





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

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THE MEANING OF POLITICAL SYMBOLS:

THE CASE OF OBSCENITY

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Harry Lee Howard

March 1980

1413837

ABSTRACT

The literature in political science is ambiguous in defining what is meant by political "symbols." Further, assuming a definition of "symbol," there is a tendency to derogate that which is identified as "just symbolic." This dissertation seeks to clarify what is meant by "symbol" in political science and to understand how symbols function in politics.

The approach to this problem is two-fold. First, a theoretical understanding of symbol is developed in terms of symbolic interaction and of Edward Sapir's distinction between referential and condensational symbols. Specifically, such concepts as "significant symbols," "problematicism," "negotiated meaning," and "lines of action" are employed. It is proposed that the popular distinction between "symbolic" and "non-symbolic" corresponds, respectively, with "condensational symbol" and "referential symbol." Based on this, the theoretical distinction between referential and condensational symbols is tested by means of a Q-study, focusing on the obscenity issue. The main hypothesis tested is that obscenity, as a moral issue, will be treated primarily in condensational symbolic terms.

The results of the Q-study indicate that people define the obscenity issue primarily in condensational symbolic terms regardless of whether or not the subject was opposed to obscenity. It was further found that the use of condensational symbols occurred among non-elites and elites, a finding that is significant to the study of political elites.

The conclusions drawn from the research were as follows. First, obscenity is a public policy issue that will be dealt with in condensational terms by elites and non-elites. This conclusion is not in harmony with much of the literature on the nature of elites. Second, based on the notion of symbolic interaction, symbols are understood to be grounded in a pluralism of group definitions of reality and this provides an ontological basis for political pluralism. Third, it is concluded that moral political issues draw heavily on the affective dimension of personality which is why the condensational symbolic mode is so prominent in treating obscenity, for the condensational mode is characterized, in part, by affective expressiveness. It is also because moral issues engage the affective dimension of personality that questions of identity arise and thus make moral public policy issues so intractable at times. Finally, it is concluded that referential and condensational symbols are of equal ontological status and that both must be viewed as equally "real" if one is to deal realistically with American politics.

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CHAPTER I

SYMBOLIC POLITICS: THE CONFUSED REALM OF POLITICAL SCIENCE USAGE

I. INTRODUCTION

The literature of political science is replete with treatments of the role of symbols in politics. Throughout the history of political commentary, thinkers have recognized the importance of symbols in forming, maintaining, and directing the life of political communities. These treatments have not always dealt with the matter directly in terms of the specific concept of symbol, but in retrospect, scholars have so designated them. Anyone who chooses to survey this literature might well conclude that because of the extent to which political symbols have been considered, to the same extent it is clear what political symbols are. Such, however, is not the case.

What is clear in surveying the literature is that political symbolism is widely discussed but not clearly understood. This is not to say that everyone is wrong in his understanding of political symbols, rather, it is to say that these understandings are noticeably diverse. Thus, if one were to seek an answer to the question, What is political symbolism?, one would be left in a state of uncertainty. In a word, the problem is one of definition. It is significant, moreover, as will be seen in Chapter II, that this confusion exists not only for political scientists but for sociologists, psychologists, economists, and philosophers as well. Thus, the confusion is not so much in terms of political symbols as it is of political symbols.

The purpose of this chapter is to present a discussion representative of, not inclusive of, the treatment of political symbols. In many instances the problem encountered is that "political symbol" is not defined clearly. In those cases where "political symbol" is defined, one finds diversity among definitions. Either way, the problem of definition remains as the dominant concern.

II. PLATO

Concern with political symbols is not a recent phenomenon. One can find interest expressed by Plato in The Republic (1945) in the function of symbols in politics. Although he does not use the word "symbol," he does discuss the Greek pseudos which can take on a variety of meanings, many of which are comparable to contemporary usages of symbolism. Depending on the context of the concept, it can mean "fiction" which refers to anything which has not actually occurred, or to various stories in allegorical, fable, parable, poetic, or romantic forms. In these senses, pseudos does not mean a "lie" or a "falsehood"; rather, it seems to be a type of discourse that is lacking in historical, empirical referents rather than being a reportorial accounting of what actually happened. When used with the passive verb epseusthai, pseudos means "deception" or "error." Moreover, depending on the context of usage, pseudos can mean "lie." Yet of all these possible meanings, Cornford argues that those of "deception," "error," and "lie" are the exception rather than the rule in Plato's usage (p. 68).

What, then, is the purpose of Plato's pseudos or fictions? In Part II, Book X, Plato discusses the way in which Guardians are to

live. As he details the Guardian regime, his question is, How can Guardians be persuaded to accept their role in the polity and to carry it out effectively? The answer is "fictions." Plato seems to be looking for a unifying mythos that will create the unity and purpose that will result in a viable polity--in a word, consensus (p. 106).

Now it is precisely at this point in The Republic that many commentators have accused Plato of endorsing the "Noble Lie." If one accepts this analysis that the myth proposed by Plato is a lie, then pseudos must be understood as "untruth"; but as noted above, the rendering of pseudos is usually more properly that of "fiction." In this context the proper rendering, according to Cornford, is "fiction" (p. 106).

In the context of the concern with political symbols, the relevance of Plato is as follows. Fiction, myth, allegory, etc., all are part of that aspect of communication that deals with other than concrete, empirical reality as understood in modern scientific terms. This, as will be seen later, often is what some writers would also designate as the realm of symbols. For the logical positivist, such discourse is literally non- sense or untrue because it lacks real, empirical referents (Ashby, 1964, pp. 485-500). But as has been seen, this is not what Plato intends. A fiction is not an untruth. The problem, however, is that Plato does not devote time to a delineation of what is meant by pseudos. So we know what Plato does not mean, but it is not clear what he does mean. Thus, to the extent that one equates Plato's pseudos with "symbol," as Lasswell (1952, p. 1) does, one can conclude that a symbol is not a lie, and yet it is not clear what it is.

III. BAGEHOT

This discussion of political symbols moves from Plato to Bagehot, a period of approximately 2200 years. This does not mean that political thinkers ignored the question of symbols for over two millenia. Rather, the literature tends not to deal with symbols with any greater degree of explicitness during this period than did Plato. The use of Plato simply demonstrates that the importance of political symbols is present, at least implicitly, in some of the earliest writings about politics.

Bagehot's importance lies with his popular explication of the British constitutional system. Even though his work, The English Constitution, was written in 1867, Crossman could write in a 1963 introduction to the same work the following:

Yet for anyone who wants to understand the workings of British politics--be he university student, foreign observer or merely a curious elector--The English Constitution still remains the best introduction available (p. 1).

Clearly a great deal of change occurred in British government and politics from 1867 to 1963, thus raising the question of how such a work could still be timely. The answer lies in how Bagehot constructed his analysis of British politics.

Bagehot identifies two dimensions in British politics: "efficient" and "dignified," or "theatrical." The efficient dimension refers to the rather matter of fact specifics of politics such as the procedures whereby a bill becomes law through parliamentary procedure, the number and responsibilities of parliamentary committees, or the socio-economic characteristics of party

constituencies. Or, as Bagehot puts it, the efficient dimension "is decidedly simple and rather modern" (p. 65), referring to the concrete process of doing government.

The "dignified" dimension, on the other hand, is that which many refer to as the symbolic dimension of the British political system. It embodies the values, traditions, and habits of the British political community. "Community" is emphasized here because, with Plato, Bagehot sees the need, indeed the inevitability, of some body of values, a mythos, that will, when held in common, provide a political consensus. As Bagehot puts it:

The most intellectual of men are moved quite as much by circumstances which they are used to as by their own will. The active voluntary part of a man is very small, and if it were not economized by a sleepy kind of habit, its results would be null. . . . It is the dull traditional habit of mankind that guides most men's actions, and is the steady frame in which each new artist must set the picture he paints (p. 64).

And having set forth the character of the dignified dimension, he later states:

In fact, the mass of the English people yield a deference rather to something else than rulers. They defer to what we may call the theatrical show of society (p. 248).

In other words, the Briton's loyalty is to the dignified dimension of British politics, to a body of values, traditions, and habits that are uniquely British in origin and purpose (p. 65).

Now, as in Plato, one's consideration of Bagehot is not in terms of an explicit delineation of "symbol," but, rather, his discussion of the dignified dimension is comparable to what some have called a "symbolic dimension" of politics. If such is accepted, then what is distinctive about the dignified dimension? First, it

is comparable to Plato's pseudos or "fiction" in that it is not so much a statement of concrete, instrumental fact as it is a valuation of the polity. Here, presumably, is an affective judgment that is not particularly time specific, a conclusion which explains the relative time-less-ness of Bagehot's work and makes it pertinent even today. But if one can say that the dignified is more affective than the empirical (or logical (p. 64)) and more valiative than the descriptive, such does not take one very far. How is it that this dignified dimension arises? What are the analytical aspects of the dignified dimension? The answers to these questions are not clear in The English Constitution.

Thus, in Bagehot, as in Plato, one encounters a concern for that aspect of political life that deals with something other than the instrumental and concrete aspects of a polity such as the distribution of governmental power. This discussion designates this aspect of political life, i.e., the dignified, as "symbolic" even though Bagehot does not use this particular term. Call it what one will, the problem is still one of definition with the corollary problem of description; for how and what one defines something controls how and what one describes.

IV. WALLAS

In 1908 Graham Wallas wrote Human Nature In Politics. In the Preface to the third edition he states one of two main points which distinguishes his effort to understand political behavior.

My first point was the danger, for all human activities, but especially for the working of democracy, of the

"intellectualist" assumption, "that every human action is the result of an intellectual process, by which a man first thinks of some end which he desires, and then calculates the means by which that end can be attained" (p. 5).

Or as Rowse puts it in the Forward to the 1947 printing of Human

Nature In Politics:

The subject of his [Wallas] book is what may conveniently be described as the Rationalist Fallacy in political thinking; namely the assumption that human beings largely act in politics upon rational motives and trains of intelligent reasoning (pp. 1-2).

The major contribution, then, of Wallas was to challenge the dominant paradigm of human behavior as "enlightened self-interest" (p. 6) and to offer as an alternative the position that human behavior is non-rational in general and in politics in particular.

Wallas continues from the primary axiom of nonrationality to the question of how politics come into existence. A basic component to political genesis is affective identification with markings that represent the polity (pp. 84-89). Such markings are political symbols, be they language or some other form of denotation (pp. 84-93). A phenomenon that arises out of this identification process is that, very quickly, the affective dimension is intertwined with logical implications and it becomes difficult to sort out the two. The result is that often our presumably rational motives are actually nonrational affections, or at least dominantly so, and so the business of politics is often nothing more than fundamental nonrationality.

The political importance of all this consists in the fact that most of the political opinions of most men are the result, not of reasoning tested by experience, but of unconscious or half-conscious inference fixed by habit. It is indeed mainly in the formation of tracks of thought that habit shows its power in politics (pp. 122-123).

Wallas' main concern is with the nonrational dimension of political behavior rather than with political symbols. And yet one of the main vehicles of this nonrationalism is the affective attachment one develops with political symbols. Because of this, symbols become one of the main ways in which the nonrational dimension is mobilized and directed in politics.

Now to some observations on Wallas. First, one sees again the identification of symbol with affective states of human behavior with an implied corollary of the non-symbolic dimension being associated with non-affective states, i.e., with rationality. This, however, is not without problems. There is the implication that symbols are not of a rational or logical order. Langer, however, argues that the meaning of symbols is irreducibly based on the logic of the relationship of symbols to each other (1957, p. 70). That is to say, logic is nothing more than syntax. As will be seen later in Chapter II, the construction of syntaxes is not a static process but, rather, is an ongoing and problematic process and that there can be a variety of syntaxes or logics existing in the same setting. This being the case, then the judgment of nonrationality falters because there can be no nonrationality except from the standpoint of a given rationality.

The question of whether or not there is such a thing as non-rationality may seem to be beside the point, except that symbolism has often been characterized not only as nonrational but as ir-rational as well. The point is that no sense can be made of symbols and symbolism unless there is a logic of symbols. This is the basic thrust of Langer's effort. Although Wallas does identify symbols

with the affective dimensions of human behavior, it does not follow that affective functions are to be equated with nonrational or irrational functions. Just as there is a logic of the intellect, likewise there is a logic of the affective.

The second observation is that Wallas deals explicitly with the idea of political symbols. As stated above, the primary emphasis in Wallas is not so much political symbolism as it is to explicate the character of the affective dimension of human behavior in politics. It is understandable, therefore, that he does not treat symbols extensively. Yet for purposes of this paper, there is inadequacy in dealing with political symbols to the extent that he does at all. What, for example, is a symbol not? Negative characterizations are powerful vehicles of definition. The answer to be inferred from Wallas is that the non-symbolic is intellectual, rational, logical. And yet, as was seen above, the criterion of rationality is not clear in Wallas' thinking. Thus, what might have been a clue to understanding symbolism quickly disappears.

Third, how and why is it that symbols arise? What is the nature of the process whereby symbols are formed? If there is such a thing as a non-symbol, why do symbols occur where they do and non-symbols where they do? The point in raising these questions is that Wallas suggests that at least some people can transcend the power of political symbols and deal with politics in a more rational manner. He states in the Preface that the second point he wishes to make clear is that one should try to recognize the "intellectualist assumption," avoid the errors that result from non-recognition, and

thereby understand and better direct the political affairs of man (p. 5). But to take this position requires, in effect, a Platonic philosopher-king, if one will, who can break the chains in the cave of ignorance and turn toward the light of reason at the mouth of the cave. But where is the guarantee that the philosopher-king is not, in fact, simply one more ingenious but still ignorant soul who is still chained in the cave? In other words, if there is a non-symbolic dimension to human behavior in which man's rational capacities are in control, how is it to be recognized? Who is to define it? What are the criteria by which it can be recognized?

What Wallas contributes to the discussion of political symbolism is that he recognizes explicitly political symbols, links them to the affective dimension of the human personality, and thereby challenges the Rationalist Fallacy. But what one does not find in Wallas is what, in fact, a symbol is, how it comes to be, and how it functions.

V. MERRIAM

Approximately 25 years after Wallas first published his book, Charles E. Merriam wrote Political Power (1934). In the course of the book he freely uses the term "symbol" and its variants, and one of the chapters, "The Credenda and Miranda of Power," deals extensively with political symbols. For all the advances pioneered by Merriam in the discipline of political science, one of them was not to clarify what is meant by political symbols. The following considerations are illustrative of this shortcoming.

First of all, Merriam uses the concept of symbolism on page 50 without explaining what it is. He indicates in broad terms that symbolic content is highly variable and often internally inconsistent (pp. 50-51). His treatment of symbolism is in the context of political leadership where leaders use and construct symbols that interpret mass desires. In tandem with this command of symbolism is the organizational skill necessary for manipulation of symbols in a manner conducive to achieving goals desired by political leaders. If one grants the accuracy of Merriam's analysis at this point, it still does not take one much further than Plato already has.

The one possibility of clarifying the nature of political symbolism in Political Power lies in Chapter Four, "The Credenda and Miranda of Power." By "credenda" Merriam means those things to be believed; "miranda" are those things to be admired (p. 109). He further clarifies miranda as that which is

deep rooted in emotion, embedded in feelings and aspirations, in morality, in sage maxims, in forms of rationalization among the higher levels of cultural groups. The eye, the ear, the aesthetic sense, must be attracted and enlisted also, if whole-souled admiration and loyalty are to be maintained (p. 109).

It seems that Merriam sees political symbolism functioning primarily in the realm of "miranda" since he refers constantly to symbols and examples thereof to explicate the idea of the "miranda of power."

By contrast, the "credenda of power" "contain the reasons which oblige the intellect to give assent to the continuance of authority" (p. 118). That is to say, political belief, as contrasted with political admiration or miranda, is more reasonable and

intellectual both in content and in function. Thus, the clarification provided here is one not at all dissimilar to that of Wallas, namely that the source and focus of political symbols is more in terms of the nonrational dimensions of persons' personalities than of their intellects.

Yet, is there a point at which Merriam can take one beyond Wallas to a fuller understanding of political symbolism? Not really. The same concerns raised by this paper in consideration of Wallas' presentation are applicable in Merriam's case. One still does not know why symbols arise instead of man simply dealing with politics solely in terms of credenda or of the intellect. One still does not know whether or not there are certain areas of political concern where symbols are more likely to arise. One still does not know if symbols are a function of certain types of persons and/or of certain types of situations. In other words, even though Merriam recognizes that symbolism is an integral factor in understanding politics, he does little to clarify the nature of political symbolism.

VI. ARNOLD

About the same time Merriam published Political Power, Thurman Arnold treated the issue of political symbols in The Symbols of Government (1935). The first and most striking observation to be made about Arnold's book is that virtually nothing is said about symbols and symbolism. In the Preface he states:

By the symbols of government we mean the ceremonies and the theories of social institutions. Ordinarily these ceremonies and theories are collected and studied, not as symbols, but as the fundamental principles of the separate sciences of law, economics, political theory, ethics, and theology. In this book we propose to examine law and economics, not as collections of truths, but as symbolic thinking and conduct which condition the behavior of men in groups. A single phrase is needed to describe all of these sciences and to indicate that they are all part of a common folklore and for that purpose the term "Symbols of Government" has been chosen (p. iv).

Even though Arnold proposes to tell the reader what he means by the symbols of government, he actually does not. He says that political theory, for example, is a symbol, but that helps one no more than saying, in response to the question of what makes a car run, the engine. Just as one still does not know how an engine runs, one still does not know what a symbol is. One does get the impression that symbols include a wide range of concerns, indeed broader than in the cases of Plato, Bagehot, Wallas, and Merriam, but one is left with little sense of the new limits of the concept.

Arnold provides some clarification in Chapter I with this statement.

Almost all human conduct is symbolic. Almost all institutional habits are symbolic. The symbols are everywhere inconsistent. Society is generally more interested in standing on the side lines and watching itself go by in a whole series of different uniforms than it is in practical objectives. The chief interest of the intellectual is to prove that such irrational conduct is inherently rational--or else the product of some form of group sinning (p. 17).

This quotation moves one a bit further so that now symbols and political symbolism are to be understood as irrational and lacking in practical objectives. These two factors, i.e., irrationalism and lack of practicality, coupled with the pervasiveness of political

symbols, results in the following typification: For Arnold, the major portion of politics is the irrational pursuit of conflicting purposes that are lacking in practical objectives.

The tone of Arnold's treatment of political symbols is uncompimentary. The following comments are typical.

The history of the symbols of government is a succession of romantic but unnecessary sacrifices of human life or comfort in their honor. Sometimes men die for their ideals of things as they ought to be rather than tarnish those ideals by practical compromise with things as they are. More often they are content to permit other people to suffer for them. Such romance and faith are among our greatest realities. They give purpose, beauty, and symmetry to the drab business of living. Yet important as they are in their place, they are not the tools by which discoveries are made. When men observe human conduct in the light of principles which they consider sacred or fundamental, they develop priests but not scientists (pp. iv-v).

And also:

The inhibiting effects of traditional ideals are not felt by everyone. However, it is always that great, conservative, orderly class of people who have been running the small affairs and giving support to the large affairs of the nation who are most affected by the social disease of slavery to symbols (p. 253).

Several points need to be made about Arnold's use of symbol. First of all, as in the previously discussed writers, there is no clear definition of symbol. When all is said and done, one still cannot explain just what it is that Arnold is concerned with. Yes, he says that symbols are pervasive and that they are irrational, but that does not really say very much.

Second, Arnold moves beyond Wallas and says that symbols are ir-rational. Wallas, by contrast, says something quite different, namely that symbols are non-rational. Recognizing that this paper

found problems with Wallas' use of "nonrational," he here is viewed favorably. It is to Wallas' credit that he uses the term "nonrational," for in so doing he at least excludes symbols from the judgment of rationality. In the case of Arnold, however, symbols are brought directly under the judgment of rationality and found to be lacking.

To judge something irrational requires an understanding of what is rational, but the criteria of what constitutes rationality are not provided by Arnold. He does suggest that reasonableness is associated with "practical objectives," but even this is of little help; for reason is of logic whereas practical objectives are of empiricism. Indeed, modern scientific thinking has wedded rationalism and empiricism, but they are of different orders. Historically, the difference between rationalism and empiricism is the difference between idealism and realism, respectively, a difference which is quite considerable, to say the least. Thus, to say that rationality deals with practical objectives does not clarify what is meant by rationality.

If one were to place in abeyance the question of what Arnold means by rationality, one might inquire, thirdly, why it is that rationality is to be preferred over irrationality? It is clear that such is Arnold's position in that he refers to irrationalism, as manifested in people's attachment to symbols, as a "social disease." Where and what are the hierarchical criteria by which such a judgment is to be made? What is it in the nature of symbols that makes them a second-class reality? One should be clear at this point that, indeed, symbolism may be a second-class reality, but in this case

Arnold does not demonstrate that such a conclusion is warranted.

In conclusion, Arnold seems to characterize symbol in the following manner. It is irrational, it pervades society in man's everyday life, it is not practical or instrumental, and it is not desirable. What he does not tell one is how and why symbols arise, nor does he say why they are undesirable.

VII. LASSWELL

Political symbols were a major concern of Harold D. Lasswell's research and writing. One finds in his analyses a much more careful treatment of symbols than is found in the writers heretofore considered. This section will look at four of his books in chronological order: World Politics and Personal Insecurity (1935); Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (1936); Language of Politics (1949); and The Comparative Study of Politics (1952).

In his 1935 publication, Lasswell sees political order as based on the "value patterns of society" (p. 3). This pattern of values as it pertains to politics is what is called political myth, and the expressive component of the myth is symbols (p. 237). He continues by stating that

The prerequisite of a stable order in the world is a universal body of symbols and practices sustaining an elite which propagates itself by peaceful methods and wields a monopoly of coercion which it is rarely necessary to apply to the uttermost. This means that the consensus on which order is based is necessarily nonrational; the world myth must be taken for granted by most of the population. The capacity of the generality of mankind to disembarass themselves of the dominant legends of their early years is negligible, and if we pose the problem of unifying the world we must

seek for the processes by which a nonrational consensus can be most expeditiously achieved (p. 237).

The political symbols that Lasswell refers to are of three types: identification, demand, and expectation (p. 8). "Identification symbols" are those through which persons come to know who they are and, thus, what their place is in the order of society. "Demand symbols" are those which indicate to political leaders what it is that persons want from the political order, e.g., security and equality. "Expectation symbols" are those which indicate what people expect to happen and how things will happen in the political order. The point in World Politics and Personal Insecurity is that old political myths are crumbling and leaving a vacuum of identity, demands, and expectations which, in turn, results in personal insecurity. Out of this insecurity people look, often desperately, for new myths that can fill the vacuum.

One of the most striking things to note is Lasswell's willingness to accept the givenness of nonrationality in human behavior. He does not denigrate the nonrational (or the irrational) as Arnold does; he does not seem driven to avoid the nonrational as Wallas seems to be at points. But even though he is much more open to nonrationalism, he does little to clarify precisely where rational and nonrational meet; and this is important, for presumably this is also where one comes to understand the distinction between non-symbol and symbol, respectively. The effect, once again, is the use of symbol without demonstrating how symbols rather than non-symbols come into being.

Additionally, Lasswell takes the position that the mark of successful leadership is, among other things, the successful manipulation of political symbols; "An elite preserves its ascendancy by manipulating symbols, controlling supplies, and applying violence" (p. 3). This position assumes that the symbols in question are the object of fairly wide-spread consensus in a political community as to what the symbols mean. This assumption is necessary, for in order to mobilize a mass in an intended direction with a certain combination of symbols assumes that a particular intended response from the masses will come from the stimulus provided by the political elite. Such a position, however, is not self-apparent, as will be seen more fully in Chapters II and V of this paper. There it will be suggested that the social control model of political leadership, which is what Lasswell posits, is not warranted in light of how people act.

In Politics (1936) Lasswell devotes Chapter II to a consideration of political symbols. In general, the approach is more anecdotal than analytical. He introduces the Freudian perspective to the study of symbols and concludes that political symbols are the recipients of psychological projections of the political community (pp. 39-41). In doing so, he recognizes, along with earlier writers, the affective aspect of symbols, but this in itself does not take one any further in understanding political symbols than has already been achieved by the writers thus far considered.

Other than this more explicit reference to the psychological functions of symbols, Politics does not move beyond World Politics and Personal Insecurity to any substantial degree. Lasswell

reiterates in Politics the point that symbols are used by elites and counter elites to maintain or to challenge a given ideology in a particular social context (p. 51).

One of Lasswell's notable achievements is his seminal work in content analysis. Both in Language of Politics (1949) and in The Comparative Study of Symbols (1952) his primary concern is employment of content analysis of political symbols. If this is the case, then one can understand why he does not develop the concept of symbol beyond that of the 1935 and 1936 publications; for his concern in the former two works is to develop the technique of content analysis and to apply it to the study of political symbols rather than to develop more fully an analytical understanding of symbol. Thus, in Language of Politics he discusses political symbols mostly in terms of Merriam's "miranda," which was discussed earlier in this chapter. He goes on to reiterate the concept of political symbols in terms of the symbols of identification, demand, and expectation, an approach that Lasswell had already introduced in World Politics and Personal Insecurity. Finally, in The Comparative Study of Symbols, there is no elaboration beyond what Lasswell had already developed in his three earlier works.

Where does this leave one? With these two major questions. First of all, where is it, for Lasswell, that one is to draw the line between symbol and non-symbol? In answer to this question he seems to rely, as have others, on the distinction between nonrational and rational. But as noted earlier, Langer (1957, p. 70) argues persuasively that the very possibility of a symbol having any meaning at all rests on the fact that there is a logic of relationships.

If by rational one means logical, then the criterion of distinction offered by Lasswell must be questioned; and if in questioning the criterion is found wanting, one is left with little basis for distinguishing between symbol and non-symbol in the work of Lasswell.

The second major question, and one that has been asked of earlier writers considered, e.g., Merriam and Lasswell, is the appropriateness of the social control model. To use such a model assumes certain characteristics of symbols and of human behavior which will be questioned later. Again, the basis of this challenge is whether or not symbols have the degree of predictable control over people that the social control model requires?

One can conclude that even though Lasswell's contribution to the study of symbols is notable, there remain important questions about how and why symbols arise in the first place and of what the character of symbols is. So it is that one must look to other political scientists to see if they have moved beyond Lasswell. One possibility is Murray Edelman who currently is perhaps the most notable political scientist studying symbols.

VIII. EDELMAN

The two major works by Murray Edelman are The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964) and Politics as Symbolic Action (1971). Of these two, the former is more to the point of developing an analytic understanding of political symbols and so will be the focus of this section.

Edelman's stated central theme in The Symbolic Uses of Politics is ". . . the capacity of political forms both to serve as a powerful means of expression for mass publics and to convey benefits to particular groups" (p. 2). According to this position, the expressive function of a political form occurs when it comes "to symbolize what large masses of men need to believe about the state to reassure themselves. It is the needs, the hopes, and the anxieties of men that determine the meanings [of the symbolic political forms]" (p. 2). These expressive concerns are psychological rather than material in nature. The distribution of benefits, on the other hand, deals more with material concerns such as the actual tax burden and tax benefits of various groups within society.

Edelman continues with the assertion that the general, unorganized public functions as a spectator rather than as a political activist (p. 5), and therefore it is not recipient of material governmental benefits in proportion to its size. The reason why the general public seems content to acquiesce in this is because the message of political symbols is one that invokes emotions of "patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories of humiliations, promises of future greatness" (p. 6). Political elites, both in and out of government, can, therefore, distribute symbolic benefits to political spectators without incurring the hard costs of material goods and services.

By contrast, it is the political activist, such as the bureaucrat in government and the organized interest outside government, who deal in the politics of distributing concrete material governmental benefits (p. 5). In order to achieve acquiescence in

the politically active population, government may not rely just on symbolic gratification, if at all; rather, if one will, it must "really" produce specific, tangible results for the politically active.

The political activist, of course, is in the minority in American politics (Lindblom, 1968, p. 45), representing, at best, about 30 percent even if one includes such limited activity as attempting to persuade someone to vote a particular way. Or, if one wishes to include an even lower and broader level of political activism such as voting, one still finds only about 54 percent of the eligible American population participating (Burns, Peltason and Cronin, 1978, p. 194). The point for Edelman is that only a minority of the American political community is involved in the process of giving and receiving material governmental benefits.

.But what of symbols, their nature and dynamic? Here one finds some advance over earlier analyses considered in this chapter. Edelman distinguishes, in accordance with Sapir (1934), between "condensational symbols" and "referential symbols" (Edelman, 1964, p. 6). The former are communication forms that are remote and diffuse in linkage to the material world and thus are informed more by the emotions of the symbol users. The latter, by contrast, are economical means of referring to the material world. Thus the flag is a condensational symbol and labor statistics are referential symbols.

Use of referential and condensational symbols together seems to be so inclusive as to preclude the concept of non-symbol. Is

this what Edelman intends? He is not explicit at this point, but by implication the answer seems to be yes. What he seems to mean is this. What is generally referred to as "symbolic" by most writers is what Edelman means by "condensational symbol"; what is generally referred to as "non-symbolic" by most writers is what he means by "referential symbol." This interpretation is supported in light of the title of his book and of its stated theme, i.e., the symbolic uses of politics are those uses that deal more with expressive rather than material concerns. If this is correct, then a more accurate, but clearly more confusing, title for the book might be The Condensational Symbolic Uses of Politics. Be that as it may, what Edelman seeks to do is to provide analytical clarification of political symbols.

What is all this to say? For Edelman it is, first of all, to establish the affective character of condensational symbols. Second, he argues that the majority of people in American democracy are linked with their polity primarily in terms of condensational symbols. And finally, he seeks to demonstrate that political elites engage in a continual process, often unintended, of manipulating condensational symbols so as to shape persons' desires and needs in such a way as to support further the viability of symbolic wants and gratifications in the mass public.

Still, the questions this writer has asked above in this chapter are not addressed by Edelman. First of all, why does a symbol arise at all in the first place? Why do not people deal with their environment in terms of referential symbols (i.e., non-symbols in popular usage) instead? Edelman simply says that there are two

kinds of symbols without explaining why it is this way.

Second, it was noted above that the combination of referential and condensational symbols was so broad as to suggest that all one perceives in the environment is symbolic in some form. Actually, Edelman does not say this, but is this what he means? Or is there a third aspect of human behavior in addition to the two symbolic ones? If so, what is its nature, how do humans perceive it, and how does it relate to the symbolic dimensions? Again, one is not clear as to the answer to these questions.

Third, there is a sense in Edelman's entire book, a sense also detected by Mayer Zald (1966, p. 87), that the world of symbolic politics is somehow less "real," or perhaps even "unreal," than the world of referential symbols. For example, Edelman says that the political symbol of government bureaucracy serving the public interest is contrary to the reality that bureaucracy benefits private interests. What results is a type of theological "orders of creation" scheme in which there is a hierarchy of reality in which certain levels are more real than others. If this be the case, then what is Edelman's criterion for distinguishing between the real and the less real? The answer is the "rational man" (Zald, 1966, p. 86).

The rational man seems to be Edelman's index of reality. The rational man presumably is in contact with hard "reality" and is able to control his emotions that would, if given free rein, distort his vision of reality. The general public is not rational and thus is susceptible to the effect of condensational symbols with all the affective distortions that go with it. Thus, if the general public would but look at the "realities" of American politics, then the

power of political symbols would decline and America would have a more rational and realistic political system.

Three comments are pertinent to this issue of the reality index. First, to take the position that humans are or can be primarily rational (and this includes Edelman's efforts in writing), is open to question (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 64-67). It would be better to view humans as personality systems that have, as one aspect, rationality, and that rationality is in constant interaction with other nonrational aspects of the personality. In this sense, no one is ever purely rational in one's efforts.

Second, to reiterate once more, to be nonrational does not mean to be non-logical. When Edelman and others treat of non-rationality, there is the assumption that logic is absent. Langer (1957, p. 70), as has been suggested already, demonstrates otherwise.

Finally, and most telling, if the criterion of reality is not rational man, then what is it? Why is the "real" of the material world to be considered more real than that of the non-material world of expressiveness? Here Edelman is silent.

A fourth and final comment about Edelman's treatment of political symbols needs to be made. He sees the role of political elites including the conscious and unconscious manipulation of political symbols for the purpose of producing in the polity desired supports and expectations which are symbolic in character and thus amenable to symbolic fulfillment. Once again this social control model of political behavior is feasible only if certain assumptions about human behavior are accepted. As was noted in the discussion

of Merriam and Lasswell, it is the position of this paper that the social control model of governing does not comport with human behavior. Hence, at this point Edelman is problematic for this writer.

And so Edelman does move one along in the understanding of political symbols by introducing Sapir's taxonomy. In fact, this taxonomy will be of central importance in developing this paper's position on political symbols. But important questions remain unanswered and so one must move to other writers in search of clarifications.

IX. COBB AND ELDER

In the decade of the 1970s Roger Cobb and Charles Edler have noted in their research the importance of political symbols for an understanding of political participation and of how individuals relate themselves to their polity (1972a, 1972b, 1976). Their work goes beyond that of Edelman in that the latter is concerned to demonstrate a perceived discrepancy between symbols and material reality whereas Cobb and Elder seek to investigate at a more detailed and sophisticated level the dynamics of symbols for political participants.

The first thing to be noted in the three works of Cobb and Elder is that they do not provide an explicit definition of symbol, a surprising fact in light of the importance they attach to the concept. Yet one can glean from their discussions a general idea of what they mean by the term.

With Edelman, Cobb and Elder see political symbols as having an important expressive dimension, but they depart from Edelman in

that they suggest that there is a cognitive dimension to symbols as well. Depending on the blend of these two dimensions in a political symbol, they suggest various ways in which a political symbol functions for a political participant in actual behavior. They present a political symbol matrix (1972a, p. 82) in which the columns represent high and low affective content and the rows represent high and low cognitive content.

In addition to seeing a cognitive dimension to political symbols, a recognition not found in the above review of other writers, Cobb and Elder believe that political symbols may be the key to understanding how the micro and macro levels of political behavior are linked (1976, p. 306). This is a significant point since political scientists have a tendency to focus on either the micro or the macro level of the political process.

One still, nevertheless, is left with the persistent questions that have arisen repeatedly in this chapter. What, actually, is a symbol? Why are there symbols? What is the relationship and status of symbols to non-symbols? Perhaps these questions are not appropriate in the eyes of Cobb and Elder, for they are concerned with the place of political symbols in the dynamics of the American political process. And yet it would seem that these fundamental questions have a bearing on how one understands the function of symbols in the political process. Hence, even though Cobb and Elder develop new ground in the study of political symbols with their recognition of the cognitive dimension of symbols, they still leave important questions unanswered.

X. MITCHELL AND MITCHELL

Joyce M. Mitchell and William C. Mitchell devote an entire chapter in Political Analysis and Public Policy (1969) to a consideration of political symbols as a type of public good that governments must provide. Political symbols are salient in certain issue areas, namely the nation and patriotic identifications, status issues, and morality issues. What is distinctive about their treatment of political symbols is that they are seen as simply another type of public good, right along with others such as regulation, distribution of governmental costs, etc., that government must deal with. This is to be seen in contrast to Edelman's estimate that the symbolic is less real and that perhaps the goal of government should be a more rational politics in which the symbolic dimension is mitigated.

More to the point, however, is what Mitchell and Mitchell understand a symbol to be. Strangely enough, in this introductory political science text, one does not find a definition of symbol. Thus one must extrapolate from their discussion just what they mean by the term.

The most telling point from which to extrapolate is the section in the chapter on symbolic public goods entitled "Symbolic Issues and Rationality" (pp. 157-159). They begin with an understanding of humans as a combination of rationality and irrationality. They do not assume the rational man model of behavior. On this basis they conclude that members of a polity will perceive, think of, and respond to their political environments in both rational and irrational terms simultaneously. The degree of rationality and

irrationality will vary among individuals according to personality constitutions and among issues according to subject matter. It is here that one has the best clue to understanding the taxonomy of symbols for Mitchell and Mitchell. Borrowing from Lane and Sears (1964, pp. 72-82), they posit the following conditions as likely to result in irrational responses to political objects.

1. The more vague the referents of the issue, the greater the tendency toward irrationality.
2. The more remote and difficult the consequences are to assess, the greater room for irrationality.
3. The more abstract the terms of the issue, the greater the tendency toward irrationality.
4. Issues dealing with matters commonly repressed [e.g., sex] invite irrationality.
5. Socially "unpopular" views are more likely to stimulate irrationality in others.
6. Issues that pertain to people, as distinct from more purely instrumental matters, will encourage irrationality (pp. 157-158).

On this basis one may conclude that the symbolic tends toward irrationality because the conditions of irrationality listed above are the same ones that Mitchell and Mitchell set forth as conditions of political symbols. Symbols, therefore, tend to be irrational, to have vague referents and remote consequences, to be abstract in representing an issue, to deal with repressed and unpopular issues, and/or to deal with issues with human referents. It would follow that non-symbolic politics would tend more toward rationality in issue areas and under conditions antithetical to those listed above.

But why is this so? Why do political symbols arise when treating morality issues, for example, and not with the calculation of the unemployment rate? Why is there a symbolic dimension at all? Mitchell and Mitchell posit the reality of political symbols

and proceed to describe those areas and conditions in and under which they are likely to occur. But one is told very little about the analytical nature of a symbol. They are very sympathetic to political symbols and seem to be comfortable with the inevitability of such in a political process. There is no call for a "rational politics" that would result in a more instrumental polity. But when all this has been said, there is still the uncomfortable feeling that one still does not know what a political symbol is.

XI. AND OTHERS . . .

At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that this literature review would be limited to political scientists and that it would be representative rather than inclusive. There are, therefore, other writers who could be discussed on the subject of political symbols. Time does not permit such a discussion, but mention of others is useful.

Almond and Powell (1966), pioneers in the study of comparative politics, note that viable political systems must have a "symbolic capability" which serves to affirm the values of a polity (pp. 199-200). Beer, et al. (1958) recognize the expressive function of political symbols and their important role in political motivation (pp. 22-24). Frankel (1953) sees political symbols as central to developing and sustaining voluntary collective behavior in a polity but also points out that these symbols, when outmoded, become burdens to effective political communication (p. 352). Friedrich (1963) sees symbols as providing for members of a polity the reasons why a particular political system makes sense. The symbols are the "emotional underpinnings" of

a polity which facilitates political cooperation (p. 102). For Goodwin (1977), political symbols are affective and produce feelings of political solidarity, a result that is to be valued as highly as material goods provided by government (pp. 388-392). Isaak and Hummel (1975) state explicitly that "symbol politics" is "pseudopolitics" and is to be avoided (p. 27). Kautsky (1965) recognizes the reality of political symbols and that they can be the basis for real political conflict, yet he believes that symbols can be wrong in terms of the "real" world (p. 2). For Lane (1978), political myths (and by implication, symbols) are untrue as judged by the standards of the real world. Lippmann (1929), on the other hand, is much more favorable, not only seeing symbols (or "images," to use his term) in a positive light but as being the inevitable result of trying to make sense out of a world of massive information chaos (p. 16). MacIver sees symbols contributing to the legitimacy of political institutions in a way that is not possible when relying only on concrete facts (p. 45). Prothro and Grigg (1966) contend that the general American public has little concrete knowledge of the American political system which results in a knowledge based on emotional symbols (pp. 276-294). Stumpf (1966) uses symbol as that which is different from what is real or from what something really means (pp. 293-294). Walzer (1967) understands symbols to be illusory, as constituting a realm of second-class reality at best. Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) distinguish symbolic politics from politics dealing with material concerns and conclude that the busing issue is dealt with primarily in symbolic terms (pp. 381-383).

Casey (1974) contends that political symbols and myths "transform political institutions from instruments of naked power to legitimate authorities capable of proclaiming and implementing policies without use of force" (p. 386).

XII. EVALUATION

The materials cited and/or discussed above are diverse in their various concerns and approaches to the question of political symbols. There are, however, discernable patterns that emerge that characterize some or all of the writers represented in this chapter.

First of all, the most common pattern is to use the concept of symbol without defining it. Many writers begin with the assumption that they and their readers know what the concept means and proceed from there. Now is this justified? Not really, for it has been demonstrated in the analyses in this chapter that when one proceeds to extrapolate what a particular writer means by symbol, that what results often is quite different from the understanding extrapolated from another writer. This, then, is the first major problem encountered when one undertakes an inquiry into symbols in general or political symbols in particular.

A second pattern and problem that emerges, and one that is corollary to the first one, is trying to clarify what is not symbolic. This, of course, is the reverse side of the first problem, but it is legitimately an independent concern, for often one can say what something is not without being able to say what it is. So writers also fail at the task of negative definition.

Third, it has been noted that for some writers the symbolic is that which is untrue and/or unreal. The central problem raised by such a position is establishment of criteria of truth and reality, for without such criteria the charges that symbols are untrue or unreal are not warranted. The criteria most often suggested are the "rational man" and the "real" world of concrete, material reality. It has already been discussed above that the rational man criterion is weak in light of personality studies; and deference to the concrete world does not deal adequately with perceptual and interpretive differences that could result in "multiple realities" of the world in which people live.

A fourth characterization of symbol that emerges is that they are irrational or nonrational and therefore not subject to the canons of logic; that, in fact, symbols are affective distortions of the real world. This is the reverse side of the third pattern. The independence of the fourth pattern is that the attribution of irrationality to symbols leads to conclusions that symbols somehow are of lesser value and integrity than are non-symbols. This reflects a hierarchy in which "logic" has a preeminent position in the repertoire of perceptual modes. Such a conclusion is quite acceptable, but it cannot simply be posited without providing a rationale for such a conclusion. Most writers do not attempt to demonstrate the warrantedness of such a hierarchy.

One additional point is worth noting about this fourth pattern, a point that has already been made above. To be irrational or nonrational does not mean to be without logic. It does mean that one has abandoned the canons of one of many logics and moved to

another. For example, the Westerner usually is mystified by Eastern thought patterns that tend to transcend our familiar dialectical mode of thinking and move to a more inclusive "both/and" perspective. The confusion is a difference in logics.

Logic is nothing more than a socially recognized syntax by which meanings are constructed, and so there is the possibility of many logics. The problem that arises is that writers are very much the children of their day in which the dominant logic is scientific thinking, not so much in the sense of quantification methods as in the sense that the current age is the product of rationalism and the formal logic that derives therefrom. Yes, it is a logic, a syntax, that has rules of meaning, but it is not the only one.

A fifth pattern is that writers in political symbolism tend to avoid the question of why there are political symbols in the first place. Why do symbols arise at all? If humans have a rational capacity, why do they not deal with the world in rational terms? These are central questions for understanding political symbols, for the answer to these ontological questions go to the very heart of whether or not symbols are inevitable or can be "overcome." Lasswell comes closest to addressing this issue when he applies Freudian categories in the analysis of symbols. Other writers have missed this question.

Finally, there is a pattern of "regard," if one will. That is to say, some writers seem to be uncomfortable or embarrassed by the reality of political symbolism and thus tend to have a somewhat low regard for it. Other writers, on the other hand, such as Mitchell

and Mitchell, have a higher regard for political symbols in that they see them as simply another mode of political activity in which symbolic goods are as real and important as material ones.

XIII. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter has been to give examples of how some political scientists have dealt with political symbols and to suggest what some of the weaknesses are therein. The conclusion that what these writers have done is of no value is not warranted, for they have written and do write with purposes that this writer does not share. Indeed, the writers selected are among the most significant ones in the area of political symbols. Still, given the concerns of this writer, the literature thus far reviewed is not responsive to the questions underlying this paper.

The task to be pursued now is to develop a definition of symbol that is responsive to the questions raised in this chapter. Chapter II will move into a broader review of what thinkers outside political science have done with symbolism and then move to a definition of symbol. From there the paper will look at the dynamics of symbols and attempt to answer the question of "Why symbols?"

CHAPTER II

TOWARD A BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF SYMBOLISM

I. THE PROBLEM

Though man is typically the symbol-using animal, he clings to a kind of naive verbal realism that refuses to realize the full extent of the role played by symbolicity in his notions of reality (Burke, 1966, p. 5).

This statement by Kenneth Burke goes to the heart of the problem in understanding symbolism. The stated purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the meaning of political symbols in the area of obscenity. In order to effect this task requires that the components of meaning be made clear. For purposes of this dissertation, the idea of "symbol" is the concept necessary, sine qua non, to understanding the meaning of meaning in general and to understanding the meaning of political symbols in the area of obscenity in particular. Thus, what is the meaning of symbol?

At first glance it would seem that the meaning of symbol would be clear since the term is used rather frequently not only in everyday language but in learned discourse as well. But the survey of the literature in Chapter I on symbols shows that such is not the case. In fact, one must conclude that there is a wide range of differences, if not confusion, as to what symbol means. This problem is illustrated well in Langer's (1953) discussion of the problem.

Consider, . . . a word around which this whole book is built: "symbol." Cecil Day Lewis, in his excellent book The Poetic Image, means by it always

what I have called an "assigned symbol," a sign with a literal meaning fixed by convention; Collingwood goes still further and limits the term to deliberately chosen signs, such as the symbols of symbolic logic. Then he stretches the term "language" to cover everything I would call "symbols," including religious icons, rites, and works of art. Albert Cook, on the other hand, opposes "symbol" to "concept"; by the latter he means what Day Lewis means by "symbol," plus everything that he (Cook) condemns as "mechanical," such as the comedy of Rabelais. He speaks of "symbol's infinite suggestiveness." Evidently "symbol" means something vaguely honorific, but I do not know what. David Daiches has still another usage, and indeed a definition: "as used here," he says in A Study of Literature, "it simply means an expression which suggests more than it says." But shortly afterwards he restricts its sense very radically: "A symbol is something in which sensitive men recognize their potential fate. . . ." Here the meaning of "symbol" may or may not be the same one that Mr. Cook has in mind.

All the poor philosopher can do is to define his words and trust the reader to bear their definition in mind (p. x).

As indicated in this lengthy quotation, it is not clear what is meant by symbol, not even to one of the most noted philosophers of symbolism in the 20th century. Moreover, a further consideration of the literature demonstrates how complex the question can become. There is, for example, the point of view that most, if not all, of man's reflective perception of reality is mediated through symbols. If accepted, this position states that language, gestures, rites, icons, and other social artifacts are symbols (Burke, 1966; Cassier, 1944; Langer, 1957; Langer, 1953; Friedman, 1965; Friedrich, 1963; Hertzler, 1965; Littlejohn, 1977; Mead, 1962; Nieburg, 1973; Sapir, 1939; Whittier, 1970).

Alternatively, other writers see symbols as a much narrower concept that is subsumed as one of several elements in the broader class of signs. In this case, a symbol is not a covering category

as it is in the previous paragraph, but, rather, is one part of the covering category of sign (Alston, 1967; Bertalanffy, 1966; Cherry, 1961; Firth, 1973; Peirce, 1955b; Worth and Gross, 1972).

Yet a third approach to understanding symbols is to view signs, symbols, and perhaps signals, as different kinds of constructs, logically of equal status, that function to relay respectively different kinds of meanings in a social context (Alexander, 1972; Bolinger, 1975; Chebat, 1974; Fawcett, 1970; Frank, 1966; Rasmussen, 1974; Royce, 1965; Thass-Thienemann, 1968, Ver Eecke, 1975).

The above three uses of symbol all share in common the notion that symbols are genuine, legitimate representations of reality; and yet as Firth (1973; pp. 22-25) and Frankfort, Frankfort, Wilson and Jacobsen (1946, p. 20) have noted, there are those who would relegate the notion of symbol to the status of that which is illusory, unreal, or second-class reality (Arnold, 1935; Casey, 1974; Douglas, 1949; Edelman, 1964; Edelman, 1971; Homans, 1978; Isaak and Hummel, 1975; Kautsky, 1965; Lane, 1978; MacIver, 1947; Manning, 1964; Mason, 1962; Miller, 1965; Miller and Schefflin, 1967; Stumpf, 1966; Walzer, 1967).

Even though the above representations of the use of symbol are very broadly stated and perhaps do not fit exactly with respect to a particular author cited, the point is that the meaning of symbol is very equivocal in the literature even outside the discipline of political science. Now what is one to make of all this? Here Langer is instructive once again as one recalls her concluding statement above in which she stated: "All the poor philosopher can do is to define his words and trust the reader to bear their

definition in mind" (1953, p. x). What one is to do, then, is not so much to struggle with the "correct" definition of symbol as to make clear what one means by symbol in a particular context. Such will now be done.

II. THE DEFINITION

To say simply that one will define symbol and that that is the end of the matter is to engage in solipsism, for in defining the term one must go further and define in a manner that is persuasive and meaningful to the audience addressed. The definition must be "consensually valid" (Nimmo, 1974, p. 24; Sullivan, 1953, p. 183). With respect to questions of word usage and etymology in the English language, The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) is widely accepted and is thus one source of consensual validity. It is here that the current definition process of symbol begins.

It has already been noted that discussions of the meaning of symbol have been tied intricately with the meaning of sign. OED states that the word "sign" comes from the Latin signum which means mark or token. Among the definitions offered, the following seem most pertinent.

I.1.a. A gesture or motion of the hand, head, etc., serving to convey an intimation or to communicate some idea.

I.2.a. A mark or device having some special meaning or import attached to it, or serving to distinguish the thing on which it is put.

II.7. A token or indication (visible or otherwise) of some fact, quality, etc.

Regarding the word symbol, one finds the following. The term is derived from the Greek symbolon which means token, pledge, or

sign by which one infers a thing. Among the meanings offered by the OED are the following.

2.a. Something that stands for, represents, or denotes something else (not by exact resemblance, but by vague suggestion, or by some accidental or convention relation; esp. a material object representing or taken to represent something immaterial or abstract, as a being, idea, quality, or condition); a representative or typical figure, sign, or token.

3. A written character or mark used to represent something; a letter, figure, or sign conventionally standing for some object, process, etc.

What is striking in these two sets of definitions, one of sign and one of symbol, is that in defining symbol, OED makes use of the term "sign," and that both sets of definitions use "token." Implicitly there is conveyed that both sign and symbol represent or stand for something other than the sign or symbol itself. In a word, there is marked similarity between the definitions of sign and symbol. Why is this the case?

It would seem that one plausible account for the apparent redundancy of definitions is that the two words are derived from two different language traditions, and that what one encounters here is simply two different words, i.e., signum and symbolon, that have comparable semantic and pragmatic functions (Morris, 1942) in the two respective traditions. Thus, etymologically, there may be no real difference in the two terms and thus, perhaps, can be used interchangeably. This suggests that etymologically there is no decisive distinction between sign and symbol and, therefore, such a distinction is not very useful in developing a definition of symbol.

And yet with few exceptions, most writers agree that there is a difference between sign and symbol. The specifications of the

difference varies, the following being some examples. Signs are said to be denotative whereas symbols are connotative (Fawcett, 1970, pp. 14-15, 26-37; Langer, 1957, p. 43); that signs are univocal and symbols equivocal (Boulding, 1963, pp. 98-99; Chebat, 1974, p. 36; Frank, 1966, p. 9; Hayakawa, 1965, p. 90; Rasmussen, 1974, p. 23; Thass-Thienemann, 1968, p. 19); that signs have physical, concrete referents whereas symbols have no direct correlation to physical reality, if any (Alston, 1967, p. 440; Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 31-34; Cobb and Elder, 1972, p. 80); that signs are arbitrary conventions whereas symbols are organic, socially evolved entities (Chebat, 1974, p. 36; Fawcett, 1970, pp. 14-15, 26-37; Thass-Thienemann, 1968, pp. 20-21); that signs are indicators whereas symbols connote meaning (Cassier, 1944, p. 35; Cassier, 1957, p. 93; Frank, 1966, pp. 5-8; Friedrich, 1963, p. 99; Gordon, 1969, p. 58; Langer, 1957, p. 61; Thass-Thienemann, 1968, p. 22); that signs have predictable consequences as understood in terms of a stimulus-response model whereas symbols are unpredictable in their consequences (Chebat, 1974, p. 36; Thass-Thienemann, 1968, pp. 19-20; Ver Eecke, 1975, p. 29, fn. 2); that signs are non-affective in character whereas symbols are (Cobb and Elder, 1972, p. 81; Frankel, 1953, p. 358); and that signs represent on a one-to-one basis whereas symbols do so on a one-to-many basis (Royce, 1965, p. 16). Notice that these various ways of distinguishing sign and symbol are not shared by all the writers cited; rather, these are some of the ways in which the two terms are distinguished.

The purpose of this review is to demonstrate that there are several options available by which symbol and sign may be understood.

Because of this equivocation, Langer's suggestion and the discussion of symbolic interaction which will be presented later in this chapter, this writer will proceed with a definition of symbol and sign which is useful and persuasive for purposes of this paper.

The following is meant in distinguishing sign and symbol. A symbol is anything that conveys meaning in a social setting. The data of reality that one takes into account are signs or designations of the "world out there." When sign combines with meaning, the result is a symbol, i.e., a sign to which meaning has been assigned (Mitchell, 1962, p. 123; Nimmo, 1974, p. 6; Warner, 1959, p. 4, 455; White, 1949, p. 25). Having said this much, several implications of this definition must be made clear.

First, it assumes that the objective world, in and of itself, is meaningless. The world takes on significance and meaning for human beings only as they take it into account and confer meaning on it. That is to, the human world of meaning, of purpose, of intention, of motive is a world that is constructed by people. Hence, one can speak of the "social construction of reality" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

Second, it follows that for human beings there is very little that can be called a sign, for as Langer (1957, p. 43) has noted, the human organism is driven to the symbolic function, to the function of conceptualization, to a mediated prehension of the world rather than to an immediate prehension of raw sense data. In this vein, the late Walter Lippmann noted:

[T]he real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not

equipped to deal with so much subtilty, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations (1929, p. 16).

Or consider Hertzler's comment:

This assigning of meaning [to experienced reality] is a necessary human activity. Without it, no experience has existence or reality. Thus these meanings or "abstractions," at various levels of complexity, become man's working realities. Men could not function in their environments without them. All knowledge is experience that has specific meaning. But it should be noted that the assigning of significance or meaning is also a distinctively human act: meaning is thus primarily a property of human behavior, and only secondarily a property of objects or of events or situations (1965, p. 26).

Thus, not only does man assign meanings to the world out there, but in so doing he also constructs a social reality which becomes his "real" world, a world that is distinctively human. In this sense, man lives in a symbolic world.

Third, one needs to consider the source of meaning that humans confer on signs to create symbols. The source of this meaning shall be named (Bentley, 1935; Dewey and Bentley, 1949; Frank, 1966) image or imagery. By image is meant that body of subjective knowledge of the world that each person has and in terms of which the world is encountered and interpreted. The image is derived from one's on-going transaction with the world, one's experiences in the world whereby one has learned society's grammar of symbols which, in turn, enables one to deal with the world in terms that are acceptable to and functional in one's society. The image is the basis for determining fact, value, reality, emotion, etc. (Berelson and Steiner, 1964, p. 189; Boulding, 1956, pp. 97-98; Mead, 1962, pp. 345-346; Nimmo, 1974, pp. 5-6; Nimmo and Savage, 1976, pp. 7-9; Warner, 1959, p. 455).

Fourth, what is meant by meaning, by that which derives from one's image of the world? Here one encounters a limiting question in that the very question itself introduces shadows of tautology. The answer to this question given here is essentially from the pragmatist tradition of Charles S. S. Peirce whose position was later adapted by George H. Mead to what later became known as symbolic interaction.

For Peirce, pragmatism was nothing more than a method for ascertaining the meaning of words and concepts (Peirce, 1955c, p. 271). His definition of pragmatism, therefore, is also a definition of meaning. There are two classic statements by Peirce as to the definition of pragmatism, and they shall be used here as statements of the meaning of meaning.

Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearing you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Think your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object (Peirce, 1960, p. 119).

Because this definition proved to be problematic for many readers, Peirce reformulated it some years later as follows.

The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol (Peirce, 1969, p. 119).

In the first statement of definition Peirce places the meaning of a concept in the future in that he asks one to consider what effects (durationally an implication of future) the conceived object might have. That is to say, what one's intentions or purposes for the future are of a concept constitute its meaning. But in addition to this, Peirce also invokes the criterion of "practical bearing" as a component in understanding the meaning of a concept. By this

is meant the empirical, concrete behavior or operations that could result from the concept.

The second definition uses language that is more directly pertinent to the present concerns of this paper, specifically the term symbol. One of the main differences between the two definitions is that in the second one the term "symbol" is substituted for "conceived object"; the substance, however, of the two definitions remains the same. To simplify even further, Peirce (1955a) stated in his essay, "The Essentials of Pragmatism," that "[t]he rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future" (p. 261). Or, what a symbol means, or what is meant by meaning, is what one intends or purposes by that symbol. The intention comes from the image of the person who then confers meaning, or intention of action, on the sign and thereby constitutes a symbol. With this in mind, it follows that a symbol is a statement of intended human action.

One final consideration of Peirce's second definition is in order here. In conceiving the effects of a symbol or concept in the future, he states that the meaning of the symbol can be understood only under specific, temporal-spatial circumstances or conditions. To put it in terms that will be discussed later in this chapter, meanings are always situation-specific. What one means is relative to the situation in which the process of meaning takes place. For example, to say that a diamond is hard really means to say that a diamond can cut glass. The word to define here is "hard"; its operational definition or its "condition" is that it can cut glass. On the other hand, if one were to substitute for glass a material that is harder than glass or a diamond, then relative to the

substituted material the diamond would not be hard (see also Mead, 1938).

In this way Peirce underscored that "facts" are not isolated, static entities but, instead, are relational, conditional, situational phenomena. In light of this, one may say that a symbol or concept is projected into a future mode whereby one completes an intended act, and in so doing one evaluates various "conditions" under which the act can be completed and what the possible effects of each condition of the intended act might be. As will be seen below, this is essentially the same thing as the symbolic interaction concern with "situation definitions" in that the meaning of an anticipated act informs how a person will behave in that situation.

By way of review, the following is being suggested as the understanding of symbol. There are three components in symbolism: (1) referent, (2) symbol, and (3) meaning. Referent is the world out there that is experienced by taking it into account. The referent is taken into account selectively in terms of one's image, one's subjective knowledge of the world. Symbol is the result of the transaction between referent and meaning, or image. Note well. The relationship between referent and symbol is not direct; instead, the symbol arises through the mediation of interpretation. Recalling Langer (1957, p. 43) and Hertzler (1965, p. 26), that which is distinctively human is that man can, man must symbolize.

But what is different about the immediate prehension of raw sense data on the one hand and symbolization on the other besides Lippmann's observation that the former would be overwhelming? The

answer is transcendence. What the symbol facilitates in human action is the ability to transcend the immediate moment of experience and to project oneself into the past and the future, to conceive of oneself in the present relative to the world out there, and to synthesize all of these projections and conceptions into a unity that is called personality. This is possible because a symbol is not limited to concrete sense referents of the immediate moment but, instead, is free to be used independently of the immediate. As Warner (1959) concludes:

The meaning of a sign may be something more than, or entirely different from, its object; sometimes it is both to those who interpret it. When an object stands to its interpreters for something beyond itself, and is not limited to what it is inherently, its usefulness to its interpreters lies precisely in the fact that it is not what it is, and--acting cooperatively--they can use it to mean something else. . . . Old symbols are transformed into new symbols or cease to be, and new ones become old as those who send and receive meaning by this means repeat their attributions and deepen the connotation. Meaning is created out of, and is a product of, man's experiences; without the mutual exchange of attributed meanings he and his world would perish (pp. 456-457; see also Frankel, 1953, p. 358; and Freidrich, 1963, p. 99).

Others have recognized this aspect of symbols. Frank (1966) states the matter thusly.

By this knowing, symbolic process, each group of people has created an "As if" world of its own, transforming the actual world into a "virtual world," as Suzanne Langer has described works of art, which do not represent actuality but present a humanly created set of images or symbols. Just because these symbolic worlds are human creations which can persist only insofar as members of a cultural group recognize and use these common symbols and perform what those symbols require, almost all groups are greatly concerned with the early indoctrination of their children into their symbolic worlds, and have sometimes established rigid constraints upon deviations

and penalties for neglect of the prescribed patterns of thinking, speaking, and acting (p. 10).

Two points are notable in this quotation. First, and less important, is that Frank notes the virtually genetic predisposition (Piaget, 1970/1971) of humans to symbolize. This comports with Langer's (1957, p. 43) and Hertzler's (1956, p. 26) positions as discussed earlier. But second, and more to the point of the current discussion, is the idea of "As if" worlds. What Frank recognizes is that symbols allow one to move beyond that which is given in the immediate to that which one would have, or be, or do, i.e., to move on to a "virtual world."

Likewise does the literary critic, Kenneth Burke (1966), so state in yet different terms. In characterizing humans, he notes that man, through symbols, is the creator of the negative, of that which is not.

Man is inventor of the negative, for in nature there is no negative--in nature, what is, is what it is as it is--period. A prime use of the negative is unfulfilled expectations, and unfulfilled expectations presume the ability to transcend the given and envision the un-given (pp. 9-10).

To transcend the immediate requires that one act in terms of that which is not. The vehicle whereby this is possible is the symbol in that it allows one to create that which is not.

Herein is the power of symbols and their danger. They are powerful because man can use them at will to create reality here and now in terms of one's image, to conceptualize the past, and to project the future. It is in terms of these creations that man not only acts but that social man is created. The danger lies in what

Burke calls "naïve verbal realism" (1966, p. 5) in that one fails to recognize the mediated and constructed character of social reality that symbols provide as a result of human action.

In light of the foregoing, one can conclude that symbols arise out of the transaction between the subjective aspect of knowledge or the human-based image and the objective aspect of knowledge of sensual sign data. But in taking such a position, symbol becomes a very broad category, almost to the total exclusion of signs, except for analytical purposes, and so the definition of symbol so far derived may be too broad to be of any use (Friedrich, 1963, pp. 102-103). To avoid this dilemma, one can turn to Edward Sapir. Sapir suggests a distinction in understanding symbols that increases the specificity and usefulness of the definition so far stated. The distinction is between "referential symbols" and "condensational symbols."

By "referential symbol" Sapir (1934) means

. . . such forms [of symbolism] as oral speech, writing, the telegraph code, national flags, flag signaling and other organizations of symbols which are agreed upon as economical devices for purposes of reference.

Or in terms of earlier discussion, a referential symbol is one in which its meaning has "consensual validation," i.e., in which there is wide-spread agreement as to what a particular symbol means.

A "condensational symbol," on the other hand,

. . . is a highly condensed form of substitutive behavior for direct expression, allowing for the ready release of emotional tension in conscious or unconscious form. . . . [A condensational symbol] strikes deeper and deeper routes in the unconscious and diffuses its emotional quality to types of behavior or situations apparently far removed from the original meaning of the symbol.

In this understanding of symbol, one sees that the symbol's referent is not as apparent as that of a referential one, that it is more diverse and corresponds with the potential diversity of images which derive from individuals, groups, subcultures, or what have you, that are found in society in general.

For example, as Sapir points out, a national flag is a referential symbol in that most members of a national society would recognize it as a symbol of, as standing for, or re-presenting, the respective "nation." In the United States the national flag is understood to stand for the United States, irrespective of what one's affective disposition toward the nation might be. But when one takes into account one's affective disposition, then the meaning of the flag may have less consensual validity and thus take on the character of a condensational symbol whereby the flag comes to stand for a cluster of emotions and affections which derive from one's life experiences. A referential symbol always is a potential condensational symbol.

Thus it was in the United States during the 1960s that the American flag not only was understood as a referential symbol denoting the United States, but it also became a condensational symbol connoting affective support for or attack on particular meanings of the United States. As a condensational symbol, the American flag became a form of substitutive behavior that represented conflicts among sets of values, casuistic symbols, moral goals, personal identities, etc., just to suggest a few (Frank, 1966, p. 9). This being the case, then one may, indeed, conclude, as many observers have suggested, that

much of the public debate on Viet Nam was characterized by semantic confusion because there was confusion of vocabularies, that of reference vocabularies and that of condensational vocabularies.

The usefulness in distinguishing between referential and condensational symbols is not just for the discussion which is to follow but also for clarifying, in part, some of the earlier confusion in the definitions of sign and symbol. It seems that when writers distinguish between sign and symbol, the former is understood to be fairly denotative, specific, and univocal in meaning. In terms of Sapir, such an understanding of sign is compatible with that of referential symbol. Symbols, in the sign/symbol discussions, are commonly indicated as connotative, lacking in specificity, and tending to equivocity in meaning. This characterization of symbol comports generally with Sapir's condensational symbol. Thus, for this writer, what is generally considered by many writers to be a "sign" is here understood to be a "referential symbol," and what is generally viewed as a "symbol" is here understood to be a "condensational symbol."

If the foregoing is accepted, then one must conclude that the world is understood by human beings, i.e., it has meaning, it is the object of intended behavior, only through the facility of symbols in some form, be they referential or condensational. Distinctively human behavior is symbolic behavior, a proposition that will now be developed in more detail.

III. THE PROCESS

Human behavior is symbolic behavior. But what is the human action process by which symbols are created and used? Symbolic interaction provides an explanation of how this takes place. But before considering symbolic interaction, it must be understood that what it is as a social psychological perspective of human behavior is somewhat heterogeneous. For example, even though some writers point to George Herbert Mead as the progenitor of symbolic interaction (Blumer, 1969, p. 1), it also is clear that much of what Mead did was to create a synthesis of earlier American philosophical thinking, drawing from such thinkers as Chauncey Wright, Charles S. S. Peirce, and Josiah Royce (Lincourt and Olczak, 1974, p. 78).

More contemporarily, there are the competing views within symbolic interaction, i.e., the Chicago school as represented by Herbert Blumer and the Iowa School as represented by the late Manford H. Kuhn (Meltzer and Petras, 1972, pp. 43-57). To complicate the matter further, recent years have seen ethnomethodology (Denzin, 1969; Denzin, 1970; Garfinkle, 1967), dramaturgy (Goffman, 1959), and dramatism (Burke, 1962; Duncan, 1962; Duncan, 1968) incorporated into symbolic interaction.

Finally, many insights into human action that symbolic interactionists consider to be unique to their perspective have been incorporated into other sociological approaches such as labeling and role theory. This incorporation has been to such an extent that some sociologists do not see symbolic interaction as a distinctive theoretical perspective of human behavior (Hood, 1975).

This is all to say that there is no purist position to be had in understanding symbolic interaction. And yet this writer is persuaded that there is a distinctive position that can be labeled "symbolic interaction" and that such a position is identifiable in terms of a body of assumptions about human behavior when taken together.

There are several summaries of the distinctive characteristics of symbolic interaction (Blumer, 1969, pp. 1-60; Denzin, 1974, pp. 269-273; Hall, 1972, pp. 35-49; Lindesmith, Strauss, and Denzin, 1975, pp. 3-27; Meltzer, 1972, pp. 5-22; Meltzer, Petras and Reynolds, 1975, pp. 42-81; Rose, 1962, pp. 3-19; Swanson, 1968). The following explication of symbolic interaction will draw variously from these sources as well as from George Herbert Mead.

For purposes of this paper that will be more apparent later, the most significant assumption of symbolic interaction to be noted is that social reality is negotiated meanings rather than being unequivocally determined by inherent properties in that reality (Blumer, 1969, p. 18; Denzin, 1974, p. 269). Out of this, "problematicism" arises because of reasons similar to those stated earlier in the discussion of the meaning of symbol. Meaning is not a quality that inheres in an object. Instead, meaning is conferred by the perceiver on whatever is taken into account, the source of this meaning is imagery (Mead, 1962, pp. 345-346), and the means by which the meaning is conferred is the symbol.

Take for example the meaning of a "chair." One defines it conditionally, i.e., in terms of a specific kind of situation

(Peirce, 1960, pp. 122-123), as that which is used by persons to sit on. That is to say, we have in our culture objects which are standardly named and used as "chairs," standard in that they are routinely produced for the purpose of sitting. Relative to the earlier discussion of Sapir, such a standard definition or meaning is an example of a "referential symbol." But what about a nail box that is now used for sitting rather than for storing nails? The meaning of the nail box has changed from "storing nails" to "sitting." To complicate the example a bit more, consider two persons with conflicting notions as to the use, and thus the meaning, of the nail box. One of them may wish to store nails in the box while the other person may wish to use it for sitting. Or perhaps a third person may envisage a heretofore unconferrred meaning, or use, for the nail box such as it being a component in an original art display. The point is that the nail box has no inherent meaning; rather, the meaning is conferred and the meaning to be conferred is problematic in that different persons have different notions, different images, as to what that meaning shall be.

Out of this arises the conclusion that people behave in terms of how they define situations. As was seen earlier in the discussion of Peirce's understanding of meaning, one symbolizes the future and so completes in one's mind an intended act or a situation definition. It is in terms of this definition of the situation that people direct their behavior. For Blumer (1969), this process of defining, or interpreting, is the heart of symbolic interaction (p. 2).

In a social situation not involving the definition of a material object such as a nail box, the process of attributing meaning is more complicated. Take, for example, persons A and B. Each will act initially in terms of what each understands the other to intend in that situation, i.e., A acts in terms of what A understands B to intend and B acts in terms of what B understands A to intend. This is so because both A and B have their own purposes that they intend to achieve with each other in the same situation. But unlike the nail box, A and B are not passive objects to each other; they are active subjects and active objects, active in that they both are minded organisms, creating and using symbols to function in a symbolic world. Thus, this situation requires a constant process of evaluation of the "other's" intentions in the situation. So A is not only engaged in acting out his own intentions but must also be engaged in adjusting his intentions and actions to the perceived intentions and actions of B, and of course vice versa. This is what is meant when symbolic interaction characterizes social reality as problematic. The meaning, the intelligence of human action is not fixed; it is negotiated, it is mediated through cognitive, symbolic processes, it emerges in the process of human action (Blumer, 1969, pp. 2-6; Denzin, 1974, p. 269; Hall, 1972, p. 36; Lindesmith, et al., 1974, pp. 4-6; Rose, 1962, pp. 7-8). Human action, therefore, is not determined causally by environment; rather, it emerges in the context of environment which, in turn, is made meaningful through the mediation of symbols whereby meaning is conferred on the situation, or to put it more accurately, whereby meaning is constructed in the process of social interaction.

A further assumption of symbolic interaction is that humans live in physical and symbolic worlds. Considering the physical world, man is like all animals seeking to satisfy basic needs such as survival, for example. But man, as human rather than as animal, is also capable of engaging in symbolic behavior in that he can, through the use of learned, i.e., negotiated, symbols, organize the past into meaningful schemata and can project himself into a potentially meaningful future. Organization of the past is "experience," and it gives meaning not only to the past but, more importantly, to what one is now in the present. And in terms of one's current identity and the perceived meaning of the present, goals are developed and projected into the future, symbolically testing in one's mind how best the goals can be accomplished successfully. In other words, man symbolically completes an act in his mind after or before acting; the mind is like a trial-and-error laboratory. The key tool for engaging in this symbolic world of "minded behavior" is language, a tool that is socially constructed through negotiation and the meaning of which is constantly subject to revision (Mead, 1962, pp. 68-75; see also Peirce, 1955, p. 261).

The discussion of symbolic interaction thus far provides a basis for addressing the question, How is society possible? Society is internalized in the individual through the process of socialization whereby the grammar of society is learned, or, whereby one learns the symbols of society, what they mean, how they are used, and what they are used for. It is through this process that one becomes a person in any meaningful social sense. In other words, the socialization process involves the learning of roles or standardized routines of

behavior. One understands the role of "mother," "father," "lover," "combatant," etc. The adult is one who has learned these roles, not so much at this point for the purpose of living these roles over an extended period of time and thus of being identified as those roles (although this may be the case in a sense not discussed here), but as a dictionary of roles by which one can understand the intentions of others when one interacts with them.

For example, when A and B meet and B engages in verbal abuse of and shakes his fist at A, it is reasonable for A to confer on B's linguistic and gestural behavior the socially learned meaning of "hostility." Now A needs to know what A's behavior is communicating to B in order to deal successfully with the present situation, assuming that A intends to avoid a hostile situation. Did A's behavior in the past communicate the meaning of "provocation" to B? Does A's current behavior communicate the meaning of "provocation" to B? But most importantly, what will A's immediately future behavior communicate to B? More provocation? Resolution?

The way in which A attempts to answer these questions is to take the role of B and view his own, i.e., A's behavior. Or put otherwise, A views A from the point of view of B and thereby judges what his different options of future behavior might mean to B. In this way A becomes a social object to A in that symbolically A can converse with A as well as with B. This is the genesis of the "self"--the process of indicating A to A. This is possible because of "significant symbols." "Significant symbols" are that shared body of meanings that allows persons to understand each other's actions and intentions and thereby to adjust their own behavior in accord with their own

intentions and those of others (Mead, 1962, pp. 68-75). Symbols make possible the construction of "joint action" among persons which results in society (Hall, 1972, p. 41; Blumer, 1969, p. 18). It is not, therefore, an instinctual factor that holds society together, nor is it some reified social structure. It is the process of negotiated, joint actions, using the significant symbols of one's culture, that makes possible society.

Yet another major proposition of symbolic interaction is voluntarism (Hall, 1972, pp. 36-37). To argue that persons can choose, that they can negotiate and confer meaning, that they can adjust their behavior to that of others, is to argue for the capacity of agency. This in no way denies the conditioned nature of the agent and the situation when considering human action. On the contrary, this conditional factor is inextricably a part of the symbolic interaction perspective. Instead, to posit voluntarism is to locate the source of social action in acting individuals rather than in social structures and social categories such as statuses and classes. The latter are part of the environment and thus conditions of action, but they are not the source of action. Only persons can act (Burke, 1968, p. 447).

The processes of indicating oneself to oneself and of voluntarism combine to provide a key as to why problematicism arises in social processes. Mead (1962, pp. 192-200) states that there are two aspects or "phases" of the self--the "I" and the "me." As Rose (1962, p. 12) points out, it is not clear what Mead's precise meaning is in this distinction, but this writer understands it to be as follows.

Through the socialization process, one builds up a repertoire of expectations that others have of one, and this repertoire is incorporated into an

. . . organized set of attitudes and definitions, understandings and expectations--or simply meanings--common to the group. In any given situation, the "Me" comprises the generalized other and, often, some particular other (Meltzer, 1972, p. 10).

If one goes no further than this in understanding the self, then one is nothing more than the social roles and expectations that are learned and played out. But it is in terms of the other aspect of the self that problematicism in meaning can arise. Mead (1962) characterizes the "I" as that which

. . . reacts to the self which arises through the taking of the attitude of others. Through taking those attitudes we have introduced the "me" and we react to it as an "I" (p. 174).

Or consider Mead (1962) in the following:

The "I" is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the "me" is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of others constitute the organized "me," and then one reacts toward that as an "I" (p. 175).

In both quotations there is a sense that the "I" is somehow beyond the immediate grasp of the social. As Meltzer (1972) puts it:

The "I" is the impulsive tendency of the individual. It is the initial, spontaneous, unorganized aspect of human experience. Thus, it represents the undirected tendencies of the individual (p. 10).

The "I" of the self sounds much like the elan vital of Henri Bergson (1911/1944) whereby the life process is energized. Now, of course, the energy of the "I" does not remain unsocialized, for it is immediately structured, symbolized, and communicated to self

and/or to others, and so to communicate is possible only through significant symbols which are social products. But the "I" is the propulsion for the human act while the "me" gives it structure (Meltzer, 1972, p. 10). What is significant here is that the "I" represents the capacity of agency in the self. Voluntarism obtains because the self contains an "I." It is the "I" which views the "world out there," be it external to the self or be it internal to the self in terms of the "me." The "I" is the source of novelty, of new purposes and definitions, and of the capacity to choose purposes. True, the success of realizing such novelty in social action is dependent on the success of negotiated action that one enters into with other persons, but the novelty arises in the acting person. When this novelty arises, so does problematicism.

It should be clarified here that the problematic character of an act can arise from at least three sources that have been implied in this discussion of symbolic interaction. In the first instance it may arise out of misunderstanding among the persons in a situation. Persons always say what they mean, but they do not always mean what they say. That is, one may be unlearned in the grammar of significant symbols and thus incorrectly choose symbols that do not mean what is intended. Second, the participants in a situation may be quite clear and quite correct in their use of significant symbols, but their intentions are at cross purposes resulting in a clearly understood conflict. Or third, problematicism can arise from the introduction of novelty whereby what one intends is beyond the current grammar or symbols and thus is faced with the task of negotiating new significant symbols. In all three instances the problematic character

would be arising from the action of persons in those situations.

One final concern of symbolic interaction needs consideration since it pulls together all the foregoing. This is the concept of the "act." For Mead (1962), the act is the basic unit for analysis of human behavior (pp. 4-8). The entire preceding discussion of symbolic interaction is of the various aspects of the human act. No one of these aspects, e.g., self-reference or voluntarism, is sensible in and of itself except as it is seen as a component of the human act. Act implies durational and spatial dimensions and it is for this reason that the study of human behavior is a study of a process, a process through time and space.

For Mead (1962) the beginning of the act is an impulse which causes disequilibrium. This leads the person to select out, on the basis of one's images, stimuli that are needed to re-establish equilibrium. The process of selecting stimuli is intelligence and the result is construction of one's own environment (p. 6, fn. 5). It will be recalled that this process of selecting stimuli, of intelligence, of creating an environment, is possible only through the vehicle of significant symbols, which is to say that human action is precluded if there are no symbols.

Moreover, at each succeeding instant in the process of the act, new stimuli, or syntaxes of stimuli, are introduced, having the effect of providing new impulses and thus changing the telos of the act from its original conception. In this manner the person must constantly be adjusting intention to the new stimuli that are constantly being taken into account. This process of moving toward ever-adjusting

goals is the "natural theology" of the act (Mead, 1962, p. 6, fn. 5).

Meltzer's (1972) statement is to the point:

The act, then, encompasses the total process involved in human activity. It is viewed as a complete span of action: Its initial point is an impulse and its terminal point some objective which gives release to the impulse. In between, the individual is in the process of constructing, organizing his behavior. It is during this period that the act undergoes its most significant phase of development. In the case of human behavior, this period is marked by the play of images of possible goals or lines of action upon the impulse, thus directing the activity to its consummation (p. 16).

The foregoing is but a general characterization of symbolic interaction and is, of course, subject to a more detailed explication if other purposes are assumed. Yet for our purposes here it is sufficient in that it does suggest how symbols function in society. By way of summary, the following has been proposed (Meltzer, 1972, pp. 17-18).

The human organism is born into established, on-going society which is understood as symbolic interaction. The human organism begins the process of becoming a person through learning the meaning of significant symbols which allow the emerging person to take the role of others. Without significant symbols, one cannot take the role of others.

Learning the meaning of significant symbols and taking the role of others enables one to share in and to understand the point of view of others; and it is precisely in taking the role of others that the self, the person, emerges. For in order to act toward another person or object necessarily means that one can act towards oneself. This is so in that to act toward another means that one has an

intention, one must be able to indicate it to oneself. This conversation with the self is where the "I" and the "me" emerge, and this emergence allows one to choose how one will act in a situation as distinct from re-acting mindlessly to one's environment. This is the locus of human freedom.

As stated at the beginning of this section, that element of symbolic interaction that is most pertinent to this paper is "problematic meaning." One might, of course, choose other elements as being more fundamental, such as the interpretive basis of human activity (Blumer, 1969, p. 2) or human activity as emergence (Hall, 1972, p. 36). It really is not a matter of correctness at this point in designating the most fundamental element, for it was also noted earlier that all these elements are intertwined into a functional whole that is called the "human act." Thus, when one selects out an element to emphasize, it represents simply one aspect of the same phenomenal whole. It is a matter of which direction from which one wishes to approach a consideration of human action.

In stressing the problematic character of meaning, one may lose sight of another element that is present in symbolic interaction. That element is the commonality of meaning which was discussed above. Without a broad base of non-problematic meanings, communication would be severely limited, if not precluded, and would thereby undercut the possibility of social interaction to any serious extent. By way of perspective, then, the conclusion is that society is a meaning continuum that runs from problematic to non-problematic. It is useful to emphasize the problematic dimension as a corrective

to the common emphasis on non-problematic meaning, even though this in no way proposes ignoring the non-problematic dimension.

IV. THE SYNTHESIS

Thus far, considerable effort has been expended discussing symbols, epistemology, and symbolic interaction under the general rubric of "symbolism." It is now appropriate to draw these discussions together into a synthesis.

This chapter proposed that human behavior is symbolic behavior in that human reality is conceived of and dealt with primarily in terms of symbols. It was further proposed that these symbols basically were of two types: referential and condensational. This distinction of types of symbols comports essentially with the distinction in symbolic interaction between non-problematic and problematic meanings, respectively.

Sapir describes a referential symbol as one about which there is agreed upon meaning or a fairly strong consensus that a given symbol will be used to mean a particular thing. In other words, the likelihood of misunderstanding arising in the use of a referential symbol is not great. For example, among those persons who have learned the Fortran language of computers, there is little confusion as to what the symbols and their syntaxes mean, i.e., what operations they produce in the computer process. It was also suggested earlier that the rather precise meaning of referential symbols is quite similar to many of the definitions of "sign," e.g., unequivocal in meaning, reference function is one-to-one, etc. (although this is not the way in which "sign" was used in defining symbol in this paper, supra,

p. 45). Thus, it is permissible to equate these three ideas so that by "referential symbol" is meant "sign," at least as used generally in the sign/symbol controversy, and relatively non-problematic meaning as used in symbolic interaction.

Sapir characterized condensational symbols as having deep emotional connotations that are "far removed from the original meaning [i.e., referent] of the symbol" (Sapir, 1934). In this case, the possibility of misunderstanding is increased over that of the referential symbol because the person employing the symbol is freer to attribute some meaning other than what the original referent may have been. That is to say, when a referent is not readily available upon which persons can agree that it is a symbol of, then the individual is required to draw more on his own resources in conferring meaning. In terms of the sign/symbol discussion, a condensational symbol is equivocal in meaning because it has multiple and often vague referents. This also is similar to the problematicism of meaning noted by symbolic interaction as arising when the participants in an interaction confer different meanings on the same referent or assign the same symbol to different referents. Here too, then, the equation can be made among these three ideas. Hence, "condensational symbol" is what is meant by "symbol" in the sign/symbol controversy, and what is meant in symbolic interaction by problematic meaning.

Yet to state these equations raises difficulty when considering Mead's understanding of "significant symbol," for he argues that significant symbols are those of which the meaning is shared socially. If this is the case, then would not all symbols that allow

for communication of any kind be "significant" and thus "non-problematic?"

In one sense, yes, but in another, no.

In the first sense, one can say that at some level of communication a symbol is non-problematic in its meaning. The limiting example of this is the communication that one has with oneself. The symbols used are socially derived, are thus "significant," and the meaning attributed is fairly non-problematic. In this case one always "says what one means" or intends. Or even in a small, on-going group there may be such a closeness of identity that a certain body of symbols have essentially the same meaning for all members of the group.

In the second sense, however, significant symbols, although socially derived, are not necessarily non-problematic. Remember, meaning is not something that is fixed prior to a situation of interaction; rather, meaning is constructed in the process of interaction and thus is not fixed. What one does bring to a situation is a socially constructed repertoire of meanings and the possibility of constructing new meanings and of contributing thereby to the social repertoire of meanings. What is constructed in the interaction will be a unique syntax of meaning.

Syntax is the arrangement or order of elements in a phenomenon. Langer (1957, p. 70) notes that the meaning of symbols is a matter of logic or the relationship of the elements of language. In other words, meaning is relational. Thus, two situations may have the same elements, the same socially derived, or significant, symbols, but the elements may also be arranged differently into different syntaxes

and therefore connote different meanings. Or, two persons with unique biographies (and all persons have unique biographies) will have different meanings for the same symbols because their different biographies represent different syntaxes.

The point of this is to clarify that "significant symbol" does not mean an absence of problematic meaning; rather, the significant symbols are the elements out of which syntaxes are constructed, a process that can result in problematicism. It is in this sense that condensational symbol is being used in that syntax results in equivocal meanings of symbols.

V. SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to suggest an understanding of symbolism that grows out of pragmatism and symbolic interaction. In so doing, stress was laid on the fact that epistemologically the distinctively human world is one in which the world-out-there is grasped through symbols. By symbols is meant the combination of sense data from the world-out-there with human-conferred meaning, the latter deriving from one's life experiences which are called "images." It was shown further that the specificity of symbols varies on a continuum from fairly specific, and thus referential, to less specific, and thus condensational.

Next, symbolic interaction was presented as a behavioral explanation of how symbols are created and function in human activity. It was noted that symbolic interaction recognizes that the use of common meanings in communication makes society possible; but it was further noted that symbolic interaction recognizes that

a significant portion of meaning in social interaction is problematic or equivocal and that this seems to be similar to the meaning function of condensational symbols.

A major question that has not been dealt with thus far is, Is the understanding of symbolism proposed in this chapter empirically demonstratable? More specifically, is there an empirically demonstrable distinction between referential and condensational symbols? These questions represent the task of the remaining chapters in this paper.

CHAPTER III

THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF SYMBOLISM

I. INTRODUCTION

Thus far this paper has reviewed the political science literature on political symbols, pointed out the limitations of this literature, moved to a broad consideration of the literature on symbols in general, suggested an alternative understanding of symbols, and linked this understanding to symbolic interaction. Now the question that is to be asked is whether or not this definition is empirically demonstrable. The purpose of this chapter shall be to test the definition of symbol as suggested in Chapter II.

II. HYPOTHESES

In Chapter II it was proposed that what is generally meant by "symbol" by most people is what this paper means by "condensational symbol." It was further suggested that what is characteristic of condensational symbols is the fact that their meanings are problematic in the sense that there is a lack of social consensus as to what they mean and to what they refer, resulting in the user of condensational symbols drawing more on his own interpretative processes in understanding the condensational symbol and that which it represents. As one draws more and more on one's own interpretive understandings or imagery of a condensational symbol, there will result a more diverse understanding of it and its referent relative to other people who

take that same condensational symbol into account. To put the matter in broader terms, it will be remembered from Chapter II that what characterized the "referential symbol" was the greater degree of social consensus as to what it means and to what it refers. This is what is recognized generally as the "non-symbolic."

Now if this is the case, then one would expect that issues that are dealt with in condensational symbolic terms would be those about which there is a lack of consensus and that those issues dealt with in referential symbolic terms are those about which there is a greater degree of consensus. Other writers, moreover, have noted that there are certain areas of political activity that seem to be more susceptible to condensational symbolic modes of discourse than are others. For example, Joseph R. Gusfield's main point in Symbolic Crusade (1963) is that the politics of prohibition in the 19th and 20th centuries was not so much a debate over the instrumental effects of alcohol consumption, although this was part of the debate, as it was a conflict between competing life styles. Those who supported attempts to prohibit the production, distribution, and consumption of beverage alcohol tended to be rural, Protestant, nativists while the opponents of prohibition tended to be urban, non-Protestant, immigrants. In other words, the debate was focused around the question of whose moral point of view and life style would be the dominant one, or at least the legally recognized one. It was also seen in Chapter I that Mitchell and Mitchell (1969) believe that those political issues around which condensational symbols arise are national loyalty and identification, status, and morality. Likewise,

Lasswell (1935) points to the importance of symbols in developing national identity, cohesion, and purpose.

If morality issues are among those that tend to be dealt with in condensational symbolic terms and if condensational symbols are those forms of communication that are problematic, then one would expect that people would deal with moral public issues in terms of condensational symbols that would reflect diversity of opinion, i.e., problematicism. To state the matter in terms of hypotheses, one has the following:

H₁ People tend to deal with the public issue of obscenity primarily in terms of condensational symbols.

H₂ People will differ among themselves on the obscenity issue primarily in terms of condensational symbols.

H₃ People will agree among themselves on the obscenity issue primarily in terms of referential symbols.

Obscenity was chosen as an example of a public moral issue for two reasons. First, this writer has engaged in research in this area and thus would like to continue consideration of the topic. Second, obscenity is a fairly salient public issue about which most people have an opinion and thus makes it a fairly easy area to research.

III. THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD

W. I. Thomas stated: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Merton, 1957, p. 421). Or as Blumer (1956) states it:

We can and, I think, must look upon human group life as chiefly a vast interpretative process in which people, singly and collectively, guide themselves by defining the objects, events, and situations which they encounter. Regularized activity inside this process results from the application of stabilized definitions (p. 686).

Stated differently, people behave according to how they define the world in which they live; in fact, people construct social reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Such a position places a great deal of importance on how people define reality, for such is at the heart of understanding why people behave the way they do.

It will be remembered from Chapter II that symbols, both condensational and referential, are the tools with which the meaning of reality is constructed, communicated, and understood. If one is interested in people's attitudes and behaviors toward obscenity, the point at which to begin is to see how people define the issue of obscenity. The hypotheses stated above in this chapter contend that the task of defining the issue of obscenity will be carried out primarily in terms of condensational symbols and that the condensational symbols will be more salient than referential symbols, to the extent that the latter are used in defining obscenity.

Q-technique provides a means by which one may observe in a systematic way other persons' definitions of a situation. This writer is not aware of any attempt to use Q-technique as a way to test this aspect of symbolic interaction, but that is what is proposed here. Simply put, Q-technique allows a person to construct a verbal picture, a definition, of some specified object according to specified conditions.

Before proceeding with a description of Q-technique, one needs to keep in mind the following consideration. There is a distinction to be made between Q-technique and Q-mythodology (Stephenson, 1953, pp. 16-17). Q-technique refers to the statistical procedures and the operations of design and sorting that constitute the doing of a Q-sort study. It is at this level that most people have evaluated Q and often found it lacking. Q-methodology, on the other hand, refers to the underlying assumptions about human behavior that provide the justification for Q-technique in the first place. Stephenson notes that some of the distinctive constituent elements of Q-methodology are that:

The total person-in-action is our concern. One of our psychological principles is that what is subjective, such as thinking, and what is observable to others, such as playing golf, are in no way distinguishable for scientific purposes. Dreaming is as much behavior as is jumping a stile or dashing a hundred yards. All is a matter of interacting with this or that situation. Inner experience and behavior are thus alike. Both are matters for objective, operational, definition and study (1953, p. 4).

Stephenson's unwillingness to accept the Watsonian distinction between the subjective and the objective (or observable) is quite similar to Mead's central concern in Mind, Self, and Society. There, Mead begins his work by taking J. B. Watson to task and concludes that:

. . . part of the human act lies within the organism and only comes to expression later; it is that side of behavior which I think Watson has passed over. There is a field within the act itself which is not external, but which belongs to the act, and there are characteristics of that inner organic conduct which do reveal themselves in our own attitudes, especially those connected with speech (1962, p. 6).

The point here is that the assumptions about human behavior employed

by symbolic interaction and by Stephenson are similar at important points, and so the use of Q-technique to investigate aspects of symbolic interaction seems to be justified. The point also is that a judgment of Q-technique is inadequate if it does not take into account the methodological assumptions that underlie the technique. This, for example, is the deficiency in Kerlinger's exposition of Q-technique (1973, pp. 582-600).

How does Q-technique work? First, it is to be remembered that the concern is to see how people self-refer themselves to a particular object, and so the modes of self-reference are decisive. In Q-technique such modes of self-reference usually take the form of statements with which the subjects in the study will describe themselves. In order for this self-reference to be of use, it is desirable that the statements used be fairly representative of the universe of statements that might be made about the object under consideration. In the case at point, the object is obscenity, and so the first task is to select statements that are representative of the universe of statements about obscenity.

An additional consideration in selecting the statements should be kept in mind. As Stephenson (1953) notes, there should be some theoretical reason for the Q-study being done, for this theoretical concern will inform the selection of statements (p. 18). With this in mind, one can revise the position in the previous paragraph to say that the statements should be representative of the theoretical universe of statements that might be made about obscenity. Thus, the theoretical concern in this study is expressed in the earlier stated

hypotheses as follows. People will deal with obscenity primarily in condensational symbolic terms, regardless of whether or not they oppose it and wish to regulate or prohibit it or if they are opposed to regulation of obscenity. This results in the following theoretical possibilities of statement types: (1) anti-obscenity in a condensational symbolic mode; (2) anti-control in a condensational symbolic mode; (3) anti-obscenity in a referential symbolic mode; and (4) anti-control in a referential symbolic mode. The concern, then, is to develop a Q-sample that is representative of these four possible combinations, and the resulting sample is what is referred to as a structured sample (Stephenson, 1953, pp. 66-79).

One should have no problem understanding the distinction between the anti-obscenity and anti-control of obscenity positions. What may be less clear, however, is the distinction between condensational and referential symbols. In Chapter II the main theoretical distinction was made according to the criteria of problematicism and concreteness in which condensational symbols were held to be more problematic and less concrete than referential symbols. In order to test this distinction, one must select statements that are more and less problematic and concrete.

The basis for distinguishing the symbolic modes in selecting statements was as follows. Statements that appealed to what this writer judged to be vague authorities such as the Constitution, moral character, individual rights, etc., were considered condensational in mode. The basis for this judgment was that the literature indicates that these appeals are not unequivocal in their connotations. The

referential mode was attributed to statements that were either straight-forward, instrumental statements, such as the effectiveness of obscenity legislation with regard to minors, or statements that appealed to professional judgments about mental health and obscenity. A word of caution is needed here, for there is, indeed, much equivocation in some quarters about the relationship of mental health and obscenity. Yet, these statements were used as referential ones because it is quite difficult to identify referential statements that are mainly instrumental and concrete in focus.

The sources of the statements for the Q-sample in this study are varied, ranging from books and articles to personal interviews. Several statements were selected from United States Supreme Court decisions in the area of obscenity; books and articles were surveyed for fairly straightforward declarative statements on obscenity; and finally three clergy and four students were interviewed by this writer, the interviews being taped and played later for the selection of statements. This process resulted in 143 statements from which 60 were selected. But why not use the remaining 83 statements? The consideration is this. In order to avoid experimental fatigue, it is generally felt that no more than 100 statements should be included in a Q-sample. On the other hand, there must be enough statements representative of the theoretical design of the sample to allow the subjects freedom to construct their own model of the obscenity issue. This latter concern is crucial, for the theoretical design represents the researcher's model of obscenity, but the concern is to tap the model of other people. Thus the theoretical design that

structures the Q-sample of this study has four types of statements that are replicated 15 times for a total of 60 statements (see Appendix A for the statements and their sources).

Once the statements have been selected, the next consideration in designing this experiment was selection of the people who would actually do the Q-sort. This P-sample, as it is called, may or may not require structuring to the extent found necessary in the Q-sample. If one's theoretical framework says something about the type of people and how they might deal with the object being studied, then there should be a structured P-sample. For example, Nimmo and Savage (1976), in studying candidate images in the 1970 U.S. senatorial campaign in Missouri, used an equal number of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in their P-sample (pp. 229-231).

In this study of obscenity, however, the hypotheses say nothing about the type of person and how he might deal with obscenity; on the contrary, the theoretical position is that the type of person makes no difference to the substantiation of the theory. Presumably, then, if the hypotheses are correct, any P-sample selected at random would produce the same results. There is, however, some theoretical consideration represented in the P-sample used in this study. That concern was to try to insure that there would be persons included in the P-sample who could be expected to be opposed to obscenity and those who could be expected to be opposed to the regulation of obscenity. For this purpose, clergy were included as those who might oppose obscenity and reading teachers in Knox County public schools were included as those who might be expected to oppose restrictions

on access to obscene materials. In addition to clergy and reading teachers, college students were included as representatives of the general public. Indeed, college students do not represent the general public, for a majority of the public does not and has not attended college; but in this case they were more likely not to have been socialized into the norms of a profession or career, a factor that might figure into their attitudes toward obscenity as is more likely in the case of clergy and teachers.

Selection of the P-sample was as follows. Twelve clergy, known to this writer, were contacted by telephone and asked to participate in the Q-study. The selection of clergy took into account large and small churches, young and old clergy, urban and rural patterns of where these clergy have tended to serve, and whether or not they were actually serving in a local parish. All 12 clergy had B.A. and M. Div. degrees, one had an additional advanced degree in theology, two had Ph.D. degrees, and one was a Ph.D. candidate. All the clergy were male. After securing oral agreements from them to do the study, each of the 12 was sent a letter explaining the nature of the study, a letter from their supervisor (District Superintendent of the Knoxville District, United Methodist Church) verifying this writer's status as a Ph.D. student doing doctoral research, a deck of 60 statements, a set of instructions explaining how to do the Q-sort, a score sheet for recording their Q-sorts, and a stamped, self-addressed envelop for returning the score sheet (see Appendix B). Eleven of the 12 clergy did the Q-sort.

The teachers selected were secured by this writer's wife who supervises reading teachers in Knox County public schools. Of the 12, 11 were female. All 12 had at least a bachelor's degree, six had master's degrees and one held a Doctorate in Education degree. Once these 12 had agreed orally to do the Q-sort, each was mailed the same materials as were the clergy, except for the letter from the clergys' supervisor. All 12 teachers did the Q-sort.

The students selected for the study are enrolled at Maryville College. Forty-eight students were contacted by mail rather than by telephone or in person. The 48 were chosen with the following design in mind. Twenty-four were male and 24 were female; 12 were freshmen, 12 were sophomores, 12 were juniors, and 12 were seniors; 8 were majoring in disciplines in the humanities, 8 in the social sciences, 8 in sciences, 8 in business, 8 in education, and 8 in interpreting for the deaf. Forty-eight were contacted because it was anticipated that no more than 50 percent would respond to an inquiry by mail. The mailed inquiry explained who I was, what I was doing, and asked them to indicate a time when they could meet in the college library to do a Q-sort (see Appendix B). The response was 37.5 percent, or 18 students. Of these, 10 were male and eight were female; there were two freshmen, five sophomores, six juniors and five seniors; areas of study represented were four in humanities, four in the social sciences, two in science, one in business, four in education, two in interpreting and one was undecided. All the above combined to constitute a P-sample of N= 41.

One final matter of research design is the Q-sort instrument itself. Each person in the P-sample was asked to sort the deck of 60 statements on an 11 point continuum that represented the two extremes of "Most Uncharacteristic" to "Most Characteristic" of the person's point of view on obscenity (see Appendix B, "Score sheet"). The condition of the sort was to sort the statements according to how characteristic or uncharacteristic each statement was of the person's personal point of view of the obscenity issue. Each point on the continuum has a prescribed number of statements that can be placed there and is so indicated under each column in parenthesis. This, of course, is a forced distribution, and has been a point of concern for many. A case can be made for either forced or free distribution, but this study will use the forced (Brown, 1971, pp. 283-287). As Washington (1976) points out, there are two advantages in using the forced distribution. First, the subjects are forced to make some hard decisions about the statements that could be avoided in a free distribution situation. Second, the forced distribution results in identical means and standard deviations for all the subjects, thus facilitating further statistical analysis of the data (p. 147). If one were to do a factor analysis of the data after a free distribution, the data would need to be weighted in order to construct a normal distribution of the data. Thus, it seems more efficient to build in the normal distribution in the actual sorting process in the first place.

A final consideration is in order in discussing the sort distribution of the statements. The result of the sort is an ordinal

scale in which the statements are ranked one through 11, and yet the statistical method of analysis is Pearson's product moment correlation and factor analysis, both assuming interval scale data. Is factor analysis, therefore, a permissible technique to employ in a Q-study? Brown (1971) demonstrates that the use of ordinal and of interval data in Pearson's r (which is a preliminary step in doing a factor analysis) produces virtually the same results. Thus, there seems to be no compelling reason not to use factor analysis in Q-studies.

IV. THE EXPERIMENT

Once the Q-sorts were completed, they were scored for purposes of analysis. Statements in the "Most Uncharacteristic" column (-5) were assigned a score of 1, those in the "Most Characteristic" column (+5) were assigned a score of 11, and each column in between was assigned a respective score, moving left to right, of 2 through 10. These statement scores become the observations of the study and persons who did the sorts are the variables. The data were then coded for computer analysis. The factor analysis was done by means of a computer program call QUANL 1975.¹ This program provides for generation of up to 10 factors, provides principle components, extended vector, and simple structure matrixes, and allows for orthogonal and oblique rotations.

¹This computer source program was written by N. Van Tubergen of the University of Kentucky.

The analysis began with orthogonal and oblique rotations, no specified number of factors sought, with an eigenvalue of 1.00. A satisfactory solution did not result in either case. The analysis did suggest that a common variance test recommended a five factor solution, the scree test a three factor solution, and the Humphrey test a two factor solution. The next step was to run three and five factor orthogonal and oblique solutions, none of which was satisfactory in explaining the variance of the data. The two factor oblique solution reverted to a two factor orthogonal solution. The two factor orthogonal solution was judged the best solution for these data.

The two factor solution provides the following results. Factor One explains 27.88 percent of the total variance and 56.93 percent of the variance within the two factor solution. Factor Two explains 21.09 percent of the total variance and 43.07 percent of the variance within the two factor solution. Humphrey's test suggests that both factors are meaningful. The two factors correlate at $-.239$, further suggesting that they are quite distinct factors.

V. THE RESULTS

The QUANL program provides a list of the 60 statements arranged in descending order according to Z scores for each factor. This array is the representative Q-sort for people who load on that particular factor. Also it is to be recalled that the "Score Sheet" indicating the distribution for sorting the statements had three statements in each of the two extreme columns and four statements

each in the two columns next to the extremes. The six statements in the two extreme columns represent 10 percent of the statements and the 14 statements in the four extreme columns represent just over 23 percent of the statements. It is to be recalled further that the statements placed at or toward the extremes are more salient than those that occur more toward the middle of the distribution. Thus, if one were to select the top seven and bottom seven statements in each factor array of statements, one would have the most salient statements that typify those factors. That is what has been done in Table I for the first factor.

Teacher Factor: Total Sample

An analysis of the Factor One array of statements reveals that persons associated with this position are reluctant to place restraints on the availability of obscene materials. Because a majority of teachers load on this factor, it will be called the "Teacher Factor." The most salient statement, #47, for this factor is one that notes the ambiguity in understanding the influence of obscene materials on those who expose themselves to it. The second statement, #34, invokes the American heritage of constitutional protection of individual liberties. The third statement, #42, invokes the authority of freedom of moral choice. These three statements would be placed in the extreme right column of the "Score Sheet." The next four statements represent those that would have received a score of +4 on the "Score Sheet." Of these, the first one, #46, appeals to protecting others' rights while leaving them freedom in the area of morality. The second one, #26, cites the authority of

TABLE I

TEACHER FACTOR DESCRIPTION OF OBSCENITY: N=21

Statement Number	Iten Description	Score
47	Responses to literature are highly variable and subjective, so there is no way to determine the effect of a given piece of literature upon a particular person. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+5
34	Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+5
42	People should have open to them the moral choice about the kind of erotic lives they will live, the kind of print they will read, the kind of enactments on stage and screen and elsewhere they will take the trouble to see. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+5
46	In our law-rooted society, we are not the keeper of our brother's morals--only of his rights. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4
26	If the First Amendment means anything, it means that the state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4
49	Obscenity laws should restrict the public access juveniles have to sex-related materials so as to allow parental authority to be exercised with regard to such materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+4
56	Juvenile delinquency is more a result of socialization than of exposure to obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4

TABLE I (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Score
33	Sexual intimacy as represented in obscene materials should be prohibited out of simple respect and regard for the dark secret things of life--that they should be inviolable, and guarded by the two who take part, and that no other presence should be invited. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
39	The desire to expose oneself to obscene materials represents infantile sexual and sadistic desires. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
59	Reading obscene material encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex and interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for the opposite sex. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
19	Obscenity causes sex crimes. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
17	If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship of obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5
27	Obscenity causes juvenile delinquency. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5
5	Poor people more likely will indulge in antisexual behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5

the First Amendment as protecting one in the privacy of one's home against governmental intrusion into what one reads. The third statement, #49, with a score of +4 would restrict juvenile access to obscene materials in order to buttress parental authority over what their children read or see. The final statement, #56, attributes juvenile delinquency to socialization rather than to exposure to obscene materials.

Of these seven statements rated highest by the Teacher Factor, five are opposed to imposing controls on obscenity. The remaining two came from sources that were opposed to obscenity. Of these two, statement #47 is more a judgment of fact than it is a judgment of moral value. The other anti-obscenity statement, #49, appealed to the value of parental authority and is thus an important competing value with that of free expression. It should be noted, however, that #49 is only sixth in rank order in the typal array. The primary pattern of statements on the characteristic end of the Teacher Factor is an appeal to individual freedom of choice in the area of obscenity and to the legal-constitutional guarantees that underpin such freedom.

The salient statements at the negative end of the Teacher Factor array reveal a somewhat different pattern than does the positive end. The most salient statement, #5, with a score of -5, associates the ill effects of obscenity with social class. The next most salient statement, #27, identifies obscenity as a cause of juvenile delinquency. The third one, #17, sets forth a necessary link between the quality of American democracy and the need for censorship. The fourth most salient one, #19, identifies obscenity

as a cause of sex crimes. Statement #59 suggests that obscenity detracts from the development of healthy attitudes toward sex. Statement #39 characterizes an interest in obscenity as infantile and sadistic. Finally, #33 sees sex as something that should be private.

All seven negative statements for the Teacher Factor are taken from anti-obscenity sources, which is to be expected. The primary pattern of rejected definitions of obscenity for this factor is positive correlations of obscenity with antisocial behavior, unhealthy sex attitudes, economic class susceptibility, and with a desirable quality of life in American democracy.

Clergy Factor: Total Sample

Factor Two, which will be called the "Clergy Factor" because a majority of the clergy loaded on this factor, reveals a quite different array of statements than found in the Teacher Factor (see Table II). All seven of the positively salient statements are derived from anti-obscenity sources. The first three, with a score of +5, are as follow. The most salient statement, #37, holds the protection of innocent minors as being more important than constitutional protection of communication. Statement #13 associates obscenity with the incident of unworthy traits of character. Statement #53 views obscenity as a danger to the moral fabric of society. The most salient statement with a score of +4, #57, asserts society's right to protect the minds of members of society. Statement #21 sees morality as a necessary condition for the well-being of the nation. Statement #41 again places the protection of

TABLE II

CLERGY FACTOR DESCRIPTION OF OBSCENITY: N=20

Statement Number	Item Description	Score
37	I think in these times with this terrible increase of juvenile delinquency, with this immensely profitable flood of pornography, using techniques never before available to the seducers of the innocent, I think it is nonsense to say that we are so bound by a very extreme interpretation of the freedom of the press that we cannot act. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+5
13	An obscenity-saturated literary environment could function as one factor in the activation and reinforcement of unworthy traits of character. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+5
53	It is not unreasonable, in our present state of knowledge, to consider that pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct which a state may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+5
57	Society has the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+4
21	Just as loyalty is essential to the well-being of a nation, so some sense of morality is essential to the well-being of a nation, and to the healthy life of the community; and accordingly, anyone who seeks, by his writing to corrupt that fundamental sense of morality is guilty of obscene libel. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+4
41	I do not believe that in order to protect the fundamental liberties of the press we have to turn our children, who are, in a sense, the ward of all our society, over to the kind of visual exploitation of base emotion, and the arousal of base emotion to which, of course, this pornographic literature, these films and cards, and	

TABLE II (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Score
	all the rest are directed. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+4
45	Obscenity violates one's right of privacy, the right to protection against intrusion by unwanted materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+4
22	Any regulation of obscenity will encroach upon the constitutional prohibition against any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-4
38	Censorship of obscene material curtails the right of the individual, be he creator or consumer, to satisfy his intellect and his interest without harm. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-4
20	The obscene is that which disturbs the sexually insecure. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-4
2	Adults should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess and consume whatever communicative materials may appeal to them. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-4
5	Poor people more likely will indulge in anti-sexual behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5
50	The idea behind censorship of obscenity is contrary to every principle that this country was built on. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-5
24	Obscenity is a crime for which there is no victim, and so it should not be illegal. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-5

children higher than the constitutional guarantee of free communication. Finally, #45 takes the position that obscenity violates one's right to privacy. The primary content pattern of these characteristic statements for the Clergy Factor is one that appeals to the role of morality in the to be desired lives of individual and society.

The most salient negative statement for the Clergy Factor is #24 which says that obscenity is a victimless crime. The second statement with a score of -5 is #50 which says that obscenity censorship is contrary to the principles of the United States. The last statement with a -5 score, #5, associates a greater negative effect of obscenity on poor people than on the non-poor. The most salient statement with a -4 score is #2 which states that adults should have complete freedom in the area of obscenity. Statement #20 sees only the sexually insecure as being bothered by obscenity. Statement #38 judges censorship as a violation of the right to harmless pursuit of obscenity. The last statement with a score of -4, #22, sees any regulation of obscenity as a violation of the First Amendment. One of these seven negative statements, #5, is taken from an anti-obscenity source; the remaining six are from anti-control sources. The primary content pattern of these uncharacteristic statements for the Clergy Factor is rejection of statements that define obscenity as harmless, that see censorship as undemocratic, and that implicitly assert individual freedom as being unlimited in the area of obscenity, especially in light of the First Amendment.

Elites and Non-Elites

The discussion thus far assumes that the two factors generated from the data represent two populations. Yet 44 percent of the P-sample is made up of students while the remaining 56 percent is comprised of professionals. If one were to label the teachers and clergy as "elites" and the students as "non-elites," separate the total sample of $N=41$ into two sub-samples of Elites ($N=23$) and Non-Elites ($N=18$), and perform a two factor orthogonal solution on each of the sub-samples, would significant differences result between the resulting Clergy factors and Teacher factors? This possibility is suggested in light of a discussion of the data with a graduate seminar in political science at the University of Tennessee, October 22, 1979. It will be remembered that earlier in this chapter (p. 77) it was stated that no particular theoretical point of view informed the design of the P-sample except that of trying to make sure that conflicting points of view would be represented. But in doing this, there unintentionally was constructed a P-sample comprised of elites and non-elites.

It was noted in Chapter I that writers such as Lasswell and Edelman understand condensational symbols to be the vehicles by which elites manipulate non-elites into doing what the former desire. If this is true, then one would expect elites to deal with public policy issues that are pertinent to them in terms of referential symbols (i.e., in terms of what things "really are"), at least to the extent that such dealings were self-referential. It would follow, moreover, from Lasswell and Edelman that non-elites would deal with public

issues in condensational symbolic terms not only for public reference but for self-reference as well.

If this be the case, then the Q-sort that was performed by the total sample for this study is amenable to testing the position of Lasswell and Edelman. Thus, the following becomes the fourth hypothesis of this study:

- H4 The elite sub-sample will deal with the obscenity issue primarily in terms of referential symbols whereas the non-elite sub-sample will deal with it primarily in terms of condensational symbols.

To test this hypothesis, the total sample was divided into two sub-samples: Elite sub-sample, $N=23$; Non-Elite sub-sample, $N=18$. Each sub-sample was then factor analyzed according to orthogonal, two factor parameters. The results for each sub-sample were an anti-obscenity and an anti-control factor. That is to say, the Elite sub-sample had an anti-obscenity and an anti-control factor with clergy generally loading on the former and teachers on the latter. In the Non-Elite sub-sample the anti-obscenity and anti-control factors also emerge, and the students who loaded on these respective factors in the total sample analysis essentially loaded on the same factors in the Non-Elite sub-sample analysis. Thus, four factors are now under consideration: Elite Teachers ($N=11$) comprised primarily of teachers opposed to control; Elite Clergy ($N=12$) comprised primarily of clergy opposed to obscenity; Non-Elite Teachers ($N=9$) comprised of students opposed to control; and Non-Elite Clergy ($N=9$) comprised of students opposed to obscenity. As one can see, just as there was a fairly even split in the total sample (Teacher = $N=21$;

Clergy = $N=20$); also in the split fairly even in the sub-samples (Elite Teacher = $N=11$, Elite Clergy = $N=12$; Non-Elite Teacher = $N=9$, Non-Elite Clergy = $N=9$).

The stability of the factors in the total sample and the sub-samples is attested to by the fact that only three persons move from one factor to the other as a result of factoring sub-samples rather than the total sample. One clergy who loaded on the Clergy factor in the total sample moved to the Teacher factor when the Elite sub-sample was factored. Two students who loaded on the Teacher factor in the total sample moved to the Clergy factor when the Non-Elite sub-sample was factored. This is probably accounted for by the fact that the purity of their factor loadings was the lowest for their respective factors in the total sample analysis. Thus, the clergy person who moved to the Teacher factor in the sub-sample analysis had a purity loading in the total sample analysis of only .608. The two students who moved from the Teacher factor to the Clergy factor had purity loadings in the total sample of only .667 and .551.

Once the two factor solution was generated for each of the sub-samples, the salient statements characterizing the factors were analyzed, resulting again in Clergy and Teacher factors for each sub-sample. Then the Clergy factors from the Elite and Non-Elite sub-samples were submitted to a t test; likewise, the Teacher factors from the Elite and Non-Elite sub-samples were so tested. The results of the t tests are as follows.

The t ratio for the Clergy factors was 2.082, which is significant at the .05 level (1.729) using the one-tail test, and at

.10 level (1.729) using the two-tail test. Traditionally, for the t ratio to be considered "significant," i.e., beyond the realm of chance, the .05 level must be achieved (Phillips, 1973, p. 85). This level is achieved only in the case of the one-tail test. The one-tail test of significance is appropriate, however, only when the hypothesis being tested predicts the direction of difference (Phillips, 1973, p. 85), and in this instance no such prediction is made. Thus, the two-tail test must be used here, and it has been seen that significance is achieved only at the .10 level. One may conclude, therefore, that the differences in means between the Elite and Non-Elite Clergy is within the realm of chance. That is to say that one is not justified in treating the Clergy factors as if they were drawn from two different populations. Thus, in terms of factor arrays, the Elite and Non-Elite Clergy are not separable based on the results of the t test.

The t ratio for the Teacher factors suggest a different conclusion. The t ratio for the Teacher factors is 15.695 which is significant at the .001 level (3.922) using the two-tail test. Statistically, two different populations are involved here. Thus the two Teacher factors are sorting their statements in significantly different manners. By contrast, the Clergy factors are not. In conclusion, then, there has been identified three populations: (1) Clergy; (2) Elite Teachers; and (3) Non-Elite Teachers. Since the Clergy factor has already been looked at, the discussion will now look at the two Teacher factors.

Teacher Factors: Elite and Non-Elites

An analysis of the content of the Elite and Non-Elite Teacher factors does not reveal as significant a difference as the t ratio suggests, or at least in terms of the salient statements. The most salient statement, #47, for the Elite Teacher Factor (see Table III) asserts that the effect of obscene material is variable, implying that categorical conclusions about the effects of obscenity are unwarranted. The second statement, #34, points out the incongruity between America's constitutional heritage and government efforts to control the minds of citizens by means of censorship. The third +5 statement, #56, understands juvenile delinquency to be a function of one's socialization in general rather than of obscene materials. The remaining four salient statements invoke the values of a free society, individual moral choice, and the sanctity of one's home against state intrusion, and assert the judgment that obscenity does not demonstrably affect community standards. The clearest pattern here is a concern with the effect of obscenity and with offering alternative accounts for the cause of anti-social behavior. Secondly, there is a pattern of appeal to the values of the constitution and freedom of individual choice.

The uncharacteristic end of the statement array for Elite Teacher is as follows. The most uncharacteristic statement, #5, links increased ill-effects of obscenity with being economically poor. The second most salient statement, #27, asserts that obscenity can cause juvenile delinquency. The third statement, #17, equates the high quality of democracy with the necessity of censorship. The

TABLE III

TEACHER DESCRIPTION OF OBSCENITY: ELITE SUB-SAMPLE, N=11

Statement Number	Item Description	Score
47	Responses to literature are highly variable and subjective, so there is no way to determine what will be the effect of a given piece of literature upon a particular person. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+5
34	Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+5
56	Juvenile delinquency is more a result of socialization than of exposure to obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	+5
26	If the First Amendment means anything, it means that the state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4
42	People should have open to them the moral choice about the kind of erotic lives they will live, the kind of print they will read, the kind of enactments on stage and screen and elsewhere they will take the trouble to see. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4
8	It is by no means clear that obscene literature is a significant factor in influencing substantial deviations from community standards. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4
14	The right to receive information and ideas regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4

TABLE III (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Score
3	There is a proven relationship between erotica and antisocial sexual behavior, and thus government control of such materials is legitimate. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
59	Reading obscene material encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex and interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for the opposite sex. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
33	Sexual intimacy as represented in obscene materials should be prohibited out of simple respect and regard for the dark secret things of life--that they should be inviolable, and guarded by the two who take part, and that no other presence should be invited. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
19	Obscenity causes sex crimes. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
17	If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship of obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5
27	Obscenity causes juvenile delinquency. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5
5	Poor people more likely will indulge in anti-sexual behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5

remaining statements, the -4's, link obscenity with sex crimes, anti-social behavior, and unhealthy attitudes toward sex, and contend that sex should be private. The primary pattern in these statements is still an instrumental one as regards the effects of obscenity.

The Non-Elite Teacher Factor (see Table IV) rates statement #42 highest with its invocation of the right of individual moral choice. The second statement, #34, is the stated disparity between American constitutional values and attempts by the state, through censorship, to control the minds of citizens. The third most salient statement, #47, notes the variable effect of obscenity on different persons. The remaining four statements appeal to the values of legal rights, parental authority, and the sanctity of one's home, and state the need for proof that obscenity causes anti-social behavior. The primary pattern here is one of appeal to constitutional values that protect the individual against interference from the state. The secondary pattern is more descriptive-instrumental, revealing a question of the effects of obscenity on people.

The uncharacteristic statements of the Non-Elite Teacher Factor differ little from the Elite Teacher Factor. The first three salient, uncharacteristic statements are the same for the two Teacher factors with only the order differing, the second and third statements being interchanged. In terms of the -4 statements, two are different. The Non-Elite Teachers rank fifth the statement, #39, that interest in obscenity is infantile and sadistic. In the seventh rank the Non-Elite Teachers place statement #57 which states that society legitimately may seek to protect an individual's mind. The primary

TABLE IV

TEACHER DESCRIPTION OF OBSCENITY: NON-ELITE SUB-SAMPLE, N=9

Statement Number	Item Description	Score
42	People should have open to them the moral choice about the kind of erotic lives they will live, the kind of print they will read, the kind of enactments on stage and screen and elsewhere they will take the trouble to see. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+5
34	Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+5
47	Responses to literature are highly variable and subjective, so there is no way to determine what will be the effect of a given piece of literature upon a particular person. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+5
46	In our law-rooted society, we are not the keeper of our brother's morals--only of his rights. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4
40	Any governmental restriction or punishment of any form of expression on the ground of obscenity must require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that such an expression would directly cause, in a normal adult, behavior which has validly been made criminal by statute. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	+4
49	Obscenity laws should restrict the public access juveniles have to sex-related materials so as to allow parental authority to be exercised with regard to such materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	+4
26	If the First Amendment means anything, it means that the state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	<u>4</u>

TABLE IV (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Score
57	Society has the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
59	Reading obscene material encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex and interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for the opposite sex. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
39	The desire to expose oneself to obscene materials represents infantile sexual and sadistic desires. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
19	Obscenity causes sex crimes. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-4
27	Obscenity causes juvenile delinquency. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5
17	If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship of obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5
5	Poor people more likely will indulge in anti-sexual behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-5

pattern found here is also an instrumental focus on the effects of obscenity.

A comparison between the two Teacher factors, then, indicates that the primary pattern of statements for the Elite Teachers is instrumental in focus while only secondarily being concerned with constitutional values. The Non-Elite Teachers, however, are primarily concerned with the constitutional values and only secondarily with the instrumental focus on the effects of obscenity. When the Clergy Factor is added, one sees that persons on this factor are more concerned with moral standards and thus are more open to placing limitations on free communication procedures in society. What is it, however, that is the basis of these three different groups of people? To pursue this question, the discussion will now turn to a consideration of the P-samples as it relates to the content of the factor arrays.

The P-Samples

A discussion of why different people define a situation in different ways need not deal in matters of causality; indeed, this writer prefers not to so deal. To explain something may lead to understanding without leading to a knowledge of causality. With this distinction in mind between "understanding" and "cause," the discussion will suggest an understanding of why the data suggest three different definitions of obscenity.

In Chapter II the discussion of symbolic interaction suggested that the way in which a human being becomes a person is through the process of learning a repertoire of significant symbols. Through this process one not only comes to understand others around one, but

also to understand oneself. Groups of people, then, are "communities" that share the same grammar of symbols. As Kuhn (1964) points out:

Thus category membership is in any social system a derivative matter. It is the group or groups with whom one feels identified which are the source of the very vocabulary creating the categories and their meanings. Therefore, the other with whom one has a we-feeling, that is, a self which includes him, is an altogether different kind of other than the one with whom one shares a similar age or sex or number of years of overseas service. The dynamics for the support or modification of the self and, therefore, the dynamics for the organization and redirection of action, lie in one's group relationships. They will only refer to his category assignments (p. 15).

It is in terms of Kuhn's statement that this writer wishes to avoid discussions of causality as they pertain to the "significant correlations" of socio-economic variables to perceived behaviors. The notion of being a part of a group is much more than shared socio-economic characteristics; indeed, as Kuhn points out, it is the sharing of a world view, of a grammar of meaning, that constitutes groups. This, of course, is precisely the rationale for using Q in this study, for it allows one to tap the world view other people.

The understanding, then, of why there are three definitions of obscenity in the data is based on the idea that there are three symbol grammars which assert three different definitions of the obscenity issue.

At this point one can combine the two Teacher factors for the purposes of discussion since they are both opposed to the control of obscenity. This leaves one with two definitions of obscenity: Teacher and Clergy. In the case of the Teacher definition, one may say that there is a "teacher grammar" of which freedom of choice

in selecting reading materials is but one of many expectations. The persons who loaded on this factor are those who have as part of their world view that individual freedom in reading is important. But why is such the case? One can never know the cause completely, but Mead says that the process of the mind is one that seeks to establish equilibrium between the organism and its environment (1962, p. 6, fn. 5). The difficulty in finding the "cause" for this particular grammar is compounded when one adds the element of the "I," that unsocialized, spontaneous, voluntaristic component of the person. The same, of course, can be said of the "clergygrammar" or of any other grammar one may encounter.

Where does such an explanation leave one? In the estimate of some, no where really. But what this explanation suggests is that the understanding of different grammars comes not from correlations of SES data so much as it comes from a recognition that people define and construct their own behaviors. This is what is to be grasped in understanding different groups or different symbol grammars. In other words, what the two or three different definitions of obscenity in this study represent is three different lines of human action or situation definitions rather than the result of a S-O-R model of behavior. More will be said in this regard in Chapter IV.

The Symbolic Modes

The discussion of the results of the experiment so far has been limited to the content of the statements in the typal arrays and to a cursory comment on why there are different definitions of the obscenity issue. One will recall, however, that the thrust of the

four hypotheses is in terms of the mode of symbolism used to define the obscenity issue. Thus, the discussion now will consider the modes of definition.

Table V shows the extent of the use of the two symbolic modes in the factor arrays. It will be noticed that the Elite/Non-Elite Clergy distinction is being employed here whereas earlier it was not. This is because the earlier concern was with differences in means between the Elite and Non-Elite Clergy factors, a difference that was found to be insignificant and thus was not pursued. The concern now, however, is with the frequency of use of a particular symbolic mode. As one can see, there are differences in the extent to which condensational and referential symbols are used, but are these differences significant? To answer this question, the chi-square test of significance was used for the following combinations. With the columns of the 2x2 chi-square matrix always being condensational symbols and referential symbols, and with the chi-square always being applied to the seven, salient, characteristic statements and then to the seven, salient, uncharacteristic statements, the following row combinations were used: (1) Clergy and Teacher factors, total sample; (2) Elite and Non-Elite Clergy factors; (3) Elite and Non-Elite Teacher factors; (4) Elite Clergy and Teacher factors; (5) Non-Elite Clergy and Teacher factors; (6) Elite Teacher and Non-Elite Clergy factors; and (7) Non-Elite Teachers and Elite Clergy factors. The results for each of these tests are found in Table VI. There were no significant differences among the groups compared as to the frequency with which the symbolic modes were used.

TABLE V
PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF SYMBOLIC MODES

Statements		<u>Characteristic</u>		<u>Uncharacteristic</u>	
Persons		Cond.*	Ref*	Cond	Ref
Clergy	Total*	100%	0%	71%	29%
	Elite*	86%	14%	86%	14%
	Non-Elite*	86%	14%	43%	57%
Teacher	Total	71%	29%	43%	57%
	Elite	57%	43%	43%	57%
	Non-Elite	71%	29%	43%	57%

*Cond = Condensational symbolic mode

Ref = Referential symbolic mode

Total = Total P-sample, N=41

Elite = Teacher-Clergy P-sample, N=23

Non-Elite = Student P-Sample, N=18

TABLE VI
CHI-SQUARE SCORES FOR SYMBOLIC MODES

	Characteristic	Uncharacteristic
Total: Clergy and Teacher	2.334	1.160
Clergy: Elite and Non-Elite	0.000	2.800
Teacher: Elite and Non-Elite	0.312	0.000
Elite: Clergy and Teacher	1.400	2.800
Non-Elite: Clergy and Teacher	0.424	0.000
Elite Teacher Non-Elite Clergy	1.400	0.000
Non-Elite Teacher Elite Clergy	0.424	2.800

$$\chi^2 = 3.841$$

$$p < .05$$

$$df = 1$$

The importance of this finding is seen in light of the first and fourth hypotheses. The first hypothesis stated that persons, regardless of how they define obscenity, will tend to define in terms of condensational symbols. This is the case for all of the characteristic, salient statements and for some of the uncharacteristic, salient statements. In the case of the latter, each sample is but one statement away from using a majority of the salient statements in the condensational mode.

The fourth hypothesis proposed that elites would define obscenity in the referential mode whereas the non-elites would employ the condensational mode. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. Indeed, in those negative typal arrays where the referential mode tends to dominate, it is the Non-Elite factors that use the referential mode along with the Elite Teachers. The Elite Clergy use the condensational mode for both the characteristic and the uncharacteristic arrays. When one considers the total sample, the Teacher Factor in the uncharacteristic typification is the only instance in which the referential mode dominates, and even then it is a weak dominance.

The second and third hypotheses also are concerned with the symbolic mode of definition. The second hypothesis states that the symbolic mode of differences will be primarily condensational. Table VII lists those statements over which the Teacher and Clergy factors for the total sample differed the most. The plus and minus signs are disregarded and the statements listed in descending order. The first 14 statements are used since this is equal to the number of salient statements that have been analyzed in the typal arrays.

TABLE VII
 STATEMENTS HAVING MOST Z-SCORE DIFFERENCES:
 TOTAL SAMPLE, $N=41$

Statement Number	Item Description	Z- Score
59	Reading obscene material encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex and interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for the opposite sex. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.69
57	Society has the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.50
17	If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship of obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.43
13	An obscenity-saturated literary environment could function as one factor in the activation and reinforcement of unworthy traits of character. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.42
37	I think in these times with this terrible increase of juvenile delinquency, with this immensely profitable flood of pornography, using techniques never before available to the seducers of the innocent, I think it is nonsense to say that we are so bound by a very extreme interpretation of the freedom of the press that we cannot act. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.35
38	Censorship of obscene material curtails the right of the individual, be he creator or consumer, to satisfy his intellect and his interest without harm. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.30

TABLE VII (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	$\bar{Z}$ - Score
2	Adults should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess and consume whatever communicative materials may appeal to them. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.23
46	In our law-rooted society, we are not the keeper of our brother's morals--only of his rights. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.19
55	Pornography reduces or removes the empathy and the mutual identification which restrains us from treating each other merely as objects or means. Without such empathy, we are not human to each other. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.14
21	Just as loyalty is essential to the well-being of a nation, some sense of morality is essential to the well-being of a nation, and to the healthy life of the community; and accordingly, anyone who seeks, by his writing to corrupt that fundamental sense of morality is guilty of obscene libel. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.13
50	The idea behind censorship of obscenity is contrary to every principle that this country was built on. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.06
45	Obscenity violates one's right of privacy, the right to protection against intrusion by unwanted materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.03
23	Obscene materials can lead to crimes of violence. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.02

TABLE VII (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Z- Score
33	Sexual intimacy as represented in obscene materials should be prohibited out of simple respect and regard for the dark secret things of life--that they should be inviolable, and guarded by the two who take part, and that no other presence should be invited. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-1.93

Following this line of reasoning, then, the first six statements would be the most salient statements of difference. Eleven of the 14 statements are in the symbolic mode, thus lending support to the second hypothesis.

The same analysis can be done for each of the sub-samples as well. Tables VIII and IX present the 14 statements of most difference for the Elite and Non-Elite sub-samples, respectively. The Elite sub-sample uses the condensational mode in nine of 14 statements. The Non-Elite sub-sample uses it 10 of 14 times. Thus, even when the sample is broken down into sub-samples, the second hypothesis is still supported. Consideration of the Elite sub-sample in this context further disconfirms the fourth hypothesis that elites will define obscenity in the referential mode. Indeed, they are just as condensational in their approach as are the Non-Elites.

The third hypothesis proposes that the point at which persons agree on the obscenity issue, they will tend to use referential rather than condensational symbols. Tables X, XI, and XII present the consensus statements for the total sample, the Elite sub-sample, and the Non-Elite sub-sample, respectively. The definition of a "consensus statement" is one for which the difference in Z scores between the two factors for a statement is less than one standard deviation.

The total sample had 13 consensus items of which nine were referential. The Elite sub-sample had 16 consensus statements of which nine were referential. Finally, the Non-Elite sub-sample had 24 consensus statements of which 16 were referential. In each instance a majority of the consensus statements were referential in mode. One can see, however, that the Non-Elite sub-sample is markedly

TABLE VIII

STATEMENTS HAVING MOST Z-SCORE DIFFERENCES:
ELITE SUB-SAMPLE, N=23

Statement Number	Item Description	<u>Z</u> - Score
59	Reading obscene material encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex and interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for the opposite sex. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	2.82
17	If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship of obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	2.78
57	Society has the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	2.44
2	Adults should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess and consume whatever communicative materials may appeal to them. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.41
46	In our law-rooted society, we are not the keeper of our brother's morals--only of his rights. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-2.35
19	Obscenity causes sex crimes. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	2.24
27	Obscenity causes juvenile delinquency. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	2.20
33	Sexual intimacy as represented in obscene materials should be prohibited out of simple respect and regard for the dark secret things of life--that they should be inviolable, and guarded by the two who take part, and that no other presence should be invited. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	2.18

TABLE VIII (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	<u>Z</u> - Score
37	I think in these times with this terrible increase of juvenile delinquency, with this immensely profitable flood of pornography, using techniques never before available to the seducers of the innocent, I think it is nonsense to say that we are so bound by a very extreme interpretation of the freedom of the press that we cannot act. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	2.14
38	Censorship of obscene material curtails the right of the individual, be he creator or consumer, to satisfy his intellect and his interest without harm. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-2.10
47	Responses to literature are highly variable and subjective, so there is no way to determine what will be the effect of a given piece of literature upon a particular person. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.08
50	The idea behind censorship of obscenity is contrary to every principle that this country was built on. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-2.06
13	An obscenity-saturated literary environment could function as one factor in the activation and reinforcement of unworthy traits of character. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	2.05
8	It is by no means clear that obscene literature is a significant factor in influencing substantial deviations from community standards. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-2.03

TABLE IX

STATEMENTS HAVING MOST Z-SCORE DIFFERENCES:
NON-ELITE SUB-SAMPLE, N=18

Statement Numbers	Item Description	<u>Z</u> - Score
57	Society has the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obsecenity	-2.82
60	Interest in pornography is a reflection of a person's personality, not the mold of it. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.27
54	To permit any limitation on the access to reading, including obscene materials, is, in practice, to allow all encroachments dictated by local illiterates, bigots, and prudes. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.15
42	People should have open to them the moral choice about the kind of erotic lives they will live, the kind of print they will read, the kind of enactments on stage and screen and elsewhere they will take the trouble to see. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.15
45	Obsecenity violates one's right of privacy, the right to protection against intrusion by unwanted materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obsecenity	-2.10
13	An obsecenity-saturated literary environment could function as one factor in the activation and reinforcement of unworthy traits of character. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obsecenity	-2.04
25	Society requires a public denunciation of obsecenity whether or not it leads to positive harmful conduct. Such denunciations are important because men feel that without them the state would be lacking in moral standards. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obsecenity	-2.04

TABLE IX (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Z- Score
36	Obscenity is too subjective an idea to be used in law. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.01
38	Censorship of obscene material curtails the right of the individual, be he creator or consumer, to satisfy his intellect and his interest without harm. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	2.01
59	Reading obscene material encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex and interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for the opposite sex. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-2.00
21	Just as loyalty is essential to the well being of a nation, so some sense of morality is essential to the well-being of a nation, and to the healthy life of the community; and accordingly, anyone who seeks, by his writing to corrupt that fundamental sense of morality is guilty of obscene libel. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-1.94
24	Obscenity is a crime for which there is no victim, and so it should not be illegal. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	1.98
58	The First Amendment, written in terms that are absolute, deprives the state of any power to pass on the value, the propriety, or the morality of a particular expression, including obscene ones. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	1.98
30	Obscenity laws violate one's freedom of choice. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	1.95

TABLE X
STATEMENTS HAVING LEAST Z-SCORE DIFFERENCES:
TOTAL SAMPLE, N=41

Statement Number	Item Description	<u>Z</u> - Score
5	Poor people more likely will indulge in anti-sexual behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.02
29	People desire erotic censorship because they don't want the act of sex to loose its penumbra of mystery and sin, if not of sanctity. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.12
48	Impulses which are denied outlet because of repression, psychological or social, achieve satisfaction through imaginations and fantasies, facilitated by pornography, of perverted or destructive behavior. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.23
49	Obscenity laws should restrict the public access juveniles have to sex-related materials so as to allow parental authority to be exercised with regard to such materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.27
18	Any test of obscenity that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with the First Amendment. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	.29
12	The First Amendment does not permit the censorship of expression that does not incite illegal action. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.41
28	As a police measure, prohibitions against the sale of obscene materials to minors are ineffective. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.44

TABLE X (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	<u>Z-</u> Score
7	A proper role of obscenity legislation is to protect the unwilling individual from exposure to obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.46
15	Obscenity laws should be limited to regulating only the commercial distribution of obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.48
56	Juvenile delinquency is more a result of socialization than of exposure to obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.58
11	Obscenity laws should be limited to reflect a specific concern for the mental health of juveniles. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.65
20	The obscene is that which disturbs the sexually insecure. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.70
4	Founders of our nation in adopting the First Amendment meant precisely that the federal government should pass "no law" regulating speech and press but should confine its legislation to the regulation of conduct. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.95

TABLE XI

STATEMENTS HAVING LEAST Z-SCORE DIFFERENCES:
ELITE SUB-SAMPLE, $N=23$

Statement Number	Item Description	Z- Score
29	People desire erotic censorship because they don't want to act of sex to lose its penumbra of mystery and sin, if not of sanctity. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.08
7	A proper role of obscenity legislation is to protect the unwilling individual from exposure to obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.09
18	Any test of obscenity that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with the First Amendment. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.20
5	Poor people more likely will indulge in anti-sexual behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.26
49	Obscenity laws should restrict the public access juveniles have to sex-related materials so as to allow parental authority to be exercised with regard to such materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.34
20	The obscene is that which disturbs the sexually insecure. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.35
48	Impulses which are denied outlet because of repression, psychological or social, achieve satisfaction through imaginations and fantasies, facilitated by pornography, of perverted or destructive behavior. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.39

TABLE XI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Z- Score
15	Obscenity laws should be limited to regulating only the commercial distribution of obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.60
28	As a police measure, prohibitions against the sale of obscene materials to minors are ineffective. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.63
58	The First Admendment, written in terms that are absolute, deprives the state of any power to pass on the value, the propriety, or the morality of a particular expression, including obscene ones. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.75
12	The First Amendment does not permit the censorship of expression that does not incite illegal action. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.75
52	Contrary to popular misconception, people who read obscene literature are less likely to become sexual offenders than those who do not, for the reason that such reading often neutralizes what aberrant sexual interests they may have. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.79
34	Our whole constitution heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.87
9	Antipornography measures, although not to be too readily indulged, should be available to protect established morality, and when that morality has been attacked, to respond to, or to anticipate and to head off community indignation. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.94
11	Obscenity laws should be limited to reflect a specific concern for the mental health of juveniles. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.96

TABLE XI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Z- Score
56	Juvenile delinquency is more a result of socialization than of exposure to obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.96

TABLE XII

STATEMENTS HAVING LEAST Z-SCORE DIFFERENCES:
NON-ELITE SUB-SAMPLE, N=18

Statement Number	Item Description	<u>Z</u> - Score
5	Poor people more likely will indulge in anti-sexual behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.003
56	Juvenile delinquency is more a result of socialization than of exposure to obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.03
11	Obscenity laws should be limited to reflect a specific concern for the mental health of juveniles. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.08
15	Obscenity laws should be limited to regulating only the commercial distribution of obscene materials. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.13
43	An effective anti-obscenity law will eliminate the economic profit that derives from the merchandising of obscene materials and lead to its virtual elimination. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.14
48	Impulses which are denied outlet because of repression, psychological or social, achieve satisfaction through imaginations and fantasies, facilitated by pornography, of perverted or destructive behavior. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.17
28	As a police measure, prohibitions against the sale of obscene materials to minors are ineffective. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.17
4	Founders of our nation in adopting the First Amendment meant precisely that the federal government should pass "no law" regulating speech and press but should confine its legislation to the regulation of conduct. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.17

TABLE XII (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Z- Score
14	The right to receive information and ideas regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	.33
27	Obscenity causes juvenile delinquency. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.36
39	The desire to expose oneself to obscene materials represents infantile sexual and sadistic desires. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.37
1	The common circulation of obscene material can hardly help but induce many to believe that their moral code is out of date. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.44
19	Obscenity causes sex crimes. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.45
12	The First Amendment does not permit the censorship of expression that does not incite illegal action. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.45
18	Any test of obscenity that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with the First Amendment. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	.45
10	One cannot draw lines between the "good" and the "bad" and be true to the constitutional mandate to let all ideas alone. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	-.48
47	Responses to literature are highly variable and subjective, so there is no way to determine what will be the effect of a given piece of literature upon a particular person. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	.57

TABLE XII (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Description	Z- Score
49	Obscenity laws should restrict the public access juveniles have to sex-related materials so as to allow parental authority to be exercised with regard to such materials. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.60
8	It is by no means clear that obscene literature is a significant factor in influencing substantial deviations from community standards. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.71
16	If the state is only concerned about printed or filmed materials inducing criminal conduct, then the deterrents to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not prohibitions of the materials in question. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.79
2	Adults should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess and consume whatever communicative materials may appeal to them. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control	.81
51	Harmful addition to obscene materials occur in children in all walks of life who are in no way psychologically predisposed to such harm. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.86
40	Any governmental restriction or punishment of any form of expression on the ground of obscenity must require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that such an expression would directly cause, in a normal adult, behavior which has validly been made criminal by statute. Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control	.86
29	People desire erotic censorship because they don't want the act of sex to lose its penumbra of mystery and sin, if not of sanctity. Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity	-.98

more referential in mode than is the Elite sub-sample. Is the difference significant? Table XIII indicates the χ^2 scores for Elite and Non-Elites on differential and consensus statements. The differences are not statistically significant. Thus, the consensus arrays give credence to the third hypothesis that people will agree on the obscenity issue primarily in the referential mode. Table XIV presents a breakdown by samples of the use of condensational and referential statements in the differential and consensus arrays.

By way of summary, then the conclusions drawn about the hypotheses are these. The first three hypotheses are confirmed by the data while the fourth one is disconfirmed. This means that it makes no significant difference whether or not one favors or opposes the regulation of obscene material or whether or not one is an elite or a non-elite; whatever the case, one is likely to deal with the obscenity issue in terms of the condensational symbolic mode. Chapter IV will deal with the question of why this is the case.

VI. CONCLUSION

The data in this experiment suggested three different definitions of the situation regarding obscenity. Of these three, two shared the characteristic of being opposed to the control of obscene materials. Thus, two general definitions remained. These two definitions are represented as the Teacher and Clergy factors. They are different because they sorted the 60 statements in two different patterns. Figure 1 shows the ideal sorts for each of the factors. Table XV indicates the factor loadings for the two factor solution.

TABLE XIII
CHI-SQUARE SCORES FOR DIFFERENTIAL
AND CONSENSUS ARRAYS

	Differential	Consensus
Elite and Non-Elite	0.164	0.445

$$\begin{aligned}x^2 &= 3.84 \\p &\leq .05 \\df &= 1\end{aligned}$$

TABLE XIV
PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENTIAL AND
CONSENSUS SYMBOLIC MODES

	Differential		Consensus	
	*Cond	*Ref	Cond	Ref
*Total	78%	22%	31%	69%
*Elite	64%	36%	44%	56%
*Non- Elite	71%	29%	33%	67%

*Cond = Condensational symbolic mode

Ref = Referential symbolic mode

Total - Total P-sample, $\underline{N} = 41$

Elite = Elite sub-sample, $\underline{N} = 23$

Non-Elite = Non-Elite sub-sample, $\underline{N} = 18$

TEACHER FACTOR SCORE SHEET:
N=21




Figure 1. Ideal sort of the two factors.

CLERGY FACTOR SCORE SHEET:

N=20

Most Uncharacteristic			Neutral				Most Characteristic			
-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
24	2	54	36	16	27	35	7	55	57	37
50	20	44	10	14	11	17	25	59	21	13
5	38	52	46	60	6	51	31	49	41	53
(3)	22	58	8	29	28	33	56	9	45	(3)
	(4)	30	15	39	48	47	43	1	(4)	
		32	4	40	42	3	34	23		
		(6)	(6)	18	19	26	(6)	(6)		
			(7)	12	(7)					
				(8)						

Figure 1 (Continued)

TABLE XV

P-SAMPLE LOADINGS ON TWO-FACTOR SOLUTION:
SIMPLE STRUCTURE MATRIX, N=41

Person	Teacher Factor (n=21)	Clergy Factor (n=20)
16 TE*	.849	-.223
13 TE	.831	-.079
29 ST*	.803	-.133
32 ST	.781	-.334
22 TE	.773	.055
38 ST	.757	-.117
20 TE	.737	-.046
40 ST	.721	-.060
12 TE	.711	-.041
11 CL*	.692	-.369
41 ST	.691	-.125
37 ST	.688	.150
18 TE	.665	.300
30 ST	.647	-.120
24 ST	.636	.211
31 ST	.591	-.049
27 ST	.573	.405
23 TE	.572	.084
4 CL	.525	.076
19 TE	.503	-.100
25 ST	.467	.422
9 CL	-.427	.778
5 CL	.004	.762
3 CL	-.272	.762
10 CL	-.293	.757
26 ST	-.119	.757
21 TE	-.320	.716
1 CL	-.394	.686
15 TE	.185	.670
2 CL	.008	.666
39 ST	-.065	.662
8 CL	-.328	.629
28 ST	-.156	.581
7 CL	-.500	.546
6 CL	.438	.546
34 ST	.266	.518
35 ST	.337	.487
17 TE	.025	.474
33 ST	.299	.437
14 TE	.246	.418
36 ST	.138	.318

*CL = Clergy; TE = Teacher; ST = Student.

The data indicate further that the issue of obscenity is treated by the P-sample in this experiment primarily in terms of condensational symbols. The implications of these findings must be kept in perspective. This study is, indeed, an experiment. The concern here is not to generalize about populations as one might do in a survey research study; rather, the concern is to discover behavior patterns in an experimental situation. Thus, no presumption is made here to generalize from these data. What the data do suggest, however, is that the symbolic interaction view of problematicism has empirical support; that Mitchell and Mitchell are correct in hypothesizing that people deal with moral public policy issues in condensational symbolic terms; that Lasswell and Edelman are not correct in their understanding of condensational symbols and how they are treated by elites and non-elites.

The major question one encounters now is, Why is obscenity dealt with in condensational symbolic terms? The data have provided a descriptive pattern of the condensational mode. The task now is to develop an understanding of why such is the case.

CHAPTER IV

THE SYMBOLIC WORLD OF OBSCENITY

I. INTRODUCTION

It was found in Chapter III that the persons on the two factors generated by the Q-sort are differentiated by the content of their statements; but it was also seen that they are to be viewed in common according to the symbolic mode by which they define obscenity. In concluding that chapter, it was also suggested in passing why this is the case. The purpose of the present chapter is to consider in more detail why it is that the P-sample defined the obscenity issue primarily in terms of condensational symbols.

II. THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY

Moral issues such as obscenity seem to be tied to the question of personal and group identity. Clearly, the moral dimension is concerned with matters of what ought to be and how the "ought to be" should be achieved. Frankena (1963) characterizes morality thusly:

[M]orality starts as a set of culturally defined goals and of rules governing achievement of the goals, which are more or less external to the individual and imposed on him or inculcated as habits. These goals and rules may and generally do, at least to some extent, become "internalized" or "interiorized," that is, the individual takes them as his own and regulates his own conduct by them; he develops a "conscience" or "superego" (p. 7).

This point of view is quite compatible, at least as far as it goes, with symbolic interaction's understanding of how the individual develops into a person. The culturally defined goals and rules

referred to by Frankena are the systems of "significant symbols," or the "grammars of symbols" that one must learn in order to become a part of a group or a society. It is precisely in the internalization of symbol grammars that one becomes a part of society, that one simply is. Identity, then, for the individual arises through the alignment of oneself with the identity of a moral symbol system.

Mead (1917-1918), for example, sees the function of punishment as a means not only by which the legitimized moral code is maintained in a society but also as a means by which the identity of the group is constructed, maintained, and legitimized (p. 591). If the individual's identity is inextricably tied to the integrity of the group's identity, then it is a paramount issue for the individual to see that the integrity of the group's identity is maintained. As Duncan (1962) points out, meaning and purpose, both of which are part of the moral point of view, have a magical aspect whereby the social environment is created. It is in this way, and only in this way, that groups are created and group action is possible (p. 37). Significant symbols make groups and group action possible, because significant symbols are symbols the meaning of which are shared by a group of persons. As has been suggested in Chapter II, to be a person is to share in a system of significant symbols, or, to be a part of a group or groups.

The foregoing emphasizes the question of individual identity in terms of the identity of the group or the symbol system. Other writers on the question of individual identity have focused more on the individual. For example, Orrin Klapp (1969) contends that identity issues for the individual are dealt with in [condensational]

symbolic terms, focusing on life styles, moral and ethical questions, and cultic values (pp. 48-49). And in an earlier work (1962) he points out the relationship between group and individual identities when he notes that the typing of others is the key of one's own identity. "We cannot, then, without knowing him, know who we are" (pp. 4-5).

In much the same vein Langer (1957) points to symbols and ritual as the creators of identity, or personality itself, for, she argues, to violate the symbols and ritual of a person is to violate personality itself (pp. 290-291). Likewise, Nieburg (1973) asserts the role of [condensational] symbolism in constructing identity:

Symbolic behavior is more than a means of communication; it is also a learned response that gives a sense of identity and a confirmation of social meaning to the actor (p. 25).

Identity here is far more than a rational account of who one is; rather, identity involves the whole person, both rational and non-rational, and for this reason the affective aspect of personality is very much involved in the identity question. For Gordon (1969) the questions of identity include issues which are dealt with in terms of the following:

Symbols, first and most strikingly, attempt to define, clarify or manage the fundamental enigmas of existence: matters relating to birth, reproduction and death. They appear to unite the role of man with the processes of nature (p. 58).

It should be noted that the use of "symbol" in the above quotations generally comports with this paper's notion of "condensational symbol," for what is in common here in the quotations is the important element of affective attribution of meaning. If this be the case, then the contention of this section is to say that the construction

of individual identity is primarily, or at least most significantly, in terms of condensational symbols. This is the case because condensational symbols are fluid enough to accomodate the idiosyncratic character of one's biography. The inadequacy of referential symbols to achieve this end is that, by definition, they are more lexical in their meaning and thus less plastic and less adequate to the uniquenesses of individuals who seek to construct identities.

Obscenity, as generally conceived, is that which treats of human sexuality in an offensive manner. Etymologically, the word "obscene" actually has meant "toward filth," a meaning that could be attributed to something other than sexuality, such as war; but usually it is used to refer to sexuality. Sexuality is a major component of human identity. One need not be a Freudian to take this position. However one may wish to explicate the phenomenon of sexual development, what remains at issue is how one incorporates the biological givenness of one's sex into one's personality. This being the case, one can see that to the extent that obscene materials offend the given standards of a sexual code, to that extent such materials are challenging part of the identity of those persons who have internalized the moral sexual code that is being challenged.

The problem at this point that needs attention is that the question of why there is not a single sexual morality into which all persons would be socialized rather than a plurality of such codes (which seems to be the case in fact)? If one's identity is tied so closely to the identity of the group, as has been contended above, how can competing moralities arise? As a preliminary to answering

this question, it is useful to look at the nature and function of groups.

III. THE ROLE OF GROUPS

The implication of the previous paragraph is that in American society there is pluralism in the area of morality, sexual and otherwise. This descriptive observation may well be open to question, although this writer finds it difficult to make the descriptive case for a homogeneous moral point of view in American society. It is clear, however, from the data in Chapter III that the moral point of view on obscenity is not homogeneous, and so it is from this observation that this section proceeds.

Lincourt and Olczak (1974) observe that self-systems, or senses of identity, are very resistant to change, that, in fact, change may be resisted at all costs (p. 81). This reflects the opinion of many students of personality. This position is stated in terms of adult personalities rather than of children or adolescents. Indeed, the whole of socialization studies by and large assume that a major portion of personality development will occur prior to adulthood, and that during this development the human personality is relatively malleable and susceptible to influence. Hence, the phrase, "the child is the parent of the adult."

One of the important points to note about the developmental process is that the major portion of childhood learning is affective rather than cognitive (Brim, 1968, p. 151). This means that learning during this period, i.e., prior to age 11-12 (Piaget, 1964/1967, pp. 94-95), is not dominated by rational/propositional logic processes;

rather, learning is visceral, affective, deeply learned, and it is changed or abandoned only with great difficulty. It is also during the affective period that the identity process begins (Piaget, 1964/1967, p. 65). Thus, the fundamentals of identity in general and of sexual identity in particular begin and progress for a number of years in the affective mode. Additionally, the passage of time allows a cumulative process of identity construction that is difficult to change or to break down in later years.

The above remarks regarding the developmental process are pertinent to the current discussion, but they do not address the question of pluralism. Thus, one needs to turn to the question of socializing agents. Among the main socialization agents of children are the family, school, and peers. These are the primary reference groups with which children come into contact. These groups are the sources of significant symbols that a child will learn. These groups are very concrete to the child, just as the cognitive process of a child is concrete rather than formal (Piaget, 1964/1967, pp. 48-54). That is to say, for example, a child is not able to identify in terms of abstract notions such as "the American people"; rather, identity is in terms of concrete persons, relationships, and things.

Families, schools, and peer groups are more idiosyncratic than they are lexical in that the biography of specific instances of these groups will be rather unique, as also is the case of individuals. The individual child, then, learns a grammar of symbols, including sexual identity and morality, that is idiosyncratic to a group or a small set of groups. What is important at this point is that groups' significant symbols are learned first through an affective mode that is learned

deeply and changed only slowly and difficultly, even in adulthood. Thus, the plurality of moral points of view begins in childhood when idiosyncratic groups symbol grammars are learned and persists into adulthood where it is manifested socially through definitions of situations.

One must be careful, in light of these previous remarks, not to conclude that socialization or development ceases on the attainment of adulthood. The core of symbolic interaction, it will be remembered, is the life-long process of negotiating lines of action, a process that includes adaptation and innovation in behavior. In this sense one is always learning (or being socialized) and developing. The distinction to keep in mind, however, is that malleability of behavior is substantially reduced by the time one reaches adulthood; and that the learning in childhood is highly affective and existential in that it tends to embrace the whole personality, whereas adult learning is more likely to be more removed from the center of personality by the filter of "reason."

Thus, the role of the group is one of providing core indexes of identity. These indexes are first learned affectively which accounts for their strong persistence into adulthood. Be that as it may, the prior question remains as to why there is the initial pluralism into which persons are adopted. It is this question that is now to be addressed.

IV. THE ROLE OF LABELING

It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that Mead (1917-1918) understands one of the functions of juridical punishment to be that of

creating group solidarity on the part of those who sanction the punishment. Society legitimizes a particular point of view by so labeling it and by creating mechanisms for defining offenders of that point of view. This results in an inevitable hierarchical character of society. In its most rudimentary form, it is based on the dialectical framework of "us and them."

Garfinkle (1967) views the situation in much the same way in suggesting that the deviant as so designated by society serves the function of solidarity for society or, as in the case of the present discussion, for the group. The deviant becomes the dramatic personification of what one or one's group is not, and knowing what one is not is indispensable to knowing what one is.

McHugh (1968) makes the same point in terms more closely related to the discussion here when he speaks of "moral requiredness." He states that:

Members [of a group] assert the ontological necessity of some behavior independent of personal circumstance or desire. In the literature, these are usually referred to as values. Here, anything morally required is a prerequisite to bona fide membership in the interaction, so that its absence will result in exclusion (p. 44; emphasis added).

McHugh continues his discussion by indicating the consequences of the lack of moral requiredness:

Role-taking [i.e., social action] fails when interactants agree on none of these components [i.e., the properties of relativity]. As actors fail to interchange standpoints, they fail to communicate and become incapable of entering into concerted actions that are characteristic of social order. When rules of use [i.e., the grammars of symbols] are inoperable, the world of probability with regard to expectations recedes behind the world of possibility, because the absence of rules would necessarily be accompanied by the absence of a delimited set of meanings.

Under these circumstances, anything could be conceived to occur, nothing being differentiable from anything else; all things would be equipossible, fiat would become impossible. The texture of the world would be completely open, no one inference being more capable of verification than any other. There could be no such thing as roles, subsuming reciprocal expectations, or the interdependent behavior that arises out of those expectations. Social life would have no systematic character, and could hardly be called social anymore (p. 45; emphasis added).

So it is that group solidarity and identity is dependent on, is a function of, "a delimited set of meanings" of reality; and because they are delimited meanings, it follows that there must be, it is ontologically necessary to individual and group identity, labels of what the group is not beyond these limits. In following this necessity, it follows that groups necessarily occur that are differentiated from one another according to different definitions of reality. This differentiation will occur in varying degrees at all levels of human activity, from the individual to whole societies or perhaps regions of the world. The point is that if group pluralism is absent, the very stuff of identity is missing; and without identity, social order and action are precluded.

Burke (1945) approaches this issue from a more aesthetic perspective which he calls "dramatic consistency." According to Burke, human action can be understood in terms of drama and its five motivational components, namely: act, scene, purpose, agent, and agency, or what are jointly called the "pentad" (p. xv). These components must fit together in an aesthetically pleasing manner in order for an act to "come off." Thus:

From the motivational point of view, there is implicit in the quality of a scene the quality of the action that is to take place within it. This would be another way of

saying that the act will be consistent with the scene. . . . Or, if you will, the stage-set contains the action ambiguously (as regards the norms of action)--and in the course of the play's development this ambiguity is converted into a corresponding articulacy. The proportion would be: scene is to act as implicit is to explicit. One could not deduce the details of the action from the details of the setting, but one could deduce the quality of the action from the quality of the setting (pp. 6-7).

In this sense, the moral grammar of a group is the quality of the stage setting in which is implied the quality of action expected. If the expected action is not forthcoming, the play does not "come off," or the action is "offscene" (or perhaps "ob-scene?"). The label of "off-scene" is possible only with respect to the standard of the group's moral grammar.

The phenomenon of labeling is quite apparent in many of the statements of the Q-sample discussed in Chapter III. There one finds statements of judgment regarding the character of people or the expectations of behavior. Thus, very much are the two competing moral grammars of obscenity necessary to identity, but they are also necessarily engaged in labeling that and those which exist beyond the limits of the respective grammars. Thus, group pluralism is not something to be overcome through more effective socialization of persons: rather, group pluralism is an ontological necessity to individual identity and to social order and activity.

None of the foregoing gives direct insight into the function of condensational versus referential symbols in the process of identity, solidarity, and labeling. The final section of this chapter will suggest the nature of that function.

V. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY

Obscenity is an issue around which competing moral grammars seek legitimacy in the political arena. Just as prohibitionists and anti-prohibitionists on the alcohol issue each sought the support of government (Gusfield, 1963), likewise do the contenders on the obscenity issue. The two major points of view elicited in the Q-study in Chapter III are two competing "social constructions of reality," each seeking to strengthen its point of view with the sanction of law.

But why seek governmental support? Because it strengthens the solidarity of the point of view that is supported with the potential of legal sanctions as a final resort. If the ontological character of the function of group norms is to be taken seriously, as McHugh (1968) would have one do, then it should come as no surprise that groups would seek government approval of their points of view. Politics has been defined as "the authoritative allocation of values." One can revise this definition a bit and, in light of the foregoing, say that politics is "the authoritative social construction of reality." Thus, whatever authoritative position government takes on a conflict issue represents the authoritative definition of that situation.

Hall (1972) argues that those issues most likely to be dealt with in the political arena are those whose definitions are problematic, i.e., about which there is conflict as to what the issue is or means, a lack of consensual meaning (pp. 42-43). This typification fits obscenity as a political issue. Obscenity has been and is the subject of continuing political conflict, and, as the data of this study suggest, a consensus is lacking as to how to

define obscenity. It has been seen, moreover, that the mode of the competing definitions of obscenity is primarily condensational symbolic. Why is this so?

Obscenity as a political issue is dealt with in condensational symbolic terms for three reasons. First of all, obscenity affects personal identity and the moral grammar that attends it. As has been seen, much of this identity is rooted in the affective, existential mode of the personality and thus is difficult to change. Also, in light of symbolic interaction, there is noted the indivisible, symbiotic character of the linkage between individual and group identity, resulting in an equally determined group resistance to changes in identity definitions or challenges to their legitimacy. It is because the identity issue is at the very core of sanity itself that resistance to change is so strong. The identity issue is very much an affective issue and this is why the condensational mode is employed. Also the referential mode with its attendant consensualism is simply too lexical to accomodate the much more idiosyncratic identity of individuals and groups.

This position assumes that relative to the issue of identity, other values will be held in lower esteem. That is to say, persons and groups have value hierarchies and that the values associated with identity will be at or near the top. This position has not been tested in this paper and thus needs to be investigated separately. It seems reasonable, nevertheless, to assume such a status for identity values.

Before leaving this first point as to why obscenity is dealt with in condensational terms, it is worth commenting on the fourth hypothesis in Chapter III which held that elites would deal with public policy issues in referential terms. The data in Chapter III and the discussion in Chapter IV suggest that identity definitions are important, perhaps inevitable, not only for non-elites but for elites as well. This does not in itself repudiate Lasswell, Edelman, and others in their contention that elites deal with public policy issues more in referential than in condensational terms; but it does suggest that such a position, if correct, may be more limited in applicability according to the types of issues involved. The research in this paper would question the appropriateness of the Lasswell/Edelman thesis for understanding the obscenity issue, and perhaps moral issues in general.

The second reason that condensational symbols are employed in defining the obscenity issue is that what is at stake are matters that are not easily compromised. Mitchell and Mitchell (1969) define a moral issue as an ". . . issue or good [that] is characterized by a judgment or beliefs and values" (p. 144). The problem this presents is that when moral points of view are in conflict, compromise is difficult; for compromise is a request that one compromise one's beliefs about what is right and wrong, about who one is (Mitchell and Mitchell, 1969, pp. 146-147). Precisely because this is what is at stake, solutions to moral conflicts are much more difficult to achieve. In a word, how does one compromise "rightness"? What is 25 percent of being right? Thus, the more ambiguous semantics of a condensational grammar may be the key at least to controlling, if not

resolving moral conflicts, for it is precisely in this ambiguity that the idiosyncratic pluralism of moral points of view can be accommodated and that some form of communication and conflict resolution can begin without the participants feeling that their moral principles have been compromised.

Finally, obscenity is dealt with in condensational symbolic terms because the medium of moral discourse has a major condensational component in the first place. This reason is closely associated with the previous reason, although the emphasis is different. If, in the Burkean sense, the scene is set in condensational terms, then dramatic consistency prescribes actions of a condensational character. Or to state it differently, if the problem or conflict is presented in condensational terms, then the resolution will tend to be condensational. If, as was contended earlier in this chapter, certain issues such as identity and morality are condensational in nature in the first place, then conflicts arising with regard to such issues will be dealt with in condensational terms. This is compatible with symbolic interaction in that one defines a situation not only in terms of the content of the situation but of the mode of the situation as well. It would follow from this that if a situation were defined in terms of the referential mode, then the course of that situation would generally be referential, or at least for the participants who so define it.

Thus, it is the contention of this paper that obscenity as a public policy issue will be dealt with in condensational symbolic terms for understandable reasons. The world of obscenity is indeed a condensational symbolic world because of the very nature of the

issue. This is suggested as a descriptive proposition, a point that should be stressed; for if one insists that the American polity treat the issue of obscenity as a referential issue, one probably will encounter more confusion and miscommunication than that which is already inherent to the condensational mode in the first place.

VI. CONCLUSION

The concern of this chapter has been to explore why it is that obscenity is dealt with in condensational symbolic terms. It has been suggested that considerations of (1) identity, (2) the uncompromising character of moral beliefs, and (3) dramatic consistency and the inherent definitional mode of obscenity are among the chief reasons that this is the case. Finally it was suggested that because the condensational nature of obscenity is a descriptive rather than a prescriptive proposition, and that such has implications for how one deals with obscenity as a public policy issue. It is the purpose of Chapter V to explore the implications of this as it relates to the understanding of American politics in general.

CHAPTER V

THE PLURALIST QUALITY OF POLITICAL SYMBOLISM

I. INTRODUCTION

A consideration of importance that has not been addressed directly thus far is the implications of this research for American politics. Political symbolism is a constant concern of political scientists and yet, as was noted in Chapter I, such concerns are treated vaguely. Does the research of this paper move one closer to a clearer understanding of political symbolism and of the latter's place in American politics? This writer thinks it does.

II. MORALITY AND POLITICS

One of the conclusions reached in Chapter IV was that moral issues are problematic issues, and that for this reason they tend to be dealt with in condensational symbolic terms. It was also noted that Hall (1972) believes that political issues are, by definition, problematic issues. From this it follows that when ever moral conflicts are submitted to the political arena for authoritative resolution/definition, it will tend to be in terms of condensational symbols, i.e., both the submission and the resolution.

Examples of such issues on the current American political agenda are government funding of abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, and resolution of the American hostage situation in Teheran, Iran. Each of these

issues raises questions of right and wrong, of individual, group, and social identity. But there are also issues with less apparent moral dimensions that are susceptible to the condensational mode. For example, the federal tax code reflects judgments of social responsibility distribution even though tax and appropriation statutes, strictly speaking, are simple, referential matters of dollars and cents. The point is that even in areas of referential communication there is always the potential, if not always the reality, of condensational considerations.

Now of course problematicism does arise in referential areas of discourse, but this is more likely a result of semantic misunderstandings, lack of information, or what have you. In such cases the resolution of problematicism will be in referential terms. This is different from moral conflicts that more likely will be resolved in problematic or condensational terms. Referential problematicism is not the concern of this paper and so will not be developed here; but it needs to be kept in mind in order to understand better condensational problematicism.

The implication of the foregoing is to contend that the scope of "moral" issues in politics is far broader than popular notions might allow. It is further implied that the occurrence of moral problematicism, with its roots in affective, group pluralism, is a descriptive rather than a prescriptive proposition. The importance of this point is to raise the broad question of political models and of how public policy is made in the American polity.

A survey of American political science textbooks reveals two basic models of American politics: Elitism and pluralism. There are variations on and integrations of these two models, but they remain the two basic perspectives from which American politics is understood. Of these two models, is one more compatible than the other with the data and discussion of this paper? To answer this question, it is useful to look briefly at the two models.

III. ELITIST POLITICS MODEL

The title of this section would have one think that there is the elite model of politics. As Putnam (1976, pp. 5 ff.), Conally (1969, pp. 3-34), and Mills (1956, pp. 15-20) all note, there are competing notions of political elitism. Thus, what follows here is a general and limited conceptualization of political elitism.

Thomas Dye (1979), perhaps the most notable contemporary American political scientist proponent of the elitist thesis, defines political elitism as follows:

An elite is the few that have power in society; the masses are the many who do not. We shall call our men of power "elites" because they possess formal authority over large institutions which shape the lives of all Americans (p. 4).

This definition contains a crucial concept, namely "power." Carl Friedrich (1937) has stressed the difficulty of this concept, and so its meaning should not be assumed apparent. Yet, in some form or another, power usually means the capacity of A to command actions of B that otherwise B probably would not perform. Indeed, power may be conceived in various forms such as "direct," "implicit," and "potential" as examples (Putnam, 1976, pp. 5-8), but the result is

still the same. To the point, the above describes the Lasswell/Edelman position that elites are relatively autonomous in their actions and are capable of manipulating or forcing the masses to do what otherwise they might not do.

The above describes power elitism; additionally, many critiques of the pluralist model of American society point to the hierarchical character of society in terms of class and status as further evidence of elitism (Mills, 1956). The argument here is that to increased social status and economic resources accrue increased capacities for power. In this view, the "haves" are more likely to have their way in directing public policy than are the "have nots."

All this is quite persuasive. Clearly, American society is hierarchical; indeed, all societies are. But this in itself does not seem to make the case for political power elitism. The problem with the elite model is not so much in its static, descriptive account of hierarchy as it is in its account of the process of power. It is to this point that the discussion now turns.

The point was made in Chapter I that the social control model, of which political power elitism is a part, is suspect in light of symbolic interaction and of the understanding of symbols developed in Chapters II and IV. The problem is not the one that arose with the fourth hypothesis in Chapter III, i.e., whether or not elites deal with moral issues in referential terms; rather, the issue here is whether or not elites in fact have the power that elitist theory says they have. Can and do elites, irrespective of the symbolic mode, control masses? The position of this paper is that they do not and cannot.

The first problem with the elitist understanding of political power is that it presumes a consensus of symbol meanings, both referential and condensational, but especially condensational, that seems to be necessary for the extent of control attributed to elites. Yet, such power does not seem to be there. There is a pluralism of symbol grammars that undercuts the capacity of elites to control masses. A far greater consensus of symbol meanings seems to be necessary so that elites could "take the role of the other," i.e., the masses, and thereby be able to anticipate the response in the masses to proposed elite actions directed toward the masses. Elitism assumes a far more homogeneous grammar of significant symbols than this writer believes is demonstrable. Without a common body of symbols, collective action is precluded. This does not mean that there is no symbol consensus in American politics; rather, there is not the degree of consensus that seems to be necessary to the elitist understanding of political leadership.

A second problem that arises in light of the previous chapters is that elitist theory does not take into account the negotiated character of group action. Leaders (elites) can lead only as long as followers (masses) choose to follow. In this sense the followers confer on leaders the permission to act in their behalf. Leaders will remain leaders as long as they act effectively in behalf of those issues that are important to the followers.

For example, it is curious to note that in 1972 the AFL-CIO Executive Committee under the leadership of George Meany endorsed neither the Republican nor the Democratic candidates for president. What is curious is that the Committee had endorsed the Democratic candidate in every presidential election since 1956. Why the failure

to endorse in 1972? The following scenario is not unreasonable. McGovern, the Democratic candidate, had identified himself with a number of issues that the rank and file labor union member found difficult to accept. In fact, it has been said that the "three A's" defeated McGovern, i.e., amnesty, acid, and abortion. Voting results from the 1972 election indicate that McGovern did not receive the electoral support from labor union members that a Democratic candidate would normally expect. An effective leader such as George Meany perhaps recognized that labor would not support McGovern to the extent that it had supported previous Democratic candidates, and so he and the Committee choose not to endorse a candidacy for which votes could not be "delivered."

The point here is that leaders lead because there is explicit and implicit, actual and anticipated, negotiation of action that occurs constantly between elites and masses. Elitism assumes an S-R or an S-O-R model of human action whereas this paper take the position that human behavior is a continual negotiation of lines of human action.

A third problem that arises with the elite model is that it does not take groups seriously, or as seriously as this paper contends needs to be the case. Chapter IV stated that the reality of groups is very real and that these groups are the basis of moral pluralism in American society. Remembering the broad scope of what is meant by "moral," one sees that the group pluralism is transferred to a large number of public policy issues, even those which are, at first glance, apparently referential. The pluralism of American politics is not so much in terms of social status or of economic class as it

is of constructions of reality that are competing for authoritative backing from government. Such pluralism is not a quantitative issue that can be adjusted or removed through more equitable tax laws; instead, it is a qualitative pluralism that represents conflicts of what different people define to be "rightness," "oughtness," and "identity," to name a few. Social and economic hierarchy in society may well be an empirical reality, but this does not preclude the pluralism of definitions or constructions of reality which, when coupled with the first criticism of elitism stated above as to the lack of a mass consensus of symbol meanings, is a significant challenge to the correlation of increased socio-economic status with elite exercise of political power according to the social control model. It is this qualitative pluralism of social constructions of reality that provides the roots of the pluralist quality of American politics.

In order to provide a more balanced perspective and perhaps a clearer understanding of elitism and pluralism, a consideration of pluralism is in order. To this task the discussion now turns.

IV. PLURALIST POLITICS MODEL

The pluralist interpretation of American politics has been the dominant one since at least James Madison. It is perhaps because of this long dominance, says the elitist critic, that the model still persists even in the face of empirical data to the contrary (Connally, 1969, pp. 3-4). And yet, as suggested in the previous section, the elitist criticism of pluralism is dependent on a certain type of pluralism. Now, as it was with elitism, likewise does one find a

variety of pluralist theories. Be that as it may, the following discussion will point to some distinguishing aspects of political pluralism.

Fundamental to the pluralist interpretation of American politics is the group. All theories of pluralism recognize the inextricable relationship between the individual and the group, and in light of this recognition proceed to an understanding of American politics.

For James Madison (The Federalist, pp. 55-56), being part of a group is "sown in human nature." Indeed, this accounting for groups is in a language that is not in vogue today, but regardless of how one states the matter, Madison's point is to state the fundamental inevitability of groups in society.

A more sophisticated account of groups is presented by Arthur F. Bentley (1967). As early as 1908 he defined groups as

. . . a certain portion of the men of a society, taken, however, not as a physical mass cut off from other masses of men, but as a mass activity, which does not preclude the men who participate in it from participating likewise in many other group activities (p. 211).

Bentley continues by identifying what it is that gives rise to groups:

There is no group without its interest. An interest, . . . is the equivalent of a group. . . . The group and the interest are not separate. There exists only the one thing, that is, so many men bound together in or along the path of a certain activity (p. 211).

Interestingly, for Bentley the notion of "group" is processual rather than static. Thus, the simple identification of an SES characteristic would not be sufficient for designating a group because such a characteristic is not a *prima facie* indication of activity. Instead, a group exists because individuals choose to pursue

common interests. With a bit of imagination, one can see the similarity between Bentley's view and that of symbolic interaction and the idea of grammars of significant symbols. What Bentley calls "activity" is purposed human action that is negotiated among persons so that the "play" or the "act" will "come off." What binds men together in groups is common interest, common purpose, common definitions of the situation.

Another point of importance in the Bentley quotation is that individuals participate in a plurality of groups or activities. Truman (1971), an admirer and would be popularizer of Bentley, makes the same point (pp. 15-16). This group membership pluralism on the part of the individual is an important aspect of political pluralism and often over-looked by the elitist critic. The implication of this aspect of pluralism is that each individual, and on a higher level each group, is aligned with a plurality of interests or activities. This means that no one group is likely to have the total allegiance of an individual member and thus must compete with other groups for the loyalty of the same individual. In this sense, it is again difficult for elites, be they leaders of groups or of an entire political system, to command followership; negotiated followership an elite may well achieve, but it cannot be commanded.

The earlier example of the McGovern candidacy is illustrative at this point. The AFL-CIO leadership was competing with other group elites for the loyalty of union members. For example, Roman Catholic union members perhaps were disturbed by McGovern's stand on abortion and thus would follow the symbol grammar of their church in dealing with this issue. Perhaps World War II and Korean military

veterans were troubled by McGovern's stand on amnesty and so chose to follow the lead of a "patriotic grammar of symbols." And perhaps those union members who identified with a symbol grammar of "a traditional lifestyle" were bothered by McGovern's suggestion that marijuana use be decriminalized. If this were the case and if the AFL-CIO Executive Committee realized it, then they also realized that on the McGovern candidacy they could not compete effectively with these other groups loyalties; thus, no endorsement was made because the union votes could not be "delivered."

This leads to yet another aspect about groups that is noted by Truman. Truman (1971) contends that it is simply not possible for the individual to relate to society as a whole because such a prospect is so massively overwhelming (p. 15). This is not unlike Lippmann's observation that symbols or images are an ontological necessity for simply making sense out of what is otherwise a plethora of stimuli (1929, p. 16). Thus, it is through groups that the individual is related to the broader whole of society; through groups in that the group is the very source of identity and of reality definitions without which the very concept of "individual" is literally non-sense. When one couples this conclusion with the one in Chapter IV that held that groups are ontological necessities to social existence, then the givenness of groups and of pluralism is strengthened.

The above remarks regarding plural membership in groups was understood primarily in terms of followers or the masses. But there is no warrant to exclude leaders from this phenomenon. The reality of plural group membership is every bit as true for a member of the elite as it is for a member of the masses. As was suggested in

Chapter IV, all individuals will be members of group "symbol grammars" and these grammars will be reflected even in competing elite definitions of reality.

The pluralist model continues with the contention that public policy will be the result of competition and compromise among groups, and it is in this manner that the plural interests of society are represented. Now it is clear that certain groups may be more successful than others in getting what they seek in the public arena. It is also true that certain groups will get little of what they seek. It further is true that certain groups will not even enter the public arena in the first place except in the case of a limited number of issues that are especially salient for them. These truisms are the bases for elite critiques that conclude that the pluralist model is empirically unwarranted. And yet to so conclude assumes a degree of equality that historically is not understood to be necessary to a democratic polity. Again, social and economic hierarchy are not a prima facie case against the reality of political pluralism. For even if it were demonstrable that a socio-economic elite were consistently in positions to define reality authoritatively (although this writer does not think such a case is demonstrable), one still comes back to the necessity of leaders and followers to engage in on-going negotiations of the actions they engage in jointly. There must be a fundamental act of consent to, if not active support of, the elite by the masses, for an elite in the United States simply could not maintain itself in effective power simply on the basis of brute force alone.

Earlier it was noted that Truman understands groups as the basis upon which individuals interact with society or other groups. This process is reciprocal in that it is also through groups that political elites, especially in government, relate to individuals. That is to say, the group grammar is the filter through which communication between individual and government flows. This "two-step flow of communication" provides the basis, the linkage between government and the individual; it is the mechanism by which elites negotiate with the masses. In other words, government elites are negotiating not so much with a mass society of autonomous individuals as with a plurality of groups (see also Cobb and Elder, 1972a, 1972b, and 1976).

To take this argument further, it will be recalled that it was contended that those persons who have the authority to make public policy are themselves members of a plurality of group grammars and that within "the elite" is manifested a competition among these elite group grammars. In a word, the activity loyalties (in the Bentlian sense) of the elite are not homogeneous; rather, they are plural. Thus, what one finally ends up with is "plural elitism," at least as one describes elites as distinct from followers. If this is the case, then when one speaks of the negotiation of behavior between groups and the government elite, it would, instead, be more accurate to say that the negotiation is among public and private group interests and their plethora of competing definitions of reality.

It is clear that the pluralist model sees American society in general, and politics in particular, as being permeated by the reality of multiple group points of view; indeed, society is the

on-going activity of groups negotiating lines of action with individuals and other groups. Because of this, the consensus on symbol meanings that seems required for Mills' theory of elitism is lacking not only in the masses but within the realm of the elite itself.

This paper is offering the pluralist model as a more warranted model of American politics than that of elitism. This is based on a symbolic interaction understanding of human action and on the nature and function of symbols as outlined in Chapters II and IV. But might it be the case that the American polity could move away from this rather muddled process of pluralism?

V. THE FLUIDITY OF SYMBOLISM

One might propose that it is possible to achieve a more homogeneous understanding of symbols in American society that would result in a feasible basis for an elitist polity in the case of condensational symbols or for a more rational polity in the case of referential symbols. Homogeneity of this sort is not likely because condensational symbolism, as presented in Chapters II and IV, has an ontological character about it both for individuals and for groups. Nor is it likely that condensational symbolism is avoidable even in select areas where it currently obtains, for what for some persons may become referential in nature may become or remain condensational for others.

All this is to emphasize a very important dimension of symbolism and that is its fluidity. What at one time may be referential may later become condensational, and what is condensational may become

referential. This pattern of fluidity can be confusing enough even when the participants in a society are fairly homogeneous and stable in their images; but it is even more complicated when what is condensational for a person may latter become referential, and vice versa. The matter is complicated further when a condensational symbol is attributed to a variety of different referents and when a single referent is attributed a variety of condensational symbols. Such differences in meanings and varieties of perspectives are not static but are constantly in process; and the consequence is that the negotiated process of building lines of joint action is always tenuous and incomplete because it is never completely clear what a given participant's compliment of meanings and referents is that is being brought to an immediate situation.

American politics is always a combination of referential and condensational modes of reality construction in play on any given issue. In light of this, there is always a dimension of problematicism that accrues, resulting in miscommunication, confusion, or what have you. Again, the source of these competing constructions of reality is a pluralism of group symbol grammars. In light of this, one may say that the pluralism of reality constructions is ontologically inevitable. Indeed, the degree of such pluralism may vary among issues or among sizes and complexities of political arenas, but it is not avoidable.

The point regarding the size of the political arena is illustrated well by Schattschneider (1960) in his discussion of "The Contagiousness of Conflict" (pp. 1-19). He notes that the wider the scope of a

conflict, the more different conflicts are brought into play. The reason this is the case is that as the arena widens, more different constructions of reality are brought to bear, first on the original conflict, and then on new conflicts that arise by virtue of the increasing number of different combinations of interests created by the expanding scope of participants. The number of interests and issues increases making it increasingly complex and more difficult to resolve the original conflict, much less the new ones arising from the process of expansion. The pluralism of constructions of reality precludes a consensus as to what the public policy issue is that is being debated in the first place.

The mode of symbolism in American politics is fluid, always in process. The particular reality construction of a given symbolic mode, especially the condensational mode, is always being constructed in the negotiated process of fitting together lines of action of persons and of groups. Thus, the condensational mode with all its ambiguity and expressiveness will always be present in American politics, perhaps especially in those areas in which the moral point of view comes into play. Remembering the potentially broad scope of "moral," this accounts for a wide range of policy issues in American politics.

The construction of referential meanings is a relatively more stable process because of its lexical character. And yet the fluidity of symbolism comes into play as one recalls that what may generally be considered referential in meaning might well become condensational for certain individuals and groups. It is this fluidity of symbolic modes, this tenuousness of meanings, that make the warrantedness of a social control model of politics rather difficult to sustain; and it

suggests the pervasiveness of a pluralist model of politics, not out of any normative commitment but out of ontological necessity.

VI. CONCLUSION

This chapter has been concerned to outline some possible implications for an understanding of American politics that result from the treatment of symbolism in Chapters II and IV. Specifically, the discussion looked briefly at the two prevailing models of American politics, elitism and pluralism, and attempted to show the reasons why the latter is more amenable to this paper's analysis of symbolism than is the former. It was suggested further that because of the givenness of the fluidity of the symbolic modes, the possibility of a stable and relatively homogeneous grammar of symbols for American politics is not very likely, thus sustaining the pluralist character of the meaning of political symbols in America. Pluralist American politics is inevitable because the ontological character of political meanings is pluralist.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The previous chapters have raised a number of issues that are related in a number of ways. If one were to identify the single most important conclusion to be remembered from this paper, it would be that because of the nature of human meaning, human action with all its motives, means, and goals is inevitably pluralistic. The application of this conclusion has been limited to American politics, even though the discussion of symbolism has implied a universalistic scope. The limited application to American politics reflects prudence; the discussion of symbolism reflects suspicions as to what, in theory, the implications might be. Thus, it is clear that the theoretical case of symbolism is in need of further testing not only in an American context but cross-culturally as well.

Clarifications and cautions need to be noted as well by way of conclusion. The mythology of Q must be kept in perspective if its value as a research technique is to be preserved. Q is nothing more than a means of discovering what is; it is not a means of discovering descriptive proportions of a phenomenon in a given universe, as is survey research. For this reason the results of the Q-study in Chapter III are not the bases for precise generalizations to the general universe of American politics. One can, however, proceed to draw logical conclusions as to what one might find in a population, irrespective of descriptive proportions.

The weightiness of this point is that social scientists sometimes undertake descriptive and causal analyses of variables that, in fact,

may not be pertinent to members of the population under consideration. The value of Q is that it assists one in establishing what, in fact, may be relevant factors of behavior before one attempts to undertake an analysis of those factors. Thus, for example, if symbolic interaction is an accurate account of human action and if the Q data are correct, then the manner in which one studies political elites might need to be reconsidered. More to the point, if the negotiation model of behavior is more warranted than the social control model, then one must reconsider the accuracy of Edelman's analyses of public policy.

Another concluding consideration, which is "meta" in nature, has to do with the very line of argument in this paper. No claim is made here that the position adopted in this thesis is "correct" in any independently objective sense. Rather, what is presented is a point of view, a construction of reality, that is persuasive and that has aesthetic appeal for this writer. What has been done is to present reasons or accounts as to why it is persuasive. Or, as symbolic interaction would put it, a line of action is being attempted. The value in making this point is simply to illustrate in yet another way the model of human behavior that informs this paper.

Where does one go from here? The most obvious step is replication. This writer believes that other Q-studies using the Q-sample of this paper with different P-samples would help to sort out better the dimensions of symbolism. One possible approach is to employ the Thompson schema, an approach that has been used in Q-studies before (Stephenson, 1964, pp. 265-273).

Thompson's position is that there really is no such thing as the public opinion of a nation. Instead, there is a multiplicity of opinions. His question is, Which opinions are useful to consider if one wants to understand public opinion? Among other things, he suggests the following criteria for selecting types of opinion to study, types that reflect different types of interests that one will find on an issue. They are: (1) Special interests, e.g., proprietors of "adult book stores"; (2) experts, e.g., a judge or a psychiatrist; (3) existing authorities, e.g., perhaps a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union; (4) class interests, e.g., the clergy; and (5) the uninformed, e.g., the "man on the street" (see Stephenson, 1964, p. 270). A balanced P-sample could be drawn from these five types of interests with the anticipation that the results would represent the theoretical population of public opinion on obscenity.

An early attempt was made by this writer to construct a P-sample based on the Thompson schema. Problems arose in that adult book store proprietors, local Assistant District Attorneys, and local Criminal Court trial judges all were reluctant to participate in the Q-study. And yet if they were willing, and if such a Q-study were conducted, the resulting data could confidently be judged indicative of the dimensions of public opinion on obscenity. The failure to construct a Thompson P-sample, however, does not detract from the data generated by the Q-study in this paper; instead, a Thompson P-sample might enrich and elaborate the results already obtained.

Another additional step would be useful in this research, a step which is theoretically possible on the basis of the research completed thus far. That would be to take the person most representative of each of the two factors generated and to engage in an intensive analysis of these two persons. This would elicit a more complete understanding of the nature of the two factors generated (Brown, 1974). By varying the conditions of instruction for sorting a Q-sample and/or by creating additional Q-samples appropriate to the line of inquiry to be pursued, an entire Q-study can be done with an N of one (e.g., Brown, 1974, pp. 6-8).

With a view toward doing intensive analyses after the dissertation was completed, this writer approached the person most characteristic of the Clergy Factor. Unfortunately this was the only person who had expressed reluctance about participating in the original Q-study. This person, a member of the clergy, refused to participate in any further Q-studies. The most representative person on the Teacher Factor has not been contacted for purposes of further Q-sorts.

A final comment is in order at this point with respect to the nature of symbols. It is extremely important to understand that the whole of the social construction of reality, of communication, of consciousness is a process that is mediated through symbols, be they referential or condensational. Both modes of symbolization are simply different ways of attributing meaning to the "world out there." As Langer (1957) notes, we, as humans, cannot avoid symbolizing (p. 43). Thus, the "reality" of the referential and condensational modes is

equally founded with neither meriting derogation from the other as to the extent of each's ontological groundedness. The "reality" of condensational constructions of reality is neither more nor less than that of referential constructions. The political implication of this for public office holders, bureaucrats, attentive observers and participants, and what have you is that a comprehensive understanding of politics and perhaps a more effective involvement in the political process requires that one take with as much seriousness and treat with the same degree of regard the condensational constructions of reality as one does the referential constructions of reality. To do less is to delimit oneself unnecessarily from the stuff of politics. As Bentley (1967) concluded his chapter on "the Raw Materials of Politics" in 1908:

Many a child, making paper toys, has used his scissors too confidently and cut himself off from the materials he needs. That is an error to avoid. Instead, we shall plunge into any phenomena or set of phenomena belonging to the roughly recognized field of government, be it Congress in session, a town meeting, a murder's trial, a ballot-box manipulation at election time, or a mass meeting communicating the oracles of the age. If any of these things lead us to interesting paths we shall be prepared to follow them, heedless of definitions. Who likes may snip verbal definitions in his old age, when his world has gone crackly and dry (p. 199).

This admonition on definitions is cited here against defining reality too narrowly. The admonition, of course, is apropos to the definitions of this paper, and so one will, it is hoped, move beyond this paper as well, at least if one is still "young."

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

THE Q-SAMPLE: THE STATEMENTS
AND THEIR ORIGINS

THE Q-SAMPLE: THE STATEMENTS AND THEIR ORIGINS

Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity

1. The common circulation of obscene material can hardly help but induce many to believe that their moral code is out of date (Roth Briefs, 1956, 476-514).
5. Poor people are more likely to indulge in antisocial behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials (Clor, 1969, p. 162).
9. Anti-pornography measures, although not to be too readily indulged, should be available to protect established morality, and when that morality has been attacked, to respond to, or to anticipate and to head off community indignation (Kuh, 1967, p. 282).
13. An obscenity-saturated literary environment could function as one factor in the activation and reinforcement of unworthy traits of character (Clor, 1969, p. 170).
17. If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship of obscene materials (Kristol, 1972, p. 43).
21. Just as loyalty is essential to the well-being of a nation, so some sense of morality is essential to the well-being of a nation, and to the healthy life of the community; and accordingly, anyone who seeks, by his writing to corrupt that fundamental sense of morality is guilty of obscene libel (Patrick Devlin, quoted in Kuh, 1967, p. 227).
25. Society requires a public denunciation of obscenity whether or not it leads to positive harmful conduct. The fact that laws against obscenity do not have a rational or scientific basis, but rather symbolize a moral taboo, does not make them any less necessary. They are important because men feel that without them the state would be lacking in moral standards (Arnold, 1965, pp. 173-174).
29. People clamor for erotic censorship because they don't want the act of sex to lose its penumbra of mystery and sin, if not of sanctity (Alan Robbe-Grillet, quoted in Lerner, 1971, p. 186).
33. Sexual intimacy as represented in obscene materials should be prohibited out of simple respect and regard for the dark secret things of life--that they should be inviolable, and guarded by the two who take part, and that no other presence should be invited (Porter, 1960, p. 74).

37. I think in these times, with this terrible increase of juvenile delinquency, with this immensely profitable flood of pornography, using techniques never before available to the seducers of the innocent, I think it is nonsense to say that we are so bound by a very extreme interpretation of the freedom of the press that we cannot act (Thomas, 1955, pp. 217-221).
41. I do not believe that in order to protect the fundamental liberties of the press we have to turn our children, who are, in a sense, the ward of all our society, over to the kind of visual exploitation of base emotion, and the arousal of base emotion to which, of course, this pornographic literature, these films and cards, and all the rest are directed (Thomas, 1955, pp. 217-221).
45. Obscenity violates one's right of privacy, the right to protection against intrusion by unwanted materials (Rembar, 1971, p. 202).
49. Obscenity laws should restrict the public access juveniles have to sex-related materials so as to allow parental authority to be exercised with regard to such materials (Brennan in Ginsberg, 1968, p. 639).
53. It is not unreasonable, in our present state of knowledge, to consider that pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct which a state may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society (Harlan in Roth, 1957, pp. 501-502).
57. Society has the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity (State of Georgia in Stanley, 1969, p. 565).

Condensational Symbolic, Anti-Control

2. Adults should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess, and consume whatever communicative materials may appeal to them (White in Reidel, 1971, p. 357).
6. Literature should not be suppressed merely because it offends the moral code of the censor (Douglas in Roth, p. 513).
10. One cannot draw lines between the "good" and the "bad" and be true to the constitutional mandate to let all ideas alone (Author's characterization of Justice Douglas's position in Roth).
14. The right to receive information and ideas regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society (Marshall in Stanley, 1969, p. 564).
18. Any test of obscenity that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with the First Amendment (Douglas in Roth, 1957, p. 512).

22. Any regulation of obscenity will encroach upon the constitutional prohibition against any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" (Kuh, 1967, p. 217).
26. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that the state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch (Marshall in Stanley, 1969, p. 565).
30. Obscenity laws violate one's freedom of choice (Rembar, 1971, p. 201).
34. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds (Marshall in Stanley, 1957, p. 565).
38. Censorship of obscene material curtails the right of the individual, be he creator or consumer, to satisfy his intellect and his interest without harm (Crist, 1971, p. 57).
42. People should have open to them the moral choice about the kind of erotic lives they will live, the kind of print they will read, the kind of enactments on stage and screen and elsewhere they will take the trouble to see (Lerner, 1971, p. 187).
46. In our law-rooted society, we are not the keeper of our brother's morals--only of his rights (Crist, 1971, p. 57).
50. The idea behind censorship of obscenity is contrary to every principle that this country was built on (Cunningham, 1971, p. 203).
54. To permit any limitation on the access to reading, including obscene materials, is, in practice, to allow all encroachments dictated by local illiterates, bigots and prudes (Gertz, 1965, p. 8).
58. The First Amendment, written in terms that are absolute, deprive the state of any power to pass on the value, the propriety, or the morality of a particular expression, including obscene ones (Douglas in Memoirs, 1966, p. 431).

Referential Symbolic, Anti-Obscenity

3. There is a proven relationship between erotica and antisocial sexual behavior, and thus government control of such materials is legitimate (Antithesis of Douglas in Memoirs, 1966, p. 431).
7. A proper role of obscenity legislation is to protect the unwilling individual from exposure to obscene materials (Redrup, 1967, p. 769).

11. Obscenity laws should be limited to reflect a specific concern for the well-being of juveniles (Redrup, 1967, p. 769).
15. Obscenity laws should be limited to regulating only the commercial distribution of obscene material (Marshall in Stanley, 1969, p. 559).
19. Obscenity causes sex crimes (J. Edgar Hoover, quoted in Granahan Hearings, 1961, p. 28).
23. Obscene materials can lead to crimes of violence (Wertham, 1953, p. 94).
27. Obscenity causes juvenile delinquency (Clor, 1969, p. 137).
31. Obscene films create various deviations of thinking and emotional instability in regard to sex problems (M. A. Tamourianz, quoted in Kilpatrick, 1969, p. 237).
35. Exposure to obscene material runs contrary to the principles of mental health (T. J. Murphy in the Granahan Hearings, 1959, p. 129).
39. The desire to expose oneself to obscene materials represents infantile sexual and sadistic desires (Abse, 1955, p. 577).
43. An effective anti-obscenity law will eliminate the economic profit that derives from the merchandising of obscene materials and lead to its virtual elimination (Ketchersid, 1979).
47. Responses to literature are highly variable and subjective, so there is no way to determine what will be the effect of a given piece of literature upon a particular person (Clor, 1969, p. 144).
51. Harmful addiction to obscene materials occurs in children in all walks of life who are in no way psychologically predisposed (Wertham, 1953, p. 114).
55. Pornography reduces or removes the empathy and the mutual identification which restrain us from treating each other merely as objects or means. Without such empathy, we are not human to each other (van den Haag, 1971, pp. 146-147).
59. Reading obscene material encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex and interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for the opposite sex (New York Academy of Medicine, 1963, p. 545).

Referential Symbolic, Anti-Control

4. Founders of our nation in adopting the First Amendment meant precisely that the federal government should pass "no law" regulating speech and press but should confine its legislation to the regulation of conduct (Black in Mishkin, 1966, p. 518).
8. It is by no means clear that obscene literature is a significant factor in influencing substantial deviations from the community standards (Douglas in Roth, 1957, p. 510).
12. The First Amendment does not permit the censorship of expression that does not incite illegal action (Douglas in Memoirs, 1966, p. 426).
16. If the state is only concerned about printed or filmed materials inducing criminal conduct, then the deterrents to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not prohibitions of the materials in question (Marshall in Stanley, 1969, pp. 566-567).
20. The obscene is that which disturbs the sexually insecure (Alex Comfort, quoted in McWilliams, 1971, p. 90).
24. Obscenity is a crime for which there is no victim, and so it should not be illegal (Lane, 1971, p. 30).
28. As a police measure, prohibitions against the sale of obscene materials to minors are notoriously ineffective (McWilliams, 1971, p. 73).
32. There are no acceptable empirical studies by psychiatrists, psychologists, biologists, physiologists, criminologists, statisticians, sociologists, or scientists which would indicate a direct relationship between exposure to erotic stimuli and the commission of criminal acts (McWilliams, 1971, p. 72).
36. Obscenity is too subjective an idea to be used in law (Lane, 1971, p. 30).
40. Any governmental restriction or punishment of any form of expression on the ground of obscenity must require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that such an expression would directly cause, in a normal adult, behavior which has validly been made criminal by statute (ACLU, quoted in Kuh, 1967, p. 5).
44. Government should be concerned with anti-social conduct, not with utterances; thus, government should not censor obscene materials (Douglas in Roth, 1957, pp. 512-513).

48. Impulses which are denied outlet because of repression, psychological or social, achieve satisfaction through imaginations and fantasies, facilitated by pornography, of perverted or destructive behavior (Kronhausen and Kronhausen, 1964, p. 338).
52. Contrary to popular misconception, people who read obscene literature are less likely to become sexual offenders than those who do not, for the reason that such reading often neutralizes what aberrant sexual interests they may have (Karpman, 1954, p. 485).
56. Juvenile delinquency is more a result of socialization than of exposure to obscene materials (Clor, 1969, p. 146).
60. Interest in pornography is a reflection on a person's personality, not the mold of it (Gellhorn, 1956, p. 61).

APPENDIX B

THE EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT

6405 Trailhead Circle
Knoxville, Tennessee 37920
September 1979

Dear Fellow Pastor:

I am writing you to enlist your assistance in a research project which is part of my doctoral dissertation at the University of Tennessee. I have undertaken an inquiry into the nature of persons' perceptions of the obscenity issue. I believe that your views as an ordained minister are pertinent to such an inquiry, and thus I would be most grateful if you would participate. Let me assure you that your response in this study will be held in complete confidence.

Enclosed is the research instrument, called a Q-sort, with which I am asking you to work. There is an instruction sheet which will tell you how to proceed. The amount of time required to complete the sort will vary among individuals, but I would think that you will need approximately thirty minutes to complete it. If at all possible, I would appreciate the return of your record of how you distributed your statements by September 29, 1979. You may either mail the results or call me so that I can pick them up. You may keep the Q-statements unless you wish to return them.

If you have any question regarding the nature of this study or of how to proceed with the Q-sort, please call me. If, for whatever reason, you choose not to participate in this study, please contact me since I will need to secure someone else to replace you in the study.

May I express to you my appreciation for your time and assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

Harry L. Howard
577-8329--Knoxville
983-3555--Maryville

HOLSTON CONFERENCE--THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH

Knoxville District

Ben B. St. Clair, District Superintendent

September 14, 1979

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This will certify to you that Harry L. Howard, a United Methodist minister and member of the Holston Conference, is engaged in academic research related to his doctoral dissertation and will be conducting interviews for this purpose during the fall of 1979.

Ben B. St. Clair

6405 Trailhead Circle
Knoxville, Tennessee 37920
September 1979

Dear Knox County Reading Teacher:

I am writing you to enlist your assistance in a research project which is part of my doctoral dissertation at the University of Tennessee. I have undertaken an inquiry into the nature of persons' perceptions of the obscenity issue. I believe that your views as a public school teacher working in the area of reading are pertinent to such an inquiry, and thus I would be most grateful if you were to participate. Let me assure you that your response in this study will be held in complete confidence.

Enclosed is the research instrument, called a Q-sort, with which I am asking you to work. There is an instruction sheet which will tell you how to proceed. The amount of time required to complete the sort will vary among individuals, but I would think that you will need approximately thirty minutes to complete it. If at all possible, I would appreciate the return of your record of how you distributed your statements by September 29, 1979. You may either mail the results or call me so that I can pick them up. You may keep the Q-statements unless you wish to return them.

If you have any question regarding the nature of this study or of how to proceed with the Q-sort, please call me. If, for whatever reason, you choose not to participate in this study, please contact me since I will need to secure someone else to replace you in the study.

May I express to you my appreciation for your time and assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

Harry L. Howard
577-8329--Knoxville
983-3555--Maryville

Dear Maryville College Student:

Most of you know me but some of you do not, so let me begin by introducing myself. I am a Maryville College faculty member in the political science department. This fall term I am on leave of absence so that I can finish my Ph.D. degree. It is in this connection that I am contacting you.

My dissertation is an inquiry into people's perceptions of the obscenity issue. In order to do this I need several persons to do a Q-sort for me. This is a technique whereby a person's perception of something can be studied systematically. You have been chosen because of your sex, year in school, and major area of study. I would be most appreciative if you could give me about one hour of your time to do a Q-sort on obscenity. Let me assure you that your responses on the Q-sort will be held in complete confidence.

If you are willing to participate in this study, please complete the form below, being sure to indicate which of the two times you could come to the College Library to do the sort. If you cannot come at one of the two times scheduled but are interested in doing the sort, please indicate when you could do it. Finally, if you do not wish to do the sort, please indicate so on the form and return it so that I can find a replacement for you in the study.

Return the form to me, Harry Howard, Box 2814, no later than Friday, September 21, 1979. If you have any questions, call me at 983-3555 on campus or at 577-8329 at my home in Knoxville.

May I express my appreciation to you for your assistance in this matter.

Harry L. Howard

Name _____

I will participate:

Monday, September 24, 1979, 7:00 p.m. _____

Tuesday, September 23, 1979, 7:00 p.m. _____

Another time (indicate) _____

I will not participate _____

INSTRUCTIONS

The following instructions will assist you in constructing a verbal picture of your view on the issue of obscenity. The means by which you will do so is the Q-sort. This consists of sixty statements representing a variety of views on the issue. Your task is to sort the statements on a continuum ranging from "Most Characteristic" to "Most Uncharacteristic" of your point of view. The procedure is as follows.

1. This Q-sort would probably be easiest to perform on a large, clean desk or table where you have enough room to sort the pieces of paper on which the sixty statements are printed.
2. Once situated in a suitable place, read through each of the statements at least one time before going on to further steps.
3. As you read the statements a second time, evaluate each of them and place them in front of you in three piles: (1) those statements which you feel are rather or quite "uncharacteristic"; (2) those that are neither "uncharacteristic" nor "characteristic" but are "neutral"; and (3) those which you feel are somewhat or quite "characteristic" of your view of the obscenity issue.
4. From among the "uncharacteristic" pile, find three statements that you think are "most uncharacteristic" of your point of view and place them aside. From among the remaining statements of this pile, find four more that you think are a little less "uncharacteristic." These two sets of selections comprise the first two columns of the left side of your sort. Referring to your Score Sheet, continue this evaluation process of the "uncharacteristic" pile until you have found the proper number of statements for each column. The correct number of statements for each category is found in parentheses beneath the columns of the Score Sheet.
5. Finish the "uncharacteristic" pile, or the left-hand side of the sort, before you start on the "characteristic" pile. You may discover that you have too many or too few statements that you feel are "uncharacteristic." If this is the case, go to the "neutral" pile, adding to it or selecting from it for the required statements.
6. Now sort the statements of the "characteristic" pile in a similar manner as outlined in the preceding step, again using the "neutral" pile when needed.

7. The finished sort in front of you should look similar to the structure of the columns of blocks on the Score Sheet. Look over your final arrangement to make sure you are satisfied with it as representing your view of obscenity, given the limitations imposed.
8. When you are satisfied with your arrangement, record the identification numbers of the statements (found in the lower right-hand corner of each slip of paper) directly into the appropriately corresponding blocks of the Score Sheet.
9. After finishing the Score Sheet, place it, along with any comments you might wish to make, in the pre-addressed, stamped envelope provided and mail it.

Thank you for your cooperation in this study.

SCORE SHEET

Most Uncharacteristic					Neutral		Most Characteristic			
-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
(3)						(3)				
(4)						(4)				
(6)		(6)		(6)		(6)				
(7)						(7)				
(8)										

Name _____
 (Optional)

APPENDIX C

TWO-FACTOR Q-SOLUTION WITH STANDARDIZED SCORES

TABLE XVI

TWO-FACTOR Q-SOLUTION WITH STANDARDIZED SCORES

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (N=21)	2 (N=20)
		<u>Z-scores</u>	
1	The common circulation of obscene material can hardly help but induce many to believe that their moral code is out of date. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-0.2	1.0
2	Adults should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess and consume whatever communicative materials may appeal to them. Condensational, Anti-Control	0.8	-1.4
3	There is a proven relationship between erotica and antisocial sexual behavior, and thus government control of such material is legitimate. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-1.3	0.2
4	The founders of our nation in adopting the First Amendment meant precisely that the federal government should pass "no law" regulating speech and press but should confine its legislation to the regulation of conduct. Referential, Anti-Control	0.5	-0.5
5	Poor people more likely will indulge in antisexual behavior resulting from exposure to obscene materials. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-1.9	-1.9
6	Literature should not be suppressed merely because it offends the moral code of the censor. Condensational, Anti-Control	1.2	-0.2
7	A proper role of obscenity legislation is to protect the unwilling individual from exposure to obscene materials. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	0.5	1.0

TABLE XVI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (N=21)	2 (N=20)
		<u>Z-scores</u>	
8	It is by no means clear that obscene literature is a significant factor in influencing substantial deviations from community standards. Referential, Anti-Control	0.9	-0.6
9	Antipornography measures, although not to be too readily indulged, should be available to protect established morality and when that morality has been attacked, to respond to, or to anticipate and to head off community indignation. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	0.0	1.0
10	One cannot draw lines between the "good" and the "bad" and be true to the constitutional mandate to let all ideas alone. Condensational, Anti-Control	0.5	-0.8
11	Obscenity laws should be limited to reflect a specific concern for the mental health of juveniles. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	0.5	-0.2
12	The First Amendment does not permit the censorship of expression that does not incite illegal action. Referential, Anti-Control	0.6	0.1
13	An obscenity-saturated literary environment could function as one factor in the activation and reinforcement of unworthy traits of character. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-0.7	1.7
14	The right to receive information and ideas regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society. Condensational, Anti-Control	1.1	-0.3
15	Obscenity laws should be limited to regulating only the commercial distribution of obscene materials. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-0.0	-0.5

TABLE XVI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (N=21)	2 (N=20)
<u>Z-scores</u>			
16	If the state is only concerned about printed or filmed materials inducing criminal conduct, then the deterrents to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not prohibitions of the materials in question. Referential, Anti-Control	0.7	-0.4
17	If you care for the quality of life in our American democracy, then you have to be for censorship of obscene materials. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-1.8	0.6
18	Any test of obscenity that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be shared with the First Amendment. Condensational, Anti-Control	0.0	-0.2
19	Obscenity causes sex crimes. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-1.8	0.1
20	The obscene is that which disturbs the sexually insecure. Referential, Anti-Control	-0.7	-1.4
21	Just as loyalty is essential to the well-being of a nation, so some sense of morality is essential to the well-being of a nation, and to the healthy life of the community; and accordingly, anyone who seeks, by his writing to corrupt that fundamental sense of morality is guilty of obscene libel. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-0.7	1.4
22	Any regulation of obscenity will encroach upon the constitutional prohibition against any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Condensational, Anti-Control	0.3	-1.3

TABLE XVI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (N=21)	2 (N=20)
		<u>Z-scores</u>	
23	Obscene materials can lead to crimes of violence. Referential, Anti- Obscenity	-1.0	1.0
24	Obscenity is a crime for which there is no victim, and so it should not be illegal. Referential, Anti-Control	-0.6	-2.1
25	Society requires a public denunciation of obscenity whether or not it leads to positive harmful conduct. Such denunciations are important because men feel that without them the state would be lacking in moral standards. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-0.8	0.8
26	If the First Amendment means anything, it means that the state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Condensational, Anti-Control	1.4	0.2
27	Obscenity causes juvenile delinquency. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-1.9	-0.2
28	As a police measure, prohibitions against the sale of obscene materials to minors are ineffective. Referential, Anti-Control	0.3	-0.1
29	People desire erotic censorship because they don't want the act of sex to lose its penumbra of mystery and sin, if not of sanctity. Condensational, Anti- Obscenity	-0.4	-0.3
30	Obscenity laws violate one's freedom of choice. Condensational, Anti-Control	0.7	-1.1
31	Obscene films create various deviations of thinking and emotional instability in regard to sex problems. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-1.0	0.7

TABLE XVI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (N=21)	2 (N=20)
		<u>Z-scores</u>	
32	There are no acceptable empirical studies by psychiatrists, psychologists, biologists, physiologists, criminologists, statisticians, sociologists, or scientists which would indicate a direct relationship between exposure to erotic stimuli and the commission of criminal acts. Referential, Anti-Control	0.8	-0.9
33	Sexual intimacy as represented in obscene materials should be prohibited out of simple respect and regard for the dark secret things of life--that they should be inviolable, and guarded by the two who take part, and that no other presence should be invited. Condensational, Anti-Control	-1.4	0.5
34	Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds. Condensational, Anti-Control	1.8	0.7
35	Exposure to obscene material runs contrary to the principles of mental health. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-1.0	0.6
36	Obscenity is too subjective an idea to be used in law. Referential, Anti-Control	0.8	-0.8
37	I think in these times with this terrible increase of juvenile delinquency, with this immensely profitable flood of pornography, using techniques never before available to the seducers of the innocent, I think it is nonsense to say that we are so bound by a very extreme interpretation of the freedom of the press that we cannot act. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-0.3	2.1
38	Censorship of obscene material curtails the right of the individual, be he creator or consumer, to satisfy his intellect and his interest without harm. Condensational, Anti-Control	0.9	-1.4

TABLE XVI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (N=21)	2 (N=20)
		<u>Z-scores</u>	
39	The desire to expose oneself to obscene materials represents infantile sexual and sadistic desires. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-1.4	-0.3
40	Any governmental restriction or punishment of any form of expression on the ground of obscenity must require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that such an expression would directly cause, in a normal adult, behavior which has validly been made criminal by statute. Referential, Anti-Control	1.3	-0.2
41	I do not believe that in order to protect the fundamental liberties of the press we have to turn our children, who are, in a sense, the ward of all our society, over to the kind of visual exploitation of base emotion, and the arousal of base emotion to which, of course this pornographic literature, these films and cards, and all the rest are directed. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-0.3	1.4
42	People should have open to them the moral choice about the kind of erotic lives they will live, the kind of print they will read, the kind of enactments on stage and screen and elsewhere they will take the trouble to see. Condensational, Anti-Control	1.7	-0.0
43	An effective anti-obscenity law will eliminate the economic profit that derives from the merchandizing of obscene materials and lead to its virtual elimination. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-0.9	0.7
44	Government should be concerned with anti-social conduct, not with utterances; thus, government should not censor obscene materials. Referential, Anti-Control	0.4	-1.2

TABLE XVI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (N=21)	2 (N=20)
		<u>Z-scores</u>	
45	Obscenity violates one's right of privacy, the right to protection against intrusion by unwanted materials. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-0.7	1.3
46	In our law-rooted society, we are not the keeper of our brother's morals--only of his rights. Condensational, Anti-Control	1.4	-0.8
47	Response to literature are highly variable and subjective, so there is no way to determine what will be the effect of a given piece of literature upon a person. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	1.8	0.3
48	Impulses which are denied outlet because of repression, psychological or social, achieve satisfaction through imaginations and fantasies, facilitated by pornography, of perverted or destructive behavior. Referential, Anti-Control	-0.3	-0.1
49	Obscenity laws should restrict the public access juveniles have to sex-related materials so as to allow parental authority to be exercised with regard to such materials. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	1.4	1.1
50	The idea behind censorship of obscenity is contrary to every principle that this country was built on. Condensational, Anti-Control	0.2	-1.9
51	Harmful addiction to obscene materials occurs in children in all walks of life who are in no way psychologically predisposed to such harm. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-0.5	0.5

TABLE XVI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (N=21)	2 (N=20)
		<u>Z-scores</u>	
52	Contrary to popular misconception, people who read obscene literature are less likely to become sexual offenders than those who do not, for the reason that such reading often neutralizes what aberrant sexual interests they may have. Referential, Anti-Control	0.2	-1.2
53	It is not unreasonable, in our present state of knowledge, to consider that pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct which a state may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-0.3	1.5
54	To permit any limitation on the access to reading, including obscene materials, is, in practice, to allow all encroachments dictated by local illiterates, bigots, and prudes. Condensational, Anti-Control	0.2	-1.3
55	Pornography reduces or removes the empathy and the mutual identification which restrain us from treating each other merely as objects or means. Without such empathy, we are not human to each other. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-0.9	1.2
56	Juvenile delinquency is more a result of socialization than of exposure to obscene materials. Referential, Anti-Control	1.3	0.7
57	Society has the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of obscenity. Condensational, Anti-Obscenity	-1.0	1.5
58	The First Amendment, written in terms that are absolute, deprives the state of any power to pass on the value, the propriety, or the morality of a particular expression, including obscene ones. Condensational, Anti-Control	0.3	-1.1

TABLE XVI (Continued)

Statement Number	Item Descriptions	Factors	
		1 (<u>N</u> =21)	2 (<u>N</u> =20)
		<u>Z-scores</u>	
59	Reading obscene material encourages a morbid preoccupation with sex and interferes with the development of a healthy attitude and respect for the opposite sex. Referential, Anti-Obscenity	-1.4	1.2
60	Interest in pornography is a reflection of a person's personality, not the mold of it. Referential, Anti-Control	1.2	-0.3

VITA

Harry Lee Howard was born in Dubuque, Iowa, on June 2, 1945. He attended elementary and secondary schools in Northern Illinois and graduated from Oregon Community High School in Oregon, Illinois, in 1963. He entered Tennessee Wesleyan College in 1963 and received the Bachelor of Arts degree in Social Sciences in 1967. He entered Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, in 1967 and received the Master of Theology degree in 1970. He also received the Master of Arts degree in Political Science from Southern Methodist University in 1971.

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