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**Modernity, Capitalism, and War: Toward a Sociology of War
in the Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914**

A Thesis Presented for
the Master of Arts Degree
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Abstract

The academic discipline of Sociology has rarely broached the subject of war and its recursive relationship with society. This paper addresses three major approaches in several disciplines that can be deemed ‘economically deterministic’: Marxist, Liberal, and Realist. These approaches can be useful for certain questions, but also leave out, or cloud other non-economic variables in understanding war – notably culture and military variables themselves. By using Karl Polanyi’s thesis regarding the “Myth of the Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) as a foil, the historical case of war in the nineteenth century is used to highlight the nature of war in European modernity and capitalism.

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Introduction

The origins of this project stemmed from research I had begun in 2008 dedicated to understanding the American military-industrial complex and the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the course of this research I discovered a number of fascinating sociological theories of war, including Baran and Sweezy's *Monopoly Capitalism* and the world-systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein.¹ Though these perspectives provided insight into the role of the economy and its relationship to war in the twentieth century, I soon realized these frameworks had limits. For example, how does one explain the strange sense of obliviousness within U.S. culture to the fact that we are at war? If the wars in Iraq were truly about oil, or reactions to over-accumulated surplus capital, why did President Bush have to frame the endeavor in terms of national security and spreading democracy? Why did the public buy and support this agenda? Could these not legitimately be the reasons to go to war held by the administration and the public, and not simply cover for ulterior economic motives?

As I tried to find other sociological theories of war, I discovered a number of perspectives, such as that of Charles Tilly, which highlighted the role of war in generating the nation state in early modern Europe. Max Weber, Stanislaw Andreski, Norbert Elias, and others noted the role of military organization in bureaucracy and court society around the same period.² However, I found that between the end of the Napoleonic Wars in the early nineteenth century and the beginning of total war in 1914, there was a considerable gap in terms of understanding

¹ P Baran and P Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital; an Essay on the American Economic and Social Order*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1966; I Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004.

² S Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* 2nd edn., Routledge & K. Paul, London, 1968; N Elias et al., *The Civilizing Process : Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations* Rev. edn., Blackwell Publishers, Oxford ; Malden, Mass., 2000.

these two trends. If surplus capital and hegemony were the driving forces for war in the twentieth century, when did this trend begin? If war was the most important factor in the generation of the modern state, how did this trend continue to develop over the course of the nineteenth century? Precisely during the period we typically identify as the formative era of modern society in Europe, the various theories begin to lose their explanatory power.

I soon connected this problem to what I consider an overemphasis on economic variables in explaining war and peace. Relying especially on Michael Mann's *Sources of Social Power*, vol. II, both for historical material, as well as a theoretical framework that identified four sources of social power - Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political (I.E.M.P) - without granting primacy to any over the other, I realized that the questions related to war and society in the nineteenth century could begin to be addressed.³

Additionally, I found that, whereas in sociology, the subject of war is incredibly under-theorized and under-researched, in the discipline of history, since the mid-1970s a trend known as "new military history" had been developing that was explicitly dedicated to the relationship between 'war' and 'society'. The historiography of the rise of the new military history was described by Robert Citino in the *American Historical Review*.⁴ Citino identified three schools of military history: operational, social, and cultural military history. The first, operational military history, is essentially a more rigorous and contextual version of Great Leader/Great Battle history. Wars and battles are examined in tremendous detail to determine which movement on the battlefield led to which outcome. Attention is given to arms technology and the agency of officers, as well as the contingencies of weather, topography, and luck on the

³ M Mann, *The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993.

⁴ R Citino, 'Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 112, issue 4, 2007.

particular day a battle is fought. Though this operational history has lost favor within the academic discipline of history, much of the historical materials consumed by popular audiences, whether at Barnes and Noble or on the History Channel, are of this sort. The second school of military history can be termed social or “sociological,” in as much as new military history is interested explicitly in the connection between war and society. The connection between the two is, rightly, assumed to be a recursive one, in which social structure impacts the way in which wars are fought, while wars, in turn, affect society and change social configurations. The third development in military history is cultural history of war, following a general trend in many disciplines since the 1970s known as the “cultural turn.” Of the three trends in military histories old and new - operational, sociological, and cultural - clearly the *sociological* is the least developed. The promising project of new military history, directed toward understanding the recursive connection between war and society, seems to rely on a relatively weak conception of “society” as part of the equation. Particularly in terms of economy and social structure, society remains under-theorized in much new military history literature.

This realization led me to try to reinsert the overly economic theories, which I had found to be deficient, into the detailed, but under-theorized historical material that has been generated by new military historians. This process forced me to identify specifically what socioeconomic processes and mechanisms were relevant in establishing the link between war and society. In the case of the nineteenth century, these theories helped me identify precisely those economic structures that were missing or minimized within the new military history literature. At the same time, particularly in reference to cultural history, I found that these economic variables could not hold up as the solely determining influences in war and peace.

What follows is an attempt to retrace the experience of these discoveries and insights in a slightly different chronological order. In section one, I define precisely the social phenomena I am interested in exploring in relation to each other, namely ‘war,’ ‘modernity,’ and ‘capitalism.’ In section two, I retrace and critique three major theories from various social science disciplines that have tried to deal with these questions: Marxist, Realist, and Liberal. In their traditional forms, all suffer from an overly economic perspective, which prevents us from seeing non-economic variables, such as autonomous military and cultural developments, that influence decisions of war and peace.

In section three, I use Karl Polanyi’s notion of a “Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) as a hypothesis against which I can test insights gained from the new military and cultural history literature.⁵ Using a number of quantitative as well as qualitative measures I deconstruct Polanyi’s thesis to demonstrate how exactly a simply economic interpretation of war and peace will not suffice.

The fourth section then introduces cultural material that has been neglected in materialist analyses of war in the nineteenth century. Though it is difficult at this tentative stage to identify precisely what elements of culture are most important at what time, I have suggested several sociocultural and sociopsychological mechanisms that seem to be related to war in nineteenth century Europe. I conclude by identifying what these cultural considerations suggest in terms of future research and theoretical development.

Though I have not found the precise answers to my initial questions regarding our present wars in the Middle East, during the course of my research on nineteenth century Europe, I have found conspicuous similarities between our world and theirs - particularly during the late period

⁵ K Polanyi, *The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 2001.

immediately preceding World War I. At the moment the modern world was becoming conscious of itself, with the power of new technologies ready at hand – it was unclear whether theirs was a civilization of peace or of a militant hegemon. On the one hand, in 1914 very few had experienced war, at least within Continental Europe. The “Great War,” as the Napoleonic Wars were called, had been fought by grandfathers and great grandfathers. International institutions had prevented war for ages, and seemed ready to do so indefinitely.⁶ On the other hand, atrocities and failures witnessed by a new popular press, such as the Boer War and King Leopold’s rubber plantations, began to shake the assumptions underlying imperialism: that Europe was the center and pinnacle of human civilization; that European militaries were not out for their own interests, or in support of naked greed. At the time, it must have been difficult to understand the nature of modernity, war, and society, because one did not want to think of one’s own society as warlike. Today, it seems just as hard to understand. Whether we like it or not, this essay is an attempt to see war’s actual influence on our past, present, and future society.

⁶ Of course, this was only an impression of peace, since the nineteenth century was full of war as will be discussed below.

1. War, Modernity, and Capitalism

Understanding war requires an understanding of society as a whole, while, conversely, society cannot be understood without accounting for war and violence. The latter side of this argument, however, has not been sufficiently internalized within the discipline of sociology, leaving war to political scientists and anthropologists to frame in terms of politics and culture.⁷ When sociologists do approach war, it is often within the materialist framework of Marxist theory, highlighting the causal role of the contradictions of capitalism. Indeed, what is modern society if not capitalist? However, the key question in this regard is whether *economics* are the determining factor needed to explain modern war. Are wars simply the games powerful classes play with the lower classes as pawns? Are wars that are justified by participants as nationalistic, racial, or liberal simply the cynical rationalization for material self-interests? Though material interests are always present in any mobilization or execution of war, the idea that actors cannot have any non-material motivation for engaging in war represents economic determinism – an assertion I will suggest is refutable. I would suggest that the notion of economic primacy is a reflection of “capitalist” modernity itself.⁸ The task of the historical sociologist should be to deconstruct this notion and identify the evolution of this trend towards valuing economic matters in the execution of war and peace. For this reason, the case of war in the nineteenth century will

⁷ In 1999, Edward Tiryakian described war “as a societal and trans-societal phenomenon...the most understudied, underanalyzed field of sociology”; E Tiryakian, 'War: The Covered Side of Modernity', *International Sociology*, vol. 14, issue 4, Dec 1999, 473-89; Gregory Hooks and James Rice, reviewing three prominent sociological journals, *American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, and *Social Forces*, found that out of 1575 articles between 1990 and 1999, only 23 articles were related to war; G Hooks and J Rice, 'War, Militarism, and States: The Insights and Blind Spots of Political Sociology', in R Janoski, A Hicks, and M Schwartz (ed.), *The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005.

⁸ An argument that is to follow will consider, and ultimately challenge, the semantic use of the term “capitalism” as the definition of modernity. Since this argument will come considerably later in the paper, I will use the term traditionally until the argument is made.

be important to the theoretical argument of this essay, providing the historical material against which the hypothesis of economic determinism can be assessed.

Before proceeding, adequate definitions of three terms - war, modernity, and capitalism - will need to be outlined. War has been defined at various points for statistical purposes as violent conflict between two or more political groups resulting in at least 1000 battle deaths.⁹ While the adequacy of this definition for statistical use has been debated elsewhere in terms of which wars are, or are not, included according to this criterion, it is relatively uncontroversial for the purposes of this thesis. I would, however, add some characteristics that highlight the *social* aspects of war in addition to the *political* characteristics listed above.¹⁰ Wars are mass mobilizations of (typically) men designed to murder, maim, or capture members of an opposing group of warriors and/or civilians. As Lewis Mumford quite dramatically put it, “War is that special form of conflict in which the aim is not to resolve the points of difference but to annihilate physically the defenders of opposing points or reduce them by force to submission.”¹¹ While the above definitions are especially general, it will be the task of the rest of this paper to deal with what particular motivational content has filled the generic form of war in the modern era.

Defining modernity once and for all seems impossible if the ongoing debate between postmodernists, modernists, traditionalists, and radical modernists provides any indication.¹²

However, in terms of pure historical dating, a useful benchmark is Reinhart Koselleck’s

⁹ D Singer and M Small, *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook*, Wiley, New York., 1972; J Levy and W Thompson, *Causes of War*, John Wiley & Sons, Malden, Mass, 2010.

¹⁰ Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” C Clausewitz and A Rapoport, *On War*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968.; cf. J Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, Alfred A. Knopf , New York, 1993 for a critique of Clausewitz’ dictum.

¹¹ L Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, Harcourt, New York, 1963. p. 308

¹² J. F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition : A Report on Knowledge*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984; A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1990; J Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity : Twelve Lectures*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987.

suggestion that modernity began sometime in the mid to late eighteenth century Europe as society became reflexively self-aware.¹³ Koselleck suggested that the period from around 1750 to 1850 should be considered a *Sattelzeit* (saddle-time) between the early modern and the modern period. Elsewhere, Mark Raeff described that “what emerged into the open in the eighteenth century in most of Western and Central Europe - was society's conscious desire to maximize all its resources and to use this new potential dynamically for the enlargement and improvement of its way of life.”¹⁴ In this sense, modernity can be read as a set of modern institutions – the modern nation-state, the modern economy, modern technology, and so forth. Modernity can also be characterized by particular forms of consciousness, such as one that distinguishes between “Man” and “Nature.”¹⁵ Modern society, therefore, maintains a “constitution” that distinguishes it from previous epochs.

Included within the constitution of modernity is the social system defined as capitalism. In political-economic terms capitalism requires a legal framework that provides adequate protection and reproduction of private property, free labor, and (relatively) free markets. Capital is a factor of production that is not consumed within the production process, and includes money, fixed assets like machinery, and social assets such as network contacts and education. For capital to accumulate it must remain in a state of movement, for it requires the commodity form and money as both a means of exchange and as a commodity itself.¹⁶ This movement and accumulative tendency provides capitalism with its dynamic character. Because capital can

¹³ R Koselleck and T Presner, *The Practice of Conceptual History : Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 2002. pp. 154-169

¹⁴ M Raeff, 'The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 80, issue 5, 1975, 1221-43.

¹⁵ Leading Bruno Latour to conclude that “We have never been modern,” since this distinction was never real, and that reality is always characterized by “hybrids” between human products and nature. B Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1993.

¹⁶ K Marx, *Capital: Oxford Abridged Edition*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. Pp 51-92, 93-100.

never rest, neither can the social system of capitalism remain static. The social consequences of this process were described by Marx in terms of the contradictions within the logic of the system itself, particularly in terms of the class relations between owners of the means of production and labor.¹⁷ Further contradictions have been highlighted by Marxists such as David Harvey, who demonstrated the tendency within capitalism to generate fiscal crises,¹⁸ and Moishe Postone who suggested that the fundamental contradiction relates to the modern notions of abstract value and abstract time.¹⁹ Postone argued that traditional Marxists, that is, the majority of academic and political disciples of Marx, have misread the dialectic Marx tried to explain in *Capital* and *The Grundrisse*.²⁰ The details of Postone's argument will be discussed later, but for the purposes of defining capitalism here, a necessary distinction needs to be made between capitalism as an *economic system* and capitalism as a *social system*. In other words, is capitalism to be equated with the "totality" of modern society, or is capitalism the particular structure of economic relations and transactions? Providing a hard answer to this question at this point would be premature and will occupy much of the considerations that follow.

The relationship between war, modernity, and capitalism is of primary importance for establishing an adequate analysis of the question of whether war is immanently contained within the constitution of modern society, or whether war is an atavism of previous epochs that has not been removed or contained by modern international institutions. This issue is fundamentally a sociological question, in the sense that sociology is interested in understanding modern society. However, the discipline of sociology has rarely addressed this problem or incorporated the

¹⁷ op. cit. Marx 1999; K Marx and F Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Penguin Classics, New York, 1967.

¹⁸ D Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.

¹⁹ M Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination : A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge England ; New York, NY , USA, 1993.

²⁰ op. cit. Marx 1999; K Marx, *Grundrisse; Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)*, Allen Lane, New Left Review, London,, 1973.

question of war in its mainstream sociological theories, a legacy, perhaps, of the mindset of the classical sociological theories of Spencer, Durkheim, and Parsons.²¹ In other words, despite the overwhelming obviousness that war is essential to understanding society, as evidenced by the actuality of the occurrence of wars throughout the modern era, sociologists have, to this point, implicitly or explicitly assumed the position that war is *not* an immanent feature of modernity.

Of course, there are exceptions to this generalization about the mainstream of sociology. Several scholars, such as Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, Hans Joas, and others have demanded that we confront the violence inherent in modern society, especially in the form of the modern nation-state. The work of these sociologists will be of great importance to the theoretical project outlined below. Furthermore, the work of Marxist scholars from Vladimir Lenin to Immanuel Wallerstein has dealt with the issue of war by drawing on the implications of Marx's analysis of capitalism. In this sense, these scholars, more than any other, have confronted the very issue of whether war is contained within the logic of modern society. However, this project will consist of a specific critique of the economic determinism of these analyses – that is, the focus on resources, markets, and distribution, toward the relative exclusion of cultural, political, and social factors that, in orthodox Marxism, are accorded the position of the “superstructure.”

²¹ M Mann, *States, War, and Capitalism : Studies in Political Sociology*, B. Blackwell, Oxford [England] ; New York, NY, USA, 1988; H Joas, *War and Modernity*, Blackwell Pub.,Malden, MA, 2003.

2. Economistic Theories of War and Modernity

I will begin with an outline of four theories that have been developed to understand war and modern society, all of which can be deemed economically deterministic: Marxist, Realist, Liberal, and Communitarian. The relative popularity of these theories is by no means proportional, and they exist across social scientific disciplines. Synopses of the assumptions of the respective theories are as follows:

- *Marxist* – The class contradictions of capitalist accumulation generate a condition that necessitates that surplus capital which has been over-accumulated must be exported, leading to economic and military imperialism. On a world-systemic scale the global division of labor between core, semi-periphery, and periphery leads to hegemonic cycles in which the core nation-states battle, often militarily, for primacy.
- *Realist* – States exist within an anarchic international state system that has no over-arching regulatory control mechanism. The stability, or balance-of-power, that exists is maintained by states acting in their objective state interest, which is the accumulation of power. Power is defined in military and economic terms – weapons, people, land, resources, money, and so forth. If states do not act according to their objective state interests this can cause imbalances of power which can lead to war.
- *Liberal* – Industrial society and enlightened political economy provide the conditions upon which cosmopolitan peace can exist. Free markets, democracy, and international law provide the framework through which true enlightened modernity can become actualized. War is considered atavistic, feudal, or uncivilized. Markets and industrial production are considered politically neutral in this reading, and, in fact, are beneficial in stimulating transnational relationships. War is considered irrational and needs to be overcome through liberal projects such as free markets, education, and, ironically, interventionist war.
- *Communitarian* – This position, like communitarianism in general, is not explicitly codified in any one place. Yet, I use the term to describe the specific argument made by Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* regarding the Hundred Years' Peace.²² This position can be defined by what it is not: namely,

²² K Polanyi, *The Great Transformation : The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 2001.

Marxist, Liberal, or Realist. Yet it is compatible with some elements of the Marxist and Liberal readings. The economic argument is essentially that of the Liberal, which suggests that free markets and international economic integration led to peace in the nineteenth century. However, another side of Polanyi's argument suggests that this Liberal economic system was superficial and based on a false understanding of human society.

My analytic position will draw from a combination of all four of these readings, finding none entirely adequate on their own. In order to see the merits and inadequacies of the respective theories they will need to be outlined in greater detail.

2.1. Marxist Perspectives

Three of the above theories can be defined, to a certain extent, by their utopian elements.²³ This is especially important to understanding the Marxist perspective. Because war and other social problems are, in the final analysis, related to the contradictions of capitalism, removing or overcoming these contradictions will lead to a more just society and the removal of the causes of war. Whether this overcoming is through communism, socialism, or another form of political economic organization is less important than the critique of capitalism as it is currently constituted. In fact, a positive aspect of capitalism is that it allows the possibility of overcoming itself. Capitalist society's form is not determined by ethical social relations, as was the case in traditional or "primitive," societies. Rather modern capitalist society is solely determined by the economic relations of the exchange and production of commodities. Only through concerted analytical effort and political revolution, the deeply rooted motor of capitalist accumulation and class conflict could be eliminated. War and the military will exist as long as class-antagonist state societies exist and will finally be overcome only when the state ceases.

²³ The exception, of course, is Realism, which is more or less defined by its rejection of idealism, instead claiming to look at the "reality" of human nature.

Before returning to the Marxist critique of the current socio-economic situation, I need to digress on a consideration of violence in the overcoming of capitalism itself (i.e. revolution), for it will lead to an important assumption regarding the state in the Marxian framework. Marxist perspectives related to violence are not universally held by all Marxian activists and scholars. However, one reading of Engels, via Lenin, indicated that a classless society is only possible *following* a certain amount of war. Though Marx did not clearly explicate a consistent and thorough theory of the state, Lenin combed through Marx and Engels' writings in search of a definitive perspective.²⁴ Citing Engels' *Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*,²⁵ Lenin asserted,

Here we have...the basic idea of Marxism on the question of the historical role and meaning of the state. The state is the product and the manifestation of the *irreconcilability* of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where, and to the extent that the class antagonisms *cannot* be objectively reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms *are* irreconcilable.²⁶

This led Lenin to reassert Engels' declaration that the state should be abolished in the classless society. He continued,

If the state is the product of the irreconcilable character of class antagonisms, if it is a force standing *above* society and "increasingly separating itself from it," then it is clear that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, *but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power*.²⁷

Any revolution that shatters the state apparatus finds itself in conflict with the former dispossessed ruling class who will attempt to regain control of this armed body and the state.

²⁴ V I Lenin, 'The State and Revolution', in A. Giddens and D. Held (ed.), *Classes, Power, and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debates*, Macmillan Press, London, 1982.

²⁵ F Engels, *Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, Resistance Books, Newtown, AUS, 2004.

²⁶ op. cit. Lenin 1982, p. 48 emphasis in original

²⁷ ibid. p. 49 emphasis in original

This revolution is protected by “special bodies of armed men” that protects the new state from the old.²⁸

The concept of a revolutionary power, whether interim or permanent, led critics to suggest that the revolution was merely cloaked opportunism, allowing one group of dissidents in society to replace the current ruling class for another in the form of a revolutionary vanguard.²⁹ However, Lenin asserted a five-fold argument against the claim of opportunism and the validity of the ‘withering away’ argument. Firstly, the state, as defined as the container for class antagonism, would cease to be “a state” as traditionally defined. Secondly, the state’s “special repressive force” would convert from a bourgeois force oppressing the proletariat to its opposite: a proletarian force oppressing the bourgeoisie. Thirdly, the state would wither away as the communist government became pure democracy. Fourthly, the revolutionary state must exist in order to prevent anarchy. Finally, the logic of dialectics makes it imperative that the state be replaced by violent revolution, which is essentially a development of an anti-state - the proletarian state. This violent revolution would then wither away.

Lenin draws our attention to the role of violence and lethal force in revolution. All this is achieved through Lenin and Engels’ redefinition of the state as both *outside* society and composed of violent bodies. This claim, however, does not hold up to scrutiny. Excepting anarchy, there cannot be a removal of the state, if the state is defined as the monopoly of coercive force.³⁰ Any state, even one ostensibly representing the masses, must establish a system of justice which needs to be backed up by armed force. As Foucault argued in his

²⁸ *ibid.* p. 50

²⁹ V Pareto, *Les Systèmes Socialistes*, V. Giard & E. Brière, Paris, 1902.

³⁰ This definition of the state, developed by Max Weber, will not be wholly assumed in this paper. Instead Michael Mann’s critique of this definition will be described and applied below. However, the definition of the state as the monopoly of coercive force is so widely assumed that to point out that Lenin and Engels are redefining the state seems valid.

discussion with the Maoists, this force or legal system can never be truly neutral for it will always represent a certain ideology and structure of power.³¹ For this reason, the Soviet Union did not transcend or overcome the antagonist class relations of the bourgeois state and resulted, instead, in something like what Frederick Pollock described as “state capitalism.”³² Legitimate arguments can be made that Leninism, Maoism, or other violent forms of Marxism are somehow misunderstandings of Marx’s true mission, or that Marx’s scientific program should be separated from his political program.³³ However, I would argue that Lenin’s interpretation and the consequences in the Soviet Union do in fact stem from Marx and Engels’ understanding of the state as something that exists outside society – as something that can be seized.³⁴

Other Marxists, including Nicos Poulantzas, Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, and Maurice Zeitlin have suggested that the state can be defined only in relation to specific modes of production.³⁵ For example, Poulantzas wrote that the state has “the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation.”³⁶ That is, states perform a functional role for reproducing classes and the conditions for economic production. The state functions “require” expansion of the “repressive and ideological state apparatuses” –

³¹ M Foucault and C Gordon, “On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists,” *Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* 1st American edn., Pantheon Books, New York, 1980, pp.1-36.

³² F Pollock, 'State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations', *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, vol. 9, 1941, 200-25. Pollock’s analysis is problematic and has been credited with the static political economy perspective that led to the pessimism of the Frankfurt School critical theorists. See op. cit. Postone pp. 84-122; see also H Dahms 'Postliberal Capitalism and the Early Frankfurt School: Toward a Critical Theory of the Inner Logic of Social Value Spheres', *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, vol. 19, 1999, 55-88..

³³ P Paolucci, *Marx's Scientific Dialectics : A Methodological Treatise for a New Century*, Haymarket Books, Chicago, IL, 2009 suggests that there are distinctions between Marx’s political economy analysis, his analysis of history, and his political program.

³⁴ Of course, Marx and Engels retreated from their initial position in *The Communist Manifesto* that declared that all that needed to be done to achieve revolution was to seize the state apparatus. The failure of the Paris Commune led them to reconsider this notion which had been modeled after the successful capture of the state in the bourgeois French Revolution. op. cit, Marx and Engels p. 54

³⁵ see A Giddens and D Held ed., *Classes, Power, and Conflict : Classical and Contemporary Debates*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982. pp 93-100 (Poulantzas); 249-256 (Offe and Ronge); 196-223 (Zeitlin).

³⁶ N Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, NLB; Sheed and Ward, London, 1973. p. 44

police, welfare, education, mass media, etc.³⁷ This functional analysis is not exclusive to the state alone, but is also related to the concept of social reproduction as Giddens pointed out in *Central Problems in Social Theory*. In many readings of Marx,

Capitalism has its own ‘needs’, which the system functions to fulfill. Since the system needs a reserve army, one comes into being. The argument is sometimes stated in reverse. Since the operation of capitalism leads to the formation of a reserve army, this must be because it needs one.³⁸

Functionalist conceptions of social systems suggest that the system, or totality, has ‘needs’ or ‘reasons’ of its own. This proposition cannot be easily defended, for it is the actors and institutions that compose the system that have needs or reasons, not the system itself. Any social reproduction of economic modes of production are due to the actions of actors or the unintended consequences of action, which is not to say that unintended consequences are the same as latent functions.³⁹

Functionalism is also present in the post-Marxist world-systems analysis of Immanuel Wallerstein. In describing the peripheralization of Poland and the Baltic States in the fifteenth century, Wallerstein stated: “Either eastern Europe would become the ‘breadbasket’ of western Europe or vice versa. Either solution would have served the ‘needs of the situation’ in the conjuncture.”⁴⁰ Like Giddens’ example of the reserve army above, the argument can be framed in two ways: either the capitalist world-system needed some region to become a periphery and made it so, or, in reverse, because Eastern Europe became peripheralized it must be because the

³⁷ L Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays*, New Left Books, London, 1971, p. 123-73. cited from M Mann, *The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993. p. 46.

³⁸ A Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory : Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979. pp. 112-113

³⁹ R Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1957; A Giddens, *The Constitution of Society : Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Polity Press, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], 1984.

⁴⁰ I Wallerstein, *The Modern World System, vol. I : Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, Academic Press, New York, 1974. pp. 98-99

capitalist world-system needed it to be so. This functionalist logic is problematic in terms of war when the world-systems concept of hegemony enters the picture. Wallerstein wrote,

The longer hegemonic cycles involve a struggle between two major states to become the successor to the previous hegemonic power by becoming the primary locus of the accumulation of capital. This is a long process, which eventually involves having the military strength to win a “thirty years’ war” Once a new hegemony is instituted, its maintenance requires heavy financing which eventually and inevitably leads to a relative decline of the current hegemonic power and struggle for a successor.⁴¹

While Wallerstein’s analysis leads to interesting conclusions regarding the transition from Dutch hegemony to British hegemony to American hegemony, the world-systems perspective seems to indicate a “law” of hegemonic cycles, in which over-extension of militaries “inevitably” leads to relative decline.⁴² William H. Sewell Jr. suggested that this represents a kind of teleology due to Wallerstein’s misapplied cosmology analogy. Rather than explaining social phenomena in terms of the principles governing its smallest entities (human individuals, local communities, states, etc.), Wallerstein indicates that “the fates of local communities are determined not by local causes but by the operation of global, system-level causes.”⁴³ Furthermore, Wallerstein argued *a posteriori* back from the current state of the capitalist world-system to its prior state, establishing a “big bang” event (the discovery of the New World) that foreordained all subsequent development. In fact, all of the history he recounted was incredibly contingent, from the politics of Portugal in the late 1400s to the ascension of William III to the throne of England in 1689.

⁴¹ I Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004 p. 437.

⁴² This argument is similar to the one made by economic historian, Paul Kennedy. P Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers : Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* 1st edn., Random House, New York, NY, 1987, which has also been criticized for explaining everything via teleological hindsight. cf. N Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus : Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000*, Basic Books, New York, 2001. pp. 406-410.

⁴³ W. H. Sewell, Jr, *Logics of History : Social Theory and Social Transformation*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005. P. 86; Maurice Zeitlin made a similar argument as summarized in A So, *Social Change and Development : Modernization, Dependency, and World-Systems Theories*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, Calif., 1990, pp. 220-224

While there are means by which the system, or rather the totality, can impact the social reproduction of the actors who constitute the system through socialization, psychological repression, and class solidarity,⁴⁴ this does not seem to be the angle from which these Marxian analyses are coming from. Rather, the structure of the arguments of Poulantzas and others that characterize the state as functional to capitalism turns the state into a “place,” as Michael Mann has pointed out. “The state is not an actor, but a place where classes and class ‘fractions’ or ‘segments’ organize.”⁴⁵ While Mann would argue this is wrong because the state is neither an “actor” nor a “place,” but rather is an “active place,” the Marxian notion of the state as a place leads right back to Lenin and Engels’ analysis concerning the seizure of the state. If the state is a neutral place that is perverse only because it is the “committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie,”⁴⁶ it follows that seizure of the state by the proletariat is a reasonable expectation. One imagines a series of buildings with teletype machines that need only be reprogrammed before being turned off, or withering away. In fact, the state consists of the institutions that provide legacies of time and space, *as well as* the actors that compose and operate the centralized “state machinery,” *as well as* the population and territory that exists within borders.

This excursus into the Marxian conception of the state is relevant in relation to imperialism and hegemony, two subjects that are central to the Marxist analysis of war and modernity. Lenin, adapting J.A. Hobson’s analysis of surplus capital,⁴⁷ suggested that, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, imperialist growth had become a necessity generated

⁴⁴ This is position of critical theorists such as Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno, and will be discussed in the conclusion of this essay. H Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*, Sphere, London,, 1969; T Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, Seabury Press, New York,, 1973.

⁴⁵ op. cit. Mann, 1993. p. 46

⁴⁶ op. cit. Marx and Engels p. 82

⁴⁷ J.A. Hobson *Imperialism; a Study*, J. Pott & Company, New York, 1902.

by capitalism. As he said in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, “under capitalism the home market is inevitably bound up with the foreign market.”⁴⁸ The inevitability of this relationship with foreign markets stems from the need within the capitalist mode of production to expand. As Marx said, “The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome.”⁴⁹ The accumulation of surplus value from the laborer to the capitalist generates the need to reinvest (in overseas investment) and distribute (in the form of market exchange) that surplus to the non-capitalist world. The process requires the integration of the non-capitalist outside into the capitalist inside in a perpetual process of extraction and expansion.⁵⁰

The significance of this process as related to war was best expressed by the *Resolution adopted at the Seventh International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart* in 1907 constructed by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. It was agreed that,

Wars between capitalist states are, as a rule, the outcome of their competition on the world market, for each state seeks not only to secure its existing markets, but also to conquer new ones. In this, the subjugation of foreign peoples and countries plays a prominent role. These wars result furthermore from the incessant race for armaments by militarism, one of the chief instruments of bourgeois class rule and of the economic and political subjugation of the working class.⁵¹

The statement above highlights the destruction wrought by capitalism upon the peoples of what would later be termed the Third World or the Global South. The Statement furthermore insisted, simply, that “wars...are part of the very nature of capitalism.”⁵² Wars also distract the masses,

⁴⁸ V I Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline*, Foreign Languages Pub. House, Moscow, 1917. Ch. 5

⁴⁹ op. cit. Marx 1973, p. 408

⁵⁰ This model of imperialism is also taken up by contemporary Marxist philosophers, Hardt and Negri. See M Hardt and A Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000. pp. 221-239

⁵¹ Second International, International Socialist Congress, 'Resolution Adopted at the Seventh International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart', <<http://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1907/militarism.htm>>, accessed 11-29-09 2009.

⁵² *ibid.*

through ideological and nationalist sentiments, from recognizing their positions as alienated producers in conflict with capital - a phenomenon known as “social imperialism.” Because wars are fought by soldiers who are largely drawn from the proletariat, wars in the interest of the capitalist ruling class should be avoided at all costs. But should a war arise, it was the responsibility of the International Socialist community to “intervene in favor of its speedy termination and with all their powers to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the war to rouse the masses and thereby to hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule.”⁵³ This was precisely what Lenin managed to achieve in Russia, and what Luxemburg attempted in Germany – the exploitation of the sufferings of war to highlight the horrors of the capitalist system in order to encourage the proletarian masses and soldiers to overthrow the system. Lenin’s analysis of the capitalist mode of production in the imperialist stage suggested that the destruction wrought by the rapid expansion across the global landscape reflected the violence inherent in capitalism most visibly. Imperialism was capitalism laid bare. Eventually, Lenin thought that this division of the world between capitalist associations in conjunction with the division of the world between the great powers would inevitably lead to a conflict between the great powers, i.e. World War I.

Before comparing Lenin’s economically deterministic theory of imperialism to that of the other theories listed above and outlined below, I will demonstrate that this Marxist-Leninist interpretation is not fundamentally dissimilar from other Marx-inspired analyses of imperialism and surplus capital. The concept of Military Keynesianism, for example, dominated mid-twentieth century considerations of the military, inspired by the Vietnam War and the American military-industrial-complex. To a large extent, this analysis of militaries within modern

⁵³ *ibid.*

capitalist society has not been superseded. Marxist scholars Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy argued in *Monopoly Capital* that giant firms dominated the U.S. economy in the mid-twentieth century against the interests of society. Large corporations rigged the rules of the game so that surpluses would travel through the economy to a select group of firms organized in monopolized or oligopolized configurations. Among the means by which these firms were able to do this was by taking advantage of Military Keynesianism, or government defense expenditures. As Baran and Sweezy said: “Here at last monopoly capitalism had seemingly found the answer to the ‘on what’ question: On what could the government spend enough to keep the system from sinking into the mire of stagnation? On arms, more arms, and ever more arms.”⁵⁴ Military spending is capable of absorbing surplus because

1. It is fungible and can be easily diverted into different military products
2. It generates a virtually continuous demand because of the destruction and obsolescence of military weaponry
3. Military strength assures U.S. global hegemony enhancing the profitability of U.S. firms
4. The fiscal conservatism that restrains other forms of government spending is blunted by the anti-communist ideologies of the Cold War
5. Military spending does not threaten private profitability and ostensibly, it does not have the redistributive consequences of alternative forms of government spending.⁵⁵

Baran and Sweezy did place a limit on the level to which this Military Keynesianism can be effective, related to technological development. As the military focuses more and more on science, technology, and research and development, less and less people are employed by the

⁵⁴ P Baran and P Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital; an Essay on the American Economic and Social Order*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1966. p. 211; Marxist analyses related to monopoly capitalism continues in the work of John Bellamy Foster and the Monthly Review.

⁵⁵ M Wallace, C Borch, and G Gauchat, 'Military Keynesianism in the Post-Vietnam War Era: A View from the American States', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 36, issue 2, 2008, p. 217

Military Industrial Complex limiting the overall stimulus to the labor economy. Beyond this level, investment in the military (i.e. in military technology) results in stagnation and does not further absorb the economic surplus.

The application of military spending is also covered in James O'Connor's work, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, which dealt with Vietnam era social and military expenditures of the U.S. government, also with a Marxist lens. Again, the military provided a relief valve for surplus accumulation. O'Connor considered the imperial growth of American hegemony to be economically motivated, in tandem with an industrial arms cartel that received most of the military contracts outside the realm of a "free market". These government expenditures were factored into his four categories of state expenditures (all of which primarily benefit monopolies):

1. Social capital – expenditures required for profitable accumulation
2. Social investment – projects and services that increase labor productivity
3. Social consumption – projects and services that lower reproduction costs of labor
4. Social expenses – projects and services required to establish the legitimacy of the state.⁵⁶

Military expenditures typically stimulate or contribute to several of these categories at once which is why they are so often employed. For example, the military's Interstate Highway System (IHS) was developed for increased mobility of troops, and was therefore a "legitimate" *social expense*. However, as the highway system allowed workers to move to and from work it was also a form of *social consumption*. As a means of commercial freight transport, the IHS was also a form of *social investment*.

⁵⁶ J O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1973. p. 7

For O'Connor, the military was a relatively popular choice for which the state could expend monies because it fulfilled so many roles at once and remained relatively outside the purview of ideological and political considerations through which other expenditures were typically scrutinized. The "legitimized" state - that is, the state that publicly operates according to its professed values - is therefore a *welfare-warfare state*, while the actual state proceedings have intended and unintended effects that primarily benefit the monopoly sectors of the economy.

While Baran and Sweezy's and O'Connor's analyses have been empirically demonstrable in many ways,⁵⁷ and continue to stimulate considerable debate and research, there are two identifiable problems that would prevent an application of their approach more generally, even within a sociological theory of modern society. First, the analyses are historically specific in that they seem to exist only within the framework of welfare-state capitalism, monopoly capitalism, and the Cold War.⁵⁸ This is not necessarily a bad thing, in the sense that good contemporary research and conclusions have been drawn from the perspective. However, the second problem is that the military and war remain functional in the analysis. The military exists for surplus capital to be laundered. The cache of excess armaments lying around seems to stimulate imperial ambition, which serves another function in establishing safe markets for U.S. exports.

⁵⁷ Wallace, Borch, and Gauchat, op. cit. disaggregated from national statistics economic variables from individual states and regressed them against military expenditures to determine whether military spending was being used to prop up distressed state economies. The data demonstrates clear evidence of countercyclical fiscal policy in the post-Vietnam era in which state managers arranged for military industrial investment to support a sagging economy. Their additional research and analysis showed that corporate influence was an important factor in securing spending levels, as most of the beneficiaries of spending were either Fortune 500 companies or firms with five hundred or more employees.

⁵⁸ Admittedly, the Global War on Terror since 2001 could be read as a recreation of the ideological/political conditions of the Cold War that make the Military Keynesianism argument work. But this might require, or lead to a firm position attributing responsibility for 9/11 on "Capital" - in other words, Dick Cheney, Halliburton, or someone similarly motivated to generate a "New Pearl Harbor."

Again, the problem with functionalism is that *the system* does not ‘need’ to export surplus capital – *particular members of society* need to invest capital, and choose military armament firms. In this sense, Baran and Sweezy’s description of the specific reasons these investments would be attractive ventures are on the mark; as is O’Connor’s analysis that military expenditures are not as politically suspect as other government spending. However, the idea that the system also ‘needs’ to imperialize to establish safe markets abroad does not seem adequate. Certain firms, which have developed due to historically contingent circumstances, may lobby to invade Vietnam or Nicaragua or Iraq for economic reasons, but so might exile groups from Tibet or Sudan lobby to deal with a humanitarian crisis. The state responds to the interests of those who have access to power. Typically, economic power (e.g. Boeing) trumps deliberative power (e.g. the Dalai Lama), but these transactions are mediated through specific interactions between actors and institutions with particular goals and means. The actions are not directly derived from the system’s functional requirements.

In the context of postwar, postliberal society and the U.S. military, a more adequate analysis from a “Marxist” perspective comes from C. Wright Mills’ *Power Elite*.⁵⁹ Mills outlined the realms of power within mid-century American society indentifying groups or classes of people who occupied those positions of power. The military represented one of three major groups (military, political, business) which acted upon the country and, due to the geopolitical position of the United States, thereby acted upon the world and “made” history.”⁶⁰ Military men

⁵⁹ C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999. Mills, himself, would have probably not identified himself as a Marxist, and would have instead cited Max Weber as a more substantial sociological influence. However, many Marxist scholars have incorporated Mills’ analysis of class, and class actors. This Marxist-appropriated Mills is analyzed here. Politically, Mills identified with anarchism, as in the “Wobblies” of the Industrial Workers of the World; C W Mills, K Mills, and P Mills, *Letters and Autobiographical Writings*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000. p. 252

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 22. “The fact is that although we are all of us within history we do not all possess equal powers to make history. To pretend that we do is sociological nonsense and political irresponsibility.”

came from the upper middle class, and yet, within the overall class structure of the country, their status role fell somewhere between politician and manager. Because, for the most part, military officials did not begin life in the highest classes, a sublimation of politics and ideology was needed to proceed through up to 25 years of gradual mobility leading military officials to orient themselves to their immediate superiors and inferiors in expected directions relative to rank. Indeed, as Morris Janowitz explained in *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, a vast system of authoritative and communicative controls are in place within the military organization such that, more so than perhaps in any other realm of society, a role within the military hierarchy can be considered static and independent of the individual personality of the officer.⁶¹ For similar reasons, the Prussian military was one of the inspirations for Max Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy.⁶²

Critics of Mills might suggest that the military exists in a subservient status relative to civilian authority, and, by that measure, remains subservient to capital as well. This position, however, would miss on several points. For one, the civil-military relations of the postwar era are especially historically contingent. It has not been the norm for militaries to be answerable to the state, and the evolution of this civil-military relation took place largely in the nineteenth century, as will be discussed below. Additionally, the military has at its disposal advanced technological means to deliver lethal violence. As Michael Mann pointed out in his I.E.M.P model, military power must be considered as analytically separate from political power.⁶³ For example, the fact that a military coup can happen demonstrates that the military is distinct from

⁶¹ M Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York,, 1959.

⁶² M Weber, *Economy and Society : An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, 2 vols., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978. Pp. 980-982; see also H Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy; the Prussian Experience, 1660-1815*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,, 1958.

⁶³ M Mann, *The Sources of Social Power Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993. p. 8

the state if it can overthrow the state. Beyond lethal power, the military has developed politically instrumental techniques such as “systems analysis.” Though systems analysis, developed by Ed Paxson at the RAND Corporation, was not used for its intended purpose (determining nuclear bombing strategies), the Air Force did use the mathematical techniques to manipulate Congressional funding approval for defense projects.⁶⁴ All of this is to suggest that the military does have autonomous power even within the relatively constrained civil-military relationship that existed in the 1950s.

The final, and most important reason Mills’ analysis is relevant for considering the military’s power in modern society is that he points to the specific class relations that are reproduced through the recruitment of upper middle class officers. While the military goes to great lengths to depoliticize soldiers in terms of Democratic or Republican party leanings, this process is never fully complete. Evidence of this can be seen in the appointment of ex-military officials in ambassadorships, congressional posts, and even the presidency.⁶⁵ Ultimately, it is through the class relationship shared among members of the power elite, that the “system” gets its necessary actors to reproduce the particular configurations of power needed to maintain the modern political-military-economic framework. The analysis of class, particularly the class character of General Staffs and diplomats, remains an essential feature of any discussion of war and modernity. In principle, if not always in the particular form of the U.S. military-industrial-complex analyzed in *The Power Elite*, Mills’ attention to the specific actors who hold positions of power, and their relation to those class structures they draw power from and reproduce, seems applicable to many times and places in the modern era.

⁶⁴ A Abella, *Soldiers of Reason: The Rand Corporation and the Rise of the American Empire*, Harcourt, Inc, New York, 2008. p. 63

⁶⁵ op. cit. Mills, pp. 202-205

Ultimately, it must be said that Marxists have paid attention to the role of war in the constitution of modern society. However, as has been demonstrated above, this can be problematic when phenomena are treated in a functionalist manner. This can be seen in Lenin's theory of imperialism, Baran and Sweezy's conception of Military Keynesianism, and Wallerstein's law of hegemonic cycles. To be sure, the events these analysts described happened, and in many instances the Marxist lens that was utilized uncovered material left obscured by other perspectives. However, in attributing causal significance to economic factors stemming from contradictions in the distribution of surplus value (i.e. class antagonism), Marxists run the risk of excluding other 'non-economic' factors, including nationalism, humanitarianism, or aggressive impulses to dominate for its own sake. Orthodox Marxists could conclude that even these categories are superstructural and determined by the economic base in the final analysis, but this is not a position I am willing to accept as scientific. Still, many of the Marxist, neo-Marxist, and post-Marxist assumptions cannot be denied. For example, capitalism was, and is, an important feature of modern society, if not the most important feature. To reject an *over-emphasis* on economic and material concerns should not suggest a rejection of the validity of these concerns. This would represent what I call the "see-saw effect" typical of social theory debates in which stating "it's not all economics" is taken to mean "it's all culture." Of course it is both. Identifying the particular influence of capitalism and the economic sphere in relation to other, non-economic factors will be the ultimate goal of this essay. The Marxist perspective will remain an important foil against which the other economic theories and the broader historical analysis of the nineteenth century will have to be assessed.

2.2. Realist Perspectives

The Realist International Relations (IR) perspective, often associated with conservative political persuasions, is not typically considered next to Marxism in terms of their similarities. However, I would argue that both maintain similar emphases on the materialist motivations of money and power, while also reverting to systemic causal explanations. Additionally, in certain versions of the theories, modern society is considered ahistorically, or, rather, transhistorically, projecting the present condition of society backward in time.

However, as mentioned above, the utopian sentiments of a better future society or an ideal natural past, which are keys to understanding the other theories of war, are not inherent in the Realist perspective. Realism, in fact, is considered by its proponents to be emphatically not idealistic or utopian.⁶⁶ The Realist tradition, which harkens back to classical and early modern philosophers like Thucydides and Niccolo Machiavelli, can be considered derivative of Thomas Hobbes' influential work, *Leviathan*.⁶⁷ Essential to the model of international and domestic politics is the idea of *homo lupus* – man as wolf. Man's natural condition is to be in the state of war. Hobbes wrote in 1651, "During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man."⁶⁸ War is like weather – it comes and goes in spurts and is not necessarily ever-present. It is, however, inevitable and, ultimately, natural, in the sense that men following their human nature are prone to fight and engage in violent conflict. Only through the development of the strong national state can men escape this "poore, nasty, brutish, and short" life.⁶⁹ Scholars have noted that the particular life history of Thomas Hobbes, who lived through

⁶⁶ Though one might call Realism anti-idealist rather than non-idealist, in the sense that it is often based on a *negative*, as opposed to a positive vision of Human Nature.

⁶⁷ T Hobbes, *Leviathan; or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill*, University press, Cambridge,, 1904.

⁶⁸ *ibid.* p. 83.

⁶⁹ *ibid.* p 84

the brutal English Civil War of the 1640s as well as the devastating Thirty Years War in which up to a third of the population of the Holy Roman Empire was destroyed,⁷⁰ left an imprint on the author that indicated that war was, indeed, the normal condition of human society.

While Hobbes advocated the construction of a strong centralized state to impose order by force based on his assessment of seventeenth century warfare, Realist scholars see the period following the Thirty Years War as significant for establishing the modern international state system in Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 ended the wars of religion that plagued Europe since the Protestant Reformation, and secularized the causes of conflict. The consequences of this stalemate between religions were at least two-fold in terms of international relations. First, the treaty, as an agreement to disagree on matters of faith, institutionalized what IR scholars call the “anarchic” international state-system. Second, the secularization of conflict drew states’ focus away from theological debates and towards the increase of power itself. Each of these conclusions has consequences for Realist and Neorealist IR theory, as will be dealt with below.

The first issue is international anarchy. Because there is no authority above the state, the international state system is said to be in a state of anarchy.⁷¹ Whatever stability does exist is said to be maintained by multi-state balance-of-power, bipolarity, or hegemony. Balance-of-power theories are based on the assumption that states act reasonably rationally to maximize their security.⁷² Though balance-of-power theory was consequential to the extent that statesmen internalized and acted upon the international system based on the idea of it, the explanatory value

⁷⁰ see C.V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War*, P. Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1969 for both the horror of devastation, as well as the utter pointlessness of the war.

⁷¹ H Bull *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977. cf. R Little and J Williams, *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke [England], New York, 2006.

⁷² op. cit. Levy and Thompson, pp. 38-43.

in the context of IR is suspect when it is turned into a law of history. Paul Schroeder described the defective concept of balance-of-power well:

Balance-of-power arguments generally, explain any outcome equally well. War or peace can be accounted for either by a balance or by an imbalance of power. Wars arise because conflicts end too indecisively, like the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-8), or because they end too decisively, like the Seven Years War, because one side gains a dangerous superiority, like Britain on the high seas, or because neither has the upper hand, like Austria and Prussia in Germany. Thus the balance-of-power argument fails really to explain anything and begs the question. Worse, it conceals the main fact: balance-of-power rules and practices were not a solution to war...but a major part of the problem.⁷³

Furthermore, one of the assumptions behind balance-of-power is that states will act to prevent conditions of hegemony or bi-polarity as existed (simultaneously?) during the Cold War.

However, as the Cold War example demonstrates, the international system can be stabilized or unstable in these other conditions. Why are these objective state interests (maintaining balance-of-power) something that leads to objectively similar conditions as lack of these state interests (hegemony)?

This is the case because peace and survival are not the only state interest, as indicated in the second consequence of Westphalia mentioned above – the secularization of power. Rather, attainment and increase of power can, and likely will be in the state's interest, often trumping maintenance of peace as a goal. Initial Realist perspectives on power were defined in the 1940s by Martin Wight in his book *Power Politics*, and Hans Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations*.⁷⁴ Power politics (*Machtpolitik*) is a state of international relations in which sovereigns protect their own interests by threatening one another with military, economic, or political aggression. *Machtpolitik*, and its related concept *raison d'état*, imply a separation of morality from the

⁷³ P Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848*, Clarendon Press, New York, 1994. p. 6

⁷⁴ M Wight, *Power Politics*, Royal institute of international affairs, London, 1946; H Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace*, A. A. Knopf, New York, 1948.

objective interest of state, which should be the increase of more power. As Wight explained, “Every dominant power aspires, by giving unification to the whole of international society, to become a universal empire.”⁷⁵ Thus obtaining hegemony is the goal of every state, and according to the principles of competition, every other power is duty bound to prevent another state from attaining this position of dominance. Interestingly, as can be seen in Morgenthau’s quotation, “The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers,” the semantic use of the word “power,” meaning “state,” and “power” meaning “resources” establishes a kind of cannibalistic notion in which powers gobble other powers using power to gain more power.⁷⁶

And yet, power is rarely defined explicitly in Realist and Neorealist texts. Kenneth Waltz, for example, tried to clarify that power can be considered either as a “means to an end” or an “end in itself.”⁷⁷ Yet, this does not define what power actually *is*. From a sociological and philosophical perspective, leaving power undefined seems inadequate, and assumes that everyone knows what power means based on common sense.⁷⁸ Steven Lukes, for example, defined three dimensions of power in his work, *Power – A Radical View*.⁷⁹ The first dimension of power corresponds with Max Weber’s definition of power as “the possibility of imposing one’s own will upon the behavior of other person,” or in terms of A’s authoritative power of command (domination) over B.⁸⁰ The second dimension relates to the power of decision making

⁷⁵ op. cit. Wight, p. 37

⁷⁶ op. cit. Morgenthau, p. 165

⁷⁷ K Waltz, *Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York., 1959, p. 35.

⁷⁸ S Lukes ed., *Power*, New York University Press, New York, 1986 contains several essays from the likes of Bertrand Russell, Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and others, demonstrating that power cannot be defined as exclusively one thing.

⁷⁹ S Lukes, *Power : A Radical View* 2nd edn., Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York, 2004.

⁸⁰ M Weber, *Economy and Society*, p. 942-946

and non-decision making.⁸¹ The third dimension relates to ideological power, or the power to “manipulate consensus by definitional fiat” - in other words, having the power to make others accept the existing order of things because they can see no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable.⁸² Furthermore, Weber’s, Barach and Baratz’, and Lukes’ definitions of power concern only *distributive* power, to say nothing of *collective* power, as described by Talcott Parsons in his critique of C. Wright Mills’ *Power Elite*.

Power is a generalized facility or resource in the society. It has to be divided or allocated, but it also has to be produced and it has collective as well as distributive functions. It is the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general ‘public’ commitment has been made, or may be made. It is mobilization, above all, of the actions of persons and groups, which is binding on them by virtue of their position in the society.⁸³

Indeed, Mills’ statement that “Politics is a struggle for power,”⁸⁴ implies that power is a zero-sum game between “ins” and “outs” – an image of power that seems compatible with other materialist conceptions of power, like the Realists’.

Within the Realist framework, implicitly, power seems to be material interests – wealth, military arms, or territorial control, all of which function as means and ends for distributive power, or domination. Furthermore, because Realists consider morality to be removed from considerations of pure *raison d’etat*, ideological and (domestic) political concerns are conceived of as disguises for actual material interests, in other words, as means to an end. This eliminates two of the four sources of social power identified by Michael Mann in his I.E.M.P. model,

⁸¹ see P Bachrach and M Baratz, ‘Two Faces of Power’, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 56, issue 4, 1962, 947-52.

⁸² S Lukes, 2004, p. 28.

⁸³ T Parsons, “Distribution of Power in American Society: review of C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*,” *The Talcott Parsons Reader*, Blackwell, Malden, Mass, 1999, p 232.

⁸⁴ op. cit. Mills p.171

Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political power.⁸⁵ In the case of ideology, Mann does indicate that ideology can be configured as “immanent morale,” intensifying the power of an already-established social group, which would correspond with the idea that ideology can be simply justification for material state action.⁸⁶ However, ideology can also be “socio-spatially transcendent,” when emergent properties of social life “transcend the organizational reach of secular authorities.”⁸⁷ In other words, ideology can have autonomous power of its own, as in the case of Christianity during Medieval European history, which transcended national borders and material interests.

Without even bringing in the complex issues of power brought up by Nietzsche and Foucault at this time,⁸⁸ the point can be clearly made that classical Realism and Neorealism did not adequately incorporate the many faceted debates concerning the philosophy and sociology of power.⁸⁹ By not examining the particular nature and configurations of power at the abstract level, Realism contended itself to identifying the objective interests of state in terms of brute power, hegemony, or security, but not in terms of human rights, true religion, or even cooperation for its own sake. This is further complicated by the fact that throughout the twentieth century Realist scholars like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and George

⁸⁵ Mann’s political power is dual (domestic and geopolitical). To be more precise, geopolitics is the combination of military and political power. The argument above refers to domestic politics, not geopolitics. op. cit. Mann 1988, p ix

⁸⁶ M Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I : A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York, 1986, pp. 23-24

⁸⁷ *ibid.* p.23

⁸⁸ F Nietzsche, *The Will to Power, an Attempted Transvaluation of All Values*, The Macmillan company, New York,, 1924; M Foucault and J Faubion ed., *Power*, New Press ; Distributed by W.W. Norton, New York, 2000; op. cit. Foucault 1980.

⁸⁹ This cannot be said of International Relation Theory as a whole, which is not to be equated solely with Realism and Neorealism as outlined by Morgenthau, Waltz, and others initially. see, for example, A Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 1999.

Kennan have actually made the policy decisions that are supposed to be hypothesized by the theory, proving the case by making the case exist.⁹⁰

This has led to what John Hobson has called “tempocentrism” and “chronofetishism.”⁹¹ Chronofetishism is the assumption that the present can only be explained by examining the present and ignoring the past. This leads to reification of the present which makes the modern international system appear static and self-constituting. This illusion, in turn, leads to a sense of the naturalness of the system, as opposed to having been historically constituted in a particular time and place: the modern era in Europe. Finally, this leads to an illusion of immutability as the structure of the system becomes eternalized. The perspective does even more epistemological damage when the condition of the present (which is reified and misunderstood) is extrapolated backwards throughout all of history. This is what Hobson means by tempocentrism. History done as such would have Imperial Rome operating off of balance-of-power imperatives identical to the Duke of Burgundy in 1477. A famous (and inane) example of tempocentrism can be found in the comparison between the “bipolar” worlds of competing Sparta and Athens and the Cold War United States and the Soviet Union.

Chronofetishism and tempocentrism cause Realism to suffer from the same teleological and functionalist problems characteristic of some of the Marxist readings of war and modernity described earlier. Like Wallerstein’s big bang concept of capitalism, tempocentrist projections of the present state of things back in history forces events into the analysis to fit the theory.

⁹⁰ In the context of economics, George Soros has called this phenomenon “reflexivity,” in which economists use theories to explain the economy, all the while acting upon the economy, causing systemic instability that is obscured because the observers are not included within the model. Soros has used this concept to explain and predict several financial bubbles and crashes. G Soros, *The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1987; G Soros, *The New Paradigm for Financial Markets : The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means* 1st edn., PublicAffairs, New York, 2008.

⁹¹ J Hobson, 'What's at Stake in 'Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations'? Transcending 'Chronofetishism' and 'Tempocentrism' in International Relations', in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (ed.), *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002), 3-41.

Events can be explained equally well by states engaging in their pure material state interests, or by acting on ideological or psychological grounds, which are considered as cover for actual state interests. This causes cherry-picking and a misreading of history, for example, by explaining the European Crusades of the Levant as the result of demographic growth or the desire for access to the riches of the wealthier Near East. The religious motivations actually felt by Pope Alexander II or Bernard of Clairveaux are considered “irrational” and are assumed to be either false consciousness of their true material interests, or secondarily important.

I do not mean that material interests are irrelevant; for the productive capacities of states’ economies and the states’ ability to extract resources from the economy are important variables that can determine the outcome of geopolitical rivalries and wars.⁹² A brief review of Paul Kennedy’s encyclopedic history of European politics from 1500 to 1986, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, will demonstrate the merits of this type of analysis, while also showing the way teleological laws of history develop which are similar to Realist IR theory in many ways.⁹³ He summarily states:

The triumph of any one Great Power in this period, or the collapse of another, has usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has also been the consequence of the more or less efficient utilization of the state’s productive economic resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the way in which that state’s economy had been rising and falling, relative to the other leading nations in the decades preceding the actual conflict.⁹⁴

Kennedy’s analysis begins with the first major contender for European dominance, Hapsburg Spain during the reign of Phillip II (1554-1598). Early access to New World gold provided the Spanish throne with unusually large resources with which it could challenge the other European states. However, excessive debts that eventually led to multiple bankruptcies, rising inflation,

⁹² C Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1990*, B. Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1990.

⁹³ op. cit, Kennedy 1987.

⁹⁴ ibid. p. xv

and the inability to transform the agricultural economic base toward a more commercial one, led to the steady decline of the Hapsburg Empire in Spain, Flanders, and Austria.⁹⁵ As an early prototype for the typical trajectory of many aspirants of European hegemony, the Hapsburg Empire prequels the rise and decline of modern European states, including Holland, France, Britain, Russia, and Germany. Similarities can be immediately drawn between Kennedy's historical theory and the cycles of hegemony witnessed by world-system theorists, Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi.⁹⁶

However, as Niall Ferguson argued in *The Cash Nexus*, Kennedy's law-like analysis is tautological and represents history incorrectly.⁹⁷ Ferguson suggested that, in particular, the case of the British Empire does not seem to correspond to the military over-stretch argument.⁹⁸ Though Great Britain in the late nineteenth century controlled 13 million sq. miles of the Earth's surface and up to 25% of the world's population, the imperial administration was comparably minimal. The British defense budget prior to 1914 was only 3.2% of GNP, much less than that of Russia, France, Italy, and Germany. Kennedy's argument resembles nineteenth century critics and modern counter-factual economic historians who have suggested that Britain could have relinquished her territories in the late nineteenth century to receive a "decolonization dividend" in the form of a 25% tax cut.⁹⁹ Ferguson debunked this claim by pointing out: the idea that the imperial colonies would have maintained the same level of trade and investment without military support assumes that international free trade was a naturally occurring condition in which Britain could reap the same rewards in a global free market without direct administration. He suggested

⁹⁵ *ibid.* p. 46

⁹⁶ *op. cit.* Wallerstein 2000; G Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century : Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*, Verso, London ; New York, 2010.

⁹⁷ N Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus : Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000*, Basic Books, New York, 2001 pp. 390-418

⁹⁸ *ibid.* p 406.

⁹⁹ *ibid.* p. 410.

that Kennedy's argument in the British case is contradictory and tautological, "It is not clear from this what Kennedy thinks Britain should have done: while some governments are damned if they spend too much on defense, others are damned for spending too little."¹⁰⁰ Even on materialist grounds, the argument that military overstretch causes unsustainable deficits that lead to decline is too narrow a view, and seems to reflect the contemporary concerns related to the United States' giant deficit of 1.4 trillion dollars in the late 1980s.¹⁰¹

Indeed, the projection of very historically specific conditions in the immediate postwar period back in time made the geopolitical configuration of the Cold War seem natural.¹⁰² The problem of chronofetishism, however, is not exclusive to Realist IR theory, and has been a charge leveled at the functionalist sociology of Talcott Parsons that was also hegemonic in the postwar period.¹⁰³ In fact, functionalist logic was characteristic of Neorealism, as it was in Marxism. Ostensibly, Neorealism tried to remove the causal power of Hobbesian human nature. However, in attempting to establish social scientific foundations for empirical research, Kenneth Waltz suggested that balance-of-power is the norm in international state systems, which seems similar to economic theories of supply and demand equilibrium.¹⁰⁴ In *Man, the State, and War*, Waltz identified three levels of analysis: the individual, the nation-state, and the international state-system, through which the "polarity" of international relations can be examined.¹⁰⁵ While the heuristic value of the three levels is useful in many regards, ultimately, the assumption that

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.* p. 406

¹⁰¹ At the time of this writing (May 2010) the U.S. debt is \$13 trillion according to [Hwww.usdebtclock.org](http://www.usdebtclock.org)

¹⁰² For this reason, Neorealism came under substantial attack following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet Union. As a predictive measure, Realism failed to predict

¹⁰³ cf. C W Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, Oxford University Press, Oxford England New York, 2000; A W Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, Basic Books, New York, 1970.

¹⁰⁴ A Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations : A Selected Edition*, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2008; J B Say, *A Treatise on Political Economy*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2001.

¹⁰⁵ *op. cit.* Waltz; K Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* 1st edn., McGraw-Hill, Boston, Mass., 1979.

the “normal state” of international relations is balance-of-power gives primacy to the system level. Again, as Levy and Thompson pointed out, “systems do not have goals. Only actors (individuals, organizations, states) have goals.”¹⁰⁶

However, one can even question whether states, within the second level of analysis, have goals. Suggesting that states have rational goals implies a rational mind, either internally (in the sense that “Poland” decides to do this or that) or as deemed by an observer (as in “Poland’s” actions were rational.) This runs a substantial risk of reifying states into characters. So France goes to war with Britain, then changes her mind and signs a treaty with Britain against Germany. In certain instances, descriptions of this sort are useful.¹⁰⁷ However, there is a risk that this essentializing of states obscures complexity in the realm of domestic politics (was all of France’s population happy about this change of diplomatic relations?) and in history (what are the continuities vs. the differences between the France of the 1890s and the France of the Hundred Years’ War (1337 to 1453?).

For this reason, the analytic level of the individual actors that make state decisions are, indeed, important. Who decides that France joins the Triple Entente? Questions of this sort have led to an emphasis on “great leaders” – kings, diplomats, and generals who make the decisions of state. For example, in the historical work of Henry Kissinger, Metternich, Bismarck, Stalin, or Clemenceau either act according to the objectively “correct” *raison d’etat*, or fail by disrupting the balance-of-power.¹⁰⁸ However, this can also lead to tautological analyses. In Kissinger’s view, Metternich established the best possible scenario of balance-of-power through the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe established at the Treaty of Vienna

¹⁰⁶ op. cit. Levy and Thompson, p. 39

¹⁰⁷ see C Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1990*, B. Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1990.

¹⁰⁸ H Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994.

in 1815. However, Bismarck disturbed this balance-of-power by unifying Germany under the Prussian banner in 1871. Though Bismarck acted as a master statesman in regard to Prussia it left the continental geopolitical order unstable which was inherited by lesser statesmen before World War I. This analysis begs the question: if Metternich's balance-of-power system was so great, why did it fall apart in 56 years? How can Bismarck be considered a great statesman, who made all the best calculations of state interest, while simultaneously making the decisions that led to Germany's ruin 43 years later?

Beyond tautology, this approach emphasizing *Aussenpolitik* over *Innenpolitik* generates an elitist model of the state itself. The state corresponds with the individual actors who represent the mind and will of the state. Michael Mann called this analysis "true elitism." Though elite theories of state are right to emphasize the autonomous power of politics, their model is based on distributive power of state elites *over* society which radiates outward from, not inward to, the state.¹⁰⁹ Mann made the suggestion that "true elitism" should be distinguished from "institutional statism." While there is some room for the autonomous power of elites, there are also autonomous effects exerted by state institutions on the political actors themselves. Laws and constitutions developed at one time can have tremendous effects across time and space - constraining actors through social contracts limiting declarations of war, or through institutionalized elements of popular sovereignty. In the Realist framework, however, states are *active* rather than *passive*. Here, then, we have a major difference between the Marxist conception of the state as a "place," as opposed to being an "actor." Again, Mann pointed out that neither view is correct: the state is actually an "active place."

¹⁰⁹ op. cit. Mann 1993, p 48.

While the epistemological assumptions that underlie Realist theories of war lead to problematic ontological conclusions that overemphasize materialist concerns and accord primacy to the international system, the theory cannot be wholly discarded. One of the important insights of Realist IR theory is that attention *should* be paid to the international system. States exist within a network of other states. It is a realm and a context for action - specifically war. As Anthony Giddens pointed out in *The Nation-State and Violence*, states exist based on the legitimacy accorded by its territorial subjects, but also based on the reflexive recognition of other states.

The conception of the 'sovereign state' has so often been discussed as a purely internal affair that it is worth stressing that it necessarily has external implications for the state in the context of others. The state is to have exclusive authority within its own domain, all other rights being conferred by the sovereign and revocable by him. By its very nature, this formula draws a clear-cut distinction between the authority of different states, and gives a new significance to the territorial demarcations between.¹¹⁰

Another sociologist, Michael Mann, recognized the utility of the geopolitical realm of analysis which has been neglected in the wider discourse of sociological theory. His description of geopolitics seems to draw from the Realist perspective on the anarchic state-system, though the system is a context, not a functionally determining system.¹¹¹

Diplomacy is far less regulated, routinized and predictable than are major domestic politics. Diplomacy involves a number of autonomous states among whom there are few normative ties, yet continuous re-calculation of the main

¹¹⁰ A Giddens *The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985. p. 88

¹¹¹ John Hobson has argued that Mann's geopolitical perspective is actually *too much* derived from Neorealist International Relations theory and suffers from an over-emphasis on materialism as well. J Hobson, 'Mann, the State and War', in John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (ed.), *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006. Indeed, in *States, War, and Capitalism*, Mann even indicates his assumption of a kind of Hobbesian human nature: "That mankind is restless and greedy for more of the good things of life, and that essentially this is a quest for greater material rewards." op. cit. Mann 1988, p. 59

chance. The actions of one set up ripple reactions among others, amounting to an unpredictable whole.¹¹²

Indeed, one of the problems with sociology more generally is its lack of attention for the geopolitical realm, which is where wars occur. Hence the influence of geopolitics and war on social order is often underrated or missed. In this regard, the insights of IR theory can be useful correctives for the pacific social theories discussed below, provided they are not assumed uncritically.¹¹³

2.3. *Liberal Perspectives*

The characterization of liberal theories of war as economically deterministic may seem peculiar. Indeed, within this tradition, *war* is not explained by economic activity and material interests, as was the case in Marxist and Realist theories of the causes of war. Rather, the very opposite: *peace* can be explained by the interdependence and cosmopolitanism generated by economic markets and liberal democracy. In other words, truly enlightened modernity would amount to peace, if we only let it develop. Before addressing the specifics of this economic argument, however, I should clarify Enlightenment concepts of the human individual, which are essential to understanding the way in which the economic argument ‘works’.

As in Marxist theory, underlying the Liberal position is a utopian element - in this case, derived from a sense of the human individual in nature – ‘the noble savage.’ In a primordial,

¹¹² op. cit. Mann, 1988, pp. 151-152

¹¹³ Particularly promising, in terms of sociological relevance, is Constructivism which is rapidly supplanting Neorealism as the dominant International Relations Theory. Constructivism rightly perceives the dialectically relationship between ‘Structure’ and ‘Agency,’ as Giddens most explicitly described in Sociology. see A Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 1999; V Kubáľková, N Onuf, P Kowert, *International Relations in a Constructed World*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 1998; S Hobden and J Hobson, *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002.

prehistoric state, aboriginal humans lived peacefully in nature, and only with the advent of agriculture, private property, and class and state coercion did wars develop. Some credit Rousseau with the concept of the noble savage, though this origin is misapplied,¹¹⁴ for in *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* Rousseau suggested that man in a state of nature was an animal and could only be made “good” through social organization.’¹¹⁵ However, Rousseau did make the point that the imprint of civilization on “man” is problematic and that many of the evils that afflict humanity, such as war, are learned behaviors that are not inherent to the human species in Nature. This notion, whether developed by Rousseau or his contemporaries, held significant sway for much of the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and impacted the social sciences of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notably economics, anthropology, and sociology. What emerges from this philosophical assumption - that “man” is naturally good and is only corrupted by society - is the idea that war is not inevitable, but rather a reflection of irrational social organization. However, because the Enlightenment project leads toward a rational society, the phenomenon of war is either not explained at all, because it has no place in the object of inquiry (modern society), or war is explained as an atavistic remnant of traditional, feudal, or otherwise archaic society.

The Liberal worldview is characterized by attention paid toward law, which may be emphasized in terms of morality and ethics, or in terms of natural law. Often modern considerations of these emphases can lead to debates concerning “negative rights” (what cannot be done to you by others) vs. “positive rights” (what you owe to others and is owed to you).¹¹⁶ The specifics of this debate are well outside the scope of this essay, but can be briefly

¹¹⁴ A Gat, *War in Human Civilization*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006. pp. 3-10 includes a discussion between the Hobbesian and Rousseauian frameworks and their influence in analyzing war.

¹¹⁵ J Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2009.26-55

¹¹⁶ I Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1958.

demonstrated by looking at the political philosophy of John Locke. Contrary to Hobbes, Locke did not see the natural state of humanity as being characterized by permanent war. Rather, Nature follows the ‘Law of Reason.’¹¹⁷ Stemming from this natural law, humans are free to do as they wish, provided they do not infringe upon others’ rights for preserving “Life, health, Liberty, or Possessions.” However, at a certain point, it becomes reasonable for individuals to act in coordination with each other to preserve these rights, and via contracts the individuals establish a government. The significance of Locke’s position is twofold: Firstly, individuals precede the state. Secondly, the state is based upon a social contract. As in Rousseau, the natural human individual enters into the state, society, and civilization as a relatively neutral being in terms of good and evil. In Rousseau’s conception, this neutral being can be corrupted by the civilizing process if the society, state, and civilization are not arranged to maximize the positive qualities of nature – liberty, equality, etc.

Locke’s philosophy was derived from the Christian bible. However, even without theological underpinnings, modern social science has not entirely shoved off the assumption that civilization and, by extension, war are cultural constructions. In Margaret Mead’s anthropology, clearly coming down on the side of the noble savage argument, “warfare is only an invention – not a biological necessity.”¹¹⁸ The Seville Statement adopted by the American Anthropological Association (AAA) in 1986 similarly declared that “it is scientifically incorrect” to believe that we have inherited war from our animal ancestors, or that war is genetically programmed into our human nature. Also scientifically incorrect: that natural selection favors aggressive behavior over other kinds of behavior, that humans have a “violent brain,” or that war is caused by

¹¹⁷ J Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 5th edn. J. Churchill, London, 1728.

¹¹⁸ M Mead, 'Warfare Is Only an Invention - Not a Biological Necessity', *Asia*, vol. 15, 1940, pp. 402-5.

“instinct” or any other single motivation.¹¹⁹ Military historian John Keegan described the Seville

Statement critically:

There is much to be admired...since it seeks to liberate the human race from the deadening conviction that war is its natural lot. Unfortunately, there is little that is scientific about it. Science has thus far quite failed to substantiate any of its five articles, some of which are not scientific propositions at all.¹²⁰

Other critics, including contemporary anthropologists themselves, as well as evolutionary psychologists, biologists, and historians have drawn attention to so many factors that can lead to war other culture – geography, genetics, psychology (or psychopathology), demographic and material crises, etc., that the position of Mead and the AAA seems based on wishful thinking along the lines of Rousseau and Locke.¹²¹

Margaret Mead and the AAA were reacting to evolutionary biological perspectives that highlight underlying animal survival instincts or selfish genes in explaining the causes of war.¹²² And yet, the Lockian view of human nature corresponds with the sociology of the arch-Social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, who coined the phrase, “survival of the fittest.” Spencer, too, assumed an original humanity of *individuals* who had become aggregated into *society*. However, unlike Locke’s model of voluntary cooperation through contract, Spencer saw the origins of the state and society as having occurred *because* of war. War necessitated centralized control and led to a “militarist” state governed by “compulsory cooperation.”¹²³ This led to hierarchical and stratified societies that limited individual freedom in favor of a minority of elites. Due to

¹¹⁹ Seville Statement, *Anthropology Today*, vol. 5, issue 3, 1989

¹²⁰ J Keegan, *War and Our World* 1st Vintage Books edn., Vintage Books, New York, 2001, p. 20

¹²¹ see, for example, op. cit. Gat; op. cit. Keegan 1993; B Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites : Origins and History of the Passions of War* 1st edn., Metropolitan Books, New York, 1997; G Dyer, *War : The Lethal Custom* 1st Carroll & Graf edn., Carroll & Graf Publishers, New York, 2005; J Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel : The Fates of Human Societies*, Norton, New York, 2005.

¹²² R Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1976.

¹²³ H Spencer and S. Andreski, *Principles of Sociology* Abridged edn., Macmillan, London., 1969.pp. 117-125l cited from op. cit. Mann 1986, p. 58

population pressure, agricultural productivity, and commerce, a new type of society emerged in the modern era: “industrial” society, which was evolutionary, in the sense that it replaced the static society of military hierarchy and coercion with a compounding and fluid society based on the division of labor. This new society upended the relationship between state and civil society (the economy, civic associations, free press, etc.), replacing the former with the latter in terms of primacy. Though Spencer’s evolutionary perspective is today considered the ultimate master narrative of Western progress, it is often forgotten that Spencer made no guarantee of the moral direction of evolution as a process. Spencer saw greater complexity and differentiation transpiring within industrial society, which was good in so far as it held the promise of greater human freedom. However, toward the end of his life, Spencer saw all around him - in the Boer War, the naval and armament races of the Great Powers, and even the Salvation Army - a reversion toward a militarist society. When accused of advocating for the application of the law of the survival of the fittest on human society, Spencer responded, “Aggression of every kind is hateful to me.”¹²⁴

Talcott Parsons famously challenged in 1937, “Who now reads Spencer?. . . Spencer is dead.”¹²⁵ And, as students in introductory sociology seminars all know, Émile Durkheim fixed Spencer’s problems. However, as Robert Carneiro pointed out,

The idea of a comparative sociology, an interest in typologies of human society, concern with the division of labor, discussions of structure, function, aggregation, and integration, all of which are found in Durkheim, occurred earlier in works by Spencer with which Durkheim was thoroughly familiar. Even when Durkheim found himself at odds with Spencer, the latter’s views often served him as a springboard to launch his own new interpretation.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ quoted from P Gay, *The Cultivation of Hatred: The Bourgeois Experience : Victoria to Freud*, 5 vols., Oxford University Press, New York, 1984, p. 45

¹²⁵ T Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, 2 vols., 1, The Free Press, New York, 1937, p. 2

¹²⁶ H Spencer and R Carneiro, *The Evolution of Society; Selections from Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,, 1967, p. 1

Perhaps, because of the influence of Spencer's utilitarianism and/or the positivism of Auguste Comte,¹²⁷ Durkheim could not escape from an evolutionary perspective of modern society that suggested a move from mechanical solidarity (à la militarist society) to organic solidarity (à la industrial society).

However, the important correction Durkheim made was precisely at the level of the individual in the state of nature. Durkheim wrote in *The Division of Labor in Society*,

Far from being able to date the effacement of the individual from the institution of some despotic power, we ought on the contrary to see in it the first step taken along the road to individualism. In fact, the chiefs are the first individual personalities who have risen from the mass of society. . . Dominating society, they are no longer constrained to follow its every movement.¹²⁸

In Durkheim's framework, "primitive" societies exist within a state of mechanical solidarity, in which social functions are regulated by a relatively simple system of norms via the *conscience collective*.¹²⁹ Only as the size and scale of society increases does a division of labor become functionally necessary to maintain organic solidarity, which is more fluid due to the separation of social tasks assigned according to merit and choice. At this point, the *idea* of individualism develops, though it never a fully realized actuality due to the influence and coercion of social facts upon social actors.¹³⁰ This consciousness of an individual psychology comes from modern social organization. Durkheim said,

Most of our states of consciousness would not have occurred among men isolated from one another and would have occurred completely differently among people grouped together in a different way. Thus they derive not from the psychological nature of man generally, but from the way in which men, once they associate together, exert a reciprocal effect upon one another, according to their number and

¹²⁷ A Comte and H Martineau, *The Positive Philosophy*, AMS Press, New York,, 1974.

¹²⁸ E Durkheim and W D Halls,, *The Division of Labor in Society*, Free Press, New York, 1984, p. 143

¹²⁹ *ibid.* pp. 127, 118

¹³⁰ E Durkheim, *The Rules of the Sociological Method*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938. p. 10

proximity . . . Society does not find ready-made in individual consciousnesses the bases on which it rests; it makes them for itself.¹³¹

So why, then, does Durkheim not provide the theoretical bases upon which war and modernity can be assessed, as has been argued by Michael Mann, Hans Joas, Edward Tiryakian and others?¹³² If society and individual consciousnesses exist within a reciprocal relationship, why do societies and individuals engage in war? In the context of modernity, Durkheim indicated that the evolutionary development of the state in the context of organic solidarity causes individuals to realize their interest in avoiding war. The increased social population and the more complex division of labor in modern society require a larger state performing more functions.¹³³ Again, this is the opposite of Spencer's view. Among the important functions of the state, in this context, is to preserve the sphere of individual liberty. As the individual personality emerges from the social mass "he" realizes that,

War fetters his activity, diminishes his stature and so becomes the supreme evil. Because it inflicts undeserved suffering on him, he sees in it more and more the supreme form of moral offence. In these conditions it is quite contradictory to expect him to submit to the same subordination as before.¹³⁴

In this view, the individual is no longer as compelled to submit to the whim of the despot who would send him or her to war, because Reason allows them to distinguish the contradictions that underlie the activity of military participation. Of course, Durkheim was writing this before the most irrational of wars, the Great War, in which 70 million soldiers precisely did submit willingly to subordination. Yet, in his pamphlet, "Germany Above All," published during the war, Durkheim suggested that Germany was responsible for having lost its Enlightenment ideals

¹³¹ *ibid.* p. 287

¹³² *op. cit.* Mann 1986, pp 146-165; *op. cit.* Joas 2003; E Tiryakian, 'War: The Covered Side of Modernity', *International Sociology*, vol. 14, issue 4, Dec 1999, 473-89.

¹³³ E Durkheim and A Giddens, *Selected Writings*, University Press, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 189-202

¹³⁴ *ibid.* p. 195.

by glorifying war and denouncing international law.¹³⁵ That Durkheim harkened to morality amidst the irrationality of war, confirms Edward Tiryakian's suggestion that the roots of the Liberal assumption of pacifist modernity pervading classical social theory do, in fact, lie in the moral principles of the Enlightenment itself.¹³⁶

In "Perpetual Peace," Kant suggested that the moral foundations of all national constitutions imply that wars should be eliminated.¹³⁷ Through Republican government, voluntary international congresses, and economic interdependence, sovereign nation states in cooperation could establish the legal framework for this peace to be engendered. The cosmopolitan point of view is also the natural outcome of the Universal Historic trend toward Reason and Freedom.¹³⁸ Nature provides the conditions through which individuals come to realize themselves through conflict between one another and with Nature herself which establishes the motivation for hard work and positive action. For individuals themselves, this may not represent a trend towards Reason. Only for the species as a whole can a Universal History be conceived of that leads toward the final culmination of the trend towards moral freedom – the end of war.¹³⁹ This does require concerted human effort, however, as the idea of cosmopolitan law "can only serve as a guiding thread for presenting as a system . . . what would otherwise be a planless conglomeration of human actions."¹⁴⁰

Kant's argument for a perpetual peace has been influential in contemporary political philosophy and political science. In 1983, Michael Doyle wrote two essays in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* inspired by Kant that led to an outpouring of historical and empirical research on

¹³⁵ cited in Joas 2003, p. 69

¹³⁶ op. cit. Tiryakian, p. 5

¹³⁷ I Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1939.

¹³⁸ I Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View', <<http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/universal-history.htm>>, accessed 04-01 2010.

¹³⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.* Ninth thesis.

“Democratic Peace Theory.”¹⁴¹ The argument is simple: ‘democracies almost never go to war with each other.’ This is presumably because rational citizens of a democratic state would not vote to go to war against other democratic peoples. Indeed, there exists “extraordinarily strong empirical” evidence demonstrating the plausibility of this theory, as Levy and Thompson have pointed out.¹⁴² However, critics of the theory have challenged the definitions of “democracy” used by the Democratic Peace analysts.¹⁴³ For example, in the War of 1812 (or the Napoleonic Wars for that matter), Britain is not characterized as a democracy because the monarchy still handled foreign policy. Similarly, in the U.S. Civil War, the Confederacy did not meet the criteria of being a democracy for over three years. Numerous exceptional cases have been raised, often by Realist IR scholars, and defended by liberal peace theorists. However, one reason Democratic Peace theory fails at explaining the problem of war, and modernity in general, is that it employs a dyadic model of war and peace, in that the cases are single democratic states vs. single democratic states. Indeed, these states rarely go to war with each other. But, democratic states *do* go to war with states they deem authoritarian quite often. Furthermore, democratic states are often inclined toward alliances and treaties that organize them into blocks, like the Triple Entente, or NATO. These alliances are based on shared normative values of democracy, but also on security concerns that would make attack against an ally fundamentally irrational since it would isolate the aggressor from the collective defensive pact. The power and security afforded by these democratic blocs may actually *encourage* the aggressive actions of democracies against autocracies outside their normative international community; for example,

¹⁴¹ M Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts I & II, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, vol. 12, issue Fall, 1983, pp. 205-35, 323-53.

¹⁴² op. cit. Levy and Thompson, p. 105

¹⁴³ See op. cit. Mann 1993, pp. 766-774; op. cit. Levy and Thompson 104-117

in the NATO bombings in the Balkans, covert engagements in Latin America, or Operation Iraqi Freedom. In any event, wars have not been eliminated by liberal democracy.

However, of the three principles that *guarantee* Kant's perpetual peace, the third points to the heart of the Liberal economic determinism I have promised to address.¹⁴⁴ Kant wrote,

Just as nature wisely separates nations...the spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with war, sooner or later gains the upper hand in every state. As the power of money is perhaps the most dependable of all the powers (means) included under the state power, states see themselves forced, without any moral urge, to promote honorable peace and by mediation to prevent war wherever it threatens to break out. They do so exactly as if they stood in perpetual alliances, for great offensive alliances are in the nature of the case rare and even less often successful. In this manner nature guarantees perpetual peace by the mechanism of human passions. Certainly she does not do so with sufficient certainty for us to predict the future in any theoretical sense, but adequately from a practical point of view, making it our duty to work toward this end, which is not just a chimerical one.¹⁴⁵

There are a couple of elements of this argument that are worth highlighting. First, “the spirit of commerce” is incompatible with war. By this, Kant means that war disrupts economic activity, and that commercial states and firms, acting in their own self-interest, will soon prevent wars from transpiring. Second, the material interest of states will force them to prevent war, “without any moral urge.” Because citizens and states following their economic self-interest inevitably create the conditions desired by morality, one does not, in fact, have to rest upon those moral foundations, since peace will happen ‘naturally.’ Hence, our faith in cosmopolitan peace is rested assured “by the mechanism of human passions.”

As is well known, Adam Smith's “Invisible Hand” was supposed to achieve similarly positive results by having merchants, industrialists, and consumers involved in market exchange

¹⁴⁴ The first two principles are Republican Government, addressed above, and International Law.

¹⁴⁵ op. cit. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” First supplement.

regulated by the “law” of supply and demand. Before globalization, Smith assumed that capital would naturally prefer to invest in their home market. Smith said,

By preferring the support of domestick (sic) to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. . . By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.¹⁴⁶

Though Smith did provide that one of the state’s necessary duties was to secure the territory of the nation with militaries and war deficits,¹⁴⁷ ultimately, Smith trusted that states engaged in free trade across borders would find that they could increase the wealth of their nation more effectively through commercial activity than through pillaging and aggressive war. Smith, therefore, relegated war to the political realm, where it would remain exogenous to the free market economy.

Hans Joas suggested that Kant and Smith reflect two sides of the same coin. Kant represents the *republican* tradition, while Smith demonstrates the *utilitarian* perspective.¹⁴⁸ While Joas noted that there is “productive tension” between these two optimistic positions, when combined into the *liberal utilitarian* position (as in Spencer), the idealism of the perspectives became dangerous when used to justify imperialism and colonialism.¹⁴⁹ Though Joas did not think imperialism happened due to a Leninist model of capital exportation, Jürgen Habermas, in his essay, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove,” showed his Marxist stripes by saying,

¹⁴⁶ A Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations : A Selected Edition*, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2008. pp. 291-292

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.* p. 458

¹⁴⁸ *op. cit.* Joas 2003, p. 35

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.* p. 36

Kant did not foresee that the social tensions that initially intensify in the course of accelerating capitalist industrialization would both encumber domestic politics with class struggles and direct foreign policy into the channels of violent imperialism.”¹⁵⁰

Habermas was correct in pointing out that Kant could not have known in 1795 that, for example, nationalism would turn active citizens into willing subordinates to the state, or that philosophy could be taken up by anti-Enlightenment thinkers who justified aggression and war. On the point of the economy, Kant’s inattention to the class conflict inherent in capitalism, to say nothing of the anomie generated by industrialism and the division of labor, led him to conclude that the self-interested economic activity of individuals would lead to morally beneficial outcomes in the realm of international peace.

The symbiosis between the liberal and utilitarian positions is still evident in the current discourse surrounding Democratic Peace Theory and free markets neoliberalism. In “The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace,” Michael Mousseau found evidence to support his theory that “market democracies,” in particular, were especially prone to peace.¹⁵¹ Mousseau considered this trend as endogenously contained with market society, since free markets directly contribute to the generation of a liberal political culture. Internationally, Richard Rosecrance suggested, in *The Rise of the Trading State*, that as markets connected states together in a competitive, but also mutually reliant system, the rational need to go to war would be effectively removed.¹⁵² The advent of the Information Age and globalization further increased this interdependence, as computer, satellite, and transportation technologies led to an even more

¹⁵⁰ J Habermas, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove,” *The Inclusion of the Other : Studies in Political Theory*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1998, p. 173.

¹⁵¹ M Mousseau, 'The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and Evidence', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47, 2003, p. 483.

¹⁵² R Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State : Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, Basic Books, New York, 1986.

peaceful *Rise of the Virtual State*.¹⁵³ In 1999, perhaps it seemed reasonable to assert that “the world is making steady progress toward peace and economic security.”¹⁵⁴ But Rosecrance was far more prescient when he wrote: “The factor of land might stage a resurgence and territory become more significant...where land and its products still remain the vital factor of production. [In] the oil of the Caspian or the Middle-East – territory will continue to exert a delusive influence.”¹⁵⁵ Indeed, the resurgence of war since 2001, involving democracies engaged in pre-emptive war in defiance of international law, has (or should have) challenged the liberal assumptions behind peace and modernity. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama had declared the victory of two forces, democracy and free market capitalism, which amounted to *The End of History*.¹⁵⁶ 20 years later, it seems history still moves on.

How is the continuation of war to be explained? If, for example, we assume Mousseau’s claim that markets generate democracy which generates peace – in other words, that peace is *endogenous* to market society - then war must be an *exogenous* or *atavistic* variable to the economy – as Adam Smith and Richard Rosecrance have suggested.¹⁵⁷ While peace can be explained by markets, wars persist in the modern era for reasons other than trade. Joseph Schumpeter, for example, suggested in “The Sociology of Imperialism,” that war “falls in the great group of those things that live on from earlier epochs, things which play so great a role in every concrete situation and which are to be explained not from the conditions of the present but from the conditions of the past.”¹⁵⁸ The fact that war still exists is a reflection of the continued

¹⁵³ R Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Virtual State : Wealth and Power in the Coming Century*, Basic Books, New York, 1999.

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.* p. xi.

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.* p. xv

¹⁵⁶ F Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Maxwell Macmillan International, New York, 1992.

¹⁵⁷ *op. cit.* Rosecrance, 1999, p. xv

¹⁵⁸ J Schumpeter, "'The Sociology of Imperialism', <<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1918schumpeter1.html>>, accessed 11-15-09 2009.

existence of war-minded nobles and not due to the logic of capitalist production itself. This view was shared by other classical economists, including Thorstein Veblen and A.C. Pigou, and has been reformulated throughout the twentieth century in an economic theory debate that Coulomb and Fontanel described as ““Markets-as-Peace” vs. “Capitalism-as-War.”¹⁵⁹ The battle lines of this debate match up according to whether an economist is a Marxist¹⁶⁰ or a Liberal,¹⁶¹ indicating that one’s position comes down to whether war is considered *inherent* in capitalism, or not.

2.4. A Synthetic Critique of Marxist, Liberal, and Realist Perspectives

None of the three economically deterministic theories of war and peace are satisfactory on their own. I should note, before proceeding, however, that the positions outlined above are not necessarily the sum of Marxist, Liberal, or Realist schools of thought, or even the specific theorists. Rather they should be considered as particular points of view that have been associated with these traditions. In fact, the correctives to deal with the economic determinism within these perspectives can be found immanently contained within the assumptions of the theories themselves.

To start with the Liberal position - that market integration leads to peace and that war is an atavism of pre-modern social systems - we should recall Rousseau’s emphasis on the civilizing process in corrupting “man” away from the positive conditions of Nature. If this is the case, then the continued persistence of war is a demonstration of the fact that modern social

¹⁵⁹ F Coulomb and J Fontanel, 'Disarmament: A Century of Economic Thought', *Defence and Peace Economics*, vol. 14, issue 3, Jun 2003, 193-208.

¹⁶⁰ e.g. Hilferding, Lenin, Luxembourg,

¹⁶¹ e.g. Schumpeter, Veblen, Keynes, Pigou

organization *is still* not correct. Rather than conceiving of an ideal world, as Kant did in “Perpetual Peace,” in order to direct natural human activity toward morally desirable outcomes, we should heed Voltaire’s ironic perspective to see that ‘this is not the best of all possible worlds.’¹⁶² Modern war is not only a continuation of feudal militancy running counter to evolution, but has itself evolved throughout the modern era in terms of technology, strategy, and military participation. Rather than calling for a return to a natural state of noble savagery, or resort to throwing our hands up by declaring war is simply a cultural construction, we should direct our attention directly at the reality of war and society to determine which factors within social organization are the causes of war.

The undermining use of an ideal, utopian future is also an issue for the Marxist perspective. Indeed, Michael Mann, Hans Joas, and Edward Tiryakian have lumped the two perspectives together as the “Liberal/Marxian” tradition, since both consider war to be prehistoric and removable in a, yet unrealized, future society. Yet, the Marxist analysis of capitalism does attend to question of what precisely is the element of modern society that causes this corruption, concluding that the economic relations of capitalism generate class antagonism and stimulate imperialist wars. Orthodox Marxists would suggest that it is exclusively the material economic base that causes these problems. But this type of thinking leads to exclusively economic prescriptions, such as the revolution of property relations attempted by Lenin, which could only come about through coercive violence and war.

Another side of Marxian thought relates to the consciousness that is required for class revolution to take place. In an objective sense, class relations are determined by economic factors, such as income and wealth. But there is no guarantee that these class actors will become

¹⁶² Voltaire, *Candide*, Fine Editions Press, New York,, 1957.

aware of their conditions and unite. For this, a subjective awareness of being a “class for itself” is necessary. As Michael Mann pointed out, this indicates that the social consequences of class are related to both economic power and ideological power.¹⁶³ Mann outlined Marx’s own position on class consciousness in terms of four positions:¹⁶⁴

1. *Identity*. The definition of self as working class, as playing a distinctive role in common with other workers in the economy. This self-conception need not be associated with class conflict.
2. *Opposition*. The perception that capitalists and their managers constitute the workers’ enduring opponent. Identity plus opposition will generate conflict, but this may not be extensive.
3. *Totality*. The acceptance of the first two elements as the defining characteristics of (1) the workers’ total social situation and (2) the whole society.
4. *Alternative*. Conceiving of an alternative form of power relations to existing capitalism. This will reinforce extensive and political class conflict and legitimate revolutionary struggle.¹⁶⁵

Some combination of all four components should be present for a proletarian revolution or class action to take place. This is why Marxist activists direct so much attention toward explaining the non-self-evident features of the capitalist system to workers who are used to conceiving of issues in terms of local, particularistic ways. While Marx’s polemics against idealism led his followers to over-emphasize the material conditions that generate economic class structures, his position above demonstrates that conscious awareness actually *determines* the outcome of overcoming current conditions. Furthermore, contemporary research along Marxist lines, such as David Harvey’s examination of neoliberalism, demonstrates that a conscious effort has been made by

¹⁶³ op. cit. Mann 1993, pp. 23-43

¹⁶⁴ M Mann, *Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class*, Macmillan, London,, 1973.

¹⁶⁵ op. cit. Mann 1993, p.27

the capitalist class to institute conditions that benefit their international economic interest.¹⁶⁶ In this sense, the ideological awareness of all classes is relevant, not just in clouding the material conditions of the present, but in *determining* the conditions of the present. With that in mind, addressing the persistence of war should not come solely from theories that highlight the economic structures that lead to war, but also the ideological factors that stimulate those actions.

The same position is also implied within the conception of power that is the basis of Realism's *Machtpolitik* perspective. As I suggested, the Realist definition of power is hard to find, but seems to suggest material interests as determining the ever-present cycles of war that take place at the international systemic level. However, there are two reasons power should not be conceived solely in economic or material terms according to the model's assumptions. First, there is an underlying idea that humans and states are motivated to increase their power by default, according to a kind of Nietzschean 'Will to Power.' This implies that power actually transcends material desires and represents an end in itself. Wealth and territory could be simply evidence of achievement of the real object of interest: power itself.

This leads to a second important conclusion. Because, at the individual level of analysis, Realism represents a "true elitist" perspective of the state, one must look at the individual statesmen who act within the state system. In this view, the statesmen who drive the state toward its objective state interest do so, based on particular perceived opportunities or threats, but also based on an instinctual or psychological desire to increase their power. This is the inevitable conclusion of Hobbes' *homo lupus* view of man. If one rejects the Hobbesian instinct as unscientific, as Kenneth Waltz and the Neorealists do, then the instinct to increase state power should be replaced with psychological motivations to increase their power. These psychological

¹⁶⁶ D Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2005.

traits, which might be egotism, dominating personalities, or sociopathy, could be just characteristic of individuals who rise to the positions of power in foreign policy, and do not necessarily have to be universally held by all humankind. These personalities might also be absent in statesmen who fail to operate in their states' objective interests. These psychological features may come from the biology of the human brain, but they also come from society through socialization and interaction. Here the question becomes, what are the features of modern society that cause these actors to have this psychological 'Will to Power'?

All of the issues above point to a misrecognition of the autonomous power of culture and ideology on the part of the economistic theories of war. This is a reflection of the universalistic assumptions underlying the theories, which largely stem from the Enlightenment. As Clifford Geertz noted,

The trouble with this kind of view... is that the image of a constant human nature independent of time, place, and circumstance... may be an illusion, that what man is may be so entangled with where he is, who he is, and what he believes that it is inseparable from them. It is precisely the consideration of such a possibility that led to the rise of the concept of culture and the decline of the uniformitarian view of man. Whatever else modern anthropology asserts... it is firm in the conviction that men unmodified by the customs of particular places do not in fact exist, have never existed, and most important, could not in the very nature of the case exist.¹⁶⁷

Indeed, how can we speak of war in the modern era without speaking about the specific cases of France during the Third Republic or Germans during the Nazi period? How can we understand the motivations of imperialists during European colonialism without understanding the bourgeois sensibilities of *Bildungsbürgertum* or Social Darwinism? Though not in whole - in part, the economic theories of war tend to neglect these features as either unimportant or irrational. Even

¹⁶⁷ C Geertz, "The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man," *The Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays*, Basic Books, New York,, 1973, p. 35.

the best sociological attempts to critique the monolithic power of capital in structural analysis, for example, Michael Mann's *Sources of Social Power, vol. II*, or Charles Tilly's *Coercion, Capital, and European States, 990-1990*, do so by emphasizing the additional role of the military in constituting society.¹⁶⁸ Rarely do they emphasize the symbolic power of national identity, the social psychological pathologies that developed in the modern era, changes in gender and masculinity norms, the colonial importation and export of culture, or the novelty of bourgeois individualism itself. These were not simply surface manifestations of modern society, but were, rather the medium and glue that held together and constituted Western society in the midst of dramatic social change. That these "non-economic" factors could, and did, lead to wars in many instances should not be ignored due to theoretical narrowness.

Of course, anthropology already deals with war through the lens of culture.¹⁶⁹ If we are in search of a compatible sociological theory, we cannot let the "see-saw" fall on the proposition that "It's all culture." Structures are important. And with all due respect to the achievements of Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Sapir and Whorf and others, language, semiotics, and mythology cannot explain social structure entirely.¹⁷⁰ Material and economic relations do have important roles to play in determining the channels and possibilities of social action, as do political organizations and status hierarchies. This structure need not be functionally understood according to biologicistic or cybernetic analogies. Rather, systems exist due to the reproduction of social

¹⁶⁸ Of course, Michael Mann's I.E.M.P model includes Ideology. However, many critics have charged that he did not emphasize ideology in his second volume dealing with the period of 1760 to the First World War. see J Hall and R Schroeder, *An Anatomy of Power : The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2006, which includes Mann's partial admission and defense on pp. 343-396.

¹⁶⁹ American Anthropological Association et al., *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression*, Natural History Press, Garden City, N.Y., 1968; N Chagnon, *Yanomamö, the Fierce People*, Holt, New York., 1968; M Meggitt, *Blood Is Their Argument : Warfare among the Mae Enga Tribesmen of the New Guinea Highlands* 1st edn., Mayfield Pub. Co., Palo Alto, Calif., 1977.

¹⁷⁰ C Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* University of Chicago Press edn., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1983.

structure by actors and institutions that linger across space and time.¹⁷¹ Neither should structure imply a universal model that is applicable transhistorically irrespective of difference. So how then, do we reach an understanding of modern society, which is not transhistorical, but, rather, was particularly structured between 1750 and the present, with origins in Western Europe? As Wallerstein and world-systems theorists have clearly shown, a particular economic structure did expand from the territory of Europe to encompass the globe during this period – namely industrial capitalism. What are the impacts of (and preconditions for) this economic system which seem so important to the constitution of modern society?

This question should not be posed simply in terms of a global division of labor or class relations, but also in terms of cultural exchange, Orientalist racism, and even religion. In fact, an ontologically and epistemologically correct understanding of modern society, modern capitalism, and modern war, would require that there be no distinction between culture and economics made at all.¹⁷² Rather, culture and material interests are always involved in a *dialectical* relationship. The work of Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, Bourdieu, and others have demonstrated that social structure and individual consciousness are not actually distinct from one another. The societal totality (however defined) does not *functionally* reproduce individual actors, but rather, totality and agents *reciprocally* reproduce each other.¹⁷³ A conception of social structure conceived dialectically makes it difficult to assign primacy to a particular sphere of social life - for example, the economy, because economic relations cannot exist without other forms of social interaction, like religion, political ideology, or family traditions. Furthermore, by removing the causal power of structural-functional needs, phenomena must be explained in terms of the

¹⁷¹ op. cit. Giddens 1979; Giddens 1984

¹⁷² excepting where actors conceived of themselves in this way (namely in modern society)

¹⁷³ see T Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, Seabury Press, New York, 1973.

relatively conscious action of individuals, who are no longer in the position of “cultural dupes,” to use Anthony Giddens’ phrase.¹⁷⁴ This becomes especially apparent if we take seriously the Realists’ elite theory of the state. These powerful individuals are acutely aware of their own power and the dynamics of power at work in international society.

On another level, however, individuals can be considered as cultural products - though not in terms of “false consciousness” which can only be subjectively attributed by the analyst. Rather, through a dialectical framework, we can see the manner in which existing society imprints the cultural traditions, behaviors, and a sense of self on the individual. This establishes highly specific cases of cultural difference at the level of the individual, but also explains why societies take on a recognizable form at the aggregate level.

When one considers that asymmetrical generational differences persist through all eras, while the cultural dynamic generated by immigration, transnational relationships, and the media stimulate further changeable grounds upon which society rests – one can see that the dynamic structure of capitalism exists within, while also causing, a chaotic social totality moving through time. Wars are similarly situated within the modern era, causing, as well as being caused by, the greater modern society.

To penetrate the logic of this dialectic at work, we will need to examine particular historical cases. With that in mind, I have decided to look at wars in the nineteenth century – 1815-1914. This period has often been overlooked in terms of military development, because it is generally considered peaceful, as I will critically discuss below. Returning to this period is important for understanding modernity and war, for, in many ways, the modern world was born in the nineteenth century. Because social theorists living during the period could not bear

¹⁷⁴ op. cit. Giddens 1979; op. cit. Giddens 1984

witness to the climaxes of modern warfare, World Wars I, II, and the Cold War, their theories do not seem to have left specific road maps to understanding war in their time. Meanwhile, twentieth century and contemporary scholars seem to forget that wars even happened in the nineteenth century. In many ways, the nineteenth century can be read as the best comparative case for the twentieth century, and though the space of this essay leaves little room for this comparison, the historical analysis below should be read in terms of the essential similarities and differences between our modern world and our world in the recent past.

3. The Myth of the Hundred Years' Peace: War in the Nineteenth Century

The previous section identified three theories that have been used to understand the relationship between war, capitalism, and modernity – Liberal, Marxist, and Realist. However, I have argued that, in their traditional forms, each places too great an emphasis on economic determinates leading to an undervaluation of ideological and cultural factors. While I have identified several problems with the assumptions that underlie the theories, I have also noted that the theories do not necessarily preclude the influence of ideology. Rather, all have immanently contained within their respective frameworks positions in which non-material influences have considerable importance. In Figure 3.1 below, I have outlined the core assumptions, the negative consequences of these assumptions, and the openings for ideological analysis in each of the theories.

Figure 3.1 - Three Economically Deterministic Theories of War

Theory	Assumption	Consequent Error	Ideology?
<i>Marxist</i>	Mode of production causes war.	System causes events. States and actors are treated functionally.	Class consciousness can be determining.
<i>Realist</i>	States and elites want to survive and increase their power.	Systemic and tautological analyses. Elites are equated with the state.	“Power” can be an end in itself for actors, which we may be able to explain through psychology.
<i>Liberal</i>	War is atavistic. Market integration and democracy lead to peace between nations.	Does not recognize war’s particular character in modernity, or the persistence of war despite the institution of liberal democracy.	Individuals are constructed by culture and civilization.

The most significant dichotomy exists between the Marxist and the Liberal perspectives, which is reflected in the debate between “Markets-as-Peace” and “Capitalism-as-War.” The fact that each perspective has a more-or-less completely opposite view of the pacific nature of modern market capitalism demonstrates how important one’s point of view is in determining the analysis of the same series of events.

Luckily, between these theories lies a fourth perspective I identified earlier as the “Communitarian” position. This position is not widely held, though there are consonances within the communitarian philosophy of scholars, like Michael Walzer, and his influential perspective on war.¹⁷⁵ In this case, I use the term to distinguish the particular position assumed by Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, written in 1944.¹⁷⁶ The book’s primary purpose was not to develop a theory of war, and his hypothesis regarding the “Hundred Years’ Peace” (1815-1914) occupied only the first two of thirty-five chapters. However, Polanyi’s argument figures especially well within the context of the three theories discussed above. In terms of his economic perspective, Polanyi is aligned closely with the Marxists, who would suggest that the growth of the capitalist market has led to alienation and social disintegration. His political economic ideology could just as easily be termed “socialist,” but this would run the risk of associating Polanyi with the Marxists all together. For Polanyi also ceded to Liberals that transnational capitalism did appear to have led to peace in the nineteenth century. He challenged Lenin specifically for suggesting that finance capital was responsible for wars, when, in fact, it appeared as though they had averted a major

¹⁷⁵ M Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* 2nd edn., Basic Books, New York, 1992.

¹⁷⁶ op. cit. Polanyi

conflagration until 1914.¹⁷⁷ Finally, less explicitly, there is some indication that Polanyi regarded the Realists' 'Will to Power' as a condition that would have taken place in the nineteenth century had there not been a countervailing trend (transnational capitalism). In other words, Polanyi still feels as though *peace* needs to be explained.

Because Polanyi made an explicit argument regarding war in a specific historical period, I will use his argument regarding the "Hundred Years' Peace" as a hypothesis reflective of the economic determinism generally found in all of the theories.¹⁷⁸ In disproving the absolute validity of this hypothesis I hope to show the merits and inadequacies of looking at war, modernity, and capitalism in this overly economic way.

The first part of the critique will consist of a historical challenge to Polanyi's claims on materialist grounds themselves – that is, by highlighting alternative historical evidence within the framework of power as traditionally conceived. The second part of the critique will examine cultural and ideological factors that are not considered important by Polanyi or other materialist scholars. Though I have argued in the previous section that the separation between economy and culture is not an accurate representation of reality, it will serve here as a necessary heuristic device. This approach reflects the dramatic cleft within the discipline of history between "social history" and "cultural history." Since I will not be engaging in primary research at this time, I will need to follow the division as it exists within the secondary historical literature. After addressing nineteenth century war and society in this way, I will return to the dialectical

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.* p. 16

¹⁷⁸ The notion of the Hundred Years' Peace is not the core of Polanyi's argument in *The Great Transformation*. Rather, the process by which the market economy became "disembedded" from society during the English Industrial Revolution consumes the bulk of the book. The short Part I, about nineteenth and twentieth century war and peace is meant to introduce the urgency behind a proper examination of domestic political economy. The following critique of Polanyi's notion of nineteenth century geopolitics should not invalidate his seminal contribution to the field of economic sociology and economic history.

theoretical framework to indicate where future research should be directed according to initial findings.

3.1. Polanyi's Hundred Years' Peace

Between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I there lies “a phenomenon unheard of in the annals of Western civilization, namely a hundred years’ peace – 1815-1914.”¹⁷⁹ So stated Karl Polanyi in 1944 amidst the ruins of that very civilization. Nineteenth century civilization, he said, rested on four institutional pillars – the balance-of-power system, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market, and the liberal state. Two of these institutions were political, two were economic. In another configuration, two were domestic and the other two were international, as can be seen in Fig. 3.2.

Figure 3.2 - Four Pillars of Nineteenth Century Civilization

	National	International
Political	Liberal State	Balance of Power
Economic	Self-Regulating Market	International Gold Standard

Source: Polanyi, p. 3

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.* p. 5

The Hundred Years' Peace was maintained by the international balance-of-power political system and the international economy maintained through the gold standard. Though the breakdown of the international gold standard was the proximate cause of World War I, Polanyi considered the domestic political-economic configuration of the self-regulating market to be the underlying root cause of the seemingly stable, but ultimately superficial nineteenth century civilization. Polanyi explained,

The fount and matrix of the system was the self-regulating market. It was this innovation which gave rise to a specific civilization. The gold standard was merely an attempt to extend the domestic market system to the international field; the balance-of-power system was a superstructure erected upon and, partly, worked through the gold standard; the liberal state was itself a creation of the self-regulating market. The key to the institutional system of the nineteenth century lay in the laws governing market economy.¹⁸⁰

Note that the other institutional pillars are either created by or are a superstructure upon the self-regulating economy. The primacy of the economy in Polanyi's analysis is most apparent here, where the echo of Marx's base/superstructure model is clearly evident. Nineteenth century civilization, or at least its "specificity," was itself derived from the capitalist market economy, indicating that social relations were determined by the relations of economic exchange.

Polanyi's communitarian position was that the idea of a self-adjusting market is "a stark utopia" that could not exist without destroying the human and natural substance of society.¹⁸¹ Here Polanyi has made a normative judgment about what is "natural," which he clarified later in the book. In Nature, society is just, egalitarian, and symmetrical based on patterns of reciprocity and redistribution, as was the case in the Trobriand Islanders of Western Malanesia.¹⁸² Modern

¹⁸⁰ *ibid.* p. 3

¹⁸¹ *ibid.* p. 3

¹⁸² *ibid.* p. 50-54; see also K Polanyi, *Trade and Market in the Early Empires; Economies in History and Theory*, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1957; B Malinowski, *The Ethnography of Malinowski : The Trobriand Islands 1915-18*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London ; Boston, 1979.

society, therefore, is “unnatural.” It had to be created by capitalists in their image. The majority of *The Great Transformation* is a remarkable examination of how this creation was developed in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, an enduring legacy of Polanyi’s work is his identification of a natural “double-movement” in which civil society reacts against the transgressions of capital in an attempt to restore social reciprocity, redistribution, and social order – for example, during the American New Deal. By restraining unchecked greed, the double movement prevents capital from completely “disembedding” the economy from society. Removing social constraints to allow greater economic freedom is always in the capitalist class’s interests; however, the process is never complete since the economy will always be “embedded” within society. On the one hand, capital itself needs the political apparatus of the state and society to maintain its legal and cartel privileges. On the other hand, society never lets itself become fully reduced to economic cogs, but rather fights back against the deadening life of economic exploitation by reembedding the economy under social control. Polanyi’s perspective has been criticized as “primitivism,” by Murray Rothbard, in that he implied our advanced market society should return to its “primitive” roots in egalitarianism.¹⁸³ This positions Polanyi differently than Marx, who would overcome capitalism *through* industrialism, taking advantage of modern technological achievements. However, Polanyi’s communitarian ideal of a collective society that has been distorted by the stark utopia of the self-regulating market is not entirely essential to his analysis of war. Rather his attempt to connect the horrors of World War I and II to the international gold standard served to provide brutal evidence of the consequences of an unquestioned liberal state protecting an unregulated free market.

¹⁸³ M Rothbard, 'Down with Primitivism: A Thorough Critique of Polanyi', <<http://mises.org/daily/1607>>, accessed 05/20/2010

Polanyi's observed that peace was not the normal state of international relations in previous and subsequent centuries. In order to identify the cause of the peace, one must identify the novel variable that could explain the difference within the new era. Polanyi acknowledged new diplomatic relations that institutionalized balance-of-power, notably the Congress system, but suggested that these held a loose confederation that convened rarely and were not aligned. There needed to be something that bound these powers together. He said, "We must seek some undisclosed powerful social instrumentality at work in the new setting, which could make the peace interest effective. This anonymous factor, we submit was *haute finance*."¹⁸⁴ *Haute finance* was an institution peculiar to the last third of the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth (at the time of Polanyi's writing).

Polanyi argued that transnational capital functioned as the *main link* between the political and economic organization of the world, representing a permanent independent agency dedicated to peace between Great Powers. According to Polanyi, "There was intimate contact between finance and diplomacy... neither would consider any long range plan, whether peaceful or warlike, without making sure of the other's goodwill."¹⁸⁵ The members of the elite class of bondholders, embodied in the Rothschilds and J.P. Morgan, would have to float the loans required to pay for wars. They held the reins of states, and yet were independent of national organizations. Because international banking was not restricted to financing governments, and included foreign investment in industry, public utilities and banks, as well as long-term loans to public and private corporations abroad, any risk of war that would jeopardize these investments would be emphatically discouraged. Trade had become linked with peace through an international monetary system which could not function in a general war. Any holders of

¹⁸⁴ Polanyi, p. 10

¹⁸⁵ *ibid.* p. 10

government securities were bound to lose if currencies were affected, and to the extent that governments relied on these financiers in multiple directions, they listened. Polanyi asserted, “Consequently, there was never a time when the peace interest was unrepresented in the councils of the Concert of Europe.”¹⁸⁶ Their motivation was purely for economic gain. Peace was, in fact, an unintended consequence.

The logic behind this assessment is similar to that of the Liberal market peace theory. It is natural that businesses will lobby for peace because it is in their rational self-interest to leave the international economy undisturbed. Polanyi, however, offered a list of specific mechanisms that provided capital with the necessary power to ensure this peace in the nineteenth century. The gold standard limited fluctuations in budgets since loans and the renewal of loans hinged on good credit behavior. Finance had substantial power over smaller sovereign states because of loans and credit, allowing the City of London to make “its voice heard” in these smaller countries with a “timely pull of a thread in the international monetary network”.¹⁸⁷ Finance also provided de facto administration of semi-colonial regions in the Near East, North Africa, etc. Capital intensive projects such as railroads across the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, Persia, Egypt, Morocco, and China, were long-term enough that states considered the risks to their investments in time of crisis. Soon enemies’ banks were investing in each others’ markets. While it might be controversial to invest directly in a potential enemy’s domestic market, this was less of an issue in colonies, as evidenced, for example, in the case of Germany’s investments in Algeria and Morocco late in the century while assuming a hostile posture with the French. During this period legal frameworks were set up to safeguard loans and business during wartime. The Napoleonic wars were the last major examples of confiscation of private property in belligerent territory

¹⁸⁶ *ibid.* p. 14

¹⁸⁷ *ibid.* p. 14

(until the twentieth century), and, during the Crimean war, enemy merchants could come and go at port, maintaining international trade. Slowly, but surely, throughout the century the influence of transnational capital grew, making it the only other international organization with sufficient power to motivate nations toward maintaining the balance-of-power and peace. As Polanyi said, “Budgets and armaments, foreign trade and raw material supplies, national independence and sovereignty were now the function of currency and credit.”¹⁸⁸

Polanyi did cede that *haute finance* were anything but pacifists, noting that “they had made their fortune in the financing of wars; they were impervious to moral consideration; they had no objection to any number of minor, short, or localized wars.”¹⁸⁹ As we shall see below, there were plenty of these to be found. Industrial and agricultural capital interests also worked against international finance by encouraging aggressive action that would lead to increased armaments spending or mercantilist customs regulations. The road toward financially-instituted peace between Great Powers was not inevitable or easily won, but eventually became the invisible causal link that contained war within Continental Europe, in Polanyi’s view.

There are several historical points on which Polanyi’s analysis can be criticized, as will be discussed below. Yet, there is merit in his attention toward the novel factor of transnational capital and the international gold standard as an influence in decisions of war and peace in the nineteenth century. Indeed, on the bond market especially, where states gathered the loans necessary to fund wars, one can see the relationship that existed between political and economic events. Historian Niall Ferguson identified four political assumptions, based on the experience of the French Revolution of 1789-1815, felt by nineteenth century financiers themselves. 2 - 4 relate to war:

¹⁸⁸ *ibid.* p. 18

¹⁸⁹ *ibid.* p. 15

1. That a political move to the left, ranging from outright revolution to a change of ministry due to elections, would tend to loosen fiscal and monetary policy;
2. That a new and radical government would be more likely to pursue an aggressive foreign policy which might, in turn, lead to war;
3. That any war would disrupt trade and hence lower tax revenues for all governments;
4. That direct involvement in war would increase a state's expenditure as well as reducing its tax revenues, leading to substantial new borrowings.¹⁹⁰

These fears led to market crises during, for example, the Revolutions of 1848 and the outbreak of the Crimean War, demonstrating that investors priced bonds in response to political news as often as fiscal or monetary indicators (see Appendix A, Table A.1). Indeed, this was the perspective of particular financiers, like the members of the Rothschild family. During the threat of revolution in France in 1830, James de Rothschild said, "We have a holding of 900,000 rentes; if peace is preserved they will be worth 75 percent, while in case of war they will drop to 45 percent...I am convinced that if peace is maintained rentes will improve on three month by at least 10 percent."¹⁹¹ And to be sure, the Rothschilds and other major bond holders did have some access to the ears of state. The personal influence of these lenders, with the impersonal pressure of the bond market, certainly affected decisions of war and peace during the nineteenth century.

But, to what extent? After all, Polanyi's argument was that transnational finance was the *primary* cause of peace between Great Powers in this period. For his argument to work, two hypotheses would need to be verified. First, the influence of bond holders would need to be substantially different than previous eras. Since at least the fiscal crises that beset Habsburg

¹⁹⁰ op. cit. Ferguson 1999, p. 273

¹⁹¹ ibid. p. 275

Spain during the sixteenth and seventeenth century following multiple defaults and bankruptcies, states have taken note of their bond holders.¹⁹² Throughout the eighteenth century, the modern international bond and stock markets themselves *originated* because of the need to finance and pay back war debts.¹⁹³ However - even if we concede that the bond market took on a newer, more robust form in the nineteenth century as modern banks, trusts, and economists put their lot into the fluctuations of growing and more complex international markets – the necessary proof of Polanyi’s primacy argument must come by excluding other explanations for war and peace. This second hypothesis will be the focus of the discussion below.

¹⁹² *ibid.* p. 267; *op. cit.* Kennedy 1987, pp. 31-70

¹⁹³ That wars were the origin of state debt was well known by 1776 when Adam Smith wrote, “The want of parsimony in time of peace, imposes the necessity of contracting debt in time of war. When war comes, there is no money in the treasury but what is necessary for carrying on the ordinary expence of the peace establishment. In war an establishment of three or four times that expence becomes necessary for the defence of the state, and consequently a revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue. Supposing that the sovereign should have, what he scarce ever has, the immediate means of augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his expence, yet still the produce of the taxes, from which this increase of revenue must be drawn, will not begin to come into the treasury till perhaps ten or twelve months after they are imposed. But the moment in which war begins, or rather the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army must be augmented, the fleet must be fitted out, the garrisoned towns must be put into a posture of defence; that army, that fleet, those garrisoned towns must be furnished with arms, ammunition and provisions. An immediate and great expence must be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the gradual and slow returns of the new taxes. In this exigency government can have no other resource but in borrowing.” *op. cit.* Smith 2008, p. 458;

During the same period (1795), Kant indicated that the state’s ability to use credit was actually a cause of war, saying, “As an opposing machine in the antagonism of powers, a credit system which grows beyond sight and which is yet a safe debt for the present requirements--because all the creditors do not require payment at one time--constitutes a dangerous money power. This ingenious invention of a commercial people [England] in this century is dangerous because it is a war treasure which exceeds the treasures of all other states; it cannot be exhausted except by default of taxes (which is inevitable), though it can be long delayed by the stimulus to trade which occurs through the reaction of credit on industry and commerce. This facility in making war, together with the inclination to do so on the part of rulers--an inclination which seems inborn in human nature--is thus a great hindrance to perpetual peace.” *op. cit.* Kant 1939, Section I, Article 4.

3.2. Measuring War and Peace in the Nineteenth Century

Polanyi was not alone in seeing the nineteenth century as oddly peaceful. Especially in the years following World War I, the idea of a “Hundred Years’ Peace” was in the air. After all, those who could remember the *belle époque* of international peace that existed between 1870 and 1914 seemed justified in wanting a return to that way of life. Polanyi, however, provided very specific vectors that defined this period as a Hundred Years’ Peace, which we can use to assess the historical veracity of such an impression.

According to Polanyi, “apart from the Crimean War – a more or less colonial event - England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia were engaged in war among each other for altogether only eighteen months,” compared to an average of sixty to seventy years of major wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹⁹⁴ Indeed, in terms of average battle durations, battle deaths per year, and a host of other statistical criteria, nineteenth century Europe does not rate with either the eighteenth or the twentieth century versions of itself. Though Polanyi does not provide his data sources, the proportions of his facts seem to bear out according to his criteria. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Great Powers were involved in war 94% and 78% of the time, respectively, compared to 40% of the time in the nineteenth century (including the Napoleonic Wars of 1800-1815).¹⁹⁵ Table 3.1 below demonstrates these changes in proportion, while Figure 3.3 shows these proportions in three dimensions.

¹⁹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 5

¹⁹⁵ *op. cit.* Tilly 1990, p. 72; Tilly’s definition of Great Powers is slightly more inclusive than Polanyi’s, see Tilly, p. 170

If we focus on wars *between* Polanyi's 'Great Powers' - the Austro-Sardinian War, the Roman Republic War, The War of Italian Unification, The Seven Weeks War, and the Franco-Prussian War amounted to a total of 17.7 months, as seen in Table 3.2 below.


Table 3.1 - Wars Involving Great Powers

Century	Number of wars	Average duration of wars (years)	Proportion of years war underway (%)
16th	34	1.6	95
17th	29	1.7	94
18th	17	1.0	78
19th	20	0.4	40
20th^a	15	0.4	53

^a through 1975

Source: Tilly 1990, p. 72

Figure 3.3 – Magnitudes of Great Power War by Century, 1500-1975



Source: Tilly 1990, p. 73

Table 3.2 - Great Power Wars According to Polanyi's Criteria

War	Great Powers Involved	Years	Duration (months)
Austro-Sardinian War	Austria v. Italy	1848-49	4.7
Roman Republic War	France v. Austria	1849	1.8
War of Italian Unification	France, Italy v. Austria	1859	2.5
Seven Weeks War	Prussia, Italy v. Austria	1866	1.4
Franco-Prussian War	Prussia v. France	1870-71	7.3
Total^a			17.7

^a Total with Crimean War (+28.3 months) is 46.0.

Source: Singer and Small 1972

However, before accepting Polanyi's claim outright, his calculation needs to be examined further. For one, there is no reason why the Crimean War should be left out – it was not “a colonial event,” as Polanyi suggested, but was rather one of the century's most significant wars, involving Britain, France, and Turkey against Russia. The war dramatically shifted the balance-of-power as Austria-Hungary became isolated from the Holy Alliance;¹⁹⁶ Russia stalled its persistent incursion through the Caucasus and Black Sea in the hopes of seizing Constantinople;¹⁹⁷ while Britain preserved the Ottoman Empire and its communications network to India. As Winfried Baumgart suggested, “if the fighting had carried on during 1856, the First World War would then have taken place 60 years earlier.”¹⁹⁸ Adding this conflict's 28.3 months back into the calculation brings the ‘Great Power’ total to 46.0 months – nearly 4 years. This is still a long shot from previous centuries' 60 to 70 years of major wars.

But, Polanyi's six powers (England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia), while the greatest, were not the only European, or “Western” powers during this period as states declined out of, or entered into the core inter-state system. One could add the Ottoman Empire (Turkey), Holland, Spain, the United States, Japan, and China by the end of the period. Wars between these twelve powers would yield an additional 88.4 months of war between “Western” powers (See Table A.2). If one adds all of the wars that were not *between* these powers, but involved one or


¹⁹⁶ op. cit. Kissinger, p. 93-94. Though Austria was neutral throughout the Crimean War, her ultimate entry on the side of the Allies led to the cessation of hostilities. Russia no longer felt bound to the principles of the Holy Alliance after Austria's betrayal.

¹⁹⁷ A Avtorkhanov and M Broxup. *The North Caucasus Barrier : The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992. Russia engaged with the various empires and peoples of Central Asia throughout the century, in part, due to a fantastical idea of reaching India from the north. From 1825-1859 a major effort was directed toward the Caucasus mountain regions of Chechnia, Daghestan, and Georgia at the expense of the Ottoman, Persian, and Circassian Muslims. The transfer of Caucasus troops to the siege at Sevastapol effectively delayed this campaign in this region until the early twentieth century.

¹⁹⁸ W Baumgart, *The Crimean War : 1853-1856*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999. Baumgart's history of the Crimean War pointed out that the possession of the Crimea was never the issue, and the war was fought as far afield as the Baltic and White Seas and the Pacific Ocean. What was at stake was Russia's bid for suzerainty over Turkey, which was effectively stopped by the victors.

more of the powers against weaker states, like the newly independent Latin American¹⁹⁹ or Balkan states²⁰⁰ an additional 125.5 ‘nation-months’ of war can be accounted for (see Table A.3). Adding colonial wars by these powers against non-state actors yields an astonishing additional 784.1 months (see Table A.4). All of these figures combined amounts to approximately 87 years of war in which major powers were involved, as seen in Figure 3.4 below.

Figure 3.4 – Wars by Western Powers, 1815-1914



¹⁹⁹ M Centeno, *Blood and Debt : War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 2002. Miguel Centeno's analysis of Latin American conflict struggles to incorrectly characterize Latin America as a region void of significant inter-state war by dismissing the major conflicts: The War of the Triple Alliance (1864-70) and the War of the Pacific (1879-84). Nonetheless, historical attention to this region is admittedly poor. For a brief, yet relatively thorough synopses see J Black, *War and the World : Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1998.; J Black, *War in the Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914*, Polity, Cambridge, 2009

²⁰⁰ Black, *War in the Nineteenth Century : 1800-1914*, pp. 184-186. The First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-1913) were the best opportunities for contemporary military observers to see the effects of modern technology, including airplanes, before World War I. In fact, these wars between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Turkey could be considered the first battles of World War I in which a million troops were involved in trench and artillery-based warfare.

In this light, it is difficult to characterize states as peaceful during this period of time. They were involved in nearly constant preparation for, and execution of war at home or abroad. Even within Continental Europe, Kalevi Holsti determined that during the ninety-nine years after the Congress of Vienna there was only a 13% lower occurrence rate of war than the previous period - one war every 3.3 years compared to one every 2.8 years (see Table A.5).²⁰¹

Furthermore, Holsti's comparative data reflects the causes of war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, providing us with a window into the relative proportion of economic motivations in the execution of war (see Tables A.5 and A.6). According to Holsti's calculation, the most frequent war-generating issues in the nineteenth century were:

1. Maintaining integrity of state/empire – 55% of wars
2. Territory – 42% of wars
3. National liberation/state creation – 29% of wars
4. National unification/consolidation – 26% of wars
5. Protecting ethnic confreres – 16% of wars²⁰²

Several of these motivations were novel, either as agenda items at all, or in terms of relative significance. For example, 'national liberation/state creation', and 'maintaining the integrity of a state/empire' each went from being a part of 8% of all wars from 1715-1814, to being a part of 29% to 55% respectively. National unification and ethnic protection were not issues listed at all


²⁰¹ K Holsti, *Peace and War : Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, p. 142. Holsti's data set from 1648-1989 is different than Singer and Small 1972. In the nineteenth century, Holsti excluded some conflicts, like the Mexican-American War, which did not 'impact' the system of mutual relations, while adding other "major armed interventions" like the conflict over Belgian Independence from 1830-33, which did not fit the criteria of 1000 battle deaths in Singer and Small 1972. See Table A.5 for Holsti's complete list.

²⁰² *ibid.* p. 145; see Table A.6; note that multiple issues could be reasons in individual wars, so that percentages will not add up to 100%

in the preceding period. At the same time, the issues of the past became less important.

‘Territory’, for example, while still accounting for 42% of all wars had dropped from being a part of 67% of wars in the preceding period. The other two most important issues from 1715-1814 were ‘commerce/navigation’ and ‘dynastic succession claims.’ The comparative difference between these selected issues in each period can be seen in Figure 3.5 below.

Figure 3.5 – Key Issues in War, 1715 – 1914



Source: Holsti 1993, p. 145

In Table A.6, I have attempted to reduce the complexity of Holsti's list of war causes using Michael Mann's I.E.M.P. model, which identifies Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political sources of power.²⁰³ While all of these sources overlap, making it difficult to isolate a single primary cause in most of the 31 wars Holsti examined, the issues themselves could be defined in terms of their emphasis on economic, ideological or military power.²⁰⁴ For example, support for ethnic confrères would be more ideologically driven (I) than wars to secure strategic territory, which would be more important militarily (M).

As Fig. 3.5 demonstrates, the economically motivated (E) wars about commerce and navigation declined from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. This could be the indication of two possible scenarios in relation to Polanyi's and the Liberal market peace theses. The first confirms, while the second contradicts the thesis.

1. The increase in the scale and scope of the free market decreased the use of war as a means to resolve competition for resources and commerce, or
2. The major commerce and navigation issues were resolved in the eighteenth century, with Britain as the dominant naval power controlling sea lanes.

Indeed, there are many indications that the second proposition could have been the case. Holsti noted that, although the occurrence of war decreased by only 13%, "except for the three brief wars of German nation-building and Russia's armed interventions into Hungary and Poland at mid-century, the center of Europe running from London, through Paris, Berlin, and Vienna constituted a significant zone of peace."²⁰⁵ At sea, and in the core of the Western European state system, the unresolved territorial, dynastic, and navigational issues that plagued Europe through the eighteenth century seemed to have been settled by 1815, following the breakdown of

²⁰³ op. cit. Mann 1986; 1993

²⁰⁴ most issues and wars listed here could be considered political

²⁰⁵ ibid. p. 142

France's claim to hegemony.²⁰⁶ The largest remaining questions of this sort were in Central Europe, and were resolved by war as will be discussed below. Simply observing that peace existed does not tell us whether the peace that transpired in Central and Western Europe was due to market integration, or whether international trade was a byproduct that was allowed to take place due to the territorial security established by Continental balance-of-power and naval hegemony.

Paul Kennedy suggested that there were, in fact, three materialist causes for this pacification of the core. First was the growth of the integrated economy, as was explained by Polanyi and others. Second was the fact that Europeans focused their energy abroad against less developed peoples, as shown in Figure 3.4 above. Third, technology derived from the Industrial Revolution led to uncertainty and changes in the nature of power and war, itself. According to Kennedy, "Although it is difficult to generalize, the shifts in the Great Power balances caused by the uneven pattern of industrial and technological change probably affected the outcome of mid-nineteenth-century wars more than did finance and credit."²⁰⁷

Consider, for example, the expansion of railways and telegraph lines. On the one hand, railways were economically motivated, linking territories by land that were previously commercially isolated from one another. Railroads and telegraphs, however, increasingly assumed military significance throughout the century, as the case of the Franco-Prussian War and the U.S. Civil War showed especially. As early as 1859, the French were able to move

²⁰⁶ Within world-systems literature, hegemonic cycles have persisted throughout the modern era (1500 to present) as aspirants try to unseat the current hegemon. Hegemonic stability theory is also analyzed by International Relations scholars such as George Modelski, who has traced five hegemonic powers (Portugal, Netherlands, Britain (I), Britain (II) and the United States) and their corresponding failed aspirants (Spain, France (I), France (II), Germany, USSR). see op. cit. Goldstein 1988, p. 127. For an account of France's failed bid for hegemony see I Wallerstein, *The Modern World System, Vol. III : The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s*, Academic Press, San Diego, 1989, pp. 55-126

²⁰⁷ op. cit. Kennedy 1987, p. 144

50,000 men to Italy by rail during the War of Italian Unification to gain the upper hand against 60,000 Sardinians.²⁰⁸ By 1871, Prussian General Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke had developed a carefully planned strategy of rail movements, in which uniform length trains were run at uniform speed, linked and responsive to telegraph instructions.²⁰⁹ When Napoleon III rashly declared war with Prussia over an issue of Spanish succession, beginning on July 15, 1870, over 1,500 trains travelled to their destination in Alsace, turned around and went back for another load, until nineteen days later the field force of over 380,000 men and supplies was gathered while the French were still ferrying reservists from Algeria. Even during peacetime, Prussia used their railways as a military threat. As Michael Mann noted,

Railways resembled spiderwebs, each spun over a state's territories, with only a few threads connecting the national webs. This was deliberate. A Prussian line ran inside almost the whole length of the Saxon border, with many connections back into Prussia and only one into Saxony. Military and national economic considerations combined ...in war the Prussian army could flood over the Saxon border, as it did in 1866.²¹⁰

Additionally, the Prussia monarchy nationalized the railways, providing the state with 44 percent of its revenue, which was used to fund wars with autonomous discretion from the inconsequential Reichstag. Railroads led to three consequences in relation to war.

1. Railroads served dual purposes – providing economic and military advantages.
2. As the density of railway networks increased within the core of continental Europe, a type of check-mate scenario evolved due to the dramatic increase in the numbers of troops and armaments that could be mobilized for wars.
3. The few wars that were actually fought became relatively short.

²⁰⁸ op. cit. Black 2009, p. 67

²⁰⁹ ibid. p. 128; D Showalter, *The Wars of German Unification*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, pp. 247-249.

²¹⁰ op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 304

All three of these consequences are worth examining further. First, the dual military and economic benefit was not exclusive to railroads alone, but rather demonstrates the dramatic power generated by the Industrial Revolution for all realms of society. Steamships and telegraphs connected Britain to her 9.5 million square mile Empire. By 1880, there were 97,568 miles of telegraph cable across the oceans, allowing 900 British civil servants and 70,000 British soldiers to govern over 250 million Indians with direct contact with mainland Britain.²¹¹ This contact would prove decisive, for example, during the Sepoy War of 1857-59.²¹² Because Britain could quickly mobilize troops from its scattered regions in South Africa, Australia, India, and elsewhere, while also being able to wire money, they could be anywhere they wanted or needed to be in ‘all good speed.’²¹³ This amounted to a massive “compression of time and space,” to borrow David Harvey’s expression used to describe the postmodern condition of the late 1980s.²¹⁴ Whereas, in the late eighteenth century it took nine days to travel from Frankfurt to Berlin (302 miles), by 1872, Phileas Fogg could realistically travel the entire world (23,739 miles) in eighty days – nearly a nine-fold increase – to say nothing of how quickly he could send a telegram.²¹⁵ The massive increase in the speed of travel and communications made the world a

²¹¹ N Ferguson, *Empire : The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, Basic Books, New York, 2003, pp. 164-171

²¹² The Sepoy War was the result of a mutiny in the Indian Army over a rumor that rifle cartridges were made using animal fat. see V G Kiernan, *From Conquest to Collapse : European Empires from 1815 to 1960* 1st American edn., Pantheon Books, New York, 1982, pp. 47-50.

²¹³ A particularly good example was the 1866 rescue of several British subjects from Emperor Theodore (Tewodros) of Abyssinia, whose castle was 400 miles off the Ethiopian coast upon a mountain. Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier set sail from Bombay with 13,000 British and Indian soldiers, 26,000 camp followers, 13,000 mules, ponies, and sheep, 7,000 camels, 7,000 bullocks, 1,000 donkeys, 44 elephants, as well as a prefabricated harbor and railway system. The British defeated the Emperor in three days with no British casualties. op. cit. Ferguson 2000, p. 176-179

²¹⁴ D Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity : An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1989.

²¹⁵ D Blackbourn, *History of Germany, 1780-1918 : The Long Nineteenth Century* 2nd edn., Blackwell Pub., Malden, MA, 2003, pp. 7-8; op. cit. E Hobsbawm 1996, p.52; Phileas Fogg was the fictional hero of Jules Verne’s *Around the World in 80 Days*. The trip had been achieved by travelers prior to Verne’s writing, and was a trip offered by U.S. travel agents around 1870.

smaller place.²¹⁶ The territorial ambitions of states were no longer limited by the distance a soldier could march in a day with necessary supplies (approx. 10-15 miles).²¹⁷ European colonial powers began fighting upon the far flung continents of Asia, Africa, and Australia, perhaps, because of “the need of the world-economy to expand its boundaries,” as Immanuel Wallerstein has suggested.²¹⁸ However, as crises like the Fashoda Incident of 1898 in the middle of desert Africa highlights, the Great Powers fought in previously inaccessible parts of the world because they could.²¹⁹

However, Wallerstein was right to point out the internal pressures of the capitalist system that stimulated the expansion and extension of that system abroad. These pressures, such as unprecedented demographic growth, urbanization, and proletarianization developed as the Industrial Revolution changed the European landscape.²²⁰ This relates to the second point listed above concerning railroads’ impact of military considerations. The density of the railway network within Europe itself changed the military potentials of war, particularly in regard to the size and speed of mobilization. Great Powers like France and Austria could no longer count on

²¹⁶ This increase in communications was itself partially derived from war, especially following the Napoleonic period. see M McLuhan, *War and Peace in the Global Village*, HardWired, San Francisco, CA, 1997.

²¹⁷ M Van Creveld, *Supplying War : Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* 2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2004. Michael Mann considered logistics to be one of the determinates of the scale of authoritative power. For example, the fact that armies could not travel quickly in pre-modern civilizations necessitated that they be organized federally, even within empires. op. cit. Mann 1986, pp. 9-10

²¹⁸ op. cit. Wallerstein, 1989, p. 129. This need “was itself the outcome of pressure internal to the world economy” – a view that should not be discounted.

²¹⁹ The Fashoda Incident did not result in war, but was, instead, resolved as a diplomatic victory for Britain. Fashoda was the intersection point between Britain’s goal of claiming a straight line from Cape Town to Cairo and the French goal of a West-East line from Dakar to the Red Sea. A French expeditionary force travelled for 14-months to secure Fashoda only to find an Anglo-Egyptian army that had recently finished defeating the Mahdi at the Battle of Omdurman in present day Sudan. The resolution of the crisis is often considered the end of the “Scramble for Africa.” A Moorehead, *The White Nile*, Vintage Books, New York, 1983.

For the argument that technology provided the “means” of European imperialism, that proceeded along three phases of imperialism (penetration, conquest, and consolidation) see D Headrick, *The Tools of Empire : Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981.

²²⁰ L Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects*, Harcourt, New York, 1989, pp. 410-481

the numerous buffer states of the German Confederation or the Northern Italian region providing breathing space should conflict arise. With the exception of Russia beyond her Polish territories and Britain secured behind her wall of ships, states with connected railroad networks became neighbors. With this in mind, Eric Hobsbawm's figures related to railroad building take on remarkable significance (See Tables A.7 and A.8). Where railroads became densely situated in the core of the European system, the size of armies necessary to compete was substantially increased. Whereas in the Napoleonic Wars, there was only one battle (Leipzig [1813]) in which more than 300,000 men were involved, by 1860, these numbers were par for the course (as in the battles at Sadowa [1866], Gravelotte[1870], and Sedan [1870]).²²¹ Though the French Republic accomplished the historically unprecedented achievement of a standing army of over one million men through the *Levée en masse* begun in 1793, only forty years later saw 2.5 million men mobilized in the U.S. Civil War out of a population of 33 million, and 1.7 million in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.²²² The introduction of machine guns, breech-loading rifles, artillery and trenches further increased the number of infantry required to pitch battle. In the battle of Mukden in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, 624,000 men engaged before each side lost nearly a third of their forces to machine gun fire.²²³ The persistent progress of technology throughout the century led to the evolution of mass warfare that characterized the twentieth century. This form did not emerge autopoetically in the First World War, but was, rather, tentatively engaged in during the various wars that did happen over the course of the Hundred Years' Peace.

The industrialization of war that occurred throughout the nineteenth century led to relatively short conflicts that were resolved quickly and decisively, as indicated in the third

²²¹ op. cit. Hobsbawm 1996, p. 79

²²² ibid., p. 79

²²³ G Jukes, *The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905*, Osprey, Oxford, 2002, pp. 66-68

consequence attributed to railroads above. The Wars of German Unification (The Second Schleswig War [1864], The Austro-Prussian War [1866], and the Franco-Prussian War [1870]) stand as the best examples of this trend.²²⁴ On the one hand, wars in the mid-century were still based upon the principles of eighteenth century diplomacy. They were about specific issues that were intended to be settled decisively on the battlefield without involving civilians or risking the stability of the domestic societies of belligerents. This was apparent in the Austrian Habsburg's decision to end the war in 1866 as soon as it was clear that the Prussian's substantially greater mobilized force would win, providing the war with the moniker the "Seven Weeks War." The significance of this chess move, however, cannot be adequately summed up in the duration of the conflict. The terms of the treaty ended the hopes of the numerous other German states who lined up behind the Austrians (Hanover, Bavaria, Baden, Saxony, Württemberg, Hesse Electoral, Hesse Grand Ducal, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin) for a *Grossdeutsch* solution to the German question. Instead, Catholic Austria was eliminated from Bismarck's plan to extend the Zollverein customs union to political unification of the German Empire under a Prussian banner. All that was needed was to unite the independent German militaries according to the terms of the pact against a non-German foe. Napoleon III's declaration of war provided this opportunity, and in 1871 at a conquered Versailles, Bismarck established the unified German Reich.²²⁵ The goal of a unified German state in Central Europe had evaded statesmen since at least Ferdinand II's last attempt to consolidate the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).²²⁶ To suggest that these wars amounted to peace simply because, in sum, they only took a few months clouds the overwhelming importance of the motivations behind the wars and the consequences of their

²²⁴ op. cit. Showalter

²²⁵ G Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War : The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK ; New York, 2003.

²²⁶ C V Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War*, P. Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1969.

resolution. Not only did the Wars of German Unification resolve the German question, but they allowed the maneuverability necessary for Mazzini to unify Italy under King Victor Emmanuel II of Piedmont. That these wars would have taken several months in the eighteenth century should not be the conditions by which we measure nineteenth century war and peace. Equating wars with duration or even battle deaths minimizes these wars' impact of geopolitics and society.

Additionally, suggesting that these short industrial wars amounted to a period of peace shifts our attention away from the profound ways warmaking still impacted society. Consider, for example, the dramatic increase in arms, battleships, and armies during the long peace. Conscription, which had begun in Revolutionary France, was instituted in Prussia, Austria, and Russia early in the century. Though conscription was initially very unpopular, by the end of the century, serving two or three years in active service followed by reserve duty became a taken for granted experience in many young men's lives.²²⁷ Ute Frevert described the manner in which Prussian enlisted men in either the *Landwehr* (militia army), or the regular army, were conditioned by the army as a "total institution."²²⁸ Individual identities were broken down in order to become incorporated into life in the barracks, through a process of *trimming*, *programming*, *stripping*, and *leveling*.²²⁹ By 1910, as much as 20 percent of adult males in most countries had been disciplined in this manner.²³⁰ The gray uniformed soldiers of World War I had truly become a mass army through conscription and "provided the human fodder for total war," as Anthony Giddens has said.²³¹ Recall that Napoleon's army of 1.3 million men was historically unprecedented, with the hypothetical exception of the Chinese military during the

²²⁷ U Frevert, *A Nation in Barracks : Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society*, Berg, Oxford ; New York, 2004; op. cit. Black 2009, pp. 187-196

²²⁸ see E Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*, Aldine Pub. Co., Chicago, 1962 for the original sociological analysis of "total institutions."

²²⁹ op. cit. Frevert, p. 182

²³⁰ op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 430; Since one of the side benefits of army service was easy access to growing number of civil service jobs, a segmented caste of reservists, veterans, and civil servants grew to collectively associate themselves directly with the state. The consequences of this indoctrination in terms of nationalism will be important to our discussion of ideology below.

²³¹ op. cit. Giddens, 1985, p. 230

Ming Dynasty.²³² The large battles that followed this precedent in the nineteenth century were made possible due to the amount of enlisted populations ready to go to war, as seen in Table 3.3 below. Even accounting for substantial population growth, the percentage of active military personnel in these societies were high. In 1900, Austria's army represented 6.9%, France's 8.8%, Britain's, 6.6%, and Germany's 6.3% of the male population aged 20-44 years.²³³ These mass armies, developed and trained during peacetime, provided statesmen with tremendous diplomatic bargaining power with which the stalemate of Europe was precariously maintained.

Table 3.3 – Armies (in 000s)

	1879		1913	
	Peacetime	Mobilized	Peacetime	Mobilized
Great Britain (India)	136 200	600 -	160 249	700
Austria-Hungary	267	772	800	3,000
France	503	1,000	1,200	3,500
Germany	419	1,300	2,200	3,800
Russia	766	1,213	1,400	4,400

Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 351

²³² W H McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power : Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982, pp. 24-62

²³³ op. cit. Tilly 1990, p. 123

Advances in arms technologies further increased the capabilities of states to execute lethal violence. This can be seen by considering the hegemony maintained by Britain, who had one of the lower numbers of soldiers above, but was the dominant naval power throughout the century. Though Britain had succeeded at eliminating her French rival at sea during the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805,²³⁴ her lead in the Industrial Revolution was the true key to commanding the seas during the nineteenth century. Navies depended on sophisticated infrastructures of bases and supply systems. Britain's advantage lay in its capacity to build and maintain more ships of different kinds due to technological leads in metallurgy and hydrodynamics.²³⁵ These advantages, and indeed Britain's industrial capacity generally, were themselves products of the Napoleonic wars. During the wars, the government provided massive capital expenditures in ironworks, establishing the foundry base upon which the nineteenth century railroad and factory networks were built. As William McNeill said, "The men who built the new coke-fired blast furnaces in previously desolate regions of Wales and Scotland would probably not have undertaken such risky and expensive investments without an assured market for cannon. At any rate, their initial markets were largely military."²³⁶

By keeping alive the image of British sea power through the occasional execution of "gunboat" diplomacy in Algeria in 1824 or Navarino Bay in 1827, the British were able to establish a convoy system that increased their share of the world mercantile shipping. The Royal Navy, in turn, was able to draw upon the trained manpower of substantial merchant marine. This allowed the image of Pax Britannica to thrive even as its actual naval capabilities declined until France restarted fleet construction in the late 1820s rekindling a competitive incentive.

²³⁴ R Adkins, *Nelson's Trafalgar : The Battle That Changed the World*, Viking, New York, 2005

²³⁵ op. cit. Black 2009, p. 71

²³⁶ op. cit. McNeill 1982, p. 211

Steamships gradually replaced sail ships throughout the period, but both were used together until the 1890s when wooden ships were finally considered obsolete. As steam developed, so did long range artillery and armor plate on board. Inventions, like exploding shells instead of solid shot, were useful in naval bombardment and were soon incorporated on land in breech-loading artillery. The mid-century witnessed a brief age of “ironclads,” beginning in the American Civil War and climaxing at Lissa in 1866 during the Austro-Prussian war where seven Austrian ironclads went up against twelve Italian steamships. During the Ironclad race between Britain and France during 1859-65, the innovations of gun turrets and self-propelled torpedoes were introduced. Torpedo boats and fast moving cruisers soon became the lot in which the so-called *jeune école* of French naval theorists cast their hopes of *revanche*.²³⁷ In 1881 the French Chamber of Deputies ordered seventy torpedo ships and cancelled armored warship construction. Five years later, they ordered fourteen cruisers and an additional one hundred torpedo boats. This action stimulated the British to move away from their Nelsonian strategy of big guns on big boats firing from far away toward dreadnaught battleships and destroyers. Eventually, the British dropped their convoy system altogether and focused instead on being able to deliver overwhelming force anywhere in the world on short notice. Around the same period, German industrialists pressured the Kaiser to begin what would be termed the Great Naval Race between Britain and Germany on the North Sea.²³⁸ By the end of the century, most of the Great Powers were focusing their energy on building bigger, better ships, as quickly as possible, as can be seen in the dramatic jump between 1900 and 1914 (see Table 3.4 below).

²³⁷ op. cit. McNeill 1982, pp. 263-264

²³⁸ J Rüger, *The Great Naval Game : Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York, 2007. The Great Naval Game included nationalist spectacles in which miniature versions of warships would engage in staged battles in public bodies of water, in a type of industrial gladiator match.

Table 3.4 - Navies (In Number of Battleships)

	1900	1914
Great Britain	49	64
Germany	14	40
France	23	28
Austria-Hungary	6	16
Russia	16	23

Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 351

Though the nineteenth century could be considered a “naval” century, similar advances occurred in land-based military technology as well. In logistics, we have already drawn attention to railroads and telegraphs mid-century, but these had their origins in Napoleon’s use of semaphore and the flexible use of divisional corps to deliver overwhelming and coordinated force before his opponents could congregate.²³⁹ The semaphore system allowed messages to travel 150 miles per hour in clear weather, and Napoleon’s mobile cartographic unit, the *Bureau Topographique*, was the first general staff in history.²⁴⁰ Military academies, including with the *École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr* in 1802, were established to expand the technical

²³⁹ op. cit. Black 2009, pp. 5-26; op. cit. Van Creveld pp. 40-74; P Johnson, *Napoleon*, Viking, New York, 2002.

²⁴⁰ op. cit. Johnson, p. 28-29

capabilities of soldiers. Initially education was only required of artillerymen, who needed special engineering skills, but the mathematically-minded Napoleon encouraged further technical knowledge within the ranks. As military theorists like Antoine-Henri Jomini codified the principles of Napoleonic warfare, which emphasized flexible corps and sharp, direct attack, the armies of Europe became academically imitated and uniform.

Chemical and mechanical innovations were developed, such as mercury fulminates which allowed an all-weather ignition system - providing reliable rifles when combined with mass-produced metal percussion caps. For much of the early nineteenth century arms manufacturing proceeded at a slow pace. However, as inventors produced thousands of patents for exotic and new arms technologies to kill the enemy better, stronger, and faster, states began restructuring their procurement systems to manufacture new weapons with unprecedented speeds. For example, Prussia's effort to convert their muzzle-loading rifles to breech-loaders in 1840 would have taken 30 years to complete at a rate of 10,000 per annum using existing production facilities. Diktats from military advisors demanding changes in production capabilities resulted in increases up to 22,000 per annum by 1863.²⁴¹ In the United States, mass-produced firearm factories and metallurgy forges were built in New England in coordination with the Army Ordnance Department and were among the first industrial operations to employ F.W. Taylor's scientific management techniques.²⁴² By the 1880s this development in ships, artillery, rifles, and shells was being accomplished by what William McNeill termed, a "Command Technology" system, which was essentially a military-industrial-complex eighty years before Dwight

²⁴¹ op. cit. McNeill 1982, p 236

²⁴² M R Smith, *Military Enterprise and Technological Change : Perspectives on the American Experience*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985, pp. 1-116

Eisenhower coined the term.²⁴³ McNeill described the gray public/private distinction within this command complex:

Fast acting feedback loops thus arose whereby financial and managerial decisions in the Admiralty meshed into financial and managerial decisions made within what were still ostensibly private firms. Public and private policy became irremediably intertwined...Marxist or quasi-Marxist historians since the 1950s assert that the dominating element in this mix was the private one...This seems a distorted vision of human motivation and behavior...Market and pecuniary considerations were not firmly subordinated to political command before 1914; but then, political and military decisions were not subordinated to profit maximizing by private manufacturers either.²⁴⁴

Industrialists like Alfred Krupp, William Armstrong, and Hiram Maxim made fortunes through war profiteering; however, military officials were equally motivated to produce the most effective weapons in order to earn staff promotions. The arms industry attracted the best technical minds because the most advanced industrial research was being done among the drydocks and foundries connected to warmaking.

The mutually reinforcing dynamic between private and military industry led to dramatic technical innovation throughout the century, as can be seen in Table A.9. This remarkable chronology demonstrates the dramatic acceleration of technical innovation that developed late in the century, as game-changing inventions were arriving annually until World War I. Indeed, in Kenneth Macksey's *Encyclopedia of Weapons and Military Technology*, from which the table was derived, the nineteenth century's military innovations take up the space of 5 pages, while the twentieth century, including both World Wars and the Cold War, only take up 2.5 pgs. All preceding history dating back to 4,000 B.C. and the invention of wheel occupies only 4.5

²⁴³ op. cit. McNeill 1982, pp. 278-85; E Jarecki, *The American Way of War*, Free Press, New York, 2008.

²⁴⁴ ibid. pp. 293-294

pages.²⁴⁵ While the table does not indicate whether a technology had military or civilian origins, the dual purposes of inventions like the telephone or pneumatic tires indicates the advantages militaries derived from consumer industrial developments, as well as military “spin-off” technology – an effect that is often associated with the Cold War nuclear and space races which led to the internet, robotics, LED lights, etc.²⁴⁶ Many products that are today taken for granted were inspired for military purposes. Napoleon III, for example, offered a reward for a cheap process of making steel capable of withstanding the explosive force of the new shells.²⁴⁷ The Bessemer process was the immediate answer, which has since allowed the construction of skyscrapers, high tension cables, and other industrial creations made possible by cheap steel. Napoleon III’s incentive strategy also led to the creation of margarine when a substitute for butter for the armed services was called for.

At this point, Anthony Giddens distinction between “capitalism” and “industrialism” is worth considering. In *The Nation-State and Violence*, Giddens wrote,

In European history, the development of capitalism antedates that of industrialism, and by a considerable period of time. The former was also the necessary condition for the emergence of the latter. But capitalism and industrialism have their own distinctive features. They cannot be conceptually collapsed into one another and empirically they can exist in some substantial separation.²⁴⁸

Giddens considered capitalism similarly to Marx and Weber in that it involves particular social, class, and monetary relations and is engineered toward the pursuit of profit. However, according to Giddens, industrialism is a relatively neutral organization of mechanical and technological processes and only takes on the particular form associated with Marxian analyses as ‘industrial

²⁴⁵ K Macksey, *The Penguin Encyclopedia of Weapons and Military Technology : From Prehistory to the Present Day* 1st edn., Viking, London ; New York, 1993, pp. xi-xxi


²⁴⁶ J K Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1978; H L Nieburg., *In the Name of Science*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago,, 1966.

²⁴⁷ op. cit. Mumford 1963, p. 91

²⁴⁸ op. cit. Giddens 1985, p. 123

capitalist society.’²⁴⁹ In the realm of military production this distinction can be seen most dramatically. The merging of industry, technology, and the means of waging war has been one of the most important features of the processes of industrialization as a whole.²⁵⁰ While capitalist profits were drawn by armaments firms, the state’s interest in weapons and technology was independently motivated.

Figure 3.6 – Military Expenditure by the Great Powers^a, 1880-1914



^a Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, and France

Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 350

²⁴⁹ As Theodor Adorno declared in 1968, this is the “fundamental question of our present society.” Whereas industrial society sociologists like Ralf Dahrendorf and Talcott Parsons might suggest that capitalism was a passing phase on the way toward modern industrial society, Marxists such as Adorno would suggest that capitalist *relations of production* exist contradictorily between owners and workers, while the *forces of production*, i.e. industrial production methods, are as much a part of the present mode of production. T Adorno, 'Late Capitalism or Industrial Society? - the Fundamental Question of the Present Structure of Society', in Rolf Tiedeman (ed.), *Can One Live after Auschwitz? : A Philosophical Reader*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003).

²⁵⁰ op. cit. Giddens 1985, p. 3

And yet, the technological innovation that took place during the nineteenth century could not have occurred without the material support of states. Figure 3.6 above represents the total military expenditures of the Great Powers during the most accelerated period of arms production. In absolute terms, states' investment in war grew throughout the century. Table A.10 provides figures that reflect the relative percentages of military and civilian expenditure from 1800-1910. One can see that midway through the century spending on non-military services began rising as a relative percentage in most states. The introduction of social welfare programs certainly account for some of this increase. Charles Tilly suggested that welfare and other civilian demands were a delayed reaction to extraction by states for war purposes that had been on the rise since the eighteenth century. The initial state functions of statemaking, warmaking, and protection, paid for via extraction of resources and manpower from subject population led to new state responsibilities: adjudication, distribution, and production.²⁵¹ Tilly wrote,

European states began to monitor industrial conflict and working conditions, install and regulate national systems of education, organize aid to the poor and disabled, build and maintain communication lines, impose tariffs for the benefit of home industries, and the thousand other activities Europeans now take for granted as attributes of state power. The state's sphere expanded far beyond its military core, and its citizens began to make claims on it for a very wide range of protection, adjudication, production, and distribution...Direct rule and mass national politics grew up together, and reinforced each other mightily.²⁵²

However, Tilly's perspective treats the civilian activities of the states as being a function of their ultimate and primary goal: making war. This is in line with his well known quotation, "wars made states and states made war."²⁵³ Indeed, as several sociologists, from Perry Anderson to Anthony Giddens have pointed out, one of the earliest jobs of states in the modern period was to

²⁵¹ Tilly suggested that the first three functions of the state (statemaking, warmaking, and protection) most resemble the institution of organized crime than anything else. C Tilly, 'War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York, 1985), p. 390.

²⁵² op. cit. Tilly 1990, p. 115

²⁵³ op. cit. Tilly 1975, p. 42

make war.²⁵⁴ In large part, this was the only job of monarchs up until the beginning of our period.²⁵⁵ However, as Immanuel Wallerstein said,

If we compare the real power (ability to get decisions actually carried out) of Louis XIV of France (who reigned 1661-1715), usually taken as the arch-symbol of absolute power, with say the prime minister of Sweden in the year 2000, we will see that the latter had more real power in Sweden in 2000 than Louis in France in 1715.²⁵⁶

It was only during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that states were able to make a shift toward direct rule of their internal populations. If we recall our initial definition of modernity itself, according to Mark Raeff, it “was society's conscious desire to maximize all its resources and to use this new potential dynamically for the enlargement and improvement of its way of life.”²⁵⁷ Through the influences of liberal reformers, physiocrats and social engineers like Saint-Simon in France and Stein and Hardenberg in Prussia, states began trying to harness the energy of its population toward the increase of power, including both military and economic power.²⁵⁸

Michel Foucault termed this state interest, “governmentality,” which was fundamentally new compared to the earlier Cameralist model of ideal government. Antecedent to the administrative state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Foucault identified

A state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, and, for sure, the territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of its component. This state of government, which essentially bears on the population and calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument, would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ P Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, N.L.B., London, 1974; op. cit. Giddens 1985.

²⁵⁵ see Mann 1986, pp. 450-497

²⁵⁶ I Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004, p. 43

²⁵⁷ op. cit. Raeff, pp. 1222

²⁵⁸ C Clark, *Iron Kingdom : The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006 pp. 312-344

²⁵⁹ M Foucault, M Senellart, and A Davidson., *Security, Territory, Population : Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-1978*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, 2007, p. 109-110

Indeed, Foucault inverted Clausewitz's famous dictum, "War is politics by other means," into "Politics is war by other means."²⁶⁰ In Clausewitz, Foucault saw a theory of strategy that applied not just to war, but to any ends that are achieved via strategies of power.²⁶¹ Accessing the natural forces of the population, such as the rational self-interest of Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand," required knowledge of subject populations. For this reason, the nineteenth century was the Golden Age of statistics, and states used their knowledge of society to control and maximize the activities of their domestic populations toward the increase of state power.

This could also explain the decline in "Territory" as a cause of war, as states dedicated their energies internally toward their existing populations. Prussia, for example, integrated vast territories throughout the period through dynastic, military, and diplomatic victories. The partitions of Poland were among the first territories requiring new means of directing the population toward the interests of the Prussian state.²⁶² Similar mechanisms, often involving compromises with local elites, were required most notably in the German Rhineland, which was the most advanced industrial region in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.²⁶³ While this interest in domestic populations may have been initially motivated by states' ability to go to war, as Tilly suggested, by the mid-century the functions assumed by states were numerous and had developed a life of their own through a increasingly autonomous bureaucracy.

²⁶⁰ J Reid, 'Foucault on Clausewitz: Conceptualizing the Relationship between War and Power', *Alternatives*, vol. 28, issue 1, Jan-Feb 2003, 1-28.

²⁶¹ Critical theorists, like Max Horkheimer or Jürgen Habermas would term this "instrumental reason." Derived from Weber's concept of rationality, instrumental reason refers to the growth in mathematization in all scientific practice and the extension of scientific rationality to the conduct of life itself. This secularization of life leads to a growth of means-end rationality. D Held, *Introduction to Critical Theory : Horkheimer to Habermas*, Hutchinson, London, 1980, p. 65; J Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols., Beacon Press, Boston, 1984; M Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, Continuum,, New York, 2004.

²⁶² op. cit. Clark, 58-60;

²⁶³ M Rowe, *From Reich to State : The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780-1830*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York, 2003;

Michael Mann's theory of the state identified several functional crystallizations within the modern state which rose to prominence during the period of 1760-1914. Mann saw state crystallizations as being polymorphous, in that they did not need to establish "ultimate" primacy. So states could be "Capitalist" in addition to being "Protestant." Furthermore, among the five states, Austria, Prussia, Britain, France, and the United States, there were many roads to nationhood which resulted in multiple variations in form according to which functions were emphasized. Mann's identification of state functions is not the same as pursuing a "functionalist" analysis, as I have criticized Marxist and Realist perspectives for engaging in above. Rather, Mann has pointed to specific decisions in which states identified and pursued goals, eventually institutionalizing those that were effective and desirable in specific configurations.

Mann's theory of the state differed from Marxist, Realist, and Pluralist theories which conceive of the state as a "place," an "actor," and again as a "place" respectively. As mentioned above, Mann considered the proper definition of the state to be an "active place." His definition can be summarized in four points:

1. The state is territorially centralized. It does not wield I.E.M. (Ideological, Economic, Military power), but must draw on these resources which are *outside* it. It does, however, have binding powers over a territory.
2. The state contains two dualities. It is a place and persons and center and territory. It is simultaneously 'statist' (vested in elites and institutions at the center), and it is composed of 'party relations' between center and across territories.
3. State institutions are differentiated, and undertake different functions for different interest groups. Unity or even consistency are not necessary, and do not tend to occur because of overlapping, intersecting power networks.
4. States are in relationships with other states.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁴ op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 56

Because states are the territorial space and population within borders *as well as* the actors that occupy the elite positions, the third component of Mann's definition allows us to look at the various state functions in the correct light. The state develops functions, maintained by institutions and bureaucratic civil servants, based on the needs of elites and constituents. States may allocate priorities according to four state mechanisms: legal codes and constitutions, budgets, party-democratic majorities, or monocratic bureaucracies. These may, indeed, satisfy economic functions by reproducing the capitalist mode of production.²⁶⁵ However, these may also lead to geopolitical or military interests that run counter to the segmental interests of capital – as in the case of Prussian industrialists encouraging naval production despite the increased risk to financial capital posed by a provoked Great Britain. This head-on conflict, which many (including Mann himself) have argued led to the outbreak of the First World War, is the result of functional crystallizations that are systemic and limiting. Not all crystallizations are systemic in this way, however. For example, moral-ideological crystallizations between secular, Catholic, and Protestant religion may conflict with class crystallizations, but not systemically, and therefore do not produce a head-on dialectic. For this reason, multiple crystallizations developed and existed simultaneously in nineteenth century states. Identifying absolute primacy in regard to economic modes of production may be analytically helpful for certain questions, but can also lead to neglect of other crystallizations that were often equally important. No crystallization existed purely without interacting with the other state functions. These interactions produced emergent unanticipated consequences.

²⁶⁵ see K Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/index.htm>>, accessed 11-23-09 2009; N Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, NLB; Sheed and Ward, London,, 1973.

Mann identified six higher-level crystallizations that most Western states came down on in one manner or another in the period between 1760 and 1914.

1. *Capitalist* – States became capitalist by the end of the period, but only through dialectical struggle between classes. States established private property rights that allowed capital accumulation and industrialization.
2. *Ideological-moral* – These crystallizations concern the official religious denomination of the state, or freedom of religion, as well as moral obligations of the state in terms of social welfare and humanitarian assistance.
3. *Militarist* – Though military budgets diminished as a percentage of state expenditures, geopolitical and domestic needs for the deployment of violence led to different configurations of civil-military relations and military postures.
4. *Representative* – States varied on the issue of who was represented in the decision-making processes of the state, falling between the two poles of party-democracy and autocracy.
5. *National* – States needed to determine who was a member of the state, in terms of ethnic background, religious affiliation, and language. Furthermore, states coordinated with their broader territories either as a centralized nation-state, or as a confederal regime.
6. *Patriarchal* – As in the capitalist crystallization, all of the states Mann considered ended up as patriarchies, establishing repressive gender and sexual roles that were not substantially addressed critically until the twentieth century.²⁶⁶

Mann pointed out that, if a state failed to modernize in terms of the four most important crystallizations - capitalist, militarist, representative, and national - that state did not survive.

This Darwinian determination resembles Tilly's conclusion regarding why the national state became the dominant governmental form in the modern era, when other forms, such as the ecclesiastical state, multi-ethnic empire, or city-state, were equally valid in 990 C.E. Tilly wrote,

Over the last three centuries, compacts of powerful states have increasingly narrowed the limits within which any national struggle for power occurred... That narrowing restricted the alternative paths of state formation. Throughout the world, state formation converged on the more or less deliberate construction of

²⁶⁶ op. cit. Mann 1993, pp. 81-88

national states...according to models offered, subsidized, and enforced by the great powers.²⁶⁷

Tilly saw this as the consequence of competing state strategies that employed varying proportions of capital, coercion or both. Certain states, such as Venice and Holland were able to use their financial resources to hire mercenary forces to defend and expand their domains. Other states, like Brandenburg-Prussia or Poland had more coercive trajectories and drew power through warlords and direct extraction in kind. Between these two lay the capitalist-coercive trajectory, as exemplified by France, Britain, and Imperial Germany. These states were able to take advantage of a monetized economy, which made extraction via taxation easy, while also developing substantial standing militaries and navies to compete for territory and resources.²⁶⁸ Ultimately the states that combined both capital and coercion became the most powerful states and forced other states into their model of “national states.” The trajectory of these various strategies can be seen in Figure 3.7.

In terms of state coercion, Jeremy Black outlined the three main functions of the military in the nineteenth century: international, domestic and colonial.²⁶⁹ The weaponry, organizational systems, logistics and communications employed were similar, but in the case of domestic conflict the fighting took place in urban environments, quite different from the traditional open field battles of previous eras. Because military history has traditionally focused on symmetrical warfare between nations, the period between 1815 and 1849, which primarily saw military action of the domestic sort, has been largely ignored.²⁷⁰ By the years following 1848, the technology of


²⁶⁷ op. cit. Tilly 1990, p. 182

²⁶⁸ There are some indications that any society that develops either a standing army or a mercenary force locally bivouacked in and around a city or state increases the amount of money in circulation as soldiers spend the sovereign currency in the local market. These conditions arose in China during the twelfth and thirteenth century, as they would in the Italian city-states during the Renaissance period. However, the presence of capital, which requires a monetized and commodified economy, provided the best opportunity for militant states to develop, since capitalists could provide credit and could be taxed more easily. op. cit. McNeill 1982; E Schoenberger., 'The Origins of the Market Economy: State Power, Territorial Control, and Modes of War Fighting', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 50, issue 3, Jul 2008, 663-91.

²⁶⁹ op. cit. Black 2009, p. 204

²⁷⁰ The use of traditional militaries persisted outside the realm of typically recognized Great Powers in the Mexican-American War of 1846-48 and the brutal Spanish Carlist Wars of 1832-47. *ibid.* pp. 27-59; J Eisenhower, *So Far from God : The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848*, Random House, New York, 1989.

Figure 3.7 – Relative Concentration of Capital and Coercion as Determinants of States' Paths of Growth.



Source: Tilly 1990, p. 133

social control became refined to the point where actual violence was rarely necessary. This was not, however, an “externalization” of conflict toward the geopolitical realm due to the increased effectiveness of surveillance, as Giddens and Foucault have argued.²⁷¹ Rather, as Michael Mann indicated, the symbolic use of the military persisted everywhere except Britain, whose night-watchman state was the exceptional case social theorists based the norm off of.²⁷² Throughout the century, the military was gradually supplemented by distinct police and paramilitary forces in domestic situations. The army was only called up when the situation extended beyond the control of these two forces. Repressive militarism proceeded along three stages – first, by establishing a “presence,” then engaging in a “show” of force, and only rarely through actual

²⁷¹ op. cit. Giddens 1985; M Foucault, *Discipline and Punish : The Birth of the Prison* 2nd Vintage Books edn., Vintage Books, New York, 1995.

²⁷² op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 410

violence.²⁷³ Success in this regard was supplemented by the state's monopolization of coercive force through the disarming of populations, while advanced technological weaponry, like machine guns and cannon, made resistance futile.²⁷⁴

The case of Britain's early ability to stifle domestic violence is exemplary in one way. That the military was not needed domestically provided the opportunity to dedicate resources overseas toward expanding the British Empire, which grew at an average annual pace of about 100,000 square miles between 1815 and 1865.²⁷⁵ As other states on the continent resolved these domestic problems later in the century this allowed them similar opportunities, which could explain the dramatic rise in "New Imperialism" after the 1870s.²⁷⁶ If we recall the three functions of the military – domestic, international, and colonial - the third, colonial military action, was emphasized most after the domestic crises subsided and the European balance-of-power became bipolar along lines that would clash in 1914. In fact, we can associate the primacy of each of these functions with three periods within the Hundred Years Peace.

1. 1815-1848 – Domestic violence / international peace.
2. 1848-1871 – Localized international violence.
3. 1871-1914 – International peace / New Imperialism

Polanyi described the first third of the hundred years' peace, as being under the firm grip of the Holy Alliance (Prussia, Austria, and Russia): "Its armies were roaming up and down Europe putting down minorities and repressing majorities."²⁷⁷ This was partially true within the

²⁷³ *ibid.* p. 408

²⁷⁴ N Elias, *The Civilizing Process : Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford ; Malden, Mass., 2000, p. 268

²⁷⁵ *op. cit.* Kennedy 1987.

²⁷⁶ *op. cit.* Hobsbawm 1987.

²⁷⁷ *op. cit.* Polanyi, p. 7

territories they were responsible for, which included the minimally militarized remnants of the Holy Roman Empire. The army did not exist solely for repressive purposes, however, nor could a military achieve such ends without political and legislative mechanisms in the form of local concessions and alliances between middle classes and old regime nobles and patricians, who also wanted order.²⁷⁸ Still, Giovanni Arrighi, following Polanyi, described the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe, the two primary diplomatic mechanisms to emerge from the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, as “an instrument of British governance of the continental balance of power.”²⁷⁹ While the novelty of the post-Napoleonic international system was a commitment toward domestic order, Britain was actually notably absent from Continental diplomatic issues and spent most of the period consolidating its overseas empire.²⁸⁰ Furthermore, other than the Metternichian interest in domestic order, there was nothing particularly unusual about a period of peace following a general European war. After the Seven Years War of 1756-1763, the Great Powers were materially exhausted and dedicated themselves to maintaining the balance-of-power while they regrouped.²⁸¹ The Partitions of Poland, in which Austria, Prussia, and Russia carved up the decaying state of Poland to avoid war with each other provides an example of how far these powers were willing to go to preserve the peace. To suggest that the Holy Alliance was simply

²⁷⁸ The gradual political negotiation between local and state bureaucratic authorities within Prussia and the cities and towns of the old Holy Roman Empire are well outlined in M Walker, *German Home Towns : Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998.; C Clark, *Iron Kingdom : The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006. Rather than being coercively suppressed by armed militaries, Blackbourn and Eley indicated that what would have been a traditional (aka British) liberal bourgeois class, actually allied with the *old regime* nobility to establish a ‘party of order’ that was mutually interested in suppression of labor and the establishment of industrial capitalism. D Blackbourn and G Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History : Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984.; C.B.A. Behrens, *Society, Government, and the Enlightenment*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1985. indicated that this trend was not exclusively German, and could be applied as well to France.

²⁷⁹ op. cit. Arrighi, p. 54

²⁸⁰ op. cit. Kissinger, pp. 78-102; P Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.

²⁸¹ op. cit. Schroeder.

acting according to British hegemonic interests implies that the continental powers had no interest of their own in maintaining order and peace after the exhausting “Great War,” as the Napoleonic Wars were called throughout the nineteenth century.

The second period, 1848-1871, actually saw quite a lot of intra-European wars. As has been discussed above, some of these were shortened because of new technologies and because diplomatic understandings prevented the wars from becoming general conflagrations. However, as we have also seen, these wars involved unprecedented scales of troops and supply mobilizations, and should not be measured necessarily according to their duration. In any case, this period also saw several lengthy wars such as the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the U.S. Civil War of 1861-1865, the Franco-Mexican War of 1861-67, and the intermittent wars of German and Italian Unification. Polanyi said that during this period, which was “one of the most confused and crowded quarter centuries of European history - peace was less safely established, as the ebbing strength of reaction met the growing strength of industrialism.”²⁸² But what does this mean? By peace being “less established” does this admit that there was war? Does this mean peace was maintained, but it was precariously stabilized without the presence of either reaction or finance? If one ignores the wars that did happen, as Polanyi did, the second proposition might be tenable except for his reasoning regarding the third period.

1871 to 1914 was the era that best resembled the conditions Polanyi described as the peace between Great Powers, though it lasted forty-three years instead of one hundred. Considering the dramatic increases in military and naval spending and troop buildup, the fact that states resisted deploying their geopolitical power does seem to need explanation. As we know, Polanyi suggested that transnational capital provided the mechanism through which peace

²⁸² op. cit. Polanyi, p. 8

was maintained. However, Polanyi said that “by the end of the seventies the free-trade episode (1846-79) was at an end as the actual use of the gold standard by Germany marked the beginnings of an era of protectionism and colonial expansion.”²⁸³ Indeed, Eric Hobsbawm’s breakdown of the nineteenth century’s eras mirrors this assessment. 1789-1848 was the “Age of Revolutions.” 1875-1914 was the “Age of Empire,” and, in between, was the “Age of Capital” - 1848-1875.²⁸⁴ Hobsbawm characterized the post-1848 period as such:

The era of liberal triumph began with a defeated revolution and ended in a prolonged depression...The new era which follows the age of liberal triumph was to be very different. Economically it was to move away rapidly from unrestrained competitive private enterprise, government abstention from interference and what the Germans called *Manchesterismus* (the free trade orthodoxy of Victorian Britain), to large industrial corporations (cartels, trusts, monopolies), to very considerable government interference, to very different orthodoxies of policy, though not necessarily of economic theory.²⁸⁵

The economy in the Age of Empire was different from the Age of Capital in four ways.

1. The First Industrial Revolution was replaced by the Second Industrial Revolution
2. The domestic consumer market developed.
3. The era of British industrial monopoly was replaced by rival national industrial economies
4. Competition led to economic concentration, market control, and manipulation.²⁸⁶

In Polanyi’s reading, a powerful unified Germany upset the balance of power and The Concert of Europe broke down leaving Britain as the leader of the peace interest. Colonial rivalry became acute and the ability of *haute finance* to avert the spread of wars diminished rapidly, especially

²⁸³ op. cit. Polanyi, p. 19

²⁸⁴ op. cit. Hobsbawm 1987, 1996; E Hobsbawm. *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969.

²⁸⁵ op. cit. Hobsbawm 1996, p. 303.

²⁸⁶ ibid. p. 304

after 1904 when the Triple Alliance removed France as a power that could independently mediate between the British and the German blocs. According to Polanyi, the peace effect of *haute finance* peaked around 1890. If we follow this timeline then,

1871 – “Localized” wars between Great Powers end.

1879 – Free trade era reaches an end – Germany’s acceptance of gold standard starts the downfall of the Concert of Europe

1890 – *Haute finance* peace interest peaks.

1904 – Concert of Europe is effectively over.

1914 – World War I

Other than the 1890s and perhaps the 1880s, it seems as though finance maintained the stability of the system for a very limited period of time. As Polanyi indicated, this period was characterized mostly by a *decline* in the stability of the Concert of Europe. This would be a decline from a period in which peace “was less safely established” (1848-71), which, in turn, was measured relative to the period in which the Holy Alliance ruled Europe with an iron fist (pre-1848).

In this sense, Polanyi was really talking about two periods – what he calls The Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe. The “confused” middle period (1848-1871) can be dismissed from the analysis as either a 23 year outlier, or as a transition period between the two geopolitical configurations. The problem with this analysis is two-fold. On the one hand, the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe are two separate things, but not two separate times. Actually, both were established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Secondly, Polanyi saw the Holy Alliance breaking down due to the decline of the Catholic Church and religion as a transnational binding force. This is problematic because religion and ideological sodality did not

actually subside within Europe during the nineteenth century, especially not at the level of the highest dynastic classes that handled geopolitics.²⁸⁷

Polanyi's bifurcation between the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe makes the Concert of Europe seem like a separate secular organization that worked only in the second half of the century, while the religious Holy Alliance was at work in the first half of the century. Rather, in 1815, the Treaty of Vienna established two major innovations in European diplomacy that had not existed prior to the Napoleonic Wars. One was the Congress system, in which the winning powers (and a restored France) would meet to resolve diplomatic issues. The other was the Holy Alliance that was devised by Czar Alexander of Russia because "the course *formerly* adopted by the Powers in their mutual relations had to be *fundamentally* changed and that it was *urgent* to replace it with an order of things based on the exalted truths of the eternal religion of our Savior."²⁸⁸ However, Russia was Greek Orthodox, Prussia was Protestant (Lutheran/Calvinist), and Austria was Catholic. These confessional divisions provided little religious common ground upon which they could establish an international order. Rather, by the time Metternich had revised the plan, preserving only lip-service to matters of faith, the three powers were dedicated primarily to preserving the domestic *status quo* in Europe. Through the Holy Alliance these three powers (and just these three since Britain refused to be involved in the domestic issues of other states) intervened in concert to preempt liberal, democratic, or nationalist uprisings. But this begs the question in relation to Polanyi's analysis of the Holy Alliance as the protector of international peace: did radical democrats on the barricades have some interest in international war? Were these not efforts to preserve the internal survival of regimes? The insurrectionary violence of the early century was largely unrelated to potentials

²⁸⁷ This second point will be addressed in the next section.

²⁸⁸ Czar Alexander quoted in op. cit. Kissinger 1994 emphasis in original.

for Great Power war, which was still left on the diplomatic table. The only relation the Holy Alliance had to international peace was its provision of a normative bond between the rulers of these three states. In other words, it was the common enemy of liberalism that distracted states away from war with each other, not their success in putting down the rebellions themselves.

The diplomatic mechanism established at Vienna was much more important, the Concert of Europe, which as Polanyi noted, lasted nearly up until the First World War. This diplomatic system, which led to five major Congresses throughout the century,²⁸⁹ was initially secured by the Quadruple Alliance between Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. While Britain conceived of the balance-of-power in terms of how well the various nations performed the roles assigned to them in their overall hegemonic design, the other powers did not conceive of themselves as cogs in Britain's wheel, but rather in terms of their own national interests, which happened to correspond with Britain's model. Austria and Prussia were concerned with each others' potential influence in the German Confederation which had replaced the Holy Roman Empire.²⁹⁰ Each was also wary of Russia's ambitions to their east. The Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe were stabilized due to the inability of the others to gain an upper hand. While I have argued above that the International Relations theory of balance-of-power is not always useful in explaining geopolitical phenomena, it is appropriate in this instance because the statesmen who

²⁸⁹ The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) incorporated restored France into the Congress system. The Congress of Troppau (1820) involved the decision to act in concert to quell a rebellion in Naples. The Congress of Laibach (1821) concerned similar issues that were unresolved at Troppau. The Congress of Verona (1822) allowed French intervention in Spain. The Congress of Berlin (1878) revolved around the "Eastern Question" and the breakup of the declining Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, which Austria and Russia both hoped to claim for themselves; op. cit. Kissinger 1993; op. cit. Schroeder 1994.

²⁹⁰ In 1806, Emperor Francis II resigned his title to become Emperor Francis I of Austria according to Napoleon's demands. This led to the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine, which lasted from 1806 to 1815, at which point, the German Confederation was established and included 39 states represented in the Frankfurt Assembly; op. cit. Blackbourn 2003.

generated the Concert of Europe thought, themselves, in terms of balance-of-power and intentionally constructed an institutional framework to preserve it.

For some reason, however, Polanyi did not think the Congress system was effective. He said,

The Concert of Europe was essentially not a system of peace but merely of independent sovereignties protected by the mechanism of war...Take the economic system away and the peace interest would disappear from politics. Apart from it, there was neither sufficient cause for such an interest, nor a possibility of safeguarding it, insofar as it existed.²⁹¹

From a Realist International Relations perspective, however, Henry Kissinger described the Concert of Europe as a close approximation of a real government of Europe for fifty years following 1818.²⁹² Polanyi's suggestion actually implies a radically Hobbesian perspective in which states could not have possibly wanted to preserve peace themselves. To be sure, the mechanism by which they preserved leverage was war, but this is the case with any binding international law, as in the United Nations today, which requires coercive enforcement. Because of the Concert of Europe, powers did not allow Bismarck's tinkering wars in Germany and France, nor Russia and Austria's simultaneous incursions into the Balkans to upset the balance. These disputes were resolved by diplomacy, which became as rationalized and calculated as other realms of society during the nineteenth century.

Helmuth von Moltke, the pre-eminent general of the age began thinking in terms of "risk," defined in terms of size, space, time and technology, for the first time just before the Wars of German Unification, which appeared to have been calculated precisely. War was analyzed as a systemic process in which the application of planned pressure led to predictable

²⁹¹ op. cit. Polanyi, p. 18-19

²⁹² op. cit. Kissinger 1993, p. 82. 1818 marks the date in which France was incorporated into the Congress system.

results.²⁹³ When these military planners, monarchs, ministers, and diplomats met they could make decisions based on strategy, and calculations of potential success. More often than not, states did not go to war with each other because they knew they could not win. These calculations of caution increased throughout the century as planners could execute wars in their heads to see who would win, who would lose, and what might be the unintended consequences. For this reason, in the late century, crises like the Fashoda Incident of 1898 between France and Britain, and the two Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 between France and Germany did not lead to wars, though they did lead to diplomatic tensions and escalated production of armaments.


All of this is to suggest that, while the influence of *haute finance* was certainly a factor in state's assessments of risks, there simply does not need to be an invisible force that explains the Hundred Years Peace. Geopolitics, diplomacy, and military risk assessment served quite legitimately as mechanisms through which peace was preserved.

Furthermore, if we focus on explaining the forty-three year peace from 1871-1914, we must acknowledge the vast amount of military attention dedicated toward regions outside of Europe. While Europeans had been colonizing regions of the world since the fifteenth century, there were two reasons that this impulse was dramatically accelerated in the late nineteenth century. First, the technology stemming from the Industrial Revolution provided the "tools of empire" that allowed significantly greater penetration into Asia, Africa, and the Americas.²⁹⁴ Second, the resolution of domestic conflict through social control and political reform, coupled with the stalemate situation between the Great Powers led militant interests abroad. Between 1876 and 1915 about one-quarter of the globe was distributed as colonies among a half-dozen states, as can be seen in Figure 3.8 below.²⁹⁵

²⁹³ op. cit. Black 2009, p. 122

²⁹⁴ op. cit. Headrick 1981

²⁹⁵ op. cit. Hobsbawm 1987, p. 59

Figure 3.8 – Increase in Territory per State, 1876-1915^a

^a Does not include Russian expansion which was significant, but difficult to measure. Net losers of territory during this period include Turkey, Spain, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark

Source: Hobsbawm 1987, p. 59

By 1900 Britain had one fifth of the world's land surface, which rose to one quarter by 1909, containing 400 million people out of a total world population of 1,600 million.²⁹⁶ Enhanced communications, sanitation, and disease control helped the military requirements of this expansion, while the invention of machine guns and artillery eventually overwhelmed resistant groups. Indeed, many colonial conflicts were often considered "war games" by military staffs in which new technologies could be experimented with and opportunities for promotion could be determined.²⁹⁷ As seen above in Figure 3.4, these actions were the majority of conflicts Western

²⁹⁶ op. cit. Black 2009, p. 161

²⁹⁷ op. cit. Mann, p. 436

powers engaged in, though they were usually grossly asymmetrical and quickly lost by states and peoples who dared to resist.²⁹⁸

Still, imperialism is not typically understood as having been stimulated by military ambitions. Rather, the most common interpretation suggests that imperialism was primarily the outgrowth of economic pressures. As discussed above, Lenin's *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, provided a widely accepted model of capitalist imperialism in Marxian, as well as non-Marxian circles. The problematic functionalist assumptions behind the theory have been discussed in detail above, but it is worth outlining Lenin's analysis again and comparing its economic considerations against other perspectives, including Polanyi's. Lenin's theory of Imperialism can be summarized in three points.

1. The capitalist economy cannot absorb its own production, or surplus, domestically and must therefore expand in search of markets and investment opportunities.
2. Economic competition causes European nations to compete for overseas territories.
3. This competition overseas leads to war at home as the Europeans run out of land left to carve up between themselves. At its limits, further expansion comes at the expense of rival European states, which leads to violent conflict (i.e. World War I).²⁹⁹

This economistic theory of imperialism has been criticized profusely since it was written in 1917, but as Eric Hobsbawm noted,

²⁹⁸ While the technological and logistic capabilities of the West were far superior to many states and peoples outside Europe, it is also worth noting that this was not an inevitable landslide either. Throughout the period, Europeans lost ground as often as they gained, as in the cases of Britain in Afghanistan and Italy in Ethiopia. As Jeremy Black noted, "Precisely because non-Western societies were not decrepit, primitive, undeveloped or weak, the Western success in conquering large areas was a formidable military achievement." op. cit. Black 2009, p. 161 Europeans often secured their positions through allegiances with local groups, as in Buganda and the Punjab region, providing them with arms and access to their import/export markets. This led to increased conflict between previously warring local groups, as the Europeans' client groups became advantaged, then victorious, and then loyal; op. cit. Black 2009, pp. 151-171; op. cit. Black 1998, pp. 164-202.

²⁹⁹ op. cit. Lenin 1917; cf. R Aron, *The Century of Total War*, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1954, pp. 56-73

Non-Marxist analysts of imperialism have tended to argue the opposite of what the Marxists said...They tend to deny any specific connection between the imperialism of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries with capitalism in general, or with the particular phase of it which...appeared to emerge in the late nineteenth century.³⁰⁰

Anti-anti-Imperialists, as Hobsbawm termed them, instead emphasize psychological, ideological, cultural and political explanations. In critiquing the Leninist perspective, then, we should not *over-emphasize* non-economic issues to the exclusion of the obvious economic issues that were involved in imperialist expansion.³⁰¹ What is at stake at this point, then, are these questions - what were the precise economic issues? And, what was their relation to imperialism as a *causal* mechanism? To do this we need to break down each of the three points listed above, which are distinct propositions.

The first issue - that capital could not contain its surplus and needed to export it abroad to relieve the pressures of the contradictions of capitalism - was inspired by the socialist political agenda that would have capitalists redistribute their surplus wealth to the working class at home instead of exporting it abroad.³⁰² However, others, including Lenin himself, acknowledged that the cheap colonial manufactures benefited the working class with a higher standard of living, which was frustrating since this distracted them from their class positions. That Capital exported investments abroad is without doubt. Figure 3.9 provides relative distributions of European capital investments overseas among the three leading imperialist powers, Britain, France and Germany, amounting to over \$30,000,000,000 in foreign and colonial loans and investments as of 1914.³⁰³


³⁰⁰ op. cit. Hobsbawm 1987, p. 61

³⁰¹ Although these ideological, cultural, psychological, and political issues will be paramount to our discussion in the next section.

³⁰² op. cit. Hobson 1902

³⁰³ R Palmer and J Colton, *A History of the Modern World*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965, p. 570

Figure 3.9 – Export of European Capital to 1914



Source: Palmer and Colton 1965, p. 570

However, the assumed link between capital export and imperialism is analytically weak. The two occurred simultaneously, but were not entirely commensurate. For example, between 1865 and 1914 only a quarter of total British investment went to the British Empire, whereas 45 percent went to other foreign economies.³⁰⁴ Only one tenth of French investments were in French colonies.³⁰⁵ While investment overseas did, indeed, provide substantially higher returns than domestic investments in government bonds and industrial stocks, investors still preferred “civilized” regions like the United States, Russia, or Latin America where there was less risk of default. In any case, returns on investments overseas peaked around 1884, when they yielded

³⁰⁴ op. cit. Ferguson 1999, p. 279

³⁰⁵ op. cit. Palmer and Colton, p. 620

around two-thirds higher returns than domestic investments, falling two-fifths lower thereafter.³⁰⁶

The second proposition - that economic competition led to imperialist competition - is even harder to substantiate. First of all, while protectionism did rise during this period, as will be discussed below, this did not amount to a wholesale ban on mutual cooperation between national capital markets. Indeed, this is evidenced by the transnational, proto-globalized economy everyone acknowledges developed during the nineteenth century. In 1913, over 20 percent of Germany's imports came from the British Empire, which in turn absorbed over 18 percent of German exports.³⁰⁷ If we follow the logic that trade wars generate real wars, then Britain's greatest enemy should have surely been the United States which was her outstanding economic rival. Yet, since the War of 1812 over the forced conscription of American sailors into the British Navy, the U.S. and Britain has never been on the verge of going to war against each other.³⁰⁸ Considering Britain's aggressive incursion into the Uruguayan and Argentine markets in the early twentieth century, which fell within the bounds of the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, the Anglo-US bond was all the more remarkable. Furthermore, the greatest colonial rivalries of the era, the Anglo-Russian "Great Game" in Central Asia, and the Anglo-French "Scramble for Africa" were between eventual allies in World War I.

This leads to the third proposition, though it most requires the first two to work. The idea - that rivalry for colonies led to European conflict within Europe itself when the peripheralization of the world reached its limits - can be disproven on many counts. Neither the First nor the Second World Wars originated directly from a conflict over colonies. The immediate cause of

³⁰⁶ op. cit. Ferguson 1999, p. 280

³⁰⁷ op. cit. Aron p. 64

³⁰⁸ A Langguth, *Union 1812 : The Americans Who Fought the Second War of Independence*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006.

the First World War was the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria which triggered war between Austria and Serbia; which triggered Russia's mobilization; which triggered Germany's declaration of war against Russia and France; which led to Germany's invasion of Belgium; which triggered Britain's entry into the war. All of these were stipulated consequences of diplomatic treaties designed (imperfectly) as defensive pacts to *prevent* war. The colonies had nothing to do with it. Several colonial crises such as those in Morocco between Germany and France were resolved diplomatically without a shot fired. European powers did not feel that colonies were worth general military engagement. To be sure, armaments were expanded for leverage at the diplomatic table, and wars might have occurred between rival Muslim armies trained and led by British and Russian officers in Central Asia, but these wars were always "localized" to use Polanyi's term.

Reflecting the teleology of functionalist analyses, Lenin's theory of imperialism takes the consequences of the First World War, namely that Germany and Austria were stripped of their colonial territories, and infers that this must have been the Europeans' motivations. Since these were not the expressed motivations of the participants on the eve of war, who pointed instead to a burgeoning German navy or the oppression of Slavic brethren, Lenin's analysis requires an orthodox Marxist connotation of false-consciousness onto the protagonists. As Raymond Aron has pointed out, it is difficult to see how this can be proved or disproved. In fact, one can just as easily find evidence that economic interests were propounded as false legitimization of unprofitable territorial acquisition which could have been the ultimate goal of imperialists. As Aron put it,

It is a fact that in each epoch conquerors have found different formulas for masking the will to power, which appears to be one of the unchanging features of European communities. It is certain that, once a territory has been acquired, enterprising individuals and companies seek to exploit the protected areas. While

this exploitation is not the primary purpose of the governments, they conceive it as one of the advantages of conquest. More than that, at a time when thinking everywhere is dominated by economic considerations, the so-called colonialists can increase the popularity of their cause by using these considerations to justify it. The public might turn away from them or rebel if they spoke of glory or national greatness.³⁰⁹

While the merits of this argument are, perhaps, unsustainable in light of the popularity of nationalist sentiments during this period, Aron's argument does demonstrate the ease with which expressed motivations, whether economic or political, can be attributed as either true or false depending on the agenda of the analyst.

Even if we reserve that the incentive of overseas investment and unexplored markets had some impact, as they surely did, it appears that the overwhelming economic influence directing imperialism ran in the opposite direction. That is, rather than being stimulated by the need to export capital or find markets, territories were needed to extract resources for importation. New industrial manufactures and consumer products in the late century required raw materials such as rubber, petroleum, tin, coconuts, tea, coffee, and a wealth of other products that only tropical regions could provide.³¹⁰ Furthermore, because these goods required advanced industrial processes to be extracted, Europeans could no longer resign themselves to maintaining isolated trading outposts on coasts where pre-industrial natives brought their harvested vegetable products and human traffic (in the form of slaves). They needed to establish direct rule to secure heavy capital investments in mines, plantations, docks, warehouses, factories, refineries, railroads, river steamships, banks, etc.³¹¹ In many cases, these capital investments had been encouraged where they were not forthcoming by investors, as in the Italian government's

³⁰⁹ op. cit. Aron, p. 61

³¹⁰ op. cit. Palmer and Colton, p. 618.

³¹¹ *ibid.* p. 616; Once the Europeans arrived, of course, they also need offices, homes, hotels, clubs, and cool mountain resorts to make their stay in the tropics comfortable. One such refuge was the town of Simla in India, perched over 7,000 feet, which became a sort of unofficial seat of the British government for seven months out of the year; op. cit. Ferguson 2000, p. 182

granting of discount privileges to the Bank of Rome on the precondition that they would invest in colonial projects in Tripoli.³¹² The colonial focus on raw materials turned many regions into monocultural exporters, determined according to the worldwide division of labor. So Malaya provided rubber and tin, Brazil coffee, Chile nitrates, Uruguay meat, Cuba sugar and cigars.³¹³ This dependency is in line with Immanuel Wallerstein's identification of the core-periphery dynamic, evident as far back as the sixteenth century, when "the trend in the core was *toward* variety and specialization while the trend in the periphery was toward monoculture."³¹⁴

Europe's need for these resources did not, in and of itself, cause the dash to seize territory. As the post-colonial era demonstrates, these resources can be obtained without direct colonial rule (though, to be sure, dependency relations still persist). Rather, it was the protectionism that rose during the late nineteenth century that necessitated access to as much territory as possible. Neo-protectionism, promoted by new economic theories such as the "National System" of Frederich List that emphasized high tariffs and managed economies meant that, colonial exportation to rival economies became limited, while colonial host nations could reserve access to their material imports. The only way a state economy could secure the necessary range of raw materials needed for industrial production was by directly claiming the territory within which the materials rested.

This protectionism was, in fact, what Polanyi considered the leading economic cause of imperialism. Also, high tariffs and state interference in the economy were introduced late in the century along with the seemingly contradictory institution of the international gold standard.

Polanyi wrote,

³¹² op. cit. Aron, p. 60

³¹³ op. cit. Hobsbawm 1987, p. 64; Even white settler colonies, other than the United States, failed to industrialize in this period because they were reliant on the needs of the core European markets.

³¹⁴ op. cit. Wallerstein 1974, p. 102

The coming of the gold standard itself hastened the spreading of protectionist institutions, which were the more welcome the more burdensome fixed exchanges proved. From this time onward tariffs, factory laws, and an active colonial policy were prerequisites of a stable external currency...Only when these prerequisites were given could now the methods of market economy be safely introduced. Where such methods were forced upon a helpless people in absence of protective measures, as in exotic and semicolonial regions, unspeakable suffering ensued. Herein we hold the key to the seeming paradox of imperialism – the economically inexplicable and therefore allegedly irrational refusal of countries to trade with one another indiscriminately, and the aiming instead at the acquisition of overseas and exotic markets. What made countries act in this manner was simply the fear of consequences similar to those which the powerless peoples were unable to avert.³¹⁵

Polanyi's insights into the effects of the introduction of the international gold standard are worth considering, especially since contradictory protectionist mechanisms were instituted simultaneously.³¹⁶ Polanyi indicated at least three significant consequences:

1. The traditionally separate spheres of the economic and political classes were merged due to protectionism, so that politicians involved themselves in economic matters, while capital became intricately entwined with political events.
2. This incestuous union led to higher concentrations of capital and monopolies due to protectionist cartel arrangements. Individual firms and politicians held more power in this configuration.
3. The strains produced in the economic realm due to normal currency fluctuations caused political upheavals and led to rigid international relations, including alliances between military and trading blocs.

These consequences all seem to have been plausible effects of the international gold standard and protectionism.³¹⁷ The era was certainly characterized by an increase in consolidation of firms into large monopolistic entities that were necessary for both market protection as well as

³¹⁵ op. cit. Polanyi, p. 223-224

³¹⁶ Although Polanyi's assertion that Europeans somehow felt insecure - that they might become like the powerless peoples they dominated - seems specious considering European chauvinism and racist attitudes. These ideologies will be discussed below.

³¹⁷ Although one of the understandings built within the gold standard was the ability for states to suspend the standard in the exceptional case of war; op. cit. Ferguson, p. 333

industrial economies of scale.³¹⁸ However, whether this was the cause or the effect of the incestuous relationship between politicians and industrial capitalists seems more difficult to gauge.

Polanyi's analysis suggests that independent capitalists, who had extricated themselves from the bonds of society, then reembedded themselves into the state through institutional mechanisms that linked the fate of markets and states together. However, the ideal of the disembedded capitalist existed only in economic theory.³¹⁹ Adam Smith wrote the *Wealth of Nations* because trade *was not free* in 1776. During the course of the nineteenth century, particularly in Britain, the theory of *laissez-faire* and open-markets promised, and, to an extent, delivered greater wealth for individuals and the national state. Yet, this was allowed to occur because the state could see benefit from releasing the energies of individuals engaging in self-interested market behavior. If we assume Tilly's definition of the state as a warmaking institution, would it not be the economy that was allowed to prosper because it provided the means through which a more advanced military could develop? In turn, the greater security afforded by this advanced military and/or navy would have been the only way the economy was *allowed* to prosper as it did.

This dynamic between capital and coercion proceeded according to a feedback loop in which economy and military developed to each others' benefit until reaching a fevered pitch immediately before World War I. However, there is no reason to give primacy to the *economic* in this analysis. Rather, the warmaking state and its military might be considered the agent that

³¹⁸ see A Chandler, *Scale and Scope : The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990 for detailed historical analysis of big industrial development in Britain, Germany, and the United States from the 1870s to the 1930s.

³¹⁹ There were, perhaps, a few golden years mid-century where a number of the entrepreneurial species could be spotted in Britain and the United States. See C W Mills, *White Collar : The American Middle Classes*, Oxford University Press, New York, N.Y., 2002, pp. 3-12

made this dialectic come about. More precisely, the state may have been the agent that *allowed* this dialectic to develop.

But, there is also no need to assert the primacy of either, for they both existed together, and neither would have existed without the other. The particular economic configuration of nineteenth century capitalism certainly impacted the course of military developments in the period - by stimulating industrial innovation and providing the monetized resources that allowed effective extraction. At the same time, states' willingness to expand their territories militarily in pursuit of raw materials and markets, whether ahead of, or for capitalist interests, allowed particular conditions to exist for the economic market and manufacturing sector.

Thus, as Michael Mann, Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens and other sociologists have argued before me, we must submit that economic activity does not solely, or primarily, provide the constitution of modern society. We must include militaries, wars, and violence within the historical logic of modernity.

But even this addition of military power, while significant, cannot explain the totality of modern society; for the economic and military relations that exist do so within a broader frame of cultural and ideological landscapes. In the case of the nineteenth century, both war and economics were significantly impacted by, while impacting upon, the symbolic universe of European society.

4. Culture, Ideology, and War in the Nineteenth Century

Using Polanyi's analysis of the Hundred Years' Peace as a foil, I have pointed to a number of indicators to suggest, not only that war has been an important feature of modern European civilization, but that it cannot be reduced to solely economic variables. Though Polanyi did effectively argue that transnational capitalism and protectionist tariff policies had a novel effect on decisions of war and peace between 1815 and 1914, these do not prove to have been the only variables at work. To summarize some of the findings that have led to this conclusion:

- The Hundred Years' Peace was not actually peaceful. States were involved in nearly constant preparation for and execution of war.
- Economics as a cause of war declined. Commerce issues were less of an issue stimulating war between European powers. More often, political and ideological factors, like maintaining the integrity of an empire or relieving ethnic confreres, were the interests involved with war.
- Industrialism stimulated military development and vice-versa. Technological innovations in weaponry and communications accelerated throughout the century.
- Armies, navies, and armaments levels increased in scale.
- Wars should not be equated with duration in this period, because many were shortened due to the influence of technology, mobilization scales, and diplomatic concessions.
- The three major periods (1815-1848, 1848-1871, and 1871-1914) saw distinct developments in war, emphasizing domestic, international, and colonial war respectively. Each of these periods contained non-economic, as well as, economic explanations for peace. Especially important was the Concert of Europe political system which should not be underrated.
- During the forty-three year peace from 1871-1914, imperialism occupied the attention of states and militaries.
- The dialectic between capital and coercion did not allow one (capital or coercion) to exist without the other in the modern international state

system due to the survivability probability of states that failed to modernize in both.

While critical attention was directed toward Polanyi's thesis, the economically deterministic theories - Marxist, Liberal, and Realist - have come up, implicitly or explicitly, above. Figure 3.1 above summarized the assumptions and problems within the three theories. Figure 4.1 below summarizes the pros and cons of these approaches in relation to the Polanyi's thesis.

Yet, as noted in Figure 3.1, all of these theories, while not focusing on ideological factors, do allow the possibility for cultural influence. Marx, for example, suggested that class consciousness could be constituting. In the Liberal framework, the idea that the rational individual is constructed by civilization demonstrates that culture and socialization can generate positive or negative qualities. Realists, who identify a will to power inherent in international action, should acknowledge that these power interests are not universally held since elites may not act according to *raison d'état*. In this case, the particular personality and psychology of elites can tell us why certain aggressive or defensive behaviors occur. Polanyi's position was closest to the Liberal/Marxian perspective here, since he considered modern market society as an unnatural social arrangement that emphasizes certain characteristics. He wrote,

Nineteenth-century civilization alone was economic in a ...distinctive sense, for it chose to base itself on a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human societies, and certainly never before raised to the level of a justification of action and behavior in everyday life, namely, gain.³²⁰

Nonetheless, the economic determinism of the theories tends toward system-level causal explanations. Even the critiques of these perspectives, such as those of Giddens, Mann, and Tilly, as well as my own thus far, incorporate military as another *structural* factor in the constitution of society. Modern society is conceived of as a particular set of institutions through

³²⁰ op. cit. Polanyi, p. 31

Figure 4.1 – Merits and Weaknesses of Theories in Relation to Nineteenth Century War

Theory	Pro	Con	Nineteenth Century Examples
Marxist	Repressive force of the state may reproduce economic relations or deal with economic needs.	Cannot explain non-economic military compulsions.	Pro: Need for resources stimulated imperialism. Con: World War I was not directly caused by economic competition.
Realist	Balance-of-Power <i>institutions</i> can establish peace.	Cannot explain war and peace except through systemic forces and the rational action of elite agents.	Pro: The Concert of Europe had an effect in maintaining relative peace. Con: Does not account for the internal evolution of state societies caused by capitalism, industrialism, and democracy.

Figure 4.1 – *continued*

Theory	Pro	Con	Nineteenth Century Examples
Liberal	Economic integration can lead to peace between powers.	Does not explain war and violence against peripheries, or hegemonic cycles. Nor does it account for military alliances between trading blocs.	Pro: Transnational markets established grounds that cautioned against war in the late nineteenth century. Con: Does not predict imperialism, localized wars between powers, arms build-up, or Great Power Wars. i.e. all of the wars and warmaking in the period.
Communitarian (Polanyi)	Balance-of-power and International Gold Standard worked together to establish peace, however precariously.	- Cannot explain non-economic war and peace. - Gives primacy to the systemic institutional level. - Does not explain why the wars that happened happened.	Pro: Identifies a particular relationship between economy and politics in the nineteenth that led to both sustained peace and failure in war. Cons: see bulleted list above. (p. 125)

which social action is channeled. The primary structuring of these institutions can be either economic, or political-economic, or as a military-industrial-complex in these views. While most of the scholars I have mentioned would not suggest that ideology is irrelevant, most seem reluctant to incorporate culture and ideology as a causal mechanism into their structural models and analyses. For example, though ideology is the “I.” in Michael Mann’s I.E.M.P model, and is carefully distinguished as either “immanent morale” or as “socio-spatially transcendent,” in Mann’s epic historical study of the period immediately preceding World War I (1760-1914), he wrote “that ideological power declined somewhat in significance during the period,” providing justification for relative minimization of ideology compared to economic, political, and military phenomena.³²¹ This decline may have been the case in terms of the Christian ecumene, but other ideologies arose during the period, for example, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, Nationalism, Darwinism and, indeed, every doctrine and movement that emerged during “The Advent of the ‘Isms’” as R.R. Palmer described the period between 1815 and 1848.³²² As Palmer described them,

An ‘ism’ (excluding such words as ‘hypnotism’ or ‘favoritism’) may be defined as the conscious espousal of a doctrine in competition with other doctrines. Without the ‘isms’ created in the thirty-odd years after the Peace of Vienna it is impossible to understand or even talk about the history of the world since that event.³²³

³²¹ op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 35 Mann did acknowledge the tremendous import of ideology in two regards especially: in relation to a transnational literary culture, and in relation to class identities. Furthermore, Mann has acknowledged that ideological analysis might have been lacking in *Sources of Social Power*, vol. II, and, to be fair, its inclusion would have made 800 pg. tome even longer. see op. cit. Hall and Schroeder 2006.

³²² op. cit. Palmer and Colton. Pp. 430-443

³²³ ibid. p. 431

Some of the “isms” that emerged during this period included:

- 1819 - Liberalism
- 1832 - Socialism
- 1835 - Conservatism
- 1830s - Individualism, Constitutionalism, Humanitarianism, and Monarchism
- 1840s - Nationalism and Communism
- 1850 – Capitalism

Most of these doctrines are still with us today, and though many of these ideas existed prior to their naming, the appearance of so many ‘isms’ showed that people were making their ideas more systematic. To a certain extent, this is an advantage to the analyst who can categorize ideas according to the professed boundaries established between two or more opposed ideologies – for example between Constitutionalism and Monarchism. On the other hand, this limits the ability to distinguish ambiguity that was actually felt by individuals and groups that rarely assumed pure ideological orthodoxy.

For the purposes of this historical project, a more useful conception comes from Lewis Mumford’s term “idolum.”³²⁴ Mumford defined an idolum as being similar to Walter Lippmann’s expression, “pseudo-environment,” and wrote,

By idolum I do not mean either an idea or an idol : neither a concept nor a fetich (sic) nor an ideology. By idolum I indicate the existence of an ideological ‘field,’ which unites and polarizes, as it were, a number of related images, symbols, ideas, and even artifacts. Idolum is close to the German term *Weltbild* when taken in its literal sense: a picture of the world, that is, the world experienced in and through a culture, that people carry in their minds. I prefer it to the term pseudo-environment, because as such an idolum is neither fictitious nor false: it is simply the dominant mental environment of a particular culture, containing both permanently verifiable experiences and temporarily acceptable illusions.³²⁵

³²⁴ L. Mumford, *The Condition of Man*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1973. D. Miller, *Lewis Mumford, a Life*, Grove Press, New York, 2002. Mumford’s term, “idolum,” never quite caught on in general academia, or, indeed, within Mumford’s later work.

³²⁵ op. cit. Mumford 1973, p. 424

There are a number of exceedingly useful elements in this term as defined above. On the one hand, the recognition of an ideological “field,” similar to an electro-magnetic field, allows the possibility that ideologies can be unifying and polarizing. The idolum therefore is the totality of cultural outlooks, which is experienced as given to individual participants.³²⁶ The idolum is generated and transformed by the ideas and feelings of social actors, but it is also limited by the available ideas accessible at any given time. The idolum can be conceived of as moving along a historical time axis, similar to Hegel’s World Spirit (*Weltgeist*), though an idolum is not necessarily dialectical, or wholly determining.³²⁷

In the context of an idolum, the “isms” that align themselves against one another as discreet ideologies are coherent and recognizable. However, within individual or group consciousness, these ideologies cannot exist so purely. So an individual may be mostly “Conservative,” but have some “Liberal” inclinations, while also being “Nationalist” and/or “Capitalist” in varying degrees. Unlike economic structures and ideologies that can be analytically conceived of as discreet entities at the macro-sociological level, individual actors may contain several forms of consciousness that could be considered logically contradictory. This does not mean that they are false consciousness, in the orthodox Marxist sense, since this is the actual consciousness of actors. Rather a more complicated notion of the human self may contain double consciousness, psychologically repressed rationalizations, or “misrecognition” of power relations.³²⁸ Micro-sociologists from George Herbert Mead to Erving Goffman to Harold

³²⁶ However, this does not mean that the idolum is given in the way Althusser might suggest ideology is received by subjects from the outside via an Ideological State Apparatus. In other words, an idolum is not the ideology of the ruling class exclusively. L Ferretter, *Louis Althusser*, Routledge, London ; New York, 2006, p. 75. K Marx, 'The German Ideology', <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01c.htm>>, accessed 11-25-09 2009.

³²⁷ G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, Cosimo, New York, 2007.

³²⁸ Double consciousness is associated with W.E.B. Dubois’ idea regarding a black man’s ability to contain two identities at all times. This could be extended to indicate that individuals may have several “selves” at work at

Garfinkle have demonstrated the manner in which the social self is constructed through social interaction, making a single “self” difficult to place.³²⁹ At the same time, micro-social interactions constitute social structure at large.

The importance of the above discussion is relevant to our study of war for two reasons. First, identification of double, or multiple consciousness in individual actors establishes the micro-foundations upon which the overall social theoretical examinations are based. An analysis of large scale structures, such as the modern capital economy, or European ideologies, require actors to enact and reproduce these structures. These actors cannot be reduced to the atomized level of their human bodies. Below even the individual level, the workings of human psychology complicate behavioral and structural analysis that might equate social roles with particular interests and behaviors, as in models that highlight the rational utility maximizing human. Second, the attention paid toward the idolum moving through time provides a general framework through which these social actors have to interact. For example, there is no way that the economic mode of production can stimulate war or peace without stimulating that action in actors, who exist within the context of an idolum. Prevailing ideologies at a given moment may further reinforce, or contradict the rational calculations of statesmen. The mechanism through which these two levels work is best captured by Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *Habitus*.³³⁰

Habitus results from socialization experiences in which external structures are internalized,

various times. W E B Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* Bantam classic edn., Bantam Books, New York, 1989. see C Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory : Culture, History, and the Challenge of Difference*, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., 1995.pp. 70-97. The role of psychology, in terms of socialization and psychic repression will be dealt with below. see S Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* Rev. edn., Hogarth Press : Institute of Psycho-analysis, London, 1963. “Misrecognition” is an important concept in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, and is similar to “false consciousness” but involves a more active denial of economic and political interests. see D Swartz, *Culture & Power : The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997, p. 89.

³²⁹ E Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Allen Lane, London, 1969; G H Mead, *On Social Psychology; Selected Papers*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964; Mead’s take on war was described in M Deegan, *Self, War, & Society : George Herbert Mead's Macrosociology*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J., 2008.

³³⁰ P Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; New York, 1977.

generating a “system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions,” as Bourdieu described it.³³¹ The psychic process of enculturation via familial rearing, class-based social interaction, education, and religious upbringing impact the individual with cultural norms that are “structuring structures.” Though at the individual level this externalization is highly personalized, at the aggregate level, recognizable patterns can be discerned within the idolum. As these patterns change, the reproduction of ideological structures changes as well, according to generational processions, discursive favor, and asynchronic social rhythms.³³²

With this in mind, we can return to our discussion of nineteenth century Europe to see that there were several idolum evolutions from 1815-1914, the period of Polanyi’s Hundred Years’ Peace. These changes were not as pivotal and segmented as Michel Foucault would suggest in his concept of “historical *a priori*,”³³³ since new ideologies do not always amount to a rejection of previous beliefs, but rather contain legacies and shifting emphases of concepts and ideas. However, cultural concepts and ideological fields do have the potential to change much more rapidly than social structures such as the economy or national state, precisely because of their discursive, mutable character. Thus, in the period of the nineteenth century in Europe we can identify a number of shifting ideas and concepts that make the early period remarkably dissimilar from the end of the period immediately before World War I. While it is more or less impossible to identify one, single European culture during the nineteenth century, there are distinctive trends within the overall idolum that should be considered within the context of war

³³¹ op. cit. Swartz, p. 100.

³³² The movement of generations through time as a sociological phenomenon is described in K Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia : An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, 1985. This movement creates what Ernst Bloch called, asynchronicity, in which different paces and rhythms between different social systems develop and exist simultaneously. E Bloch, *Heritage of Our Times*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991.

³³³ M Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Routledge, London ; New York, 2002.

and peace. The purpose of this examination is to identify contexts in which the causal considerations discussed above took place. While it might be difficult to attribute primary importance to general ideas such as nationalism, militarism, scientism, etc., these ideologies did impact decisions and should be discussed in terms of their influence as qualitative variables.

Just as Polanyi identified three periods of war in the nineteenth century – the Holy Alliance (1815-1848), the confused middle period (1848-1871), and the forty-three year peace (1871-1914), one can identify different idolums beginning with the post-Revolutionary period, in which democracy, proto-nationalism, and free speech liberalism were among the important issues of the day, remnants of the eighteenth century Enlightenment ideals. By mid-century, entrepreneurial capitalism, and the beginnings of a consumer society were laying the ground for the late century “Victorian” culture which is, today, often associated with the century as a whole. Men in black top hats and coats, women in painful corsets holding umbrellas; these are impressions that arise when we recall Europeans in the 1800s. However, even this culture was not monolithic. For example, the “Victorian” attribution refers to British industrial/capitalist society; all the while Paris was considered the pinnacle of culture throughout the century. German-speaking cities like Berlin, Frankfurt, and Vienna witnessed the emergence of Wagner’s operas and Romanticism, while similar centers of culture developed in New York City, St. Petersburg, Milan, and Geneva. While each cultural capital was unique and distinct, homology developed as these cultural centers became ever more unified due to the increase in discursive communication that emerged during this period, which, in turn, led to similarities of concerns in the realm of political ideas and cosmopolitan interests. The emergence of this discursive space within entirely novel institutions like the modern research university or widely-circulated periodicals, led not just to a communion of culture, but also to a fragmentation of political

ideologies as competition within the market of ideas encouraged the calcification and rigidification of perspectives.³³⁴

Before returning to the relevance of this European culture to the study of war and society, I request a suspension of our cultural context in the twenty-first century. There are many perspectives that Europeans in the nineteenth century held that may seem “irrational” to us today. For example, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that democracy, as a concept, became a foregone political assumption that all states must nominal pay lip service to. Thus, when the Holy Alliance policed the internal politics of Central Europe repressing democratic uprisings, we should recall that, in many regions such as the Rhineland, the majority of the population was *counter-revolutionary* and would have overwhelmingly supported the forces of Reaction.³³⁵ Similarly, we must remember that many scientific and philosophical ideas we take for granted did not exist prior to the twentieth century. For example, imagine a world before the psychology of Sigmund Freud and William James indicated that there was such a thing as the “unconscious.”³³⁶ In this world, one’s thoughts were one’s own; under control; capable of discerning the objective reality of Nature in a way humans could have hardly dreamed of a century before. In this light, the Positivism of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer are not “irrational” or “chauvinist” but rather, immanently logical from within the nineteenth century.³³⁷ Thus, we must not hold a twenty-first century notion of Racism in our minds as something that is not logical - for what is offensive today was not perceived as such in 1853 when Arthur de

³³⁴ W Clark, *Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006; J Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989.

³³⁵ op. cit. Blanning; op. cit. Rowe; J Sperber, *Rhineland Radicals : The Democratic Movement and the Revolution of 1848-1849*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1991.

³³⁶ H S. Hughes, *Consciousness and Society; the Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930* [1st edn., Knopf, New York., 1958.

³³⁷ That is until, of course, Comte’s turn toward megalomaniacal ambition as the pope of a “religion of humanity” in 1849, which even close associates like John Stuart Mill and Harriet Martineau could not abide.

Gobineau published his “Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races.”³³⁸ Like phrenology (the scientific study of skulls), the scientific study of biological difference between races became an accepted method of grasping natural truth via scientific principles. Though, as will be discussed below, this practice can be considered an “alibi” for ideologies (and psychologies) which benefitted from such an interpretation,³³⁹ here we should acknowledge that for the actors themselves, they were not oppressing indigenous peoples across the world – they were helping them by bringing Christian civilization. They were not suppressing democratic and socialist movements – they were assuming paternal responsibility for the wretched of the earth. Without engaging in extreme cultural relativism, we should recall that many similarly “offensive” and “irrational” perspectives enjoy broad support today, are tolerated within our public sphere, and are, therefore, constitutive elements of our present idolum.³⁴⁰ This is important because, as in any era, many individuals in the nineteenth century were not necessarily representative of the ideologies we most identify with today. Radical Jacobin democrats, or abolitionists, or transcendentalists were merely a percentage of the population. Rather individuals, such as the statesmen we are interested in understanding, may have been Monarchists, racists, Social Darwinists, militarist, or other “offensive” attributes by current standards, and would have still

³³⁸ Gobineau did have some critics, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, who could see the underlying ethnic superiority in Gobineau’s description of the Aryan race. Like racial studies as a whole, Gobineau’s scholarship was not unchallenged throughout the century. It was, however, tolerated, and legitimated as a scientific discourse in a way it would not be today.

³³⁹ op. cit. Gay

³⁴⁰ At the time of this writing, the Tea-Party movement is dominating the American political psyche. While some elements exhibit more racist sentiments than others, a simple example of “illogic” can be seen in the “Oath Keepers,” a group of military and police personnel who vow to uphold the constitution should they be ordered to violate it. While they claim to be protecting the 10th Amendment which states that powers not expressly granted by the Federal Government remains in the states, Article 3 of the constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to determine whether a law oversteps the powers designated by the Federal Government. In short, the Oath Keepers are protecting the sacred constitution by giving themselves powers to interpret the constitution the Founders had no intention of granting local law enforcement. This is just one of many examples of contradictory positions (in terms of logic) held by the libertarian Right in the United States, while as many contradictions can be seen within the ideologies of the Left, such as progressives who would like to keep jobs in the United States (achieved through tariffs) while simultaneously demanding support for Third World economies who suffer from high tariffs on exports.

been acceptable to broad segments of their constituent populations (which were themselves often limited to varying elite segments of the population).

An underlying assumption behind much of the literature reviewed above implies a distinction between politics and economics. Polanyi, for example, described the countervailing force of transnational capital in terms of the cautionary influence of 'business' upon the warmaking 'state'. While, in analytic terms, distinguishing between the economic sphere and the political and geopolitical spheres can be helpful, from a cultural sociological perspective attentive to the micro-foundations described above, we must determine how much a distinction can be made, in terms of the individuals who occupied roles within those spheres. As C. Wright Mills' *Power Elite* demonstrated in the case of mid-twentieth century American society, identifiable members of certain classes occupy roles of power that allow them to "make history." These elites might be the owners of large capital firms, diplomats and bureaucrats in state service, and, in nineteenth century Europe, high ranking clergy. In order to understand their motivations and the ideological content of their characters we must identify who occupied these positions and what sorts of ideas typically stimulated their actions and behavior.

The nineteenth century is typically regarded as the century in which the bourgeoisie rose to power in Western European society. In this reading, the expanding role of business replaced the role of the church and aristocracy, making way for modern processes of rationalization and commodification. However, in the realm of the military, this class transformation was not evident. Though we have seen above that conscription expanded the Military Participation Ratio within Great Power armies,³⁴¹ and the need for technical skills allowed a certain amount of

³⁴¹ Stanislaw Andreski developed the concept of the Military Participation Ratio (MPR) which demonstrated that as the percentage of the population involved in the armed services increased, a leveling in class inequality took place. Stratification might increase as the ranking of military offices expands. However, the difference between the top

meritocracy to enter the nepotistic military hierarchy, war was still left, by and large, to the *old regime*. The vast majority of high-ranking officers were drawn from landed nobility and gentry, especially in the General Staffs, which represented a sharp contrast to the democratizing societies at large. For example, in the French army of 1870, 39 percent of division generals were of noble origin, with similar proportions persistent even in democratic countries such as Great Britain and the United States.³⁴² The same holds true of diplomats, as Michael Mann pointed out: “Foreign policy remained the private domain of a small group of notables, plus special interest groups advising the few politicians who aspired to be ‘statesmen’.”³⁴³ Routine foreign policy was handled by a small ruling elite, even in parliamentary countries like Britain, France, and the United States, as, indeed, it still is today. Only in crises and wars were outside parties consulted.

In the case of diplomacy, the use-value of aristocrats in the foreign service was rationalized according to the skills, such as foreign language, that were engendered in elite schools. In the military, however, the expansion of technocratic meritocracy should have led to democratization of the higher ranks of officers, though this was not the case. In the French army, for example, 14 percent of division generals had come from the ranks in 1870, while less than 3 percent in 1901.³⁴⁴ From the Napoleonic era forward, the aristocracy in Europe made the military its home and bastion, filling elite positions in the most nepotistic manners. In turn, the military took on a character increasingly distinct from broader society. By conscripting hundreds of thousands of men into the ranks, the aristocratic military caste was able to enculturate a large segment of the population loyal to the specific codes of honor and status found within military

and bottom in terms of social power (e.g. economic inequality) shrank via a middling force; S Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* 2nd edn., Routledge & K. Paul, London,, 1968.

³⁴² op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 431. The United States, of course, had no dynastic aristocracy, but even after the Civil War, army officers were drawn from “old-family, anglo-saxon, Protestant, rural, upper-middle-class,” as Morris Janowitz noted.

³⁴³ Mann, p. 416.

³⁴⁴ *ibid.* p. 430

establishments.³⁴⁵ While consisting of perhaps no more than 5 percent of the population, the aristocratic class was able to maintain a large and powerful influence within politics and society through the preservation of its separate military sphere.

In certain countries, such as Prussia and Austria, the state (the Hohenzollern or Habsburg monarchies) and the aristocracy maintained similar allegiances in relation to the military, which was preeminent. In other nations, such as Third Republic France, the isolated caste of the military could become a highly controversial subject, as in the Boulanger Crisis of 1889 and the Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s and 1900s. In these cases, Michael Mann's distinction between military and political power is most evident. The military existed as a power-wielding entity that was, in many ways, autonomous and could be arranged in a variety of configurations with the political state at large.³⁴⁶ Since large states could not do without militaries in this period, and these militaries had a distinctly aristocratic character, this "militarist" character could be found in varying degrees in most states.³⁴⁷ Eventually the term "militarist" became synonymous with "aristocratic" and, in a pejorative sense, "feudal," though it is important to note that this negative connotation developed largely *after* World War I.³⁴⁸

Prussia is typically considered the most militarist state during the period. Indeed, the state of Prussia would likely not have risen to her position within the Holy Roman Empire and

³⁴⁵ op. cit. Frevert

³⁴⁶ The civil-military configuration was of great importance to Frederick Engels, who had served as an artilleryman in the Prussian Army, and was abreast of the important advances in military science. In his essay, "The Armies of Europe" Engels analyzed every major European army, how it was organized and how it was related to political authority. F Engels, 'The Armies of Europe', <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1855/armies-europe/index.htm>>, accessed 11-29-09 2009. See also, F Engels, 'The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers' Party.', <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/02/12.htm>>, accessed 11-23-09 2009.

³⁴⁷ The possible exception to this would be the United States, whose federal military was not substantially influential before or after the Civil War. However, the United States did engage in probably the most violent of all the military actions of the century – the genocide of the Native Americans during the course of its westward expansion.

³⁴⁸ While sociologists like Spencer and Engels might have wailed against the "militarism" of nineteenth century European society, one must also acknowledge the considerable popularity of military parades among the 'non-intellectual' masses. As will be discussed below, it was not necessarily unpopular to be "militarist."

German Confederation had they not possessed an unusually large army during the seventeenth and eighteenth century.³⁴⁹ However, following the Battles of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806, Prussia was nearly brought to her knees by Napoleon and only survived by placating and submitting to the French emperor's treaty terms and ongoing diplomatic requirements. Following the war, Prussia "modernized" her army through conscription, strategic planning by General Staffs, and the incorporation of the most advanced technological means of destruction.³⁵⁰ Prussia was the leader which others followed, especially after 1871. The overwhelming success of Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war marked the move away from the dominant French model of war toward the Prussian way of war, reflected in the popularity shift away from military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini toward Carl von Clausewitz who had inspired Field Marshal Moltke's strategy. The shift was further reflected in the change in fashion from French-style uniforms to Prussian dress throughout the armies of Europe, Latin America, Japan, and elsewhere.³⁵¹ To have a "modern" army, meant to have an army modeled on Prussia. Though after World War I Prussia's militarist character was criticized by Anglo-American scholars as "feudal" and "backward," before the war, their quintessentially *modern* military was the envy of Europe and the world.³⁵²

³⁴⁹ op. cit. C Clark, 38-56. This army was raised in response to the lack of natural defenses from adjacent states on all sides, and the humiliation suffered during the Thirty Years War. By the end of Frederick the Great's reign in 1786, the Prussian standing army of 196, 000 was one of the largest in Europe, despite Prussia's relative small territory, population, and natural resources. As Friedrich von Schrötter said at this time, "Prussia was not a country with an army, but an army with a country." op. cit. Blackbourn 2003, p. 17

³⁵⁰ I have put "modernized" in quotes, because, in regard to military affairs, Prussia was the leader which others followed. Modernization theories that posit a teleological movement toward democratic capitalism typically suggest that Prussia was "backward" or "premodern" because of its feudal legacies. This implies that having the most modernized military is a sign of premodernity. B Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966; R Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1979.

³⁵¹ op. cit. Black 2009, p. 141

³⁵² T Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, A. M. Kelley, New York, 1964.

The problem with this type of negative analysis of Prussian/German exceptionalism, that suggests a uniquely “militarist” or “feudal” society in Imperial Germany, is that it disguises the illiberal and aristocratic nature of the assumed European norm.³⁵³ Germany’s militarist union between monarchy, aristocracy, and military represented an alternative path to modernization that led to fascism.³⁵⁴ Like the Liberal/Marxian traditions described above, this perspective assumes that war and the military are not component parts of modern social organization - militarism is “premodern.” And yet, every major power that exists today did go through at least one period of massive militarization - for the most part, willingly. Why aren’t these non-German militarizations considered “backward” or “feudal”? In the case of France, Great Britain, the United States, and even the Soviet Union, the assumption appears to be that Germany’s war guilt in World Wars I and II necessitated the militarization of the democratic capitalist West, which otherwise would not have occurred. Therefore, German militarism represents a scapegoat for the entire Western world.

This perspective is based on an assumption that the bourgeois capitalist class is not militant and war-like. War is the aspiration of the aristocracy, whose members are presumed to be antagonistically related to the middle class. However, this assumption needs to be substantially challenged and qualified to understand war, particularly in the nineteenth century.

As Joseph Schumpeter described English capitalist society, “the aristocratic element continued to

³⁵³ That Prussia was “backward” is the argument of the *Sonderweg* thesis dominant in German historiography, which suggests that Germany had a “special path” that led to Naziism. cf. D Blackbourn and G Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History : Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1984. Eley and Blackbourn suggested that the *Sonderweg* thesis is based on ideal versions of Britain, France, and the United States that never existed in these countries in the first place.

³⁵⁴ Classical modernization theory, in general, would suggest that in the traditional path to modernization democratic capitalism developed due to the rise of the bourgeois capitalist class at the expense of the aristocracy and monarchy. A third path was the communist trajectory. see op. cit. Moore, pg. 433-453; Alvin So, *Social Change and Development : Modernization, Dependency, and World-Systems Theories*, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, Calif., 1990; W Knöbl, 'Theories That Won't Pass Away: The Never-Ending Story of Modernization Theory', in Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Isin (ed.), *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, Sage Publications, London, 2003), 96-107.

rule the roost right to the end of the period of intact and vital capitalism.”³⁵⁵ However, as noted above, Schumpeter indicated elsewhere that this aristocratic element was “atavistic” and could be considered the cause of militancy and imperialism.³⁵⁶ It was widely assumed that the aristocracy, who held elitist attitudes and codes of honor and valor, glorified war. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote,

Feudal honor prescribed vengeance and stigmatized pardon of injuries...It made neither humanity nor mildness a law; but it vaunted generosity; it prized liberality more than beneficence, it permitted one to enrich oneself by gambling, by war, but not by work; it preferred great crimes to small gains. Cupidity appalled it less than avarice; violence often agreed with it, whereas guile and treason always appeared despicable to it... Feudal aristocracy was born of war and for war; it had found its power in arms and it maintained it by arms; nothing therefore was more necessary to it than military courage; and it was natural that it glorified that above all the rest. All that manifested this outwardly, even at the expense of reason and humanity, was therefore approved and often commanded by it.³⁵⁷

Indeed, the history of eighteenth century Europe, which is often in practice the history of the aristocracy, was full of conflicts over honor and unusual (from our twenty-first century perspective) violent behavior.³⁵⁸ As a function of the absolutizing monarch which demanded that nobles serve in the central court where they could be surveyed, there was little asked of the

³⁵⁵ J Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, Harper Collins, New York, 2008, p. 138. In Schumpeter’s analysis the period of vital capitalism roughly translates to the mid-nineteenth century and begins coming apart in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some scholars position the end of the aristocracy even later, for example, at World War II, while a very good case can be made that aristocratic families have never lost their inheritable positions in society.

³⁵⁶ op. cit. Schumpeter 1918.

³⁵⁷ A de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America / Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000, p. 591.

³⁵⁸ T. C. W. Blanning provided a fascinating account of the level of hunting aristocratic courts engaged in during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The majority of the time monarchs and nobles spent either hunting hundreds of animals daily or gambling at night. Hunting, for example, was considered a duty for the nobility who needed to be trained for battlefield duty. T.C.W. Blanning, *The Pursuit of Glory : Europe, 1648-1815*, Viking, New York, 2007. Also significant until the mid-nineteenth century was the tradition of dueling, which was required of men of honor (nobles), and involved extremely destructive rituals of violence. This practice was revived in the late nineteenth century in university dueling societies, leading to the expectation of facial scars as a sign of manhood. op. cit. Gay 1984.

nobility except to maintain constant preparation for war.³⁵⁹ Since the highest authority of the monarch rested upon the interest of territorial defense, without military action, the entire legitimacy of the monarchy could be threatened.

The perspective of the bourgeois revolution in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century stems from Karl Marx's analysis of the dual revolution – the democratic revolution in France and the industrial revolution in Great Britain.³⁶⁰ The analysis implies that a rising bourgeois merchant class overtook the monarchy and the aristocracy. The aristocracy and monarchy could no longer enjoy the life of the “leisure class,” and was compelled to deliver power to the owners of capital who represented the vanguard of progress.³⁶¹ However, this perspective clouds the persistence of the aristocracy throughout the nineteenth century, particularly in cultural and political terms.

Rather than Junker Prussia and Imperial Germany, widely considered the most “feudal” of Western states, we should examine the case of the most capitalist nation: Great Britain.³⁶² In terms of land ownership, with the exception of Austria, Hungary, and Romania, the British gentry and grandees owned a greater proportion of territory in the British Isles than any other European country in 1880 (see Table A.11). Though the House of Commons overtook the primacy of the House of Lords over the course of the century, as late as 1860, in the lower house

³⁵⁹ A notable exception to this rule (whose ideal type lay in the French court of Versailles), was the Prussian court, which, under Frederick the Great and his father, transformed the military into loyal, efficient servants of the state, which led to the generation of the famous Prussian bureaucracy. op. cit. Rosenberg 1958.

³⁶⁰ op. cit. Marx 1967

³⁶¹ T Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class; an Economic Study of Institutions*, B. W. Huebsch, New York, 1924. Veblen suggested that the institution of a leisure class is found in its best form within barbarian cultures. He wrote, “The upper classes are by custom exempt or excluded from industrial occupations, and are reserved for certain employments to which a degree of honour attaches. Chief among the honourable employments in any feudal community is warfare” p. 1

³⁶² Of course, the United States did become the most capitalist state by the end of the century, and as a new nation did not have the legacy of a substantial landed class, although Barrington Moore suggested that the American Civil War was the point at which the Southern plantation owners, who resembled the German Junkers, were eliminated from the American democratic capitalist social system. op. cit. Moore 1996, pp. 111-158

it was estimated that three-quarters of all MPs were patricians and that one-third of the Commons was filled by no more than sixty families.³⁶³ Furthermore, the majority of the most significant civil service positions were held by men of patrician status. If the state is the executive committee for the ruling class, the ruling class was the aristocracy. The Conservative (Tory) governments under the Duke of Wellington, Robert Peel, and Benjamin Disraeli made some political concessions to the new industrial class, most notably by repealing the Corn Laws in 1846. However, as David Cannadine put it, “in practical terms, these did not amount to much. Their position of dominance was so entrenched, so complete, that their generosity ... in making concessions mattered far less than it was commonplace to suppose.”³⁶⁴ As late as the 1870s, the British aristocracy was the wealthiest, the most powerful, and, certainly the most conscious class in the country. While early in the modern era the bourgeoisie may have achieved a coup in opening the feudal door so that they were even *allowed* to minimally participate in power, it is difficult to describe the process as revolutionary.

Though the economic, political and legal structures necessary for capitalist accumulation were established in the major European nations, we must not assume that this was *because* it was in the capitalist class’s interest. Indeed, in Prussia and Germany under Bismarck, entrepreneurial and industrial capitalism needed to be established “from above,” because the state and military saw a need for the economic power that would enable it to compete among the Great Powers.³⁶⁵ Where Schumpeter described this process as “the active symbiosis of two social strata,” the typical reading of this relationship has the ‘ascendant’ class, the bourgeoisie, in the drivers’ seat. Rather, as Arno J. Mayer said,

³⁶³ D Cannadine, *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1990, p. 14.

³⁶⁴ *ibid.* p. 15

³⁶⁵ A J P Taylor, *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman*, H. Hamilton, London, 1955.

The rising business and professional classes were in no position to challenge the landed and public service elites for parity or first place in Europe's ruling classes, let alone in its governing classes. Quite apart from their numerical and economic disadvantage ... the new-fledged industrial and financial bourgeoisies as well as the subaltern free professions lacked a coherent and firm social and cultural footing of their own.³⁶⁶

Precisely at the social and cultural level, not the economic, this issue of class primacy is essential to understanding not only the nineteenth century idolum, but our own. Against the typical analysis of Victorian culture which highlights the "embourgeoisement" of society, I would suggest that we note the "feudalization" of the bourgeois middle classes, not just in Germany, but throughout Europe as a whole.³⁶⁷

Though the remarkable historical work of Eric Hobsbawm highlighted the ways in which the hegemonic culture of the European ruling classes permeated society throughout the nineteenth century, there seems to be no reason to assume that this was somehow "bourgeois" culture.³⁶⁸ Where did the bourgeois get this autonomous culture from? To be sure, in the British Liberal party or the French Doctrinaires under Francois Guizot the state was pressured in the interests of capitalism and the bourgeois class. Through John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Herbert Spencer, and other (typically British) social philosophers, bourgeois class activities and interests received important political justification and clarification. However, this political economic theory did not define the sum of European culture then any more than it does now. Indeed, the impetus for deploying the political economic theories of Adam Smith or David Ricardo were necessary because the aristocratic class, the church, the peasantry, and other realms

³⁶⁶ A Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime : Europe to the Great War* 1st edn., Pantheon Books, New York, 1981, p. 79.

³⁶⁷ This analysis could likely be applied, in part, to the United States as well, when one considers the cultural transfer of European bourgeois society to the United States' urban elite culture. This cultural exchange was of interest in the literary works of Henry James and Edith Wharton, for example.

³⁶⁸ op. cit. Hobsbawm 1969, 1987, 1996. see also A Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* International Publishers, New York, 1972.

of society were *against* the valorization of material wealth as an end in itself. At the same time, where relevant and instrumentally useful, these economic theories were used by the patrician classes themselves, initially in gambling and agriculture, and eventually in commercial investment itself, leading to a further consolidation of their power and influence. Even in the most capitalist of nations, the United States, only 48 percent of millionaires from the Age of Capital (1848-1875) came from lower or lower-middle class families, and only 8 percent of the “industrial elite of the 1870s” came were sons of working-class fathers.³⁶⁹ In Britain, at least 70 percent of the millionaires who died between 1858 and 1879 were descendants of at least one generation of wealth, over 50 percent of which was based on land.³⁷⁰ All of this is to suggest that the “bourgeois” theories of political economy seem to have benefitted the old landed estates more than the upstart middle class who joined their ranks in the leisure classes.

Since this was not “revolutionary” in the temporal sense in which social order was overturned in a quick order of time, we must consider that the bourgeoisie who did rise were assimilated into the culture of an existing “high society.” In pre-Revolutionary France, for example, those who managed to attain substantial wealth could purchase hereditary titles – literally joining the aristocrat class.³⁷¹ In England, where noble titles were restricted and non-proliferating (a unique arrangement in Europe), the distinction between the two separate classes, aristocracy and bourgeois, was most evident. Yet, even here, the rising millionaires and wealthy capitalists assumed the cultural characteristics of the noble classes, parroting the nobility in broad terms and details from patriarchal household management to lawn landscaping on country estates. The most obvious examples of this trend were the Nabobs, who made their fortunes

³⁶⁹ op. cit Mills 2000, pp. 94-117.

³⁷⁰ op. cit. Hobsbawm 1996, p. 146.

³⁷¹ op. cit. C.B.A. Behrens 2005

within the British Empire overseas, typically in India. They would return from several years of sun-baked entrepreneurship, purchase large estates, and ostentatiously spend their money in ways that made dukes cringe.³⁷² It is important to not assume that this life of luxury was a change in a positive direction, no matter how much we assume a preference for comfort and leisure. As Lewis Mumford described it,

The ‘performance of leisure’ imposed new sacrifices. The dinner party, the ball, the formal visit, as worked out by the aristocracy and by those who, after the seventeenth century, aped them, gave satisfaction only to those for whom form is more important than content. To be ‘seen,’ to be ‘recognized,’ to be ‘accepted’ were the supreme social duties, indeed the work of a whole lifetime.³⁷³

Elsewhere Mumford similarly quipped, “By his very success in inventing labor-saving devices, modern man has manufactured an abyss of boredom that only the privileged classes in earlier civilizations have ever fathomed.”³⁷⁴

Indeed, the manufacturing potential of modern industrialism, coupled with exotic imports from faraway places brought the modern consumer culture into being. If one understands this not as an alleviation of material want, but as a submission to the rituals of “conspicuous consumption,” as Thorstein Veblen insisted went hand in hand with leisure society, one can see the evolution of modern capitalism as the extension of the aristocratic lifestyle, however ‘gilded,’ to broader realms of society; beginning in the bourgeois merchant classes, then extending to professional, managerial, and working classes. This democratization of aristocratic airs was not reflected economically, that is as a distribution of wealth throughout society. As the century

³⁷² This “new money” inexperience, and dilettante identity was quickly shed over the course of generations, so that William Pitt could say in 1770, only 79 years after his ancestor “Diamond” Pitt, a rogue Indian merchant had purchased a seat in Parliament, “The riches of Asia have been poured upon us, and brought with them not only Asiatic luxury, but, I fear, Asiatic principles of government...The importers of foreign fold have forced their way into Parliament, by such a torrent of pricate corruption, as no private hereditary fortune could resist...We have sitting among us the members of the Rajah of Rangore and the Nawab of Arcot, the representatives of petty Eastern despots.” op. cit. Ferguson 2000, pp. 48-50

³⁷³ op. cit. Mumford 1961, p. 377

³⁷⁴ L Mumford, *The Conduct of Life*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1970.p. 14

proceeded, the proletarian working class emerged as financial wealth consolidated into oligarchies. Rather, the cultural distribution of old regime values through greater European society developed such that members of the middling classes, particularly those in civil service, military, and managerial roles identified themselves with the state. Because of this among other reasons, nationalism became one of the most important ideological issues of the period.

Yet, despite the convincing attempts of Marxist historians like Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm to connect nationalism to economic forces, the process cannot be understood outside of the context of the military.³⁷⁵ In the Central European regions of the Rhineland and Prussia, for example, the incursion of the French Revolutionary armies in the territories of the Holy Roman Empire caused people to identify themselves as “German” in distinction to the hated, hypocritical “French.”³⁷⁶ Though the German states exploited national enthusiasm when the time came to expel the French, monarchs and nobles did not immediately recognize nationalist ideologies as being in their best interests, as the repressive policies of the Holy Alliance demonstrated. These national movements were distinctly autonomous from the state, as in the *Turnbewegung*, or gymnast’s movement, that developed in Prussia in 1811 to train for the coming war with the French.³⁷⁷ The citizen-soldier/acrobats wore matching pajama-like clothing and performed routines in parks in Berlin, generating popular enthusiasm for national sentiment, physical fitness, and Enlightenment ideals of equality.³⁷⁸ Hegelian philosophy became a popular

³⁷⁵ E Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge England ; New York, 1990; B Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, New York , 2006.

³⁷⁶ op. cit. Rowe 2003; Blanning 1983; Blackbourn 2003; C Clark 2006.

³⁷⁷ op. cit. C Clark, p. 351.

³⁷⁸ In 1819, Karl Sand arrived at the door of the conservative playwright August von Kotzebue in this gymnastics costume and assassinated Kotzebue whose plays were considered effeminate and unpatriotic. The issue of the purity of Sand’s motives was hotly debated in the context of German nationalist. The Prussian state, which could not easily square the dual allegiance of Prussian vs. German national identity, did not approve of this popular nationalism initially. *ibid.* p. 400

justification for ideologies on both the Left and the Right, and imbued the state with a quasi-mystical ‘Spirit.’ Indeed, nationalism as a concept became a reinforcement for all political spectrums during the period leading up to 1848, as Matthew Levinger described in *Enlightened Nationalism*.³⁷⁹ Levinger identified at least four groups of actors who employed distinct conceptions of the national state of Germany: liberal state reformers, aristocrats, romantics, and revolutionaries. The co-option of the term nationalism by the aristocratic class was a particularly interesting case. While proposed national reforms stood as potential threats to their legal privileges and way of life, the aristocrats soon managed to use the rhetoric of nationalism to defend their position. While some rejected the concept outright, a significant portion of the class invoked the authority of the nation as a means of preserving the old traditions. Levinger identified this as having two broader consequences. First, Prussian nobles reinforced the civil servants’ definition of the nation as a “harmonious body.” Secondly, they transformed their own social and political identities by conceiving of the nobility as a national, rather than a provincial, institution.³⁸⁰

In the case of Germany and other nations that utilized conscription, the role of the military in the construction of national identity cannot be underrated. As mentioned in the previous section above, as much as 20 percent of the male population in nations had gone through the process of *trimming, programming, stripping, and leveling* described by Ute Frevert in *A Nation in Barracks*.³⁸¹ Army recruits were, and still are, more or less children. In the nineteenth century, contrary to Frederick Engels’ assessment, the majority of recruits were from the countryside, since the urban working class was mistrusted and, more importantly, was needed

³⁷⁹ M Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism : The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806-1848*, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2000.

³⁸⁰ *ibid.* p. 96

³⁸¹ *op. cit.* Frevert 2004.

in the factories to produce armaments.³⁸² These peasants would be stationed in a distant city where they had no familiar social identity and learned about the world for the first time in the context of military culture.³⁸³ Surrounded by flags, insignia like Prussian Iron Cross, military music, marching formations and drill instructors cadenced calls, these individuals submitted and conformed to the unit and eventually came to identify themselves with their corps, and by extension their nation state.³⁸⁴

The national state, which had only recently established monopoly over the means of violence, was the new feature in military training. The technique of drill had existed since it was recovered from the Classical texts of Julius Caesar, Vegetius, and Aelian in the fifteenth century during the so-called “Military Revolution.”³⁸⁵ In sixteenth century Holland, Maurice of Orange incorporated the notion of drill. With almost scientific precision, every movement of the musketeer’s routine was observed and codified so that the entire corps could move like clockwork.³⁸⁶ The mechanization and division of labor created one of the first examples of a functional top-down organization that communicated vertically and horizontally according to rank and instruction. The broader relevance of this innovation was made quite clear by Lewis Mumford:

The general indoctrination of soldierly habits of thought in the seventeenth century was, it seems probable, a great psychological aid to the spread of machine

³⁸² op. cit. Engels 1865

³⁸³ Among the most significant experiences on a personal level for soldiers were those related to late night revelry and temporary women.

³⁸⁴ op. cit. Dyer, pp. 31-62

³⁸⁵ Since Michael Roberts introduced, in 1956, the idea of a 16th century “Military Revolution,” during which the military and feudal societal structure was transformed as mounted knights were replaced by gunpowder infantry and cannon, the historical debate has raged over the question of technological change and its proper dating. Geoffrey Parker responded to Roberts’ claim by suggesting the true revolution was due to the development of the *trace italienne*, a packed earth fortification system developed in Italy to respond to artillery attack. The obsolescence of castles and the difficulty of aggressive siege attack was, in this reading, the primary cause of societal transformation in the period. C. Rogers, *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1995. see also op. cit. Howard 2009.

³⁸⁶ op. cit. McNeill 1982, p. 128.

industrialism. In terms of the barracks, the routine of the factory seemed tolerable and natural. The spread of conscription and volunteer militia forces throughout the Western World after the French Revolution made army and factory, so far as their social effects went, almost interchangeable terms. And the complacent characterizations of the First World War, namely that it was a large-scale industrial operation, has also a meaning in reverse: modern industrialism may equally well be termed a large-scale military operation.³⁸⁷

Though Spencer and other contemporary sociologists saw their era as being ‘Industrial’ *as opposed* to ‘Militaristic,’ the gap between these two forms of social organization was not as wide as it appeared to those living during the Hundred Years’ Peace.

Indeed, this was the period during which the process Max Weber described as ‘rationalization’ developed to its full potential. The ‘iron-cage’ of administration, compelled by the tyranny of the written rule, led to the disenchantment of the world. As Weber, himself an unsatisfied conscript in the Prussian army, was well aware, bureaucratic administration originated in the military and preserved many of its organizational patterns, including even an *esprit de corps*.³⁸⁸ However, Weber’s letter to his mother from military training demonstrated his awareness of the mind-numbing character of modernity present within the duties of a “one-yearer” on base. He wrote, that “‘even far worse’ than the physical exertions was ‘endlessly killing time’ and ‘the repetitions of any number of purely mechanical skills, not just a thousand times but a million times’ which ‘simply obliterated any power to think and generated a dreadful apathy.’”³⁸⁹ Weber’s depressive disposition aside, Ute Frevert compared his letter, written at the

³⁸⁷ op. cit. Mumford 1963, p. 84

³⁸⁸ *Esprit de corps*, in Weber’s reading, was not, in fact, a characteristic of rational organization, but rather a holdover from “communal” organization that is impossible to eliminate. He wrote, “Every social relationship which goes beyond the pursuit of immediate common ends, which hence lasts for long periods, involves relatively permanent social relationships between the same persons, and these cannot be exclusively confined to the technically necessary activities. Hence in such cases as association in the same military unit, in the same school class, in the same workshop or office, there is always some tendency in this direction, although the degree, to be sure, varies enormously.” Importantly, Weber also associates this sentiment to the identification with members of one’s own race. op. cit. Weber 1978, p. 41; see also 956-1001

³⁸⁹ quoted from Frevert 2004, p. 165

time of his service, to that of Friedrich Paulson who wrote about the same monotonous barrack lifestyle, but at age 50 within a “unified, meaningful picture of his youth – a phase of development ending with his military service year, marking the transition into an adult life.”³⁹⁰ Service in the military became an essential component of the middle-class résumé. When one considers the high employment of military men in state civil service and business management positions one finds both the discipline required of the “Organization Man,” and the direct identification with the state that led Michael Mann to suggest that it was this substantial civil service/military population that were the most visceral proponents of chauvinistic nationalism - not the middle class in general.³⁹¹

But nationalism, of all the ideologies in the age, is the most difficult to place within a structural framework, for, as we have seen, it was used as legitimation for several classes and social groups. Nationalism cannot be reduced to a single class, or be explained as the propagation of a single source. It could be conceived of as a relatively neutral set of ideas applied differently in different contexts - were it not so emotionally charged.³⁹² Though many theorists have struggled to get a handle on such an “irrational” social phenomena, I would like to relate nationalism to some of the themes that have been brought up thus far. In particular, there are two trends that run in somewhat different directions, namely ‘rationalization’ and ‘feudalization’. The application of rationalized, or instrumental reason found its strangest

³⁹⁰ *ibid.* p. 166

³⁹¹ *op. cit.* Mann 1993, pp. 575-588; W Whyte, *The Organization Man*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1956.

³⁹² Craig Calhoun’s excellent survey provided an overview of some of the modern sociological perspectives on nationalism, which are often from the perspective of sub-national, and independence movements. These frameworks are useful for understanding, for example, the Balkan Wars in the 1990s. More difficult to understand are the origins of nationalism in Western Europe in the nineteenth century, which arose in correspondence with the mass national state. C Calhoun, *Nationalism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997. see also A Roshwald, *The Endurance of Nationalism : Ancient Roots and Modern Dilemmas*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006; see also L Greenfield, *Nationalism : Five Roads to Modernity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992.

bedfellow - the popular identification with the nation, military, and aristocracy – in the ideology of ‘Scientific Racism’.

There are two conceptions of rationalization I am interested in exploring here. Both are related to each other, but are distinct social processes. The first is the typical sociological process of “rationalization” as outlined by Max Weber, and expanded by Jürgen Habermas, who recalled that

Weber sees cultural rationalization in modern science and technology, in autonomous art, and in a religiously anchored ethic guided by principles. He designates as rationalization every expansion of empirical knowledge, of predictive capacity, of instrumental and organizational mastery of empirical processes. In modern science, learning processes of this type become reflective and can be institutionalized in the scientific enterprise.³⁹³

Weber thought the expansion of rational organization would continue indefinitely because it represented the most efficient and powerful means of achieving goals. In the analysis of critical theorists, such as Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School, this process of rationality leads to reification in which social relationships and subjective experiences are turned into “things.”³⁹⁴

Whereas Weber’s conception of rationality is relatively “value-neutral” in the sense that the rational process can be applied in the service of any number of ends, the Frankfurt School tradition, like Michel Foucault, considered this scientific process as an instrument of power itself.³⁹⁵ This is especially the case in the human sciences, which were modeled on the natural sciences, leading to a pattern that is, like the rest of society, dominated by industrial production techniques.³⁹⁶ Because of the necessity of an inductive method in sociology, as Durkheim

³⁹³ op. cit. Habermas 1984, vol. I, p. 159

³⁹⁴ G. Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, Merlin Press, London, 1971.

³⁹⁵ op. cit. Foucault 1980

³⁹⁶ M. Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', <<http://www.sfu.ca/~andrewf/hork.doc>>2009.

correctly established, value-neutrality is impossible within social science.³⁹⁷ The scientific form, beginning with the selection of hypotheses, simply does not allow ideological bias to be eliminated.

This is related to the second meaning of “rationalization,” which takes place at the level of the individual personality. Just as Horkheimer and Adorno criticized positivism for confirming that which is already the case in *society*, within individual consciousness the actions and behaviors one engages in may exist prior to the justification for those actions. So, for example, male householders were engaged in patriarchal relations with their wives and children for hundreds of years before they were forced to justify *why* they did this. A habitual behavior like this - which seems natural since, as far as one knows, it has always existed - is very unlikely to be discarded. Much more likely, one will develop a rationalization for this behavior, which may be entirely “irrational” - that is, contradictory or illogical on its own terms. As one searches for justification to counter critical challenges to one’s ways of life – for example, the bourgeois capitalist who is accused of materialism, or “mammon worship” – the rationalizing ideologies available within the idolum can be employed where available, or developed where lacking. So, in the case of the capitalist, the rational “scientific” theories of classical economics provided justification for behavior they would have engaged in anyway. This rationalizing process leads to several reinforcing trends.

1. The ideology itself is strengthened as more adherents and proponents join the movement.
2. Individuals and groups are able to identify with like-minded actors to mobilize greater social power and to feel better about the own actions. This is

³⁹⁷ E Durkheim, *The Rules of the Sociological Method*, trans. Sarah A Solovay, and John Mueller, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938.

especially the case when an ideology can be understood as an “objective” science.

3. Existing behaviors, institutions, and status structures may become rigid in relation to competing ideologies.

In the light of both forms of rationalization, we should examine the nineteenth century most significant socio-cultural trend – the overwhelming belief in scientific progress. Nineteenth century Europe was, above all else, optimistic. Right up to World War I, Europeans had no reason to assume that the progress they were witness to would ever stop.³⁹⁸ Indeed, as Paul Fussell has argued, our modern cynical attitude toward everything - from the state, to technology, to other human beings - was actually generated, in large part, by the absurdity of the First World War.³⁹⁹ Instead, men like Charles Kingsley entered the Great Exhibition of 1851 and broke into tears, saying,

If these forefathers of ours could rise from their graves this day they would be inclined to see in our hospitals, in our railroads, in the achievements of our physical science, confirmation of that old superstition of theirs, proofs of the kingdom of God, realizations of the gifts which Christ received for men, vaster than any of which they had dreamed.⁴⁰⁰

It is important to note that science and the ideology of progress are not disconnected from religion here. Though many accounts of the age speak of the “secularization” of society during this period, this increase in scientific rationality was rarely at the absolute expense of religious sentiment.⁴⁰¹ Churches continued to be built by the thousands. Conflicts, like the German

³⁹⁸ Oron Hale, *The Great Illusion, 1900-1914*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971.

³⁹⁹ P Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, Sterling, New York, 2009, pp. 18-29

⁴⁰⁰ W E Houghton, *The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870*, Published for Wellesley College by Yale University Press, New Haven, 1957, p. 43

⁴⁰¹ George Kitson Clark noted that “probably in no other century, except the seventeenth and perhaps the twelfth, did the claims of religion occupy so large a part in the nation’s life, or did men speaking in the name of religion contrive to exercise so much power.” quoted in T C W Blanning, *The Short Oxford History of Europe. The Nineteenth Century : Europe, 1789-1914*, Oxford University Press, Oxford ; New York, 2000, pp. 130-134; Margaret Lavinia Anderson declared that the decline of religion after 1800 was, in fact, a fantastic product of "the secularization of scholarship in the twentieth century" rather than a reflection of any real historical trend. M L Anderson, "The Limits

Kulturkampf between Prussian Pietism and “ultramontanist” Catholicism, and surges in humanitarian missionary work throughout Africa and Asia, reflected a heightened religiosity during the period. James Sheehan has even suggested that religion was a cornerstone of the Enlightenment itself; while spiritual disposition was a necessary component of *Bildungsbürgertum*, an untranslatable German word indicating education and civilization.⁴⁰²

While intellectuals from Nietzsche to Weber spoke of the ‘Death of God’ or the ‘Disenchantment of the World,’ this process was primarily in relation to changes in the emerging public sphere.

That is, as religious tolerance became gradually acceptable in Europe, one’s beliefs became a matter of private, rather than public conscience. This did not, however, eliminate pietistic feeling within the (male) individual - who still went to church, held theological opinions of others, and demanded allegiance from his ‘private sphere’ (wife and children). Enlightened religion combined with science in various attempts to prove or disprove the existence of God.⁴⁰³

Beyond denominational Christianity, cults of Nature, spiritualism, transcendentalism, Free Masonry, pantheism, and alternative forms of religion still provided quasi-theological visions of the world. The ability of scientists, particularly in Physics, Geology, and Biology to identify immutable natural laws, in fact, reinforced the notion of an intelligent designer.⁴⁰⁴ Europeans were, in a sense, being entirely “rational” in identifying themselves as God’s chosen people, for they had discovered the techniques to unlock His secrets.

of Secularization: On the Problem of the Catholic Revival in Nineteenth-Century Germany', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 38, issue 03, 1995, 647-70;

⁴⁰² J Sheehan, 'Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay', *The American Historical Review*, vol. 108, issue 4, 2003, 1061-80; For the anthropological and semantic use of “*Bildung*” see op. cit. Koselleck 2002, pp. 170-207.

⁴⁰³ Kierkegaard thought this trend of proving the existence of God was entirely *not* the point of Christian faith. S Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, Penguin Books, New York, 2006.

⁴⁰⁴ R Olsen, *Science and Scientism in Nineteenth Century Europe*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 2008; R Purrington, *Physics in the Nineteenth Century*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1997.

This feeling of superiority increased throughout the century as technology allowed contact with peoples throughout the world who appeared to be living in a different stage of human social organization. While colonial Europeans had been treating indigenous races, deemed “savages” or “primitives,” with little regard throughout the early modern era, in the nineteenth century, this domination needed to be “rationalized.” What gave Europeans the right to exploit and take land from other peoples? Men like Arthur Gobineau took the latest findings in linguistics and anthropology to determine a hierarchy of ethnic groups, nations, and communities.⁴⁰⁵ Indeed, the tangible experience of exploration was immanently related to racialized thinking. Without the vanguard of anthropologists, missionaries, and biologists who travelled into the uncharted heart of Africa and Asia, the European public might not have become so consumed with the relationship between their race and others. Missionaries, who had been an active element in the inimitable British impulse to export millions of its citizens to the corners of the Earth, involved themselves in such humanitarian missions as the banning of *suttee* (the ceremonial immolation of widows) in India, ending the Atlantic and Arabic slave trade, and exploring the ‘dark heart of Africa’ around Lake Victoria and the Mountains of the Moon in advance of ‘Christian civilization.’⁴⁰⁶

In *Lords of Human Kind*, V.G. Kiernan described the manner in which racist attitudes developed in every region of the world where the Europeans came in contact with native peoples.⁴⁰⁷ In some areas like the islands of the South Seas discovered by Captain Cook this led to an idealized image of the ‘noble savage.’ Elsewhere, as in the Sudan, the “horror and human

⁴⁰⁵ H Salmi, *Nineteenth Century Europe: A Cultural History*, Polity Press, Malden, MA, 2008.

⁴⁰⁶ op. cit. Ferguson 2000; V Kiernan *The Lords of Human Kind : European Attitudes to Other Cultures in the Imperial Age*, Serif, London, 1995.; op. cit. Moorehead 1983. This was also the first time any civilization engaged in vacations and exotic tourism, which included big game hunting and amateur anthropological research. op. cit. Hobsbawm 1996.

⁴⁰⁷ op. cit. Kiernan 1995

depravity” of the “witches’ brew of African primitivism and Muslim fanaticism” caused the British to engage in acts of violence equivalent in ruthlessness and self-righteousness.⁴⁰⁸ At the battle of Omdurman (1898), the Anglo-Egyptian forces used Maxim machine guns to slaughter up to 95% of the 52,000 dervishes with a loss of only 48 British soldiers.⁴⁰⁹ General Kitchener followed up the battle by desecrating the Mahdi leader’s tomb and carrying off his skull.⁴¹⁰ The brutality of some Europeans - for example, those engaged in King Leopold’s notorious rubber plantations - represented one of two trajectories of *acculturation*.⁴¹¹ The first attitude, which could be termed the ‘Conrad’ approach, was captured in *The Heart of Darkness*, in which Europeans “went native” - adopting violent practices that were unacceptable in “civilized” Europe, while simultaneously using the technical, instrumental skills useful for dominating the societies they assimilated into as gods or kings.⁴¹² More common, however, was what could be called the ‘Kipling’ approach, in which the civilizing mission was seen as a universally beneficial gift of a patriarchal race that was willing to sacrifice themselves for the betterment of humanity. The white man was willing to battle against heathenness, malnutrition, and disease to “serve their captives” needs.⁴¹³

Though some native races, such as the Zulus under Shaka, became idealized to portray the colonials as having put up a fight, most were considered ‘child-races’. As the century went on, race-thinking was used to scientifically justify the treatment and confiscation of property

⁴⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p. 226

⁴⁰⁹ *op. cit.* Ferguson 2000, p. 268

⁴¹⁰ *op. cit.* Kiernan 1995, p. 226.

⁴¹¹ A Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost : A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1999; I use the term “acculturation” in a technical sense, referring to the phenomena which results when groups of individuals with different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, leading to changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups. This process, while often examined at a sociological level, is also relevant at the individual level and is researched in the sub-discipline of psychological acculturation. see J Berry, ‘Acculturation’, in J Grusec and P Hastings (ed.), *Handbook of Socialization: Theory and Practice* The Guilford Press, New York, 2008).

⁴¹² J Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, Knopf, New York, 1993.

⁴¹³ *op. cit.* Salmi, p. 115-118

from weaker peoples.⁴¹⁴ In the twentieth century, this race-thinking was applied back upon Europe itself. Indeed, in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt argued that, in addition to Anti-Semitism as emerged in France's Dreyfus Affair, late nineteenth century imperialism was a primary source of twentieth century totalitarianism. As she said,

When the European mob discovered what a 'lovely virtue' a white skin could be in Africa, when the English conqueror in India became an administrator who no longer believed in the universal validity of law, but was convinced of his own innate capacity to rule and dominate, when the dragon-slayers turned into either 'white men' of 'higher breeds' or into bureaucrats and spies ... the stage seemed to be set for all possible horrors. Lying under anybody's nose were many of the elements which gathered together could create a totalitarian government on the basis of racism.⁴¹⁵

Indeed, it was not just scientific racism that developed, but also the bureaucratic administration of death that would become deployed during the purges under the Soviets and the Holocaust under the Nazis. Though developed in Cuba in the 1890s, concentration camps were first used substantially in war against the "white tribe" of Africa - the Dutch Afrikaners during the Boer War of 1899-1902.⁴¹⁶ In the same vein, Isabel Hull convincingly linked Germany's organization of mass death during their colonial administration in German Southwest Africa from 1904-1907 to the administration of concentration camps during World War II.⁴¹⁷

Indeed, the cases of the Boer War, German Southwest Africa, and the Belgian Congo were among the major scandals at the turn of the twentieth century that led to a breakdown in the popular perception of pure imperial motives.⁴¹⁸ The rationalization, or "alibi" as Freudian historian Peter Gay termed it, could no longer support the contradictions between the professed

⁴¹⁴ H Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Schocken Books, New York, 2004. pp. 158-184; op. cit. Kiernan 1995; op. cit. Gay 1984.

⁴¹⁵ op. cit. Arendt, p. 221

⁴¹⁶ *ibid.* pp. 191-207; op. cit. Black 2009 p. 195; op. cit. Ferguson 2000 pp. 272-82

⁴¹⁷ I Hull, *Absolute Destruction : Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2005.

⁴¹⁸ op. cit. Hale 1971

values of “Civilization” and “Christianity,” and the realities of economic and military exploitation.⁴¹⁹ Though popular social movements, like the Congo Reform Association rose to shut down specific egregious cases, the notions of racial superiority continued to grow unabated among segments of the European population. When coupled to nationalism, as in the Pan movements (pan-Germanic, pan-Slavic, etc.), these racialized political projects began dividing biologically identical populations from one another according to linguistic or cultural differences.⁴²⁰ As Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis of Anti-Semitism theorized, negative domestic social attributes could be ascribed to particular ethnicities.⁴²¹ So in Germany, enemies of the empire (*Reichsfeinde*) were considered to be foreign powers as well as domestic enemies (socialists, Leftist liberals, ethnic minorities, Catholics, etc.). The internal enemies were identified with international conspiracies (Catholics with Austria, Poles with Slavs and Russians, Jews with capitalism, Alsations with France, liberals with Britain and France, etc. etc.).⁴²² This reification of social conflict onto ethnic groups and nations allowed the process of “social imperialism” to contain some of the internal disorder threatening to undermine the legitimacy of the old regime political system during the *fin de siècle* and early twentieth century. The result was an intensely chauvinistic public affect. This was, on the one hand, the expression of official state communications reported by the media, but was also generated by the yellow media itself. In 1899, Conan Doyle suggested that the greatest threat to the twentieth century was “an irresponsible press,”⁴²³ while J.A. Hobson thought that “the modern newspaper is a Roman

⁴¹⁹ op. cit. Gay 1984, pp. 35-128

⁴²⁰ A Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires : Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923*, Routledge, London ; New York, 2001.

⁴²¹ M Horkheimer and T Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment : Philosophical Fragments*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 2002. pp. 137-172

⁴²² op. cit. Mann 1993, p. 789; see also M Postone, 'Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction To "Holocaust"', *New German Critique*, vol., issue 19, 1980, 97-115.

⁴²³ op. cit. Hale 1971, p. 3

arena, a Spanish bull-ring, and an English prize-fight rolled into one. The popularization of the power to read has made the press the chief instrument of brutality.”⁴²⁴

This jingoism, as well as scientific racism, patriarchy, demagoguery, and other ‘pathologies’ of nineteenth century European society, were reflections of psychologically repressed violence according to Peter Gay, who said, “Every culture, every class, every century, constructs its distinctive alibis for aggression. And each of these defensive strategems has its history. Most are sheer replicas of time-honored rationalizations, or subtle variations on them; only a handful ever manage to be truly innovative.”⁴²⁵ Gay identified three major rationales, or alibis, for aggressive impulses in the nineteenth century:

1. The case for competition – stemming from biological theory to economic, political, literary, and private life.
2. The construction of the convenient Other.
3. The cult of manliness – a nineteenth century adaptation of the aristocratic ideal of prowess.

These three expressions together constituted a distinctive “Victorian” culture, which was not unique to Britain under Queen Victoria, but also applied to France, Germany, the United States, and Europe in general. In order to understand this psychopathological mechanism at work, we should return to the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud that inspired Gay’s theoretical framework.

In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud considered the process of sublimation in the individual ego within the context of civilization as a whole. He wrote,

Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities,

⁴²⁴ quoted from Gay 1984, p. 525

⁴²⁵ *ibid.* p. 35

scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life...it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction ... of powerful instincts. This 'cultural frustration' dominates the large field of social relationships between human beings.⁴²⁶

Freud identified two contradictory instincts, *Eros* and *Thanatos*, that motivated individuals' relationship to society. Eros, the capacity for empathic, altruistic desire for human relationships leads individuals to identify with others and establish social bonds. The contrary drive, the death drive, leads individuals to resent 'civilization' which provides so many personality characteristics, especially the super-ego. The egoistic desire to sabotage one's civilization provides an inclination towards aggression, which civilization must channel and check. As Erich Fromm suggested, this psychological explanation, when placed in a sociobiological and historical framework, does not have to rely on an innate aggressive instinct, as Konrad Lorenz theorized in the mid-twentieth century.⁴²⁷ Rather, the real condition of existence of man qua man, establishes a neuropsychological structure that may take the form of malignant aggression, including *sadism* – the passion for power over another sentient being; and *necrophilia* – the passion to destroy life and the attraction to dead and purely mechanical things.⁴²⁸ Not every individual handles these aggressive impulses in the same way. Still, at an aggregate level, these instincts can be useful explanations for social phenomena. Not just war, but also competition between rigid ideologies and business firms.

It is no coincidence that team sports were also institutionalized during this period in the late nineteenth century. Again the technology of railroad provided a precondition that allowed remote schools and teams to travel to one another to compete. This necessitated codification of

⁴²⁶ op. cit. Freud 1963, p. 44

⁴²⁷ E Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, Holt, New York, 1973, K Lorenz, *On Aggression*, Methuen, London, 1966.

⁴²⁸ op. cit. Fromm 1973, p. 27

rules so that teams could coordinate their incredibly varied versions of Football in order to play together, leading to the three versions of American Football, Australian Rules (Rugby), and Soccer.⁴²⁹ The significance of sport is not most important for the athletes themselves, but rather, as in the Roman Coliseum, makes its most vital impact on the mass of spectators. Lewis Mumford described the effect:

Through his place in the chorus, the spectator finds his special release: usually cut off from close physical associations by his impersonal routine, he is now at one with a primitive undifferentiated group ...The spectator feels himself contributing by his presence to the victory of his side...for in the sports arena the spectator has the illusion of being completely mobilized and utilized.⁴³⁰

This is related to Freud's principles of Group Psychology, which were later incorporated by Adorno et al, in *The Authoritarian Personality*.⁴³¹ When one identifies with organized, artificial masses, such as the church or the army, one transfers the libidinal dependency for the "father" to the illusion of a supreme chief, or an authoritative idea, which is frequently negative.⁴³² By this mechanism, each individual becomes bound to both the leader and the other members in the group. While the specifics of Freud's oedipal framework are rightfully controversial, the general dynamic that establishes this form of mass psychology seems to be related to a number of the processes we have been discussed thus far: sports, nationalism, racism, and war. Georg Simmel theorized a similar process related to his in-group/out-group hypothesis by identifying a "rally round the flag" effect that increases support for political leaders. Conflict with an out-group increases the cohesion and political centralization of the in-group.⁴³³

⁴²⁹ op. cit. Gay 1984, p. 436-445

⁴³⁰ op. cit. Mumford 1963, p.

⁴³¹ S Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Hogarth Press, London, 1959; T Adorno, *The Authoritarian Personality*, Norton, New York, 1982.

⁴³² Institut für Sozialforschung (Frankfurt am Main, Germany), *Aspects of Sociology*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1972, pp. 72-88.

⁴³³ G Simmel, 'The Persistence of Social Groups. II', *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 3, issue 6, 1898, 829-36.; op. cit. Levy and Thompson, pg. 100

However, not all channels of aggression are necessarily harmful. For example, in the case of sports, we see in this period the development of the Olympic movement, intended specifically for the establishment of world peace through athletic competition. One need not identify with saber-rattling ideologies either, and could, instead engage with the substantial international peace movement that was incredibly vital throughout the century, with its greatest success in the decade immediately preceding World War I.⁴³⁴ In 1899, Bertha von Suttner, an Austrian aristocrat caused a sensation with her pacifist novel, *Die Waffen Nieder*, selling more than a million copies in eight languages. She later convinced Swedish industrialist Alfred Nobel to establish the Nobel peace prize in 1905, and enlisted Americans Theodore Roosevelt and Andrew Carnegie, as well as Czar Nicholas II of Russia to the cause of peace. Roosevelt soon thereafter resolved the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, while the Czar Nicholas convened the second Hague Conference to establish armament limitations. In 1910, Andrew Carnegie established the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. These were the culmination of a century of social peace movements, from the International Red Cross established in 1863 following the Austro-Sardinian war, to the Salvation Army, to the hundreds of Associations dedicated to the establishment of International Law.⁴³⁵

Ultimately, two contradictory ideologies were operating simultaneously within the idolum immediately preceding World War I: the international peace movement and the jingoist nationalist movement. These ideologies also drew from a number of laterally, dialectically, or mimetically related trends that existed simultaneously, such as the leisure consumer culture, free-market Liberalism, or Evangelical Christianity. How, precisely, the human individual

⁴³⁴ op. cit. Hale 1971, p. 19

⁴³⁵ These, approximately 400 organizations ranged from the Interparliamentary Union, the Institute of International Law, and the International Law Association to the International Union of Esperantist Vegetarians. *ibid.* p. 18

internalized these varied ideologies is difficult to say from this perspective. Of course, every individual personality was uniquely shaped at a microsociological level. Of these individuals, the ones we should be most focused on are those at the *political* level at which decisions of war and peace were made. This would certainly include the elites, who we have seen were largely composed of old regime class members. But we must also recall Michael Mann's definition of the state as an "active place." That is, these elites were also related to their populations and territories at large, from which they drew their power. These citizens and subjects lobbied the state for action that could be contradictory in practice or motivation. Industrialists might encourage arms production, while pacifists might demand arms reduction. As democratization proceeded throughout the century, these conciliations and contradictions became more significant even as many principles, such as trade liberalism, balance-of-power, and international law became institutionalized across time and space.

All of the military, economic, and political structural transformations outlined in the previous section were established within a cultural context, or *idolum*. Even as structural circumstances and considerations, such as accumulated surplus capital or diplomatic alliance opportunities might compel state actors to establish particular institutions to reinforce or countervail existing power relations, these actors did so with individual personalities shaped by their cultural, ideological, and class milieu.

Conclusion: "Capitalism" vs. "Civilization"

The above considerations related to war, modernity, and capitalism represent only a tentative outline of the major trends that took place across the nineteenth century (1815-1914).

However, the goal of this essay has been directed toward challenging Polanyi's thesis regarding the Hundred Years' Peace, and, by implication, economistic interpretations of war and society. In this direction there are several points upon which we can assert that, while economic variables were relevant and important, there is no basis upon which we can afford these economic conditions *primary* explanatory importance. First, geostrategy and war itself were autonomous pressures that continued to exert influence upon states. From the build-up of arms to the actual short wars that did take place, the period between 1815 and 1914 did not substantially differ from previous periods in military/diplomatic terms. While the influence of transnational capitalism did exert important encouragement in the form of imperialism, and discouragement in the form of a peace interest between Great Powers, no less important were the decisions by state actors to institutionalize balance-of-power principles. The consequence of attributing economic structural factors primary importance is that the actual development of the military in Europe becomes clouded. Conscription, military industrial development, and the rationalization of military theory within General Staffs were essential variables in both war and society. Without recognizing these trends one cannot properly understand the First World War, or the twentieth century that followed – a century that was by far the bloodiest period of human history. By looking at the actual development of war and the military in the nineteenth century we see that war is absolutely a component part of modernity.

By suggesting that war is somehow an atavism that has not yet been removed from modern society, the Liberal/Marxian tradition relegates our understanding of war to “feudal,” or “pre-modern” traditions held by the aristocratic rulers of national states. However, though the hereditary position of old regime aristocrats has been relatively minimized during the course of the twentieth century, this aristocratic class weakness was not present in the nineteenth century.

By examining the ways in which the aristocracy imparted their cultural codes of honor and glory to the rising bourgeoisie during this period we see the middle and lower classes - especially those in civil service positions - engaged in “irrational” jingoistic nationalism. This phenomenon is still with us today, as any newspaper headline regarding this or that “outrage” a nation or group has committed against our nation, can provide evidence of.

Furthermore, we must also follow the development of the modern individual consciousness in the age of industrialism and consumer capitalism. As traditional social bonds were replaced by rationalized and commodified systems of social relations, the individual was confronted with a void. According to Freudian conceptions of the pleasure principle and death drive, the individual latched onto illusory groups, or ‘imagined communities’, as Benedict Anderson would term them. Even if one does not assume the validity of psychoanalytic conceptions of the self, there can be little doubt that the modern psyche underwent tremendous change during the course of the nineteenth century. By the 1890s, intellectuals including Freud himself, as well as Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Karl Jung, Georges Sorel, and others were beginning to see how necessary a recognition of human consciousness was in order to understand the society they were living in.⁴³⁶ Sociologists, including Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, and Vilfredo Pareto, reacted to the distorted Enlightenment principles represented by positivism and Marxism to insist that human sciences could not be understood according to mechanistic natural laws. This pessimistic intellectual environment developed in the so-called *fin de siècle* societies of Paris and Vienna.⁴³⁷ Meanwhile, society at large experienced the *belle époque*, full of exotic consumer products available at the Paris Arcades, with public museums, zoos, and libraries

⁴³⁶ op. cit. Hughes 1958

⁴³⁷ E Weber, *France, Fin De Siècle*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986; C Schorske, *Fin-De-Siècle Vienna : Politics and Culture*, Vintage Books, New York, 1981.

extending knowledge to the masses.⁴³⁸ What wars, or threats of wars, existed were handled through the medium of a popular press, creating a battle of words between hawks and doves - one that has never ceased. Readers could invest themselves in these issues in entirely novel ways, especially as democratic developments proceeded towards fulfillment of the promise of the French Revolution. However, these citizens could just as easily invest their energy into following sports, or religious and labor movements, or Harry Houdini, or technical achievements like flight and cinema. All of this is to suggest that war, like other European institutions became transformed into a commodity on the market of the public sphere. In this sense, we can speak of the relationship between the capitalist economy and society as cultural practice, at the level of the bourgeois individual, as Theodor Adorno or Michel Foucault might term it.

As Adorno outlined in *Negative Dialectics*, individuals have become products of the exchange principle, or identity thinking. He wrote,

The individuals are not only character masks, agents of value in a supposedly separate economic sphere. Even where they think they have escaped the primacy of economics - all the way into their psychology, the *maison toleree* of uncomprehended individuality - they react under the compulsion of the universal.⁴³⁹

In this sense, the individual is not, as the ideology of individualism suggests, an autonomous utility maximizing agent, but rather a product of social content – of the societal totality, which in the modern era has become capitalist. This dialectical perspective was taken up by Moishe Postone in his critical Marxist analysis, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*. Postone suggested that Marx was really trying to communicate a theory of capitalism as a social totality, which was unique in human history. Marx's analysis is therefore exclusively applicable to modern society, and is not, as traditional Marxists have suggested, a transhistorical theory of political economy.

⁴³⁸ W Benjamin and R Tiedemann, *The Arcades Project*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999.

⁴³⁹ op. cit. Adorno 1973, p. 311

The modern capitalist social formation is constituted by a qualitatively homogenous social ‘substance,’ that is *alienation*.⁴⁴⁰ Alienation and commodity fetishism allow a single structuring principle to penetrate all social relations as a totality, in a way that is not the case in other social formations. These deep structures ground everyday action and thought which reconstitute those structures through practice. In this dialectical interaction between structure and agency, the capitalist totality reproduces the actors that willfully regenerate that totality without knowing the extent to which their interaction is constitutive of the society at large.

In this context, where capitalism is the social totality, we can begin to speak of the effect of capitalism on war. Unfortunately, this project will need to be left for another occasion. I would, however, like to make two points here regarding the dialectical framework of Adorno, Postone, and other critical theorists. First, although Postone borrows heavily from Pierre Bourdieu’s theories, which would include room for agents to improvise within the context of “fields” – I find the Marxist perspective lacks a positive theory of action.⁴⁴¹ Instead, I find Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration more useful, in that it allows actors, who are not “cultural dupes,” to engage in freedom of action relative to the amount of power resources they are able to draw from social structures.⁴⁴² This power need not be exclusively distributive (i.e. domination), but may also include collective power that is not a part of a zero-sum game. Structures constrain *and* enable.

Secondly, and more importantly, I find no reason why we should call that modern social totality “capitalism.” Saying modern society *is* capitalism assumes a normative stance that amounts to saying, ‘even if we acknowledge that base and superstructure are dialectically related

⁴⁴⁰ op. cit. Postone 1993, p. 79

⁴⁴¹ op. cit. Bourdieu 1977; op. cit. Swartz 1997; Calhoun 1995

⁴⁴² op. cit. Giddens 1979, 1984

- as Marx understood and Althusser did not - the social totality is still ultimately determined by the economic base.’ As I hope the discussion of war in the nineteenth century has demonstrated, there are many cases in which economic actions and structures could be deemed byproducts of military activity. At the same time, war could be stimulated by cultural and ideological concerns that were very isolated from economic issues. The complex totality of social issues, including economic, military, religious, ideological, political, scientific, sexual, and other concerns, are a necessary context through which any social phenomena needs to be understood. However, unless one is interested in studying *exclusively* economic phenomena, there seems no scientific reason to trace the core of modern society to economic issues. In many ways, this trend is itself a reflection of a modern society which is so economically obsessed; and the Marxian argument seems to be the greatest possible submission to the utilitarian idea that all human beings are simply materialistic greedy creatures – *homo economicus*. Instead, I propose that we return to the trend in the nineteenth and early twentieth century social analysis to engage in a discussion of “civilization.”⁴⁴³ What we have been talking about thus far concerns modern European *civilization*, and the role of war within it. Provided we do not reassume the master narrative that would associate civilization with the progress of European hegemony, the sociological use-value of a concept of social totality could prove very effective.

These concluding remarks are clearly only indications toward further research. By analyzing precisely what was lacking in the overly economically-determined Marxian, Liberal, and Realist theories, while noting what was effective and useful, a picture of war in the nineteenth century has begun to come into focus. But ultimately - like a grainy daguerreotype taken during the Crimean War to provide some context to the interested newspaper subscriber in

⁴⁴³ op. cit. Mumford 1963; op. cit. Elias 2000; op. cit. Freud 1963, etc. etc.

London or Barcelona - this research on war in the nineteenth century still needs further development.

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Appendix

Table A.1 – Wars, Revolutions and the Bond Market, 1830-1914

Event		Britain		France		Russia		Austria	
Starting Date		Peak Date	Increase ^a	Peak Date	Increase	Peak Date	Increase	Peak Date	Increase
1	7/27/1830	2/8/1831	67	4/2/1831	273				
2	2/22/1848			4/7/1848	505	4/7/1848	172	4/28/1848	662
3	6/2/1853	3/31/1854	52	4/7/1854	106	3/24/1854	175	3/31/1854	243
4	4/19/1859	4/29/1859	18	5/20/1859	50	5/27/1859	46	6/24/1859	426
5	6/7/1866			6/8/1866	9	6/8/1866	29	4/26/1867	298
6	7/2/1870			3/31/1871	181				
7	4/24/1877	5/4/1877	5	4/27/1877	12	4/27/1877	60	4/27/1877	59
8	2/4/1904					5/10/1906	129		
9	6/28/1914	7/13/1914	22	7/31/1914	5	7/13/1914	52	7/31/1914	42

^a All increases in basis points (one percent = 100 basis points)

Key:

1. 1830 Revolution: revolt against Charles X's ordinances
2. 1848 Revolution: revolt in Paris after ban on banquets
3. Crimean War: British fleet ordered to Dardanelles
4. Austro-Italian War: Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia to disarm
5. Austro-Prussian War: Prussian troops occupy Holstein
6. Franco-German War: Leopold of Hohenzollern's acceptance of Spanish throne
7. Russo-Turkish War: Russia declares war on Turkey
8. Russo-Japanese War and 1905 Revolution: outbreak of war
9. Approach of First World War: assassination at Sarajevo

Source: Ferguson 1999, p. 276; orig. *The Economist*

Table A.2 – Wars between “Western” Powers, 1815-1914^a

War	Western Powers Involved^b	Years	Duration (months)
Franco-Spanish	France v. Spain	1823	7.3
Navarino Bay	England, France, Russia v. Turkey	1827	0.1
Russo-Turkish I	Russia v. Turkey	1828-29	16.7
Russo-Turkish II	Russia v. Turkey	1877-78	8.8
Sino-French	France v. China	1884-85	11.8
Sino-Japanese	China v. Japan	1894-95	8.0
Spanish-American	USA v. Spain	1898	3.7
Russo-Japanese	Russia v. Japan	1904-05	19.3
Italo-Turkish	Italy v. Turkey	1911-12	12.7
Total			88.4

^a Does not include Great Power Wars listed in Table 3.2 (or Crimean War).

^b China, Japan, and USA are included when they entered into “Western” geopolitical orbit.

Source: Singer and Small 1972

Table A.3 – Wars by “Western” Powers against Lesser States, 1815-1914

War	States Involved	Years	Duration (months)
Mexican-American	USA v. Mexico	1846-48	21.1
First Schleswig-Holstein	Prussia v. Denmark	1848-49	8.1
Anglo-Persian	England v. Persia	1856-57	4.6
Spanish-Moroccan I	Spain v. Morocco	1859-60	5.2
Franco-Mexican	France v. Mexico	1862-67	57.7
Second Schleswig-Holstein	Prussia, Austria v. Denmark	1864	3.6
Spanish-Chilean	Spain v. Peru, Chile	1865-66	6.5
Greco-Turkish	Turkey v. Greece	1897	3.1
Spanish-Moroccan II	Spain v. Morocco	1909-10	8.5
First Balkan	Turkey v. Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria	1912-13	6.1
Second Balkan	Turkey, Serbia, Greece, Romania v. Bulgaria	1913	1.0
Total			125.5

Source: Singer and Small 1972

Table A.4 - Wars Involving “Western” States and Non-State Actors, 1815-1914

War	States Involved	Years	Duration (Months)
British-Mahabattan	England	1817-18	6.9
Greek	Turkey	1821-28	85.1
First Anglo-Burmese	England	1823-26	29.1
Javanese	Holland	1825-30	56.2
Russo-Persian	Russia	1826-28	17.0
First Polish	Russia	1831	8.3
First Syrian	Turkey	1831-32	13.7
First British Afghan	England	1838-42	48.4
Second Syrian	England, Turkey	1839-40	3.1
First British-Sikh	England	1845-46	2.9
Hungarian	Austria, Russia	1848-49	11.1
Second British-Sikh	England	1848-49	5.1
First Turco-Montenegrin	Turkey	1852-53	3.4
Sepoy	England	1857-59	22.9
Second Turco-Montenegrin	Turkey	1858-59	12.9
Second Polish	Russia	1863-64	14.9
Ten Years	Spain	1868-78	112.1
Dutch-Achinese	Holland	1873-78	65.2
Balkan	Turkey	1875-77	21.4
Bosnian	Austria	1878	2.1
Second British-Afghan	England	1878-80	18.2
British-Zulu	England	1879	5.7
Franco-Indochine	France	1882-84	25.7
Mahdist	England	1882-85	39.6
Franco-Madagascar	France	1894-95	9.7
Cuban	Spain	1895-98	37.3
Italo-Ethiopian	Italy	1895-96	10.5
First Philippine	Spain	1896-98	23.1
Second Philippine	USA	1899-1902	40.9
Boer	England	1899-1902	31.6
Total			784.1

Source: Singer and Small 1972

Table A.5 - Wars and Issues, 1815-1914

Wars/major armed interventions	Dates	Issues for original combatants
Austria – Naples	1820-21	1. Government composition
Austria – Piedmont	1821	1. Government composition
France – Spain	1822-23	1. Government composition
Russia (Greece, Great Britain, France) – Turkey	1828-29	1. National liberation/state creation (R., Gr., B.B., F.) 2. Protect religious confrères (R.) 3. Commerce/navigation (R., T.) 4. Protect ethnic confreres (R.) 5. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Belgium (France) – Holland	1830-33	1. National liberation/state creation (B., F.) 2. Maintain integrity of state (H.)
Turkey – Egypt	1832-33	1. Territory 2. Empire creation (E.) 3. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Turkey – Egypt	1839-47	1. Dynastic claims 2. Territory 3. Empire creation (E.) 4. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Prussia – Denmark	1848	1. Dynastic/succession claims (D.) 2. Territory 3. National unification/consolidation
Sardinia – Austria	1848-49	1. Territory 2. National unification/consolidation (S.) 3. Ideological liberation (S.) 4. Maintain integrity of empire (A.)
France – Roman Republic	1849	1. Government composition 2. Maintain regional dominance (F.)
Russia (Austria) – Hungary	1849	1. National liberation/state creation (H.) 2. Maintain integrity of empire (A., R.)
Turkey (Great Britain, France, Austria) – Russia	1853-56	1. Protect religious confrères (R.) 2. National liberation/state creation (Wallachia, Moldavia) (R.) 3. Balance of power (G.B., F., A.) 4. Maintain integrity of empire (T., G.B., F., A.) 5. Strategic territory (R.)

Table A.5 *continued*

Wars/major armed interventions	Dates	Issues for original combatants
Sardinia (France) – Austria	1859	1. Territory (F., S.) 2. National liberation/state creation (S.) 3. Ideological liberation (S.) 4. Maintain integrity of empire (A.)
German Confederation (Prussia) – Denmark	1863-64	1. Dynastic/succession claims 2. Protect ethnic confrères (P.) 3. Strategic territory (D.) 4. Enforce treaty terms (P.) 5. National unification/consolidation 6. Territory 7. Ethnic unification/irredenta
Russia – Poland	1863	1. National liberation/state creation (P.) 2. Maintain integrity of empire (R.)
Austria – Prussia (Italy)	1866	1. Territory 2. National unification/consolidation (P., I) 3. Maintain regional dominance (A.)
Italy – Roman Republic	1870	1. National unification/consolidation (I.) 2. Regime/state survival (R.R.)
France – Prussia	1870	1. National honor (F.) 2. Test of strength 3. National unification/consolidation (P.)
Serbia, Montenegro – Turkey	1876-1878	1. Territory 2. National unification/consolidation (S., M.) 3. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Russia – Turkey	1877-1878	1. Protect religious confrères (R.) 2. Territory 3. National liberation/state creation (Wallachia, Moldavia) (R.) 4. Protect ethnic confrères (R.) 5. Commerce/navigation (R.) 6. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Bulgaria – Turkey	1885	1. Ethnic unification/irredenta (B.) 2. National unification/consolidation (B.) 3. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)

Table A.5 *continued*

Wars/major armed interventions	Dates	Issues for original combatants
Serbia – Bulgaria	1885	1. Territory
Turkey – Greece	1897	1. Protect ethnic confreres 2. National liberation/state creation (Crete)
Spain – United States	1898	1. Ideological liberation (U.S.) 2. Commerce/navigation (U.S.) 3. Maintain integrity of empire (S.) 4. National liberation/state creation (Cuba, U.S.)
Russia, Great Britain, Germany – Chinese rebels	1898-1900	1. Maintain regional dominance 2. Commerce/navigation 3. Autonomy (C.)
Boer Republics – Great Britain	1899-1902	1. Strategic territory (G.B.) 2. Autonomy (B.) 3. Protect nationals/commercial interests abroad (G.B.)
Japan – Russia	1904-1905	1. Empire creation (R.) 2. Colonial competition 3. Strategic territory (J.)
Italy – Turkey	1911-1912	1. Territory 2. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia – Turkey	1912-1913	1. Territory 2. Maintain integrity of empire (T.)
Bulgaria – Serbia, Greece	1913	1. Territory
Austria-Hungary – Serbia	1914	2. National honor (A.) 3. Maintain integrity of empire (A.) 4. Protect ethnic confrères (S.) 5. Regime/state survival (A.)

Source: Holsti 1991, pp. 140-142

Table A.6 – Issues that Generated Wars, 1815-1914

Issues	Frequency	% of wars	Previous period % ^a	I.E.M.P Type ^b
Maintain integrity of state/empire	17	55	8	P
Territory	13	42	67	P
National liberation/ state creation	9	29	8	I, P
National unification/ consolidation	8	26	-	I, P
Protect ethnic confrères	5	16	-	I
Government composition	4	13	14	P
Strategic territory	4	13	17	M
Commerce/navigation	4	13	36	E
Dynastic/succession claims	3	10	22	P
Ideological liberation	3	10	1	I
Protect religious confrères	3	10	11	I
Maintain regional dominance	3	10	-	E, P
Empire creation	3	10	11	P
Regime/state survival	2	6	17	P
Ethnic unification/irredenta	2	6	-	I
National crown honor	2	6	3	P
Autonomy	2	6	-	P
Balance of power	1	3	3	P
Enforce treaty terms	1	3	8	E
Test of strength	1	3	-	M
Colonial competition	1	3	11	E
Protect nationals/ commercial interests abroad	1	3	-	E
Total	92			

^a 1715-1814^b Ideological (I); Economic (E.); Military (M); Political (P)

Source: Holsti 1991, p. 145

Table A.7 – Progress of Railway Building

Number of countries in Europe	1845	1855	1865	1875
with railways	9	14	16	18
with over 1,000 km. railway line	3	6	10	15
with over 10,000 km. railway line	-	3	3	5

Source: Hobsbawm 1996, p. 54

Table A.8 – Density of Railway Network, 1880

km² (per 10,000)	Country
over 1,000	Belgium
over 750	United Kingdom
over 500	Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands
250-499	France, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Italy
100-249	Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Rumania, United States, Cuba
50-99	Turkey, Chile, New Zealand, Trinidad, Victoria, Java
10-49	Norway, Finland, Russia, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, Jamaica, India, Ceylon, Tasmania, N.S. Wales, S. Australia, Cape Colony, Algeria, Egypt, Tunis

Source: Hobsbawm 1996, p. 310

Table A.9 – Wars, New Technology and Weapons, 1800-1914

Year	War	Technology/Weapon
1800	French revolutionary	Chemical-electric primary cell
1805		Percussion cap
1809		Bottled food
1813		Steam-powered armored warship
1820		Electromagnetic rotation
1821		Natural-gas well
1822		Photographic plate
1827		Water-turbine engine
1831		Steam-turbine engine; Electromagnetic induction
1833		Plastics
1834	First Afghan First Opium	Electric motor; Computer
1837		Screw-propelled boat; Practical telegraph system
1839-42		
1839		Fuel cell; Canned food
1845-9	Anglo-Sikh	
1845		Pneumatic tire
1846		Nitrocellulose; Rodman gun barrel; Anesthetics; Arc light, Carbon;
1849		Bombs from unmanned balloons
1850		Morse code with telegraph ‘sounding key’
1850-64	Taiping Rebellion	
1851		All-steel artillery piece
1852		Repeater rifle; Man-carrying, non-rigid airship
1854-7	Crimean	
1854		Periscope
1855		Cowen’s armored fighting vehicle; Refrigeration; Rodman powder
1856-60		
1856	Second Opium	Bessemer steel
1857-58	Indian Mutiny	
1858		Heliograph; Aerial Photography

Table A.9 – continued

Year	War	Technology/Weapon
1859	Austro-Piedmont	<i>La Gloire</i> armored ship; Breech-loading artillery; Hand-rotated machine-gun; First successful oil well; Lead-acid storage battery
1860		Magazine rifle
1861-5	American Civil	Turreted ironclad warship
1861-7	Franco-Mexican	Pasteurized food
1864	Danish-Prussian	
1865		Antiseptics
1866	Austro-Prussian Austro-Italian	Locomotive torpedo
1870-71	Franco-Prussian	Anti-aircraft gun
1870		Xylonite (Celluloid)
1873		Spar torpedo-boat; Practical typewriter
1874		Barbed wire
1875		Ballistite smokeless powder; Cordite
1876		Telephone; Four-stroke gas engine; Locomotive torpedo-boat
1877-8	Russo-Turkish	
1878-80	Second Afghan	
1879		Electric-light bulb; Dynamo
1880-81	First Boer	
1881		Searchlight
1882		Armored Steel
1883-5	Sino-French	
1884		Destroyer; Steam-turbine dynamo
1885		Four-wheel motor carriage; Smokeless powder; Semi-automatic machine-gun
1886		Electrically powered submarine
1888		Portable roll-film camera; Pneumatic tyre
1889		Cine-camera; Radio waves;

Table A.9 – *continued*

Year	War	Technology/Weapon
1890		Electromechanical computer
1892		Detected radio signal
1894-5	Sino-Japanese	
1895		Radio transmission and reception; Gyroscope
1897		Steam-turbine-engine ship; French 75mm field gun; Cathode-ray-tube oscilloscope
1898	Spanish-American	Wire recorder (forerunner of tape recorder)
1899-1901	Second Boer	Armored car
1899		Plastic explosive (later RDX)
1900-1901	Boxer Rebellion	
1900		Gas-electric submarine; Rigid airship
1901		Transatlantic radio link
1902		Thermionic diode valve; TNT
1903		Powered, heavier-than-air flying machine
1904-5	Russo-Japanese	Radio-direction-finding (DF)
1905		Dreadnought battleship; Scott naval fire-control system
1906		Radio crystal detector
1908		Voice radio
1909		Duralumin; Bakelite
1910		Aerial bombing; Armed aircraft; Nuclear theory; Shipborne aircraft
1911-50	Chinese revolutionary	
1911-12	Italo-Turkish	Seaplane; Airborne torpedo
1912-13	Balkan	Aircraft catapult

Source: Macksey 1993, pp. xv-xix

Table A.10 – Central^a State Expenditures in Current Prices, 1800-1910

Year	<u>Austria</u>				<u>Prussia-Germany</u>			
	Absolute (millions of florins)	% of GNP	% Military	% Civilian ^b	Absolute (millions of marks)	% of GNP	% Military	% Civilian
1810	216		57	15				
1820	160		35	33	201	19	38	45
1830	138	9	33	35	219	17	34	50
1840	165	9	33	35	204	12	35	53
1850	269	11	47	34	252	9	37	48
1860	367	11	51	39	323	8	36	49
1870	332	11	24	46	1,380	15	40	22
1880	432	12	19	45	519	4	82	15
1890	560	13	19	39	1,044	5	78	25
1900	803	15	17	47	1,494	5	59	35
1910	1,451	17	16	60	2,673	6	52	40

Year	<u>France</u>				<u>Great Britain</u>			
	Absolute (millions of francs)	% of GNP	% Military	% Civilian	Absolute (millions of pounds)	% of GNP	% Military	% Civilian
1800	726	9	64	24	51.0	19	31	5
1810	934	10	75	9	81.5	27	59	11
1820	907	7	25	48	57.5	20	29	17
1830	1,095	7	30	47	53.7	16	28	18
1840	1,363	8	34	49	53.4	12	26	19
1850	1,473	9	35	29	55.5	10	27	22
1860	2,084	9	39	17	69.6	11	25	34
1870	2,482	10	26	32	67.1	7	32	28
1880	3,141	13	30	39	81.5	8	53	35
1890	3,154	14	34	32	90.6	7	36	37
1900	3,557	12	38	36	143.7	9	48	36
1910	3,878	11	37	40	156.9		40	47

^a Mann also provides figures for All government expenditures (i.e. beyond central state expenditures). Adding these slightly increases % allocated to civilian expenditures)

^b Civilian + Military + Interest = 100 %

Source: Mann 1993, pp. 363, 366, 373

Table A.11 – Land of the British Isles Held in Estates of 1,000+ Acres, 1880

Country	Number of Owners	Total acres owned	% of total land area owned
England	4,736	12,825,643	56.1
Wales	672	1,490,915	60.78
Ireland	3,745	15,802,737	78.4
Scotland	1,758	17,584,828	92.82
Total (UK)	10,911	47,704,123	66.14
Total (Russia)		177,000,000	14.0
Total (France)		-	20.0
Total (Prussia)		-	40.0
Total (Spain)		-	52.0

Source: Cannadine 1990, pp. 9, 19

Vita

Eric Royal Lybeck graduated with a Bachelor of Arts from Rutgers University in 2003 with two majors in Religion and English (Cinema Studies). He received high honors (magna cum laude) from the College of Arts and Sciences and received high honors for his Religion Honors thesis, “Runes, Vikings, Kings, and Christ : Scandinavian Religions from 800 to 1250 C.E.” Between 2003 and 2008, Eric became a partner in the start-up confections manufacturing company, Oral Fixation Mints and helped run the operations of the international business. In 2008, Eric accepted a graduate teaching assistantship at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville Department of Sociology. Eric graduated with a Masters of Arts in Sociology with a concentration in Political Economy in August 2010. He is continuing his education in the PhD program at University of Tennessee-Knoxville.