it. In the very fibers of our being, we bear within ourselves the fact of the solidarity of life...we realize how closely we are linked with others of our kind. We might like to stop here, but we cannot. Life demands that we see through to the solidarity

> of all life which we can in any degree recognize as having some similarity to the life that is in us. (Christendom 237)

As Mary Midgely points out, "...the competition relevant to natural selection is mainly within a species, rather than without...The competition that kills is ...(usually)...within the species" (24-5). *Most* living things do *not* depend upon the "ghastly drama" of painfully killing sentient creatures for sustenance; most living things - sentient and non-sentient - feed upon non-sentient creation, which hardly strikes most of us as a "ghastly drama" (any more than humans eating green beans does). The upshot, I think, is that Schweitzer, for both inherent and cultural psychological reasons, and to make his point more emphatically, is overly obsessed with the idea of guilt-as-culpability *and* guilt-as-debt/atonement. That is *his* choice within the confines of reverence for life; it does not, as he would admit, in any way require the rest of us to feel and act to exactly the same degree.

It is true that we cannot eliminate the tension between what is necessary and what is ethical, but we can strive to decrease the tension, by refusing to injure or kill unless it is absolutely necessary, and by aiding and succoring other will-to-live when and as we can. Schweitzer asks that we never "let ourselves become blunted"; he asks that we be fully and thoughtfully aware of the destruction of life we cause for whatever reason, and to make amends whenever and however possible within our sphere of influence. Reuben Jeske suggests, correctly, I think, that the tension/guilt we incur from taking a life can be viewed as an indication of "ethical vitality" (42). I will concede that Schweitzer was overly concerned with the idea of atonement - he certainly saw his work in Africa as atonement for the evils inflicted by previous white men on the African natives. Because of our Christian

heritage, we are easily led to believe that we are *always* sinful, *always* guilty, and *always* in need of repentance-by-atonement. Yet our motivation need not be as oppressive as this: when I move an earthworm from the pavement to the dirt (and I do this frequently), it is not because I am atoning for some other earthworm's demise under my or another's foot, but because I don't want *this particular earthworm which has come within my sphere of influence* to be squashed and killed. Had there never been destruction, or evil, or injustice in the natural or civilized world, we would still have, as a given facet of our being, the ethical impulse and obligation to actively aid other life which comes within our reach, and the correlative obligation not to injure or destroy unnecessarily.

Schweitzer is telling us that ethics requires a guiding principle, that of reverence for life, even if we are forced at times to injure or destroy individual manifestations of life. He asks us to think deeply rather than to obey mindlessly, and to open ourselves to the understanding that *all* life is valuable in and of itself. Reverence for life does not require specific rules or the extremely oppressive guilt-mongering of Schweitzer himself; it demands only that we realize that *living itself* is a constant and continuous process of valuation, the results of which vary from one situation to the next, and which bode well or ill for us *and* for those whose lives we judge.

CHAPTER V

VETERINARY APPLICATIONS: ANIMAL WELFARE THEORY

The application of the ethic of reverence for life to animals occurs at many levels and divisions within society - by individuals, communities, governments, and professional and academic organizations. My focus will be on applications within the veterinary profession, where a linguistic shift from discussion and implementation of "animal ethics" to "animal welfare" occurs. "Animal welfare" is often contrasted and/or compared with "animal rights," but my emphasis will be on the concept of ethics-as-welfare rather than on ethics-as-animal-rights. I do not mean to imply that "animal rights" is either unrelated to, or irrelevant to, "animal welfare"; but the veterinary profession's focus lies with the "welfare" concept, and we can assimilate the ethic of reverence for life within this concept while avoiding the linguistic and emotional pitfalls of the concept of "animal rights."

The primary question is this: What is "animal welfare"? The secondary question is: To whom and to what degree does animal welfare apply? The secondary question may seem odd, in that "animal welfare" clearly applies to *animals*, but traditionally and in contemporary American culture, only certain animals - individuals and/or groups of animals - are targeted for consideration, and a fundamental conflict arises over the justification of *which* animals warrant welfare considerations, and to what *extent* they are to be provided. Within the profession, animals are often segregated into four categories: food animals, research animals, pet animals, and wild animals (further subdivided into those in captivity

and those in the wild). Randall Ott's classification of animals as belonging to either the pet or the production paradigm (1134) is, however, at times a better division when teasing out the meaning and implications of the welfare of animals, and I shall elucidate and employ this distinction also.

I will argue that most implicit and explicit definitions of animal welfare are clearly inadequate in either or both of the following crucial aspects: 1) they fail to address the issue of an animal's telos (i.e., they fail to address the issue of Schweitzer's self-perfection or self-realization of the will-to-live - what Kenneth Shapiro calls an animal's "species-way"); and/or 2) they fail to address the fundamental problem of death as a harm. Jerrold Tannenbaum's sampling of current definitions of animal welfare in the scientific and medical literature demonstrates these omissions, as well as indicating the lack of a coherent foundation for the concept itself:

> - "A state of complete mental and physical health where the animal is in complete harmony with its environment."
>
> - "The degree to which [animals] can adapt without suffering to environments designated by man".
>
> - Absence of "methods for handling and management [that] are so extreme as to induce stress or its overt symptoms, distress, on animals. Stress is understood to mean extensive physiological and behavioral disturbance in the animal resulting from noxious environmental factors."
>
> - Absence of "suffering."
>
> - "Mental well-being," which is identified with the absence of "suffering." Suffering is defined as "a wide range of unpleasant emotional states" including "fear, pain, frustration and exhaustion" and other mental states "such as those caused by loss of social companions."

- Freedom from pain and suffering. "Pain" is defined as "aversive stimulation of the central nervous system (CNS) originating from the damage of tissues, and, or organs either by disease, injury or functional disorder." "Suffering" is defined as "aversive stimulation of the CNS originating from behavioral and physiological conflicts with the environment."

- "Well-being," characterized as the fulfillment of "needs."

- An animal's "state as regards its attempts to cope with its environment." The level or degree of welfare is seen as the degree of success achieved by the animal in coping with "difficult conditions." ("Ethics"1368)

Determination of what meets an acceptable level of welfare, and how one correctly defines and applies the concepts of pain and suffering to physical and mental states, will be a task entailing input from a wide variety of sources - not just experts in animal science and neurophysiology, but also experts in psychology, behavior, and ethics - and equally importantly, the rest of the thinking but nonacademic world.

The Official Position on Animal Welfare: AVMA Guidelines

I will utilize the definitions and concepts of official veterinary ethics - that is, the pronouncements of the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA), found in the 1998 AVMA Directory, as a springboard for further evaluation of the concept and implications of animal welfare. There are three separate documents incorporating aspects of the profession's views on the valuation and treatment of animals: the *Veterinarian's Oath*, adopted in 1969; the *Principles of Veterinary Medical Ethics*, revised in 1997, and the AVMA's *Positions on Animal Welfare*, approved in 1994.

The *Veterinarian's Oath*, quoted in full, reads:

Being admitted to the profession of veterinary medicine,

I solemnly swear to use my scientific knowledge and skills
for the benefit of society through the protection of animal health,
the relief of animal suffering, the conservation of livestock resources,
the promotion of public health, and the advancement of medical knowledge.

I will practice my profession conscientiously, with dignity, and
in keeping with the principles of veterinary medical ethics.

I accept as a lifelong obligation the continual improvement of
my professional knowledge and competence. (front cover)

The *Principles* document deals primarily with what Tannenbaum distinguishes as "veterinary ethics" as opposed to "animal ethics" (Veterinary Ethics 6); that is, its purpose is to address ethical issues faced in veterinary practice (i.e., advertising, drug and alcohol abuse, competition, and so on). There is very little reference to animal ethics. The *Principles* state that

> veterinarians who accept the Golden Rule as a guide for general conduct and make a reasonable effort to abide by the *Principles of Veterinary Medical Ethics* in professional life will have little difficulty with ethics...The *Principles*...are standards by which an individual may determine the propriety of conduct in relationships with clients, colleagues, and the public. (46)

The only references to animal ethics are in the second and tenth Guidelines:

> 2.Veterinarians should consider first the welfare of the patient for the purpose of relieving suffering and disability while causing a minimum of pain and fright. Benefit to the patient should transcend personal advantage or monetary gain in decisions concerning therapy...10. The responsibilities of the veterinary profession extend not only to the patient but also to society. The health of the community as well as the patient deserves the veterinarian's interest and participation in nonprofessional activities and organizations. (46)

The *Positions on Animal Welfare* contains three sections: "Guiding Principles," "AVMA Policy on Animal Welfare and Animal Rights," and a lengthier section on "Cruelty

to Animals, Animal Abuse, and Animal Neglect," which deals with certain specific issues relative to pets, wildlife, research animals, and food animals. The first two sections, quoted in full, are:

> Guiding Principles
>
> The AVMA encourages all veterinarians to offer their time and special expertise to aid in developing a better understanding of all aspects of the welfare of animals. Veterinarians are also encouraged to aid in developing guidelines and standards that may be necessary to assure proper stewardship of animals.
>
> The AVMA has a long term concern and commitment to the welfare, humane treatment and care of animals. Veterinarians demonstrate this commitment on a daily basis. Enhanced utilization of veterinarians to provide adequate medical care of animals would make a major contribution to the improvement of animal welfare.
>
> These AVMA position statements deal primarily with the scientific aspects of the medical well-being of animals. It is also recognized that all veterinarians have ethical, philosophical, and moral values that must be considered as positions are developed.
>
> The Animal Welfare Committee will continue to monitor, study, and make recommendations on animal welfare issues, and the AVMA will take positions where there is an adequate scientific basis and where veterinary medicine is involved.
>
> AVMA Policy on Animal Welfare and Animal Rights
>
> Animal welfare is a human responsibility that encompasses all aspects of animal well-being, including proper housing, management, nutrition, disease prevention and treatment, responsible care, humane handling, and, when necessary, humane euthanasia.
>
> Animal rights is a philosophical view and personal value characterized by statements by various animal rights groups. Animal welfare and animal rights are not synonymous terms. The AVMA wholeheartedly endorses and adopts promotion of animal welfare as official policy; however, the AVMA cannot endorse the philosophical views and personal values of animal rights advocates when they are incompatible with the responsible use of animals for human purposes, such as food, fiber, and research conducted for the benefit of both humans and animals. (58)

Clearly, the profession's view is an anthropocentric one, which leads to numerous problems and contradictions if we wish to expand the arena of moral concern (irrespective of exactly how *far* we might wish to expand it). Of primary concern are the following points (Tannenbaum discusses these and other additional concerns in Chapter 9 of Veterinary Ethics):

1. The veterinarian is to use his/her knowledge and skills for society's benefit: the protection of animal health, relief of suffering, etc. noted in the *Oath* are not direct duties for *animals'* sakes, but indirect duties for *humans'* sakes. Tannenbaum says that

> I have found considerable hostility to the Oath among some of my veterinary students because of its identification of society as the beneficiary of *all* of veterinary medicine. (Some students are so offended by this statement that they refuse to utter the Oath at graduation.) One need not believe that animals are as important as people or that veterinarians should favor the interests of patients over those of clients, to assert that at the very least, caring for animals is as worthy a general goal for veterinarians as service to society. Any oath that fails to recognize this will fail to reflect the attitudes of many veterinarians. (Veterinary Ethics, 90)

2. The *Oath* is clearly contradictory: for example, one cannot always relieve animal suffering in the pursuit of medical knowledge and the promotion of public health; therefore, choices have to be made which will not be congruent with the intent of the *Oath.* As Bernard Rollin notes, "much fleshing-out through dialogue is required to make the oath more than a pious but vacuous statement of good intentions" ("Updating" 1017).

3. The *Oath* singles out livestock as worthy of "conservation," and neglects mention of all other types and species of animals. Indeed, the "conservation of livestock resources" by its very nature places an emphasis on the group rather than the individual, and views the individuals instrumentally as renewable resources.

4. Granted that the *Principles* are designed in reference to veterinary ethics, the fact remains that animal ethics play a large role in most veterinary endeavors. Once again, adherence to the Golden Rule will tell veterinarians *nothing* about how they ought to value and treat animals, since the Golden Rule deals only with human-human relationships - and yet the human-human relationships in which veterinarians participate, especially in the private sector, always involve one or more "third-party" animals. I contend that most thinking, caring private practitioners will agree that the Golden Rule and *Principles* provide little or no guidance in the daily ethical conflicts they face (i.e., euthanasia, the owner's economic interests versus the animal's welfare interests, etc.). The reference in the second Guideline to placing relief of suffering first places such behavior within the context of the veterinarian's personal (financial) gain or loss; assuming that all practitioners can afford to alleviate pain and suffering at any financial cost to themselves, the equally important question of client versus patient concerns is unaddressed. In fact, the reference in the tenth Guideline is to society as a whole rather than to individuals.

5. The *Principles* offer no guidance concerning the welfare of specific individuals or groups of animals. Tannenbaum seems to feel that this is inadequate, since the American Medical Association's *Principles of Medical Ethics* "...contain lengthy discussions of the obligations of physicians regarding research subjects and industrial practice" (Veterinary Ethics 105). However, the *Positions on Animal Welfare* do address some of the specific issues, albeit inadequately.

6. The welfare position statements define animal welfare as "...a human responsibility that encompasses all aspects of animal well-being, including proper housing, management,

nutrition, disease prevention and treatment, responsible care, humane handling, and, when necessary, humane euthanasia." No mention of behavioral considerations/species-way interests are mentioned here, presumably because the AVMA's concern is solely with the "..scientific aspects of the medical well-being of animals." We shall see that there is, however, no value-free assessment of even the "scientific" aspects of animal welfare.

7. The position statement that animal welfare and animal rights are "not synonymous terms" is assuredly correct; yet to dismiss without evaluation and discussion any personal or philosophical viewpoint which is "...incompatible with the responsible use of animals for human purposes..." is surely inadequate and biased. The most fundamental question we can ask about animals is how we *ought* to value and therefore treat them; thus it cannot be correct to start from the value assumption that use of animals for human purposes such as food, fiber, and research is ethically acceptable, since this is to ignore the basic question altogether. Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life will never even be discussed by the AVMA in its ethical deliberations. It is interesting to note that the purposes listed, though not inclusive, do not mention animals used in sports, or hunted, or kept in zoos, etc. - perhaps because it is clear to the profession that a growing segment of society considers these uses of animals to be less defensible.

The First Expansion of Animal Welfare: Inclusion of Species-specific Ways

Let us turn now to consideration of the concept of welfare. I have suggested that welfare encompasses more than the standard provision of biological/physiological needs (i.e., food, medical care, and shelter). This is surely true when we speak of human welfare: we

believe that the welfare of human beings in isolation or confinement is severely reduced; that socialization with others of the human species is necessary to emotional/psychological welfare; and that intellectual stimulation (e.g., education) is a good which should be provided to all individuals. What we are saying is that human beings have a telos, a species-way, and that each individual's welfare is tied up with being allowed and aided in the striving for self-perfection and self-realization - biologically, intellectually, and psychologically. Provision of biological welfare needs alone is not provision of welfare interests. To understand and provide for the scientific aspects of individual human welfare (food, clothing, shelter, and medical care) would be to provide only a part of a much more comprehensive welfare package, and it is clear that we do not need scientific studies (such as maternal deprivation studies in monkeys) to know that human welfare is constituted by much more than provision of physical needs.

The same is just as surely true for animals, and certainly for the sentient mammals and birds which comprise the vast majority of veterinary patients: I contend that there is something more to an animal than its biological make-up, and that something more is most certainly related to welfare interests. Kenneth J. Shapiro discusses this something more in a 1989 article in Between the Species. In one brief sentence he summarizes beautifully the essence of what animal welfare involves: he says "*A lion in a cage is not a lion*" (188). To acknowledge the immense and overwhelming implications of this statement is to alter radically one's concept of what is by custom and habit considered to be morally right and wrong in regard to the animal world. Analogously to Schweitzer's reverence for all wills-to-live with their striving - beyond sheer survival - for self-realization, Shapiro's delineation of

the meaning of the "species-way" of an individual forces us to see that while human beings cannot be human out of context, neither can monkeys in cages be monkeys; nor veal calves be calves; nor chickens be chickens.

Shapiro's paper focuses on what he refers to as the "ontological vulnerability" (183) of nonhuman animals, of which he describes two types. The first is

> ...a vulnerability to the loss of individuality...[T]he threatened loss here is not merely the failure to achieve a particular style or feature, or personal or social history that might constitute an animal as an individual, but is the ontological threat of loss of the possibility of being an individual. We will link this death of the individual to a humanistic concept which categorically excludes nonhuman animals from the status of individual...we will suggest that certain features of animals, such as limitations in reflective and linguistic capacities, invite this reductive social construction of animality. (184)

The second type of loss is of identification as species,

> ...wherein an animal becomes what we will call a "generic animal" or an organism. This reduction is exemplified through an account of laboratory research using animals. It will be argued that this vulnerability is made possible through a radical dependence in the case of nonhuman animals on their species specific habitat, by contrast to the human possibility of a relative transformation, through symbolism, of his or her setting. By contrast to the first type, we will show that this second reduction, more clearly, actually occurs. Beyond the social construction of the generic animal, we actually create such beings. (184)

Shapiro uses the "sport" hunting of deer as an example of the loss of an individual: the hunter's deer is seen, in Heidegger's term, as a "standing reserve," a resource awaiting human use (185). When the hunter kills the deer, the animal as an individual "...is not there for him or her. What is there is an impersonalized, deindividualized but reified abstraction...The deer is not an object as an individual but an object as an example of a specific feature" (185).

Equally obvious examples of the loss of individuality occur in factory farming and research situations, but as Shapiro points out, we also often deindividuate animals regarded as pets. Many dogs, for instance, are acquired and lived towards as examples of a breed - i.e., one acquires and lives towards a rottweiler as an example of a physically powerful and aggressive dog; and despite the existence of the so-called human-companion animal bond, for many people a "pet" is a replaceable commodity (which leads to some of the most difficult ethical situations in small animal practice). Shapiro argues that this ontological loss of the individual is a social construction:

> ...one still dominant social construction of individuality took nonhuman animals as the categorical foil. In this construction animals are defined as the exemplar non-individual in order to more discretely and exclusively preserve individuality for human animals. A humanistic philosophy defined rationality or reason as that feature which is both free and freeing. It argued that free reason is the *sine qua non* of individuality, for only an individual is self-determining or autonomous. Precisely in distinction from humans, nonhuman animals are instinct and need-dominated rather than rational...Given the gulf created by this ideology, humanistic philosophy can then justify its reinforcement by the epistemology that we can only know animals through a scientific method in which reason is applied to objective and distanced observation of these now strangely "other" creatures. In the correlative political-legal system, only individuals are granted legal rights. Hence, as nonindividuals, animals have no rights and no legal standing. By sanctioning our forgetting the individuality of nonhuman animals, these philosophies and traditions support our living toward them as certain reified classifications, as species. (186)

If living toward individual animals as species representatives is not reductive enough, consider Shapiro's second type of reduction: the loss not only of individual identity but of species identity as well. The animal is reduced to a "generic being": there is a loss not only of a "...particular species identity but of the possibility of being any species" (188). Here we return to the lion in the cage. Shapiro uses the metaphor of caging to explicate this

second type of loss. The lion in the zoo, the mouse in the research laboratory, and the chicken in the poultry operation are each defined as a "generic being" because "An object is generic...when its pure essence is sought or when merely the effect on self of that essence is sought...'caging an animal'...refer(s) to a way we can live toward an animal kept in a radically depleted setting" (188-9).

In research, the animal is lived toward as a "..'preparation'...where what is being readied is not a rat or cat or dog but an organic or behavioral process" (188). In terms of the lion, what we have lost is "...both lion country and lion behavior and habit" (189). We have lost the "...behavioral forms peculiar to and typical of a given species" - i.e., the "species-ways" (189) of the animal in question. (Through genetic engineering and biotechnology, we carry this loss to the ultimate extreme.)

Shapiro argues that "species-ways" are irreducibly linked not only to genetic make-up but to habitat. He says that:

> An animal is not merely surrounded by, so much as it is a constituent part of that system. Species-ways are part of what effects a certain ecosystem. In the other direction, the effect of ecosystems on species-ways is as constitutive and is better captured by the terms "habit" and "habitat"...than by the term environment. When we say that the animal inhabits a certain habitat we mean that a particular habitat is the necessary locus of being of a particular species. The dynamic relation between lion and lion country is constitutive of lion being. That part of animal being that is attributable to species membership is radically dependent on natural habitat for more than merely a surround or medium, it is *necessary* for the animal to be that species. The animals of a particular species dwell there in the sense that they have their being there...
>
> By comparison a human being is its habitat in a weaker sense. Through reflection he or she can take up a posture to a given environment, and, thereby, can transform it symbolically to create with it a world. Unable to construct a world by taking a reflective posture to selected features of its environment, a nonhuman animal becomes itself only through certain features

> of that habitat. A nonhuman animal's radical dependence on a species specific habitat is part of its ontological vulnerability to the reduction to generic animal...Niche is constitutive, not substitutive. The notion that an animal's *telos* remains inside, intact and unchanging as long as its biological integrity is maintained is a limited and convenient abstraction. To "ex-hibit" an animal in a cage is to take it out of its habitat, which is to lose its species-way which is to reduce it to a generic animal. (190)

Thus while human beings can live within the artificial confines of New York City and still remain "human" (I am not actually convinced that this part of the theory is entirely correct), lions in zoos are not lions, and chickens packed into cages in a poultry operation are not chickens. Shapiro suggests that the indicator of a genetic animal is chronic boredom:

> When the relation between environment and animal is chronically such that the animal has no interest in its environment, the habitat-habit unity that sustains and constitutes a species-way has been split asunder and the lion or chicken or rat is no longer.
>
> Wemelsfelder...offers various indices for determining the presence of boredom in an animal, such as stereotypic movement, redirected activity, vacuum behavior, and immobility over long periods...she further characterizes boredom as a state in which an animal "misses the opportunity to perform its specific behavior"...or "does not have the chance to perform the behavior which is part of a species-specific range of behavioral possibilities." (191)

Boredom is a harm precisely because the animal is deprived of interests (both the having and the taking of interests):

> In boredom, an animal has lost the capacity for interest itself, not merely the opportunity to fulfil interests. Beyond the distress inherent to it, boredom is harmful for it deprives an animal, radically, of interest, of that attitude which directs it to the environment as a source of stimulation. In the terms of the present argument, a generic animal is bereft of species-specific interests (and of individual interests as well) for the habitat-habit unity which provides the matrix of those interests has been dissolved. A generic animal is harmed in that, being bored, it no longer has interests. (193)

(Shapiro notes that this may cause problems for Singer's account since generic animals are not interest-bearers and thus would no longer count morally; for Regan's account, the claim can at least be made that it is wrong to produce a generic animal, since an animal "...has an inherent value that inheres in its having interests" (193).

Shapiro's elucidation of the loss of individuals as individuals and as species describes that aspect of welfare interests which has been so painfully lacking in our assessments; the harm is arguably as great or greater than that of death itself. Shapiro's habit-habitat unity is a prerequisite for fulfillment of species-ways, such that loss of this unity precludes the possibility of self-perfection of the individual animal will-to-live.

The Scientific Version of Animal Welfare: The Pure Science Model

Jerrold Tannenbaum approaches the welfare issue from a different but equally enlightening perspective. In an article in The Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association (JAVMA) in 1991 (which is incorporated into the 1995 revision of his text Veterinary Ethics), he argues against the prevailing "pure science model of animal welfare investigation" ("Ethics" 1360). This model, standard in animal science and veterinary literature, demands "value-free 'objectivity'" and

> postulates an inseparable theoretical gap between animal welfare science (a realm of facts) and animal welfare ethics (a realm of values). According to the model, those who are engaged in welfare science cannot be engaged simultaneously in welfare ethics; the latter involves a qualitatively different activity, the expression of moral judgments. ("Ethics" 1362)

He defines the model thus:

> The pure science model does not deny that the underlying motivation for investigating animal welfare can be the ethical principle that people should pay due regard to animal welfare. Rather, the model asserts that once one begins to study animal welfare scientifically, one must do so without considering or taking any positions with respect to ethical issues. According to the model, one need not make any value judgments in studying animal welfare because animal welfare is a state or condition that is experienced or undergone by an animal itself. Determining whether an animal is living in conditions that are conducive to its welfare is thus like discovering whether it can see. In determining whether an animal can see, one engages in empirical observation of the animal. One would not wonder if the world would be a better place if this animal could see, or whether human beings have a moral obligation to assure that animals like this retain their ability to see. These might be important questions, but they are different from the question of whether an animal can see. Likewise, according to proponents of the pure science model of animal welfare investigation, asking when people ought to afford conditions conducive to animal welfare may be an important question. But this is different from asking whether animals are living in conditions conducive to their welfare. The latter issue is a purely factual one, and addressing it does not involve making value judgments. ("Ethics" 1361)

For instance, in Farm Animal Behavior and Welfare, Fraser and Bloom claim that

> The assessment of welfare can be carried out in an objective way which is quite independent of any moral considerations. Mortality rate, reproductive success, extent of adrenal activity, amount of abnormal behavior, severity of injury, degree of immunosuppression, or level of disease can all be measured...In addition to measurements of poor welfare, it is possible to investigate the preferences of animals and the value which they place on various resources or other aspects of their environment. Such studies and a wide range of work on the basic biology of animals give information about the biological needs of animals...
>
> When scientific evaluation of welfare has been carried out, there remains the moral question of how poor welfare should be before it is regarded as unacceptable. This is an issue where the farmer, the veterinary surgeon, the welfare research worker, or the member of the public are equally entitled to have an opinion. (qtd. in "Ethics" 1361)

Within the veterinary profession, the *Positions on Animal Welfare* statements quoted earlier stress the investigation of animal welfare as a scientific matter divorced from philosophical

issues. The intent, clearly, is to avoid the ethical and political issues; if the profession provides "facts," society can then use those "facts" as it sees morally fit.

The fundamental defect of the model is simple to see, however: the pure science model is not and cannot be, value-free, because *what* animals' welfare to study (i.e., research animals, or rodeo animals, or wild skunks and possums), and *which aspects* of it to study (i.e., nutritional, behavioral, or psychological needs and interests) are predicated upon value judgments. One does not assess the degree of pain and suffering of rats and mice fed warfarin if one does not think that rats and mice inhabiting one's basement are worthy of such study.

Further, to study the welfare of particular animals or groups of animals (i.e., veal calves or research rats) whose welfare is of concern as a means to provide for the welfare of human beings may be an inappropriate use of the term; the interests we want to promote are our own, not theirs. If we could safely eat diseased cows, or it was economically and palatably feasible to eat starved cows, would we be so concerned with their nutritional and medical needs? The issue of animal welfare as an instrumental concern is of tremendous significance to the question of whether death is a harm, to which I shall return shortly: it seems a twisting of the concept of welfare to claim that it encompasses provision of an animal's needs when we are meeting those needs solely to provide for our own wants or needs, and the end result is the death of a healthy animal. Within the concept of welfare is the idea that the welfare of an individual is what is in his/her own best interests.

Tannenbaum argues, correctly again, that welfare needs may be applicable to individuals or to groups, but that it is "...ethically unacceptable to consider the needs of

individual animals irrelevant, or relevant only in so far as the fulfillment of individual needs furthers the productivity or general welfare of the herd" ("Ethics" 1364). Whether one agrees or disagrees, the decision to study individual versus herd welfare is an ethical decision involving value judgments.

Which aspects of welfare to study, once the choice of a particular individual or group is made, is surely also an ethical one; many aspects of welfare such as reduction of boredom and provision of an environment conducive to species-appropriate behavior, are never even considered for study, or are immediately rejected as economically infeasible. Tannenbaum recommends that

> To prevent the foreclosing of valuable ethical and scientific work, welfare investigators should avoid trying to give purportedly complete and exhaustive definitions of welfare. Definitions, as has been seen, can remove competing ethical and scientific viewpoints from one's universe of discourse; alternative ethical and factual inquiries become literally unthinkable because they do not fit a preconceived definition of welfare. Robust scientific and ethical inquiry about factors relevant to animal welfare is not facilitated by unexamined factual or moral propositions parading under the guise of purely "objective" definitions of central terminology. ("Ethics" 1372).

The Second Expansion of Animal Welfare: Death as a Harm

I have been supporting an expansion of the concept of animal welfare in much the same vein as that in which Schweitzer insisted upon the enlargement of the moral arena; if we owe reverence to other living creatures' wills-to-live, and have an obligation to aid them (or at least not to thwart them) in the realization of their own species-ways or telos, then the welfare concept must expand to take these interests into account. Perhaps the most difficult result of the ethic of reverence for life is that death is, under normal conditions, considered

to be a *harm*. By normal conditions, I am referring to relatively healthy, non-terminally painfully ill animals - food animals, research animals (at least prior to their use in research), unwanted dogs and cats in animal shelters, etc. There are situations in which death is *not* a harm relative to the present and future quality of life; I am not referring to those situations at this time. Death is a harm because it precludes the having and/or taking of welfare interests. *The dead take no interests*. Let me marshall support for this non-traditional concept of an animal welfare interest in life itself.

Tannenbaum suggests that there is no "...value-free boundary of minimal animal welfare" ("Ethics" 1367). He uses the example of death as a harm to validate the point:

> Most, if not all, people believe that death is inimical to human welfare. We think this not just because living is necessary for experiencing welfare, but also because we value human life as a good. Death frustrates human welfare because it takes away the most precious gift one can have, life, and all that living can bring.
>
> With respect to animals, however, many people deny that death is inimical to, frustrates, or indeed has any relevance whatever to welfare. Fraser and Bloom (6), for example, state that :
>
> > If an animal is suddenly shot, with no previous warning that this might happen, and it dies instantaneously, then there is a moral question about whether such killing should occur but there is no welfare problem. If an animal dies slowly with much pain, or is wounded by a shot which results in pain and difficulties in normal living, then its welfare is poor...If animals are kept in order that they will eventually be eaten, their welfare could be good throughout their lives even up to the point of slaughter.
>
> Although this statement is supposed to show that "welfare" does not presuppose value judgments, it demonstrates the opposite. Because we believe that the taking of innocent human life is evil, and because we value the lives that would be taken, we say that a genocidal maniac will negatively affect human welfare even if he kills his human victims immediately, without pain or warning. What is the difference between such human beings who

would be killed and animals that are killed instantaneously and painlessly? The difference, clearly, is that many people (including Fraser and Bloom) do not regard the taking of animal life as itself an evil and do not regard life as something that is morally owed to all animals.

However, people who object to the killing of animals, even when this might be done painlessly, do believe that such killing is inimical to animal welfare precisely because they regard the taking of an animal life under these circumstances as morally wrong. Philosopher Tom Regan maintains that even the painless killing of animals for food or in experimentation is inimical to their welfare because, in his view, such animals have an interest in living that ought to be respected. For Regan (13), the farmer or experimenter who kills an animal, however painlessly, oversteps the minimal boundary of animal welfare.

> Death is the ultimate, the irreversible harm because death is the ultimate, the irreversible loss, foreclosing every opportunity to find satisfaction. This is true whether death is slow and agonizing or quick and painless. Though there are some fates worse than death, an untimely death is not in the interests of its victims, whether human or animal, independently of whether they understand their own mortality, and thus independently of whether they themselves have a desire to continue to live.

My point is not that Fraser and Bloom are incorrect in thinking that it is sometimes morally permissible to kill animals. Rather, their characterization of the relevance of death to animal welfare rests on a value judgment that might appear so obvious and self evident to some that the authors do not recognize it as a value judgment. Fraser and Bloom appear to endorse what I have called the anti-cruelty position, the view that one's major moral obligation to animals is not to cause them unnecessary pain or suffering. However popular this view may be among animal welfare scientists and the general public, it is an ethical view nonetheless. It does not provide a value-free "objective" boundary of minimal animal welfare. ("Ethics" 1367-8)

Of course, Regan is not the only thinker in the field of animal ethics who contends that death is a harm related to the obliteration of interests; Bernard Rollin and S. F. Sapontzis also concur. Let us further elaborate beyond Goodpaster's initial argument on the meaning and significance of "interests".

Sapontzis' argument is indirectly a response to R.G. Frey, who claims that animals do not have any interests at all. While it seems to this author to be rather a waste of time and paper to refute Frey's argument, its refutation will more clearly defend the opposing point of view - that all moderately sane people know and agree that animals have interests, including the interest in life itself.

Let me summarize Frey's view as succinctly as possible. In his book Interests and Rights: The case against animals, Frey is actually arguing against a concept of moral *rights* for animals, which would not be relevant to the current discussion except that the reason animals cannot have *rights* is that they have no *interests*. In brief, the argument is this: To have rights, one must have interests. To have interests, one must have *wants*, which encompass "(at least) *both needs and desires...*" (82). To have desires, one must have *beliefs*. To have beliefs is to believe that "...a certain sentence is true" (that is, the sentence is true or false, not the state of affairs to which it refers, which either *is* or *is not*); and "If what is believed is that a certain sentence is true, then no creature which lacks language can have beliefs; and without beliefs, a creature cannot have desires" (88). Therefore, because animals lack language, they have no interests - and indeed, on this earth, human beings may safely retain their superior moral status. Now I contend that to most (even marginally) thoughtful people, this argument is ridiculous, and Schweitzer would certainly find it so. But let us give Frey a little benefit of the doubt, and unpack the term "interests" a bit further. Frey distinguishes two types of interests: the interest in "having a good or well-being which can be harmed or benefited" (79), and an interest in the sense of "having a want which can be satisfied or left unsatisfied" (82). The distinction is one of something's being in one's

interests as opposed to one's having an interest in the sense of wanting a particular something. There is yet a further distinction: that of taking an interest in something. Frey does not deny that animals have interests in the first sense, of something being in one's interest, but this is a meaningless sense because counterintuitively *objects* as well as animals have these interests - that is, the tractor has an interest in being oiled; it will be harmed (mechanically) if its interests are denied. In the same way, a cow has an interest in being fed. Frey's claim is that this cannot be the sense of interests that counts - and indeed it cannot. Frey believes that it cannot be because then we must attribute interests to objects also, which no one wants to do; I contend that it cannot be the correct sense because this is a concept in which interests can be viewed in a purely instrumental sense (as the interests of humans and not of the animals themselves). It is not that the tractor has a stake in being oiled; it is the human owner of the tractor who has a stake in its being oiled. Likewise, on this concept, the cow only needs to be fed because the owner wants it to live until slaughter.

This brings us to the second concept of interests, that of having wants (needs and desires) which can be satisfied. In that respect, Frey claims, one must have language in order to have beliefs in order to have desires-as-wants in order to have interests; thus animals are summarily excluded from the realm of interest holders in this sense of interests. His argument rests on the argument about what beliefs are, and that argument is well beyond the scope of this paper. This author would argue that the premises are simply wrong-headed and purely anthropocentric; even small children know that animals have beliefs. If I leave the house at 8:00 every morning, and return at 5:00 every evening, both my infant and my dog *believe* that I will return to them, despite the fact that neither one of them can utter the

sentence "I believe that she will return home," and no amount of twisted philosophical debate about the necessity of language to the holding of beliefs will change this; indeed, I suggest that behavioral/psychological studies would confirm this intuitive knowledge.

In the sense in which interests are construed as "taking an interest," I make the same assertion: we know that animals "take an interest" in many things. (From an environmental ethics perspective, the limitation of being a holder of interests to those living beings who can *take* (self-consciously, rationally) an interest is even more devastating than it is to the animal welfare movement). Since Frey does not deem it necessary for human beings to be able to take an interest in order to be interest holders (i.e. Karen Quinlan), it is logically inconsistent to summarily dismiss animal interests on this account. In arguing against Singer's contention that one must be able to suffer pain in order to have interests, he says that "...we regard...Karen Quinlan as (a) human being or person, and, in virtue of that fact, deem (her) to have a genuine stake in certain things, quite independently of whether (she) can feel pain; and what we deem (her) to have a genuine stake in, we deem (her) to have an interest in" (148). If this holds for humans, then it holds equally for animals, unless the argument is one of pure anthropocentric bias.

Sapontzis argues against Frey's concept of animals having no interests, saying that

> One can suffer the misfortune of death even though he or she lacks the intellectual capacity for taking an interest in or valuing life itself...death is ordinarily a misfortune for an individual (whether he or she knows it or not), because it totally eliminates the possibility of his or her further enjoyment and fulfillment...even if animals cannot suffer certain dimensions of the misfortune of death that humans can, it does not follow that they cannot suffer the misfortune of death or that it would be nonsensical to extend a moral right of life to them in order to protect them from misfortune...life is necessary for enjoyment and fulfillment, (and) this generates an interest for

> sentient beings in remaining alive for as long as life holds (the prospect or even just hope of) sufficient enjoyment or fulfillment for them...(168-170, 175).

Sapontzis correctly argues that *having* an interest (i.e., in life/living) is in no way dependent upon the ability to *take* an interest; one can suffer a loss without the awareness of it (170). The distinction between having and taking an interest is certainly a real one, but its relevance to the moral right to life is highly questionable; even Frey says (in reference to human beings, and Karen Quinlan in particular) that "It is...a mistake always to conflate having an interest with taking an interest..." (157). Sapontzis argues, however, that having an interest in the sense of something's being in one's interests applies to animal as well as human interests in not being harmed by death. Frey's ploy seems to me to be one of designating two realms: one is composed of human beings, and the other of objects. Animals are sitting on the fence between the two realms; since they cannot have interests in the sense of wants, they are consequently dismissed into the realm of objects. Regan and Sapontzis will have none of this.

Rollin, in a discussion of the harm of death to terminal surgery subjects in veterinary school teaching laboratories, deals with this same issue. The reasoning in such situations is that pain or disfigurement (i.e., from being recovered from a surgery) is a worse harm than death itself (there are rather significant economic concerns which generally override the claimed moral concern). There are undoubtedly circumstances in which this may be true, but as Rollin points out, the harm of death is that it precludes the having/taking of interests:

> ...we know that certain interests are of higher priority to animals than pain. It is well known that animals will chew off limbs to escape from traps, suggesting that concern with freedom - or life - trumps concern with pain.

> Animals will also choose sexual contact at the cost of pain. Biologically, as well as morally, it makes sense to suggest that life is more important to an animal than anything else...Even if, as some philosophers have suggested, loss of life is incomprehensible to an animal, being too abstract a notion to impute to it, it does not follow that we do not harm animals by killing them when they are not living a life of misery. By taking life, we take away the possibility of actualizing those interests which would be experienced as good by an animal. (The Unheeded Cry 173).

Nowhere is the debate over death as a harm to animals more significant than in the differences of opinion over the appropriate meaning and usage of the term euthanasia. My own views on this subject are similar to Regan's, and in significant contrast to Tannenbaum's. This is a debate over the proper linguistic use of the term, which I believe to be extremely important while Tannenbaum does not so believe.

The definition of euthanasia in the 1993 Merriam- Webster's Collegiate Dictionary is "the act or practice of killing or permitting the death of hopelessly sick or injured individuals (as persons or domestic animals) in a relatively painless way for reasons of mercy" (401). The definition used in the "1993 Report of the AVMA Panel on Euthanasia" is, however, considerably different. It says that "The term euthanasia is derived from the Greek *eu*, meaning 'good', and *thanatos*, meaning 'death.' A 'good death' would be one that occurs without pain and distress. In the context of this report, euthanasia is the act of inducing humane death in an animal" (229). The quarrel should be immediately obvious: if the AVMA is correct, then a "good death" means a (relatively) painless death and *nothing more*; if the dictionary definition is correct, there is a critical underlying ethically motivating factor inherent in the term: that is, the death comes about for "reasons of mercy" - *the death must be in the interest of the one dying* and not in the interest of the one causing the death

(i.e., the patient must be "hopelessly sick or injured"). Note that the dictionary definition now includes at least some animals - and importantly, "domestic" animals, which are represented in *both* the pet and production paradigms.

Regan says that

> Euthanasia requires more than killing another painlessly or with a minimum of suffering. If Cedric kills his Aunt Bertha without causing her any pain or suffering (say he injects a lethal dose of sodium pentothal into her bloodstream while she sleeps) but does so in order to collect the inheritance in store for him upon her death, then Aunt Bertha's pasing from this life is not a case of euthanasia. It is a case of murder. For the concept of euthanasia to apply to the active termination of an individual's life, that individual's life must be terminated *for the right reason*, not merely by the right (that is, the least painful) means. Actively to euthanize another requires that one kill the other in the belief that this is for his/her own good *and* out of concern for that individual's good. Euthanasia thus requires that one's motives be other-regarding, not self-regarding, and that the other for whose sake one acts must be the one who is killed. Were Cedric to bring about Aunt Bertha's death painlessly but do so in order that his children might get their inheritance, without any thought of what he personally stood to gain, his act would be other-regarding but it would still be murder.
>
> For a case of actively terminating the life of a given individual to qualify as a case of euthanasia, therefore, at least the following conditions must be met:
>
> 1. The individual must be killed by the least painful means available...
> 2. The one who kills must believe, and it must be true, that the death of the one who is killed is in that individual's interests...
> 3. The one who kills must be motivated to end the life of the one who is killed out of concern for the latter's interests, good, or welfare. (109)

Regan's analysis is correct; of course, it hinges upon predication of interests to animals and the notion that death is a harm to one who has interests.

Tannenbaum's response to Regan is that

> Regan is correct that the word "euthanasia" would not be applied to the killing of a healthy person for someone else's benefit. But his claim that

> it is therefore "improper" or "inaccurate" to speak of the euthanasia of a healthy animal for its owner's benefit is just incorrect. Veterinarians and most other people do use the word "euthanasia " to refer to killing an animal painlessly or with as little pain as possible, whether or not the animal is healthy or killing it can be said to be in its interest. This use of the word is too widespread to be called improper. The usage reflects what the word "euthanasia" now means in our language when it is applied to animals...
>
> I have yet to find a veterinarian who does not know that "euthanizing" an animal involves killing it. I have yet to find a veterinarian who would not inquire about the morality of killing a patient or who would take a certain position regarding killing it *because* he or she used the terms "euthanasia," "putting an animal to sleep," or "putting an animal down." It is also silly to suppose that only by enforced, unremitting use of the word "kill!" will veterinarians or anyone else pay attention to moral issues concerning the killing of veterinary patients. If a mere word or phrase can insulate someone from these issues, surely taking the word away will not cause him or her to engage in serious moral deliberation.
>
> We all know what we are talking about: veterinarians sometimes kill their patients. They sometimes kill healthy patients the interests of which are not served thereby. They sometimes kill patients that ought not be killed. The current way in which the word "euthanasia" is applied to animals reflects the fact that most people do *not* regard the painless killing of animals as akin to murder. Whether things ought to be otherwise is a matter for moral argument and not defintions of terms. (Veterinary Ethics 338-9)

Now I think that Tannenbaum is just plain wrong and needs to step out into the real world, the same world into which the author of Merriam-Webster's definition ventured. The widespread usage of the word is not the AVMA's but Merriam-Webster's. And arguing over whether to use the word "kill" or "murder" when the death is not in the dead one's interest is to avoid the issue (we can fault Regan here for leading us to believe that the human term "murder" is equally applicable to animals). I am certain that some persons do use the term in the AVMA's and Tannenbaum's sense (especially in regard to research animals). Fifteen years of private practice have convinced me of this, however: almost all clients who consider "euthanizing" healthy animals (usually due to behavioral problems) are in a very painful

ethical quandry. They *know* that the death is not in the animal's best interest but in theirs, and they feel very guilty even thinking about it, much less actually having it done. I am a veterinarian, and I know the difference between euthanasia and killing; and in situations where I believe that the client wants me to kill a healthy animal, I make it very clear that I will not do it precisely because it is killing and not euthanasia.

To return to my original emphasis on "domestic animals" in Merriam-Webster's definition, and to further refute Tannenbaum's blanket dismissal of the effect of the use of the word on "serious moral deliberation", consider an article by Temple Grandin in JAVMA in 1994 titled "Euthanasia and slaughter of livestock," where the incline of the slippery slope has increased from a rolling hillside to Mount Everest proportions. Grandin's aricle is in actuality a discussion of appropriate conditions and methods of humane (i.e., stress-free and physically painless) slaughter of livestock; my interest lies in the first two paragraphs and the conclusion of the article, where she claims that

> Euthanasia is defined as a humane death that occurs without pain and distress. Physical methods of euthanasia are used in slaughter plants and in clinical practice...When slaughter is performed properly, it is euthanasia; however, when it is performed improperly, animal suffering may result...The technology exists that allows slaughter and euthanasia to be one...(1354, 1359)

Do most people consider the slaughter of animals to be used as food to be euthanasia? Presumably they would have called such killings "euthanasia" long before now if they believed this. To encourage such a usage of the term is not merely to use it incorrectly but to encourage a decrease in moral concern for the interests of animals and to negate much of the progress the veterinary profession has made in its advocacy of the human-companion

animal bond. It is to place all animals back in the category of bearers of only instrumental value. In a rsponse to Grandin's article, veterinarian Curtis Fritz quotes Merriam-Webster's definition of euthanasia and says that

> The vast majority of animals processed through a slaughter operation are neither severely injured nor terminally ill. In fact, if they are, public health mandates can often deny them the usual course of death. Thus, needlessly taking the life of a young, healthy animal, whether it is performed in a stress-free manner or not, has neither the physical nor psychologic interests of the victim in mind, as implied by the use of the term "euthanasia." Although hopelessly oxymoronic, the term "humane slaughter" is perhaps a better description of the techniques for the expeditious termination of life that Dr. Grandin promotes. (1234)

I suggest that if we insist upon killing animals for our own purposes we ought to admit that this is what we are doing, rather than hiding behind the linguistic connotations of the term "euthanasia." Let us be honest when the death of an animal is a harm to that animal - whether it is an unwanted dog, a laboratory rat, or a cow at the slaughter house. Let us admit that we are killing, rather than erecting semantic barriers behind which we can hide the truth of what we are doing and why we are doing it.

To recapitulate: Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life asserts the value of all wills-to-live, that is, of all living things; the sacrifice of life at any stage or level is *always a harm to that life*. We may reasonably consider death to be a greater harm for a rational being who understands its meaning than for a being who (may) have no concept of death; and it may be true that a sentient being has greater capacity to enjoy and to suffer (i.e., has more interests) than a non-sentient being; but these facts/beliefs do not negate the consideration that death is a harm to all living things. In Goodpaster's sense, moral considerability begins with those who are alive. For an animal to have a welfare is for that animal to have welfare *interests*,

and the primary interest is in continuing to live and fulfill one's other interests, to realize one's species-ways. I repeat: the dead take no interests, and therefore have no welfare.

Animal Welfare Interests: Who Counts and How Much?

While the original question I have been addressing is a determination of the meaning of the concept of animal welfare, the secondary question is to whom and in what degree welfare interests are to count. Within the veterinary profession, as within society as a whole, the valuation and treatment of animals is traditionally illogical and incoherent. Randall Ott, in an article in 1990 in JAVMA titled "Veterinary services for animal use in the United States: A conflict of paradigms", clarifies the confusion in terms of the standard of care received by animals from veterinarians in the private and academic sectors. He says that "...the veterinary profession, in large measure, serves the paradigm of the animal owner" (1134). Ott differentiates two treatment paradigms, the pet paradigm and the production paradigm, and suggests that they have "...been evolving to come into conflict with each other. The approach and methods of service for one can be not only irrelevant, but economically injurious, for the other" (1134).

The pet paradigm has evolved

> ...to accommodate an owner's emotional attachment for or anthropomorphic view of animals...Medical technology is applied to animals to the extent of the owner's wishes or within the limit of financial resources, whichever comes first. Pet paradigm services evolve along a continuum in which owners (1) accept responsibility for care of animals that are maintained for companionship, amusement, or recreation; (2) include them as part of their "families"; or (3) in the extreme, substitute them for, equate them with, or pronounce them superior to, people.

> Services developed and promoted for the pet paradigm have been patterned largely after those of the human medical profession. (1134)

The production paradigm, on the other hand, is

> ...designed to recognize an owner's animal production system as a business enterprise. This paradigm evolves along a continuum in which owners (1) accept responsibility for care of animals that are produced for uses such as food, sport, or experimentation; (2) view them as a resource to which technology can be applied to enhance the efficiency of their production (in this continuum, animal husbandry became animal science); (3) and in the extreme, refer to them as units in a production system...Critics of the production system have used terms such as "factory farms" or "puppy mills" to imply a machine-like view of animals thought by some to be too closely confined, poorly managed, or genetically modified in ways that compromise their welfare. (1135)

Ott's thesis is that

> In veterinary medical education, the conflicting nature of these paradigms is at the core of divisive issues relevant to animal welfare and to the proper training of future veterinarians. Despite the fact that the same owner could easily receive state-of-the-art service for 2 distinct paradigms, it is becoming less likely that the same veterinarian could give it. Economic forces and technologic developments have accelerated the evolution of these paradigms over the past several decades and thus have exacerbated the differences between them. (1134)

That the pet paradigm is patterned after the human medical profession is certainly true; as Ott notes, the greater the similarity in treatment of the animal to that which would be provided to a human, the greater the perceived "quality" of medicine. However, the owner's financial resources are often a limiting factor in diagnostics and treatment; though equivalent procedures in human and veterinary medicine differ considerably in cost - often by a factor of 10 to 20 times - veterinary medicine has not yet developed a third-party payment system whereby costs of medical care can be hidden and absorbed.

Production paradigm services are, as Ott describes, based on a "population-oriented epidemiologic approach" (1135). Treatment of individual animals is often times not economically feasible, or at least not economically desirable; high-tech, "quality" medical services are rarely provided to individuals.

Obvious examples of the paradigms are the much-beloved companion animal belonging to an affluent client versus the cows and calves in a typical dairy operation. (The owner of the one may also be the owner of the others, and the owner may thus provide very different levels of welfare to the animals.) A particular individual or species can be viewed by an owner via either paradigm: there are people who keep cows as pets, and people who participate as owners or spectators in the "sport" of greyhound racing. Indeed, in some Asiatic countries, puppies are considered a gastronomic delicacy. Pigs are variously valued as pets (at least the Vietnamese pot-bellied variety), laboratory research animals, and food animals. Though Ott does not describe it in this way, the difference in his paradigms is fundamentally a philosophical one. Pet animals (in the ideal sense) are those individuals who are viewed as having inherent value; they are participants in the human-companion animal bond, which by definition involves a mutually beneficial and reciprocal relationship; pet animals have a right to life and their welfare interests are construed as encompassing behavioral/psychological as well as biological needs. Production animals have only instrumental value; they are viewed as means to human ends rather than as individuals with value in and of themselves. These animals have no perceived right to life (death is not considered a harm or even relevant to their welfare interests). The welfare interests they have are those of basic physiological needs - food, shelter, and medical care. They are those

Shapiro classifies as ontologically vulnerable - those who are deprived of either or both individual and species identity.

For individual animals or groups of animals, inclusion in one or the other paradigm is predicated on the individual and/or cultural bias of the owner:

> The critical determinant of the assignment of a single animal or a group of animals to a particular paradigm is, ultimately, the perception of the owner. Once so assigned, the approach and paraphernalia offered by the veterinarian are similar within a paradigm, but can be strikingly different between paradigms. Within each paradigm is a continuum of evolution toward the "pure ideology" of that particular viewpoint and pattern of interaction with animals. One cannot "evolve" to another paradigm; one must "shift." One shifts to the other paradigm only by virtue of having been won over to a different viewpoint. (1136)

The problem, of course, is the incoherence of the differing valuations of animals within paradigms. In this country, to eat dogs is considered to be cruel and inhumane, but it is ethically acceptable for any given individual pig to be either a companion animal or dinner. As Ott says,

> ...from a scientific point of view, the two species are essentially equivalent. A dog is not biologically different, in any substantive way, from a pig. There is no evidence that a dog feels pain more, is more "intelligent," or is more human-like than a pig...
>
> While thousands of healthy pigs are slaughtered (our health inspections ensure this - people prefer not to eat diseased ones), a debate ensues among veterinarians as to whether it is ethical to perform euthanasia on healthy dogs no longer wanted by their owners. In our affluent society, the dog, for some, has become a sacred cow. From an animal welfare perspective, if it is unacceptable to kill a healthy dog, it is equally unacceptable to kill a healthy pig. If it is acceptable to kill and eat a pig, it is equally acceptable to kill and eat a dog. Thus, the "ethical" debate about euthanasia of healthy dogs could more properly be described as a "market posture" debate - unless the debator is a vegetarian. (1137)

Ott is correct: from a logically consistent ethical perspective, killing pigs to eat is acceptable only if killing dogs to eat is also acceptable. In my ethics classes at the University of Tennessee College of Veterinary Medicine, I propose to my students that we solve the pet overpopulation problem by slaughtering the healthy unwanted dogs and cats and eating them. Even if *we* don't want to eat them, there are certainly hungry people here or elsewhere who would; therefore what we would be doing would be both ethically and economically sound. (It has also been suggested that we make fur coats out of the cat skins.) Needless to say, the vast majority of students are appalled by this suggestion - but they are stubbornly unwilling to consider seriously the other alternative (that we respect the same interests for food animals that we theoretically do for companion animals).

Ott asks what effect the conflict in paradigms will have for the veterinary profession. Most veterinary students come from urban backgrounds (i.e., their experience is with the pet paradigm), and most pursue careers in small animal private practice. Ott suggests that "...it could be argued that a more complete shift of paradigm within our profession is inevitable" (1138). Though this seems logical, my own experience suggests that veterinary students and veterinarians are as willing as the general public to look the other way in regard to eating animals. Most are either unwilling or unable to thoughtfully assess the issue and its implications in their daily lives.

Ott recommends that, at the very least, the profession needs to focus on the welfare abuses within each paradigm. While most veterinarians are at least aware of welfare issues in the use and treatment of research and food animals (i.e., castration without anesthesia, inadequate pain control in research protocols), there is often a lack of awareness and/or real

concern regarding issues in the pet paradigm (with the exception of the overpopulation problem). I am referring in particular to the issues of "euthanasia" of healthy animals, and of the assumed ethical acceptability of high-tech medicine in any and all situations where the owner is financially able to pay for such medical care. For example, dogs with malignant oral tumors may undergo disfiguring surgical removal of the tumor, which also impairs the ability to eat normally, followed by radiation/chemotherapy with attendant side effects. Life span is generally lengthened by perhaps two to six months. Many patients can live equally if not more comfortably for this same length of time without this intervention. I encourage my clients to consider the degree of pain and suffering caused by aggressive medical intervention when they are making a decision regarding appropriate care which is in the animal's best interests.

In my classes, I encourage students to think about the individual and cultural biases toward different animals which determine their valuation and treatment of these animals. I have them read an article from the sports section of the Sunday, November 28, 1993 Knoxville News Sentinel, written by Morgan Simmons, and I ask them to consider the enormous variation in assignment to paradigms which is seen in this article, and thus to valuation and treatment of the animals involved - the bird dog, the Jack Russell terriers, the ground hog and other varmints, the varmint dogs , the pigeons, and the grouse to be hunted by the bird dog. I ask the students about their attitudes, the author's attitude, and what they think the author wanted them to think and feel. Perhaps my readers will also find the article, quoted in full, to be "food for thought":

You can't love a dog without paying a price. I've buried enough of them to know. Sooner or later, they break your heart, and the end always comes too soon.

The call came two weeks ago, on a late Friday afternoon. Hogan, my year-and-a-half-old bird dog, had been hit by a car. Our neighbors had found him lying on the side of the road, and were bringing him home.

Five minutes later, my wife called again. The news was unimaginable. Hogan was dead.

I've had a lot of dogs (perhaps too many at times), and I've buried more than my share. To prepare for Hogan's arrival, I gave up six Jack Russell terriers. I wanted to train a bird dog from scratch, and I wanted to give it all my time. I wanted Hogan to hunt hard and grow old. I envisioned him retiring from the field about the time my daughter, now 6, started high school.

Hogan was a German wirehaired pointer, a breed often described as intelligent and prone to occasional prankishness. He definitely had a sense of humor.

It was too early to tell what kind of grouse dog he would have made, but I know he had the love. His pointing instinct was strong, but it was in the realm of retrieving that he really shone. He loved to swim, and would fetch objects under water. The woods for him were an immense world of delight; it soothed me just to watch him run.

I buried Hogan the morning after he got hit. I knew where to take him. Behind my house is a mountain, and not far up it is where Hogan's predecessors died.

Tina and Moon Pie were the best varmint dogs I've ever owned. Two summers ago, while I was exercising them behind the house, they broke away and raced up the mountain after a groundhog. By the time I reached the hole, they were deep in the tunnel, their barks already muffled and faint.

Somehow, they got stuck. I dug for them day and night, but having no signal to go by (neither terrier was wearing a telemetry collar, which they always wore when hunting), I was digging blind. After a week, I abandoned the rescue. The only thing to show for my effort was a large hole in the mountain, which, when Hogan died, became a ready-made grave.

The saying about "dead weight" takes on literal truth when carrying a dead dog up a mountain. Hogan only weighed 50 pounds, but his carcass felt big as a horse.

After the burial, I had two things to tend to. First, I wanted to gather up all of Hogan's training equipment - the retrieving dummy, check chord, blank pistol, and whistle - and put them away. As tokens of our brief time together, I wanted them out of sight and out of mind.

Secondly, I wanted to release the pigeons. I had trained Hogan on them all summer, working the mornings to avoid the heat. I had three pigeons left, and it was time to let them go.

Coming down the mountain, I could hear my kids playing in the yard. I unlatched the door to the pigeon loft, handed each child a bird, and stepped back. I expected a grand finale. It never occurred to me that the pigeons were too fat to fly.

Maybe they weren't too fat. Maybe their wing muscles had atrophied from being cooped up so long. In any case, the pigeons fluttered about the yard, basically blowing the whole effect. Their wingbeats never afforded them more than a few feet of altitude. One, a cinnamon-colored bird with pink eyes, sailed headlong into a tree.

The ensuing chase scene was pure slapstick. It felt good to laugh. After rounding up the pigeons, the kids set them on branches, where they perched like Christmas ornaments.

I expect Hogan's spirit will be around for a while.

s

CHAPTER VI

VETERINARY APPLICATIONS: SPECIFIC ISSUES

The greatest difficulty in discussion of the application of Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life to animal welfare lies in the perceived threat to basic assumptions regarding the appropriate use of animals. Given the principle of reverence for life, with its insistence that the death of any living creature (even a death necessary for human survival) is a harm to that animal, how can we have any meaningful dialogue which does not deteriorate into name calling? The veterinary profession is as closed-minded towards the so-called radical animal rights movement (i.e., Ingrid Newkirk and PETA) as are the beef industry and McDonald's. In the new edition of Veterinary Ethics, Tannenbaum makes this very clear. Prior to discussing animals used for food and entertainment, he says that

> One task for an acceptable approach to ethical issues in agricultural or performance animal practice is to establish certain basic premises from which practical moral deliberation can proceed. The following are offered as examples of such principles.
>
> **1. People may use and benefit from agricultural and performance animals.** A fundamental premise upon which all farm and performance animal practice rests is that people may sometimes use animals for purposes such as food, fiber, and entertainment. This view is so widely and deeply held that one can assert it not just as a fact of life which any realistic approach to veterinary ethics must accept as a given, but also as a correct moral principle.
>
> To be sure, some people believe that it is inherently immoral for human beings even to use animals for our own benefit. Some of these people think they are owed a demonstration of why the human use of animals is permissible...But to engage here in an attempt to refute animal-use abolitionism would be a hopeless task. Those who endorse abolitionism are no more likely to accept refutations of their point of view than the rest of us would be disposed to agree that an animal farmer is the moral equivalent of

> a slave owner, or that a meat-eater is no better than a human cannibal. Articulating the objections to animal-use abolitionism is a legitimate task for animal ethics, which as a branch of philosophical ethics seeks theoretical completeness. However, for the veterinary profession, its clients, and the vast majority of the public, absolutism is a fringe position espoused by a hardy, but nevertheless tiny, few. It has almost always been so. This is not just a historical fact, but important moral evidence. Through the centuries, in diverse places and cultures, the overwhelming majority of humankind has consulted its basic moral intuitions - and has concluded that it is proper to use animals for food, fiber, draft, entertainment, and companionship. Absolutists may prefer to think that this belief has been a giant, horrible prejudice. However, the fact that most people who have lived and toiled on this earth have arrived at the same general conclusion is powerful evidence of its correctness. (408)

Tannenbaum efffectively slams the door on discussion of the fundamental issue of the morality of using animals for food and entertainment by claiming that such discussion is simply a "hopeless task," though Schweitzer and many others (i.e., Regan, Singer, Sapontzis) have clearly not believed this to be the case. Tannenbaum shuts the door in two ways: by claiming that if a particular moral viewpoint is/was historically acceptable, it must be correct, and by employing inflammatory comparisons to the historical point of view. I am reminded of the issue of slavery - a historically correct moral view, and if media reports are correct, a practice which is considered to be morally correct in certain parts of the world today. Yet I doubt seriously that Tannenbaum is pro-slavery just because some or many people, past and present, have thought that slavery is/was an ethically acceptable way to value and treat other human beings. For those who might not be convinced of Tannenbaum's logic, he offers a black and white depiction of animal use: if we don't eat them and entertain ourselves with them, then we must be absolutists, with the beliefs that farmers are the moral equivalents of slave owners and meat-eaters are the moral equivalents of human cannibals.

This sort of all-or-none inflammatory, prejudicial statement has no place in a serious textbook of veterinary ethics. Let us remember John Stuart Mill's famous statement that "All great movements must experience three stages: ridicule, discussion, adoption." The veterinary profession has chosen not so much to ridicule the animal rights movement (though there is some of that too) as simply to ignore its premise of the inherent value of animal life; it stands only to fail itself and society by refusing to move into the discussion phase of the animal movement. So, at the considerable risk of being branded a Newkirkian animal rights freak, I will employ Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life and its implications to suggest what we ought and ought not to do to and with animals - those who are pets; those who are a part of the research or food animal industries; and those who are non-domesticated.

Pets: The Human-Companion Animal Bond

The traditional distinction between pets and other domesticated animals has categorized dogs, cats, and, to some extent, birds, as pets, and other domesticated species as what Ott terms production animals; as we have seen, however, to label human valuation of animals by species-type is an inadequate categorization. In addition, clarification of the term "pet" is necessary in order to understand the valuation and treatment of such animals.

Merriam-Webster defines a pet as "a domesticated animal kept for pleasure rather than utility" (868). There is no specific designation of the pet as a being with inherent value, though the possibility is not ruled out; nevertheless, to keep an animal for one's "pleasure" is to keep it instrumentally, as a means to a human end, even if that end is not work, or breeding, or hunting, or protection. There appears to be an underlying assumption within the

veterinary profession that a pet is a participant in the so-called human-companion animal bond, though clearly many people who own cats and dogs are not participating in such a bond with them. The profession is, indeed, strongly advocating the value of the human-companion animal bond to both human and animal participants and to the economic stability of the profession.

Tannenbaum suggests that the bond be defined minimally as

> a continuous, bidirectional relationship between a human and an animal, which brings a significant benefit to a central aspect of the lives of each, which is in some sense voluntary, and in which each party treats the other not just as something entitled to respect and benefit in its own right but also as an object of admiration, trust, devotion, or love. (Veterinary Ethics 185)

That is, both the human and animal are endowed with inherent worth; Tannenbaum says that "...the animal members of such bonds have some significant moral rights" (Veterinary Ethics 189). This is not to claim that the animals have the same or equal moral rights as the humans involved. They do have a right to life (i.e., death is a harm), and to have their emotional/psychological interests met, as well as their medical and nutritional ones. This is certainly a much stronger valuation of animals than the standard sense of pets like dogs and cats owned by human beings who are minimally responsible for provision of food and shelter. The dog chained up in the back yard and provided with a dog house, food, water, and a rabies vaccine, but otherwise generally ignored, is possibly a "pet" but is not a member of a human-companion animal bond. (Sadly, this dog probably *was* a member of such a bond when he/she was a cute puppy.) A dog which is kept for purposes of breeding, hunting, or human protection - for the sole benefit of the owner - cannot be viewed as a member of the bond, since that animal is viewed entirely as having instrumental rather than inherent value.

From the standpoint of the ethic for reverence for life, the human-companion animal bond is to be encouraged, as it clarifies and exemplifies Schweitzer's concept of the inherent worth of animals, and also the illogical polarization of animals into those of inherent versus those of instrumental value (in Ott's sense of differentiating animals via paradigm). A word of caution is in order, however. Just as many animals are not participants in the the bond because they are viewed instrumentally, so others may become participants in the bond in an aberrant way, a way which is ultimately detrimental to them. A dog which is perceived as a surrogate child, for example, may be provided with such an excess of attention and food that it becomes neurotic and/or obese. The owner professes to love and respect the dog for itself, but in reality the dog is a representative or a substitute for someone (human) or something else. This animal is likely to be one which the owner cannot let die or be euthanized when the time comes; the suffering and needs of the animal take second place to the owner's emotional/psychological need to keep the animal alive at any cost. An ethic of reverence for life asks that when pain and suffering cannot be eliminated, euthanasia is an appropriate way to acknowledge the primacy of the animal's interests over our own; Schweitzer said that "when the suffering of a living creature cannot be alleviated, it is more ethical to end its life by killing it mercifully ..." (Indian Thought 83).

For veterinarians and for society, the encouragement of the bond in its true sense forces a look at other issues within the pet paradigm; as noted, euthanasia is one of them. When is euthanasia acceptable? What are we to do about pet overpopulation? Which species and individuals can truly be considered participants in the bond? Are procedures such as

cropping ears and declawing (and indeed, spaying and neutering) ethically acceptable within the bond? Let me suggest some answers to these questions.

Euthanasia

Euthanasia is an acceptable procedure *only* when the death *qualifies* as euthanasia; i.e., the motivation lies only in the interests of the animal being killed. Thus, the killing of a suffering and terminally ill cat in renal failure is euthanasia; there may be some agonizing on the part of the owner and the veterinarian as to the *timing* of the death, but the primary interests in question are those of the suffering animal. There is often a period of time - hours, days, or possibly weeks, when euthanasia is appropriate. Competent, caring veterinarians and loving owners can assess this fairly accurately in most cases.

However, the millions of healthy, usually young, but unwanted cats and dogs who are in animal shelters are not euthanized but killed. The semantics of euthanasia are important here: let's admit that we are killing these animals because *we* do not want them and/or cannot afford economically to keep them alive. It is true that the killing is less painful than disease, starvation, or trauma as a cause of death; but this comparative pain does not ethically justify the deaths. We are using Schweitzer's so-called "relative" ethical standards: we claim that painless death by injection is in the animals' better/best interests relative to other types of death; but, of course, relative to what is ethically correct - i.e., participation in the human-companion animal bond, these painless deaths are certainly ethically *wrong*. While a few dogs and cats might survive on their own for a period of time, and a very lucky few might be taken in by other people as participants in the human-companion animal bond, it is

nevertheless the case that the vast majority of unowned animals will succomb to disease, starvation, or trauma. Since human beings have domesticated dogs and cats, such that their survival as unowned animals is virtually impossible (even feral cat populations survive only as long as someone is feeding the animals), Schweitzer would say that we have an ethical obligation to keep our end of the bargain. One way to avoid acknowledging the failure of keeping our end of the bargain is to refer to the killing of unwanted dogs and cats in shelters as "euthanasia." Until we acknowledge these deaths as *killings* rather than *euthanasias*, we are hiding behind a linguistic facade. People who leave unwanted animals at shelters comfort themselves with the belief that someone else will provide a home for their rejected animals, or that they will at least be "put to sleep" painlessly. In Schweitzer's time and place, there was no viable sterilization procedure or injectable "euthanasia" solution; and he was criticized for applying a cruel technique when he killed kittens by a blow to the head rather than see them succumb to disease and starvation from overpopulation:

> In Africa, where one must do all of his own slaughtering, I force myself whenever possible to be present in order to prevent all unnecessary pain to the animal. If cats must be done away with, do not try to drown them and think that everything is well when they are out of sight. They may survive for hours in misery in the water. Instead, kill them yourself with a hammer blow to the head. This is your duty toward them. (Sermons 31)

Of course, he never claimed that what he did was ethically *right*: the necessary is not the ethical; certainly Schweitzer saw his choice as a subjective one, and his decision as the lesser of two evils.

Animals in shelters are unowned; what of *owned* healthy animals whose owners ask that they be "euthanized"? This class of animals includes such specific situations as the

puppy with parvo virus whose owner can replace him/her more cheaply than he/she can treat the sick animal (there is clearly no true bond here), and the owner whose cat urinates outside the litter pan, or whose dog is aggressive towards the children.

In these cases, the bond has either failed to develop or has been broken - and it is very, very often due to the failure of the owner to understand species-specific behavior and/or be willing to take the time and responsibility to address such unwanted behavior. There are situations in which behavior cannot be safely and consistently controlled, and in which the animal cannot be placed in another bond (i.e., some dominant aggressive dogs) - but these animals are still being *killed* and not *euthanized.*

For veterinarians who do not believe in killing healthy, owned animals, the ethical dilemma is intense. Within the profession, the guiding principle is that the veterinarian works for the owner/client and not the animal/patient; Tannenbaum says that it is

> ...a fact of western legal systems and cultures that animals are considered property. One might attempt to argue for a client's interest in being able to make her own decisions about her animal by appealing to a general moral right of people to own animals. Such an argument is not necessary for our purposes here. A more immediate justification for permitting the client to make the decisions about her animal's veterinary care is that when client and veterinarian enter a professional relationship they *accept* the fact that the animal is the client's property. Moreover, it is not part of the typical expressed or implied agreement between veterinarian and client that the veterinarian shall decide what is to be done with the client's property. Quite the contrary, both doctor and client usually understand (even if they do not state this understanding explicitly) that the doctor is working for the client, who retains the right to decide what services will be provided. Simply in virtue of having made such an agreement, the doctor is under an obligation to keep it. (Veterinary Ethics 181)

There is a justifiable fear of the legal consequences of not doing as the owner instructs; heresy that it is, I suggest that there are times when veterinarians must do what is *ethically*

correct rather than what is merely *legally* correct. (This adherence to doing what is in the *patient's* best interest is probably most acute in the reverse case, where an animal *needs* to be euthanized and the owner will not give permission.) While Tannenbaum is correct that both veterinarian and owner know who owns the animal, in the vast majority of cases the owner is seeking the veterinarian's opinion and input, and is generally willing to abide by the veterinarian's expertise. If a client wants an animal killed for no justifiable reason (to the veterinarian's mind), the veterinarian has the right to refuse to kill the animal and to terminate the client-veterinarian relationship.

Species Participants

What of the inclusion into the pet or human-companion animal bond of species other than the traditional dogs and cats? Certainly, at least some individuals of other domisticated species are capable of participation in the bond (horses, cows, pigs, goats, sheep, rats); but what about birds and non-domesticated animals such as reptiles, racoons, and tigers? The veterinary profession has in recent years been promoting birds (from parakeets to macaws) as pets, and many people can attest to the bond they share with their birds. I contend, however, that birds can *never* be full participants in the human-companion animal bond, because (with rare exceptions) birds are either caged and/or have their wings clipped to prevent flight/escape. To paraphrase Shapiro, a bird who cannot fly is not a bird. To keep a bird inside one's home is to prevent that bird from pursuing its telos, its species-way - even if it was born in captivity rather than captured in the wild. In the same way, to keep snakes and iguanas in fish tanks is to prevent the pursuit of their species-ways; additionally, these

sorts of animals cannot and do not "participate" in the human-companion animal bond in any real sense of the word. The same holds true for tigers, koala bears, monkeys, and other non-domesticated mammals, whether they are bred in captivity or captured in the wild as infants or adults. To "cage" such creatures is to deny them their species-ways, which is to see them as beings who are instrumental to human wants rather than as beings worthy of reverence or respect in and of themselves, as required by the ethic of reverence for life.

Breed Standards

The manipulation and perpetuation of specific breeds of pet animals, particularly when it results in physical and/or mental deformities which interfere with the individual's ability to function in a normal or appropriate way (i.e., enhancement of aggressiveness, bone defects, respiratory defects, etc.), are disrespectful of those animals. Cropping ears and docking tails to meet breed standards is also to fail to participate in the human-companion animal bond because it is to further view animals as instrumental to the specific aesthetic preferences of humans. Even the AVMA has endorsed the interests of animals rather than the interests of humans in this particular case:

> The AVMA has recommended to the American Kennel Club and appropriate breed associations that action be taken to delete mention of cropped or trimmed ears from breed standards for dogs and to prohibit the showing of dogs with cropped or trimmed ears if such animals were born after some reasonable date. (AVMA Directory 58)

The AVMA has taken no direct stand, however, on the breeding of defects into domesticated animals - the aggressiveness of Rottweilers, the structural bone deformities of Basset hounds,

the severe ocular problems of Shi-tzus. Yet if to participate in the bond is to value animals for themselves, it cannot be logical to value such painful and/or aberrant traits.

Declawing Cats

The issue of declawing cats would seem to fall into the same category as manipulation of breed characteristics, but it brings up much more difficult choices. The AVMA says that "declawing of domestic cats is justifiable when the cat cannot be trained to refrain from using its claws destructively" (AVMA Directory 58). Declawing involves the removal of the distal phalanges of the front feet; it is, in human terms, the removal of each finger at the first joint (not just the removal of the finger nail). There assuredly *is* pain and discomfort - at the very least the psychological stress involved in bringing the cat in and anesthetizing it, and the subsequent post-operative physical pain. There is also the potential for post-surgical complications (usually abscess formation). However, thousands and possibly several million cats are in homes participating in the human-companion animal bond *because they are declawed.* These strictly indoors cats are additionally not contributing to the depopulation of songbirds and other wildlife, nor are they suffering the effects of disease and trauma which occur in outdoor cats. The average indoor/outdoor or strictly outdoor cat lives 1-2 years; an indoor cat lives on average 15-20 years. While the claim can consistently be made that keeping a cat inside is to thwart its pursuit of some of its species-ways, we can also consider that the prey of these cats are now free to pursue *their* species-ways (in Schweitzer's terms, we are forced to make a choice here). Additionally, it can be argued that domesticated animals, like human beings, give up certain rights in order to

retain/acquire other rights: humans, for example, give up the right to kill and injure other humans in return for protection of their own lives and property; cats and dogs give up the right to procreation, or their claws, or the freedom to roam at will, in return for protection from the dangers that such behaviors entail (we don't allow small children to roam at will, either.) Unless one wishes to argue against the ethical validity of domesticating any animals at all, these issues will always be both relevant and ethically debatable.

Wild Animals: In Captivity and in the Wild

The valuation and treatment of wild animals encompasses a wide variety of issues and situations, and eventually must be dealt with by veterinarians and the general public within the context not only of animal welfare but of environmental ethics. How we are to synthesize the various animal ethics points of view to one another and to the various environmental ethics viewpoints remains to be seen - but it will be a monumental task. I will make several comments in regard to the impact of environmental ethics, but I will not attempt any delineation of current philosophical theories *per se.* Instead, I will focus on a selected sample of issues relating to wild animals, and suggest the impact of the ethic of reverence for life on these issues. I have chosen situations which cover the spectrum of human relationships with wild animals - those kept captive as pets and in zoos and circuses; those killed in the name of the sport of hunting; and those injured in the wild and in need of treatment or euthanasia. I will employ the use of the terms "wild" and "exotic" in the same legal sense used by Tannenbaum (Veterinary Ethics 528): a wild animal species is "...not domesticated,...has not been tamed for economic uses, or typically does not live in

association with people." An exotic species is a wild species which is not native to the particular area or habitat in which it lives (e.g., parakeets and panthers).

Wild Animals as Pets

As discussed previously, the keeping of wild animals by individuals under the guise of "pets" is ethically unacceptable. It can also be dangerous, and the danger to humans is usually the motivating factor when local, state, and/or federal governments ban ownership of wild animals by individuals. The AVMA acknowledges the relevance of both issues in its *Policy Statements and Guidelines:*

> RESOLVED, that the American Veterinary Medical Association recognizes that: a) Wild animals are often maintained in captivity as companion animals for breeding purposes, for research activities, and for exhibition, and b) Certain species of wild animals, when maintained under responsible ownership, may constitute no significant hazard to human health, other animal species, the environment, or to the animals themselves.
>
> It is FURTHER RESOLVED that certain species or individual animals of most species, when maintained under irresponsible ownership may, in fact, be a hazard to human health, other animals, and/or the environment.
>
> It is FURTHER RESOLVED that the American Veterinary Medical Association strongly opposes the keeping of wild carnivore species of animals as pets and believes that all commercial traffic in these animals for such purpose should be prohibited.
>
> It is FURTHER RESOLVED that the American Veterinary Medical Association strongly opposes keeping as pets those reptiles and amphibians that are considered inherently dangerous to humans and believes that all commercial traffic in these animals for such purposes should be prohibited.
>
> **Statement About Resolution**
>
> People acquire wild animals as pets because they like to possess unusual pets or regard them as status symbols.
>
> Problems associated with wild animals include disease, diet, exercise, housing and traumatic injury.

> Wild animals kept as pets are frequently subjected to various surgical procedures for the sole purpose of making the animal more sociably acceptable to its owner.
>
> Disposing of a wild animal can be a traumatic experience for both the animal and its owner. Frequently, legitimate zoos will not accept them and they are "too domesticated" to return to the wild; therefore euthanasia may be the only alternative. Veterinarians should exert their influence to discourage the keeping of wild animals as pets. (98)

Tannenbaum finds the AVMA's policy to be much too restrictive and intolerant, because it "...does not attempt to place the organized profession in a leadership role in advocating good veterinary care for wild animal pets..." (Veterinary Ethics 531). Clearly Tannenbaum believes that the keeping of wild animals as pets is ethically permissible:

> There are too many different kinds of wild and exotic species to make it possible to brand all equally as inappropriate pets. Surely, there are some exotic animals that can be kept healthy and safe by some knowledgeable and careful owners. If this were not the case, all states would prohibit the possession of all wild species. Moreover, although there undoubtedly are some people who acquire certain wild animals as status symbols or for certain strange psychological reasons, the same is true of some people who own dogs or cats. (Veterinary Ethics 531)

His reasoning is faulty here: just because some owners can keep their animals "healthy and safe", and don't own them as status symbols, and because by some stroke of magic all states would outlaw such possession otherwise, Tannenbaum gives his ethical stamp of approval to such ownership.

This issue, however, is much larger than the instrumental wishes and beliefs of wild animal owners. As I noted earlier, there are two issues at stake: wild animals do not participate in the human-companion animal bond, and an individual animals's welfare interests include the right to pursue its species-way (or, in Schweitzer's terms, its self-perfection). Thus it is impossible to justify ethically the captivity as "pets" of iguanas,

tarantulas, hedgehogs, or large carnivorous felines, to name but a few. Nor is it justified by the claim that an individual was born in captivity rather than captured in the wild. While I would agree that veterinarians (if competent) should be legally allowed to treat such individuals as are presently in captivity, I submit that the veterinary profession ought to endorse any and all efforts to prohibit as quickly as possible the ownership of such animals in the future. One cannot coherently claim to respect the inherent value of a wild animal and keep it as a pet; wild animals in captivity are the antithesis of Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life.

Wild Animals in Circuses

If an ethical principle of reverence for life holds the confinement of a tiger as a pet to be morally incorrect, then the moral wrong is compounded by training such a creature to obey unnatural human commands for the entertainment and amusement of human beings. Schweitzer said that

> I never go to a menagerie because I cannot endure the sight of the misery of the captive animals. The exhibiting of trained animals I abhor. What an amount of suffering and cruel punishment the poor creatures have to endure in order to give a few moments' pleasure to men devoid of all thought and feeling for them! (Memoirs 44-5)

Tannenbaum, however, asserts that "performances involving captive animals are not inherently disrespectful" (Veterinary Ethics 561); he suggests that such performances can be educational and enjoyable. Yet, in a discussion on dolphin and whale shows, he notes two problems. First, people are left with the impression that "these animals always exist to make people happy"; and second, such performances are dangerously anthropomorphic (i.e., they

leave people with the impression that the animals "...have human thoughts and emotions and do human things in the wild"). This is not what we want to teach, however; we want to teach people "...an appreciation of wild animals and their behavior" (Veterinary Ethics 561). I presume that Tannenbaum means an appreciation of the behaviors of wild animals *as wild animals*; if this is the goal, I do not see how he can claim that "performances involving captive animals are not inherently disrespectful". He can't have it both ways, and in fact, in regard to cetaceans (whales, dolphins, porpoises) he says that "My own view (for what it is worth) is that the competing considerations tip the scales against keeping cetaceans in captivity" (Veterinary Ethics 561).

Wild Animals in Zoos

The confinement of wild animals in zoos appears initially to present a much more difficult ethical dilemma. The living conditions of such animals vary widely, though they are in general a vast improvement over conditions a mere ten to twenty years ago. (Some of us can relate to this in terms of the Knoxville Zoo and the changes which have occurred there over the past decade. Despite massive improvements, some species are still confined in totally inadequate habitats - think of the tigers versus the elephants.)

There are strong justifications for the existence of zoos: they educate people about wild animals (so that they may be more concerned about saving wild species in the wild); they participate in breeding programs whose goal is to put endangered species back in the wild; and they provide medical and scientific knowledge which will help other animals in the wild (National Geographic 2-47). On the other hand, any and all of these admirable goals

use the individual animals in question instrumentally; the inherent worth of these individuals is sacrificed to the good of the human species or to the good of the captive animals' own species and/or other species in their native habitats.

I am not convinced that the argument from the educational perspective is valid; studies have shown that people go to zoos for entertainment more than for education, and in fact, spend much more time socializing with the humans they are with than watching or studying the animals. Perhaps people are best educated about wild animals when they are "up close and personal," but the use of film documentaries seems a much better educational tool. Such documentaries are widely available on television and in schools and libraries, and they teach people about species-ways and interactions of multiple species within ecosystems. If the main function of (some) zoos is ultimately entertainment, then they are not ethically justified; if the claim is an educational function, then there are better ways available to teach people about wild animals.

A stronger case can be made for what we learn about and can then apply to the needs and treatment of wild species. Having interfered so destructively with the habitats and survival capability of many species, there is perhaps an obligation to further these species at the expense of some individuals. However, we incur very strong obligations to provide the maximum welfare interests possible for each of these individuals, and to be constantly aware of the sacrifices they are making for others of their kind. Thus, for example, we are obligated to provide "natural" habitats for endangered panthers rather than confining them in small cages; and they should not be exhibited to the general public, because their purpose is not entertainment but survival of the species. We cannot claim to provide "natural" habitat for

wild animals which are forced to be constantly exposed to human beings. Indeed, such animals should not be kept in zoos but in breeding facilities conducive to their own species welfare; instead of breeding Siberian tigers in the United States, we should contribute funds toward breeding facilities in Siberia.

A final note on a troubling ethical problem for zoos: the breeding of surplus animals is always ethically unacceptable. To sell such animals to private owners/breeders, or to hunting ranches, or to "euthanize" them, are all unacceptable practices, because such practices fail to respect/reverence these individuals' inherent worth. The only wild animals bred in captivity should be bred for purposes of restocking in their native habitats; that is, for the perpetuation of individuals as true participants of their own species.

Wild Animals as Sport

We can distinguish two purposes for hunting of wild animals by human beings: the first is the provision of food or other goods (i.e., clothing) necessary for human sustenance; the second is for sport. The ethical disagreement today occurs largely over the second type of hunting.

Historically, and in some cultures today, wild animals provide critical components of human diets and other survival needs (e.g., whales in Eskimo culture). Traditionally, such use of animals has been ethically constrained within the context of the natural environment. For example, in his discussion of hunting by the Kuyukon, Richard Nelson says that

> The necessary killing of animals and harvesting of plants is not considered disrespectful. The natural order - established in time beyond memory - dictates that humans and other animals must sustain themselves by taking other lives. But people should do everything possible to prevent unnecessary

> suffering; they should never take more than they need or waste what has been given them; and they should treat all remains according to traditional rules. (Kellert and Wilson (213-14)

Killing is thus seen as a necessity, and not as entertainment; the lives taken are taken with respect and with a minimum of pain.

Schweitzer would, of course, remind us that the killing is still unethical (though necessary), and that the hunter incurs a burden of guilt/debt. The Kuyukon pay the debt by limiting their hunting to what is necessary; not wasting the animal's life; respecting the remains; and causing a minimum of pain.

The problem today lies in hunting for/as "sport." Schweitzer was (rightly) adamantly opposed to such killing:

> *And hunting*? Is that to be condemned as well? Hunting as the necessary killing of all sorts of beasts of the field, whether for food or to defend against their overpopulating the area, is not condemned. But hunting as an amusement: yes!...That for so long it has passed as an amusement, even as a sort of training ground for manhood, will someday be cited as one of the most meaningful facts in the history of the spiritual life. And those who think that such sensitivity causes the species to grow soft cannot be allowed to disconcert us. Manliness that shows itself in thoughtless joy in destruction and torture is not authentic manliness. We must reach the stage at which killing for sport will be felt as a disgrace to our civilization. (Sermons 28, qtd. in Winston 23)

Why do we consider the hunting of wild animals to be a sport? Merriam-Webster defines a sport only as a "source of diversion: recreation" (1137). I would like to suggest a redirection of several aspects of the idea of hunting as a sport. There is an underlying basis for the practice of "sports," and that is that the competitors are reasonably evenly matched; the outcome - the win - does not involve death for the opponent; and the competitors *have mutually agreed* to participate and compete. Throwing the Christians to the lions was *not*

sport, dog and cock fighting are *not* sports; and killing a deer or a tiger for one's amusement is *not* sport. To kill an animal when one has no real need to is to view that animal instrumentally, and to deny that it has any interests or value in and of itself; as Paul Taylor says, it is to treat wild animals "...as if their very existence is something having no value at all, other than as means to the satisfaction of human preferences" (qtd. in Veterinary Ethics 541).

Perhaps studies of hunters' motivations have been or ought to be done in the field of psychology. While I have no academic background in psychology, I cannot resist musing on the underlying motivations of the typical hunter. Every hunter I have asked assures me that he (they are almost all males) doesn't deliberately cause pain and suffering; that he eats the meat, so the animal's life is not wasted (he doesn't *need* the meat - he can survive without this meat or go to the grocery store if he wants meat); that he enjoys being out participating in nature with friends; and that the prey is not a helpless victim but an opponent (an opponent whose only option in battle is to try to run away). I cannot see that any of these reasons justify killing a sentient creature which is not threatening one's own livelihood and which has an interest in living out its species-way. (The deer may indeed by killed and eaten by coyotes, but this is a part of the species-ways of both predator and prey, as is/was the case when humans hunt(ed) to survive.) There has to be something more psychologically to hunting: one can enjoy nature and one's human companions without killing - why do some humans *need* to kill, to be violent? And note that there is a need for the one killed to be a sentient opponent - if we put artificial deer out in the woods, I doubt there would be many hunters. Hunters don't want to destroy tractors or trees or clams; they want to destroy

obviously sentient creatures. Studies have shown a correlation between violence toward domesticated animals (cats and dogs) and violence toward other human beings. Given our violent culture, one has to wonder if there is not also a correlation between violence toward wild animals and violence (e.g., as indicative of a lack of respect for individuals) toward humans. If one has no respect for one sort of life, one is less likely to value other sorts of life either. It seems to me that it cuts both ways - perhaps if we truly respected human life, we would respect non-human life, and if we respected non-human life, we would truly respect human life. Perhaps, as Schweitzer suggests, hunting of wild animals for sport will one day be seen as the disgrace to humanity which it is.

Wild Animals as Injured Individuals

It is unfortunately well beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the relationship of the valuation and treatment of wild animals to any or all of the various environmental ethics, or whether we might try to pigeonhole Schweitzer himself or his ethic of reverence for life into one or another viewpoint. The sorts of treatment or help human beings would give to individual wild animals in need of such help depends to a large extent upon one's views regarding the inherent worth of individuals versus species or ecosystems or whole environments of one sort or another. While it might be thought that Schweitzer's ethic supports some sort of environmental ethic because it acknowledges the inherent worth of *all* life (e.g., plants, trees, clams, and spiders as well as higher sentient life such as mammals and birds), on second thought we must realize that for Schweitzer it is *individuals* who count first and foremost. I do not mean to suggest that Schweitzer would be opposed to an

environmental ethic, but I believe that he would always remind us that species and ecosystems are made up of individuals, and that harm caused by humans to individuals, even for the benefit of the species or the ecosystem as a whole, is an ethical harm. We must never forget the trees as we contemplate the forest. I would also like to suggest to the environmental philosophers that an ethic that ignores - or worse, that callously harms - individuals will never be an acceptable ethic. It is a good thing to revere the land, but only if we revere its individual inhabitants as well. Let me argue the point with a couple of examples used by Holmes Rolston at the Animal Welfare Forum of the AVMA in 1991 (JAVMA 108).

Case 1:

In February 1983, a bison fell through ice into Yellowstone River, and was unable to pull itself out of the water. A party of snowmobilers attempted unsuccessfully to rescue the animal after the National Park Service refused to come to its aid or to kill it. The bison died that night, presumably from hypothermia/exhaustion/drowning. Coyotes, ravens, and a grizzly bear ate the body.

Case 2:

In Glacier National Park in 1989, a wolverine attacked and injured a deer, which may have gotten away because two workmen who saw the attack startled the wolverine. The injured deer was seen by many visitors, but Park Service officials refused to help or euthanize the deer, which suffered for two days prior to its death.

Case 3:

That same year, in the same park, a bear was hit by a truck and injured; park officials

"mercy-killed" the bear immediately.

Rolston acknowledges that in cases like the first two, where individuals are left to suffer and die rather than being either treated or euthanized, ethics seems to have taken a strange path:

> Ethics can really seem to have gone wild when it respects even this contingent element in nature and refuses to end fortuitous pain. Sometimes it seems that environmental ethics take us nearer than we wish toward a tragic view of life. (620)

But no, here is the logic or Rolston's and the Park Service's environmental ethic:

> ...we see why the lame deer should not be mercy-killed but why the bear hit by a truck was. The logic is that an encounter with a truck is no part of the forces of natural selection that have operated historically on bears. When human beings cause pain, they are under obligation to minimize it. If we had thought that the wolverine failed to kill the deer because human beings interrupted the attack, that might have been cause to dispatch it, although even here consideration for the wolverine, as an endangered species, would probably have meant that the deer should be left in case the wolverine returned. (620)

Thus, Rolston's ethic is one of non-interference in the natural workings of the ecosystem; individual animals are to be left to suffer their fates, unless their fates have been rerouted by human intervention. Rolston claims that while leaving animals such as the bear in Case 1 and the deer to die slowly and painfully seems a bit odd, it is the ethically correct thing to do.

I submit that in the spirit of Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life, and in hopes that human beings are capable of being humane, Rolston's outlook is not merely ethically incorrect but unbelievably appalling. No rational, moral human being who has become a participant, willing or not, in a case like any of those described, should or would leave an animal to suffer for hours or days rather than provide medical aid or kill it as quickly and

painlessly as possible. *Who* caused the animal's pain is *absolutely irrelevant morally*; the moral relevance lies in the fact that this is a sentient being with a vital interest in the cessation of its pain, and that there are human beings at hand who can alleviate the animal's suffering. I am advocating, as Schweitzer would, that we do all that we can to alleviate pain and suffering within our sphere of influence, whether we caused the pain and suffering or are bystanders to it. In choosing to work or to play in a natural environment, we set ourselves up for the possibility of being participants in the suffering of wild animals, and our obligations are the same as those incurred when we come upon an injured person or dog in the road. The ethic of reverence for life compels us to aid suffering individuals, regardless of how or where the suffering occurs. Rolston should have said that "when human beings *see* pain, they are under obligation to minimize it." I would not wish to have Rolston on *my* lifeboat.

I am not, however, advocating interference - that is, some sort of moral obligation - of human beings in the predator-prey relationship; that is, in saving gazelles from lions or deer from wolverines. This issue seems to confuse and confound animal rights theory (Daisie and Michael Radnor address Regan's inconsistency in their book Animal Consciousness (214-225).) Regan advocates a rule of non-interference, which means that the prey will suffer rather than the predator; Schweitzer's view is that when you are a by-stander in such a situation, there are no hard and fast rules; the issue cannot be resolved by a concrete rule. It is, rather, one of those subjective choices we must make under the auspices of reverence for life. A choice in either direction causes harm to the other; the prey dies, or the predator goes hungry, or the prey escapes but some other prey will now suffer.

Schweitzer asked:

> A special question: In the battle of life against life that plays itself out in nature, may I choose sides? May I involve myself in it? For instance, out there on the ground crawls a large spider. I know that she will capture many insects in the web she will spin. She will torture and kill them. One step from me squashes her and removes much pain for many from the world. May I do that? Should I do that? Here no universally valid decision can be given. Rather, you must deal with every individual case according to your conviction and to your conscience. Perhaps one time you will do one thing and another time another...These decisions can go either way. If only you act responsibly and according to conscience, and not thoughtlessly, you are justified. (Sermons 29-30)

Schweitzer made his own choices as necessary:

> The rationalization of individual cases is a different matter. Someone brought me four poor pelicans whose wings had been so badly slashed by unfeeling people that they cannot fly. It will take two or three months before their wings heal and they can fly freely. I have hired a fisherman to catch the necessary fish to feed them. I always pity the poor fish to the depths of my soul, but I have to choose between killing the fish or the four pelicans who would surely starve to death. I do not know whether I am doing the right thing in deciding one way instead of the other. (qtd. in Bahr 218)

Food Animals

Surely no issue arouses as much irrational defense and pure emotion as that of the morality of killing and eating animals for food. Those who support vegetarianism in one form or another are perceived by meat eaters to be making personal attacks on the morals of individuals, their families and communities, and even their religious beliefs. No other animal welfare issue hits so close to home. When we discuss this issue in my veterinary ethics classes, the first thing I ask students to "get clear about" is that vegetarianism is not an automatic consequence of opposition to some or all aspects of the food animal industry. It

is perfectly consistent to believe that killing and eating animals is morally acceptable, but that certain practices or facets of food animal agribusiness are morally objectionable. The second thing that students must get clear about is that there are both degrees of vegetarianism, and a variety of reasons for vegetarianism. Of the 5-10% of Americans who are estimated to be vegetarians, many do not eat meat (and sometimes other animal products) for reasons of personal health - not for reasons relating to animal welfare.

In Beyond Beef, Jeremy Rifkin provides an excellent, well-researched and accurate account of the rise of the cattle industry in the United States, as well as a perceptive and well-researched account of the "psychology of beef." For those who are capable of open-mindedness as regards social issues, Rifkin's work is an excellent starting point: he discusses meat in relation to gender hierarchies (men and meat, women and plants) as well as to nationalism and class divisions: meat symbolizes masculinity, power, and material success. Mary Midgley notes the same sort of issues in Animals and Why They Matter; she says that meat eating is a

> ...very widespread element of social symbolism. Meat-eating indicates success and prosperity, therefore hospitality. Medical opinion, too, used to proclaim the need for plenty of meat and dairy-products...The original symbolism, depicting a straight life-and-death clash between animals and man, is still very strong... (27)

In addition, we make it easier linguistically for urban dwellers with no direct contact with food animals to ignore the reality of eating animal flesh: we eat "meat," "pork," and "beef"; and as Schweitzer said, "For many people suffering does not exist if they do not need to witness it" (Sermons 30).

The Larger Issues of Meat-Eating

While the veterinary community and the general public focus on specific animal welfare issues within the food animal industry, (e.g., castration without anesthesia; confinement of veal calves) there apprears to be an almost total lack of awareness of other ethical concerns related to food animal agribusiness. That is, while animal welfare concerns are certainly of tremendous importance, the impact of the industry in other areas ought also to play a role in ethical discussions in the present and the future. There is widespread ignorance about the effects of the food animal industry on humans and on the environment. While the animal rights movement has made headway in informing the public about real and perceived cruelty within the industry, there is a lack of awareness of these larger basic issues which ought to be studied and taken into account. No one in the veterinary community has to my knowledge acknowledged or discussed these issues in depth, yet they are vital to the future of the food animal industry. I will sketch them very briefly here, in the hope that further elucidation of these issues will be relevant to future policy-making decisions regarding the food animal industry.

- Effects on the World's Poor:

The human population is expected to double to 10 billion in the next 50 years. Today, over 1 billion people are malnourished; 15 million children and 5 million adults die annually of causes related to malnutrition. In the United States 50-70% of the grain produced annually (some 200 million tons) goes to feed livestock. We get an average of 1 pound of beef per 16 pounds of grain and soybeans fed; the ratio is roughly 1:6 for poultry. (Rifkin 159ff., Tierkert 11). While not all of the land used for animal grain production is suitable for human grain

production, and while much of the problem of feeding the poor is related to political and social problems, there is a strong case to be made - especially under the umbrella of Christianity, our dominant religious tradition - for the production of grain to directly feed the world's hungry humans. There are, of course, other massive social issues here, not the least being human population control.

- Effects of Meat-eating on Consumers:

As Walt Kelly's Pogo said, "We have met the enemy and he is us." Though many meat-eaters still object that because human beings are physiologicallty omnivorous, the consumption of animal products is necessary for survival, numerous scientific studies have confirmed that eating meat is not necessary in order to have a nutritionally balanced diet, and it is in fact possible to be a vegan (one who consumes no animal products at all, including milk, cheese, and eggs) and have a balanced died - though it takes a great deal of time and effort to obtain all of one's nutritional requirements (Rifkin 73-75, Singer 256). There have been radical changes in the American diet since the turn of the century - a tremendous increase in the amounts of protein and fat obtained from animal sources, increases in sugar and salt consumption, decreased fiber consumption, and the addition of food additives, antibiotic residues, and pesticide residues to the diet. Twenty to thirty percent of Americans are now classified as medically obese. Five of the ten leading causes of death are related to high fat diets (not all of the fat comes from animal products, of course) - heart disease, stroke, atherosclerosis, cancer (breast, colon, urinary bladder, and prostate), and diabetes. The medical cost to society is estimated at 100 million dollars annually (Consumer Reports 644, Rifkin 171-5). Of course, smoking, heredity, and other environmental factors also play

a role - but note that the risk of heart attack for a (vegetarian) Seventh Day Adventist male is 4%; for the average American male, it is 50% (Tiekert 11). Even the government has been forced to make the switch from the Four Basic Food Groups to the Pyramid (meat and dairy products are at the top, under the apex of fats, oils, and sweets), despite the intense efforts of the food animal industry to the contrary (Consumer Reports 644-655). Obesity itself has harsh psychological as well as physical penalties; we spend five billion dollars a year to lose weight; one-half of all fourth-grade girls claim to be dieting, and are at risk of bulemia and anorexia (Rifkin 165-169). The message is clear: eat fat but don't get fat.

- Social Effects of Animal Agribusiness:

Today, the Big Three - Iowa Beef Packers (bought by Occidental Petroleum in 1981), Excel, and Con-Agra - slaughter 70% of all cattle, and own a majority of cropland, feed lots, slaughterhouses, fertilizer and pesticide companies, seed companies, and packing plants in the United States (Rifkin 130-131). We bemoan the loss of family farms and small communities, but perhaps our thoughtless insistence on the consumption of mass quantities of beef is to blame for at least some of the perceived loss of family and cultural values.

- Environmental Effects of Animal Agribusiness:

There is a host of terribly important issues here, including

Deforestation and Soil Erosion - Massive deforestation and/or soil erosion has ocurred in this country and abroad secondary to grazing beef cattle and growing crops to feed them (the best known example is probably the clearing of rain forest in Brazil, which allows owners to run cattle there for 3 - 5 years; the land is then not habitable for cows, humans, or any other species. Topsoil there is replenished at the estimated rate of 1" every 200 years (Rifkin 194-

199, 200-212)). The loss of biodiversity - plant and animal species - is probably incalculable (Rifkin 223-230).

Water Losses - Water tables are decreasing world-wide, both above and below ground. Over half of the water used in the world goes to cattle production; it takes an estimated 25,000 gallons of water to produce one pound of meat (Rifkin 218-222, 228).

Global Warming - The use of fossil fuels in grain production, the production of carbon dioxide from the burning of forests to provide crop and range land, and emissions of methane (from cows) may have a significant effect on global warming (Rifkin 223-230).

Wildlife - Species are displaced to provide free range for cattle and sheep (our western lands are a case study), and predators are mercilessly destroyed, resulting in severe imbalances in ecosystems. In the United States in 1989, the Animal Damage Control program killed 86,502 coyotes, 7,158 foxes, 236 black bears, 1,200 bobcats, and 80 gray timber wolves with a federal budget of $29.4 million (Rifkin 209).

Animal Welfare Concerns

The ethical significance of animal welfare issues can be easily lost in the midst of the aforementioned concerns, yet the fundamental questions remain: is it ethically acceptable to kill and eat animals for non-survival purposes, and if so, what welfare considerations are the animals owed?

Later in his life, Schweitzer was a vegetarian; his daughter, Rhena Schweitzer-Miller, thinks that he was not when she visited Lambarene in 1958 but that he was by 1960. His reasons were not for personal health but because he did not want to be even indirectly

responsible for causing harm to animals (Schweitzer-Miller, personal communication). From the perspective of the ethic of reverence for life, we can only conclude, I think, that vegetarianism is, under normal circumstances, an ethical requirement. Thus we could halt the animal welfare discussion right here: there should be no animals raised for human consumption (presuming that we can obtain adequate nutritional sustenance from non-animal foods), and therefore there should be no welfare to be concerned about. The reality, however, is that most people do eat meat, and the food animal industry does exist.

I will not rehash the ethical issues of death as a harm; the significance of individuals versus herds/groups (individuals suffer, not herds); and the interests individuals have in pursuing their species-ways. Most of the current welfare concerns are concerns about housing requirements, social requirements, and specific medical and slaughter procedures. Tannenbaum provides a representative list of concerns for swine, ruminants, and poultry (Veterinary Ethics 421-423), and the *1998 AVMA Policy Statements and Guidelines* address a few select issues. The *Guidelines* refer veterinarians to Report No. 91 of the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, titled "Scientific Aspects of the Welfare of Food Animals," for further information regarding specific welfare concerns of food animal species. This report deals with technical aspects of housing (lighting, temperature, etc.); management practices (i.e., debeaking of poultry; castration of pigs); and handling, transport, and slaughtering techniques. The report is rather out of date; it was published in 1981.

Under the auspices of Schweitzer's ethic if reverence for life, I will suggest to the veterinary community, food animal producers, and the general public that these issues are not so very difficult to resolve ethically, though they may be very difficult to resolve

economically, if we continue to kill and consume animals. An obvious and consistent minimal ethical guideline is to follow the medical guidelines of Ott's pet paradigm. Thus, if it is unethical to perform a particular procedure in a particular way on a dog or a cat, it is also unacceptable to perform the procedure in like manner on a pig or cow; if a certain practice is considered detrimental to the physical or emotional welfare of a dog or a cat, we ought to consider whether it would likewise be detrimental to a pig or a cow. (One could reverse the order, of course, and do to dogs and cats what we do to pigs or cows, but most meat-eaters would not tolerate this complete reversal of an ethic of reverence for life). Therefore, if it is ethically unacceptable (i.e., not in the interests of the animal) to castrate a dog or cat without anesthesia, it is also unacceptable to castrate a pig or calf without anesthesia, since there is no biological/physiological evidence that pigs feel no pain during the procedure though dogs and cats do. Interestingly, the *AVMA Guidelines* support the present castration practices of pigs as "acceptable management practices when performed in a sanitary manner during the first week of life," but support "the use of procedures that reduce or eliminate the pain of ...castrating cattle." The procedure should be performed "at the earliest age practicable" (60).) Apparently, the AVMA believes that the younger the animal, the less the pain.

Again, if it is unacceptable to confine a dog, cat, or canary in a cage such that it cannot lie down, stand up, and move around, it is unacceptable to crate a sow, a veal calf, or a dozen chickens in the same way. The response of the veterinary community and of producers to such a guideline would probably be that it is not economically feasible to follow such a guideline. Yet economic considerations are not in theory allowed to trump ethical

concerns in regard to human beings (though in reality this occurs all the time); thus economic concerns ought not automatically trump concerns regarding animal welfare. Further, there is no proof that meat-eaters would not pay higher prices for meat from animals treated more humanely; there have been no scientific/economic studies to answer the question.

Though such a guideline might not answer every food animal welfare question, it would begin to take the interests of these animals into account. If we begin to consider the interests and needs of food animals in this way, we may open the philosophical door a bit wider, and perhaps begin to see these animals in the light of Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life - as beings with value in and of themselves, rather than, or at least in addition to, perceiving them as beings of value only instrumentally to human wants.

The greatest ethical achievement of an ethic of reverence for life in American culture today would be the elimination of the killing of animals for food: such a gestalt shift would result in massive animal welfare, human welfare, and environmental welfare improvements, and allow us to concentrate our ethical concerns on the limited use of animals in research and on appropriate attitudes and behavior toward whatever remains and can be salvaged of the wild creation, both animal and plant.

Research Animals

Albert Schweitzer had strong beliefs about the use and treatment of animals for purposes of research and teaching; he said that

> Those who experiment with operations or the use of drugs upon animals, or inoculate them with diseases, so as to be able to bring help to mankind with the results gained, must never quiet any misgivings they feel

> with the general reflection that their cruel proceedings aim at a valuable result. They must first have considered in each individual case whether there is a real necessity to force upon any animal this sacrifice for the sake of mankind. And they must take the most anxious care to mitigate as much as possible the pain inflicted. How much wrong is committed in scientific institutions through neglect of anesthetics, which to save time or trouble are not administered! How much, too, through animals being subjected to torture merely to demonstrate to students generally known phenomena! By the very fact that animals have been subjected to experiments, and have by their pain won such valuable results for suffering humanity, a new and special relation of solidarity has been established between them and us. (Philosophy 318)

The question, as I see it, is not simply whether, and in what particular cases, we are ethically justified in using animals in medical research, but rather involves the larger issue of what particular research - irrespective of the use of animals - is ethically and economically justifiable to society, and who is to make these decisions. That is, there is a larger justification issue at stake here, in which animals play a role at times. To focus on animal pain and use issues alone, as the federally mandated Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs) do, is to start nearer the end of the problem than the beginning. The larger issues involve the use of public resources (i.e., money and medical expertise) for various kinds of research; let me offer a generalized example. Should we support research to find a drug which will help prevent heart attacks in human beings? Given that most heart attacks are the result of poor lifestyle choices by individuals (smoking, obesity, lack of exercise), might our dollars and expertise not be better employed in educating, motivating, and providing the means for people to pursue healthy life-styles? Or would our resources be better spent on a disease over which people have no control, no personal responsibility, such as juvenile diabetes? Or perhaps we ought to fund state-of-the-art sanitation facilities instead. The point is that most of the rhetoric - by animal rights activists and the medical

community - focuses rather narrowly on the use and treatment of animals in research, rather than on the initial problem of justification of the research itself. Raymond Giraud's comment in an article in Between the Species titled "Ethical Considerations in the Use of Transgenic Animals" is applicable in any and all fields of research: we need

> ...to question the moral value, as well as the feasibility and utility, of every invention or innovation that promises to alter the conditions of our existence and that of the other animals with whom we share the earth. Moreover, the questions and the decisions that follow them ought not be left to scientists. In a democratic society we should all claim the right to participate in decisions that affect all the inhabitants of the planet. (58)

The animal rights movement has focused public attention primarily on animals used in research rather than on our impact upon animals in other contexts, particularly in the agricultural arena. This is, I think, quite significant. The public is now primed to respond to both the real and perceived abuses to some (or all) research animals, but a comparison of the numbers of animals used in research and in the agricultural industry does not warrant this narrow focus. An estimated 17 to 22 million animals are used in research annually: the majority (75%) are rats and mice. In contrast, over 5 *billion* animals are killed annually for human consumption, of which 90% are chickens and turkeys (Donnelly 2). Tannenbaum lists statistics for 1991, a year in which 6 billion broiler chickens were raised, along with almost 200,000 laying hens and pullets; 1 billion beef cows, 10 million milk cows, 57 million hogs, and 11 million sheep (Veterinary Ethics 470). Additionally, the number of animals used in research is decreasing (Veterinary Ethics 469), while the number killed for food is increasing. If numbers of individuals count, we are looking in the wrong direction.

If pain and suffering count, we are still not focusing correctly. Animal welfare

standards are much higher, more specific, and better enforced in research than they are in agriculture. Procedures which are acceptable in the food animal industry - and are performed on millions of animals - are not ethically acceptable in the research arena (e.g., castration without anesthesia). The general public is perhaps ignorant of the treatment of food animals, but I suspect that it is a deliberate ignorance - most people simply do not wish to deal with the consequences of coherent ethical debate about the use and treatment of food animals. It is a lot easier to be ethically concerned about animals when your personal day-to-day lifestyle is not involved. Tannenbaum is correct when he says that "...it is both inconsistent and antiintellectual to accept ordinary uses of animals for food and other consumer conveniences and to require animal researchers to always show that their work must have some (usually enormously important) practical benefit" (Veterinary Ethics 472). As long as it is ethically acceptable to eat, wear the skins of, and entertain ourselves with animals, then it is ethically acceptable to experiment upon them. Of course, I have argued that within the context of Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life, eating and being entertained by animals is *not* ethically acceptable; where then does that leave experimenting upon them?

In a Hastings Center article in 1990, Strachan Donnelley and others address the issue of the justification of using animals in research and its application by federally mandated Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs). He refers to the "troubled middle" (2), that is, to the problem of finding an ethical middle ground in using animals in research: how do we give animals some moral status, so that they are due consideration of their welfare interests, without giving them enough moral status that we can no longer do to them what we find morally unacceptable to do to humans? Rather than discussing IACUCs

in any detail, or specific research protocols which may or may not be ethically justified, I want to comment upon this question in two distinct yet interrelated ways: through the issue of death as a harm, and through a brief discussion of an article by James Nelson in Between the Species in which he uses human diabetes as a case study of "exemplary" medical research (195-204).

That death is *assumed* not to be a harm by the research community is quite clear when one examines IACUC guidelines on permissible levels of pain and distress in research subjects. Every research protocol reviewed by an IACUC categorizes the level of pain and distress to animals anticipated by the researcher. In brief, they are as follows:

Category A: Procedures induce no more pain, distress, or discomfort than that of routine injections or venipuncture, and require no analgesia or sedation.

Category B: Procedures are non-survival anesthetic surgeries,and/or tissue collection following euthanasia.

Category C: Procedures induce minor, short-lasting pain not relieved by analgesics, or procedures induce moderate pain which will be alleviated by analgesics.

Category D: Surgical or other procedures induce more than minor post-operative pain/ distress which cannot, for scientific reasons, be alleviated with drugs (i.e., organ removal, induction of toxic or infectious agents, radiation sickness, etc.).

Category E: Procedures induce "severe pain on unanesthetized conscious animals" (i.e., the use of curare without anesthesia for surgical procedures; recovery after induction of severe trauma under anaesthesia, etc.) (Schaffer, personal communication).

While we may wonder how many Category D protocols are approved, and whether

Category E protocols are *ever* justified morally (I think not), my focus is on Category B. These animals presumably undergo minimal pain/distress prior to complete anaesthesia, but they are not recovered from anesthesia (they are killed, not euthanized). Three other categories are ranked as being of greater violation of welfare interests than that of being (painlessly) killed. As Richard Haynes aptly describes in his article "The Muddled Middle: The Search for Ethical Principles to Regulate the Use of Animals in Research," there are no ethical consequences for the deaths of research animals:

> Although there is an official recognition that death is a harm in the principle that using animals as models in research is to be avoided when possible (the three Rs), killing animals is not generally considered to be causing them a serious harm, and the fact that a protocol will cause the death of the animal subject is not, in practice, regarded as a good reason for grading it at the weightier end of the harm classification scale. For example, euthanasia is standardly recommended as an acceptable form of anesthesia. Furthermore, animals used in research are characteristically euthanatized after a study as a form of disposal. If providing support for the animals is not considered to be economically feasible, nor is release or adoption, then killing them is considered routine. This under-assessing of the harm that death is is reinforced at the level of middle position theorizing whose principle task is thought to be to provide, in general terms, a standard justification for permitting the killing of nonhuman animals under conditions that would not be acceptable when applied to human animals. That justification is that nonhuman animal life is of less inherent value than human life, and under some principle of necessity, given certain legitimate ends, it is morally permissible to kill nonhuman animals even in cases in which it would not be morally permissible to kill humans. There are at least three different sorts of cases in which euthanasia is regarded as justified.
>
> > 1. In some cases the study requires the death of the animal in order to complete the study, such as where the effects on the internal organs of a procedure are to be studied in such a way that they need to be permanently separated from the subject.
> >
> > 2. In some cases the study causes such a significant amount of harm to the subject that it could not live

> comfortably afterwards. Here, euthanasia serves as an anesthesia or analgesic.
>
> 3. In many cases the funds needed to support the research, including providing welfare support for the subject, are not adequate to provide maintenance after the study is completed, and there are no other means of support available. Under these circumstances euthanasia is a better alternative than providing no maintenance.
>
> The focus of the moral theorizing seems to be on the first case, where the death of the animal subject is required by the study. But in cases 2 and 3, death is offered as a remedy or solution to a problem: how to avoid some sort of suffering brought about by the diminution of the quality of the subject's life. The logic of the fact that euthanasia is regarded as a form of anesthesia seems to dictate that death be regarded as a lesser harm than the pain and suffering that it is thought to avoid. For that reason, studies that kill without pain are regarded as less costly to the subject than studies that cause pain. It is simply another step to then regard loss of life as having no significant moral consequences, since, by our system of grading, non-survival surgery protocols, for example, require little scrutiny by the IACUC, call for little pricking of the conscience of the investigator, and show up on the institutional animal use reports as uses that are not graded as having much moral significance. Something seems wrong here. (26-27)

Something is very wrong indeed; as I have already argued, and as an ethic of reverence for life contends, death *is* a harm, and as such ought to be ranked beyond category D (though perhaps not beyond Category E, if one could find any justification for Category E at all). Death would be the ultimate harm to a human subject of research, and it is equally so for animal subjects of research. Our own treatment of animals used in research, and in other uses also, will ultimately hinge upon the answer to the question of whether death is harm to them; if, as I have argued, it *is* a harm, then we will be morally constrained in a way which will severely limit experimentation upon animals, and which will tremendously magnify the economic costs of research in terms of post-research maintenance of animals

subjects.

That we have come a very long way in our attitudes about animal subjects of research is clear; but we have far to go. Mary Midley describes the initial attitude toward animal experimentation and its opposition by some, and has a suggestion as to where we ought to be going:

> ...Claude Bernard, the great French physiologist...flatly refused to defend by argument his systematic total disregard of distress and pain in his unanaesthetized animals, proclaiming simply that it was the attitude proper for scientists, who should therefore refuse to discuss the matter at all with anybody except their like-minded colleagues. (The first anti-vivisection society in Europe seems to have been founded by Bernard's own wife and daughters, who had come home to find that he had vivisected the domestic dog.) Bernard's purely tribal approach to a topic which is after all not beyond the scope of reason has fortunately been gradually giving way to more intelligent and open-minded methods, under the influence of a changing attitude to animals. Both sides now acknowledge the need to meet each other's arguments. It must emerge that some experiments are much more justifiable than others. The feat of justification cannot, in any case, be performed merely by raising an umbrella marked 'Science'. It demands attention to the actual benefits which can reasonably be expected, and a serious comparison of the conflicting values involved. (28)

James Nelson's analysis of diabetes as a model of "exemplary" medical research, and its implications for use of animals in research, suggests just how far we may have to go in our ethical deliberations. Nelson delineates three qualities of "exemplary" medical research:

> 1. it targets widespread, debilitating diseases;
> 2. it has an admirable track record in using animals to aid in our understanding and management of the disease;
> 3. it is conducted according to humane standards as they are currently understood. (196)

Such research "...at least meets the test of prudence"; the question is whether it "passes the

stricter test of morality" (196). Nelson takes research on diabetes mellitus as an example of prudentially exemplary medical research; the focus then turns from prudential to ethical validation of such research.

While some animals (dogs and cats participating in the human-companion animal bond) do benefit from diabetes research, it is nonetheless certain that there is a maldistribution of the consequences of diabetes research: "one group - humans - reaps virtually all the benefits. Another - nonhumans - bears virtually all the burden" (198). Nelson asks if, given that nonhuman research subjects are bearers of inherent worth (in a Reganesque sense), we can utilize the concept of involuntary conscription to justify their participation in medical research. That is, can we justify their use in research protocols in the sense that children can be "conscripted" with parental permission into research which benefits society, or in which individuals can be conscripted into military service in time of war?

Involuntary conscription during wartime is predicated upon the "justness" of the war; Nelson says that

> Two aspects of the tradition seem especially relevant: the insistence that the war in question be winable, and the condition of proportionality.
>
> Both of these conditions are intended to avoid moral waste: the violence and other destructiveness associated with war are not justifiable unless the good aimed at is in fact attainable, and no more such evils are justified than are absolutely necessary to attain the end. (202)

These aspects are applicable to exemplary research:

> It might seem that the conditions are too vague to guide practice, but I think that need not be so. Exemplary research's insistence on a demonstrable record of achievement in using animal models to ameliorate disease coheres nicely with the first of them and reinforces the condition as a selection

> criterion for the kinds of diseases against which invasive animal-based research may be employed; concern with proportionality underscores the need to press on with refinement, reduction, and replacement strategies. (202)

There are additional requirements to consider as well: compensation for those who are conscripted; some equity in assignment of hardships; and respect for the rights of those conscripted. Difficult as it might be to adhere to these requirements in terms of research animals, there is a more basic issue:

> But before these conditions come into play, a more fundamental and much more problematic condition would have to be satisfied: all the conscripts must belong to the community being threatened, in the sense that individual and community interests are in large measure shared, as in the justification for pediatric research. What motivates these conditions generally is the need to make a real distinction between serving the community as a slave and serving it as a conscript. (202)

Thus we are "...faced with the challenge of making animals a part of the community to whose weal their sacrifice contributes. Otherwise, we treat them as if they were mere receptacles of value, not valuable in themselves" (202).

Significant consequences would clearly result. Granted that animals may not be able to feel an identification with their (our) community, in the sense that war conscripts do, we still have the tremendous task of making animals members of this larger community. Nelson suggests that "Minimally, bringing about some substantial identity of interests between humans and nonhumans would require ending their exploitation at our hands for food, clothing, and entertainment and taking their interests seriously into account in making public policy decisions that affect them" (200). It probably also requires that

> ...if the enterprise of research medicine is really so important to us, we may have to impose some kind of nonvoluntary participation in research by humans as well. Equity does not demand identical treatment, of course; there

> are differences in vulnerabilities among species which would make subjecting humans (or monkeys) to the kind of confinement and rigors undergone by rodents altogether inequitable. But if we have to look solely to involuntary conscription as a means of overcoming the presumption against using animals as means to our ends, we may have to demonstrate our good faith by participating in the process ourselves. (202)

This theoretical approach to the ethical justification of animal experimentation coheres well with Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life and its application in medical research. There is much stronger ethical justification for using animals (and humans) in research than we can possibly generate for using animals for food or entertainment, but in the pursuit of the alleviation of pain and suffering in humans (and animals), we are still under great ethical constraints. We would do well, I think, to ask ourselves very seriously what the effects of a cessation of all medical research would mean, given the tools and expertise we already have available. At what point will we have done enough research - when no human being ever dies, or when we are all clones or transgenic mutations? One has to wonder when enough will be enough; one wonders when we will be satisfied with what we have.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: MORAL AGENTS AND FEASIBILITY

While I have attempted to elucidate and defend Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life, and to suggest ways in which it could be concretely applied by the veterinary profession and the general public, there remains, to my mind, a most troubling problem (one which exists for every ethical theory, to a greater or lesser extent). The problem is one of feasibility; that is, of whether it is really possible for human beings to act as moral agents and to carry out the duties which the ethic entails. Schweitzer's ethic, like many current animal rights and environmental ethics, requires an extraordinary degree of personal motivation and responsibility; the ethic of reverence for life is particularly demanding because it sets out no list of rules, leaving the ignorant or unmotivated person with nothing to go on, so to speak. Much of humankind is apparently satisfied with traditional cultural beliefs and religious dogma. Is the failure of Schweitzer's ethic to take hold so much in its scope or its lack of rules as it is in Schweitzer's unwarranted faith that his convictions were representative of humankind, and that the "common man" has the ability to think and reason properly? Clark criticizes Schweitzer's belief that reason is the ruling faculty in human beings, and that reverence for life is the fundamental reality of the will-to-live. He accuses Schweitzer of not appreciating the "irrationality, selfishness, and sheer evil built into the finite will to live" (124). Hall makes the same sort of accusation in his criticism of the influence of Schweitzer's personality on the subjectivity of his ethic. Schweitzer claims that the

convictions of the will are a necessity of thought which gain legitimacy from our thinking experiences, and obviously Schweitzer believed that *his* experiences of the innate convictions of the will are paradigmatic of proper thinking. Yet Nietzsche and Schopenhauer showed that "consistent" thought about the will's innate convictions could lead in directions far removed from reverence for life. Hall goes so far as to claim that there is nothing in history or general experience to support Schweitzer's assumption that his thinking was analogous to everyone else's (192); and, as Martin claims, other moral theories motivate others, and if we accept the "modern pluralistic point of view it is misguided to call for a 'single ideal of civilized man'" (206), let alone Schweitzer's view in particular.

I think that we can respond to such criticisms in several ways; we must look not only to philosophy but to psychology, genetics, and sociobiology to formulate a (possibly) optimistic answer to the problem. To those philosophers who make accusations of improper psychological motivation against Schweitzer (or any other philosopher), I suggest that ethical debate has never been, and will never be, separable from psychological make-up. On the other hand, there is no need to worry that the psychological make-up of a Hitler could or should rule the world. I see no reason to claim that the philosophy of either Nietzsche or Schopenhauer is "consistent" with civilization as commonly understood and valued, and therefore as worthy of consideration as Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life. We need only remind ourselves of the struggle for culture and civilization: what is it that we are seeking? A philosophy of pessimism is not conducive to civilization as the striving for human self-realization in the realms of knowledge and intellect, art, and psychological and physical development. As Schweitzer pointed out, pessimism leads at best to a theory of

nonmaleficence, but ethics is activity in and on the world; it goes well beyond doing no harm to a theory of actively promoting the cessation of harm and the provision of good to others. Nor is a philosophy of individualistic, self-centered power conducive to the existence and perpetuation of civilization. It is the vagaries and perceived injustices of the natural state that led us to erect a defense in the form of civilization in the first place. Without an optimistic, world-and-life-affirming civilization, individual humans cannot do much more than survive; the other elements of self-realization - the intellectual, aesthetic, and emotional components - are simply not possible.

What, then, has gone wrong? John Dickenson Regester suggests that

> There are probably persons in whom the experience (consciousness of other life) is less strong than in others, just as there are individual differences in all psychological functions; but the disposition and experience may be regarded as common and normal...
>
> The artist, or the genius in any line, however, is only an individual with somewhat heightened sensibility and insight. Without his higher development he would not be a leader, but there is also implied a common experience which he evokes and sharpens. Thus Schweitzer seeks to make men aware of and to bring to clear consciousness in them what he considers to be the fundamental experience of all men. (131, 129)

Is Schweitzer's psychological make-up *not* paradigmatic of human nature? Perhaps the question lies not only or even in questioning Schweitzer's characterization of the innate will-to-live, but in its development - or lack thereof - in humankind. This is certainly what Schweitzer thought, and there is a great deal of agreement in present-day thought. Schweitzer believed that all humans start out with a fundamental reverence for their own and all other life, but that cultural conditioning, especially that which occurs in our modern

technological societies, prevents and/or arrests the development and maturation of proper ethical thought. Brabazon said of Schweitzer that

> What he did know with absolute confidence, through experience and inward search, was his solidarity with other life. At a simple level, any small creature will teach the same lesson - a puppy, a lamb, an infant: they come into life with a fund of goodwill, a trust in other creatures and a delight in life that is only dimmed by the pressures of growing up. Schweitzer came to the conclusion that this consciousness of solidarity with all life is always there in every living being, and that any human being can use it who has to will to do so - though it is often so overlaid by bad experience, by hardened dogma and unchecked theory, or by the dismissive views of people who think it "adult" to be cynical, that it is no longer acknowledged, and scarcely even felt. (qtd. in Miller 112)

The ethical enemy, then, is not a lack of innate convictions or of reasoning ability, but ultimately a culturally induced indifference and apathy, as Schweitzer pointed out:

> Doubts whether the mass of men can ever attain to that level of reflection about themselves and the world which is demanded by a reflective theory of the universe, are quite justifiable if the man of to-day is taken as an example of the race. But he, with his diminished need of thought, is a pathological phenomenon.
>
> In reality there is given in the mental endowment of the average man a capacity for thought which to the individual makes the creation of a reflective theory of things of his own not only possible, but under normal conditions even a necessity. The great movements of illumination in ancient and modern times help to maintain the confident belief that there is in the mass of mankind a power of thought on fundamentals which can be roused to activity. This belief is strengthened by observation of mankind and intercourse with the young. A fundamental impulse to reflect about the universe stirs us during those years in which we begin to think independently. Later on we let it languish, even though feeling clearly that we thereby impoverish ourselves and become less capable of what is good. (Philosophy 56)

> The great enemy of morality is indifference. As children, insofar as our understanding for such things went, we had an elementary capacity for compassion. But this ability did not grow through the years commensurately

> with our increasing understanding. It was something uncomfortable and embarrassing to us. We saw so many people who no longer possessed it. Then we, too, repressed sensitivity in order to be like the others, in order not to be different from them, and because we did not know any better...(Sermons 14-15)

Now, ignorance and indifference to ethical thought seem to be related to and dependent upon ethical enculturation and hence education; it is not of much use to have an innate reverence for life if it is not acknowledged or cultivated, or if it is denigrated as being outside the societal norm. And indeed there is a great deal of support for the idea that the morality of individuals develops in stages which can be arrested or negatively affected by social/environmental conditions (i.e., Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan). Perhaps the massive deterioration of human and other life has been the result of a failure of most human beings to realize their full potential for ethical reasoning. As Goodpaster suggests:

> Suppose that the structure of practical rationality is dynamic - that it involves a kind of evolution of different sorts of motivationally effective considerations. Recent work by Lawrence Kohlberg and others provides significant warrant for such supposition. If this were (is) true, then whether a consideration (c) counts as a "reason for action" for a person (p) is not a once-and-for-all fact about p but is instead relative to the stage of development which p has reached. ("Categorical Imperatives" 189)

His conclusion is that the "cumulative deliverances" of philosophy, religion, psychology, and biology, while not capable of providing definitive logical proof, nevertheless give us substantial and trustworthy reasons to believe that "...moral considerations play an essential role in either the decision-making or the character formation of human persons, at least at the highest stages of their growth in practical rationality" ("Categorical Imperatives" 192-3).

Of psychological theories of moral development, Lawrence Kohlberg's is perhaps the best known and most widely used. He describes, based on thirty years of research, six stages

of moral development; the validity of his system has been tested cross-culturally, and across gender and socioeconomic lines. According to the theory, humans proceed through these six stages as they mature; the sequence does not vary, but the rate of moral maturation and the final stage reached vary among individuals. The results obtained from the tests refined to measure an individual's moral development level are independent of particular values, beliefs, and behaviors (i.e., one's stage of reasoning is not dependent upon whether one is a liberal or conservative, a Baptist or an atheist).

Briefly, the moral stages are as follows:

Level A: Preconventional Level

Stage I: The stage of Punishment and Obedience
Moral choices are based on what figures of authority demand, and the reason to obey is to avoid punishment.

Stage 2: The stage of Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange
What is right is what serves one's own or another's needs, and results in a fair exchange ("You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours").

Level B: Conventional Level

Stage 3: The stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Conformity
What is right is being nice or good; i.e., what is right is what people close to you expect from you: loyalty, trust, concern for their feelings, and following rules and expectations.

Stage 4: The Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance
What is right is to do one's duty in society - to maintain the group's welfare.

Level B/C: Transitional Level

Choice is personal and subjective; ideas such as "duty," "morally right," and "conscience" are seen as arbitrary and relative.

Level C: Postconventional and Principled Level

Stage 5: The Stage of Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility

What is right is endorsement of a social contract which protects everyone's rights and is committed to upholding individual's rights and liberty regardless of the opinion of the majority.

Stage 6: The Stage of Universal Ethical Principles

What is right is what is dictated by universal ethical principles (i.e., principles which should be followed by all of humanity), even if those principles collide with the law or societal norm. One does this because he/she has seen the rational validity of the principles and is committed to them. (Vol. I and II)

Kohlberg's theory is based on the principle of justice (in a Rawlsian sense) as the highest level of morality, with the correlative principles of autonomy, equality, and respect for all human beings. Kohlberg theory has been used in (the only) two studies of the ethical development of veterinary students (and in numerous such studies of medical students), with the results indicating a lack of development (and even a tendency toward regression) over the four years of structured academic discipline inherent in the veterinary schools (Self et al.). If these limited surveys are correct, Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life will make no headway at the professional veterinary level. It may be that the veterinary school experience fosters the very apathy and indifference that Schweitzer and many others are fighting, indicating the need for significant curriculum changes.

However, it may be that such studies focus on levels of moral development which are invalid or incomplete for some people, especially women. The theory of morality as a developmental process is surely fundamentally correct; however, that justice in the Rawlsian sense is the highest stage of moral development has been called into question, particularly by Carol Gilligan (In a Different Voice). Gilligan's studies indicate that women in particular conceive of morality within an orientation of care rather than of justice - a theory which

corresponds better to Schweitzer's ethic of reverence for life than does Kohlberg's.

Gilligan argues that most women "arrest" at Stage III on Kohlberg's scale because for women morality is tied to concepts of care and connection rather than separation, individual rights, and rules. That is, "The sequence of women's moral judgment proceeds from an initial concern with survival to a focus on goodness and finally to a reflective understanding of care as the most adequate guide to the resolution of conflicts in human relationships" (105):

> In this sequence, an initial focus on caring for the self in order to ensure survival is followed by a transitional phase in which this judgment is criticized as selfish...At this point, the good is equated with caring for others. However, when only others are legitimized as the recipients of the woman's care, the exclusion of herself gives rise to problems in relationships, creating a disequilibrium that initiates the second transition. The equation of conformity with care, in its conventional definition, and the illogic of the inequality between other and self, lead to a reconsideration of relationships in an effort to sort out the confusion between self-sacrifice and care...The third perspective focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates the tension between selfishness and responsibility through a new understanding of the interconnection between other and self. Care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgment that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt... (74)

Thus we come round again to the ideas of kinship, care, and biophilia. The key to our spiritual and environmental dilemmas almost certainly lies in educating the "average man" (and woman) from the time of birth until a principled level of morality is reached whose guiding light is one of reverence for *all* life - reverence as care and compassion. As Warnock suggests, though people don't *have* to be moral, they can be

> ...simply [because] it is possible for them to come to want to... Just as the need for morality, its having a point, derives from very general facts about human beings and their predicament, so also it is a fact about human beings

> that they are capable of morality...But the essence...is not in reason; it is in non-indifference. Reason, in human affairs, is a plant of precarious, variable, always limited growth; so is non-indifference - and that's why the moral conscience doesn't govern the world. (165-166)

I am not so sure that the essence is non-indifference as opposed to reason; it is, rather, that reasoning is necessary if we are to battle the enemy of indifference. One cannot reason well (i.e., at the highest level of moral maturity) unless provided with means and motivation. Rectification (obliteration) of the division of earth's creatures into "us" and "them" categories (the Cartesian dualism, the Levi-Strauss line), with the attendant loss of a concept of kinship, care, reverence and respect, is possible only through an intensive educational effort. Katcher and Wilkins ask the question: "Why is biophilia, if it exists, so weak a determinant of human behavior?" (Kellert and Wilson 189). They suggest that "kin" implies "not-kin", i.e., "vermin" - those who are bad and/or useless, hence valueless. This cultural categorization can lead from others as "vermin" to others as objects or things (food and research animals; animals hunted for sport); in either case there is a loss of compassion and an attitude of indifference. Because how we view nature is a cultural phenomenon, education is the key to development of an ethic of biophilia:

> ...cultural instruction may well be the primary determinant of how that general disposition [of biophilia] is incorporated into behavior and affects the environment...We might wish to consider how the science instruction received by our children could hinder or contribute to the development of an ethic of biophilia...there needs to be a juncture between education and direct sensory experience of life and nature. (190-193)

Even if there exists an innate reverence for life in the will-to-live, or a genetic tendency for biophilia, it seems reasonable that any expression of such a genetic tendency is greatly conditioned or determined by a person's (especially a child's) learning environment.

As Schweitzer noted, children start out with a curiosity and love of other life, which Western culture denigrates and disparages as emotional sentimentality. We are discouraged in our natural tendencies toward compassion, unless it is directed at other appropriate human beings. David Orr suggests that the education of biophilia begins at birth and must be furthered in various ways: nature must be experienced, by a fairly young age, as a "friendly place of adventure and excitement"; it requires continuous access to natural places; it needs the active participation of parents, grandparents, and teachers; and it requires good communities and a stable nourished human population: the end result is a gestalt shift - "...a change ...in our loyalties, affections, and basic character that subsequently changes our intellectual priorities and paradigms" (Kellert and Wilson 428-430).

Is Schweitzer's vision and that of many contemporary thinkers feasible? Can we reach a principled stage of morality based on reverence for life? Can we manage to accomplish what Orr so aptly describes as an "efficiency" and a "sufficiency" revolution - efficiency being about technology and economics; sufficiency being about morality and human purpose? As Orr says,

> ...we face a series of dilemmas which can be avoided only through wisdom and a higher and more comprehensive level of rationality than we have yet shown...our crisis...fundamentally...is one of mind, will, and spirit...The biophilia revolution is about the combination of reverence for life and purely rational calculation by which we will *want* to be both efficient and live sufficiently. It is about finding our rightful place on earth and in the community of life; it is about citizenship, duties, obligations, and celebration. (Kellert and Wilson 430)

I suspect that the answer to the question of feasibility of such an ethic is affirmative; we *can* alter the way we think and the way we live, though there will be a great deal more

loss of life - individual and species, human and non-human - before humankind accepts the responsibility and limitations incurred by Schweitzer's or any other animal welfare or environmental ethic. Gabriel Langfeldt suggests that the transformation we are seeking can come about *only* through organized religion:

> The only hope that, among other things, people can be stimulated to use thought to further the ethical endeavor implanted in us, lies in a new reformation in the church whereby love will come to the forefront and dogma be relegated to the background. If the view that man has the ability himself to create the kingdom of God on earth and that this is the purpose of life, could become the central theme of all religions, then people would be entitled to hope to avoid our present doom, which is to be wiped from the face of the earth. In all parts of the world, eminent thinkers are now pointing out this danger that threatens mankind as a result of having made technical development its almost exclusive goal. If mankind is to have a chance of escaping the catastrophe that threatens it, therefore, it must come to its senses and direct its endeavors to bringing about a change in the human mind itself. Many writers are pointing out that this change can only come about with the acceptance of a *new philosophy...(118)*

Though religious change cannot be all that it takes to alter our perceptions of our own and other life, there is a good deal of sense in this; a new religious "dogma" which supported an ethic of reverence for live would be a massive educational tool for the "common man," if it is possible for religious thought to open its mind to a not-so-human-centered earth, and to let go of other-world solutions to *this* world's problems. Still, I think that the impetus to change ultimately lies elsewhere, in the very self-centered desire for the survival of the human species. Ice and others have suggested that the widening of the arena of moral responsibility will be (is being) forced upon us by biological necessity: we must preserve the earth and its life forms in order to preserve ourselves biologically, as well as intellectually and aesthetically - "Now reverence for life truly becomes for our times a Necessity of

Thought" (141). The irony is clear and painful: Schweitzer sought a fundamental moral principle from within; the motivation to revere other life, to have compassion for other life, was to come from within. For some of us, this *is* how it happens, but for most of humankind, the motivation will come from without, and may involve a grudging acquiescence to the interests of other life which is motivated primarily by self-concern. Perhaps before, or during, or after the required moral transition, more and more of us will come to see our motivations as internally and altruistically derived, rather than externally and selfishly derived.

While we must learn to look and think holistically, we must never forget that the whole is composed of individual parts. I do not believe that we can convince ourselves - philosophically or psychologically - to protect and revere the whole if we do not focus on reverence and compassion for the individual parts. Because the human psyche relates concretely to individuals, reverence for the individual parts will protect the whole; the reverse does not seem likely.

Schweitzer offers us an ethic which affirms *all* life, as individual lives, and which allows us to acknowledge and celebrate our kinship with other life. He offers us an ethic which slams the door on apathy and indifference, and opens the door to ethical activity in the world as the striving to relieve pain and suffering and help other life in its struggle for self-realization. Reverence for life is the antithesis of greed and violence and hatred; it is the essence of kinship, care, and compassion, which Mary Midgley so beautifully describes as "...a habit or power of the mind, which grows and develops with use. Such powers (as is obvious in cases like intelligence) are magic fluids which increase with pouring. Effective

users do not economize on them" (31).

Schweitzer's ethic comes from within but works its magic outwardly; it is a burden but also a joy. It is an ethic which celebrates the spirituality within every human being, and thus adds a dimension to philosophical and scientific endeavors which has long been lacking. If John Stuart Mill is correct when he says that "Every great movement must experience three stages: ridicule, discussion, adoption," then we must strive quickly and mightily to work our way through ridicule and discussion to adoption; we would do well to remember Schweitzer's words that "we live in the world, and the world lives in us" (Sermons 17).

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Dr. Bennett plans to open a feline hospital in the near future, and to continue to teach as an adjunct professor in the College of Veterinary Medicine.