





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


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Associate Vice Chancellor
and Dean of The Graduate School

**AFTERMATH OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965:
RACIAL VOTING PATTERNS IN MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTIONS,
1967-1991**

A DISSERTATION

Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

by
Sharon Denise Wright

August 1993

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Annie Ruth Wright, who has given me life, love, and courage.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my highest gratitude to my major professor and friend, Dr. John Scheb for his advice, guidance, and patience as well as to my other committee members Dr. Paul Bergeron, Dr. William Lyons, and Dr. Otis Stephens. I would also like to thank my family, Willie, Ruth, Donald, and Janice with special acknowledgement to my loving brother Marvin who was always supportive of me throughout my long ten-year educational struggle. I want to give special thanks to my colleagues in the Department of Pan-African Studies at the University of Louisville - Ms. Angela White, Dr. Robert Douglas, Dr. Blaine Hudson, my sister Dr. Yvonne Jones, and my mentor Dr. Deidre Badejo. Finally, I wish to thank my fiance Cerea Beal Jr. for his love and understanding.

ABSTRACT

On October 4, 1991, voters in Memphis, Tennessee elected their first Black mayor. Dr. Willie W. Herenton became the sixth Black mayor of a major American city. He defeated the incumbent Richard C. (Dick) Hackett by 172 votes, the narrowest margin of victory in the city's history.¹

The Herenton victory is unusually significant. Until this point, Memphis, a city with 610,000 residents and an approximately 55 percent Black population, was one of only three cities with the 15 largest Black populations that had not elected a Black mayor. In the past, the major barriers to the election of a Black mayor in Memphis included the inability or refusal of Black leaders to support one Black candidate, the lack of White crossover votes for Black candidates, the low Black voter registration and turnout rates. Blacks have consistently cast crossover votes in sizable blocs to elect White candidates. However, before 1991, they failed to mobilize behind one single Black candidate for mayor. In most past Memphis mayoral elections, the Black vote became fragmented and split because of the number of Black candidates seeking the office. On the other hand, Whites voting as a bloc consistently elected their preferred candidates. This dissertation examined the factors that led to a Herenton win, but thwarted previous campaigns

¹Since the October 1991 election, different figures have been given for Herenton's margin of victory. Days after the election, a final audit showed a Herenton win by 142 votes. Also, newspaper accounts have reported that Herenton defeated Hackett by approximately 136 votes. In this dissertation, the original 172 vote margin will be used.

and found that a strong Black voting bloc and a large Black voter turnout rate were the major determinants of victory for Dr. Willie W. Herenton.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
Review of The Literature	7
Description of This Study	11
Significance of The Study	12
 CHAPTER ONE: ENFRANCHISEMENT AND MAYORAL HISTORY, 1865-1965	 13
Incorporation of Memphis	13
The Reconstruction Period	14
The Crump Machine and the Exploitation of Memphis Voters	22
The Beginning of Independent Politics	26
The 1960s: The First Period of Increased	
Black Officeholding Since the 1880s	30
The Case of <u>Baker v. Carr</u> and the Issue of	
Reapportionment	30
The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Implications	
for Memphis Mayoral Elections	33
The 1967 Mayoral Election: A.W. Willis Jr.	
Runs for Mayor	37
Final Results	42
 CHAPTER TWO: THE 1970s: THE EMERGENCE OF THE FORD ORGANIZATION AND THE HIGGS-CHANDLER RACES	 44
The Emergence of the Ford Organization	44
Organization or Machine?	45
The Ford Organization and Black Mayoral Politics	49
The 1975 Higgs-Chandler Race	50
Higgs and Turner: The Battle for the Black Vote in the	
General Election	50
The Chandler Strategy	53
The Runoff Candidates: Otis Higgs, The Black Guy	54
The Runoff Candidates: Wyeth Chandler, The White Guy ...	54
A Deracialized Runoff Campaign	55
An Examination of Results and Possible Reasons	
for Higgs' Defeat	56
The 1979 Higgs-Chandler Race	59
The Candidates of the General Election	59
The Chandler and Higgs Strategies	60
Flagrant Racial Attacks in the Runoff Election	62

An Examination of Results and Reasons for Higgs' Defeat	64
CHAPTER THREE: THE 1980s: A DECADE OF TOTAL FAILURE FOR BLACK MAYORAL CANDIDATES	67
The 1982 Special Election: The "Love-In" Ends for Dick Hackett and J.O.Patterson Jr.	67
1982: Harold Ford's Year?	67
A Split White Vote in the General Election	69
The Patterson Campaign	70
The Runoff Candidates: J.O. Patterson Jr.	71
The Runoff Candidates: Richard Cecil (Dick) Hackett	72
The Patterson Campaign: Attracting Crossover Support	73
The Patterson Campaign: Encouraging Black Voter Turnout ..	78
Results of the Runoff Election	80
The 1983 Election: Machine Politics vs. "White Money"	81
The 1983 Election: Anger, Disillusionment, and Total Failure	81
Black Leadership at the Crossroads: The Splitting of the Black Vote	81
Ford Bullying Tactics in a Racially Polarized Election	83
The 1987 Election: "Uncle Toms," "Black Racism," and "The Oprah Winfrey of Memphis"	87
The 1987 Election: Black Memphis Misses A Prime Opportunity	87
Divided and Conquered: The Splitting of the Black Vote	90
Black Racism	93
Results of the 1987 Election	95
CHAPTER FOUR: THE 1991 ELECTION: DR. WILLIE W. HERENTON TARGETS BLACK MOBILIZATION	97
An Assessment of the Herenton Victory	97
The Candidates: Dick Hackett	98
The Candidates: Dr. Willie Wilbert Herenton, Ed.D.	99
The Candidates: Robert "Prince Mongo" Hodges	100
Trouble in Paradise: The Choice of a Consensus Candidate ..	102
White Fears of a Black Mayor	109
Voter Registration Drives and Turnout Rates	111
Final Get-Out-The-Vote-Campaign	112
Crossover Votes	115
An End to Runoffs in At-Large Elections	119
The Failure of the Political Strategy of Deracialization	123

Further Evidence of Racial Polarization At-Large Elections and Countywide Races	128
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION	137
The Ascendancy of the "New Black Politics"	137
Findings	139
REFERENCES	143
APPENDICES	169
APPENDIX A. CANDIDATE VOTE TOTALS IN MEMPHIS GENERAL MAYORAL ELECTIONS	170
APPENDIX B. CANDIDATE VOTE TOTALS IN MEMPHIS RUNOFF MAYORAL ELECTIONS	171
APPENDIX C. CITYWIDE ESTIMATES OF REGISTERED VOTER PERCENTAGES IN MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTIONS	172
APPENDIX D. CITYWIDE TURNOUT IN MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTIONS	173
APPENDIX E. PRECINCT DATA	174
VITA	180

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1	Estimates of the Maximum Number of Citizens Voting in Either Democratic Primary or General Gubernatorial Elections 23
2	Population Totals of Memphis, 1900-1990 88
3	Racial Voting Patterns in General Elections Which Resulted in Runoff Elections 120
4	Racial Turnout in General Elections Which Resulted in Runoff Elections 121
5	1991 General Election Results 122
6	Citywide Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting Patterns in At-Large City Council Elections 130
7	Countywide Estimates of Districts With Highest Black Populations 132
8	1990 Population Totals in Tennessee's Largest Cities 135

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE		PAGE
1	Support for Hackett by Percentage of White Registration by Precinct, 1991	127
2	Support for Herenton by Percentage of White Registration by Precinct, 1991	128

INTRODUCTION

The Black electoral experience has undergone a gradual movement from "protest to politics" (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1985). From the Reconstruction era until the mid and late 1960s, Blacks focused on protest as a way to protect their right of suffrage. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, these votes led to Black representation during the era of the "new Black politics" (Nelson, 1987).

During Reconstruction, Black officials, many of whom were former slaves, were both appointed and elected throughout the state. In 1867, Black Tennesseans gained the right of suffrage. One year later, the Tennessee legislature passed an Act which allowed Black citizens to hold office and serve on juries. As a result of this Act's passage, Randall Brown and James C. Napier of Nashville became the first Black elected officials in Tennessee. Later in 1872, Dr. J.B. Young became the first Black contender in a mayoral race in the city of Knoxville. Beginning in the late 1880s, suffrage restrictions disfranchised Black voters. As a result, another substantial increase in Black officeholding would not take place until the 1960s.

During the Crump era (1910 to 1948), the Black vote was extremely powerful in the city of Memphis. Robert Church, one of the most influential Black Republicans in the state, persuaded Black Republican voters in Memphis to support Edward H. Crump's candidates in various races. Both Black and White citizens voted for Crump's candidates.

After the decline of Crump's influence, an age of independent politics began. During the 1950s, Black citizens again became candidates in elections. In 1951, Dr. J.E. Walker became the first Black candidate in a Memphis political race in 45 years. Although Walker's bid to become a city school board member failed, other Black Tennesseans were successful in 1959 municipal elections. During this time, Blacks were elected as city council members in Nashville and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Also in 1959, the first all-Black ticket competed in a Memphis election. Each of the four candidates - Russell Sugarmon Jr., A.W. Willis Jr., Benjamin Hooks, Reverend Roy Love, and Reverend Henry Clay Bunton - were defeated. However, they proved that Black candidates would continue to make serious efforts for political office in Memphis.

During the 1960s, Black politicians developed new hopes as a result of the 1962 Baker v. Carr decision. Two years later, A.W. Willis Jr. became the first Black Tennessean to serve in the state legislature since the 1880s. In 1965, Lyndon Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act. When first enacted, the Act did not apply to counties in Tennessee. However in later years, Black plaintiffs throughout the state challenged voting practices and procedures under section two of the Act. In 1967, three Black Memphians - Fred Davis, Reverend James L. Netters, and J.O. Patterson Jr. - were elected by predominantly Black districts as city council members. During the same year, A.W. Willis Jr. became the first Black mayoral candidate in Memphis. Although he only received 12 percent of the total vote, his candidacy provided

evidence that Black Memphians would continue to compete for the city's highest offices in future years.

Although Black citizens continued to enter Memphis mayoral races during the 1970s and 1980s, they were unable to translate their numerical majority into representation under the "new Black politics" (Nelson, 1987). This concept was defined by political scientist William E. Nelson Jr.:

The new Black politics looked inward to the reservoir of strength existing in the Black community for the power required to move the struggle for Black freedom to higher levels. Through the election of 'new breed' politicians to public office and the unification of the Black masses through community based institutions, the social and economic position of the Black community would be transformed. In places where they represented electoral majorities, Blacks would take over local governments, and reorient policy priorities toward a concern for the vital needs of the Black community. Wherever Blacks existed in significant numbers, the prevailing power structure would be compelled to address itself to the welfare of Black citizens. In this sense, the new Black politics would become an instrument of social change, permanently eradicating obstacles to the upward mobility and continuing progress of the entire Black community (Nelson, 1987).

During the 1970s and 1980s, Black candidates lost Memphis mayoral races because of confusion, disorganization, and apathy. In other cities, Black contenders used the political strategy of deracialization to win mayoral elections. Concentrating

on a cohesive Black vote along with limited White crossover support, they placed less focus on racial issues such as affirmative action, racial polarization, and the problems of the inner-city in favor of those that would not alienate the White electorate (McCormick, 1990). However in Memphis, Black citizens lost mayoral elections despite deracialized campaigns.

Voting patterns remained racially polarized with Black and White candidates garnering between 90 to 98 percent of their support from Black and White voters respectively. In 1975, candidate W. Otis Higgs Jr. (hereinafter referred to as Otis Higgs) emerged as the first serious Black contender for the mayoral office. In his first two unsuccessful bids for the mayoral office (1975 and 1979), he was encouraged by competitions in runoff elections, growing Black population rates, and limited crossover support, but his candidacies failed primarily because of Black turnout rates which were lower than White turnout percentages and racially polarized voting patterns.

A statement made by political scientists William E. Nelson Jr. and Philip J. Meranto characterized the state of Memphis' Black politics during the 1980s as Black voters failed to elect Black mayors despite a majority Black population:

In order for a group to wield political power, it is not enough that it be concentrated in large numbers in a limited geopolitical area. Political power [the ability to influence the allocation of governmental resources] in so far as it flows from electoral action, is achieved only if numbers are augmented by

group cohesion, leadership, political consciousness, and organization (Nelson and Meranto, 1977).

As a result of a lack of unity, effective leadership, and mobilization, the decade of the 1980s saw three separate failed Black mayoral bids. In the 1982 general election, J.O. Patterson Jr. received a total vote of 40.6 percent as opposed to 34.6 percent for eventual winner in the runoff Richard Cecil (hereinafter referred to as Dick) Hackett. A majority vote requirement in the general election and lower Black voter turnout rate in the runoff led to his defeat. In the 1983 and 1987 mayoral elections, Black candidates suffered mostly from split Black votes and Black voter turnout rates which were lower than White turnout percentages.

On October 4, 1991, voters in Memphis, Tennessee elected their first Black mayor. Dr. Willie W. Herenton defeated Dick Hackett by 172 votes, the narrowest margin of victory in the city's history (Bayne, 1991, pg. B1). Memphis, a city with 610,000 residents and an approximately 55 percent Black population, had finally elected a Black mayor.

Before Herenton's win, the major barriers to victory included the inability or refusal of Black leaders to support one Black candidate, the lack of White crossover votes for Black candidates, and disappointing Black turnout rates. Black participation has fluctuated during mayoral elections from 1967 to 1991. The highest was 60 percent in the 1982 runoff election. The lowest level of Black turnout was approximately 37 percent in the 1987 general election. Although Black turnout has been substantial in some mayoral elections, it remained lower than White turnout

before 1991. As a result, White candidates won mayoral races because of White voting majorities in racially polarized elections.

Black candidates were also defeated in elections in which Blacks had high levels of participation. For example, Black turnout totaled 56.5 percent in the 1975 runoff and 60 percent in the 1982 runoff. However, candidates Otis Higgs and J.O. Patterson lost primarily because Whites had higher turnout percentages and because of racially polarized voting.

In 1991, Black turnout surpassed that of Whites for the first time in a Memphis election by approximately four percent. The 48 percent Black turnout rate in 1991 was considerably lower than Black participation figures during the 1975 and 1982 runoff elections. However, this percentage was sufficient for the defeat of White candidate Dick Hackett since White turnout only totaled 44.3 percent. Black candidate Willie Herenton, like White candidates before him, benefitted from a small racial voting majority in a racially polarized election.

The major question this dissertation will examine concerns what factors led to a win for Herenton, but defeat for previous Black candidates. Three hypotheses will be tested. First, Black candidates were defeated in Memphis mayoral elections because of racially polarized voting patterns. Second, Black candidates were defeated because of a lack of White crossover support. Third, Black candidates were defeated because Black voter turnout remained lower than White voter turnout.

Analysis of the data reveals that racially polarized voting and lack of crossover votes were factors that led to defeat for Black mayoral candidates in Memphis.

However, the splitting of the Black vote, low Black turnout, and a majority vote requirement were more adequate explanations for the defeat of Black candidates prior to 1991. The key to the Herenton victory was a five month Black mobilization effort. It included the choice of a consensus candidate, massive voter registration drives, an attempt to attract crossover votes, and the encouragement of Black voter turnout and bloc voting. Each of these factors contributed to the Herenton win. Two additional factors which led to victory were a federal ruling which banned runoffs in city elections and racially polarized voting patterns. This dissertation will examine in detail how each factor contributed to the Herenton win.

Review of The Literature

Since the 1967 election of Carl Stokes as the first Black mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, many scholars have analyzed elections of Black mayors in American cities (Weinberg, 1968; Pettigrew, 1971; Levin 1974; Hahn, 1976; Nelson and Meranto, 1977; Bush, 1984; Preston, 1984; Kleppner, 1985; Franklin, 1989; Rich, 1989; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1990). These studies and others have analyzed various aspects of mayoral elections which involved Black candidates.

Many found that a significant increase in Black voter registration and turnout led to success for Black mayoral candidates as measured by their total votes received. For example, Michael Preston analyzed the 1983 Chicago mayoral election and found that Black voter registration, mobilization, and turnout led to Harold Washington's victory over Bernard Epton in the Chicago general election. In this election, the

overall turnout of 82 percent was among the highest of any election in Chicago's history. Washington defeated Bernard Epton by a margin of 51.4 percent to 48.3 percent. Like Dr. Willie Herenton, Washington won even though his campaign lacked money, organization, and endorsements from many Black legislators and aldermen.

Other studies have found that White and Black voters support candidates of their own race. Thus, they vote in blocs and seldom cast crossover votes. Charles P. Henry (1983) pointed out that even in cities with substantial Democratic support, Black Democratic candidates received little White support in partisan elections. For example in Gary, Indiana, Richard Hatcher received 14 percent of the White vote; in Cleveland, Carl Stokes received 15 percent; in Newark, Kenneth Gibson received 10 percent; and in Atlanta, Andrew Young received 11 percent. Because of racially polarized voting, Black candidates when competing against White candidates in mayoral elections have relied on substantial levels of Black support and small percentages of White crossover votes.

As of the date of this dissertation's writing, no research had been conducted on the campaigns of Black mayoral candidates in the state of Tennessee even though Blacks have been running for mayor since 1872. Also, two Black Tennesseans have served as mayors in other cities: Floyd Brown Jr. of Bradford and Billy Gene Wells of Bluff City. In 1962, William Wright analyzed racial voting patterns in a 1959 race for public works commissioner in Memphis Politics: A Study in Racial Bloc Voting. Two years later, Mingo Scott's The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental

Affairs, 1865-1965 (1964) provided a detailed description of both Black voting behavior from Reconstruction through the mid-1960s and the elections and appointments of Black officials in the state.

Two relatively recent political studies have addressed the inability of Memphians to elect a Black mayor. In 1989, Sandra Vaughn included a chapter entitled "Memphis: Heart of the Mid-South" in Robert D. Bullard's In Search of the New South: The Black Urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s. Vaughn found that Black mayoral candidates in Memphis lost elections because of an inability to attract the majority of Black votes (usually 35 to 45 percent) and a small number of White crossover votes. Also, Black voter turnout remained lower than that of Whites. Specifically Vaughn defined "the inability of Black leadership to unify behind a strong Black candidate, the unwillingness of Whites to vote for Blacks, the decline in grassroots political organizations, the nonpartisan nature of the city elections, and the neutralizing of race as a political issue" (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 118) as major factors, that prevented Memphians from electing a Black mayor. Thus according to Vaughn, the major impediments to the election of a Black mayor were the lack of mobilization among Black leaders and the Black community and the refusal of Whites to vote for Black candidates.

In 1991, Walter Leavy wrote a two-page article entitled, "New Black Mayors; A New Beginning In Memphis" for Ebony magazine. Like Vaughn, Leavy pointed out that the key to the Herenton victory was heavy voter registration and turnout among Blacks which surpassed that of Whites for the first time in Memphis history.

Also, Leavy found that in 1983 and 1987 mayoral elections, a split Black vote resulted from the inability of Blacks to support one Black candidate.

Although a small amount of political research exists on Black Tennesseans, a greater number of historical studies have been conducted. In 1977 and 1981, Lester Lamon wrote two books which detailed the history of Blacks in Tennessee. David M. Tucker focused on the Black civil rights movement in Memphis during the post-Crump machine era in Memphis Since Crump: Bossism, Blacks, and Civic Reformers, 1948-1968 (1980). The majority of Black historical research has focused on the Civil War and Reconstruction periods such as Alrutheus Ambush Taylor's The Negro in Tennessee, 1865-1880 (1940), Chase C. Mooney's Slavery in Tennessee (1957), and Joseph H. Cartwright's The Triumph of Jim Crow (1976).

Because of the shortage of literature on Black Tennesseans, this dissertation research relied heavily on newspaper articles primarily from the Memphis Commercial Appeal and Memphis Press-Scimitar, interviews, and the few existing books. Interviews were conducted with prior Black mayoral contenders John Ford and Otis Higgs as well as 1959 candidate for the public works commission Russell Sugarmon Jr. Sugarmon also worked actively during the 1967 Willis campaign and the 1975 and 1979 Higgs campaigns. Also, attorney and 1991 Herenton campaign manager Charles Carpenter provided a rich description and insight into activities associated with the Herenton mobilization effort as well as with Black mayoral campaigns of the 1980s.

Description of This Study

Black Tennesseans have served in political offices since Reconstruction. In the city of Memphis, A.W. Willis Jr., the first Black state representative since the 1880s, became the city's first Black mayoral contender in 1967. This dissertation focuses on the almost 25-year struggle of Black Memphians to win the mayoral office. It first traces the history of Black suffrage in Tennessee. Shortly after the Civil War, Black citizens were granted the right to vote. During the late 1860s and early 1870s, former Black slaves in Tennessee used their suffrage rights to elect Black candidates to office. Because of the passage of state laws and intimidation from Whites, the majority of Black Tennesseans were disfranchised. As a result, the number of Black officeholders decreased drastically beginning in the late 1880s.

Despite the disfranchisement of a substantial number of Black citizens, the Black vote in Tennessee remained strong. Realizing its power, the Crump machine controlled both the Black and White vote for over 40 years. Black Tennesseans would experience another increase in Black officeholding beginning in the mid and late 1960s.

After a general description of the struggle for Black suffrage and officeholding, this research next provides a comprehensive analysis of the political campaigns of Black mayoral candidates in the 1967, 1975, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1987, and 1991 elections. During the 1970s and 1980s, Black candidates were defeated in extremely polarized mayoral elections. In 1991, Dr. Willie W. Herenton won an election which was equally as polarized as previous elections. However, Herenton, unlike previous

Black candidates, defeated his opponent by effectively organizing the Black voting majority in a vigorous five-month campaign.

This research also compares the racial voting behavior in these mayoral elections with other at-large and countywide races. An analysis of mayoral, city council, and county clerk elections reveals that White and Black voters are more willing to cast crossover votes when Black candidates are endorsed by White political leaders and when races do not include credible Black contenders. The data used in this research are Shelby County Board of Election Commission returns from all Memphis precincts in various elections.

Significance of The Study

This dissertation will add to the small body of research that exists on Black Tennesseans. It is the first comprehensive work examining Black political behavior in the state of Tennessee with an emphasis on racial voting patterns in Memphis mayoral elections. These will be compared and contrasted with Black and White voting behavior in other types of elections to determine whether other types of campaigns (for example, district rather than at-large elections) are less polarized.

CHAPTER ONE:

ENFRANCHISEMENT AND MAYORAL HISTORY, 1865-1967

Incorporation of Memphis

When the Fourth Chickasaw Bluff (Memphis) entered the Union in 1796, it already had a thriving slave enterprise. The first Black slaves were brought there in 1795 (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 98). At first, the objective of slave labor was to build a Spanish fort (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 98). However in later years, the institution of slavery maintained the thriving cotton industry (Ornelas-Struve, 1982, pg. 60). The names of four public squares indicated their primary functions in the slave trade - Exchange, Auction, Market, and Court (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 98).

The Fourth Chickasaw Bluff later became the city of Memphis on December 19, 1826. At this time, it had a population of 663 inhabitants (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 98). In 1856, 30 years later, its population had grown to 22,643 (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 98). Also in that year, Blacks comprised 60 percent of the West Tennessee population (Mooney, 1976, pg. 63). By 1860, approximately one-fourth of Tennessee's total population was slave and only 7,300 were classified as free Blacks (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 212). Both the emancipated and enslaved Blacks faced many restrictions. They were constantly under watch, denied an education, restricted by a night curfew, and were forbidden from holding night meetings unless such meetings were approved or authorized by the mayor and witnessed by the police (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 99).

During the early and mid-1800s, the Tennessee legislature drafted measures which both maintained the institution of slavery and prevented the influx of free

Blacks into the state. For example, the state legislature passed a law in 1831 which prohibited the migration of free Blacks into the state and prohibited granting freedom to slaves unless provisions were made for their removal from the state (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 4). In 1834, members of the constitutional convention upheld the institution of slavery because of its importance and presumed inevitability in the state. A committee issued a report asserting that since Blacks were "doomed to dwell in the suburbs of society, [any] premature attempt on the part of the benevolent to get rid of the evils of slavery" (Mooney, 1946) was ill-advised. The convention also forbade the passage of laws which freed slaves without the consent of their owners and withdrew the right to vote which free Blacks previously held in Tennessee (Mooney, 1976, pg. 80).

The Reconstruction Period

Tennessee's former slaves, unlike those in other southern states, were granted at least some rights during the Reconstruction period. In January 1865, the state constitutional convention drafted two amendments. The first abolished slavery and the second forbade the legislature to make any laws upholding "the right of property in man" (Scott, 1964, pg. 4). Convention delegates also required the removal of section 31 from the state constitution. This section prohibited "the passage of laws emancipating slaves without the consent of their owner, and declared unconstitutional, null and void the ordinance of secession" (Scott, 1964, pg. 4). In an

election held on February 22, 1865, the proposed amendments were ratified by a popular vote of 24,293 to 48 (Scott, 1964, pg. 4).

On April 6, 1865, the Tennessee legislature approved an act which disfranchised former confederates and limited the right of suffrage to White men (Scott, 1964, pg. 8). On May 3, 1866, the legislature passed an amended version of the 1865 law which continued to deny the right of suffrage to ex-confederates. The 1866 Act outlined conditions which had to be met before citizens could vote including testimony from two persons stating that the individual seeking to vote had no previous affiliation with the confederacy and taking an oath of allegiance to the federal government (Scott, 1964, pg. 9). Neither the 1865 nor the 1866 suffrage laws enfranchised Black Tennesseans (Scott, 1964, pg. 11).

On July 20, 1866, Blacks were granted the right of suffrage when the Tennessee legislature ratified the Fourteenth Amendment which provided rights of U.S. and state citizenship to Blacks (Scott, 1964, pg. 11). Because of such ratification, Tennessee was readmitted to the Union. Also unlike other southern states, the state of Tennessee was not subject to the Congressional Plan of Reconstruction which required that states lose their representation both in Congress and the electoral college if they failed to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment (Scott, 1964, pg. 11).

On February 27, 1867, approximately one year after passage of the Amendment, the Tennessee legislature passed a law entitled An Act to Alter and Amend the Act Passed May 3, 1866. This law specifically conferred the right of suffrage on Black Tennesseans. It provided the following:

That every male inhabitant of this state, of the age of 21 years, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county wherein he may offer his vote, six months next preceding the day of election shall be entitled to the elective franchise, subject to certain exemptions and disqualifications which do not apply to Negroes (Acts of Tennessee of 1866-67).

In 1867, approximately 40,000 Black citizens had suffrage rights in the state of Tennessee. Recognizing the power of Black votes, the Radical Republican party created Union Leagues with the primary purpose of securing Black votes for their party as well as teaching the principles of loyalty, freedom, and good citizenship (Scott, 1964, pg. 17). Many Blacks believed that the Republican party had freed them from slavery and that in order to remain free, they had to vote Republican (Scott, 1964, pg. 18). In the August 1867 election, Governor William G. Brownlow, a Republican, defeated his opponent by approximately 40,000 votes partly because of overwhelming support from Black voters.

Although Black Tennesseans were enfranchised, they still faced obstacles in exercising their right to vote. The Ku Klux Klan (hereinafter referred to as the Klan), formed in Pulaski, Tennessee, was an organization which practiced racial intimidation. Its major objective was to "wrest control of the state government from the radicals by terrorizing and sometimes killing Union men and Negroes and preventing the latter especially from exercising the right to vote" (Scott, 1964, pg. 15). Conservatives viewed the Klan as a "necessary political expedient justified by the

radical disfranchisement policy, the high taxes of Brownlow's administration, and the threat Black voting posed the White supremacy" (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 13).

In addition to fears of Klan terrorism, Blacks faced the possibility of a loss of employment for their political activity. Conservatives often refused to employ Black citizens unless they supported conservative candidates (Scott, 1964, pg. 20). They also assaulted Blacks who were either members of the Union Leagues or attempted to form other political organizations (Scott, 1964, pg. 21). Despite these obstacles, a substantial number of Blacks continued to vote in Tennessee elections.

Since Black Tennesseans had secured suffrage rights, their next task was to gain the right to hold political office. Although a 1867 law enfranchised Black citizens, they were not allowed to hold office or serve on juries until January 31, 1868 (Scott, 1964, pg. 24). Beginning in 1868, Black candidates were both appointed and elected to offices in Tennessee. Randall Brown, a former slave, served on the Nashville city council from 1868 to 1870 and James C. Napier was appointed as county claims commissioner from 1868 to 1870 (Scott, 1964, pg. 30). In Knoxville, Alderman David Brown served from 1869 to 1870 and Alderman W.F. Yardley served from 1872 to 1873 (Scott, 1964, pg. 30). In January 1872, Dr. J.B. Young became the first Black mayoral candidate in Knoxville, but failed to receive any votes (Scott, 1964, pg. 31). Also, the 1872 election of Sampson W. Keeble of Nashville made him the first Black citizen to serve in the state legislature (Scott, 1964, pg. 28). In the city of Chattanooga, three Blacks were elected to the Board of Alderman - George Sowell (1871-72), Robert Marsh (1873-74), and D. Medlow (1875-76).

From the mid-1870s through the early 1880s, Black candidates continued to win elective office. In Memphis, Joseph Clouston, a successful businessman, was elected to the city council from 1874 to 1875 (Scott, 1964, pg. 44). Also, J.A. Thompson and H.C. Clowens were elected as magistrates from 1876 to 1878 and 1878 to 1884 respectively (Scott, 1964, pg. 44). From 1879 to 1880, Green E. Evans served on the Memphis city council (Scott, 1964, pg. 48). Additionally in 1881, Benjamin Payne became the first Black Memphian to serve in the state legislature followed by Leonard Howard in 1883, and Green E. Evans and W.A. Fields in 1885 (Scott, 1964, pg. 48).

During the early and mid-1880s, Blacks also maintained their strong position in the Republican party. In 1880, approximately 80,000 voters in Tennessee were Black Republicans (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 63). Since the Black vote in Tennessee was a decisive factor for candidate victories, both the Republican and Democratic parties sought Black votes.

Since gaining the right to vote in the late 1860s, the majority of Black citizens had provided strong support for Republican candidates. However during the 1880s, Black voters began a brief shift to the Democratic party primarily because of their anger at having their votes exploited by the Republicans. Another period of Black Democratic support would not occur until the 1930s. During the 1880s, the majority of White Republicans would neither vote for Black candidates nor allow their full participation in party affairs (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 67). Also in 1881, the majority of White Republicans in the state legislature favored a law upholding separate but equal

seating for Black and White railroad car passengers and a law banning interracial marriages in the state (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 76). Black alienation from the Republican party also increased because of their token representation on statewide Republican tickets (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 87).

As a result of these factors, in August 1886 Black voters in Memphis strongly supported the Democratic party in the Shelby County elections. They expressed dissatisfaction with the inclusion of only two Black candidates on the 1886 Republican ticket: Isaac F. Norris for county court clerk and Louis H. Fields for county register (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 88). Mainly as a result of the Black vote, the Democrats defeated the Republican ticket. Later in November 1886, the Black vote contributed to a landslide victory for Democratic gubernatorial candidate Robert L. Taylor (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 88). Republicans realized that without the Black vote, they would have greater difficulty in winning both local and statewide offices.

During the late 1880s, many White Tennesseans feared that Blacks could use their voting strength to challenge White supremacy. Angered by the loss of Black votes and the increase in Black demands, a group of White Republicans in the late 1880s advocated a lily-White Republican party which would exclude Black membership. Many White conservatives believed that an all-White party would attract larger percentages of White Democrats (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 94). Despite the lily-White movement, the majority of Black Tennesseans remained loyal members of the Republican party. However beginning in the late 1880s, White legislators

introduced suffrage restrictions which greatly curtailed Black political participation and led to a sharp decline in the number of Black officeholders.

Democrats remained fearful of the substantial number of Black Republicans. In January, 1889, the predominantly Democratic state legislature agreed to revise voter registration laws and required the payment of polls taxes. Senator John C. Myers introduced a bill which allowed the governor to appoint legislation officials, required prospective voters to register at least 20 days before the date of the election, and stipulated that they present registration certificates at the polls before being allowed to vote (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 223). Senator Joseph H. Dortch sponsored a secret-ballot law which only applied to Shelby and Davidson counties in Memphis and Nashville respectively and the cities of Knoxville and Chattanooga (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 224). All of these areas had strong Black participation votes. A provision included in the Dortch bill prohibited assistance to illiterate voters in marking their ballots (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 224). Such provisions would greatly curtail Black voting since approximately 54.2 percent of the state's Black population over ten years of age was illiterate compared to 17.8 percent of the White population (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 225). In 1890, the Dortch bill was revised to allow the listing of candidate names in alphabetical order without indicating their party identification. This change made it even more difficult for illiterate Blacks who were accustomed to voting for Republican candidates based on party symbols, which were listed next to their names (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 234).

After both the Myers and Dortch bills became law, Senator Benjamin J. Lea drafted legislation which required that separate booths be used when voting for national offices and for state offices (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 227). This bill also passed in both houses of the legislature. Its major result was to end federal supervision of local elections. As a result of the Lea bill, local election officials gained the freedom to fully intimidate Black voters.

In addition to the Myers, Dortch, and Lea bills, the Tennessee legislature in 1889 considered requiring voters to pay poll taxes. The 1870 state constitution included a provision requiring these fees, but it was later repealed by the 1873 legislature (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 229). In 1889, Representative J. D. Pearson's bill stated that the intent of poll tax requirements was not to disfranchise Blacks, but to provide additional funds for public schools (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 228). Although the Pearson bill was narrowly defeated in 1889, one year later another bill requiring payment of two-dollar poll tax fees passed in both houses of the legislature (Cartwright, 1976, pg. 233).

The Myers, Dortch, and Lea bills, as well as the poll tax requirement, resulted in massive disfranchisement of Black voters in Tennessee. In the August 1890 county elections, the percentages of Black voters decreased rapidly in Shelby, Davidson, Hamilton, and Knox counties. The small Black voting percentages resulted in major defeat for Black candidates. Only 17 Black citizens held political office from 1885 to 1900 (Scott, 1964, pg. 59). Also the state legislature lacked Black representation from 1889 to 1894 (Scott, 1964, pg. 59).

The Crump Machine and the Exploitation of Memphis Voters

On January 1, 1910, Edward H. Crump took office as mayor of Memphis. For almost 40 years, he maintained a powerful machine which allowed him to almost completely dominated Memphis politics. From approximately 1910 until 1948, both Black and White Memphians usually supported his candidates.

Crump's power in Memphis also allowed his favored candidates to win offices throughout the state of Tennessee (Key, 1977, pg. 63). A major reason for Crump's ability to translate his local influence into statewide control was the low voter turnout rates throughout the state. During the height of the Crump machine from the 1920s through the 1940s, only approximately one-fourth of Tennesseans voted in gubernatorial elections (Key, 1977, pg. 61). For example, the highest voter turnout rate recorded from 1920 to 1946 was approximately 34.5 percent in 1920 (Table 1). Since Crump had his greatest support bases in the two areas of the state with the highest voting percentages - Shelby County in West Tennessee and the predominantly Republican counties of East Tennessee - his candidates had little difficulty in winning elections (Key, 1977, pg. 65).

The major source of strength for the Crump machine in Memphis-Shelby County was the Black vote. The majority of Black citizens supported Crump because he was considered as the lesser of two evils in most mayoral elections. Although he had a paternalistic attitude toward Blacks that was typical of his time, he was more receptive to their needs and demands than other mayors and mayoral candidates. He regarded them as being inferior to Whites believing that White men were equal

citizens, but Black men had their "proper [subordinate] place" (Havard, 1972, pg. 183).

TABLE 1

***ESTIMATES OF THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF
CITIZENS VOTING IN EITHER DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
OR GENERAL GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS**

Year	Estimated Citizens 21 and Over	Maximum Number Voting	Per Cent Voting
1920	1,208,228	417,146	34.5
1922	1,249,264	265,647	21.3
1924	1,290,300	283,230	21.9
1926	1,331,336	233,246	17.5
1928	1,372,372	342,405	24.9
1930	1,413,414	331,873	23.5
1932	1,471,390	404,963	27.5
1936	1,587,342	436,279	27.5
1938	1,645,318	477,134	29.0
1940	1,703,299	448,720	26.3
1942	1,693,206	348,317	20.6
1944	1,631,581	441,191	27.0
1946	1,744,363	386,027	22.1

* The numbers and percentages listed show the highest voter turnout in either primary or general gubernatorial elections in Tennessee for the year.

Source: Shelby County Election Commission.

Black Tennesseans in Crump's view, were entitled to some "governmental care and service" (Miller, 1964, pg. 104). Thus during his political career, he made some improvements for the Memphis Black community: Douglass Park was built for

Blacks; Black medical inspectors were placed in Black schools; poor mothers received milk for their children; and Crump made efforts to end the harassment of Black citizens by local officials and magistrates (Miller, 1964, pg. 104). Crump also engineered dedications to Blacks whom he admired such as humanitarian T.O. Fuller (Fuller Park); attorney Will Foote (Foote Homes), and Tom Lee (marble shaft describing Lee's rescue of 31 people from the Mississippi river after the capsizing of a steamer in 1925) (Miller, 1964, pg. 206).

One major way in which the Crump organization maintained its machine was through the payment of poll taxes. Using money made in saloons, gambling houses, and brothels, Crump officials paid poll taxes for thousands of citizens who could not pay the two-dollar fee (Tucker, 1980, pg. 17). Blacks who could pay poll taxes were told both how to vote and whom to vote for by Crump's associates who collected registration and poll tax receipts, later redistributing them on election day for Blacks to show as evidence of their voting qualifications. Voters were then taken to the polls and told to vote for Crump's candidates (Wright, 1962, pg. 4). This practice became so extreme that in July 1928, the Memphis Commercial Appeal printed a cartoon depicting a White man telling Blacks how to vote with a caption reading "This Must Not Happen Again in Memphis" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1928).

Although Edward H. Crump was considered as being a step above other White politicians of his era, he was not to be hailed for his fair treatment of prominent Blacks. He used them to build and maintain his power base and later discarded them. One striking example was in his treatment of Robert Church, one

of the most influential Black Republicans in the state. Church began his political involvement by serving as delegate from the tenth district of Memphis at both the 1912 and 1916 Republican National Conventions. Also in 1916, Church along with Waymon Wilkerson, Leroy McCoy, J.T. Settles, and Bert M. Roddy, established the Lincoln Leagues. This organization conducted voter registration drives to recruit, organize, and register Black voters and voter schools to instruct them of the importance of voting (Scott, 1964, pg. 90).

Before the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Church persuaded Black Republican voters to support the Democratic Crump ticket in local and state elections (Tucker, 1980, pg. 18). His authority was most powerful during the administrations of Republican presidents. Church's endorsements for appointments and jobs were extremely influential during the Harding and Coolidge administrations. In fact, the Memphis Commercial Appeal reported that in 1928 all who received federal appointments in Memphis-Shelby County had been endorsed by Robert Church (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1928). However after the 1932 election of Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt and the subsequent shift of Black voters from the Republican to the Democratic parties, Crump no longer needed the support of Church and other Black Republicans. Since Church had not paid taxes on his real estate properties for years, Crump simply allowed the Memphis and Shelby County government to foreclose on his property (Bunche, 1930, pg. 493).

After destroying Church's power, Crump targeted other prominent Blacks. His police commissioner in 1940, Joe Boyle, targeted Blacks who "[fanned] racial

hatred" (Tucker, 1980, pg. 19). By this term was meant anyone who openly questioned or criticized Crump's bossism and sought parity for Blacks and Whites. For example, J.B. Martin, a local druggist and former supporter of the machine, was run out of town after he openly criticized bossism (Tucker, 1980, pg. 19). Also in 1940, Crump told the Black editor of the Memphis World: "You have a bunch of niggers teaching social equality, stirring up social hatred. . . . That damn paper is using Communistic propaganda - we are not going to put up with Pittsburgh stuff here. This is Memphis" (Tucker, 1980, pg. 19). Crump continued his paternalistic attitude toward Blacks, but wanted them to know that they were not to step out of their place by seeking equality with Whites.

The Beginning of Independent Politics

Crump's treatment of Robert Church was one of many factors which led to the end of his political machine. Blacks and labor organizations were two of the Crump organizations strongest opponents. Blacks grew frustrated with Crump's paternalistic attitude. They sought real change and were no longer content with limited improvements in their communities. Labor organizations had approximately 20,000 members and had revenue received from the collection of poll taxes. (Church, 1974, pg. 193). Both groups were determined to end the Crump bossism which had persisted for too long in Memphis politics. The result in the August 1948 primary elections was described as the "largest anti-Crump vote in all Crump's history" (Church, 1974, pg. 193). In that year, Senator Estes Kefauver and Governor Gordon

Browning led the slate of candidates who defeated Crump's candidates (Key, 1977, pg. 70).

In 1951, the decline of the Crump machine resulted in the first Black effort for a political office in 45 years. Dr. J.E. Walker, an insurance executive, sought membership on the Memphis City Board of Education. On November 8, 1951, Dr. Walker only received approximately 7,000 votes out of about 93,000 (Scott, 1964, pg. 118). Precinct returns revealed that neither Blacks nor Whites supported his school board bid. Citywide turnout was extremely low in the November elections and only half of voters in the 23 predominantly Black precincts of the city voted for Walker (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1951). In 1951, the number of Black and White registered voters in Memphis totaled 104,671 (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1951). Out of the 30,000 voters who participated in the election, only 7,433 voted for Walker (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1951).

In 1954, the year of Crump's death, Edmund Orgill was elected mayor of Memphis and new era in independent rather than boss politics began (Wright, 1962, pg. 2). The White community made two serious attempts at political mobilization. First, the Good Local Government League was organized in 1955 and led by Orgill and Edward Meeman, editors of the Memphis Press-Scimitar newspaper. This group was made up in large part of liberals and moderates who had opposed Crump in 1948 and in other elections. Surprisingly, it was open to Black membership. This fact along with the record of endorsing unsuccessful candidates in local elections may have contributed to its early demise (Wright, 1962, pg. 2).

The second major political attempt on the part of Whites after Crump's death was the formation of the Citizens for Progress. This group, founded in 1956, was more conservative and segregationist than was the Good Local Government League. Its motto was, "Keep Memphis Down in Dixie" (Wright, 1962, pg. 8). This group folded shortly after the 1958 elections in which none of their candidates were successful.

Black Tennesseans made their next major attempt at political mobilization during the municipal elections of 1959. On May 15, 1959, eight Black candidates competed for office in Nashville with two emerging victoriously - Attorneys Robert Lillard and Z. Alexander Looby (Scott, 1964, pg. 139). Both were elected in predominantly Black precincts as city council members. Also in 1959, Washington Butler Jr. became the first Black city councilman in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Scott, 1964, pg. 139).

In August 1959, Black attorneys, Russell Sugarmon Jr., Benjamin Hooks, and A.W. Willis Jr., entered as candidates in Memphis municipal elections. The Black community had grown tired of unfulfilled promises from White politicians who appealed to the Black vote to gain office, but did nothing for Blacks once elected. White politicians faced a dilemma after entering office between Black and White citizens. They could not meet Black needs to any great extent because of fears of White backlash. On the other hand, they could not completely ignore Black interests because of the increasing Black population and voter strength in Memphis. Because Black leaders realized that they could not depend on White support and because the

number of registered Black voters in Shelby County had increased from approximately 20,000 in 1951 to over 50,000 in 1959 (from 18 percent to 30 percent), an all-Black ticket entered in the 1959 elections (Wright, 1962, pg. 7). Since the White vote usually split, these young politicians hoped to win based on a strong Black voting bloc.

The most promising race was that of public works commissioner. Russell Sugarmon Jr., a Harvard law school graduate, was the sole Black candidate running against four Whites. He entered politics in 1959 at the age of 29 by serving as campaign manager to another Black attorney, S.A. Wilbun, in a race for state representative (Wright, 1962, pg. 7). During the Wilbun campaign, Sugarmon and several other young Black lawyers and businessmen organized the Shelby County Democratic Club to replace the old Black Democratic organization that had existed prior to 1958 (Wright, 1962, pg. 7). This new Democratic organization was designed to organize voters in predominantly Black wards and precincts. Its major goal was to establish one of its local branches in every precinct in which there were at least 50 Black voters (Wright, 1962, pg. 7). A Sugarmon win in the 1959 election would have resulted in the first Black elected victory in Memphis since the 1879 election of Green E. Evans to the city council (Scott, 1964, pg. 144).

Results of the 1959 election revealed a 63 percent Black turnout, but Whites also had a substantial turnout. Also, one White contender withdrew his candidacy so that the White vote would not be as split. When Will Fowler, a Memphis city engineer, dropped out of the race leaving four other White candidates, he announced,

"I have no desire to be a hero but simply to follow the dictates of my own conscience. I have a deep affection and respect for the good old Southern Negro and I do not wish to see the harmonious relation disturbed" (Cooke, 1987, pg. A13). Despite the split White vote, Sugarmon was still defeated mostly as a result of a strong White voting bloc. His 35,000 vote total was far short of the 59,000 garnered by City Personnel Director William Farris (Cooke, 1987, pg. A13). Hooks and Willis were also defeated. Although Black candidates were unsuccessful in winning elective office during the 1950s, the first major increase in the numbers of Black officeholders since Reconstruction would take place during the 1960s as the result of the 1962 Baker v. Carr decision, legislative reapportionment, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The 1960s: The First Period of Increased Black Officeholding Since the 1880s

The Case of Baker v. Carr and the Issue of Reapportionment

On March 26, 1962, the Supreme Court announced its decision concerning the case of Baker v. Carr. The justices declared that since reapportionment claims were "nonjusticiable political questions," plaintiffs were entitled to trials in federal courts. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Plaintiffs alleged that the failure on the part of the Tennessee legislature to reapportion seats in the General Assembly in accordance with population changed since 1901 resulted in a dilution of their votes and denied them equal protection of the laws under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 186. Because of population growth, voters in rural areas had greater representation than those in urban areas.

Article II of the Tennessee Constitution required that an apportionment of the House of Representatives be made in 1871 and reapportionment be made every ten years thereafter. Id at 186. In 1901, the General Assembly passed an apportionment act which did not provide a specific formula for reapportionment. Despite population shifts, the Tennessee legislature had not reapportioned its legislative seats since 1901.

After the Supreme Court's ruling that reapportionment claims constituted a justiciable causes of action in the case of Baker v. Carr, a special session of the legislature convened on May 29, 1962 to address the issue of reapportionment (Cortner, 1970, pg. 152). On June 6, 1962, the legislature passed the Baird-Bomar reapportionment plans and also agreed to revise the apportionment provisions in the state constitution (Cortner, 1970, pg. 154). Although the Baird-Bomar plans resulted in greater representation for counties with higher populations, they did not require that the houses of the legislature be apportioned on the basis of population growth (Cortner, 1970, pg. 154).

On June 22, 1962, a federal district court in Tennessee held that the plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment because they failed to end the discriminations present in the 1901 reapportionment statute and thus continued to violate the equal protection clause (Cortner, 1970, pg. 155). The court stated that the major problem was that the plans did not state a standard for reapportionment. Writing for the

Court, one of the judges stated, "If a state legislative classification for apportionment purposes is wholly irrational and arbitrary, supported neither by the standard of the state by any other standard, it is outside the permissible limits of the Fourteenth Amendment." Baker v. Carr, 296 F.Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).

In the 1964 case of Reynolds v. Sims, the U.S. Supreme Court finally set a standard for the apportionment of the houses in state legislatures. The Court stated that the principle of "one man, one vote," required states to provide equal representation in the houses of their legislatures. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Later in the 1964 case of West v. Carr, the Court held that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that districts be "as nearly as practicable of equal population" in both houses of a state legislature. West v. Carr, 378 U.S. 577 (1964).

The Baker v. Carr decision, and the reapportionment it led to, resulted in the first Black representative in the Tennessee General Assembly since the 1880s. In November 1964, A.W. Willis Jr. of Memphis was elected to the House of Representatives (Lamon, 1981, pg. 109). Blacks in other cities also were elected to political office. Five Blacks were elected to the Nashville city council - Robert Lillard, Z. Alexander Looby, Harold Love, John Davis, and Mansfield Douglas III (Scott, 1964, pg. 194). Washington Butler Jr. was elected to the Oak Ridge, Tennessee city council (Scott, 1964, pg. 194). Robert Scales became a Murfreesboro, Tennessee city council member and Attorney H.T. Lockherd was elected to serve on the Shelby county court (Scott, 1964, pg. 194).

The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Implications for Memphis Mayoral Elections

The state of Tennessee was one of few southern states where Blacks who attempted to register and vote were most successful. For this reason, counties throughout the state were not targeted by section four of the Voting Rights Act. Tennessee was also one of few southern states which had the largest gains in the numbers of Black registered voters during the mid and late 1960s. During the three-year period from 1962 to 1965, there was an increase of 67,100 Black registered voters (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1965).

The voting restrictions faced by Black voters in Tennessee were much less severe than those faced by Black voters in other southern cities which practiced discriminatory methods to deprive them of their right to vote. These included: grandfather clauses which required literacy tests for all U.S. citizens whose ancestors or "grandfathers" had not been entitled to vote prior to 1866; white primaries which excluded Blacks from membership in political parties; and literacy tests which required that Blacks be able to read and write in order to vote. In 1890, the state of Mississippi was the first to use grandfather clauses to disfranchise its Black citizens (Stephens and Scheb, 1991, pg. 1150). In 1915, three Supreme Court proceedings known as the "Grandfather Clause" cases nullified these clauses. Guinn v. U.S., 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); U.S. v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).

In 1939, the U.S. Supreme Court again invalidated the use of grandfather clauses in the case of Lane v. Wilson. In 1915, the Oklahoma legislature passed a

law which granted permanent voting rights only to individuals who were registered to vote in the 1914 general election which took place before the 1916 Guinn v. U.S. decision (Stephens and Scheb, 1993, pg. 1150). In referring to this legislation, the Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It his onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).

Concerning white primaries, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone overturned Grovey v. Townsend in the 1944 Texas case, Smith v. Allwright. In Grovey, Texas officials refused to provide a Black voter with an absentee ballot for a primary election solely because of his race. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). The Court held that since the officials of the primary election did not act under state authority, their denial of the right to vote was not a state action. *Id* at 45. If the state had denied suffrage rights on the basis of race or color, it would have committed a constitutional violation. *Id* at 55. In Smith v. Allwright, the Court ruled that the White primary violated the Fifteenth Amendment. In overruling Grovey v. Townsend, the Court held that since states provided political parties with the power to set the qualifications of primary elections, this delegation of authority was also the delegation of a state function that made the party's discriminatory action, authorized by the state. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

Although the poll tax was repealed in a 1953 constitutional amendment in the state of Tennessee, both Black and White voters in other states continued to pay them in federal elections until adoption of the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1963. In the 1966 case, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Warren Court declared that poll taxes in state elections violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Court stated that the requirement of a fee payment as a condition for voting was discriminatory because "wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process." Id at 663. This ruling overruled the Breedlove v. Suttles decision which upheld the use of poll taxes as a precondition for voting in state elections. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277; 58 S.Ct. 205; 82 L.Ed. 252 (1937).

Unlike grandfather clauses, white primaries, and poll taxes, the Supreme Court never struck down the use of literacy tests. In fact, the Court upheld them in the 1959 case, Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections. The majority of the justices believed that literacy tests were "a valid exercise of the state's power to control voter qualifications, as long as they were not applied discriminatorily." Lassiter v. Northampton Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Literacy tests were not done away with until Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Stephens and Scheb, 1993, pg. 1151).

The Act was the first comprehensive legislation by Congress to give complete voting rights to Black citizens. It was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on August 6, 1965, was designed to reinforce the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and

Twenty-fourth Amendments to the Constitution. It suspended all literacy tests, poll taxes, and other devices which disqualified voters in federal, state, local, general, or primary elections. At the time of the signing, the Act only applied to the states of Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, at least 26 counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona (Voting Rights Act of 1965).

The Voting Rights Act also provided for the assignment of federal examiners to list voters and poll watchers to monitor voting and to count ballots (Voting Rights Act of 1965). It used a triggering formula which targeted areas practicing voting discrimination. Criminal penalties would be imposed upon anyone who harassed, intimidated, threatened, or prevented any person from voting (Voting Rights Act of 1965). Also, those who were victims of voting discrimination would be entitled to administrative and civil remedies (Voting Rights Act of 1965). Before the passage of the Voting Rights Act, only four out of ten Black voters in the South were registered. According to the Southern Regional Council, this added up to 3.3 percent of all Southern voters in early 1965 in contrast to 73.2 percent of White registered voters (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1965).

Although when first enacted, the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the state of Tennessee, in later years Black Tennesseans challenged vote dilution efforts based on some of its provisions. Currently in Memphis and Shelby County, two suits remain unsettled. Both question the validity of majority vote requirements in at-large elections under section two of the Voting Rights Act. As of 1982, the amended

version of section two allows voters to question voting practices and procedures by showing that its result was discriminatory (Davidson, 1989, pg. 146). In the Memphis and Shelby County suits, plaintiffs allege that majority vote requirements have resulted in defeat for Black candidates seeking at-large positions. Thus although the Voting Rights Act was not necessary for providing suffrage rights to Black Tennesseans, it did give them legislation for prohibiting more subtle efforts at voter discrimination.

The 1967 Mayoral Election: A.W. Willis Jr. Runs for Mayor

On November 8, 1966, Memphians voted to approve a referendum which changed the form of city government from mayor-commission to mayor-council (Street, 1967, pg. A1). It stipulated that the city would now be run by a mayor who would carry out executive responsibilities and 13 councilmen who would handle legislative matters. Both the mayor and councilmen would serve four year terms. Six of the councilmen would hold at-large positions. The other seven would represent single-member districts. This new form of government would be effective on January 1, 1968 (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 117).

The shift was made in order to make city government more efficient. The previous mayor-commission form of government had been in effect for over 50 years and had resulted in mainly ineffective and at times corrupt administrations (Ahlgren, 1967, pg. 6). The new mayor-council government would separate executive and

legislative powers and prevent infringement by one department on the duties of the other (Ahlgren, 1967, pg. 6).

A.W. Willis Jr. was the first Black candidate to run for mayor under the new mayor-council form of government. His platform advocated the creation of a civilian review board, open housing laws, a new human relations council to replace the Memphis Community on Community Relations (hereinafter referred to as M.C.C.R.), and racially-neutral testing procedures to insure that Blacks were not excluded from municipal positions (Tucker, 1980, pg. 141). In 1967, Willis ran against six White candidates including former mayor Henry Loeb and incumbent William B. Ingram, both of whom proceeded to a runoff election. Backed by a solid White vote (90 percent of the total vote), Loeb eventually proceeded to the mayor's office (Tucker, 1980, pg. 117).

As in 1959, Black leaders had grown tired of exchanging support for unfulfilled promises from White liberals who failed to remedy problems resulting from police brutality, Black unemployment, failure to achieve full rather than token desegregation of public schools, accommodations, and other facilities, and achieving equality of opportunity (Tucker, 1980, pg. 140). White liberals, especially those who were members of the M.C.C.R., continued their paternalistic views that Black Memphians should be content with their virtual lack of equality. They pointed out that the city of Memphis was one of few Southern cities in which the desegregation of public accommodations had taken place both peacefully and voluntarily before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Tucker, 1980, pg. 140). However, analysts pointed out

that few restaurants cooperated, while the majority continued to discriminate against Black patrons (Tucker, 1980, pg. 140). Moreover, the M.C.C.R. neglected to address the massive unemployment problems of Black workers. Black leaders readily admitted that some gains had been made with major employers ordering the desegregation of restrooms, water fountains, and eating areas, but the majority of employers had hired token Black employees in order to avoid the harsh penalties imposed by Executive Order 11246 which prohibited discrimination by federal contractors, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which prohibited discrimination by private firms with more than 100 employees (Tucker, 1980, pg. 138).

One primary reason for the dismal Black hiring percentages was that White M.C.C.R. members accepted excuses from White employers given to delay the hiring of Black workers. They justified the absence of Black employees with explanations of their inabilities to find qualified Blacks because of educational levels and performance (Tucker, 1980, pg. 138). Blacks were also excluded from higher-ranking public school and municipal positions (Tucker, 1980, pg. 138).

The M.C.C.R. also failed to address the issue of police brutality. By 1966, reported cases of White violence against Black citizens and civil rights leaders had diminished (Tucker, 1980, pg. 140). For this reason in 1966, police commissioner Claude Armour ended negotiations with Black leaders although evidence remained of the presence of "excessive force [and] prejudicial behavior" (Tucker, 1980, pg. 140). Although the M.C.C.R. intervened by creating a new committee to analyze police misconduct; advocated integrated police squad cars; promotion of Black officers; and

discontinued use of the term "nigger" on police radios, Black leaders still remained unsatisfied with these actions which failed to lessen incidents of police brutality (Tucker, 1980, pg. 140).

Because of these broken promises and lack of effective results, Black leaders rejected traditional biracial coalitions with White liberals such as Lucius Burch, Edward J. Meeman, and Edmund Orgill who favored Commissioner Hunter Lane Jr. for mayor in the municipal election of 1967 (Tucker, 1980, pg. 141). Many Black citizens felt that Memphis was not ready for a Black mayor, but others felt that the climate would never be favorable for running a Black mayoral candidate. They reasoned that even if Willis failed miserably, Blacks would have accomplished two crucial goals. First, they would have demonstrated their burgeoning political strength. Also, they would have proven that they would no longer be content with second-hand promises from liberals in exchange for Black support, only to have their concerns ignored after election to office.

In the 1967 general election, Black voters had no discriminatory obstacles to voting, but simply refused to support Willis. The Black community lacked the ability for mass mobilization that led to the election of Black mayors in Cleveland, Ohio and Gary, Indiana during that same year. Cleveland, Gary, and other cities in later years, proved that the election of a Black mayor was possible only if the overwhelming majority of the Black community was mobilized in support of his candidacy. It was, and for the most part still is, obvious that Black candidates would probably not receive economic support from either the White business community or White

citizens in the form of contributions. The Willis campaign proved the validity of this assertion by receiving little if any financial support from either.

Moreover because of racial polarization, White Memphians would not vote for a Black candidate. However, Black voters in 1967 were more willing to cast crossover votes in favor of White candidate William B. Ingram. He received twice as much support as Willis in many Black precincts. On average, Ingram received approximately 60 percent and higher in predominantly Black precincts as compared to approximately 39 percent for Willis (Shelby County election returns).

The major reasons for Black indifference to the Willis campaign was the lack of confidence in the possibility of victory and fear of another Loeb administration. Concerning the former, Black Memphis believed that the Willis bid for mayor was ill-advised. Victory was inconceivable because the Black electorate only numbered 37 percent in 1967 (Covington, 1967, pg. C17). Also, an atmosphere of racism, racial polarization, and White paternalism remained in the city.

Another consideration was the candidacy of former mayor and avid segregationist Henry Loeb who sought reelection to the mayor's office. Loeb had served as public works commissioner for four years and resigned from the mayoral office shortly before the end of a full four year term (1960-1963) for personal reasons (Street, 1967, pg. A1). Blacks feared the possibility of another Loeb administration to such degree that many believed rumors before the election that Loeb had paid Willis \$35,000 to enter the campaign, split the Black vote, and assure his win (Covington, 1967, pg. C17).

Moreover, Black citizens and the influential Black ministry overwhelmingly believed Ingram's claim that substantial gains had been made in the area of Black employment during his tenure when in reality, a disproportionate amount (37 percent) of Black municipal workers mainly held positions in garbage collection (Lamon, 1970, pg. 112). Also according to the local chapter of the National Association for the Advance of Colored People (hereinafter referred to as N.A.A.C.P.), Blacks held less than eight percent of white-collar positions (Tucker, 1980, pg. 141). Ironically, a few months after Ingram's loss to Henry Loeb, in April 1968 civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. would be assassinated in Memphis while addressing the exploitation of Black sanitation workers whose demands for parity in pay and working conditions had been ignored by the Ingram administration and were completely rejected by the Loeb administration.

Final Results

In the 1967 mayoral election, 235,303 or 60% of registered voters turned out on election day. Loeb received approximately 47,000 votes (33 percent of the total vote) (Shelby County election returns). Ingram placed second with 36,000 votes (24.9 percent) (Shelby County election returns). William N. Morris placed third with 30,979 votes (21.3 percent) (Shelby County election returns). Hunter Lane and other candidates received approximately 12,000 votes (8.5 percent) (Shelby County election returns). Willis only garnered approximately 18,000 votes which totaled 12.3 percent of the total vote (Shelby County election returns). He commented in disgust that "the

disgust [of the defeat] is [that the] people who could most benefit, the Negro people, could not grasp the problems" (Street, October 6, 1967, pg. A1).

The Willis campaign and subsequent failed campaigns by Black mayoral candidates led to the stereotypical belief that Black voters in Memphis were too nonchalant to elect a Black mayor. The Willis effort showed Black indifference by not turning out to the polls. The majority of those who voted supported White candidate Ingram instead of Willis. Because of Willis' poor showing, this election was tame on the subject of racism, later elections would reveal another dilemma in Memphis mayoral elections - the problem of racial divisiveness.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE 1970s: THE EMERGENCE OF THE FORD ORGANIZATION AND THE HIGGS-CHANDLER RACES

The Emergence of the Ford Organization

The Ford organization or Ford machine, as it has oftentimes been described, consists of three brothers who have been actively involved in local, state, and national politics since the decade of the 1970s: U.S. Representative Harold Ford (D-Memphis), Tennessee senator John Ford, and Memphis city councilman James Ford. Another brother, Emmitt Ford, was elected to the Tennessee House of Representatives in 1974, but was convicted in 1980 of a scheme to cheat 29 insurance companies on a hit-and-run accident. He served eight months of a 20-month sentence (Covington, 1987, pg. A12).

Harold Ford began his political career in 1970 after being elected to the state House of Representatives (Covington, 1987, pg. A12). After serving two terms in the House, Ford in 1974, benefiting from a higher than usual Black turnout (54 percent for Blacks as opposed to 58 percent for Whites), defeated three-term Republican congressman Dan Kuykendall by approximately 744 votes as U.S. Representative from the ninth congressional district in Memphis (Covington, 1987, pg. A12). He received almost 100 percent of the Black vote and approximately 15 percent of the White vote (Bernsen, 1990, pg. A1). This victory made him the first Black citizen from the state of Tennessee to be elected to the U.S. Congress (Vaughn, 1989, pg. 117).

Although Ford faced credible opposition in 1976 from then city councilman A.D. Alissandratos and in 1980 from then county commissioner Minerva Johnican, his congressional seat has not been threatened by a serious contender since the 1974 campaign (Covington, 1987, pg. A12). Also, he has been reelected nine times, each times by an overwhelming margin.

In 1971, Harold's older and more controversial brother, John Ford, defeated Rev. James L. Netters for the district six seat on the Memphis City Council (Covington, 1987, pg. A12). After being elected to serve two four-year terms, he was elected as state senator in 1974, a position he continues to hold. Dr. James Ford, a theologian, ophthalmologist, and attorney, defeated seven opponents for election to the Memphis City Council in 1979 (Williams, 1979, pg. A1). In gaining this seat, the younger Ford replaced his older brother John who relinquished his office after election to the state Senate.

Organization or Machine?

Political scientists Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson defined a political machine as:

A party organization that depends crucially upon inducements that are both specific and material. . . . A machine like any other organization offers a mixture of material and non-material inducements in order to get people to do what it wants them to do (Banfield and Wilson, 1963, pg. 115).

Ross, Levine, and Stedman (1991) associated political machines with an exchange process, spoils system, and a brokerage system. The machine exchanged material and non-material benefits for the votes necessary to maintain and reinforce its power. It denied these same benefits to those persons and groups who refused support.

Primarily because of racial discrimination, Black citizens have been among the most exploited groups by political machines, some of the most notorious being in Cincinnati (Cox machine), Chicago (Daley machine), and Memphis (Crump machine). Political scientist Alan DiGaetano (1988) has described the modern-day mayor-centered machine in which mayors transform federally-funded agencies into political organizations. Agency employees become political backers who actively stump for votes and federal aid is primarily devoted to programs (affirmative action for example) most beneficial to the mayor's most loyal constituents (DiGaetano, 1988, pg. 250). In the case of Black mayors, these funds are used for the advancement of Black interests.

During the 1979 election, the first accusations arose that the Ford organization had developed a machine style of political leadership in the Black community. Groups consisting of Black ministers and elected officials made efforts to stop this alleged coercive manner of political activity by attacking campaign tactics used by the Fords on behalf of James Ford. According to an unidentified source quoted in the Memphis Commercial Appeal, "He [James Ford] had campaigned almost exclusively on continuing the kind of service he said people had come to expect from a Ford" (Williams, 1979, pg. A1). For example, handouts promoting Ford endorsees, James

Ford and mayoral candidate Otis Higgs, pictured both alongside Harold Ford, who was not running for anything on that particular election day (Buser, 1979, pg. A8). One competitor for the city council seat, Kathryn I. Bowers, felt that "she did not lose a race to James Ford, but instead lost to Harold Ford" (Williams, 1979, pg. A1). She added, "One of the things that disturbs me is there are those people in the city that worship Congressman Ford as people worship a god. . . . It could lead down the road to destruction" (Williams, 1979, pg. A1).²

Veteran officeholder and 1987 mayoral contender Minerva Johnican has had well publicized battles with the Ford organization. In 1980, she challenged Harold Ford for his congressional seat and was defeated by a wide margin of approximately 40,700 to 11,300 (Covington, 1987, pg. A12). Two years later, Ford openly endorsed political novice Julian Bolton for Johnican's commission seat. As a partial result, Bolton defeated Johnican, but his win did not end her political career. She was later elected to an at-large city council position in 1983 and made a weak run for the mayor's office in 1987 without an endorsement from the Ford organization.

The Ford organization has also swayed the Black vote in favor of White candidates. In August 1978, the victories of White candidates Jake Butcher for

²Such "road to destruction" was almost realized in 1993 during Harold Ford's second trial on mail and bank fraud. An 11-member panel of Black ministers and many local Black elected officials pledged to boycott the city's 25-year effort to gain an National Football League expansion franchise on the grounds that the city was too racially polarized. In 1993, the trial venue had been moved from Memphis to Jackson, Tennessee allegedly so that an impartial jury could be found (Buser, 1993, pg. A1). Eleven White and one Black juror were selected. Three years prior, a Memphis jury of eight Blacks and four Whites declared a hung trial after Black jurors voted for acquittal and Whites for conviction (Buser, 1993, pg. A1). Although the N.F.L. protest never took place, frustrated Black Ford supporters threatened riots if he were convicted by the predominantly White jury. Such violence did not occur because Ford was found innocent.

governor, Bill Morris for Shelby County mayor, and Gene Barksdale for sheriff were partly attributable to an endorsement from Harold Ford. Because of Ford's endorsements, all three received massive percentages of the Black vote (Bernsen, 1990, pg. A1).

The Ford organization has been able to deliver the Black vote and encourage Black voter turnout despite various scandals with which it has been plagued since the family's arrival on the political scene. Beginning in 1974 when then City Council member John Ford told fellow member Gwen Awsumb in a council meeting, "You can go to hell as far as I'm concerned," (Bernsen, 1990, pg. A1) the members of the Ford family have continually been beset by various controversies which have threatened their credibility among Whites, but have only served to reinforce support from Blacks.³ These range from the speeding tickets and flagrant confrontations between John Ford and Tennessee state troopers to the mail fraud trials of Harold Ford.⁴ Many in the Black community have charged that the problems faced by the Ford family are part of a conspiracy on the part of the White power structure to

³In 1974 the Memphis City Council fell one vote short of censuring John Ford for his "go to hell" comment. The vote was 8-0. Nine votes were needed for censure.

⁴Since his days as a city councilman, John Ford has had many conflicts with traffic police whom he often described as "racist rednecks." He has been fined for using abusive and insulting language, disorderly conduct, and reckless driving among others. Also, Ford was once accused and later found innocent of shooting at two trucks which blocked both lanes of a two-lane interstate highway (Bernsen, 1990, pg. A1).

In 1980, Ford faced a grave career-threatening scandal as a result of a failed blackmailing attempt. While visiting a female friend, an armed intruder broke into her apartment, locked Ford in a bathroom, raped the women, then forced the two to pose for nude photographs (Garland, 1980, pg. A1). The intruder was later arrested and charged with aggravated rape, first degree burglary, armed robbery, and extortion after trying to blackmail Ford for \$1,000.

weaken Black political influence. Because of this conspiracy, Black Memphians feel that the Fords are usually portrayed negatively in the White media.⁵

The Ford Organization and Black Mayoral Politics

Although the Ford organization has delivered the Black vote to winning candidates, their endorsements did little for the Higgs race or those of other Black mayoral candidates, including Senator John Ford's bid for the 1983 mayoral seat. According to an unidentified source, "A Ford endorsement can mean anything from lip service to fund-raising to marching the Ford units through the Black community to drum out votes. . . . A Ford endorsement and Ford support are two different things" (Keeter, 1979, pg. B17).

In the 1975, and 1979 runoffs, the Ford family endorsed Higgs, but did not actively work to encourage Black voters to turn out at the polls and vote for him. In 1982, the Ford organization gave mere "lip-service" (Keeter, 1979, pg. B17) to candidate J.O. Patterson's bid for the mayor's office. As a result, Patterson lost in the general election due for the most part to low Black voter turnout.

⁵Although frequent protests have ensued from the Black community because of negative White media portrayals of the Ford family, a 1980 editorial cartoon evoked a vehement response from Black Memphians. In depicting an image of slavery, a shackled Black man was ordered to serve a caricatured Harold Ford as on the one hand Ford stated, "O.K. Emmitt (his brother whose state legislative seat was being challenged by Kathryn Bowers), tell me about this Ms. Bowers who dares challenge you for your seat," and on the other hand "Uh . . . a little more ice, boy."

Black community leaders were enraged at the obvious insinuation that Harold Ford had enslaved the Black community. In a public statement, a 15-member group called the Concerned Coalition called the cartoon, "a direct affront and insult to the intelligence and integrity of the Black community" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1980). The statement also included an assessment that "The editorial board of the Commercial Appeal with no Black representation has repeatedly exhibited a lack of sensitivity to the Black community" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1980). They planned a later-shelved Black boycott of the newspaper if talks were not conducted.

The mail fraud trials of Harold Ford prevented him from running for mayor in 1983 and 1987, touting his brother John in a failed 1983 bid. If he had run considering the majority Black population and possible voter turnout, he probably would have become the first elected Black mayor of Memphis.⁶ In the 1991 Herenton election, the Ford family had little involvement until the last ten days of the campaign. During this time, Congressman Harold Ford actively worked and made speeches during the "get-out-the-vote campaign" (Leavy, 1992, pg. 108).

The 1975 Higgs-Chandler Race

Higgs and Turner: The Battle for the Black Vote in the General Election

In 1975, six candidates competed for the mayoral office: incumbent Wyeth Chandler, businessman Joe M. Burnett, former Criminal Court judge Otis Higgs, Black schoolteacher Willie C. Jacox, businessman William Bryan Thompson, and former Juvenile Court judge and 1971 mayoral candidate Kenneth Turner. Higgs and Turner were Chandler's two major opponents.

⁶For ten years, Harold Ford endured three separate mail and bank fraud trials. The issue in each was whether the approximately \$1.5 million received by Ford from former bankers Jake and C. H. Butcher were legitimate loans or political bribes. Ford and two co-defendants, Karl Schledwitz and Douglas Beaty, were accused of conspiracy, bank fraud, mail fraud, and bankruptcy fraud (Bayne, 1987, pg. A13).

In 1983, the United American Bank of Knoxville experienced what was called "the third worst bank failure in the nation's history" (Bayne, 1987, A13). Losses totaled approximately \$50 million including an approximately \$25 million lost by 5,000 bank patrons. In 1985 and 1987 the Butchers were convicted of bank and bankruptcy fraud. Later during 1987, Ford and other co-defendants were indicted by a Knoxville jury on charges of conspiracy, bank fraud, and mail fraud. In 1990, a mistrial resulted from a deadlocked Memphis jury of eight Blacks and four White. On April 9, 1993, a jury of 11 White and one Black Jackson, Tennessee citizens found Ford and his co-defendants not guilty of conspiracy, bank fraud, mail fraud, and bankruptcy fraud.

Early in the race, it was obvious that there would be a battle for Black votes between the two. Predictably, Higgs would be the frontrunner among Black voters because of his race and his reputation. Also, his candidacy was influenced by endorsements from most Black leaders, organizations, and churches in the city.

Turner was the most favored candidate among Blacks in the 1971 mayoral election. In that election, Chandler swept virtually all of the White precincts of the city in both the general and runoff elections by appealing to conservatism in his denunciation of racially divisive issues such as busing and turnkey housing (Kellett, 1975, pg. A1). Turner, the more liberal candidate, made radio appeals to the Black community and aligned himself with prominent Black leaders. Because of his public support of these issues, he not surprisingly scored heavily in Black precincts (98 percent of the Black vote) and reaped just enough White votes to win a second place showing to Chandler (Shelby County election returns). However in the runoff, Chandler scored a victory by less than 2,000 votes (Shelby County election returns). In 1975, Turner sought to maintain his broad base of Black support and to attract the votes of Whites who were frustrated with the Chandler administration (Kellett, 1975, pg. A1). However, Higgs' entrance into the race meant that Turner would lose a substantial proportion of the support he had garnered from Blacks in 1971.

Realizing that he had to contend with the Higgs campaign, Turner angrily charged that Higgs had been paid to enter the race shortly before the filing deadline in order to split the Black vote (Kellett, 1975, pg. A1). Days later, anti-Higgs handbills were circulated through Black neighborhoods which stated that since White

Memphians would not support a Black candidate and Higgs had no chance of winning, Black voters should support Turner (Kellett, 1975, pg. A1). A second set of handbills later questioned Higgs' handling of the trial of law enforcement officers accused in the death of Black citizen Elton Hayes and his questionable associations with White Republicans (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1975).

Higgs denied these charges and focused on maintaining his Black support and White crossover votes in a city where White voters outnumbered Black voters by approximately seven percent. The 1975 Higgs campaign, as well as his subsequent 1979 and 1983 mayoral bids, employed a "dual strategy" (Ardrey, 1993) which emphasized one set of issues in the Black community and an entirely different set of issues in the White community. When addressing Whites, he used a purely deracialized political strategy which included emphasis on racially neutral issues and campaign tactics, and projecting a non-threatening political image (Jones and Clemons, 1993). He focused on the issues of decreasing property taxes, improving the quality of public schools, reducing crime, and improving leadership at City Hall (Kellett, 1979, pg. A1). His major campaign tactic was to stress racial pride and unity in the Black community while avoiding blatant and racially divisive appeals. For Blacks, support meant brotherhood, racial pride, and the fight against racism. White votes exemplified improved race relations by showing that Whites would support a Black contender if assured of fair treatment.

The Chandler Strategy

Since early polling results showed Chandler far ahead of his contenders, he expected to avoid a runoff by attracting the overwhelming percentage of White votes. During the general election, Chandler contrasted his mayoral tenure to that of preceding mayor Henry Loeb, who endorsed Chandler after declining a reelection bid in 1971. Chandler cited that during his administration, tensions were calmed between Blacks and labor, two of the most alienated groups under the Loeb administration. Also, he pointed out some of his major accomplishments as mayor including new recreation facilities and community centers, improved city services, and economic growth without an increase in city taxes (Kellett, 1975, pg. A1).

In the 1975 runoff election, both Chandler and Higgs swept predominantly White and Black precincts respectively. Higgs received approximately 10.1 percent or about 14,800 White votes (Shelby County election returns). Turner received only 16 percent of the Black vote and 19 percent of the White vote. Because Turner's total vote percentage only totaled 16.4 percent or approximately 27,875 votes, he conceded early, leaving a battle between Chandler and Higgs (Shelby County election returns). Higgs placed second with 35.1 percent of the total vote (Shelby County election returns). Chandler's total vote of 46.5 percent was approximately four percent shy of the 50 percent needed to win the general election and avoid a runoff (Shelby County election returns).⁷

⁷At this time in Memphis, a majority vote requirement stipulated that the two candidates with the highest total vote percentages had to compete in a runoff election if neither received a majority vote of 50% or above in the general election.

The Runoff Candidates: Otis Higgs, The Black Guy

Thirty-eight year-old Otis Higgs was one of the Black community's most prominent members. He was raised in a working class section of Memphis by his parents and grandparents. While in high school, 16 year-old Higgs received a scholarship for early admission to Morehouse College. After two years at Morehouse, he took a two-year break to seek employment. After doing odd jobs and saving money, Higgs later enrolled as a student at LeMoyne-Owen College. After graduation, he became a teacher and later a Deputy Criminal Court Clerk. At age 30, Higgs graduated from Memphis State University Law School and worked as an Assistant Public Defender.

His judicial career began in July 1970, when Tennessee Governor Buford Ellington appointed him as a criminal court judge. In 1971, Higgs graduated from the National College of State Trial Judges at the University of Nevada. In addition to service on the bench, Higgs had taught law courses at LeMoyne-Owen College and hosted three television shows: Out of Court with Judge Higgs, Judge Higgs Speaks, and Minority Report. He also served on the board of several organizations and has won a great number of other honors and awards.

The Runoff Candidates: Wyeth Chandler, The White Guy

Forty-four year-old Wyeth Chandler was the adopted son of former mayor Walter Chandler, a three-time incumbent who was elected as mayor from 1940-1944

and appointed as mayor in 1955 by the Memphis City Commission after the death of Mayor Frank Tobey (Keeter, 1991, pg. A1). From 1949 to 1952, he fought in the Korean War as an enlisted member of the U.S. Marine Corps (Riker, 1967). Chandler attended the University of Tennessee as an undergraduate. After the war, he graduated from Memphis State University and later from the University of Tennessee law school.

His political career began in 1967 as one of the first elected city councilman under the new mayor-council government. After chairing the zoning, public relations, and intergovernmental committees and presiding as council chairman for eight months, Chandler resigned in 1971 to run for mayor. In that election, he defeated Kenneth Turner by a narrow margin.

A Deracialized Runoff Campaign

In 1975, Chandler predicted that he would defeat Higgs by a landslide in the runoff election. Shortly after the results of the general election were announced, he was quoted as saying, "We're going to come ahead with the biggest landslide this city has ever seen" (Kellett, 1975, pg. A1). Also, both Chandler and Higgs vowed that the election would also be "on a high plane" (Kellett, 1975, pg. A1). This meant that campaign tactics which played on racial fears would not be used. Both candidates pledged to not make racially divisive appeals. Higgs was quoted in the Memphis Commercial Appeal as saying, "If the people reject me because I'm Black, that's their

choice. . . . The very idea that I'm running may offend some people, but I think Memphians are bigger than that" (Kellett, 1975, pg. A1).

Indeed, racist appeals were lacking from the runoff campaign. During the month before the November runoff election, neither candidate made personal attacks. Higgs focused on the issues surrounding an increase in property taxes during the Chandler administration. He accused Chandler of "deceit" in his telling voters that an increase in property taxes had not transpired during his administration and by alleging that Memphis had lower taxes than other cities of its size (Kellett, 1975, pg. 17). Higgs also spoke of his pledge to improve the quality of public schools, reduce crime, and improve leadership at City Hall (Kellett, 1975, pg. 17).

Chandler questioned Higgs' qualifications for the mayoralty without invoking or appealing to racism. He said that Higgs, a former judge, would have been better suited to serve as mayor if he had held a position in city government, possibly as a city councilman or in some other capacity (Kellett, 1975, pg. 17). Chandler also continued to cite accomplishments of his administration. These included improved service at the city inspection station, profitable business investments, the erection of new community centers in Black communities, and the presence of more Black appointments than any previous administration (Potter, 1975, pg. A1).

An Examination of Results and Possible Reasons for Higgs' Defeat

Wyeth Chandler became the first Memphis mayor to be elected to a second consecutive term since the 1943 reelection of his father, Walter Chandler (Pritchatt,

1975, pg. A1). He defeated Higgs by approximately 31,055 votes which was translated as 58 percent of the total vote (Shelby County election returns). Higgs received 42 percent of the total vote (Shelby County election returns).

To the misfortune of candidate Higgs, a substantial number of both Black and White Memphians refused to cast crossover votes. Chandler, by receiving 89.9 percent of the White vote and 3.2 percent of the Black vote, defeated Higgs by a wide margin (Shelby County election returns). Higgs received approximately 14,800 White votes (10.1 percent) and 68,400 Black votes (96.8 percent) (Shelby County election returns). The racially polarized voting was more detrimental to the Higgs campaign. If he had been able to attract approximately 20 percent of the White vote or if Black voter turnout had been at least 10 percent higher than 56.5 percent, Higgs would have won the runoff election. Despite these voting patterns, Higgs believed that, "We were treated as fair as we could have been treated. He [Chandler] conducted the campaign on a very high level of positivism and affirmativism" (Pritchartt, 1975, pg. A1). Chandler was quoted as saying, "Although he [Higgs] from time to time tended to exaggerate the negative aspects of the city, [his campaign was] very clean" (Pritchartt, 1975, pg. A1).

Many political analysts could not understand why Blacks and Whites voted almost solely on the basis of racial identity in the 1975 runoff election. However, one reason was because Black and White volunteers for the two camps enhanced racial tensions by appealing to citizens of both races to vote on the basis of race and by offering transportation to neighborhood polls. It seemed that both Higgs and

Chandler wanted to attract crossover support, but also to maintain high vote percentages from Blacks and Whites respectively.

Another reason for the racially polarized voting percentages was that White voters were not ready to vote for a Black candidate who lacked political experience. D'Army Bailey, a Black attorney and later a 1983 mayoral contender, discussed the racial split in voting patterns in an article entitled "Racial Division Promises To Keep Memphis Down" (Bailey, 1975, pg. A7). He lamented that the optimism about a racially neutral campaign was erroneous because the overwhelming majority of Black and White voters voted on the basis of racial identity (Bailey, 1975, pg. A7).

Bailey stated that White Memphis voters, more so than Blacks, used race as "the primary standard of their political judgment" (Bailey, 1975, pg. A7). Although both Blacks and Whites cast votes along racial lines, Bailey pointed out that whereas Blacks have routinely voted for White candidates in previous elections (such as in 1967, 1971, and in prior years), Whites refused to support the "first serious Black contender for the mayor's seat" (Bailey, 1975, pg. A7) in Memphis history. To support his view that White voters were less willing to cast crossover votes, Bailey pointed out that Black voters had strongly supported White candidates Mike Cody, Pat Halloran, Ray Churchill, James Blackburn, and others (Bailey, 1975, pg. A7). Also, he believed that Blacks voted for Higgs because they felt that Higgs' platform would benefit all of Memphis. According to Bailey, the fact that Higgs was Black was a minor factor influencing their votes (Bailey, 1975, pg. A7).

In 1975, Otis Higgs could not blame his loss solely on racial polarization, but he also lost the runoff election due to Black voter turnout rates which were lower than White voter turnout percentages. In 1975, Higgs' deracialized campaign, as did Willis' in 1967, failed to encourage Black voters to turn out on election day. Black voter turnout was approximately 56.5 percent which was lower than the White turnout of 59.1 percent (Shelby County election returns). Overall turnout rates only totaled 57.96 percent (or 194,903 registered votes) (Shelby County election returns). Although both Black and White turnout percentages were low, the Higgs campaign was most negatively affected by such rates since the number of White registered voters outnumbered Blacks by almost 100,000. If Black turnout would have surpassed that of Whites by approximately 20 percent or more Higgs probably would have defeated Chandler in the 1975 runoff election.

The 1979 Higgs-Chandler Race

The Candidates of the General Election

In the period between the 1975 and 1979 mayoral races, Otis Higgs resumed his law career. Initially, John Ford was expected to enter the 1979 mayor's race after declining a reelection bid for his city council seat. However, after Harold Ford endorsed Higgs, his brother declined entrance into the race (Porteous, 1979). His decision left a clash between Chandler, Higgs, City Councilman Pat Halloran, businessman Robert "Prince Mongo" Hodges, and Executive Director of the Memphis-West Tennessee Congress of Racial Equality Dr. Isaac Richmond

(Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1979). The most credible contenders competing against Chandler were Higgs and Halloran.

The Chandler and Higgs Strategies

In 1979, Wyeth Chandler again focused on his relatively successful eight years as mayor. The other contenders faced a long battle because of Chandler's many accomplishments. In the area of economic growth, an increase in jobs resulted from new and expanding Memphis businesses. Chandler also cited less evidence of employment discrimination, a thriving tourist industry, and a revitalized downtown which included the Mid-America Mall, Cook Convention Center, Volunteer Park, Mud Island Project, and other restaurants and night spots (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1979).

In announcing his candidacy for the 1979 mayoral election, Higgs again asked voters to look beyond the color issue. His speeches appeared to be directed mostly toward evoking White guilt. He reflected on factors which thwarted his 1975 bid shortly before announcing his candidacy in the 1979 general election, "I never tried to be the Black mayor. I just wanted to be the mayor. The extraneous cruelty of this city would not allow me to do that. I've thought repeatedly about the race and I've asked myself, When will I be viewed as a man . . . and not as a Black man?" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1979).

Despite these types of statements, the issue of race fared prominently in the 1979 election. A major dilemma for Higgs was that he lacked a credible platform.

His "Yes We Can" theme stressed racial love and equality, crime, public education, economic growth, and "ineffective leadership" (Porteous, 1971, pg. A1). This latter issue was problematic because of Chandler's successful record.

Therefore unlike in 1975, Higgs focused on racial problems in the city by implying that a vote in his favor would be a vote against racism and accusing Chandler of fueling the issue of race. He stated in a campaign speech, "For eight years, 'Somebody' has sought to divide this city by misleading racial rhetoric. He has sought to portray Atlanta as a city of chaos every chance he gets. He implies the color of Atlanta's mayor [who was Black] has brought havoc to that community. . . . The point is, it's not the color of the mayor which is important, but his character" (Porteous, 1979, pg. A1).⁸ Higgs continuously repeated these types of statements. However, he neither detailed his abilities nor convinced voters that he had greater leadership qualities than an eight-year incumbent with a relatively successful record.

Despite these shortcomings, Higgs garnered enough voters to face Chandler in another runoff election after the eliminations of candidates Halloran, Hodges, and Richmond. The Halloran bid with only 9,000 votes did not result in a split White vote, but probably was a major factor which led to the closeness in the votes garnered by Chandler and Higgs. Chandler after holding a sizable lead during early election reports (above 50 percent), watched it dwindle to 46.7 percent in comparison to 45.3 percent for Higgs (Shelby County election returns).

⁸Atlanta's mayor in 1979 was Maynard Jackson. Chandler referred regularly to "serious problems" in the city. Higgs interpreted this to be a racial statement meaning that the election of a Black mayor results in both discord and decay in the city over which he presides.

Flagrant Racial Attacks in the Runoff Election

Probably because of close vote percentages in the general election, Otis Higgs received more overt racial animosity from fearful Whites in the runoff. The Higgs campaign stepped up its focus on alleged problems of the second Chandler administration. Such included budget deficits; strikes by firemen, policemen, and teachers; increases in fees for city services; an inability to expand the city's tax base; and a federal investigation of public works division operations in city government (Keeter, 1979, pg. A12; Geehl, 1979, pg. A6).

Before the 1979 runoff election, Mayor Chandler requested a listing of registered White voters who failed to participate in the general election from the Shelby County Election Commission. He planned to make a strong effort to persuade these citizens to vote for him in the runoff (Keeter, 1979, pg. B13). This was the first time such a request had been made for the names of members of a specific race who failed to vote (Keeter, 1979, pg. B13). Since Higgs and others felt that this was a racist campaign tactic, many charges and countercharges of racism were made by both candidates.

In response to the accusations of racism, Chandler stated that his plan was not to target White voters while alienating Blacks, but was "to get out every vote that [he thought would] vote for Wyeth Chandler" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). He also hinted that he catered to White votes out of frustration in receiving only three percent of the Black vote in the general election (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). Since Higgs received Black votes simply because of his race, Chandler had to appeal to White voters. He stated,

"What we have is a Black candidate who automatically received 97 or 98 percent of the Black vote. I've never said vote for me because I'm White. . . . I've said 'Here's my record of eight years'" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1).

At a press conference, Higgs addressed the issue of racial polarization in the runoff, "My opponent is the same man that stood at a bus burying [explain what this is] with a two-by-four in his hand. My opponent is the same man that called the Civil Rights Commission 'a bunch of weirdos. . . .'" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). Chandler responded by reading an excerpt from a Black newspaper article in which Higgs allegedly labeled Black Chandler supporters as "traitor[s]" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). He later withdrew his request for the names of White voters "out of deference to the numerous people who considered it an invasion of privacy" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). Nevertheless, Chandler continued to justify it as being racially neutral (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1).

At a later date before the runoff, both Chandler and Higgs accused each other of polarizing the Black and White communities. Higgs in a televised debate accused Chandler of "[engaging] in senseless rhetoric to polarize the community [by perpetuating a myth that there would be] an all-Black city hall [if Higgs were elected]" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). Chandler charged the Higgs campaign with polarizing blacks and Whites after 16 prominent Black leaders endorsed Higgs who saw these endorsements as being "testimonial[s] to [his] leadership" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). Chandler realizing that these endorsements would assure the overwhelming

majority of Black votes for Higgs called them "an obvious effort to polarize the community" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1).

Moreover on the night before the runoff election, a flaming cross was burned in front of the Higgs' family home by an unknown assailant. The Chandler organization was not proven to be linked to this incident. Also, Chandler publicly spoke against the cross burning and stated, "I certainly wouldn't think that anyone associated with [my] campaign would be responsible for something like this" (Jordan, 1979, pg. A1).

Hours later, a 21-year-old man publicly claimed that he was Higgs' illegitimate son. At a press conference held 16 hours after the cross burning, Higgs accused Chandler of being behind this issue (Jordan, 1979, pg. A1). He stated that, "What high official is trying to attack me through these tactics over something that happened over 20 years ago when I was an 18-year-old kid?" (Jordan, 1979, pg. A1). Although he refused to name the "high official," Higgs would not deny that he may have been referring to Chandler (Jordan, 1979, pg. A1). When asked who such official was, Higgs responded with the Latin phrase, "res ipsa loquitir" (Jordan, 1979, pg. A1) which meant the thing speaks for itself.

An Examination of Results and Reason for Higgs' Defeat

Chandler defeated Higgs in the 1979 runoff by a margin of 52.9 percent (approximately 120,207 votes) to 47.1 percent (approximately 107,252 votes) (Shelby

County election returns). This victory made Chandler the first mayor in over 40 years to be elected to a third consecutive term (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1).

In 1979, W. Otis Higgs Jr. was the sole Black candidate, attracted a small percentage of White crossover votes (approximately 8.7 percent), and attracted massive Black support (approximately 96.3 percent), but lost the runoff election due to lower Black turnout rates. In the runoff, Higgs dropped the racial issue in order to solicit Halloran supporters in what was described as one of "the most colorless campaign[s] in [Memphis history]" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). This included addressing relevant issues before church, civic, and political groups in both Black and White communities (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1). Such an approach resulted in a small percentage of crossover votes from Whites, but the 42.4 percent Black voter turnout rate continued to lag White turnout levels by approximately 15 percent (Shelby County election returns). Higgs would have won the 1979 runoff if Black voter turnout had been approximately six percentage points higher.

Endorsements from Black leaders failed to encourage Black voter turnout because voters did not see a united effort to elect a Black mayor. Such endorsements were in spoken word only. Prominent Black leaders made little or no organizational suggestions to the Higgs campaign or for the encouragement of Black voting. As surmised in a Memphis Commercial Appeal election analysis, "Higgs did not turn the voters on, and went into election day with much of his hard-core support coming from the same liberal and Black-for-Black's sake voters he had the day he announced" (Keeter, 1979, pg. A1).

These shortcomings and the racial factor resulted in even greater mobilization efforts on the part of the White community in support of the Chandler campaign. As was typical of Memphis runoff elections involving Black and White candidates, voting patterns remained split among racial lines. Higgs received 96.3 percent of the Black vote and Chandler garnered 91.3 percent of White votes (Shelby County election returns).

CHAPTER THREE:

THE 1980s: A DECADE OF TOTAL FAILURE FOR BLACK MAYORAL CANDIDATES

The 1982 Special Election: The "Love-In" Ends for Dick Hackett and J.O.Patterson Jr.

1982: Harold Ford's Year?

In 1982, Mayor Wyeth Chandler resigned to accept a Circuit Court judgeship.⁹ J.O. Patterson Jr. was then chosen as interim mayor. A special election was subsequently ordered so that a successor could serve the remaining 12 months of Chandler's term (Balentine, 1982, pg. A1). After announcement of the special election, rumors surfaced that Congressman Harold Ford would surely become a top prospect. Ford, the most powerful Black political leader in Memphis, was predicted to eventually become mayor. Chandler's resignation offered afforded the perfect opportunity for Ford to reign sovereign in Memphis politics as he had done in the Black community since early in his political career.

Another factor which led to the prediction that Ford would enter the 1982 race was the potential threat imposed by the Patterson bid. Patterson too was well-respected in the Black community because of his legal and political careers and because he was the son and rumored successor to Bishop J.O. Patterson Sr., head of the influential three-million member Church of God in Christ denomination. A Patterson win would either end or lessen the political power of the Ford organization.

⁹In 1982, Chandler, who held a law degree from the University of Tennessee, was appointed judge of Division I of Circuit Court by then-governor Lamar Alexander.

Patterson would also replace Ford as the prime political leader in the Black community.

Harold Ford was also expected to run in order to regain support from Blacks who had grown disenchanted with his organization. An increasing number of Black Memphians looked for an alternative Black political force. A belief was gaining momentum that Ford's active involvement in Memphis politics was becoming detrimental to the Black community. In 1982, the Ford organization lost more respect when it endorsed political unknown Julian Bolton for a seat on the county commission. In a close race, Bolton defeated the reelection bid of Minerva Johnican, a highly admired former teacher, political leader, and long-time Ford foe (Balentine, 1982, pg. A1).¹⁰

A final factor leading to a potential Ford bid was that he allegedly wanted to defeat former U.S. Attorney Mike Cody personally. Cody initiated an investigation which led to the resignation of Ford's brother, Emmitt Ford, from the Tennessee House of Representatives and a later arrest for insurance fraud (Balentine, 1982, pg. A1). Assumingly, Ford's defeat of Cody and election as mayor would again demonstrate that those who challenged the Ford organization would later suffer defeat at their hands.

¹⁰Ford's last minute endorsement of Bolton was said to be a retaliatory measure against Johnican for being the first credible Black politician to challenge his ninth congressional district seat in 1980. Ford strongly backed Bolton stating, "Her [Johnican's] judicial record - not her politics - is what I find lacking. To suggest that I am opposed to the incumbent because she ran against me is ridiculous. I support Julian Bolton. I support him with enthusiasm and the conviction that if he is elected, he will serve the people of that district well" (Bernsen, 1982, pg. B1). Bolton later defeated the popular incumbent Johnican in a race for the county commission.

In spite of these factors, Ford declined a mayoral run in 1982. After the October deadline, nine candidates vied for the office including then-County Clerk Dick Hackett, Attorney Mike Cody, interim Mayor J.O. Patterson Jr., and City Council member Pat Vander Schaaf (Balentine, 1982, pg. A1). The other five candidates were lesser-known Memphians with little or no political experience.¹¹

A Split White Vote in the General Election

In the 1982 race, Patterson was the only credible Black contender facing three strong White candidates: Hackett, Cody, and Vander Schaaf. Hackett and Vander Schaaf were White conservatives with Republican ties and Cody, a White Democrat. Analysts predicted a Hackett victory because of his seven-year service as director of the Mayor's Action Center and four years as county clerk. Because of these affiliations with the Chandler administration and his conservative reputation, Hackett was expected to attract the majority of Chandler's supporters. As county clerk, he reduced expenditures and the number of employees and generally made the clerk's office more efficient (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6).

The Vander Schaaf and Cody bids were threatening because of their likelihood to split the White vote. Also, analysts predicted that Vander Schaaf would attract votes from Hackett's White Republican supporters. She also campaigned actively in

¹¹Homemaker Gladys Adams, nursery owner Richard Stringer, sales representative John J. Baker III, unemployed painter W. A. "Bill" Smith, and former city court clerk Joyce Bousson (Balentine, 1982, pg. A1).

Black communities by making appearances before church congregations and other predominantly Black groups (Balentine, 1982, pg. A1).

The Cody candidacy was expected to be largely ineffectual despite enormous financial support from wealthy White businessmen. Cody held the unfavorable position of being a White liberal competing against two strong candidates - one Black and one White - in a racially polarized election. Thus, he was not expected to attract substantial vote percentages from either community. As did other "middle candidates" (Balentine, 1982, pg. A1) in Memphis races, Cody would present himself as a moderate to the White community with the intention of gaining substantial support from White liberals and a few votes from White conservatives and from Black voters.

The Patterson Campaign

Patterson's strategy in the general election was to benefit from the split White vote and attract a large enough turnout among Black voters that he could avoid a runoff. Patterson mostly devoted his approximately \$30,000 campaign fund to print and radio ads. He also addressed voters through speeches before political and civic groups, ballots, and door-to-door visits (Black, 1992, pg. A7).

Since Patterson received little help from Congressman Harold Ford, he forged a coalition with other Black leaders, many of whom were Ford adversaries to ensure

a large Black voter turnout (Black 1982, pg. A1)¹². Minerva Johnican who saw a Patterson win as a way to "end the total control exerted by the Ford machine" (Black, 1982, pg. A1) arranged a Women for Patterson fundraising and mobilization drive. Rev. James E. Smith, head of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Union conducted Operation Big Vote for transporting voters and poll workers to the polls and for distributing over 100,000 ballots and balloons to Black neighborhoods (Black, 1982, pg. A1).

Partly because of endorsements from Rev. Jesse Jackson, Executive Director of the N.A.A.C.P. Benjamin Hooks, and Ford, 55 percent of Blacks voted in the 1982 general election. However, the overall White voter turnout rate totaled 65 percent (Shelby County election returns). Despite the ten percentage point gap between Black and White voter turnout, Patterson received a majority of the total vote (40.6 percent). This figure outnumbered the 30 percent received by Hackett, leaving the two in a November 30 runoff election (Shelby County election returns).

The Runoff Candidates: J.O. Patterson Jr.

J.O. Patterson Jr. earned a bachelors degree in business administration from Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee and a doctor of jurisprudence from DePaul

¹²While seeking reelection to Congress in 1982, Harold Ford, mailed an endorsements ballot to Black voters urging them to vote for him and other Democratic candidates in various races. It omitted Patterson's name. After substantial pressure from Black citizens, Ford publicly endorsed Patterson for mayor. Ford's reluctance to support Patterson in part stemmed from Patterson's refusal to cast a tie-breaking vote for city council chairman in favor of Ford's younger brother, Dr. James Ford. Patterson instead voted for White Republican Barbara Sonnenburg. After this incident, Ford stated that he would "never support J.O. Patterson again."

University in Chicago, Illinois. In 1966, he was elected to serve in the Tennessee House of Representatives. In 1967, Patterson was elected to the Memphis City Council, where he later served as chairman beginning on December 8, 1981. One year later, Patterson was elected to begin serving a two-year term in the Tennessee Senate. In 1970, he was reelected for a four-year term, but was later defeated by John Ford in 1974. Three years later, Patterson participated in the Tennessee Constitutional Convention and in 1979, became an ordained minister in the Church of God in Christ (Williams, 1982, pg. A15).

The Runoff Candidates: Richard Cecil (Dick) Hackett

Dick Hackett, the son of a contracting firm owner and a homemaker and a married father of three children, had a middle-class upbringing in Memphis (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6). Hackett has been referred to as a "college dropout" (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6) because he failed to complete graduation requirements at Memphis State University. While a student at Memphis State, Hackett worked on the mayoral campaign of Wyeth Chandler in 1971. After Chandler's election during that same year, Hackett became his executive assistant and left college a few months before his proposed graduation. Beginning in 1972, he headed the Mayor's Action Center for six years addressing concerns and complaints of Memphians toward the mayoral office (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6). In 1978, Hackett defeated eight candidates to become county clerk (Christion and

Kelley, 1991, pg. A6). A political novice, he received 40 percent of the vote (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6).

The Patterson Campaign: Attracting Crossover Support

In the runoff campaign, J.O. Patterson Jr. realized that victory was possible. His strong showing in the general election (primarily due to a split White vote) was proof that a win was possible only if he could receive two crucial things: White crossover support and a Black voter turnout rate that surpasses the White voter turnout rate.

Initially, Patterson and Hackett professed a mutually agreed-upon "love-in" in which personal attacks would be bypassed and key issues such as decreasing property and payroll taxes, increasing the number of police patrols, improving schools, and furthering economic development would be emphasized (Bernsen, 1982, pg A1). Both candidates had much to gain through use of a deracialized campaign. Hackett's major benefit would be that a friendly or boring campaign would not motivate Blacks voters into turning out at the polls. In 1982, the percentage of White registered votes continued to outnumber that of Blacks. Also, Hackett had little to gain by appealing across racial lines because only six percent of Black voters failed to support the Patterson candidacy in the general election. To this effect, Hackett stated shortly after the announcement of unofficial results of the general election, "I will not be asking the citizens of Memphis to vote for me because I am White. I won't be asking

the citizens to vote against J.O. Patterson because he is Black" (Williams, 1982, pg. A15).

Patterson did not want to heighten racial issues in the runoff election primarily because other campaigns of Black mayoral candidates had proven that doing so would only alienate White liberals whose support he greatly needed to win the election (Nelson and Meranto, 1977; Keiser, 1990; Sonenshein, 1990; Lawson, 1991; Ardrey, 1993). He especially catered to the approximately 25 percent of White voters and businessmen who supported eliminated White liberal candidate Mike Cody in the general election. Patterson believed that financial contributions, endorsements, and votes from this segment of the White community would merge with the overwhelming majority of Black votes to ensure his victory (Williams, 1982, pg. A15).

In the general election, Patterson had geared his campaign primarily to Black voters. With the exception of a few television advertisements and speeches, he made few efforts to garner White votes believing that a massive Black voter turnout would lead to his election. Since only he and Hackett remained in the runoff, Patterson knew that he had to get White support in an election where voting patterns would probably be split along racial lines.

Realizing that the White community would only provide support to a Black candidate if they were reassured that he would treat all citizens equally, Patterson sought to quell their fears. In one campaign speech he stated, "I have always said that I want to be mayor of all of the people of the city of Memphis, that I did not desire to be the mayor of one segment. . . . I didn't want to be the Black mayor and

I didn't want to be the White mayor. . . . I . . . want to see the level of government services applied equally all across the city" (Williams, 1982, pg. A15). Also in order to alleviate White fears of an all-Black City Hall, Patterson pledged to retain most of the key officials of the Chandler administration which he described as "an efficient government" (Bernsen, 1982, pg. A12).

Approximately two weeks before the runoff, a shift took place in campaign strategy when Patterson's father, Bishop J.O. Patterson Sr., equated financial support for his son's campaign with a religious duty. At the Annual Convocation of the Church of God in Christ, Patterson Sr. urged approximately 40,000 members of the Church or "Saints" to "cooperate with God, think less of material wealth - and lend a hand to [Patterson Jr's] campaign" (Burch, 1982, pg. A1). He added, ". . . Both men [Patterson Jr. and Hackett] are qualified, [but] the conscience of Memphis should honor a Black man with the office of mayor" (Burch, 1982, pg. A1).

Approximately one week before the runoff, J.O. Patterson Jr. publicly ended the "love-in" because of his frustration with Hackett's attempt "to cloak a conservative philosophy with a moderate tone" (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A1). He stated, "In a word, our so-called love-in is now annulled" (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A1). He also realized that the needed White crossover support was not forthcoming. The only result of the "love-in" was that Black voters lacked enthusiasm for a lackluster campaign.

Patterson's assessment that racially charged campaigns translated into higher Black voter registration and turnout levels has been supported in the literature.

Starks and Preston (1990) found that the racist tone of the 1983 Chicago mayoral runoff between Harold Washington and Jewish candidate Bernard Epton both angered and motivated Black Chicagoans into registering and turnout out at the polls. Nelson and Meranto (1977) presented evidence that the 1967 victory of Black candidate Carl Stokes was partly attributable to the belief that a Black mayor could more effectively calm Cleveland, Ohio's racial tensions during the mid-1960s.

After the official demise of the "love-in", Patterson attacked Hackett's inadequacies in his record on unions, political experience, educational level, and race relations. Concerning Hackett's union activities, Patterson charged that he had used "all manner of tactics" (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A3) to prevent employees from unionizing while serving as county clerk. A lack of unionized employee relationships would lead to labor disputes similar to those which brought Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to Memphis in April 1968 during which time he was assassinated. Patterson posed the question, "Can the same poisonous attitude be resurrected in City Hall?. . . . If my opponent is elected mayor, the answer is yes judging by his past record" (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A3). According to Patterson, Hackett also referred to the A.F.S.C.M.E. (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees) as a Black union, called a Black employee a Mau Mau (an African tribal name), and established a racist code for checking the identities of Black and White customers (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A3).

Moreover, 47 year-old Patterson suggested that because of 33 year-old Hackett's age, he was too young and inexperienced to serve as mayor. He stated,

"[Hackett's] age and limited educational background could be reasons for the impaired political vision that has produced a narrow view of the mayor's office. . . . If one were to tally my opponent's very young age with political inexperience and its parochial dimension to his educational restraints, the bottom line would show clearly that he would be a serious liability as mayor of Memphis" (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A3).

On the issue of race relations, Patterson believed that a continued Hackett administration would worsen both "racial polarization and . . . racial confrontations instead of providing stabilizing and progressive leadership for the city" (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A3). He stated, "If my opponent's views on race relations could be changed or were a matter of naivete, it could be treated less prominently in this campaign. [However, his views were] so simplistic that [they were] symptomatic of the very problem [they were] supposed to [have addressed]" (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A3).

Making matters worse for Patterson was the fact that Hackett failed to retaliate against his charges. Beginning what would become his usual strategy in subsequent elections against Black challengers, Hackett refused to respond to Patterson's allegations mainly because Hackett realized that Patterson was frightening away the little support he had from White liberals. Also, Hackett did not want to risk alienating Black voters with "save our city" (Hahn, Klingman, and Pachon, 1976) racial appeals as had other White candidates when faced with the threat of a credible Black contender (Kleppner, 1985; Lawson, 1991; Wilson, 1993). Hackett's only

efforts to attract Black votes included radio and newspaper appeals through the Black media (Bernsen and Williams, 1982, pg. A12). About a week before the election Hackett issued a statement which stated, "It is just a week before the election. I know there are some frustrations on the part of some people, but I guess that is natural. . . . I think to respond to opinions, which everyone is entitled to would not be in the best interest of this city. . . . Actually, I don't believe Mr. Patterson really wants to divide this city. That is the very thing he and I agree on most" (Williams and Bernsen, 1982, pg. A1). Also, Hackett canceled all scheduled joint appearances supposedly in an effort to prevent the mayoral campaign from polarizing the city (Williams, 1982, pg. A1).

Patterson's strategy of ending the "love-in" in favor of harsh racial accusations, was designed to arouse nonchalant Black voters in favor of his campaign since Whites were still not providing crossover support. However, this tactic only succeeded in scaring away the small amount of White support he had attracted. In the period before the runoff election, it was too late for Patterson without the aid of other Black leaders to motivate Black voters into turning out at the polls on election day at a rate which would surpass White turnout.

The Patterson Campaign: Encouraging Black Voter Turnout

In the 1982 runoff election, Black voter turnout was approximately 18 percent higher than it had been in the 1979 runoff race. Although 60 percent of registered Black voters participated, 68 percent of Whites turned out on election day (Shelby

County election returns). Dick Hackett won the runoff by receiving approximately 54 percent of the vote which outnumbered Patterson's 45.6 percent total (Shelby County election returns). In order for Patterson to win the runoff, a massive 70 percent of Blacks would have had to vote on election day. As was the case in 1975 and 1979, a Black candidate lost the 1982 special election because of a higher White turnout rate in a racially polarized election.

Besides a lack of encouragement due to a laid-back campaign, another explanation for the Patterson loss was that Black leadership was not a strong motivational force behind his campaign. Although Harold Ford endorsed Patterson in the general election, he remained neutral during the month-long period before the runoff, all the while hinting that he would run for mayor in 1983. As a result, the Patterson organization had to work alone in order to guarantee turnout. On the day of Hackett's swearing-in ceremony, Patterson blamed his defeat on lack of support from the Ford organization by stating, "Dick Hackett is being sworn in today instead of J.O. Patterson Jr. because of the lack of support given me by the Fords. . . . It is the Fords who are the disgrace, who have sold out the Black community. . . . They didn't want to see any Black man but a Ford serve as mayor" (Britten, 1982, pg. C8).

Despite his beliefs, Patterson could not completely blame his defeat on neutrality from the Ford family. Support from the Black church was lower than that traditionally given to Black mayoral candidates. With the exception of the Church of God in Christ, other Black churches in the city did not have active involvements in the Patterson campaign (Williams, 1982, pg. A1). While some area churches

devoted both collections to fund the campaign and church vans for transportation to the polls, the majority of Black churches were not heavily involved in the Patterson runoff campaign (Beifuss, 1982, pg. A4).

Results of the Runoff Election

Although the Patterson defeat resulted from a lack of White crossover votes and a lower Black voter turnout, it also resulted from the discriminatory nature of Memphis runoff elections. Had it not been for a majority vote requirement, J.O. Patterson Jr. would not have had to face Dick Hackett in the 1982 runoff. Out of nine candidates in the general election, Patterson received the highest number of votes with a 40.6 percent majority in the general election which outnumbered Hackett's 30 percent total (Shelby County election returns). In the subsequent runoff, Patterson was defeated by a 54 percent to 45.6 percent majority in favor of Hackett (Shelby County election returns).

In 1982, a majority vote requirement stipulated that in elections in which neither candidate received a majority of 50 percent or above, the two contenders with the highest numbers of votes had to compete in a runoff. In 1991, this requirement was found to be discriminatory toward Black candidates. If there had not been a runoff election in this race, J.O. Patterson Jr. would have been elected as the first Black mayor of Memphis in the general election.

The 1983 Election: Machine Politics vs. "White Money"

The 1983 Election: Anger, Disillusionment, and Total Failure

Dick Hackett's 1983 victory resulted mostly from a split Black vote and low Black voter turnout in a racially polarized election. Many racial accusations were thrust by the Black candidates both at each other and at the incumbent. Also, all of the candidates made appeals in their respective communities to maintain voting blocs with few efforts to garner crossover support. These types of divisions resulted in an overwhelming Hackett win in the general election without the need for a runoff.

Black Leadership at the Crossroads: The Splitting of the Black Vote

In the 1983 mayoral race, Black leaders encouraged the idea of one consensus candidate to represent the Black community. Since the Black and White populations stood at approximately 50 percent each and the percentage of White registered voters outnumbered those of Blacks by approximately 30,000, it would have been difficult for one Black candidate to win without opposition. However, the entrance of more than one Black contender made the prospect of victory practically inconceivable. Their entrances not only split the Black vote, but also made it more difficult to raise campaign funds (Jordan, 1983, pg. A1).

In 1983, Black Memphis needed a consensus candidate with broad appeal in both the Black and White communities. Neither D'Army Bailey, John Ford, nor Otis

Higgs, the most serious Black contenders, possessed this quality.¹³ By 1983, Higgs had conducted two failed mayoral bids. State Senator John Ford lacked widespread appeal outside of the Black community both because of his outspoken reputation in the Tennessee Senate and that of his family's organization. Attorney D'Army Bailey was a virtual unknown and political novice who was making his first run for a political office in Memphis, although he did serve as a city councilman in Berkeley, California during the early 1970s (Grehl, 1983, pg. A6).

Although the Black candidates agreed that only one of them should run, each believed that he should be the consensus candidate and thus refused to withdraw from the race. Also, both the candidates and Black citizens were insulted with the coercive tactics of the Ford organization to force other Black candidates out of the race and leave John Ford as the consensus candidate. Higgs stated in a subtle reference to Harold Ford, "There may be ten candidates in the race, but one of them didn't file" (Jordan and Williams, 1983, pg. B1). D'Army Bailey stated on the date before the withdrawal date, "As far as I'm concerned, the die is cast" (Williams, 1983, pg. A5). On election day, seven Black and one Lebanese candidate competed for the office of mayor with Bailey, Ford, and Higgs emerging as the most credible Black contenders.

Primarily because of his family's influence in the Black community, John Ford as the consensus candidate would probably have had the highest probability of facing

¹³Singer/songwriter Timothy "El Espada" Matthews, hair stylist Peggy Robinson, salvage company owner Lilliard Anthony (L.A.) "Tony" Watts, grocer Lugene Williams were other Black candidates who ran for mayor in 1983.

Hackett in a runoff election. Besides receiving an endorsement from then-newly elected mayor of Chicago, Harold Washington, Ford's campaign was also both positively and negatively affected by the efforts of campaign manager Harold Ford (Jordan and Ashford, 1983, pg. D1).

On the positive end, an active role by Harold Ford should have led to a larger than usual Black turnout. On the negative end, John Ford could not gain election by depending solely on the Ford name. His fiery reputation and outrageous antics in Tennessee politics could not be easily ignored. Put simply, the Congressman could not transfer his charisma and appeal to his younger brother (Jordan and Keeter, 1983, pg. A1). Also, John was characterized as Harold's puppet, a stepping-stone for Harold's later emergence as mayor of Memphis.

These divisions left Black citizens both confused and unmotivated. They knew that victory was impossible because of the lack of unity shown by Black leadership. This apathy resulted in a Black voter turnout of approximately 48 percent which was 17 percent lower than the 65 percent turnout among Whites (Shelby County election returns).

Ford Bullying Tactics in a Racially Polarized Election

Dick Hackett's 1983 mayoral win also resulted from blatant racial polarization. Hackett continued his effective strategy of not responding to allegations made by Black candidates. Realizing that he had high levels of support in the White community and that any responses against these candidates could be interpreted as

racist, Hackett remained silent while Black candidates directed harsh accusations both at the only White candidate and at each other.

Harold Ford was blamed mostly for perpetuating racial polarization. He announced early in the campaign that race would be a significant issue, but would not be exploited in order to encourage racial polarization and animosity (Grehl. 1983, pg. A6). According to Ford, race was "a major and acknowledged issue" (Jordan, 1983, pg. B1) that should not be avoided in mayoral campaigns.¹⁴

The Ford organization made its harshest charges against the Higgs campaign which most threatened that of John Ford. According to Harold Ford, Higgs accepted "White money" (Jordan, 1983, pg. B1) or bribes from the White community to remain in the race, split the Black vote, and prevent John Ford from winning.¹⁵ Angered by these accusations, Higgs responded, "When he [Harold Ford] accuses me of taking money, he must remember that my name is W. Otis Higgs Jr., not John Ford. . . . They [the Ford organization] have been unable to raise money and Black people aren't buying John Ford. Nobody wants to buy John Ford. He [Harold Ford]

¹⁴Ford sought to openly address the issue of race because of its unavoidable presence in Memphis mayoral elections which involved Black and White candidates. According to Ford, "This community is already polarized. We're [The John Ford campaign staff] not going to dodge the issue of racism. We know White people are going to vote for Mr. Hackett because he is White. Let's deal with it like it is and say they should be ashamed. Black people, poor people, grassroots people are tired of not having representations at City Hall. . . . All three major Black candidates are more qualified than Mayor Hackett, and if it were not for their race, they would be judged on their qualifications" (Black, 1983, pg. A1).

¹⁵Ford stated, "The White community is giving Higgs money, we understand, in an effort to keep Higgs in the campaign and to ensure that a Black can't be elected mayor. It is a try to overthrow the top Black contender, John Ford" (Black, 1983, pg. A1). Because of his beliefs, Ford asked Higgs to "disclose where he [was] getting his money to finance his campaign" (Black, 1983, pg. A1).

can't sell John Ford to anybody" (Jordan and Williams, 1983, pg. A1). Higgs also described Harold Ford as a "cowardly tale-bearer [seeking] to further his political ambitions [through his brother's candidacy]" (Jordan and Williams, 1983, pg. A1).

Although Harold and John Ford admitted that they would confront the issue of race, the other two major Black contenders employed racial neutrality in futile attempts to gain White votes. D'Army Bailey said that Memphis "needed a mayor [who was] unafraid to go into either the White or Black community. . . . The mayoral race should not turn on skin color [and said that he would not] stir feelings of racial discord to win a single vote" (Ashford and Williams, 1983. pg. B1). Otis Higgs claimed that if elected he would alleviate the prejudice and racism in Memphis to unite Blacks and Whites. He stated in a speech to supporters, "It is all right to rebuild Beale Street, but what about rebuilding the human personality, the spirit of this city that causes Blacks and Whites to live and work and play together. . . . That's what we need. . . . The problem . . . with Memphis, Tennessee is within itself. Fear, hate, prejudice have destroyed its vitality" (Jordan, 1983, pg. B1).

Although the major Black candidates attacked each other, most of their criticisms were directed at the incumbent. In a campaign speech, John Ford accused him of continuing a White male domination of City Hall. He stated that "Hackett had the opportunity to end the past tradition of excluding, in general, Blacks and women from city directorships. . . . Instead he chose to continue the practice of good-ol'-boy system that resulted in nearly an all-White, male administration. . . . You almost get the impression that Blacks and women are invisible. . . . Only White

males which make up 25 percent of the population, have almost all of the directorships" (Keeter and Ashford, 1983, pg. A13). Otis Higgs stated that, a "stagnant economy [was] destroying the quality of life in Memphis. The mayor of this city must take a lead in putting our community back to work [and promised to provide] 20,000 quality new jobs [if elected mayor]" (Keeter and Ashford, 1983, pg. A13). D'Army Bailey stated that "[Hackett] seems to believe he can hide in City Hall and not have to come out in the community, and particularly the minority communities, and respond to the issues and concerns. . . ." (Jordan and Keeter, 1983, pg B1).

After weeks of receiving attacks and criticisms from the three major Black candidates, Hackett in a speech to a predominantly White audience, finally responded. He told a group of mostly White lumbermen not to elect someone whose behavior while campaigning "[would] embarrass us to our knees [once elected]" (Jordan and Keeter, 1983, pg B5). Hackett further stated, "It is important that whoever leads the city is able to control himself. . . . Don't elect someone that will embarrass this community, that we'll all be ashamed of because of the way they act: that they are finger-pointing and name-calling. . . . If our candidates embarrass us now, what are they going to do after . . . they're in office. They would embarrass us to our knees. We can't have someone in office who can't control himself or his mouth" (Jordan and Keeter, 1983, pg B5).

He also showed his fear of the Fords in a later speech before a mostly White Republican group, "This race - and I cannot say this enough - must be won October

6. It's got to be. We feel we're going to have to set a record in the supporters of Dick Hackett at the polls to win this race. If we don't we're going to have difficulty in a runoff [probably against John Ford]" (Jordan and Keeter, 1983, pg B5).

To Hackett's benefit, he had no difficulty in gaining reelection in the October general election. Hackett received 57.2 percent of the total vote. Since this percentage satisfied the 50 percent majority vote requirement, he did not have to compete in a runoff election against any of the Black candidates who, as was predicted, split the Black vote. In terms of total votes: Ford received 22.1 percent; Higgs 16 percent; Bailey 3.1 percent; and other candidates 1.6 percent (Shelby County election returns). Representative of racial polarization, Hackett received approximately four percent of the Black vote while the Black candidates split approximately four percent of the White vote (Shelby County election returns).

The 1987 Election: "Uncle Toms," "Black Racism," and "The Oprah Winfrey of Memphis"

The 1987 Election: Black Memphis Misses A Prime Opportunity

Before Dr. Herenton's 1991 election, the 1987 election was the most promising for the election of a Black mayor. In the 1980s, there were massive population shifts in the city of Memphis. Mainly because of White flight, the Black population steadily increased by 7.2 percent from 307,702 to 334,737 while the White population decreased by 6.4 percent from 333,789 to 268,600 (Table 2). According to the Shelby County Election Commission, the city's Black population surpassed the White population for the first time in 1986.

TABLE 2
POPULATION TOTALS OF MEMPHIS, 1900-1990

Year	Total Population	White		Black	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1900	102,320	52,380	51.2	49,910	48.8
1910	131,105	78,590	60.0	52,441	40.0
1920	162,351	101,113	62.3	61,181	37.7
1930	253,143	156,535	61.9	96,550	38.1
1940	292,942	171,406	58.5	121,498	41.5
1950	396,000	248,713	62.8	147,141	37.2
1960	497,524	312,799	62.9	184,320	37.0
1970	623,988	379,224	60.8	242,513	38.8
1980	646,356	333,789	51.6	307,702	47.6
1990	610,337	268,600	45.2	334,737	54.8

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing. 1990.

Since Memphis had a Black majority, Black candidates would not have had to garner sizable crossover vote percentages from Whites if they could have encouraged a large voter turnout among Blacks. If one Black consensus candidate had used a successful grassroots strategy in 1987 similar to that used in 1991, a victory would probably have resulted. However, the divisions among Black candidates prevented this from occurring. Three virtually unknown Black candidates and perennial entrant Robert "Prince Mongo" Hodges competed in the 1987 election. The Black candidates were City Councilwoman Minerva Johnican, former Tennessee state representative Dedrick "Teddy" Withers, and postal worker Walter Franklin (Keeter, 1987, pg. A1).

There were two disastrous effects of their candidacies. First, the Black vote was split in four ways. Black candidates could not benefit from a split White vote because none had substantial percentages of the Black vote. Minerva Johnican's percentage of approximately 52 percent outnumbered those of her Black competitors (Shelby County election returns). Secondly because of the lack of endorsements from Black leaders and the conduct of the campaign, the Black candidates could not motivate Black voters into turning out at the polls on election day. This resulted in the lowest Black voter turnout in over 20 years (Shelby County election returns). Only 46 percent of the 371,266 registered voters participated in the election (Shelby County election returns). Out of that percentage, approximately 37 percent were Black voters (Shelby County election returns).

Despite the large crossover percentages by Black voters, racial polarization remained evident in the 1987 election. The Black community faced clashes between Black candidates and Black leaders with charges of "selling out," "Uncle Toms," and "Black racism" being thrust back and forth. White voters were initially concerned with the entrance of two White candidates and the split White votes that it entailed, but were later relieved when Black divisions resulted in confused, unorganized, and thus unsuccessful campaigns for Black candidates with Minerva Johnican barely receiving one percent of the White vote (Shelby County election returns). Thus, the 1987 election differed from those previously held because although both the Black and White vote were split badly, Hackett still won without a runoff. His victory mostly resulted from a White Republican (Bill Gibbons) who could not create a large

Republican voting bloc, a major Black contender (Minerva Johnican) who could not attract a substantial percentage of Black or White votes, and an extremely low overall turnout.

Divided and Conquered: The Splitting of the Black Vote

Three virtually unknown Black candidates and Robert "Prince Mongo" Hodges competed in this election. The Black candidates were City Councilwoman Minerva Johnican, former Tennessee state representative Dedrick "Teddy" Withers, and postal worker Walter Franklin (Keeter, 1987, pg. A1).

As a result of their entrance into the race, the Black vote was split heavily. Concerning total votes received: Franklin polled .62 percent of the vote; Hodges .93 percent; Johnican 22.65 percent; and Withers 1.62 percent (Shelby County election returns). Hackett, benefiting from this split, won easily with a runoff by receiving 58.56 percent of the overall vote (Shelby County election returns).

These percentages were most alarming because the White vote was also split in 1987. City Councilman Bill Gibbons tried to forge a biracial coalition of progressive Blacks and White Republicans to thrust him into a runoff with Hackett. With endorsements from Senator John Ford and his brother City Councilman James Ford, Gibbons expected 25 to 30 percent of both the Black and White vote, hoping that he would later win the election by receiving the majority of the Black vote and some of the White vote (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12). Although Gibbons did receive 25

percent of the Black vote, he only garnered approximately eight percent of the White vote (Shelby County election returns).

Gibbons' dismal performance mostly resulted from a lack of issues to rally around. The two Hackett administrations had faced a number of successes especially in the year prior to the election. For example, the major corporations of International Paper, Litton Microwave, Great Western Financial, and the Defense Department's U.S. Large Cavitation Channel Project all opened offices in Memphis during Hackett's two terms as mayor (Ruthven, 1987, pg. E1). Other existing Memphis businesses such as Rachels Industries and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital expanded thereby creating additional jobs (Ruthven, 1987, pg. E1). Hackett also cited recent tourist attractions in the city such as the Ramesses the Great Exhibition and a panda on loan at the Memphis Zoo (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12).

Gibbons realizing that his mayoral bid was doomed, contemplated withdrawal shortly before the August 13th withdrawal deadline, but decided to remain in the race and emphasize the issues of reducing crime and improving the quality of public schools (Keeter, 1987, pg. A6). He focused on the escalating crime rate in the city, once stating that one out of every 10 Memphis residents had been victimized by serious crimes since Hackett took office in 1982 (Keeter, 1987, pg. A6). He also mentioned the state of the Memphis city school system with its deteriorating school buildings and lack of funds. According to Gibbons, Hackett "was taken by the glitz and glitter of the [mayor's] office and ignored the need for safe neighborhoods and good schools" (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12).

Approximately two weeks before the election, Gibbons faced renewed optimism with issues surrounding the September 24th shooting death of Joseph Robinson, a mentally disturbed Black man, by White police officers. White officers pumped nine bullets into Robinson, killing him instantly (Beifuss, 1987, pg. A1). The officers alleged that a disoriented Robinson who was stabbing himself with a knife and threatening suicide continued to lunge at them with the knife even after being shot many times (Beifuss, 1987, pg. A1). However, eyewitnesses in a Memphis public housing development where the shooting occurred reported that Robinson was only a threat to himself and not to officers (Keeter, 1987, pg. A6). Many also stated that the officers continued their gunfire after Robinson had fallen to the ground (Beifuss, 1987, pg. A1). Gibbons compared this incident of alleged police misconduct to a 1983 Shannon Avenue incident in which police killed seven Black men who had held hostage, tortured, and killed a White police officer (Cooke, 1987, pg. B2). He called for a "thorough and effective investigation to provide adequate information to the public to allay suspicions of improper conduct by police" (Cooke, 1987, pg. B2).

Unfortunately for Gibbons, Hackett quickly handled what could have been a damaging issue to his campaign after threats of boycotts surfaced in Black communities. He first paid condolences to Robinson's mother (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12). Then, Hackett called for a full investigation by the Memphis chapter of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12). Finally, he pledged to create an agency to aid the mentally disturbed (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12). Thus, this last minute effort to salvage the Gibbons campaign failed to thwart the Hackett victory.

An obvious question surrounding the 1987 election concerned the issue of why a better-known Black candidate did not run. By 1987, Otis Higgs had endured three failed mayoral bids in 1975, 1979, and 1983. Candidates A.W. Willis Jr. and D'Army Bailey ended their political aspirations with their failed mayoral bids in 1967 and 1983. Also, the Ford brothers declined runs for office in 1987 mainly because of a preoccupation with Harold Ford's retrial on mail and bank fraud charges (Bayne, 1987, pg. B1). Dr. Willie Herenton had no political aspirations in 1987 because of his then relatively uncontroversial reign as city schools superintendent. One could only speculate as to reasons for the failure to choose a Black consensus candidate, the entrances of four unknown Black contenders, and the ensuing split Black vote in the 1987 election.

Black Racism

The racial tensions present in the 1987 race were not only between Black and White candidates, but involved attacks made by Black candidates against Black leaders. Minerva Johnican once stated that White voters would be more receptive of a Black woman as mayor. Dubbing herself as "The Oprah Winfrey of Memphis," (Cooke, 1987, pg. A2) Johnican pointed out that in a 1983 race for a city council post, she was the first Black citizen to be elected to a citywide office when she defeated White Democrat David Hill by garnering a substantial percentage of the White vote (approximately 30 percent). She cited this election as proof that White Memphians would vote for Black candidates. She believed, "You [a Black candidate]

have to prove to them [White voters] that you'll be fair to everybody . . . and be willing to meet [them] on their own turf" (Cooke, 1987, pg. A2). However in reality, Ms. Johnnican's victory and receipt of the White vote also resulted from her close affiliations with White Republicans who endorsed her campaign in a backlash against Hill who was strongly endorsed by Harold Ford (Cooke, 1987, pg. A2). Although Johnnican stated an assurance that White voters would support her campaign, she realized that historical voting patterns had proven otherwise in races which involved Black and White candidates. For this reason, Johnnican's bid could only be kept afloat if she received a large percentage (at least 75 percent) of the Black vote and a small percentage (about 10 percent) of the White vote (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12).

In order to attract these levels of support in the Black community, she needed backing from Black leaders which she had difficulty in gaining because of her past clashes with the Ford organization. In 1987, sour feelings remained between Johnnican and the Fords. Although Harold Ford declined involvement in the 1987 election, his brothers John and James both endorsed Bill Gibbons (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12). Also former candidates A.W. Willis Jr. and D'Army Bailey endorsed Dick Hackett (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12). Out of frustration at losing crucial endorsements from Black leaders in favor of White candidates, Johnnican labeled them as "Uncle Toms" which she translated as "Selfish Blacks [who were] selling out our [Black] people" (Cooke and Keeter, 1987, pg. A6).

As a result of these charges, Senator John Ford accused Johnnican of practicing "Black racism" in her accusations. Candidate Dedrick "Teddy" Withers also accused

Ford of being paid by the Bill Gibbons campaign for his support (Cooke and Keeter, 1987, pg. A6). In retaliation Ford charged, "Nothing is worse than White racism except Black racism" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1987).

Results of the 1987 Election

In 1987, the cities of Memphis and Baltimore were the only remaining two in the nation with Black populations totaling more than 30 percent that had not elected a Black mayor.¹⁶ During this time, Memphis was approximately 52 percent Black (Cooke, 1987, pg A1). As in previous mayoral elections involving Black candidates, Black contenders lost as a result of a split Black vote, racially polarized voting patterns or a lack of crossover support, and lower Black voter turnout percentages. The 1987 election, as was also the case in 1983, most exemplified Black chaos in failing to unify and competing against a shrewd White incumbent who ran a relaxed campaign and refused to reply to charges for fear of being viewed as racist.

The only positive result of the 1987 mayoral campaign was that the voting patterns of Black and White voters were not as racially polarized as they had been in previous elections. White candidates received higher percentages of the Black vote than did others in the past 20 years who competed against Black candidates (Keeter, 1987, pg. A1). However, Whites continued to vote on the basis of race. Hackett

¹⁶In 1987, Kurtis Schmoke, a Democratic nominee and former deputy mayor, was elected as Baltimore's first mayor after the White incumbent was elected governor of Maryland. This left Memphis as the only large city with a higher than 30 percent Black population that had not elected a Black mayor (Persons, 1993, pg. 43).

received approximately 90 percent of the White vote; Gibbons eight percent; and Johnican one percent (Shelby County election returns).

In 1987, Black voters were left angered and unmotivated by four unappealing candidates and a lack of vital issues. Also, some Black leaders, such as Harold Ford, made no endorsements while others endorsed White candidates (Keeter, 1987, pg. A12). In contract to previous mayoral elections, Black voters knew that a Black candidate would not win and they simply did not care.

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE 1991 ELECTION: DR. WILLIE W. HERENTON TARGETS BLACK MOBILIZATION

An Assessment of the Herenton Victory

The date October 4, 1991 was a milestone in Memphis politics. Twenty-four years after the candidacy of the first Black contender, a Black mayor had finally been elected. While Black Memphis rejoiced, White Memphis despaired. The latter feared that a Black mayor would appoint an all-Black administration who would favor the needs of Black citizens over Whites. Whites would leave the city in droves, taking their tax base with them - some out of fear, others out of racism. This would result in a financially depleted Black city surrounded by affluent White suburbs.

In 1991, Memphis had finally become a member of the "New South" (Vaughn, 1989). It was to be applauded that a city which was best known for the exploitative Boss politics of Edward H. Crump, the segregationist atrocities of Henry Loeb, and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. had elected a Black man to its highest office. However, this optimism may have been unwarranted. Herenton defeated Hackett and Hodges with approximately 97 percent of the Black vote and only two percent of the White vote (Shelby County election returns). The 1991 election was among the most racially polarized in the city's history. In some previous elections, Blacks supported White candidates, but not vice-versa. In 1991, neither race of voters provided significant crossover support.

Dr. Herenton once stated "[that he did not want] to get elected because he [was] Black, but rather because [he was] eminently qualified and also [happened] to

be Black" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1991). Yet contrary to this language, his entire campaign ranging from the conventions for his selection as consensus candidate to the final get-out-the-vote campaign was directed toward Black mobilization. Herenton realized that the political strategy of deracialization had failed miserably for previous Black contenders in Memphis. Despite deracialized campaigns, White voters had steadfastly refused to support Black candidates. Therefore, Herenton's five-month Black mobilization effort included: the choice of a consensus candidate, massive voter registration drives, the encouragement of Black voter turnout, limited attempts to attract crossover votes, and a federal ruling which banned runoffs in city elections. Previous experiences of Black candidates had proven that a less-organized campaign with an absence of one or more of these elements would most assuredly have resulted in defeat.

The Candidates: Dick Hackett

Forty-two year-old Dick Hackett had made his first bid for the mayor's office in a 1982 special election which was ordered after Mayor Chandler's resignation and acceptance of a circuit court judgeship (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6). In the general election, City Council member Mike Cody was eliminated leaving Hackett and J.O. Patterson Jr. in a runoff. He later defeated Patterson in the November runoff and began his first mayoral tenure on December 8, 1982 with subsequent reelections in 1983 and 1987 (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6).

The Candidates: Dr. Willie Wilbert Herenton, Ed.D.

Fifty-one year-old Dr. Willie Wilbert Herenton, the son of a laundry worker and a drug store deliveryman, was reared in a lower and lower-middle class Black neighborhood mostly by his mother and grandmother (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6). After initially seeking a career in boxing (a Golden Gloves championship winner), Herenton later pursued a teaching career (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6).

After working his way through college, Herenton became a fifth-grade teacher in 1963 (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6). In 1968 after earning a master's degree, he became a city school principal (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6) He later earned a doctorate in educational administration in 1972 (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6). On January 1, 1979, Dr. Willie Herenton became Memphis' first Black school superintendent (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6).

His tenure as superintendent was very successful and uncontroversial until schoolteacher Mahnaz Bahrmand Vincent filed a sexual harassment lawsuit in 1989 which alleged that Herenton "[initiated] an affair with her by promising job promotions" (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6).¹⁷ This lawsuit prompted an investigation which focused on Herenton's personal and administrative activities as

¹⁷Mahnaz Bahrmand-Vincent (formerly Mahnaz Bahrmand), a Memphis math teacher, sued Herenton for three million dollars on the grounds of "breach of promise to marry, fraud, outrageous conduct, and civil rights violations" (Buser, 1989, pg. B1). She alleged that Herenton initiated an affair which lasted for two years and which included a broken marriage promise, two abortions, a miscarriage, and physical abuse. After Herenton ended the relationship, Vincent claimed he denied her a promotion and tried to force her to move out of the city because her presence would damage his future plans to become mayor (Buser, 1989, pg. B1).

superintendent. Two New York City police detectives investigating Herenton for the job of New York school chancellor, later filed a report that dismissed Ms. Vincent's charges as "groundless" (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6). Herenton and Ms. Vincent later reached a private and undisclosed out-of-court settlement (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A6).¹⁸

The Candidates: Robert "Prince Mongo" Hodges

Robert "Prince Mongo" Hodges had been running in Memphis city mayoral elections since 1979. He continues to be a successful restaurateur who attended Columbia University, but has had major difficulties in gaining legitimacy. Before placing third in the 1978 race for Shelby County mayor, he was best known for his outdoor art collection in front of his middle-class midtown Memphis home which included old cars, furniture, a coffin, boulders, bathtubs and commodes, beer cans, litter, high grass, weeds, and other forms of trash (Mansur, 1982, pg. A1).

Although Hodges is of Lebanese descent, he claims to be neither human nor creature, but a "free spirit" (Riker, 1979, pg. C5) who commutes daily to and from his native planet Zambodia by hot air balloon. His everyday Zambodian attire included a garb of headdress, bones, furs, bone chest, and bare feet or socks (to emphasize his concern for the people and his effort to "crush the machine that got

¹⁸During the months preceding the election, Vincent "unknowingly" moved into the Memphis apartment complex where Herenton was staying prompting him to move out. Herenton's campaign manager, Charles Carpenter announced in a radio interview that the move was a "pre-emptive measure" (Bernsen, 91 pg. B4) to not damage Herenton's campaign. He also described the incident as "dirty tricks . . . directly linked to the current administration" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B4).

hold of everybody's life" (Riker, 1979, pg. C5). On formal occasions, he wore a Zambodian spirit suit made of rabbit skin and which has the skull of his 3,000 year old Zambodian relative, Prince Belanka attached to it (Riker, 1979, pg. C5)

Hodges, a native of Virginia Beach, Virginia, served 15 months of a four-year sentence in 1968 for the "abduction and malicious wounding of his lawyer" (Riker, 1979, pg. C5). Before 1991, his mayoral candidacies were not taken seriously. In each election, he received a couple of thousand votes from those who believed that his candidacies were harmless. His 1991 platform called for an abolishment of city taxes, holding public hangings, and "restricting the duties of the ignorant City Councilmen according to their mentalities" (Markon, 1991, pg. A9). However in 1991, the Hodges candidacy contributed to the narrow Herenton win. Hackett campaign coordinator William Boyd lamented, "Hurray for Mongo, joking and having fun" (Beifuss, 1991, pg. A14) because the approximately 3,000 votes received by Hodges could have easily resulted in a Hackett win.

Hodges, who described the city of Memphis as "a racist town whose leaders permit crime, neglect education, and murder, rob, and rape the people," (Markon, 1991, pg. A9) had intense views on the characters of both Hackett and Herenton. He stated that Hackett as mayor "tripled [city] taxes and [left] the city falling apart. . . . When you go to bed with skunks, you smell like skunks" (Markon, 1991, pg. A9). In reference to Herenton, Hodges asked, "Do you want him leading you . . . when the school system is falling apart?" (Markon, 1991, pg. A9).

Hodges also had strong views on crime and voting. In describing how he would have handled a 1991 Shelby County jail riot he quipped, "I'd throw the air-conditioning off, turn the heat off in winter, and let those pigs live in their own slop" (Markon, 1991, pg. A9). Concerning the growing crime rate he suggested, "[giving] everyone living in high-crime areas a Magnum on one side and an Uzi on the other" (Markon, 1991, pg. A9).

Trouble in Paradise: The Choice of a Consensus Candidate

Research on mayoral elections which included Black contenders has found a positive correlation between the entrance of one appealing Black candidate and increased Black voter registration and turnout percentages (Preston, 1984; Perry and Stokes, 1987; Keiser, 1990; Lawson, 1991; Ardrey, 1993; Drake and Holsworth, 1993). Realizing that one of the major dilemmas for previous Black mayoral contenders had been the splitting of the Black vote, Memphis' Black leadership decided to convene Black citizens in order to select and support one consensus candidate who would run for mayor.

The dilemma for Black Memphians, as it had been in previous elections, was in selecting one Black citizen to run for mayor. One major problem was that many Black leaders pledged to run for mayor. Proposed entrants included Benjamin L. Hooks, executive director of the N.A.A.C.P.; three-time candidate and lawyer Otis Higgs; Herenton; Congressman Harold Ford; City Councilman Shep Wilbun Jr.; City Councilman and Baptist minister Kenneth T. Whalum; and Dr. Talib-Karim

Muhammad, head of the Islamic Center of Memphis (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1; Brannigan, 1991 pg. A4).

All had various shortcomings. First, many who pledged to run were lesser-known Memphis citizens. Wilbun lacked widespread recognition in both the Black and White communities. Whalum was also a virtual unknown outside of the Black community, but planned to forge a coalition of religious leaders who would aid his campaign by using their influence in Black churches (Keeter, 1990, pg. D7). Muhammad was the first to announce his candidacy, but because of his hardline Muslim beliefs would probably not have been able to attract support from mainstream Black Memphians (Keeter, 1990, pg. D7; Brannigan, 1991, pg. A4).

The well-known candidates also faced credibility problems. Hooks, president of the N.A.A.C.P., showed little desire to run stating that he would only do so if called forth by a mandate (Brannigan, 1991, pg. A4). Higgs had already had three failed mayoral bids. Although he did attract more White crossover votes than other Black candidates in 1975 and 1979, the belief was that because of his previous failed performances, he obviously was neither the choice of Black nor White voters.

Harold Ford's problems were tied to his family's reputation as dominating the Black community. Many believed that if Ford were elected mayor, it would be a virtual return to the type of unchecked machine politics which existed during the E. H. Crump era. Also, Ford still faced court battles surrounding a retrial on mail fraud allegations.

Because of fears of a split Black vote, Black leaders decided to convene Black citizens to select and support one consensus candidate who would run. They realized that their priority was to put away their divisions so that they could get Hackett out of office. Neither Blacks nor Whites were pleased with the performance of the third Hackett administration, particularly during its later years. However, they realized that the White community would only run one White candidate.

Black Memphis not only had difficulty in deciding whom the consensus candidate would be, but also Harold Ford and Shep Wilbun disagreed over methods for choosing a Black representative. Both were concerned with the selection of one candidate and with increasing Black voter registration percentages. However, Ford believed that Black community leaders should elect the candidate, but Wilbun desired an open convention for Black citizens (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1).

Harold Ford favored first holding neighborhood community meetings. Eventually, a summit would assemble in which 100 political, civic, and religious leaders would organize a massive voter registration drive, and later select the candidate (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). Approximately 40,000 Blacks would be encouraged to register during a 60 to 90 day period (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). On the other hand, Wilbun reasoned that citizens would be more motivated to vote if they had some choice in the candidate selection process. One of the major reasons for past apathy of the Black electorate was that candidates had been chosen by leaders from the Black middle class and thrust upon voters for their acceptance. Wilbun believed that since the people would be voting, they should be allowed to choose

their candidate at an African-American People's Summit (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). Ford, Wilbun, and others agreed that potential Black candidates should pledge their support to the chosen candidate and withdraw their candidacies. Only those who signed an agreement would be allowed to organize the convention (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1).

In April 1991, Wilbun's African-American People's Convention was attended by approximately 2,000 Black Memphians (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A14). This number was far short of the expected 12,000 participants (Bernsen, 1991, pg. 14). They overwhelmingly selected Dr. Herenton as the consensus candidate. Two months later in June 1991, Dr. Herenton was again selected as consensus candidate at Ford's Black Leadership Summit which was attended by approximately 500 to 600 Black political, religious, and community leaders (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A14).

Black citizens were encouraged by the agreement on the part of Harold Ford to support the unity efforts. Since he was the city's most influential Black political leader, total unity was not possible without his support. Also in past races, a lack of Ford support, rather than an endorsement, meant defeat even in elections where victory was almost assured.

At another end, many leaders expressed reservations about the concept of a convention to choose a consensus candidate. Past experience had shown that a Black candidate could not possibly win the mayoral office unless the entire community of Black citizens and leaders backed him. Minerva Johnican, a 1987 mayoral contender, city council member, and 1990 elected criminal court clerk was quoted in a Memphis

Commercial Appeal article as saying that, "Some Blacks are reluctant to come out against a consensus candidate, while some Whites who might have supported a Black candidate were turned off by the 'angry and exclusive tone' of the unity process" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A8). Johnican added that, "Black politicians have to be careful about supporting a White. Basically, we have to worry about retaliation from some of our own if we support a White over a Black" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A8).

Others in addition to Johnican also disapproved of the idea of a consensus candidate. There were rumors that Otis Higgs would not withdraw his previously filed candidacy for the mayoral office. Higgs, who attended the people's convention, left early because of his feeling that it was "flawed and stacked in Herenton's favor" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A1). Hundreds of Herenton supporters attended the meeting and cheered their support for his candidacy (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A1). Also, those in attendance at the summit did not vote for a candidate as was agreed upon, but based on their enthusiasm it was obvious that Herenton was the chosen one (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A14).

Because of his feeling that the Leadership Summit was "not the orderly and fair consensus process that I [Higgs] was led to believe there would be [and that it was] little more than a mini-People's Convention," (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A1) Higgs vowed to stay in the race. He stated shortly after the summit, "I am staying in the race and we're going to work hard to put together a campaign" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A14). However contrary to statements made that evening, two days later Higgs withdrew from the mayor's race leaving a battle between Herenton, Hackett, and

Hodges (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). Higgs issued the following statement: "I have decided to withdraw my candidacy for mayor. It is our assessment that my candidacy would create a division within the African-American community and substantially diminish the prospect of a true consensus victory" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1).

Although a consensus candidate had been chosen, some in the Black community objected to both the choice process and to the selection of Herenton. Former state representative Alvin King, who before his 1992 defeat was the General Assembly's longest serving Black legislator, openly criticized the Wilbun and Ford meetings as being racist. King who publicly supported Hackett was quoted as saying, "I told Herenton 'I don't think you're going to win and I want to be with a winner. You can't win because you're running a racist campaign. . . . All he's running on is that he's Black - we all knew that'" (Wade, 1991, pg. A1). King also said that Higgs was "forced out of the race just because he's Black and some people are saying 'we already have a Black in the race'" (Wade, 1991, pg. A1). He added, ". . . Those days are over - White people will vote for Blacks and Black people will vote for Whites - as long as the race isn't the only issue" (Wade, 1991, pg. A5).

Moreover, complaints of reverse discrimination surfaced because both Whites and the Memphis media were excluded from both Wilbun's convention and Ford's summit. Whites could not attend the convention because of the belief that their presence would make it more difficult to mobilize Blacks. The Memphis media could not attend because of supposed racially biased coverage. The Memphis Commercial Appeal was especially the target of attack by Black leaders. It has given front-page

coverage to Herenton's alleged past infidelities and mismanagement of funds as school superintendent. It had also printed past editorials and cartoons which criticized and to some extent belittled Black leaders in the city.

Despite the objections, Herenton was probably the best choice for the consensus candidate. He had served as Memphis School Superintendent for 12 1/2 years before retiring on June 30, 1990 (Covington, 1991, pg. A1). He had many accomplishments during his tenure including "improving or originating such programs as the inner-city school improvement project, the optional schools, and the Adopt-A-School program" (Covington, 1991, pg. A1). In addition, because of his accomplishments as school superintendent, he was praised by both Black and White Memphians alike. Because he was well-known and respected in the Black community, he was probably one of few Black leaders who could motivate Black voters to turn out at the polls in sizable numbers.

Another advantage with the choice of Herenton as consensus candidate was his expertise in handling the media. As a result of events associated with the 1989 sexual harassment scandal, he knew how to maintain his composure before the media. Moreover, Herenton knew how to manipulate the media by avoiding open confrontations with Hackett. In past mayoral campaigns, Black candidates were blamed more so than Whites for racial polarization. White candidates, Hackett more so than others, who faced Black candidates in races, used the effective strategy of remaining silent during mayoral campaigns. Since they held an advantage primarily because of their race, incumbency, and a White voting majority, they avoided open

criticisms for fear of being branded as racist. Therefore, they allowed Blacks to make public criticisms. The media reported these criticisms in such a way that it appeared that the Black candidates worsened the racial divisions in the city by harshly attacking innocent White candidates.

The crucial element in electing a Black mayor besides mobilization was the time factor. In 1991, a Black mayoral candidate would have had to forge a well-organized and well-financed campaign in order to defeat a nine-year incumbent. The possibility existed for mobilizing the small Black Memphis voting majority through a viable grassroots campaign. However, leaders realized that the predominantly White business community would pledge its funds to the Hackett organization. Because of the time limitation, the fear was that no Black candidate would be able to muster up enough funds to defeat the wealthy Hackett campaign. A few Black citizens voiced their concerns. Dr. Talib-Karim Muhammad stated, "The mayor has been in office for eight years and anybody who thinks they can crank up an election in four or five months and beat an incumbent is just whistling Dixie" (Keeter, 1990, pg. D7). According to 1987 contender Minerva Johnican, "If they [Black leaders] haven't done anything by now, they're not going to be able to raise the money and put together an organization in time" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A16).

White Fears of a Black Mayor

After the Black community chose Herenton as consensus candidate and other serious Black contenders withdrew from the race, the White community was faced

with a crucial dilemma. This was the first year in which both Black leaders and citizens had chosen and pledged to support one representative for mayor. Also, Black voter registration slightly outnumbered that of Whites. Even if no one challenged the incumbent, there would be a close battle for the mayor's office. However if the White vote was split, Blacks were almost assured of a win.

On August 1, 1991, the deadline for the filing of candidacy for the mayor's office, four Whites were rumored as considering a run for mayor - State Senator Steve Cohen (D-Memphis), Attorney James D. Causey, James H. Leonard, and Elaine Coupe (Markon, 1991, pg. B1). Since Cohen and Causey were both well-known in the White community, both would probably have attracted substantial percentages of the White vote. Although Leonard and Coupe were relatively unknown, their minor candidacies would have a decisive effect in a close election between Herenton and Hackett (Nelson and Meranto, 1977; Perry and Stokes, 1987).

Although the four mentioned above and probably other Whites were considering challenging Hackett, none filed as candidates. Senator Steve Cohen, in answering that he wouldn't run for mayor stated his primary reason as being that as the third candidate, he "would have no chance" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A6). He reasoned that because of the inevitable racial divisions, he would have received virtually few if any votes from either Blacks or Whites. Neither would want to split their racial voting bloc regardless of his qualifications. Cohen also stated that racial polarization would rise to new heights in 1991 as a result of Herenton being chosen as a consensus candidate by an exclusively Black People's Convention and Leadership

Summit and Hackett's action of holding a major campaign fundraiser at the exclusively White Memphis Country Club (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A6). According to Cohen, these actions "set race into this campaign in a way unknown before in Memphis" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A6).

Voter Registration Drives and Turnout Rates

Herenton campaign organizers embarked on a heavy voter registration effort. They realized that past Black candidates were defeated because White voter registration surpassed that of Blacks. Because of racial bloc voting, White majorities always led to victory for White candidates.

Herenton especially wanted to show Black voters that 1991 was their year to elect a Black mayor. They possessed power in numbers because they were the population and voter registration majority. He wanted to assure them that "Help Is On The Way," (Huston and Christion, 1991, pg. A6) but only if they registered and turned out at the polls.

In previous mayoral elections which included Black candidates, Black voters lacked the motivation to vote in sufficient numbers to ensure Black victories. In one instance, they were displeased with the Black contenders who competed in mayoral races (the 1987 election). In other races, the conduct of the elections resulted in defeat for Black candidates (for example, the divisions among Black candidates in 1983 and 1987). Finally, a lack of cooperation among Black leaders led to Black apathy (as was the case in 1982 and 1987).

In 1991, the first two problems had already been solved. Since the people chose Herenton as their representative, they had proven their acceptance of his candidacy. Also, the mere fact that other Black leaders did not run showed signs of unity. The only remaining problems concerned perceptions of cooperation and mobilization among the Black community and among Black leaders. The challenges for Willie Herenton were first to arouse Black voters. Then he had to gain support, rather than mere endorsements, from Black leaders.

Concerning the former, in spite of a chronic lack of funds, he conducted a vigorous grassroots campaign. Although he could not persuade the White business community to furnish much-needed funds or White citizens to provide crossover support to his campaign, he possessed the power of persuasion in the Black community. Therefore, he conducted the type of open and public campaign which would easily attract media coverage and which has typically proven beneficial to Black mayoral candidates for ensuring a large Black voter turnout (Nelson and Meranto, 1977). It included frequenting streets, churches, restaurants, stores, and other public places in the months before the campaign, giving speeches, leading marches, distributing literature, and driving through the city appealing to voters through a bullhorn (Markon, 1991, pg. B1).

Final Get-Out-The-Vote-Campaign

In the final ten days before the 1991 election, Herenton held a get-out-the-vote campaign. He stepped up efforts to encourage Black Memphians

to vote to an even greater degree. This included an increasing number of speeches, marches, community meetings, and other events (Kelley, 1991, pg. A1).

Moreover during this time, Herenton addressed the second major dilemma of his campaign - gaining active support from Black leaders. He received a major boost when civil rights activists, Martin Luther King III and Jesse Jackson along with Harold Ford, made several appearances both with him and on his behalf. Their inclusion brought out images of Memphis as the assassination place of Martin Luther King Jr. They wanted the election of Herenton as the first Black mayor to cast down this image of Memphis as the focal point of racism.

Jackson also added a religious dimension in order to symbolize the Herenton campaign as a "religious pilgrimage" (Kelley, 1991, pg. A11). Black voters were receiving a divine calling to vote for Herenton and end the conservatism and racism which had for so long excluded their political voice from Memphis politics. In one appearance Jackson stated, "[Martin Luther] King [Jr.]'s death had been a crucifixion. Herenton's election would be the resurrection. . . . Let Dr. King and those who paid the supreme price rejoice that the work done in Memphis was not done in vain" (Kelley, 1991, pg. A4).

Harold Ford also became more involved during the final days of the campaign with a surprise endorsement call to Herenton during the latter's appearance on a morning talk-radio show (Kelley, 1991, pg. B1). After the Black Leadership Summit, Ford had made some fundraising efforts, but had remained silent during most of the campaign. During the brief phone call, Ford stated that a Herenton administration

"[would] be good for our community . . . [and for the elderly]" (Kelley, 1991, pg. B1). Both pledged unity as Herenton stated, "We're [Herenton and Ford] going down the stretch hand in hand" (Kelley, 1991, pg. B2).

On the October 3 election day, Ford mobilized volunteers in places where their need was greatest. As a result of these and other efforts, Black registered voters outnumbered Whites by approximately 14,000 in the 1991 general election (Shelby County election returns). Also, the Black voter turnout rate surpassed White turnout for the first time in Memphis history. The 48 percent Black turnout figure was approximately four percent higher than the 44.3 percent White participation rate (Shelby County election returns).

More importantly, Ford led a group of Herenton organizers to the Shelby County Election Commission after the polls closed to investigate a computer error in counting absentee votes (Keeter, 1991, pg. B1). The Memphis Commercial Appeal reported, "Ford . . . and commission chairman O.C. Pleasant Jr. went jaw-to-jaw as the congressman demanded to see the ballots and a list of the people counting them" (Keeter, 1991, pg. B1). Pleasant, who is Black, claimed that the computer could not read a damaged computer disc and labeled Ford's conduct as "not befitting a congressman" (Keeter, 1991, pg. B1). As commission employees reentered absentee vote totals on another computer disc, Herenton supporters suspected foul play. At 2:00 a.m. on October 4, 1991, absentee totals - numbering 5,509 for Hackett, 2,621 for Herenton, and 56 for Hodges - confirmed a Herenton victory by 172 votes (Keeter, 1991, pg. B1).

Crossover Votes

Studies of Black and White voting behavior have found that both groups usually vote along racial lines and thus seldom cast crossover votes (Pettigrew, 1972; Murray and Vedlitz, 1978; Bullock, 1984; Henry, 1987). The city of Memphis was similar to other large urban areas where Black and White voting patterns tended to be racially polarized. For this reason, both candidates Herenton and Hackett primarily targeted voters in Black and White communities respectively while making limited attempts to attract crossover support.

These efforts included a desire to gain public endorsements from leaders and officials of the opposite race and to attract citizen support in the form of funds and votes. It was difficult to attract either because public crossover support in a racially polarized election sometimes garnered a stinging wrath from the community. For example, Black state representative Alvin King (D-Memphis) who openly endorsed and campaigned for the Hackett camp in the 1991 election faced rigorous hostility from the Black community. Shortly after Herenton's narrow victory, supporters carried anti-King signs at Herenton rallies, including those which read "Remember Alvin King" and another reading "Bye bye Alvin, we can't Hackett" (Wade, 1991, pg. B2). King later lost his state legislative seat after 22 years in office and after serving as chairman of the Shelby County legislative delegation.

The Black community also openly boycotted businesses owned by George Jones, a successful Black entrepreneur who served as co-chairman of the 1991 Hackett campaign. Jones operated four McDonald's restaurants in predominantly

Black neighborhoods (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B2). He had also been appointed to the board of the Memphis Area Chamber of Commerce and to the Park Commission (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B2).

White candidates also endured criticisms for endorsing Black candidates. Dr. Harry Moore, White regional director of the National Conference of Christians and Jews supported Herenton, but did not openly campaign for him. He stated, "It could hurt them [Whites] socially and in a business sense [if they supported Black candidates]" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A8).

Despite the backlash faced by those who yielded crossover support, Hackett did receive some endorsements from prominent Blacks. The presiding bishop of the Church of God in Christ (hereinafter referred to as C.O.G.I.C.) L.H. Ford, sent letters to local C.O.G.I.C. leaders recommending that they support the Hackett administration which was better prepared to meet future goals of the city and to protect its relationship with C.O.G.I.C. (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A9). Also, the bishop asked members to pray for Hackett because he believed Hackett would "do what [was] best for the total city and the church" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A9).

Hackett also received signs of support from other influential Blacks such as 1987 mayoral contender Minerva Johnican and James E. Smith, head of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1733. They signed a petition stating his qualifications as he filed his candidacy in the 1991 race. However, realizing a potential backlash from the Black community, both refrained

from giving full endorsements by warning that their signatures were indicative of "courtesy [not of] support" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A9).

The Independent Political Action Council (hereinafter referred to as I.P.A.C.), a newly formed organization of Black pastors, also endorsed Hackett (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A9). I.P.A.C. also opened a campaign office for Hackett in a predominantly Black shopping area (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A9). The organization later ran a phone bank on Hackett's behalf and had volunteers distribute Hackett fliers on election day (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A9). In contrast, the Herenton campaign was unable to cite public support from either White leaders or from other predominantly White institutions (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A9). Although a small group of White peace activists and environmentalists did publicly endorse him on the day before the election, their backing was too late and proved almost totally ineffectual (Kelley, 1991, pg. A1). Herenton's only major action for garnering White support was to distribute a publication to White areas detailing his stances on five major issues - housing, economic development, education, quality neighborhoods, and crime - and speaking at functions in White communities when invited (Interview with Atty. Charles Carpenter, chairman of Herenton campaign).

Hackett made more attempts to attract the Black vote before election day than did Herenton for the White vote. Hackett made more attempts to reach out to the Black community in 1991 than in previous elections. Prior to this year, his usual practice was a laid-back approach which included paid television and radio advertisements and avoidance of open confrontations with his Black rivals. However

in 1991, Hackett had to change his strategy. As was the case with White candidates in other predominantly Black cities, Hackett did not need financial support from Blacks, but was in dire need of their votes (Schexnider, 1982; Rich, 1989; Persons, 1993). Therefore, he made several "handshaking stops" (Christion and Kelley, 1991, pg. A12) at shopping areas in Black neighborhoods distributing campaign leaflets and reaching out to citizens for support. Hackett also held backyard receptions before small racially-mixed groups at the homes of Black middle-class Memphians. At one reception he stated, "We will walk in unity as we have led in unity in this administration. . . . [In a subtle reference to Herenton, he stated] I don't believe in the divide-and-conquer approach" (Markon, 1991, pg. B1). At a later reception, he made another veiled reference to Herenton by saying, "Frankly, the more divisive you are during the political process, the harder it is afterward to get everyone back together" (Huston and Markon, 1991, pg. A12). His campaign tactics would have made "community cohesiveness [after the election easier to achieve unlike] those who are talking unity but not walking unity" (Huston and Markon, 1991, pg. A12).

Hackett and Herenton received almost equal percentages of crossover votes from Blacks and Whites. In 59 precincts with predominantly Black voter registration, Herenton received 97 percent of the votes, Hackett two percent, and Robert "Prince Mongo" Hodges one percent (Shelby County election returns). In 31 precincts with predominantly White voter registration, Hackett received 97 percent of votes, Herenton two percent, and Hodges one percent (Shelby County election returns).

An End to Runoffs in At-Large Elections

Since its enactment in 1965, the Voting Rights Act had been applied to alter at-large systems which worked to the detriment of Black voters. In many cities, majority vote requirements in at-large elections have usually resulted in Black majorities being unable to elect Black candidates, especially when both Blacks and Whites voted in a polarized manner (Lawson, 1991, pg. 45). Various scholars have researched the negative effects runoff requirements have had on Black candidates. Some have found that Black candidates are not at a disadvantage in runoff elections (Bullock and Johnson, 1985a, 1985b, 1992). However, other authors have cited that the lower Black participation rate was detrimental to the candidacies of Black contenders (Jackson, 1984; Foster, 1985; Wright, 1989).

In Memphis, the most recent discriminatory voting litigation began in November 1988 when Dr. Talib-Karim Muhammad representing "All African-American citizens of the City of Memphis, Tennessee who [sought] the elimination of every at-large position on the Memphis City Council," (Cooke, 1988, pg. A1) challenged at-large elections for mayor and City Council under section two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Muhammad and other plaintiffs argued that these elections diluted Black votes by giving them less of an opportunity than White citizens to participate in the political process and to elect their desired candidates.

To demonstrate this contention, Muhammad's suit pointed out that a history of discrimination against Blacks in the city of Memphis and the state of Tennessee

resulted in racially polarized voting patterns (Table 3). In the past, Black candidates who faced White candidates either lost general elections (as in the 1967 Willis race) or became top contenders in runoff elections (as in the 1975 and 1979 Higgs' races and the 1982 Patterson race). Those who qualified for the runoffs were later defeated primarily because of higher White bloc voting and turnout (Table 4).

TABLE 3

**RACIAL VOTING PATTERNS IN GENERAL ELECTIONS WHICH RESULTED
IN RUNOFF ELECTIONS**

Year	Candidate	General Election			Runoff Election		
		Black	White	Total	Black	White	Total
1975	Higgs	80.0	10.0	35.1	96.8	10.1	42.0
	Chandler	3.0	70.0	46.5	3.2	89.9	58.0
	Turner	16.0	19.0	16.4			
	Others	2.0	1.0	2.0			
1979	Higgs	94.0	10.0	45.3	96.3	8.7	47.1
	Chandler	3.0	80.0	46.7	3.7	91.3	52.9
	Halloran	2.0	8.0	7.0			
	Others	1.0	2.0	1.0			
1982	Patterson	94.0	1.0	40.6	96.5	9.0	45.6
	Hackett	3.0	90.0	30.0	3.5	91.0	54.0
	Cody	2.0	7.0	26.0			
	Others	1.0	2.0	3.4			

Source: Shelby County Election Commission.

TABLE 4

**RACIAL TURNOUT IN GENERAL ELECTIONS WHICH RESULTED
IN RUNOFF ELECTIONS**

Year	General Election			Runoff Election		
	Black	White	Total	Black	White	Total
1975	36.0	64.0	55.0	56.5	59.1	57.96
1979	42.0	58.0	49.5	42.4	57.6	59.1
1982	55.0	65.0	55.0	60.0	68.0	55.0

Source: Shelby County Election Commission.

In February 1991, the U.S. Justice Department filed a lawsuit against the city of Memphis alleging that at-large election systems discriminated against Blacks. The Justice lawsuit was later consolidated with Muhammad's earlier class-action suit. It specifically targeted runoff elections, at-large elections, and the city's annexation policy (Conley, 1991, pg. A5). In July 1991, U.S. District Judge Jerome Turner banned runoffs in city elections. He reasoned that a majority vote requirement was designed to dilute Black voting so that Whites would win elections (Conley, 1991, pg. A1). Turner ruled that, "Race was the reason for the runoff provision" (Conley, 1991, pg. A1). Evidence presented in a preliminary hearing conclusively proved that the purpose of the runoff requirement was to ensure that White voters have more ability to elect their favored candidates (Conley, 1991, pg. A1).

Turner also concluded that the runoff provision in question was designed to dilute the strength of Black voters because voting has always split heavily along racial lines in at-large elections (Conley, 1991, pg. A14). Moreover, because Black voter turnout was usually and sometimes substantially lower than White voter turnout, it had been impossible for Black candidates to defeat White candidates in those at-large and runoff elections in which one Black and White candidate competed (Conley, 1991, pg. A14). As a result of this ruling, Herenton with a 49.4 percent (172-vote) majority did not have to face Hackett in a runoff election (Table 5). A high probability existed that Herenton, as were previous Black candidates in runoff races, would have lost the runoff election mainly because of higher White voter turnout and racially polarized voting.

TABLE 5
1991 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS

Candidate	Total Votes	Percent
Hackett	122,413	49.4
Herenton	122,585	49.4
Hodges	2,921	1.2
Total	247,919	100.0

Source: Shelby County Election Commission.

In the event of a runoff, the Hackett camp would have realized its greatest need - for more effective mobilization efforts in order to increase White voter turnout. Hackett had expected the usual elements that led to his previous elections - a White voter turnout rate which surpassed that of Black voters and some Black crossover votes. Since Hackett assumed correctly that he would garner the overwhelming majority of White votes, he had geared his campaign toward attracting a small percentage of Black crossover votes. In 1991, Blacks held a slim registered voting majority. The Hackett camp did not believe that Herenton organizers would have been able to garner a massive Black turnout considering a lack of funds and time.

In a runoff election, Hackett campaign strategists probably would have shifted their place of emphasis. Rather than appealing to Black citizens for crossover votes, they would have actively sought White votes. The fears on the part of White voters of a Black mayor would have caused them to turn out at the polls in huge numbers. As a result, there is a significant possibility that Herenton would have been defeated just as were past Black candidates who made strong showing in general elections only to be later defeated in runoffs.

The Failure of the Political Strategy of Deracialization

The date November, 7, 1989 has been called "Black Tuesday" (McCormick, 1989, pg. 66). On this date, Black mayors were elected in many cities, including those with small Black populations. The cities of New York City; New Haven, Connecticut;

Seattle, Washington; and Durham, North Carolina saw the election of their first Black mayors (McCormick and Jones, 1992, pg. 66). Also, a Black mayor was elected in Cleveland for the first time since the election of Carl Stokes in 1967 and L. Douglas Wilder was elected as governor of Virginia. (McCormick and Jones, 1992, pg. 66).

In these cities and others, Black candidates have attracted massive support from White, ethnic, and other minority voters. They gained this patronage by using the strategy of deracialization, a deemphasis on racially-specific issues such as affirmative action, minority set-asides, and the plight of the urban poor in deference for those which would not alienate the White electorate (McCormick and Jones, 1992, pg. 66; Ardrey, 1993, pg. 110).

Although not as racially explosive as past Memphis mayoral campaigns, neither Hackett nor Herenton employed the strategy of deracialization. Perceiving it as a waste of time, Herenton made few attempts to win White votes. Although Herenton saw improved race relations of the "city's biggest problem," (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A1) he also stressed issues such as the need for increased funding of Memphis public schools, more affordable housing, economic growth, decreasing the growing crime rate, and improving the city's image to the nation as main priorities. While addressing these issues, Herenton was critical of the third Hackett administration. During campaign appearances, he characterized Hackett as a "clerk and a college dropout who has no vision" (Huston, 1991, pg. A14). At another, he was quoted as stating, "Willie Herenton represents growth, unity, and a prosperous Memphis. The incumbent represents the same old Memphis we've had for nine years: stagnation,

racial discord, and a lack of vision. . . . I think the incumbent has done his best, but his best is not good enough. I do not feel that presently we have a mayor with the vision and leadership ability to move this city forward" (Markon, 1991, pg. B4).

Hackett also made indirect criticisms of Herenton after expressing his belief that he was the victim of Herenton's "personal attacks" (Huston, 1991, pg. A14). However, he was careful not to make racial references. He realized that such comments would result in even stronger Black solidarity behind the Herenton campaign (Interview with Atty. Charles Carpenter, chairman of the Herenton campaign). His conservative campaign mostly had an emphasis on family values and his allegiance to the city. Its theme was "to be able to live in peace with a purpose and have a better quality of life for themselves and their families" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A1). He stressed accomplishments during his nine years as mayor which included "[the appointment of] the city's first Black personnel director in 1983, its first Black treasurer in 1984, its first black police director in 1988, its first Black city attorney in 1990, and its first Black chief administrative officer [in 1991]" (Memphis Commercial Appeal, 1991). They also included "sound management of services and finances without tax increases, a healthy local economy that has been aided by city projects such as the pyramid arena and cultural exhibits such as Catherine the Great, and an integrated administration" (Bernsen, 1991, A4). In one speech, he stated, "Examine my record . . . and you will see honesty, integrity and good old-fashioned hard work. . . . I pledge . . . to be a partner and a leader in moving this city forward while at the same time maintaining sound financial responsibility" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A4).

In contrast to the Herenton characterization of the "mean-spiritedness" [of Memphis due to its ignoring the needs of the poor, Hackett continued to describe the city as] very caring, very sharing, [and] very high-spirited" (Kelley, 1991, pg. B1). He stated in a speech before the predominantly White Exchange Club of Memphis, "A lot of things are going on that really say a lot about the character of the people of Memphis. We have become leaders in a couple of [volunteer] areas" (Kelley, 1991, pg. B1). Hackett added that Memphis was "a model of caring" (Kelley, 1991, pg. B1) because of programs founded during his administration to provide housing and food to the poor which were funded by profits from the Ramesses the Great exhibition. Hackett added, "We are a very giving community. . . . That started way before any campaign" (Kelley, 1991, pg. B1).

Despite his allegations of innocence from practicing race politics, Hackett was equally as guilty of perpetuating racial polarization as was Herenton. However, his tactics were subtle and usually not reported by the Memphis media. It was discovered that the Hackett campaign sent different brochures to Black and White voters (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). The brochure mailed to Blacks emphasized Hackett's Black appointees as evidence of Memphis as one of "the most integrated business systems [in the nation]" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). Also, six of the 13 administrators pictured in the brochure were Black (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). In contrast, the brochure mailed to Whites encouraged voter turnout by advising voters not to "miss your chance to have a voice in selecting Memphis' next mayor" (Bernsen, 1991, pg.

B1). It also listed a telephone number to call for transportation to polls on election day (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1).

Congressman Harold Ford described these mailings as being racist. He stated, "It projects nothing but racism. If I mailed that [brochure] out, I would be criticized upside down" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). In response, to this allegation, Hackett described the brochures as "factual" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). He added, "Obviously, it's been quite effective or our opponents wouldn't be so upset" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. B1). As a partial result of these campaign tactics, Black and White voting patterns in 1991 were just as racially polarized as they had been in past mayoral races. Extremely strong correlations existed between Black registered voters who voted for Herenton ($r=.996$) and White registered voters who voted for Hackett ($r=.9959$) (Figures 1 and 2).




Figure 1

Support for Hackett by Percentage of White Registration
by Precinct, 1991




Figure 2

**Support for Herenton by Percentage of Black Registration,
by Precinct, 1991**

**Further Evidence of Racial Polarization:
At-Large City Council Elections and Countywide Races**

The increase in Black officeholding which began in the 1960s continued in later decades. In the 1967 general election, three Blacks were elected to the 13-member Memphis City Council - Fred Davis, Rev. James L. Netters and J. O. Patterson Jr. In 1975, the 11 Black members of the Tennessee General Assembly formed the Black Caucus which drafted legislation of specific concern to Black Tennesseans (Political Research Group, 1987, pg. 2). By 1991, four of the 13 council seats were held by Black Memphians: Kenneth Whalum, Myron Lowery, Janet Hooks, Dr. James Ford, and Shep Wilbun, Jr. (Markon & Huston, 1991, pg. 5). Also by 1991, four Black

Memphians served as Shelby County Commissioners: Cleo Kirk, Julian Bolton, Vasco Smith and Walter Bailey Jr.

Although Black Memphians experienced sizable increases in gaining elective office, most of them won district rather than at-large or citywide elections. Beginning in the 1960s and continuing in later decades, cities created predominantly Black districts as a way to address a lack of Black representation. However, although Black candidates have successfully won district elections, few have won at-large elections. In 1960, 60 percent of cities with a population of more than 10,000 elected their councilmen through at-large elections, while only 23 percent elected them to represent districts (Davidson, 1989, pg. 65). By 1971, approximately 50 percent of cities with populations of 5,000 or more chose the majority of their councilmen in district rather than at-large elections (Davidson, 1989, pg. 65).

The city of Memphis is similar to other cities in that Black candidates usually lose at-large elections to Whites primarily because of racially polarized voting. Between 1967 and 1991, 42 at-large city council elections were held in Memphis. Black candidates won only three of these. Before the October 1991 at-large victories of Kenneth Whalum and Myron Lowery, Minerva Johnican was the only Black contender to win an at-large election in 1983 (Table 6). Johnican was also one of few Black candidates to gain a significant amount of White crossover support when competing against White candidate David Hill. She received over 30 percent of the White vote mainly as a result of her endorsements from White Republicans who were grateful for her active campaigning on behalf of White Republican Karen Williams'

bid for the Tennessee House of Representatives (Bernsen, 1983, A10). Whalum, Lowery and Johnican were pitted against White candidates. Had it not been for a July 1991 ruling which banned runoffs in city elections, Whalum with a 48.67 total vote percentage would have faced his White opponent Oscar H. Edmonds Jr. who garnered 41.28 percent of the vote in a November runoff race (Shelby County Election returns).

TABLE 6

***CITYWIDE ESTIMATES OF RACIALLY POLARIZED
VOTING PATTERNS IN AT-LARGE CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS**

	Blacks	Whites	Total
<u>1983 At-Large Position 6</u>			
Johnican	90.0	33.0	41.3
Hill	9.0	51.0	41.2
Hatchett	1.0	16.0	17.5
<u>1991 At-Large Position 5</u>			
Lowery	97.0	13.0	55.35
Alissandratos	3.0	87.0	44.65
<u>1991 At-Large Position 3</u>			
Whalum	98.0	2.0	48.67
Edmonds	1.0	92.0	41.28
Harper	1.0	6.0	10.05

*Table only includes elections in which Blacks have won at-large positions.
Source: Shelby County Election Commission.

In 1991, although voting in the Whalum-Edmonds race was racially polarized, Myron Lowery's bid against 19-year White incumbent A. D. Alissandratos was less so. Whalum fared well in predominantly Black and racially mixed precincts, but received few votes in predominantly White East Memphis area (Charlien, 1991, pg. A10). However, Lowery received a 55.35 percent vote total largely because of endorsements from White Democrats (Hirschman, 1991, pg. A10). Alissandratos received 44.65 percent of the vote (Shelby County Election returns).

Allegations of Black vote dilution have surfaced in elections for Shelby County commissioner. Shelby County has a total population of 826,330 of which 455,063 (55 percent) are White and 360,083 (43 percent) are Black. In terms of voter registration, 353,090 (58 percent) Whites were registered for the 1991 elections as opposed to 236,113 (39 percent) Blacks. According to the 1990 census, the majority of Blacks in Shelby reside in districts two, three and five.

Shelby County has a mayor-commission form of government with one mayor and an 11-member county commission. Two commissioners are elected from districts one, two, three and five. Three members represent district four. Whereas the mayor is elected by the entire county, the commissioners represent districts. Four Blacks serve as county commissioners: Walter Bailey Jr of district two position one, Julian Bolton of district two position two, Vasco Smith of district three position one, and Cleo Kirk of district three position two respectively. The other seven commissioners, who are White, represent predominantly White districts.

TABLE 7
COUNTWIDE ESTIMATES OF DISTRICTS WITH
HIGHEST BLACK POPULATIONS

District	Total White Population	Percent White	Total Black Population	Percent Black
1	109,889	78	28,732	20
2	21,891	18	100,214	81
3	9,162	7	119,637	93
4	218,125	82	42,728	16
5	95,996	57	68,772	41

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Population and Housing. 1990.

Despite Black representation in two of the three districts with the largest Black population percentages, Shelby County voters have never elected a Black mayor (Table 7). Currently, a class action suit filed by the four Black county commissioners along with the Memphis branch of the N.A.A.C.P. on behalf of Black citizens in the city remains unsettled. They allege that a 1982 redistricting plan of the Shelby County commission dilutes Black votes, hampers Black representation on the commission, and prevents the election of a Black mayor. More specifically, the plaintiffs maintain that the 1982 redistricting plan violates section two of the Voting Rights Act; the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; Article one, section eight and Article two, section eight of the Tennessee Constitution; and certain provisions of the Tennessee Code Annotated and Shelby

County Charter. According to plaintiffs, the plan "packs the Black population into two districts, splits up Black population concentrations, and combines Black population concentrations with more populous White population concentrations, thereby diluting and canceling out minority voting strength." Bailey v. Shelby County, No. 92-2039T. (1992).

Like voters in at-large city elections, voters in countywide mayoral elections have supported candidates on the basis of racial identity. State Senator John Ford's bid for General Sessions court clerk provides a good example of racial polarization in a countywide race. In August 1990, Ford finished third for the court clerk position behind two well-known White candidates: Bob Patterson and Riley C. Garner. Black and White voting split along racial lines with 94 percent of Black voters casting ballots in favor of the three Black candidates in the race: Ford, Kenneth Whalum Jr., and Sherman C. Perkins (Shelby County election returns). Ford received approximately 80 percent of the Black vote (Shelby County election returns). The three White candidates - Patterson, Garner, and Billy G. Stewart - received approximately 91 percent of the White vote (Shelby County election returns).

Although John Ford lost the 1990 General Sessions Court Clerk race, he defeated two White candidates in August 1992. In the latter election, voting patterns again split along racial lines with 95 percent of Black and White voters supporting Ford and the two White candidates respectively (Shelby County election returns). However in 1992, Ford, the only Black contender, benefitted from a two-way split of the White vote. Because of the absence of a runoff requirement in county races,

Ford with 39.5 percent of the total vote did not have to face incumbent Gene Goldsby (32.7 percent) or schoolteacher Shirley Stone (25.4 percent) in a runoff election (Shelby County election returns).

Although voting in most countywide elections tends to split along racial lines, voting patterns for Shelby County mayoral races (which are also countywide elections) have tended to be less polarized than those in city elections. One possible explanation is because of the lack of serious Black contenders to challenge strong White incumbent William (Bill) Morris. Morris is now in his fourth term as Shelby County mayor. Because the Black population in the county only began to substantially increase during the mid and late 1980s, Black candidates concentrated on winning the city rather than the county mayoral elections. A few minority candidates such as Dr. Isaac Richmond, Willie C. Jacox, and Robert "Prince Mongo" Hodges, have run against Morris, but none have been able to garner more than five percent of the total vote. Because of the lack of Black contenders in Shelby County mayoral races, Black voters have overwhelmingly supported Morris. In the average election, he usually receives between 70 to 90 percent of the Black vote.

In other Tennessee cities, Black candidates have focused on winning district rather than at-large elections probably because of smaller Black populations (Table 8). Memphis has the highest Black population in the state. The city's total population is 610,337 of which 334,737 (55 percent) are Black (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990). Nashville has a total population of 488,374 of which 118,627 (35 percent) are Black (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990). Blacks in the city of

Chattanooga constitute 51,336 or (30 percent) of its 147,574 total population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990). In Jackson, Tennessee, the number of Black residents totals 19,703 (28 percent) of its 48,949 total population (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990). Finally, the city of Knoxville has a total population of 165,121 of which 26,053 (10 percent) are Black (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990).

TABLE 8

1990 POPULATION TOTALS OF TENNESSEE'S LARGEST CITIES

City	Total Population	White		Black	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Memphis	610,337	268,600	45.2	334,737	54.8
Nashville	488,374	369,747	65.0	118,627	35.0
Knoxville	165,121	139,071	90.0	26,053	10.0
Chattanooga	147,574	96,238	70.0	51,336	30.0
Jackson	48,949	29,246	72.0	19,703	28.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing. 1990.

Although the majority of Black candidates seek to win district elections, two have served as mayor in Tennessee: Floyd Brown Jr. of Bradford and Billy Gene Wells of Bluff City (Joint Center for Political Studies, 1986). Three Blacks have also held the position of vice mayor in Tennessee: John P. Franklin of Chattanooga, J. Deotha Malone of Gallatin, and Richard Watterson of Kingsport. However, few

Black citizens have run for mayor in the largest cities of the state rather than in Memphis. Although Black candidates have campaigned for mayor in the cities of Nashville, Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Jackson, none have garnered the high percentages necessary to seriously challenge White candidates.

Other Black Tennesseans - in addition to Minerva Johnican, Myron Lowery, and Kenneth Whalum of Memphis - have also been elected to at-large positions in cities with very small populations. For example, Blacks have held at-large council member positions in the cities of Alcoa, Carthage, Dickson, Hartsville, Henning, Madisonville, Murfreesboro, Newbern, and Pulaski, Tennessee (Joint Center for Political Studies, 1986). Nevertheless, despite the few Black who have received support from both Blacks and Whites in order to gain elective office, the majority of Black candidates in Tennessee have won district elections. These include: U.S. Representative Harold Ford who represents the ninth congressional district in Memphis; Tennessee's three state senators Edward Davis, John Ford, and Avon Williams Jr.; the 11 Black members of the General Assembly; and the majority of city councilmen and county commissioners in the state (Joint Center for Political Studies, 1986).

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The Ascendancy of the "New Black Politics"

The new Black politics was the culmination of efforts which moved the Black freedom struggle from the civil rights protests of the 1950s and 1960s to an emphasis on the election of Black officials. In early 1990, approximately 293 Black Americans served as mayors of the nation's cities (Person, 1993, pg. 41). The October 3rd election of Dr. Willie Herenton ended over a century of White conservative political domination and began an era of new Black politics in Memphis. Besides Dr. Herenton's election as the first Black mayor, the number of Blacks on the city council increased from three to six members and five Blacks were elected to serve on the nine-member city school board (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A1). Thus in 1991, the 55 percent Black majority claimed its long-overdue political dominance in what was described as "the biggest government upheaval since Memphis adopted the current mayor-council form of government in 1967" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A11).

On a pessimistic note, the Herenton election revealed strained racial tensions as Hackett supporters voiced their feelings about having a Black mayor. Campaign coordinator William Boyd commented, "Isn't that something, electing a man like that? . . . Memphis will not be portrayed well to the nation. . . . It would be a shame if there wasn't a mandate to return Mayor Hackett to office" (Beifuss, 1991, pg. A14).

Immediately after the election, the city experienced new tensions as many demanded a recount. Boyd announced that since there was evidence of overvotes, an audit was necessary to determine whether ballots were unaccounted for in several

precincts (Keeter, 1991, pg. A1). Boyd further stated, "If a substantial number of votes are involved, we'd definitely have to take a serious look at contesting the election in court" (Keeter, 1991, pg. A1).

If the Hackett camp had chosen to contest the election, several options could have surfaced. Either a recount or a new election could have been ordered (Keeter, 1991, pg. A10). Another alternative would have been to subtract illegal votes from the candidates' vote totals (Keeter, 1991, pg. A10). However, days after the election an audit confirmed a Herenton win. As a result of this finding, Hackett decided not to contest the election saying that a challenge "would not be appropriate [despite] irregularities [in the vote]" (Bernsen, 1991, pg. A1).

Despite the racial divisions in the 1991 race, many would still argue that the Herenton victory represents enormous racial progress. Yet although Memphians have a Black mayor, his election was accomplished only after the city had a majority Black population, and Black voter turnout. Mayor Herenton could be described as the Black man's mayor just as Hackett and other White candidates before him could have been dubbed the White man's mayor merely because 90 to 98 percent of Black and White voters elected each candidate. It is obvious based on past mayoral elections that White voters, at least in the city of Memphis, would not vote for Black candidates in substantial percentages regardless of their qualifications or campaign tactics.

Blacks were also guilty of voting on the basis of racial identity. However in the past, Blacks have cast votes in sizable blocs which served as swing votes to place

White candidates such as William Ingram and Kenneth Turner in runoffs and to elect other White candidates such as Dick Hackett in 1983 and 1987. These swing votes revealed more of a willingness among Black voters to vote for White candidates.

Findings

An analysis of election returns confirms the first hypothesis. Black candidates were defeated because of racially polarized voting patterns. This was most obvious in the 1975, 1982, and 1983 runoff elections in which one Black candidate was pitted against one White candidate. In each, voting was heavily polarized with each candidate usually receiving 90 percent or more of votes from Blacks and Whites respectively.

The data also prove the validity of the second hypothesis. Before 1991, Black candidates lost mayoral elections because of a lack of White crossover votes. Although Otis Higgs received the highest percentage of White crossover support (10.1 percent) in the 1975 runoff election. Black candidates in the 1967, 1983, 1987, and 1991 races, received between one and two percent of White votes.

The third hypothesis which concerned low Black voter turnout was a more adequate explanation of defeat for Black candidates. The year, 1991, was the first in which Black voter turnout was higher than that of Whites. Because Herenton won by only 172 votes, if Black turnout had been even one percentage point lower, he would not have won the 1991 election.

The data also showed that the splitting of the Black vote and a runoff requirement were two additional determinants of Black candidate defeat. In the 1983 and 1987 mayoral elections, the entrance of more than one Black candidate resulted in a split Black vote. Because approximately 96 and 98 percent of White voters supported White candidates in these elections, Black contenders had no chance of winning. Besides the split Black vote, a majority vote requirement resulted in losses for Black candidates in racially polarized runoff elections.

Before 1991, different factors had more or less effect on the campaigns of previous Black candidates. In 1967, the A.W. Willis Jr. was defeated because of lower Black voter turnout rates, a lack of White crossover votes, and a loss of Black votes to White candidates. In 1975 and 1979, Otis Higgs attracted White crossover votes, was the only Black candidate, and attracted massive Black support. However despite these, Higgs lost both of these elections because White turnout percentages were higher than Black turnout rates by approximately three percent in the 1975 runoff and 15 percent in the 1979 runoff. In 1982, J.O. Patterson Jr. received the highest number of votes, but lost due to a majority vote requirement in the general election and a Black turnout rate which was lower than White turnout percentages in the runoff. Finally in 1983 and 1987, Blacks were primarily defeated because of split Black votes and low Black voter turnout.

The narrow 172-vote margin in the 1991 election leads to the question of whether the Herenton victory was merely a fluke. Studies have found that Black political mobilization organized around charismatic individuals is usually short-lived

(Starks and Preston, 1990; Ardrey, 1993). A crucial state for Herenton in maintaining legitimacy will be during the 1995 reelection campaign. Studies have found that after the election of a Black mayor, the degree of racial polarization worsens and White flight accelerates (Levine, 1974; Eisinger, 1980). This results in an even larger Black population and voting majority which almost ensures further elections of Black mayors.

Others have discovered evidence of continuing White resistance and the strong possibility of White victory. Many White candidates seek to prevent a second Black ascendancy into the mayoralty by relying upon racist campaigns (Watson, 1984; Persons, 1993). One example is their focus on the strained relationships between the predominantly Black political establishment and the predominantly White business community (Stone, 1990; Drake and Holsworth, 1993). After Whites leave the cities taking their largely middle class tax base with them and the White business community proves uncooperative, predominantly Black cities sometimes experience massive economic problems (Rich, 1989). White candidates have capitalized on these problems in order to regain the mayoral office. Also as history has proven for Black Memphians, the entrance of more than one Black candidate adds to the probability of a White victory resulting primarily from split Black votes.

Another troubling dilemma for Dr. Herenton in a reelection campaign will be in addressing conflicts within the Black community itself. In a mayoral race in which the strongest contenders are Black, lower and middle class Blacks divided along class lines. Since the racial issue is no longer as prevalent as in campaigns involving major

White contenders, a lesser amount of racial appeals and thus polarization has usually resulted. Black candidates attempting to attract White swing votes in predominantly Black cities oftentimes downplay racial issues. Middle class Blacks are proven more likely to support these candidates while lower class Blacks are more likely to see them as selling out their interests and thus support candidates who actively address racial issues (Schexnider, 1982; Watson, 1984; Ardrey, 1993).

The political situation in Memphis, Tennessee leaves many unanswered questions concerning the extreme racial divisions among Blacks and Whites. In some cities, Whites who initially refused to support Black candidates later became more receptive after their elections and successful first terms (Starks and Preston, 1990; Lawson, 1991). This may prove to be the case with Memphis or in the alternative voters may continue the practice of voting primarily on the basis of racial identity which has historically hampered social, political, and economic progress in the city.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CANDIDATE VOTE TOTALS IN MEMPHIS GENERAL MAYORAL ELECTIONS

1975 General	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Higgs	80.0	10.0	35.1
Chandler	3.0	70.0	46.5
Turner	16.0	19.0	16.4
Others	2.0	1.0	2.0
1979 General	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Higgs	94.0	10.0	45.3
Chandler	3.0	80.0	46.7
Halloran	2.0	8.0	7.0
Others	1.0	2.0	1.0
1982 General	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Patterson	94.0	1.0	40.6
Hackett	3.0	90.0	30.0
Cody	2.0	7.0	26.0
Others	1.0	2.0	3.4
1983 General	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Bailey	2.0	1.0	3.1
Ford	75.0	1.0	22.1
Hackett	4.0	96.0	57.2
Higgs	17.0	1.0	16.0
Others	2.0	1.0	1.6
1987 General	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Gibbons	25.0	8.0	15.62
Hackett	15.0	40.0	58.56
Johnican	52.0	1.0	22.65
Others	8.0	1.0	3.17
1991 General	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Hackett	2.0	97.0	49.4
Herenton	97.0	2.0	49.4
Hodges	1.0	1.0	1.2

APPENDIX B

CANDIDATE VOTE TOTALS IN MEMPHIS RUNOFF ELECTIONS

Election Year	Candidate	Black	White	Runoff Total
1975	Higgs	96.8	10.1	42.0
	Chandler	3.2	89.9	58.0
1979	Higgs	96.3	8.7	47.1
	Chandler	3.7	91.3	52.9
1982	Patterson	96.5	9.0	45.6
	Hackett	3.5	91.0	54.0

APPENDIX C

CITYWIDE ESTIMATES OF REGISTERED VOTER AND TURNOUT PERCENTAGES IN MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTIONS

1967 General	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Registered Voters	80,033	155,270	235,303
1975 Runoff	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Registered Voters	121,731	214,556	336,287
1979 Runoff	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Registered Voters	150,974	235,662	386,636
1982 Runoff	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Registered Voters	158,185	193,278	357,897
1991 General	Blacks	Whites	Totals
Registered Voters	182,716	168,790	380,812

Source: Shelby County Election Commission.

APPENDIX D

CITYWIDE TURNOUT IN MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTIONS

Year	General Election			Runoff Election		
	Black	White	Total	Black	White	Total

1967	39.0	66.0	60.0	40.0	60.0	60.0
1975	36.0	64.0	55.0	56.5	59.1	57.9
1979	42.0	58.0	49.5	42.4	57.6	59.1
1982	55.0	65.0	55.0	60.0	68.0	55.0

Source: Shelby County Election Commission.

APPENDIX E: PRECINCT DATA

TOTAL Regis	#Blacks Regis	%Black Regis	Homog Rels	%Regis Voting	Votes for	Votes for	Votes for
					Hackett	Herenton	Hodges
1873	1272	67.9%		48.3%	298	590	16
1885	981	52.0%		46.6%	382	481	15
2422	1758	72.6%		47.0%	148	971	20
942	870	92.4%	Black	53.1%	23	469	8
807	740	91.7%	Black	50.9%	13	396	2
1403	1303	92.9%	Black	57.2%	29	764	9
1458	1350	92.6%	Black	48.1%	25	672	4
1091	1018	93.3%	Black	54.5%	17	575	3
1466	1370	93.5%	Black	57.7%	45	791	10
1566	1419	90.6%	Black	53.8%	18	820	5
595	548	92.1%	Black	55.6%	29	298	4
1203	234	19.5%		62.1%	568	164	15
1418	122	8.6%	White	59.0%	677	126	33
1360	32	2.4%	White	72.9%	896	72	23
2106	523	24.8%		53.2%	790	308	25
1333	405	30.4%		48.8%	434	190	26
1359	120	8.8%	White	52.8%	565	122	31
1272	641	50.4%		48.7%	234	374	12
1201	15	1.2%	White	66.6%	742	63	19
1322	37	2.8%	White	66.6%	786	56	38
1479	939	63.5%		49.2%	217	497	13
2056	1766	85.9%		59.8%	121	1096	13
2216	2077	93.7%	Black	58.1%	47	1225	16
1793	1704	95.0%	Black	55.4%	46	940	7
1358	1285	94.6%	Black	50.1%	35	641	5
1407	1312	93.2%	Black	50.9%	27	678	11
1158	1093	94.4%	Black	59.0%	28	649	6
1467	1383	94.3%	Black	61.1%	46	837	13
703	671	95.4%	Black	61.6%	14	415	4
1714	1614	94.2%	Black	62.5%	49	1008	14
1429	1349	94.4%	Black	61.4%	29	836	12
1488	1383	92.9%	Black	50.3%	31	712	6
1344	1270	94.5%	Black	55.1%	29	703	8
1746	1577	90.3%	Black	43.9%	53	710	3
1242	42	3.4%	White	55.4%	621	50	17
1181	39	3.3%	White	66.0%	693	69	17
1402	618	44.1%		57.7%	394	394	21
1981	1874	94.6%	Black	62.1%	39	1186	6
1364	20	1.5%	White	68.9%	878	53	9
1452	627	43.2%		66.0%	490	451	18
1648	1230	74.6%		62.9%	222	794	20
1998	1830	91.6%	Black	66.8%	71	1252	11
2255	2132	94.5%	Black	71.6%	115	1489	10
1171	1067	91.1%	Black	47.6%	27	525	5
177	44	24.9%		57.6%	68	30	4
1164	210	18.0%		61.5%	519	164	33
1865	1782	95.5%	Black	66.9%	49	1182	16

APPENDIX E: PRECINCT DATA

2447	2307	94.3%	Black	49.0%	78	1108	13
1043	990	94.9%	Black	54.6%	26	541	2
1814	1723	95.0%	Black	62.8%	55	1073	11
1215	1153	94.9%	Black	59.3%	28	683	10
1867	125	6.7%	White	63.7%	1034	135	21
1913	1269	66.3%		68.9%	358	932	29
1143	337	29.5%		66.7%	499	247	16
2048	1928	94.1%	Black	56.8%	48	1105	11
1096	14	1.3%	White	73.4%	767	25	12
1558	530	34.0%		58.8%	582	317	17
1126	28	2.5%	White	70.4%	745	30	18
1062	997	93.9%	Black	44.8%	18	455	3
1224	1151	94.0%	Black	60.3%	40	688	10
1542	1390	90.1%	Black	64.3%	53	930	9
2112	1999	94.6%	Black	65.2%	32	1337	9
1833	1243	67.8%		60.3%	210	880	15
2200	2090	95.0%	Black	58.6%	59	1209	22
1005	944	93.9%	Black	62.2%	22	599	4
1593	1511	94.9%	Black	66.9%	47	1007	12
1434	1348	94.0%	Black	64.6%	29	887	10
1897	166	8.8%	White	63.9%	1086	111	15
2160	2045	94.7%	Black	59.7%	56	1219	15
2468	55	2.2%	White	70.9%	1655	66	28
1934	8	0.4%	White	76.3%	1436	27	13
1301	16	1.2%	White	72.3%	900	35	5
1425	324	22.7%		66.7%	737	199	15
1906	1368	71.8%		59.2%	273	846	10
2464	620	25.2%		69.8%	1236	458	25
1588	1067	67.2%		60.5%	262	683	16
1120	99	8.8%	White	65.4%	588	118	27
1600	16	1.0%	White	71.8%	1091	46	11
1585	245	15.5%		41.8%	537	111	15
1092	40	3.7%	White	57.5%	544	59	25
767	3	0.4%	White	77.6%	569	18	8
1313	1207	91.9%	Black	65.2%	38	808	10
1214	1139	93.8%	Black	68.3%	32	791	6
2416	2170	89.8%		68.8%	117	1529	15
1947	1857	95.4%	Black	69.1%	64	1265	16
1969	1837	93.3%	Black	66.8%	51	1253	12
1255	1193	95.1%	Black	73.6%	33	889	2
1234	1154	93.5%	Black	69.5%	48	802	8
1693	1593	94.1%	Black	63.0%	51	1003	12
2060	1915	93.0%	Black	60.4%	59	1166	19
1504	1416	94.1%	Black	49.5%	38	701	5
1425	1311	92.0%	Black	67.6%	69	884	11
1514	1146	75.7%		66.6%	189	802	17
1618	835	51.6%		63.2%	428	567	27
1238	8	0.6%	White	69.7%	831	17	15
2103	26	1.2%	White	68.0%	1374	37	19

APPENDIX E: PRECINCT DATA

2019	17	0.8%	White	68.7%	1340	22	25
962	6	0.6%	White	76.6%	720	9	8
1503	24	1.6%	White	73.5%	1062	28	15
1305	8	0.6%	White	79.7%	1022	13	5
2011	4	0.2%	White	78.0%	1518	36	14
2358	57	2.4%	White	74.3%	1671	71	10
1629	11	0.7%	White	74.7%	1174	33	10
2175	7	0.3%	White	76.1%	1603	42	10
1635	82	5.0%	White	68.6%	1016	78	27
1903	418	22.0%		68.6%	942	349	15
2007	1069	53.3%		60.9%	491	718	14
1430	69	4.8%	White	66.0%	857	69	18
1473	46	3.1%	White	73.0%	1012	55	8
1618	1507	93.1%	Black	70.3%	38	1097	3
2277	1641	72.1%		71.9%	349	1275	13
1389	1152	82.9%		73.9%	147	875	4
1377	1187	86.2%		60.6%	63	764	7
1311	1126	85.9%		68.2%	83	797	14
1387	1147	82.7%		72.7%	134	864	11
2093	1827	87.3%		56.0%	100	1062	11
2220	2128	95.9%	Black	72.1%	74	1510	16
1155	1087	94.1%	Black	65.6%	16	734	8
1116	231	20.7%		64.5%	546	169	5
1987	1826	91.9%	Black	63.5%	63	1190	9
1367	317	23.2%		62.7%	570	281	6
1639	1260	76.9%		63.5%	186	847	7
1153	1087	94.3%	Black	65.0%	19	719	11
878	824	93.8%	Black	63.6%	22	532	4
1313	1248	95.0%	Black	63.0%	33	787	7
1099	163	14.8%		60.8%	589	65	14
1263	421	33.3%		59.1%	520	213	14
1810	11	0.6%	White	74.0%	1305	16	18
1370	82	6.0%	White	74.7%	958	55	11
1069	6	0.6%	White	73.8%	744	26	19
1402	16	1.1%	White	77.5%	1046	27	13
1901	14	0.7%	White	77.9%	1443	28	9
1521	4	0.3%	White	78.0%	1160	15	11
1715	26	1.5%	White	75.9%	1239	45	18
1448	23	1.6%	White	74.9%	1048	32	5
764	9	1.2%	White	77.9%	574	11	10
1587	47	3.0%	White	79.1%	1199	44	12
1587	7	0.4%	White	76.7%	1192	14	12
2181	16	0.7%	White	78.0%	1645	39	17
2086	70	3.4%	White	76.2%	1497	71	22
1200	7	0.6%	White	76.7%	890	23	7
1536	8	0.5%	White	74.0%	1100	29	8
1911	463	24.2%		62.9%	852	331	19
1171	239	20.4%		61.1%	562	143	11
1852	491	26.5%		62.0%	832	302	15

APPENDIX E: PRECINCT DATA

1529	566	37.0%		69.5%	638	415	9
1762	661	37.5%		62.7%	657	429	19
1796	559	31.1%		69.4%	782	446	18
1165	990	85.0%		56.9%	49	607	7
1395	631	45.2%		68.2%	411	534	6
1113	377	33.9%		62.4%	454	231	9
1786	311	17.4%		68.2%	958	240	20
1704	915	53.7%		69.8%	497	685	8
1756	1139	64.9%		68.8%	304	856	13
1139	375	32.9%		62.6%	424	282	9
925	309	33.4%		69.4%	387	251	4
1367	268	19.6%		67.9%	700	222	6
1011	36	3.6%	White	77.3%	740	34	7
1552	998	64.3%		49.8%	270	496	7
1426	396	27.8%		58.1%	531	291	6
805	61	7.6%	White	71.7%	516	52	9
1326	715	53.9%		69.1%	309	598	9
1283	341	26.6%		60.2%	524	233	16
1305	889	66.1%		58.4%	152	604	6
624	49	7.9%	White	62.2%	339	46	3
1494	1247	83.5%		68.4%	95	922	5
1351	652	48.3%		58.5%	295	491	5
1479	13	0.9%	White	73.2%	1044	28	11
970	23	2.4%	White	74.2%	682	33	5
1598	180	11.3%		66.1%	870	177	9
1417	229	16.2%		65.1%	694	219	10
2074	50	2.4%	White	72.9%	1448	46	18
2060	133	6.5%	White	65.0%	1174	141	25
1423	36	2.5%	White	67.6%	919	35	8
1511	63	4.2%	White	72.9%	1027	66	8
907	68	7.5%	White	71.0%	567	72	5
1284	1183	92.1%	Black	66.1%	31	811	7
1627	1471	90.4%	Black	67.4%	58	1030	9
1590	1454	91.4%	Black	68.5%	43	1037	9
1605	1492	93.0%	Black	72.8%	40	1121	8
1585	1469	92.7%	Black	70.5%	59	1048	10
1268	1165	91.9%	Black	68.9%	23	849	2
1591	1520	95.5%	Black	66.9%	32	1020	13
1558	1460	93.7%	Black	64.6%	40	951	16
1169	1117	95.6%	Black	69.4%	34	765	12
1195	1103	92.3%	Black	59.0%	25	669	11
1115	982	88.1%		56.5%	32	592	6
1391	1255	90.2%	Black	67.1%	41	887	6
2138	1903	89.0%		72.5%	76	1464	10
1416	1227	86.7%		72.5%	92	929	5
2007	1693	84.4%		70.8%	106	1297	13
2498	2073	83.0%		72.7%	219	1588	8
2057	1916	93.1%	Black	70.0%	52	1375	12
1452	1284	86.4%		65.8%	80	870	6

APPENDIX E: PRECINCT DATA

1954	1240	63.5%		67.1%	376	830	5
1827	1095	59.9%		67.2%	363	853	11
1709	979	57.3%		66.1%	368	755	7
1414	813	57.5%		69.6%	339	632	13
1458	680	46.6%		68.2%	410	581	3
1015	898	88.5%		58.2%	14	577	0
2018	1641	81.3%		58.6%	115	1066	1
1841	1361	73.9%		58.2%	176	889	6
2185	1267	58.0%		63.4%	452	923	11
2046	1057	51.7%		70.4%	514	917	10
1054	476	45.2%		66.0%	275	416	5
1356	790	58.3%		63.0%	235	611	8
1351	884	65.4%		68.2%	181	738	2
1630	892	54.7%		69.3%	353	761	15
1334	986	73.9%		70.1%	130	804	1
1227	905	73.8%		62.3%	112	651	1
982	710	72.3%		71.6%	127	572	4
1001	38	3.8%	White	63.3%	584	43	7
2200	51	2.3%	White	65.0%	1337	83	9
2512	85	3.4%	White	62.6%	1459	100	14
1430	27	1.9%	White	75.1%	1033	32	9
1568	45	2.9%	White	70.9%	1051	52	9
1301	11	0.8%	White	75.9%	965	16	6
2193	143	6.5%	White	63.6%	1252	132	10
1605	22	1.4%	White	69.9%	1079	39	4
2036	70	3.4%	White	71.0%	1366	68	11
1958	1817	92.8%	Black	63.7%	43	1191	13
1204	631	52.4%		67.3%	345	455	10
1648	1550	94.1%	Black	71.5%	22	1149	7
1606	621	36.7%		58.1%	512	409	12
1631	388	23.8%		67.0%	786	293	14
1049	437	41.7%		65.0%	355	320	7
1502	159	10.6%		67.0%	842	153	12
681	14	2.1%	White	76.9%	506	16	2
2379	255	10.7%		69.2%	1393	235	18
1995	54	2.7%	White	70.4%	1328	65	11
1585	137	8.6%	White	68.6%	965	115	8
1472	58	3.9%	White	71.7%	976	69	10
1691	210	12.4%		61.9%	873	158	15
1845	168	9.1%	White	73.9%	1195	151	17
3097	285	9.2%	White	51.7%	1361	210	31
1128	101	9.0%	White	66.4%	635	103	11
2587	174	6.7%	White	59.3%	1365	141	29
1959	125	6.4%	White	64.6%	1121	122	22
1723	762	44.2%		61.1%	473	568	12
1610	248	15.4%		63.4%	801	201	19
1875	868	46.3%		67.1%	551	685	23
1117	180	16.1%		65.1%	457	148	11
1518	26	1.7%	White	75.7%	1089	43	17

APPENDIX E: PRECINCT DATA

1600	47	2.9%	White	66.8%	976	68	24
1818	45	2.5%	White	71.9%	1213	63	31

VITA

Sharon Denise Wright was born in Memphis, Tennessee on August 2, 1965. She is a product of Memphis public schools, graduating in May, 1983 as Valedictorian of Westwood High School. The following fall, she entered Christian Brothers University, graduating four years later in May 1987 with a Bachelor of Arts in History. In December 1989, she received a Master of Arts in Political Science with a minor in Education from Memphis State University. In August 1990, she entered the doctoral program in Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. She is presently employed as an assistant professor of Pan-African Studies at the University of Louisville with an emphasis in politics and law.