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I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Marc S. Mullinax entitled "Sino-Japanese Relations under the American Eye: The Perception of American Foreign Service Officers in China, 1914-1922." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

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and recommend its acceptance:

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SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS UNDER THE AMERICAN EYE: THE PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS IN CHINA, 1914-1922

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Arts

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Marc S. Mullinax

March 1979

191542

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To Dr. Jonathan G. Utley I owe a special debt for the direction, structure and guidance for this thesis. His suggestions have vastly improved the quality of this study. Professors Yen-p'ing Hao and Richard Rice also offered important suggestions in style and content which would not have been included otherwise. Any errors, misinterpretations or stylistic mistakes were achieved single-handedly.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the attitudes and perceptions of American foreign service officers in China toward Sino-Japanese relations from 1914 to 1922. From the beginning of the First World War in 1914 until the end of the Washington Conference in early 1922, China was the object of a series of both official and unofficial policy moves by the Japanese. These actions by their military, businessmen, missionaries, diplomats and immigrants were termed, according to one's point of view, cooperation, infiltration, penetration or even outright aggression. This thesis is a study of how a group of Americans--the foreign service officers in China--perceived the Japanese presence within China.

During the years studied, China became the focal point of aggressive Japanese policies as they attempted to gain security and hegemony over East Asia. At the same time, the United States found itself in a singular position to confront Japanese intentions in China, yet chose not to do so. As Japan became more and more entrenched on the mainland, American interests were allowed to diminish.

How did the foreign service officers react to the increased Japanese and decreased American presences? They clearly thought that if these trends were allowed to continue, China would become a debauched nation, useless to America as a strong partner in Asian affairs. The foreign service officers were motivated by differing degrees of the two Open Door principles. The first principle called for China's integrity to be respected by all foreign nations. No

foreigner should compromise China's ability to administer its own internal affairs. The second maxim of the Open Door policy exacted an equality of opportunity for those foreigners who wished to invest and trade in China. This second principle was related to the first in that many Americans, including the foreign service officers, believed a secure and unadulterated China would best allow foreign economic penetration. During the course of this study many officers experienced a shift of emphasis from one principle to the other.

Many were also motivated by a desire to reform China. Not only was China to be a purchaser of American goods and a recipient of American loans, but to be a tabula rasa for American reforms. They wished for China to assume many of the cultural trappings which America used and found useful. The foreign service officers became increasingly aware that Japan pursued antithetical cultural goals from those America wished for China to adopt. Believing that the Japanese in China used unfair and underhanded methods to control an ever enlarging segment of China, the officers blamed Japan for the failure of the Open Door principles and the inability of Americans to present an alternate paradigm for reform to China.

The major source for this thesis is the Department of State decimal files, Record Group 59 of the National Archives. Many of these documents are found in the volumes of Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Secondary works do exist giving biographical studies of one or two of these diplomats and they were used as needed.

The conclusion of the thesis is that American foreign service officers in China were motivated throughout the eight years studied by an interaction between their personal perceptions of the Open Door policy and apprehensions concerning Japan's threat to it. Most officers felt there was a dynamic struggle to see which "side"--the United States or Japan--could control the Chinese mind and enjoy the most privileges in their country. Because the diplomats and statesmen in Washington were far removed from the "battlefield" of China and would not allow the United States' officers in China to take stronger action against Japan, the American officers in China became frustrated and envious of Japan's gains. Whatever their individually harbored feelings concerning the Open Door, all agreed that Japan had an ominous sentry beside it which had to be removed.

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INTRODUCTION

(1)

Much of Chinese history, especially since the 1840's, has been the story of foreigners and their attempts to subjugate or control the Middle Kingdom. Up to the triumph of the unequal treaty system imposed by the West in the 1840's, China had been successful in its efforts to either repel the foreigner or assimilate him. As the nineteenth century progressed, the treaties became more and more detrimental to China and its sovereignty. Its internal affairs, to say nothing of its foreign affairs, increasingly came under the control of foreign agents.

"Opened" by the United States in 1854 and following a radical, progressive scheme for modernization, Japan first became interested in China in 1876, when it "opened" Korea in much the same fashion that Japan had been treated two decades earlier. An increase in its population, the desire for strategic security, a rise in industrial production and the need for industrial markets all motivated Japan to seek solutions to its own internal problems on the mainland of Asia. When China challenged Japan's status in Korea in 1894, a war ensued between the first two countries, with China suffering a terrible and humiliating defeat. To attain peace, China had to give up Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula on the China mainland to Japan. In 1904, Japan went to war against Russia for the control of this peninsula, considered a strategic doorway to China and the mainland. Japan had no desire to relinquish its hold on the Asian continent.

American involvement in Chinese affairs began in 1844 with the Treaty of Wanghsia. Its details are not nearly so important as its most-favored-nation clause. Throughout the rest of the century and into the first decade of the twentieth, the United States found itself a surprised, yet willing, beneficiary of the wars and the treaties between other powers and China. With each military and diplomatic defeat of China came more internal control in Chinese affairs for the United States and the other powers fortunate enough to have a most-favored-nation clause. In 1899 and 1900, Secretary of State John Hay issued the Open Door policy as a stop-gap measure to prevent foreign nations from taking too much control of China and its markets, control which threatened to exclude the United States from many areas of China. The first Open Door principle stipulated that no nation should exercise any power in China which would harm any other nation's chances for an equality of commercial opportunity. The second principle held that the administrative integrity and territorial sovereignty of China should not be compromised by any nation. These principles were frequently referred to by Americans as they discussed the substance of America's policy in China.

By the first decade of the twentieth century, both America and Japan held title to substantial interests in China which neither wanted to relinquish and both wanted to increase. Many United States government officials predicted that the two powers would come to arms over China. Beginning in 1905, there was almost a decade of diplomatic "jockeying" for position in China. Both nations were newcomers to the world power scene; the United States in 1898 and Japan in 1905

both received intoxicating tastes of power. Their perceptions of themselves and each other changed. Although the United States respected Japan as an Asian power, Americans and their Western tradition looked upon Japan with the same superiority they used to view China and other "less civilized" Asian countries. Moreover, the United States feared the seagoing, aggressive military machine of the oriental nation and its possible effect on the open door for the United States in China. Japan, on the other hand, viewed the United States as a possible contender for the spoils of the Pacific and the Asian mainland. In the same manner which the United States felt it had to expand or else stagnate during its Manifest Destiny period in the 1840's, so Japan felt it had to have room for its industrial economy to grow.

Many in the United States recognized that the time would soon come when the country and Japan would clash. Even if the two nations were able to push aside their own ideological and irrational preconceptions about the other, many predicted that two expanding Asian powers would have to come into contention over their conflicting interests. China seemed to be the focus for this conflict. Within the decade before the outbreak of World War One, a debate arose in the United States which set the parameters for American-Japanese relations for the next forty years: should the United States compete or cooperate with Japan for the spoils of China? Those who advocated competition felt that the United States should assume an independent stance in China. No foreign nation, they said, should be allowed to dictate or influence the United States' China policy.

Such a policy of independence would create more freedom of action for the United States in the Middle Kingdom. These competition advocates wanted the United States to be the initiator of the dominant China policy among the foreign nations, with other nations following the American dictates. Competition by the United States in China would also facilitate a "cultural open door" through which an "American" system of culture, business techniques, morals, government institutions and social habits might pass. Jerry Israel in Progressivism and the Open Door points out that many Americans believed China was not only to be a market for American investment and trade, but a tabula rasa for American reform interests in the Progressive era. "China was to be remade in the American image" through a "forced feeding" of American civilization.[1]

A policy of cooperation, on the other hand, would mean a less distinct, a less powerful role for the United States in China. Those advocating combining America's resources with other powers' felt that an economic return was the path of least resistance and commitment for the nation. Its freedom of action in a world context would be preserved. There was no reason, the cooperationist thinking went, for the United States to become involved in China to the degree of risking a war with Japan.[2]

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[1]Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905-1921 (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1971), xi, 200-201.

[2]For a more comprehensive discussion of cooperationist and independent ideology, see ibid., Chapter Two.

Except for a brief period between 1909 and 1914, the cooperationists controlled the tone of America's policy for China. When William Howard Taft became president in 1909, his Secretary of State Philander C. Knox embarked upon a moral foreign policy which had distinctive threads of independent thinking running through it. For example, the United States began a scheme which called for the establishment of a parallel railway to the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian line, and the United States proposed a plan to internationalize the existing railroads in China. Also, it participated in a consortium for China which excluded Japan. America was willing to cooperate with other Western powers, but it pursued a policy of independence in China targeted against Japan. Those who advocated a cultural open door in China were glad to see this new direction of State Department policy.

This new direction was successful, however, insofar as Japan was willing to allow it. With the Japanese presentation of the Twenty-one Demands to China, Japan began in early 1915 a series of radical actions which cut into any gains the United States might have claimed in China and which finally cut off the American penetration in most of North China. The State Department reacted with protests yet offered no substantial plan to show Japan that the United States would challenge the island empire in China. Preoccupied with the First World War, most Americans shared the Department's view that America's interests in Europe were more important than any claims it might have in Asia.

Between 1914 and 1922 there were many significant events in both Asia and the world which produced great changes in the relationship of each of the three nations to the other. First, there was the inestimable effect of World War One, drawing most Western powers away from China, and Japan towards the Asian mainland. Not satisfied with the German rights in the Chinese province of Shantung which it expropriated in August of 1914, Japan presented to China in early 1915 a list of twenty-one demands which, when accepted, insured Japan of ascendancy in China. With the death in 1916 of the only unifying force of China, Yüan Shih-k'ai, the nation experienced an eleven-year era of warlord rule. While the warlords were loosely confederated into North and South China alliances, many held little sympathy for either side, opting for policies which enhanced their own power and security. Throughout the warlord era Japan welcomed these provincial rulers, using them as puppets for its own designs. In 1917, Japan petitioned the United States, the only power capable of stopping the island nation in China and which had just entered the European conflict itself, for a vague redefinition of Japan's rights in China as the latter's neighbor. The outcome of this petition was the Lansing-Ishii agreement, a curiously interpreted document which left both signatories pleased. Japan felt that the United States had finally recognized its "paramount position" in China, while the United States believed Japan had promised anew to uphold the principles of the open door. In 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference, Japan walked away with the province which had produced the venerated Confucius, causing a massive national protest among the Chinese

people lasting several years in many places. Finally, in 1922, Japan officially gave notice that it would return the Shantung peninsula and its rights there, in the process placating both Chinese public opinion and the government of the United States.

(2)

There was a group of Americans who required a longer period of time than the rest of the country to accept a status quo in China in which Japan occupied the highest position of power, even superseding that of China. This group included the foreign service officers employed by the Department of State to be its eyes and ears in China. They commanded a unique view of China and they often sent voluminous reports telling how they perceived the Japanese in China, often recommending courses of independent action which the Department seemed to overlook.

Who were these foreign service officers? With the exception of the more important diplomats in Peking such as Paul S. Reinsch and John Van Antwerp MacMurray, most of the China hands were employed in China not because of a professional knowledge and expertise in Chinese affairs, but because they had a personal interest in China or had a good background for a particular Department of State position, China being one country of many they could have been assigned to. Clarence J. Spiker and Walter A. Adams, for example, both had law backgrounds in the United States and were initially employed in the American courts in China, and then switched to a consular post. John K. Davis was born in China, giving him an edge at a time when

few educated themselves in the Chinese language or culture. Very few officers had post-baccalaureate degrees, and there were some who did not even possess this degree. Finally, a few officers such as Jacob Gould Schurman and Charles R. Crane received their appointments because of their stature in American society; Crane, because he was a respected friend of many Washington officials, and Schurman, because he was a distinguished man of letters. On the whole, however, the foreign service officers acquired their expertise and knowledge of China from their actual work there. This caused problems in perception at times. They tended to see simple causes and offer simple solutions to complex and historical problems in China. Very few foreign service officers could be called "expert" China hands.

In light of their diverse backgrounds, did the foreign service officers hold equally diverse opinions and observations about China? about Japan? What motivated them? Did they feel Japan violated the open door policy articulated at the turn of the century? Or were they more concerned about the chances for the "cultural" open door? What about the nature of the problems in China? How much did they attribute China's woes to Japan? Were they concerned about other problems than those of the Japanese? Were they myopic in their views? Were national and international events denied proper weight as they related to China? Or were other problems and events ignored because of too much focus upon Japan? And finally, did the officers change their perceptions with the passage of time? These questions will be addressed in an attempt to understand how the group of Americans closest to Sino-Japanese interactions viewed their relations and

how the officers reconciled State Department policy with their own recommendations for action.

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This study of such a narrow segment of Americans and their perceptions is warranted for three reasons. First, the story has not been told in its entirety. Second, scholars have not used the extensive sources found in National Archive collections to broaden their source foundations when researching this period of Sino-Japanese-American relations. Third, historians of the era usually quote the foreign service officers out of context. Only passing references to both the officers in China and the Archives as a source are made, these usually proving to be an unrepresentative sampling of both. For instance, Jerry Israel in Progressivism and the Open Door cited isolated comments of these officers to prove that the perceptions of Americans at home were shared by those on the scene in China.[3] Burton J. Beers in Vain Endeavor used only Paul S. Reinsch's statements to support his theory that Robert Lansing had American backing in China as the Secretary of State tried to end the American-Japanese rivalry.[4] Other studies of the period invariably have focused on the views of the officials in Washington, Tokyo or China. Any inclusion of foreign service officers' views was, as

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[3] Ibid., 117n, 123n, 179n, 180n, 181n.

[4] Burton F. Beers, Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the American-Japanese Rivalry (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962).

with Beers, so much window dressing for their findings. No one has focused on the foreign service officers in China as a group and attempted to explain their perceptions. What is needed is a study to show the character and the motivations of this group of men (twenty-eight are cited in this paper) whose perceptions and calls for action differed radically from both the Department which employed them and the country which they represented. This study fills in a gap in the understanding of an important period of Sino-Japanese-American relations.

This thesis is divided into three sections and is arranged chronologically. Intertwined into the narrative are several thematic attitudes of the officers; some attitudes change and shift with the fluid conditions in China, others crystallize and cause shortsightedness and a lack of consular flexibility. Two officers, P. Stewart Heintzleman and Minister Paul S. Reinsch, are emphasized in Section I for the simple reason that these two were the only ones writing in any detail about Sino-Japanese relations. The two major events of 1914-1917, the Twenty-one Demands and the Lansing-Ishii note exchange, had the most impact in the areas served by Minister Reinsch and consul Heintzleman. Section II continues the themes introduced in the previous section and shows their development among an increased number of American foreign service officers. As the rising nationalism of the Chinese between 1917 and 1920 spread throughout China, many more officers became observers of Sino-Japanese relations. Section III concludes as the aftershocks of the Washington Conference die down in China. Most of the

Sino-Japanese antagonisms occurred in North China. It naturally follows that most of the officers cited were stationed in North China.

The years of this study, 1914-1922, constitute a distinct period in Sino-Japanese-American relations. Prior to 1914, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the closest event which involved all three nations. And after 1922, much of the world was isolationist; very little aggressive activity occurred among the three nations studied. Not until 1931 was there to be a significant event between China and Japan; the United States remained isolationist in Asian affairs until the 1940's.

Throughout the period studied the American foreign service officers observed and sent descriptive, emotional and colorful reports to the State Department concerning the actualities in China as they perceived them. On numerous occasions the consuls described situations which Japan officially denied existed, and they petitioned the government of the United States for a redress of Chinese grievances. This study focuses on the foreign service officers in the "battlefield reality" of China in which two world powers--one an expanding Oriental nation and the other their own hesitant Western country--wage a protracted battle with words, dollars, yen and public opinion. It is a study of the officers' perceptions and how they were influenced by this battle.

I. THE BATTLE LINES DRAWN

The First World War set vast forces in motion which affected Asia in important ways. Most notably it erased the balance of power that had existed until 1914, substituting in its place a Japanese-Chinese antagonism; the United States suddenly found itself the most prominent Western power in China. Undistracted by the European war, America commanded a unique position to deny Japan the hegemony and easy spoils of China. In 1909 the United States had adopted a policy which challenged Japanese ambitions in China, but had followed it with a halfhearted resoluteness and frequent backslidings. By 1914, Woodrow Wilson's more isolationist diplomacy had a marked effect upon America's China policy. No longer was the United States willing to assert an independent, anti-Japanese posture in China. Under this erratic American pressure, Japan had recorded steady progress towards imperialist goals, the benefits of which the war seemed to promise in more abundance.

The war, of course, was the most important event between 1914 and 1917. Japan used its declaration of war upon Germany to seize all German rights in the northern province of Shantung. This was only the prelude to its next act, the presentation of twenty-one "requests" to President Yüan Shih-k'ai in January, 1915. Two years later Japan received what it felt to be assurances from the United States that Americans would not challenge its established dominance in China.

Within China's internal politics came events which tied directly to the presence of Japan. Much of the aftermath of the

1911 Revolution was a travesty to its republican beginnings. Yüan Shih-k'ai as president resorted to assassination, intrigue and his army in order to maintain his power. He was willing to sell his country in the Twenty-one Demands in his desire to obtain financial and military aids from Japan with which to fight his republican opponent, Sun Yat-sen, and other nationalists who opposed Yüan's rule. In other actions he dissolved the parliament and wrote a provisional constitution that made him a de facto emperor for life. Indeed, he took the crown as emperor for a short time in early 1916. But Yüan's personal successes proved to be his end. Overtaken by megalomania, he made too many enemies. In 1916 these began to corner Yüan, so that by the time of his death in June, his power was all but gone.[1] His enemies, united only against Yüan, broke apart at his death. China plunged into an eleven-year period of chaos and disorder. The division of the country into North and South geopolitical regions should be seen as only a loose confederation of each area's warlords. Most warlords cared for neither cause as long as their own boundaries were safe.

Between 1914 and 1917, America's foreign service officers observed and reacted to the Japanese presence. For the most part their view was subjective and their tone moralistic. Japan's sudden increase in its Chinese involvement caught them off their guard; they were not prepared to see the Japanese take more and more control of

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[1]Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 578-583.

Chinese affairs, as indeed Japan did, not only between 1914 and 1917, but throughout the period studied. Equally feared by the American foreign service officer was that Japan would both crowd the American businessman out of Chinese ports and at the same time displace Chinese administrative and territorial sovereignty with a Japanese replacement. Underriding these fears of the diplomats was an unspoken assumption of the superiority of American values and policies. Believing China to be important to the future of the United States, they reacted from the position that Americans just would not treat China and its nationals as the Japanese did. Their idea of the China-to-be--a strong, pro-United States democracy--was inimical to that of Japan's. They cast Japan in a scheme to exploit China mercilessly for the sole welfare of the Japanese. As the years progressed to 1917, the consuls were quick to take the pen to write the Department of State, hoping that their superiors would take actions to counter Japan. They sensed a dynamic battle between the United States for China's future, one fought with words, markets and propaganda instead of military arms. They also sensed that all it would take for the United States to win this battle was for America to assume a more independent position in dealing with Japan. Aggression, they believed, once nipped in its early growth, would wither and die.

China was in no position to help itself. In 1914 it was still recovering from the 1911 Revolution and still paying indemnities for losses incurred by the foreign community, including Japan's. With the war thousands of miles away, the Japanese government felt it could get away with an aggressive China policy, one which was quick

to take advantage of China's inner weakness and territorial defenselessness. Aware of its acute vulnerability, China turned to the United States on August 3, 1914, with a proposal that the Americans entreat the belligerents in the war not to undertake or engage in hostilities in and around Chinese territory.[2] All sides concerned--the Japanese, the Americans and the Chinese--knew that the war was an opportunity which Japan would not pass by. Even before the outset of European hostilities, an American foreign service officer articulated a fear of the Japanese, predicting a far-reaching policy by Japan for the domination of China behind the backs of the European powers. Paul S. Reinsch, author and former professor at the University of Wisconsin, and newly appointed Minister to Peking for the United States, wrote that because Japan was increasing its naval demonstrations at Nanking, because there was complicity of Japanese officials in revolutionary movements against Yüan's Chinese government, and as there was a large Japanese "guard" at Hankow, he saw indications of a Japanese policy which could "weaken and intimidate the Chinese government" and which was part of "a designedly obstructive policy."[3]

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[2]MacMurray to Bryan, telegram, August 3, 1914, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914 Supplement, (hereinafter cited as FRUS) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), 162.

[3]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, June 12, 1914, 793.94/196, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives; hereinafter cited as RG59 NA.

Before the fact of official Japanese intervention and interference in Chinese affairs during the European war, one can find an ominous suspicion by an American diplomat, full of portent, concerning Japan's future in China. Minister Reinsch and, as we shall see, other diplomatic officers in China feared that China would be "Japanned," that Japan would find an excuse to close the open door in China. Other foreign service officers in China reported to the Department that Japan was interweaving itself in Chinese affairs with the aim of the economic control of its spheres of influence in South Manchuria, Fukien and Shantung.

Japan was swift to take advantage of the European war. On August 14, 1914, it issued an ultimatum to Germany, with the demand that German men-of-war and armed vessels in the China area be withdrawn or disarmed. By September 15, "without condition or compensation the entire based territory of Kiaochow" in Shantung must be delivered to Japan, "with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China."[4] As Germany had not replied to the ultimatum by the Japanese deadline of August 23, Japan declared war on Germany, asserting its compliance with the spirit and the letter of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. This treaty obligated either power to go to war to aid the other should one become involved in war.

The State Department and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan believed that Japan would return the former German areas to

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[4]Guthrie to Bryan, telegram, August 15, 1914, FRUS 1914 Supplement, 170.

China.[5] The American diplomats stationed on the scene in China disagreed. A week before Japan's ultimatum, John Van Antwerp MacMurray, the Secretary of the American Legation in Peking, reported of a secret agreement concluded in 1912 between Russia and Japan. This treaty provided that should Russia become involved in a European war, it would give Japan all "practicable support" in the annexation by Japan of South Manchuria and the acquisition of Germany's rights in Kiaochow. MacMurray also reported that by August 7 Japan had "stationed and ready" war vessels within reach of Kiaochow, with transports prepared in Japan for a possible expeditionary force to the province just south of Shantung, Kiangsu. Finally, MacMurray quoted the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires as saying that the Japanese government would welcome the opportunity to participate in the acquisition of Shantung, and that forces to this end were immediately available.[6]

The day before the Japanese ultimatum, MacMurray felt that there was something in the offing concerning Japan and China. With an attitude of mistrust he wrote, "apparently with a view to making available a pretext for further independent action, the Japanese in Manchuria have been creating daily provocative incidents." His Chinese official contacts termed Japan's attitude as "intolerable"

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[5]Bryan to Guthrie, telegram, August 19, 1914, ibid., 173.

[6]MacMurray to Bryan, telegram, August 7, 1914, ibid., 164; MacMurray to Bryan, telegram, August 11, 1914, ibid., 166.

and warned that Japan intended to occupy South Manchuria, Fukien and Shantung on a "fictitious grievance." A week later, August 19, MacMurray himself described Japan's attitude toward China as "threatening." Under duress from Japan, China had just acquiesced in police control in Shangtung to the Japanese. MacMurray asked Secretary of State Bryan if the United States would pressure Japan to cede Kiaochow to China. In compliance with America's strict neutrality, Bryan responded, the United States government would refrain from any action not in accordance with that neutrality.[7] The United States would not take any actions to oppose Japan's military policies in China. The State Department in 1914 viewed Japan's acquisition of Shantung as a military matter best left alone by America.

MacMurray was not the only American foreign service officer who felt that Japan was actually fighting China and not Germany. Minister Paul Reinsch conceptualized a China which was distrustful and fearful of Japan. "The occupation of Kiaochow by the Japanese," he wrote, "will cause the greatest apprehension in China." He wished Japan to reconsider its "hollow victories" in China, wistfully hoping that Japan would realize that Western powers would not stand for its increased stature inside China. The return of Kiaochow alone would solve all problems and would help everyone involved, including Japan. "Japan has far more to gain from friendly cooperation with China," he penned, "than from an attempted conquest with all the bitterness

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[7]MacMurray to Bryan, telegram, ibid., 169; MacMurray to Bryan, telegram, August 20, 1914, ibid., 173-174; Bryan to MacMurray, telegram, August 20, 1914, ibid., 174.

and waste it would engender." While Reinsch maintained that America was not jealous of Japan in any way, he recommended increasing the military readiness of the United States in China for the protection of the American open door. He believed that by protecting American rights, the United States could protect China's.[8] This was not an allusion to the cultural open door nor an equating of American rights in China with China's rights. As much as America upheld the sovereignty of China, the United States also participated in the unequal treaties which gave it extraterritoriality. But as the United States did participate least of all the powers in the exploitation of China, Reinsch felt that it could speak out with moral integrity for China and with moral indignation against Japan. He thought that were the United States to uphold the open door by force, or at least appear to do so, further encroachments by the Japanese would cease. What Reinsch wanted was a policy of increased American presence in China. Believing that to stop Japan would require an immovable force across its path to Shantung and South Manchuria, he recommended such to the State Department. For the time being, at least, he was not heeded.

Consul Douglas Fisher in Manchuria shared MacMurray's and Reinsch's sentiments and worried about increased Japanese activity in the Tientsin area. He interpreted numerous promotions of Japanese army officers, increased troop numbers, artillery practices and secret conferences as giving "ground for suspecting that they are

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[8]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, August 27, 1914, 793.94/356, RG59 NA.

preparing for some eventuality . . . ." There was also mention of a protocol issued to China President Yüan Shih-k'ai by the Japanese in which (a) Japan would be the guarantor of China's independence and sovereignty, (b) the Chinese government would do nothing to obstruct Japan's actions in China but would furnish "suitable facilities" for Japan's army and (c) neither government would conclude with a third government any treaty which abrogated the spirit of this protocol without first obtaining mutual consent.[9]

These foreign service officers opposed Japan's escalation of activities in China because they threatened to upset the balance of power in China. America's equality of opportunity for the China market might suffer. They reported this concern to Washington but the State Department did not react and Japan continued to increase its control within China, using the war as a pretext for expansion.

At the end of September, 1914, MacMurray wrote that Japanese forces had occupied Weihsien on the north coast of Shantung Peninsula, moving westward and taking possession of several mines. He felt it worthy to note that Japan had also forced China to declare itself unable to preserve its own neutrality there, justifying in Japan's mind the landing of forces at Lungkow and Laichow. Consul Thomas Sammons, who had been in Antung and Mukden during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, told of an invasion of private rights and Chinese houses by the occupying Japanese troops in Shantung. He was guarded in his

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[9]Fisher to MacMurray, letter, August 27, 1914, 793.94/200, RG59 NA.

assessment of Japanese motives, however, saying that Japan's sole interest was of an economic nature. He felt military schemes and land acquisition were not parts of their policy. Nonetheless, he feared Japanese ascension in China for he remembered Japan's actions from a decade before; he compared Japan's military presence and procedure in Shantung as "somewhat similar" to its campaign against Russia in Manchuria in 1904 and 1905.[10]

For the remainder of 1914, Minister Reinsch was the most vocal of the foreign service officers both in his attacks upon Japan and the noting of the effect of its policy upon the Chinese. Reinsch was particularly upset by Japan's seizure of the German-built Shantung Railway as far west as Tsinan, approximately three hundred miles from the point of the peninsula. Japanese officials had urged the Chinese press to report that the railway was liable to seizure, as it was a part of the old German rights in Shantung, but Reinsch believed Japan sought to "permanently confiscate" the railway. As proof he cited a Japanese statement which declared: "The aim of the Imperial Government is not only the overthrow of the base possessed by the enemy, but also to cause the control and administration of this inseparable railway to fall into our possession." Many times he used the term, "deep concern," when interpreting Japan's "serious attacks" upon China's sovereignty. More than any officer, Reinsch supplemented

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[10]MacMurray to Bryan, telegram, September 28, 1914, FRUS 1914 Supplement, 181; MacMurray to Bryan, telegram, September 19, 1914, ibid., 186; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, October 15, 1914, 793.94/201, RG59 NA.

his dispatches with Chinese press reports, which invariably condemned Japan and praised efforts of the Chinese to gain the full sovereignty of their country. It was morally wrong, for example, for Japan to force China to appoint Japanese customs officials at Tsingtao, the major port of Shantung. Japan earlier had attacked Tsingtao, and Reinsch noted the increased extension of Japan's occupation of the Shantung Railway as well as the acquisition of the mining rights of the Germans. He saw the war as an "excuse for extending Japanese political influence throughout the Province of Shantung." Japan seemed to be forcing China into an incident with which Japan could exploit in order to extend its authority further into the Chinese interior. Where no incident could be found, Reinsch believed that Japan was using the World War to create an insecure China--the instability of which would warrant and justify Japan's intervention. Examples of this, he pointed out, were incidents of Japanese-fomented rebellion and brigandage, counterfeited banknotes, corrupted public officials, undermining the credit of important private and public enterprises in China and the furnishing of opium to the Chinese population.[11]

There was no doubt in Reinsch's mind that Japan aspired to a leadership position in Asia; it was still a question to him what character that leadership would assume. He still felt it possible

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[11]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, September 30, 1914, FRUS 1914 Supplement, 182; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, October 12, 1914, ibid., 192; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, December 18, 1914, ibid., 204.

in late 1914 that Japan might change its aggressive expansion policies in China. He was unable to understand why Japan continued with its morally bad forced expansion in Shantung, when a more beneficent policy would still provide to the Japanese the Chinese "cake," and allow them to eat it, too. Such a policy by Japan would also allow American access to China's markets and would diminish Reinsch's fears about Japan closing them off to the United States. In his more objective moments, he felt that its "bad" policy would make economic concessions and profits much more difficult to obtain for both the United States and Japan.[12]

Any and all vestiges of objectivity on the part of Reinsch and his fellow foreign service officers ended in January, 1915. On the eighteenth of that month, Japanese Minister Eki Hioki in Peking presented a list of twenty-one "requests" to Yüan Shih-k'ai under the strictest conditions of secrecy. These "demands," as Chinese and Americans referred to them, were divided into five groupings and composed the most blatant imperialism Japan had ever practiced in its dealings with China. To briefly summarize, the Twenty-one Demands petitioned these rights for the Japanese: the right of residence and land ownership in Manchuria; the right of railway building and loan preference in Manchuria; exclusive mining rights in large areas of China; preferential economic rights in Inner Mongolia; joint Chinese-Japanese "businesses" with political powers; compulsory

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[12]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, November 28, 1914, 793.94/205, RG59 NA.

employment of Japanese advisors; compulsory purchase of Japanese goods; joint organizations of police and preferential industrial rights in Fukien province, the area of China opposite Taiwan.

Within a week of their issue, parts of the Twenty-one Demands were leaked to the international settlements, and it was not long before the whole text of the demands was public knowledge. The overwhelming bulk of American diplomatic reaction came from Minister Paul Reinsch in Peking. None of it was favorable. Most can be placed in a context of Reinsch's two fears that should Japan obtain its twenty-one "requests," the United States would suffer economically in China and China's sovereignty would be shamefully compromised. The evidence is substantial that he was worried most in 1915 about these open door principles and to a lesser extent about the increased political power the escalation of Japan's economic presence in China would bring.

Paul Reinsch's first reaction came five days after China had received the demands. He wrote that the demands were such that should China comply with them, the open door principles as well as American independence in China affairs would be doomed. Yet he knew enough about the Japanese to realize a Chinese refusal to comply would only cause trouble, for the Japanese would then fall back on a policy of supporting political and military unrest in China, offering a "pretext for military occupation" and more Japanese internal control. In other words, Reinsch felt that Japan had its eyes so fixed on the goals of the demands that it would resort to force were negotiations to fail. China was doomed with either course; likewise,

he predicted America's economic open door was doomed. "The independence of China and equal opportunity of Western nations are at stake," he wrote. The Twenty-one Demands "would effectively work to the exclusion of American participation in the economic and industrial development of China."[13]

Tied to the potential loss of the American open door, and of an increasing importance to Reinsch, was his fear of an irretrievable loss of China's sovereignty, independence and economic strength. The type of economic assistance which Reinsch liked to see and push for in China was that which would strengthen China internally to better neutralize Japanese threats to its independence. It seemed natural to him that a strong China could fight off Japan itself, minimizing the political role of the United States in the Far East. Against this light, it is understandable why Reinsch wrote that the Twenty-one Demands "constitute the greatest crisis yet experienced in China." He was frustrated because he saw the acceptance of the demands as just the first step. Later would come the popular uprising among the Chinese, adding still more to the economic instability of the country.[14]

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[13]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, January 23, 1915, FRUS 1915, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), 79; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, January 24, 1915, ibid., 80; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, January 26, 1915, ibid.

[14]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, January 24, 1915, 793.94/210, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, January 26, 1915, 793.94/211 RG59 NA.

As the weeks passed, Reinsch learned more details of the demands and gathered information concerning the status of the Japanese-Chinese negotiations. The most aggressive demands, termed "obnoxious" by Reinsch, were those in Group V.[15] These were the last leaked and proved to be the stumbling block to the negotiation of a settlement. Yet even with the Group V demands "postponed for further discussion," the negotiations progressed slowly, with Japan charging China more than once with footdragging and delay in the discussions. Finally on May 7, 1915, Japan issued an ultimatum to the Chinese government, promising measures "necessary for maintaining and safeguarding Japan's position in the Far East" if not answered within forty-eight hours. Recognizing its inability to resist the military forces of Japan, China acquiesced to the first four groups of demands. Reinsch felt it was China's only alternative. Although China believed its rights "have been cruelly overridden," its military inferiority "made it necessary to yield to the threats of

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[15]The demands in Group V were protested most strenuously by the Chinese as they were the most harmful to China's territorial sovereignty. To summarize, Group V demanded (1) the use of Japanese as advisors in influential administrative, financial and military decisions; (2) Japanese hospitals, missions and schools in China be able to own land in China; (3) China employ in its more important police departments at least one-half Japanese on the work force; (4) China either buy one-half of its arms from Japan or have China establish jointly with Japan factories for arms manufacturing; (5) three more railroad concessions; (6) primary loan rights to Chinese in Fukien; and (7) Japan's right to propagate religious doctrines in China. 793.94/241, RG59 NA.

Japan." Indeed, during the negotiations Reinsch interpreted an increased massing of troops in China as a ploy by Japan to influence China. He doubted if the Japanese any longer treated the diplomatic negotiations seriously and believed the burden of action had shifted to the military arena.[16]

As Reinsch perceived the open door, the most potentially dangerous demands were not in Group V, but in Group III.[17] The two demands here concerned the formation and administration of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, a privately-owned mining enterprise. Reinsch felt that this was just a beginning of concerted efforts by the Japanese to infiltrate important industrial operations in China, giving Japan a voice in the Chinese political economy. He felt the danger and the significance of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company was that it allowed Japan to transcend its formerly limited scope of interference in Chinese affairs. The island nation was truly entering the "big-time" in continental affairs. Group III's demands were so vague

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[16]The Japanese Foreign Office to the Japanese Ambassador in Peking, telegram, May 6, 1915, 793.94/494, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, May 9, 1915, FRUS 1915, 145; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, March 24, 1915, Ibid., 116.

[17]Group III's demands reads as follows: "(1) China and Japan shall agree to act jointly, not independently, in the contemplated formation of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company. (2) Without consent foreigners shall not be permitted to open and operate mines in the neighborhood of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company's property; and anything affecting the company directly or indirectly shall be decided jointly." 793.94/241, RG59 NA.

that Japan could easily get away with interpreting them more broadly than they were originally intended.[18]

Minister Reinsch was not truly surprised with Japan's demands. In light of its pre-1915 interests in China, he felt that "anything she [Japan] may possibly ask may be considered an extension to her existing influence." He recognized that its policy had not changed, but the degree of the policy's scope had increased. And he lamented that the demands were "a direct interference with the general operations of government and expressions of sovereignty."[19]

The most difficult task for Reinsch and other American diplomatic personnel during the Twenty-one Demands episode was to stifle their feelings of helplessness. Considering the warm relationship between the Americans and the Chinese, the American foreign service officers could not officially portray the United States as acquiescent in the Twenty-one Demands, yet they did want to informally and unofficially publicize the view that the United States had abandoned neither its material or moral obligations to China. They had to carefully avoid offering any encouragement to the idea that the United States might actually intervene on China's behalf on the ground of friendship and justice. When asked what the position of the United States was, Paul Reinsch had to tell the Chinese that:

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[18]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, April 5, 1915, 793.94/344, RG59 NA.

[19]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, March 31, 1915, FRUS 1915, 119; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, April 5, 1915, ibid., 121.

> [N]otwithstanding what the demands of Japan and the action of China might turn out to be, American treaty rights here could be affected only with the consent of the American Government, and that . . . Americans would expect to continue to participate in the commerce and cultural development of China on an equal and independent basis.[20]

This, of course, was totally contrary to that which Reinsch had been telling the Secretary of State, namely, that the Twenty-one Demands in action would most assuredly impair the open door as America knew it in China.

With the defeat of China at the negotiation table, Reinsch allowed himself to become both bitter and sarcastic towards the Sino-Japanese situation. He penned that China had finally placated Japan, although she had to do it with far-reaching concessions. Japan could not be "bought," but was satisfied only with the uncompromisable concessions. He sensed that China hoped that Japan would no longer harbor ambitions in China. Now, he continued, "nothing . . . threatens the peace of the Far East unless Japan should move to subjugate China in which case the question would arise whether China is to be allowed to be penalized for having devoted her attention principally to the works of peace." Embittered and frustrated by the new status quo in China and an uncooperative State Department, Reinsch

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[20]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, April 5, 1915, 793.94/344. Two months earlier, Minister Reinsch had expressed the opinion that should Japanese demands be enacted, "Americans could engage in important enterprises in China only at the sufferance of another government. . . ." Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, February 10, 1915, 793.94/257, RG59 NA.

used the succeeding months to try to recover and regroup, and to reconcile his desires for a strong China and a strong United States presence there with the realities of Japan's power and his own tied hands.[21]

The only other American diplomat who commented on the Twenty-one Demands, the Japanese presence and possible ramifications of these events was consul P. Stewart Heintzleman, stationed in Mukden, South Manchuria. He had been working in China since 1902 and was an expert in treaty relations. Whereas Reinsch let his emotions dictate some of his words, Heintzleman seemed more rational, able to view Japan with more objectivity. His reading of the power realities in Manchuria was far superior to any other foreign service officer in China. In the first week of March, 1915, he wrote:

> It is now too late to challenge Japan's position of paramountcy . . . [in Manchuria], which was created during the Russo-Japanese War and nurtured during the intervening decade. Now that Japan is firmly entrenched here her demands in reference to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia follow as a natural consequence of her special position . . . . No one can prevent the eventual alienation of these regions from China's sovereignty.

While clearly sympathetic to China's plight, Heintzleman was set in his priorities. He advised the United States to look out only for its own interests in China and those of European treaty powers. Only diplomatic methods should be used to retard the ongoing process of

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[21]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, May 3, 1915, 793.94/326, RG59 NA.

Japan's penetration into China. But after the Twenty-one Demands episode, Heintzleman slightly modified his position after realizing the "far-reaching designs" of Japan with respect to its continental neighbor. He posed this hard question to acting Secretary of State Polk:

> Though a strong China is the best assurance of permanent peace on the Pacific, the question arises, would it redound to the best interests of the United States for that strength to be built up and to rely for its maintenance solely upon Japan's paramount political, military and economic position in China?[22]

What the consul really asked was whether or not the United States would allow Japan to carry out its economic, political and cultural goals as delineated in the Twenty-one Demands. As with Reinsch, the Department was silent.

With regard to the Twenty-one Demands, there is only one other aspect of the foreign service officers' reports which illuminate their views on the open door. Beginning around the first of April, 1915, there arose in China a spontaneous, unofficial boycott of Japanese goods. While it survived until only May or June, it nevertheless was a topic of great interest to Reinsch and Heintzleman. Both went into detail about how much the boycott cut into Japanese profits and hurt

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[22]Heintzleman to Bryan, telegram, March 4, 1915, 793.94/282, RG59 NA; Heintzleman to Bryan, telegram, April 17, 1915, 793.94/372, RG59 NA; Heintzleman to acting Secretary Polk, telegram, July 9, 1915, 793.94/447, RG59 NA.

their trade.[23] While neither passed judgment on the boycott as being good or bad, by emphasizing its deterimental effects to Japan in public esteem and trade they indicated a sensitivity to Japan's welfare in China. They were aware that there was a dynamic, often hidden struggle between the United States and Japan for the favor and business of China. One nation's loss in any area of China, they began to realize, had the potential for becoming the other nation's gain. If Japan were to lose parts of its trade for a season, the consuls wanted to be ready to report when America's equal opportunity in China had become more "equal" than usual. Knowing that the United States had no competitor in China other than Japan at this time, the American foreign service officers in China reported any "edges" for American penetration they could find.

After tensions and emotions abated from their high pitch during the Twenty-one Demands negotiations, the American consuls reflected a crystallization of anti-Japanese sentiment; if anyone before January of 1915 was unaware of the effects of Japanese policy in China, after the Demands there were no naive attitudes. The suspicions MacMurray and Reinsch had expressed were now realized fears. They knew who the "enemy" was. With no major event of interest after the Demands, there was an increased number of diplomatic dispatches sent to the State Department which discussed Japan and the actions of its nationals in China. After the turning point of the Twenty-one

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[23]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, March 30, 1915, FRUS 1915, 117; Heintzleman to Bryan, telegram, April 5, 1915, 793.94/325, RG59 NA.

Demands Japan's intrusions were never downplayed; without exception Japan was presented in less than favorable and less than edifying terms.

Consul J. Paul Jameson in Antung, South Manchuria, reported of daily cruelties delivered by the Japanese guards to Chinese riding the Antung-Mukden Railway. The Japanese were also behind a large traffic in opium in the Antung area. Jameson felt there was no recourse to justice for the Chinese in his district, for the Japanese had too strong a hold on the country. Another revolution by the Chinese was close at hand, he predicted, as he sensed the mood and the times were almost exactly the same as those of the 1911 Revolution. Jameson concluded by saying that even Americans were followed and watched by the Japanese police. There was little business carried out by Americans which the Japanese did not know about.[24]

At about the same time, consul Heintzleman concluded that the Japanese were more shrewd than smart in their China policies. Instead of placating the Chinese after the Twenty-one Demands, he felt Japanese actions had tended to intensify anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese people. The Chinese students in particular were the most vocal in their anti-Japanese sentiment and the most active in the boycott. Heintzleman reported that Japanese police officers took a census of the students in the various schools of South Manchuria in order to affix blame for the boycott. He editorialized this action,

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[24]Jameson to Reinsch, letter, April 12, 1915, 793.94/365, RG59 NA.

writing that "such pin-pricking can only result in keeping alive whatever agitation may exist." Earlier, Heintzleman had referred to bad Japanese business realities. He explained that the Chinese was the better businessman, for the Japanese could not compete with him on the local commercial markets. In addition, Chinese coolie labor was employed by the Japanese for the heavy work to be done; Japanese laborers had to be paid two or three times more.[25]

P. Stewart Heintzleman was dedicated to the balance of power theory as a way of explaining international realities. On account of the superior position of Japan in China, the United States was unable to gain any more under the open door for the present without more efficient help from China. As this aid could not be expected in the foreseeable future, he said, the United States had three choices to choose from to enlarge the economic benefits it received from the open door. First, it could escalate its present independent policy. This was the non-alliance of the United States on moral grounds with other countries in consortium and spheres of influence acquisition. The "aggressive sincerity" of this, however, had encountered both Japan's and Russia's opposition. Second, the United States could enter into an "understanding" with Japan. Third, it could enter into a different kind of understanding with Russia, where the United States and Russia would concert their efforts against Japan in much the same

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[25]Heintzleman to MacMurray, letter, July 23, 1915, 793.94/455, RG59 NA; Heintzleman to Bryan, telegram, March 13, 1915, 793.94/299, RG59 NA.

manner as the United States was attempting in its independent policy.[26]

Heintzleman disregarded choice number three as being too unrealistic. However, he felt a change was needed in present American policy, for an escalation of it could only lead to a worsening of Japanese-American relations. That left arranging an understanding with Japan. Consul Heintzleman pushed this new direction, for it would free the United States from worrying about a Japanese threat to the Philippines, America's strongest hold in Asia. Although this understanding with Japan would sacrifice "real American interests" in China, it would keep Japan, which Heintzleman perceived as a constantly expanding power, on the mainland of Asia. Only then, he reasoned, the Philippines and Hawaii could be guaranteed. The United States had no powerful stance in China, when compared to the Japanese presence. He did not perceive China as a great potential ally for the United States. Once again Heintzleman revealed his priorities in Asia. These were the protection of those areas to which the United States had uncontested claim. He realized it was impossible to gain any more in China in 1915 without a war with Japan, and so recommended a premium be placed on the Philippines' and Hawaii's defense. Anything the United States had in China could be taken away by Japan. It was therefore a tenuous and unnecessary policy to choose an independent course in a place where the United States was

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[26]Heintzleman to acting Secretary Polk, telegram, July 15, 1915, 793.94/458, RG59 NA.

not a true independent power. Being sensitive to the State Department's feelings, he felt that a Japanese-American detente in China was not possible at the time and that a more visible role for the United States was not coming. He therefore recommended that Americans not allow the highhanded methods of Japan bother them, for this Japanese diplomacy would ensure a disunity among the "two great yellow powers." He did not want to see Japan and China united with a common grievance. Perhaps all the United States could hope for, he concluded, was to capitalize wherever it could on the two Asian powers' differences, in the process enlarging its own open door.[27]

While Heintzleman formulated his larger perspectives of the Japanese-American problem, Paul Reinsch continued to maintain a more localized view, seing Japan as a threat only to China, its sovereignty and American hopes for open door there. The Japanese, for Reinsch, were like uncontrollable ruffians, rather than Heintzleman's more mature viewpoint which saw them as an amoral threat to American interests in the Pacific. From all parts of China, Reinsch reported in early 1916, he had received indications that Chinese nationals had been stirred up by Japanese agitators to start revolutionary actions. Reinsch could see that the Japanese had much to gain from these disturbances. He believed them to be fishing in troubled waters which they had initially disturbed. Even more disturbing to Reinsch was

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[27]Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, February 24, 1916, FRUS 1916, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), 59.

his belief that the Japanese offered asylum and a headquarters to these Chinese revolutionaries from which to plan more disturbances. He even applied his conspiracy theories to the Japanese press operating inside China. For the purpose of weakening the credit and credibility of the Chinese banks, the newspapers under Japanese control would publish unfounded reports of palace revolts in Peking and the many "apoplectic strokes" of the emperor-elect.[28]

Continuing in his moral condemnation of Japanese aggression, Minister Reinsch told of a thousand-man force, many of whom were Japanese, landing at Weihsien on May 4, 1916, via a special train and attacking that port city with protection and aid from Japanese troops. As controllers of the railroad, the Japanese refused to carry Chinese forces to aid Weihsien on the specious grounds that Japan's neutrality must be maintained. In Tsinan, Reinsch said Japanese agents created an economic panic and they urged the governor-general there to declare independence. In Fukien there was more of the same, he said. The boldest perceptions of Minister Reinsch came the last of May, 1916. He stated that it was his belief that the Japanese policy was to oust Emperor Yüan Shih-k'ai "at any cost." He knew that the Japanese realized Yüan was the only key China had for a unified country. Without him, Reinsch feared Japan would divide China into three or four parts.[29]

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, May 10, 1916, ibid., 80; Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, May 11, 1916, ibid., Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, April 21, 1916, ibid., 77; Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, May 31, 1916, ibid., 83.

After Yüan's death in June of 1916, Chinese politics fragmented into monarchical parties, military parties and republican groupings. Japan was reported to be involved with these first two groups, offering encouragement and financial support in their quests to restore the Manchu House. Reinsch could envision Japan being able to work more efficiently in China if it could deal with a minimal number in a non-nationalist monarchy as opposed to a republican parliament with its party system. To summarize briefly, Minister Reinsch feared an all-pervasive Japanese conspiracy to control what government China had during its warlord era. While his first concern in China was the maintenance of the open door policy of the United States, he later exhibited a fear of the Japanese "system" invading Chinese culture, initially through special economic concessions spelled out in the Twenty-one Demands, and then later through Japanese attempts to influence the political currents in Peking and Canton. Reinsch plainly worried about the potential changes in the United States' presence in China should Japan's omnipresent influence strangle American interests and subvert China's sovereignty. "[A]t all times, the domestic situation is overshadowed by dangers threatening from abroad," he said. It was a tremendous frustration for him to see radical and moderate groups alike give frequent expression of their complete trust in Japan in return for its economic and moral support. Reinsch could do nothing to counter the "soft tunes of friendship and mutual helpfulness" from the Japanese.[30]

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[30]Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, September 14, 1916, ibid., 93,94.

The Department of State would allow only the general statements of friendship America felt toward the Chinese people and its economic penetration of China where it was possible. The United States maintained it had a policy of independence in China, but for Minister Reinsch, it was not strong enough. Professions of American neutrality in Chinese affairs made him wonder if the policy was in fact dependent upon the aggressiveness of the Japanese policy. As events were pointing out, the more visible Japan became in China, the more the stature of the United States seemed to diminish. Reinsch began to worry if United States economic penetration would be totally exorcised by the Japanese, the remaining role of America in China being just to assure the Chinese of its abiding friendship.

By 1917, Japan had consolidated its position in the political and economic fabric of China to the highest degree permissible by the Twenty-one Demands. Many Chinese politicians in both the North and South were on the Japanese payroll. To help ensure that there would be continued political unrest and division, the Japanese secretly encouraged and supplied both sides in the Chinese civil wars for the control of the country, while deceiving both. Economically, Japan reaped hefty profits in its spheres of influence in Shantung, Fukien and South Manchuria. These areas were exceptions to the widespread Chinese instability solely because of the Japanese domination there. Yet these successes were considerably short of their objective, that being a more complete control of China. What was needed was another diplomatic victory, one even more vague in its language than the Twenty-one Demands so that its ambiguity would grant Japan a license

for further expansion in China. With the United States' entrance into the war in Europe in the spring of 1917, Japan wanted a statement of policy from America setting limits to how far it would go in upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.

Taking advantage of America's new distraction in Europe, Japan in the summer of 1917 sent Viscount Ishii Kikujirō to the United States to obtain a clarification of American policy toward China. In what has proved to be a controversial exchange of notes, Secretary of State Lansing and Ishii recognized "that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries; and consequently the United States Government recognizes that Japan has a special interest in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous."[31] Such a studied ambiguity gave each signatory a carte blanche to interpret the phrase "special interests" to suit its own purposes. Japan immediately construed these two words to mean "paramount position" in China; the United States was pleased most in that it had pledged Japan to a higher respect for the open door and China's

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[31]Draft of Note, September 26, 1917, FRUS: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, two volumes, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), II, 440. The Lansing-Ishii notes recognized, more than ever, Japan's dominance in China. More than two years earlier, Secretary Bryan had sent to the Japanese Ambassador in Peking a memorandum which gave recognition "that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and . . . [the] districts . . . [of Shantung, South Manchuria and East Mongolia]. This earlier note by Bryan allowed "a special relation" to a specific geographical area within China. The Lansing-Ishii note gave to Japan a "special interest" to the whole of China. Bryan to the Japanese Ambassador, memorandum, March 13, 1915, FRUS 1915, 105-111.

integrity. This was enough to satisfy an American government which was shifting what vision it had in the East to the West, and girding itself for the conflict in the West.

Before Ishii left for the United States, Minister Paul Reinsch was aware that the Japanese were trying to get a clear American reading on what "special interests" meant. In his talks with the Japanese Minister to Peking in June of 1917, Reinsch had agreed that Japan should possess a special claim in China, but only in economic matters. He indicated that the United States would exhibit its good will toward the Japanese development of its economic interests, not wanting to raise any difficulties for the "neighbors of China," but he also called for a reciprocal respect from Japan towards American interests in China. In effect, Reinsch denied Japan's special position in China in anything but economic affairs. But "by no means" would this recognition limit, he said, an independence of diplomatic action on the part of the United States.[32]

The Lansing-Ishii notes, however, hit Reinsch like a bombshell. "It struck me in the face with stunning force," he recalled. The lack of demarcation of the boundaries on the term "special interest" was the most shocking part of the notes. To add insult to injury, the State Department delayed in its relating the notes to China, and Reinsch was informed of them by the Japanese Minister.

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[32]Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, June 25, 1917, 893.00/2627, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, June 27, 1917, 893.00/2632, RG59 NA.

> No word had been sent me. It was inexcusable to fail to give the local representative the earliest possible information . . . [E]ven before the notes had been signed their text had been communicated to the representatives of Great Britain, Russia, France and Italy.

After his initial shock and embarrassment, Reinsch had to deal with a new attitude from the Japanese who thought the United States, intimidated by Japan's military and political power, had admitted that Japan had a "paramount position" in China. He reported that the notes were "paraded in the Chinese Foreign Office as yielding important concessions from the United States and as a diplomatic triumph for Japan." While the minister's hopes for a friendly American attitude toward Japan's economic interests had been realized in the notes, he feared Japan would interpret, and then act on that interpretation, that special interests "did not refer merely to specific economic interests and enterprises," but might also include "certain political influence or preference."[33]

Reinsch could not see the requisite for the notes. He continued to take the position that American policy in China remained unchanged with respect to the existence of a special position on the part of any foreign power in China. But the Japanese were "cutting loose" in Shantung. There they set up an administration in their railway zone, asserting powers of policing, taxation, forestry and education. Americans and Chinese came before Reinsch to complain,

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[33]Paul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922), 307-310.

but he could not help them save in instances where American rights were involved. The Chinese public was demoralized, he noted. The effect of the Lansing-Ishii notes, the political evolvements of the Japanese in China, the increasing disunion between North and South China and a general feeling of impotence and disunity left China at a standstill with Reinsch increasingly unable to deal with the Chinese in a manner consistent with official American policy. It was plain to him that "Japanese influences, making a politico-commercial campaign in China, were everywhere actively taking advantage of this demoralized state of the public mind and intensifying it through their manipulations."[34]

Since 1914, a change in the attitudes of American foreign service officers in China has been noted. Even Minister Reinsch, the main American diplomatic voice coming out of China, became a seasoned diplomat with few naive illusions by the time of the Lansing-Ishii notes. In 1914 he had a genuine faith in and admiration for Japan as a country which had modernized without compromising its basic civilization. Until the Twenty-one Demands, he had downplayed Japanese intrusions and designs in China, describing them as "Chinese hearsay." "Japan, like all nations in China, would be the last nation to destroy the promising market of China," were his words in June of 1914. Yet in eight months' time, he was describing the "astonishing nature" of the Twenty-one Demands. His first responses

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[34] Ibid., 315, 316.

to Japanese aggressions were motivated by a strict interpretation of the open door as formulated in 1898 and 1900. The integrity of China should be respected by all powers, and there should be an equality of opportunity in the pursuit of profits in China. Later, in 1915, 1916 and especially after the Lansing-Ishii note exchange, Reinsch, while he was not so much motivated by a cultural open door in China for the United States to use, was very sensitive to and fearful of Japan's designs in China. He saw value in solving the Chinese problems in a Chinese way, doubting the integrity of any nation wishing to make China a social-political-economic extension of itself. With this in mind, the minister pushed for an American economic open door while eschewing any country's attempts, in this case Japan's, to make cultural inroads into China. Reinsch exhibited American cultural open door leanings only in the fact that he felt China could best be served by so-called altruistic American investments. Here he assumed that what was good for the United States was also good for China. The character of American investments would make for a stronger China which could deal unilaterally with foreign encroachments on its sovereignty. Moreover, the more American presence there was, the less Japan could take over.[35]

None of the foreign service officers examined thus far were actually against Japanese economic competition in China. In the midst

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[35]Reinsch to Bryan, telegram, June 29, 1914, 893.00/2149, RG 59 NA; Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, January 15, 1916, 793.94/500, RG59 NA.

of their numerous anti-Japanese reports, this is an easy fact to overlook. All wanted better relations with Japan, and that would have entailed cooperation with the Japanese in economic ventures. A policy of cooperation would keep the Japanese as friends and in the process keep the door open; they knew Japan had the power to close the door. The American diplomatic personnel especially opposed the perceived potential and then the actuality of Japan affecting America's open door. Once Japan began in 1915 and then continued its aggressive policy of economic and political "grab," the foreign service officers were motivated by a fear of total Japanese control in China. They began to blame Japan's ascendancy for their fears for a diminished American economic open door. In Paul Reinsch these two fears were epitomized. The exception, P. S. Heintzleman, expressed little of either fear. His rare rationalism and capacity for viewing events in a world context allowed him to accept Japan's dominance in China, as it kept the Japanese out of the Pacific. Heintzleman believed the open door was political power, and the ability to turn that power into profit. Japan, as he viewed it, had the only open door in China.

By the year 1917, American foreign service officers in China viewed the Japanese as the guys in black hats, and for the most part were unable to escape this image. There is evidence of an American sense of national superiority as a factor and even a little evidence for support of a cultural open door. However, most American reaction to the Japanese in China was just that--a reaction. There was little energy to counter and to replace the policies Japan imposed upon

China with an American system. The officers felt China could be "won" by the United States, that the initiative could be wrestled from Japan, but the Department of State made it an unfeasible course of action.

II. THE PERCEIVED LOSS OF U. S. INITIATIVE

The early months of 1917 were times of great deliberation in China as its leaders tried to relate their country to the European war, especially after the United States entered the war. While some Chinese favored neutrality, the nominal leader in Peking, a general named Tuan Ch'i-jui, felt the war could provide a change of relationship between China and Japan. On March 14, he broke off diplomatic ties with Germany, hoping to impress the Western powers with his sincerity, especially the United States. Meanwhile Japan sensed an alignment of Tuan with the United States which Japan did not credit as healthy. For China to enter the war as a protege of the United States would only strengthen American-Chinese ties. In response, the Tokyo authorities adopted a policy which allowed China to enter the war without threatening Japan's special interests in Shantung or elsewhere in China.[1] China entered the war on August 14, 1917, in anticipation that the Shantung territory--a symbol of Japanese inroads into China--would be eventually restored to it because of its war aid.

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[1] In January, February and March of 1917, Japan secured assurances from the British, French, Russian and Italian governments that Japan could rely upon their support for its stature in Shantung at the post-war peace conference. Robert T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931 (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 14-15, 17. General Tuan signed three agreements with Japan on September 24, 1918, which placed China's claim to Kiaochow Bay in question. David Trask, "Sino-Japanese-American Relations During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919," in Thomas H. Etzold, ed., Aspects of Sino-American Relations Since 1784 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1978), 81.

China's belligerent status aided it little; only the treaty rights of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire were nullified. Its contribution to the European war effort was minimal and likewise, the mark of the war within China was miniscule. Much more important events were taking place at home. The hostilities between the North and South in China commenced almost immediately after China's declaration of war upon the Central Powers. From 1915 until 1922, China knew ten civil wars.[2] At issue was the control of the Peking government, the recognized official voice of China. Led by Sun Yat-sen, the South advocated a republican system, while the North, spoken for by General Tuan in Peking, wished to maintain a loose confederation of the surrounding warlords. Interjected into this chaos were the maneuverings of non-aligned warlords against each other, provoking battle against each other for power and self-aggrandizement. In October of 1918, representatives from the North and South came together at Shanghai for eight months of sporadic and fruitless negotiations in an effort to resolve their differences.

Meanwhile, the Japanese continued their aggressive policies in China. Prompted by a liberal interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii notes giving them a de facto special position in China and encouraged by a United States which was willing to play a small role in Chinese affairs, Japan sought to further increase its own interests in China.

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[2]Marius Jansen, Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975), 247.

Japanese were instrumental in the establishment and the maintenance of the War Participation Bureau, a powerful organization which was to direct the fighting of the First World War within China. But it became an organ for the Japanese, giving them virtual dominance in police, finance and national resources in North China. The commanding position secured through this bureau allowed Japan many of the controls it had sought through Group V of the Twenty-one Demands. The years 1917 through 1919 were times of the greatest Japanese activity in China. Unhindered by international interference, particularly American, Japan advanced its influence through the War Participation Bureau, loans to China's warlords and an intervention in Siberia.[3] Not until 1919 was America to take any kind of threatening position against Japanese expansion in China, this coming at the Paris Peace Conference. Of the period covered in this study, these years were the most frustrating to the American foreign service officers in China. Japan had a free hand there and used it without fear of reprisal. The role of the American diplomat in parts of China was relegated to that of a powerless observer of Japanese action, which, in the Americans' view, constituted emasculations of China's sovereignty, integrity and inner strength. In these years the American foreign service officers doubted if Japan's supremacy could be neutralized.

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[3] Ibid., 222.

Nine officers, seven in North China and two in the South, wrote about Japanese policy in China during the years 1917 to 1920. Consul Thomas Sammons and Minister Paul S. Reinsch were the only officers involved in the one significant internal event in China, the Shanghai Internal Peace Conference, and they will be examined later with that conference. The others, because they were not observers of national or international events, can be grouped together, for their focus and their concerns are strikingly similar. Yet each had a unique blend of motives and perceptions which were conditional upon his location in China and his own personal background. Thus, a look at each consul is helpful.

As a group, these seven foreign service officers were not unlike the Minister Reinsch we have already seen. Most operated from a moral standpoint which increased in intensity as the years passed to 1920. As the "battle" for China seemed to sway in Japan's favor, the powerless officers found more and more moral arguments against the Japanese presence. This would indicate that the unspoken cultural open door for America became more of a motivating factor, particularly when the economic open door and the territorial sovereignty principles seemed to lose ground in China. The consuls reminded themselves that an American system operating in China would uplift the Chinese, educate them and help them to prosper. They viewed Japan's policy as one of total exploitation and corruption of China. Of the twin statements of the American open door, the tenet of territorial sovereignty for China became emphasized more. The officers began to realize that a strong and independent China would

provide the brightest future for American investment and markets in China, so they continued to equate China's desires and hopes with the same for America. A few of these consuls commented on the May Fourth nationalist movements, suspecting that it was China's best hope for regaining its sovereignty. As mentioned above, the officers began to become mere observers of Sino-Japanese relations; this period saw the most numerous pleas to the State Department for more support of the open door principles. Japan became increasingly at fault for China's problems as the officers tended to overlook the indigenous causes of China's disunity and fiscal problems. The belief that the absence of Japan from China would make a world of difference to both China as a country and the United States as an investor nation was first articulated in this period.

Consul E. Carleton Baker in Mukden typified consular attitudes. With twelve years of experience as a consul in China, he was concerned about Japanese violations of the spirit of the open door and noted how Japanese spy and police rings watched all foreigners, pestering them and other travellers with questions about their business in the area. At hotels, one's baggage and other private effects were pried into and often stolen. A switch of hotels would not help, he said, for they all were owned by Japanese. Subsidized by the Japanese government, these hotels could and did charge very low rates in order to drive out their competitors. The Japanese also controlled the communications of Mukden. Baker told of nosy telephone operators and inefficient telegraph clerks, who always "lost" or "misplaced" foreigners' messages. He concluded that the Japanese were very

careful to keep semblances of the open door visible, to keep it "ajar," but there was much evidence in his mind that the Japanese practiced fraudulent and cunning practices which had destroyed the "equality of commercial opportunity" in Mukden. "The open door," Baker said, "is more fictitious than real."[4]

Baker felt the Japanese had taken "full advantage" of the Twenty-one Demands, especially with regard to procuring possession of Chinese property in the interior for commercial and agricultural purposes. China was obliged to allow this activity, yet at the same time the Chinese did their best to prevent it. The Japanese did not always proceed through the proper, official Chinese channels when leasing and buying land. One onerous practice by the Japanese, he pointed out, was to offer much-needed loans with "impossible interest rates" with the security being the acquired Chinese land. Another was to obtain favorable judicial decisions in Chinese civil courts through use of personal threats and intimidations towards the judges. The attitude of China to the Japanese in Mukden, Baker imparted, was "decidedly unfriendly."[5]

In a most unique description of Sino-Japanese relations, E. Carleton Baker turned to allegory in order to convey his message:

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[4]Baker to Lansing, telegram, January 16, 1918, 793.94/668, RG59 NA.

[5]Baker to Reinsch, letter, March 18, 1918, 893.00/2823, RG59 NA.

> Japanese settlements in the heart of China are like a foreign substance which acts upon China's body politic . . . [like] a foreign substance in the human body sets up an irritation and causes the surrounding tissue to become sore and inflamed, and . . . a center of infection is created which becomes a menace to the whole body . . . . China is being debauched by the Japanese.

Baker continued by telling of a few of the symptoms of the "infection" in the Mukden area. Outlined were Japan's dealings in the opium and morphia trade, gambling and the presence of prostitution--all in the Japanese concession areas which harbored these practices. The Japanese settlement was also a place where Chinese who wished to avoid taxes could find sanctuary. In his assessment of Japan's political policy in China, Baker said that, "China is sick, and the Japanese quacks and charlatans who are pretending to bring the republic back to a normal condition are simply trying to keep the country under their influence and in continual need of their stupefying medicine." Baker was hopeful the team of "specialists" at the Paris Peace Conference would make China whole and well again.[6]

Baker had other perceptions of Sino-Japanese relations. He communicated that Japan, in addition to exploiting China, was also pursuing courses of action with an aim to drive wedges between the Chinese and keep them in constant turmoil. By having Chinese fight Chinese, Japan could better infiltrate into China unnoticed. It could also justify intervening with its own troops to "stabilize"

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[6]Baker to Lansing, telegram, January 19, 1919, 793.94/772, RG59 NA.

the conflict in order to "protect its interests," and then find an excuse for leaving its armed forces there. In 1919, civil governor Meng En-yüan of Manchuria declared his independence from the rest of China. The real power there was Generalissimo Chang Tso-lin, who was famous for his staunchly independent attitude against the Japanese, and who began a power struggle with Meng. This, Baker pointed out, was very gratifying to the Japanese, whose propensity for "fishing in troubled waters is only too well known." The Japanese "skillfully play one faction off the other and derive considerable benefit in the way of loans and concessions." Baker saw a "divide and conquer" policy at work in Manchuria by Japan. He opined that Meng had declared his independence because Japan had offered him great wealth in exchange for forests and mines in Manchuria. Both Meng and Chang had resorted to hostile actions, and consul Baker added that Japan sought to increase these hostilities, for they would capitalize on the delays. This meant greater expenses and a greater indebtedness to Japan as both relied heavily on Japanese loans. Baker concluded "that the Japanese are in a 'special position' and that their special position is used by them in a very special way to the detriment of China and for their own aggrandizement."[7]

Consul E. Carleton Baker was an example of a foreign service officer who was motivated by the economic open door, and who proved to be very anti-Japanese in his transmissions. Though he did not

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[7]Baker to Reinsch, letter, July 9, 1919, 893.00/3247, RG59 NA.

think it necessary for the American cultural system to be imported to China, Baker did feel obliged to oppose Japan's cultural manifestations, especially the morally bad ones. Indeed, his whole approach as a diplomat was based on a moral code of fair play. The question of "Japanese aggression and intrigue is simply a question of human rights . . . . It is in its essence a moral issue and should be settled according to the principle that 'nothing can be politically right, which is morally wrong.' " In his mind Japan was guilty of international immorality, the "evidence [of which] is too voluminous to include in a single document." Finally, he called for moral action that intimated nothing about upholding the "equality of commercial opportunity" he wrote about earlier. "[T]hose who deal with her aggressions and intrigues will not be regarded forever as 'anti-Japanese' and scouted as such because they hew to the line and let the chips fall on Japan or whoever else happens to be in the way."[8] Baker exhibited a change between 1917 and 1919 while serving in Manchuria. At first he expressed a concern about the economic open door, yet as he came to know in a more intimate way the effects of Japan upon the area, he virtually neglected it, conceding it as lost. In 1919, he was not worried about the status of American business in China, nor was he concerned, as was Heintzleman, about the strategic effects of a "Japanned" China. Instead, Baker concentrated on his moralizing, worrying and writing only about Japan in

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[8]Baker to Lansing, telegram, August 6, 1918, 793.94/716, RG59 NA.

China. It is evident from his communications that he gave the Japanese policy within China a great deal of thought. But he too joined those unheeded foreign service officers who had recommended more independent action to challenge Japan. His job became more and more that of an observer of China, and while he saw Japan as China's singular problem, there was nothing he could do.

Comparable to Baker in his anti-Japanese sentiment, yet more sensitive to the American open door, consul John K. Davis in Antung, Manchuria, was also a proponent of the Chinese cause in much the same way as Paul Reinsch. Born in China but educated in the United States, Davis felt it his duty to protect American business which had survived in his South Manchurian district. His reports concentrated on those Japanese actions which separated China's sovereignty from its government. Twice in the year 1918 Japan attempted to gain more control at Antung Harbor's customs house. As Davis understood the situation, the Japanese tried to control the customs in Antung because they had the largest merchant population there and the largest volume of trade. Yet the Japanese gave as a pretext the presence of non-Japanese in the port customs house tended to cause language and cultural misunderstandings. It was a reasonable request to the Japanese, continued Davis; there was ample precedent set by the French in Indo-Chinese ports and thereafter by Japan in Tsingtao, Darien and Harbin. After his own investigation into the matter, Davis denuded Japan's arguments, labeling them as "insincere," for no difficulties had arisen with the foreign and Chinese commissioners already stationed at Antung's customs house. The non-Japanese

staff all spoke Japanese fluently. The American consul had only suspicion of Japan's motives. He imparted that these Japanese actions were part of an attempt to permit easier penetration of Japanese goods into Manchuria and to exclude other foreign manufactures. Here was "the entering thin edge of a wedge" which would separate the Manchurian customs from the Chinese government. "In a word it appears that this move is merely a step in the great organized scheme to extend Japanese economic and political influence in China to the limits of possibility." In addition to the sovereignty problems the Japanese created for China, they also drove out American business, such as was left after Japan gained dominance in Manchuria. The Japanese stopped and searched barges containing American cargo on the Yalu River, seizing at one point three hundred cases of kerosene. Also, Davis charged the Japanese with illegally censoring telegraph communications of American businessmen.[9] Consul Davis conceded Japan's political and economic dominance among the foreign population in Antung, yet he was always hopeful of the endurance of the small American business community there.

In addition to Davis' views on the status of Japan's and America's respective open doors, he also gave vent to his personal anti-Japanese feelings. He called into serious question the morality of Japanese actions in his Antung district, particularly the drug

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[9]Davis to Lansing, telegram, January 31, 1918, 893.00/2797, RG59 NA; Davis to Reinsch, letter, February 6, 1919, 893.00/3042, RG59 NA.

traffic. "The principal business of the Japanese medicine shops has been the introduction of cocain [sic] and hyperdermic [sic] needles." It was a "nefarious trade" with "alarming" effects. Even more disquieting was the distribution of opium to the Chinese, calling this a "debauching of a people." Davis attributed blame on "official Japan," as it attempted to "batten on the weakness and suffering of [the] Chinese." Later, Davis had more to say about the social-cultural manifestations of Japan in his district:

> Those inevitable concomitants of the advent of Japanese "civilization"--Japanese-owned brothels, innumerable vendors of morphia and hyperdermic [sic] syringes and the protection of vice in general--continue to get their deadly but effective work in weakening the Chinese population, and thereby making the absorption of South-eastern Manchuria by the Japanese the more easy . . . .[10]

Despite these negative comments Davis held great hope for the future of the Chinese people. The May Fourth Movement of 1919 and ensuing years, caused by the diplomatic defeat of China at the Paris Peace Conference, was the political awakening of China and Chinese nationalism. Davis marked the movement as the "dawn of a better era" for patriotism, for national self-consciousness had been ignited in many Chinese hearts. Although he acknowledged it as a small beginning,

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[10]Davis to Lansing, telegram, January 31, 1918, 893.00/2797, RG59 NA; Davis to Reinsch, letter, February 6, 1919, 893.00/3042, RG59 NA. Davis also cited the Japanese for not becoming involved in the civic activities of Antung. Though there were eight thousand Japanese in the district, not one had ever contributed time or money to programs which sought to relieve the war misery and make Antung a better place to live. Ibid.

he did praise the Chinese for showing more potential than ever for throwing off Japan's rule. "With education and a feeling of national spirit," Davis hoped, "[there] will inevitably come dissatisfaction with an officialdom which is devoid of all reasons for existence."[11]

One can favorably compare consul Davis' view of the open door, Chinese sovereignty and anti-Japanese sentiment in 1919 with Minister Reinsch's opinions of 1917. Both felt the American open door was an economic venture, but at the same time that open door had a Japanese guard watching over it, controlling what was able to get inside. The two officers also held as very important the sovereignty of China's internal control, be it in customs, police forces or investment policies. And both blamed Japan as the principal factor that had brought about China's inner administrative weakness, its debauched population and the losses American businesses had suffered. Somehow they felt that were Japan to suddenly leave China and return Shantung and its other spheres of influence, the instability, the civil war and the corruption of public officials would remarkably end, and China could take its place in the comity of nations. Like E. Carleton Baker, John K. Davis' role as a foreign service officer became more of an observer than anything else. And by 1919, Davis came to stress China's territorial sovereignty more than America's economic penetration.

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[11]Davis to Tenney, letter, April 2, 1920, 893.00/3558, RG59 NA. For a standard treatment of the May Fourth Movement, see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

John Van Antwerp MacMurray, previously the Secretary of the Peking Legation in 1913 and an officer in Tokyo, blamed Japan for what he belived to be unusual economic conditions in Manchuria. There, he perceived that all foreign trade other than that of Japan's had been demoralized and thrown into confusion. Furthermore, MacMurray explained that a provision of a Japanese loan in April of 1918 obligated the Provincial Treasury of Manchuria to guarantee the redemption of certain currencies held by any Japanese national at a rate averaging 50 per cent better than the market rate. The effect of this was to drive out competition in the interior of Manchuria, where only this currency was used. In another attempt at currency control, Japan forced the use of the gold yen in towns along the Japanese-controlled railways. Policies like these caused MacMurray to believe South Manchuria was a closed field for foreign commercial enterprise.[12]

MacMurray also cited Japan for political coercion directed against China. Proof of this was in September of 1918, when the United States government offered a plan which would place the whole Siberian Railway system (controlled by Russia) as well as the Chinese Eastern Railway (Japanese) under the control of an American named Stevens and the Russian Railway Service Corps. MacMurray said this plan was well received by the Chinese government, as it would mean the American government would guarantee the rights of all involved, and China's position vis a vis the railroads would be improved. But the

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[12]MacMurray to Lansing, telegram, November 29, 1918, 893.00/2925, RG59 NA.

Chinese government was at the same time apprehensive that the American proposal would be interpreted by the Japanese as a bid to curb their activities in Manchuria. And in fact, reported MacMurray, upon the advice of Japan to several Chinese military boards and ministries, the Chinese government withheld its official comment on the proposal and the American plan was scrapped.[13]

The Japanese dominance in railroads also caused other undesirable occurrences, these being of a socially disturbing nature to MacMurray. In Manchuria and Shantung, he complained, lawlessness and banditry had grown in 1918 to an "unprecedented degree." While its sources were in the remnants of an abortive emperor restoration movement in mid-1917, he conveyed his belief that these evils were unquestionably "encouraged and aggravated" by conditions incidental to Japan's continued military occupation of the Shantung Railway. He added that the Chinese authority in the railway zone had been weakened by the alien administrators, and the line itself was an asylum and base of operations for brigandage.[14] MacMurray expressed a plaintiff attitude toward the Japanese in his articulation of the problems experienced in Sino-Japanese relations. It was the Japanese who were responsible for the loss of China's sovereignty in North China. They were also at fault for diminishing the chances for foreign economic opportunity there. When the Americans had attempted

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

to ameliorate economic conditions, it was the Japanese who had stonewalled the plan. As with other American foreign service officers, MacMurray was dissatisfied with the dominance of Japan. Concerned more than the rest of his fellow officers over America's economic open door, he could see only better days if Japan's overbearing presence were removed.

Consul Lester Maynard began his service in China for the State Department in Harbin, Manchuria, in 1911. As a veteran observer of Japanese activity in North China, he felt, like MacMurray, that they made unfair penetrations there. From his post in Chefoo, Shantung, he saw that the province's economic and political progress had been slow under Japanese control. The military administration of Shantung had been changed to a civil government controlled by Japan, which lent an air of permanence to its presence there. In February of 1919, with a mind to try to influence American negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference, Maynard reported of an incident with political implications caused by Japan. He told of thirty-eight Hung Hu Tzu (brigands) who landed by Japanese junk near a small city on the north coast of Shantung. Immediately they began a kidnapping spree of wealthy inhabitants from Teng Chowfu, pillaging the area and murdering several Chinese. Maynard added that the brigands were well-armed with Japanese weapons, and that they came from South Manchuria. Then, the brigands embarked on a southerly march through Shantung, escaping into Lao Shan, an area under Japanese control where they could not be molested. The consul termed this incident an "outrage" and claimed that it clearly demonstrated Japan's policy of creating

and continuing disturbances in Shantung. He harbored no doubts that it was a Japanese-financed and equipped operation, the object of which was political, for no ransom collection attempts were made for those kidnapped. In regard to the open door in Shantung, Maynard denied its existence, saying that practically all commerce was under Japanese control; it was unlikely that Japan would open the door in the future. He saw the Japanese policy as one which sought to ever increase its economic domination in China. The Japanese, he said, were exerting all efforts to extend rail service in Shantung and to tap the resources not only of that province, but of Hunan, Shensi and Shansi provinces.[15]

As with most of the American foreign service officers examined thus far, Maynard expressed a sensitivity to the plight of the American economic open door, realistically realizing that there was little, if any, chance for American economic penetration in the areas dominated by Japan. But he was also increasingly sensitive to the political latitudes Japanese policy reached for in China. He was able to omit any anti-Japanese feelings he might have had, thus freeing his perspective for a straightforward economic interpretation of Japanese activity. But it should be remembered that both the subjective and the more objective foreign service officers were united

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[15]Maynard to Reinsch, letter, April 16, 1918, 893.00/2843, RG59 NA; Maynard to Reinsch, letter, February 20, 1919, 893.00/3081, RG59 NA; Maynard to Reinsch, letter, January 15, 1920, 893.00/3200, RG59 NA.

in their appraisals of Japan as the main contributing factor to the increasing helplessness of China.

Japan's sphere in South China was the coastal province of Fukien. From consul G. C. Hanson, a China hand since 1909, it was learned that Japanese policy and its manifestations in South China differed in no significant manner from those in North China. Immediately after it was learned that China's hopes at the Paris Peace Conference were defeated by Japan, a great wave of anti-Japanese conviction arose in Fukien, especially in the port of Foochow. With the Chinese students as catalysts, the Chamber of Commerce there voted for an economic boycott of Japanese manufactures, promising to boost native goods. Hanson said that the Japanese retaliated in several ways. First, they planned to hold a rally in order to demonstrate their delight in the "Paris Peace Victories." At this rally they were to hire "dirty coolies," dressing them as pigs, dogs and cattle, and to parade them through the streets of Foochow to show what the Japanese thought of the Chinese. Though this demonstration never occurred, four Japanese destroyers did appear in Foochow as the boycott grew stronger. The ships' sailors, the Blue-jackets, arrived daily in the city to parade. Other Japanese "roughnecks" roamed the city with clubs, looking for trouble. Finally, the pro-Japanese governor of Fukien smashed the boycott with Japanese troops and the roughnecks; through intimidation and terror, those who had joined the boycott felt obliged to reject it. Within forty-eight hours the Japanese merchant was once again in control of the business of Foochow. The native Chinese merchants now looked to the Japanese

for protection of their businesses rather than their own gendarme forces. With their lives and livelihoods in danger, Hanson noted a swift disappearance of overt anti-Japanese feelings.[16]

Consul Hanson demonstrated a remarkable foresight when he of the economic boycotts at Foochow. A month before the Japanese warships arrived, he indicated that it would prove beneficial to the Chinese were they to keep the boycott at low profile and commit no untoward act towards any Japanese, for, "in all probability, such an act would result in an unpleasant visit of a Japanese warship to this port." The prophesied intervention did come, affecting the American open door in Fukien. Hanson claimed the Chinese merchants were so frightened by the Japanese that the former dared not borrow money from the Americans or have any business relations with them. Both America's and China's only hope, he said, was for Japan's policy to change. Hanson complained that the Japanese government operated on the theory that Chinese officials and people would yield nothing to reason and everything to force, as the Foochow intervention aptly demonstrated. As forceful expansion had so far been successful, he continued, the Japanese government saw no reason to change "the

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[16]Hanson to Reinsch, letter, June 4, 1919, 893.00/3194, RG59 NA; Hanson to Reinsch, letter, June 19, 1919, 893.00/3196, RG59 NA; Hanson to Reinsch, letter, June 12, 1919, 893.00/3197, RG59 NA.

unjustness and selfishness of this policy." Only through outside pressure could Japan be forced to change, he concluded.[17]

What Hanson described was a most severe action by the Japanese in Foochow. Though he did not admit it, he seemed to have on his mind a lament. Because of the superior power and presence of Japan in Fukien, the Chinese there did not have the benefit of an alternative policy to live under. Even the Chinese system with its many taxes and business practices was preferable to the harsh Japanese-controlled economy. No doubt Hanson would have welcomed an increased American presence there, not for purposes of domination, but as an alternative for the Chinese to choose from. Maybe he felt the American style of open door--low-key penetration and an altruistic respect for China's integrity--was the superior system. Hanson's view is difficult to discern. He did feel, however, that China might benefit more if a political-cultural system similar to that of America's was substituted in the place of Japan's. But the dominant attitude and the primary motivation of the observers for the State Department was the more restrained advocacy of the open door, in which American products and investors had the right to compete equally and fairly with all foreign powers for the China market, and in which China's territorial integrity was not compromised by a foreign power. The officers frequently pressed their appeals to the State Department to

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[17]Hanson to Reinsch, letter, May 24, 1919, 793.94/929, RG59 NA; Hanson to Reinsch, letter, July 17, 1919, 793.94/996, RG59 NA; Hanson to Tenney, letter, November 26, 1919, 793.94/1048, RG59 NA.

allow a stronger American presence in China. Consuls Jenkins and Denby are well within the mainstream of this American foreign service officer opinion.

Douglas Jenkins was a relatively new China hand, beginning his post in Harbin, North Manchuria, in 1915. He told of only Japanese gains in his district during the year 1919. The Americans had been effectively excluded from this area, he said, mainly because of the introduction of the yen as the medium of currency. This had stimulated a high level of Japanese merchant and financial activity. He gave as examples of this the Japanese acquiring exclusive control in the soya bean oil exports, that most cargo barges and steamers on the Sungari River were Japanese, that the principal electric company changed to Japanese hands in 1919 and that an electric street railway company was soon to come from Japan.[18]

Charles Denby, likewise, wrote only of Japanese gains. From his post in Hunan province in South China, he saw new ventures by the Japanese in mining, particularly in antimony mines in Hunan which produced 70 per cent of the world's supply. The 160,000 Japanese in China, Denby said, although not fully sanctioned by Tokyo, were preparing for a "post-war epoch" in China. China, meanwhile, remained powerless to oppose its transgressor. As a war ally of the United States, he advised the State Department that he felt Japan

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[18]Jenkins to Tenney, letter, January 20, 1920, 893.00/3325, RG59 NA.

should be held more accountable for the unfair advantages it had reserved to itself.[19]

Consul Thomas Sammons in Shanghai and Minister Paul Reinsch in Peking were the most vocal foreign service officers in the period beginning just after the Lansing-Ishii notes in 1917 and running through the year 1919. The two officers were closely aligned in their thinking about the cause, the nature of and the cure for China's problems. They also shared many concerns of the officers studied above. In addition to their dispatches telling of minor atrocities committed by Japanese in China, they were also sensitive to two of China's foremost problems, both involving Japan. The North-South Peace Conference in Shanghai, which dealt with unification, and the Shantung question discussions at the Paris Peace Conference superseded any other problems China experienced. If rid of the internal conflict and the Japanese invader, these two officers believed China could make great progress. Japan was heavily involved in both of these issues; Reinsch and Sammons firmly believed that the absence of Japan would make a great difference in China's internal situation. The year 1919 was felt to be the year for China to reunite and rid itself once and for all of the problem which caused and aggravated all others--Japan. Before discussing the two peace conferences, it would be helpful to introduce Sammons' perceptions of the open door

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[19]Denby to Lansing, telegram, May 26, 1918, 793.94/712, RG59 NA.

and to show how Reinsch had matured in his perceptions of Sino-Japanese relations.

The Japanese problem according to Sammons was one of coercion and corruption. Removal of this element of coercion behind Japanese enterprises and the corruption from Sino-Japanese relations would not only make Japan's good will in China worthless, but a tide of anti-Japanese reaction would set in which would ruin Japan's commercial ventures. Furthermore, this antagonism against Japan by both the Chinese and consul Sammons was based upon the view that nearly every Japanese economic move in China brought in its wake a political intrusion of some sort. For instance, Japanese economic domination in Amoy, Fukien, brought about the subsequent control of the Amoy port customs. There, he reported, the Japanese were undiligent in their searches for opium and morphine headed inland. Sammons also listed some of the Japanese influences in Shanghai, including reports of political office positions gained by the Japanese, the building of their schools, hospitals and language schools, the operations of their gandarme stations and control of the Tsinan Daily newspaper. In addition to the Japanese cultural advances in the Shanghai area, he also worried about the increasing Japanese trade, enough to remind the Department that for 1918 the Japanese had secured 40 per cent of China's entire foreign trade market. But his emphasis was more on China's than America's losses. He felt that the pervading Japanese influence had its detrimental effect on China's ability to help

itself, to develop sufficiently the capacity to adjust its own internal problems. Japan was "proving too heavy of a cross for China to carry."[20]

Paul Reinsch continued to harbor suspicions of Japan's active role in China. He termed its presence "unfavorable," one which encouraged and aggravated disorganization in China with a view to having the condition of China become so hopeless as to require Japanese guardianship. As before, Reinsch usually followed his observations with suggestions. To combat China's disorganization and the Japanese guardian role there, he recommended that the United States and other powers pursue a program of efficient, constructive aid to China. Would that the United States spend in China, he lamented, the millions in dollars and lives it was pouring into Europe at the same time for similar reasons. If the price was not paid in China now, he said, some power would have to pay it later. He proposed an increased American presence through loans, particularly in North China, to offset the Japanese influence there. In an attempt to convince the State Department of the danger of Japan, Reinsch pointed out that Japan had established a civil government in Shantung in spite of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Not only did it exercise control in the former German territories, but also in regions entirely within the

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[20]Sammons to Reinsch, letter, December 23, 1918, 793.94/741, RG59 NA; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, November 4, 1918, 893.00/2940, RG59 NA; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, January 21, 1919, 893.00/2968, RG59 NA; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, June 5, 1919, 793.94/896, RG59 NA; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, May 20, 1919, 893.00/3143, RG59 NA.

administration of China. Japan was truly in its "ascendancy phase" in its occupation of the mainland.[21]

The minister gave many examples. The first was the Japanese government's negotiations with the Peking government over a method of cooperation in any military action which might need to be taken in Manchuria and Siberia. Though these were secret negotiations, Reinsch obtained from leaks an indication the Japanese had pushed for heavy demands. Next, he reported of several Japanese acquiring positions in the Peking government, including several advisors. Ts'ao Ju-lin, the chief of the pro-Japanese political party in North China, gained posts in the two imperial ministries of Communication and Finance in the government at Peking. The Japanese had likewise "bought" the governor-general in Mongolia, Hsu Shu-chen, and had persuaded him to aid in their plans for developing Mongolia. Reinsch learned of plans for a new railway, a blueprint for colonization of agricultural lands and a fifty million dollar loan to General Hsu. There was also to be a Sino-Japanese Military Convention for Northwest China to create a Chinese military force led by Japanese officers. As Japan had already "bought" General Semenoff, the symbol of Russian authority in Mongolia, Reinsch feared that in the event of a conflict there, all military forces would be under Japanese control. Turning his attention to the Shantung Railroad, Reinsch believed it pathetic that Japan should operate the line on Chinese soil, and, in effect,

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[21]Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, February 12, 1918, 893.00/2780, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, February 16, 1918, 893.00/3507a, RG59 NA.

make loans to the Chinese with the profits of the railroad. Japan's seizure of the line had always troubled him; the Japanese administration of the railroad was a symbol to Reinsch of their method of aggression. Its military seizure had been transformed into a military-economic operation. This later became a civil-political enterprise, monopolizing the economic lives of those dependent on the railway, monopolizing the political life of the area served by the railway. Also ever present in Reinsch's mind was the Japanese-controlled narcotic trade. It is impossible to overestimate the negative attitude he felt towards Japanese-owned morphia shops. In early 1919 he did obtain Japan's word that it would end this practice, yet he believed rumors that Japan would first flood North China with a year's supply of morphia.[22]

In the two years since 1917, Minister Reinsch had undergone several perception changes. Like his fellow officers, he experienced an increasing sympathy for the territorial sovereignty of China. The economic open door, lost in many areas, was not as major a concern to Reinsch. He used a variety of reasons to try to persuade the State Department to take some increased interest and action in what he felt was the slow raping of China. He told of the demoralized Chinese government, which was "purely passive" under Japanese domination, and which payed no heed to its own welfare or to trade development

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[22]Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, April 30, 1918, 893.00/2838, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, July 7, 1919, 893.00/3187, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, March 10, 1919, 893.00/3040, RG59 NA.

potential. Those officials not sympathetic to Japan hadn't the energy or resources to fight off those who were. Reinsch said that these latter officials were not so much tied to Japan, but as it was the only source of money, they behaved for the hand which fed them. Implied here was a suggestion to the State Department that if the United States were to assume a more liberal position in at least its loan policy to the Chinese, the United States could become an effective alternative force in China. He also suggested that somehow Japan ought to be made aware of how much disapproval its actions in China provoked among Chinese and Americans. Reinsch reminded the Department of Japan's status as a trustee of the Allied Governments and that Japan ought to be made to give an accounting of its trusteeship in China. As a final plea for more action by the United States government, the minister told of numerous anti-American propaganda attacks by Japanese-controlled newspapers. These "violent and scurrilous attacks on America and things American in Japanese-owned newspapers" included political and personal attacks on Woodrow Wilson and other American officials in America and China, including Reinsch himself. In order to stir anti-American feelings among the Chinese, the press also charged Americans with the smuggling and distribution of opium. Once, Reinsch included a newspaper clipping from the Japanese press which told of a Tientsin fracas in which several score of Chinese had supposedly been killed by American soldiers. Reinsch

believed such manifestations of anti-Americanism by the Japanese had the full approval of Japanese consular officials.[23]

As seen above, Paul Reinsch recommended a political involvement in the internal affairs of China. As the degree of Japanese involvement in China increased over the years, Reinsch recommended an increased role by the United States. This presence was to be just strong enough to prove to the Japanese that America desired the open door policy in all parts of China. As previously noted, Reinsch placed little faith in statements of policy like the Lansing-Ishii notes. He desired a demonstration by the United States to prove to Japan the United States meant what it had said in its original open door policy--equality of markets and territorial integrity of China. Japan, in Reinsch's opinion, violated these. His failure to convince the State Department of his views was a continual disappointment.

In an attempt to reconcile their differences before serious negotiations began in Paris, representatives from the Peking and Canton governments met to see if there were any grounds for their uniting to become one government. Sun Yat-sen and negotiator T'ang Shao-yi from Canton, and the representatives from the militarist clique at Peking headed by Tuan Ch'i-jui, gathered at Shanghai in October of 1918. There was never any chance for success on acount of the rivalries, the divergent political philosophies and, in

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[23]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, March 10, 1919, 893.00/3040, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, October 19, 1918, 893.00/2893, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, June 6, 1919, 893.00/3180, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, September 10, 1919, 893.00/3235, RG59 NA.

Sammon's and Reinsch's opinions, the influence of Japan in the negotiations. After about seven months of sporadic, emotional talks, the negotiations were suspended without progress.

Thomas Sammons in Shanghai would have been very surprised had the two governments united. He observed increased Japanese dealings with its "bought" ally, General Tuan. The three issues to be decided--definition of military and civil authority throughout China, particularly on the provincial level, definition of rights and duties of the provincial and central governments and the issue of whether to have a constitutional form of government or not--were constantly ignored as the focus of the peace negotiations, according to Sammons. Under Japanese tutelage, Tuan instead wished for a settlement that included Southern troop disbandment. Sammons felt he concentrated on the military power realities instead of civil issues. Furthermore, he believed Japan to be causing interruptions, delays and even further splits among the negotiators. While the Japanese had an interest in the flourishing of the Tuan clique for the aid it could provide them, the Japanese had their sights on a larger question--that of Shantung. According to Sammons, Japan conspired to keep the North and the South split in order to show the negotiators in Paris a China which could not even administer its own affairs, much less those of the Japanese spheres of influence where the situation was comparatively stable. A suspension in the talks was Sammons's interpretation of Japan's

goal. Its object was "to prevent the Chinese delegation in Paris from being in a position to sign the peace documents there."[24]

Sammons maintained a careful watch on the negotiations and studied diligently a newspaper he considered to be an instrument of Japan's policy of divisiveness, the Shanghai Times. When the North-South peace talks began, the Times gloomily predicted failure for the parley, editorializing that there appeared to be little hope for a future settlement. The North, it maintained, seemed willing to effect a compromise, yet it still prepared for fighting, while the South clamored for peace but all the while secretly advanced troops northward. The effect of this press propagated a suspicious climate for the talks, keeping the two Chinas apart. Sammons saw the only benefit of this kind of press going to the Japanese. In February of 1919, Sammons quoted the Times' ominous threat to the peace negotiators: "If the Peace Conference fails in Shanghai, then the Powers [led by Japan] will have no alternative but to dictate terms to the rebel camp [South China] and ensure peace . . . . China is at the crossroads; she must seek and find salvation, or it will be found for her."[25]

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[24]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, March 10, 1919, 893.00/3040, RG59 NA; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, March 1, 1919, 893.00/2998, RG59 NA; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, May 17, 1919, 893.00/3136, RG59 NA.

[25]Sammons to Reinsch, letter, November 4, 1918, 893.00/2940, RG59 NA; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, February 10, 1919, 893.00/3010, RG59 NA.

This would have been most regretable to Thomas Sammons. He believed that through considerations of propinquity, Japan was becoming all too powerful in the affairs of China. With the Northern leaders on its payroll, and even then deceiving them by obstructing the peace conference, hoping it would fail, Sammons wrote that Japan was intriguing to "Prussianize the Far Eastern situation."[26]

The Japanese in fact dictated the "peace" as the Times had predicted, first by making sure there was no inner stability in China and then through retaining the Shantung Peninsula. What the Japanese did not predict was the reception of this news in China. In what became known as the May Fourth Movement, student-led Chinese demonstrated their anger in a mass display of anti-Japanese sentiment and Chinese nationalism. Sammons conveyed that the students were unusually agitated and that the demonstrations were well planned, indicating to him that the Shanghai area would arouse itself to nationalism and "emphatic denunciations of Japanese policy." He also interpreted the students' outcries as directed against both their own inept leaders who had compromised China in exchange for personal gain and the military warlords of the North who served as Japan's puppets. Sammons was very hopeful that the movement and

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[26]Sammons to Reinsch, letter, March 1, 1919, 893.00/2998, RG59 NA.

its accompanying boycott would lead to and aid the unification of China.[27]

But the rest of the year 1919 was disappointing to him in this respect. He observed only an increased control by the Japanese. The Tuan clique and its Japanese military and financial support had rendered the President of China virtually powerless to function in the country's behalf. Even as the year drew to a close, Sammons reported Tuan still received "millions" from Japan, whose purpose now with Shantung secure was to influence all who could possibly be influenced. The Southern leaders grew more and more depressed as the Japanese and the Tuan militarists guided the country away from their control. Moreover, the boycott began to lag. While hearts would always oppose Japan, Sammons explained that the boycott affected the pocketbook too adversely. The issue to the consul was not that of the South making peace with the Tuan clique, but peace with Japan itself. "Nothing can be done until Japan discontinues its militarist policy in China

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[27]Sammons to Reinsch, letter, May 6, 1919, 893.00/3118, RG59 NA; Sammons to Polk, telegram, September 25, 1919, 893.00/3240, RG59 NA. No American foreign service officer commented on the peace process in Paris except for a commercial attaché named Julian Arnold; the remainder of the diplomatic corps in China lamented in various tones the sustained pre-eminence of Japan in China. Arnold believed the Shantung settlement in Paris to be the "Achilles Heel" of the Peace Conference. The plea for racial equality which Japan put forth at the Conference was "pure bluff" and hypocritical, for no nation practiced in Arnold's thinking racial inequality more than Japan did. He interpreted the rejection of Japan's proposal as giving Japan a reason to bluff a feeling of deep hurt so that the Conference might have a sympathy for Japan's later claims--"her real claims to Shantung." Arnold to Reinsch, letter, June 9, 1919, 793.94/944.

and . . . recalls its military agents . . . ."[28] Once again, a consul blamed Japan for the troubles which plagued China.

Minister Paul Reinsch agreed with most Chinese as to the "official" cause of China's problems, that being the absence of a parliament through which all treaties would be decided. He lent his support in the North-South Peace Conference to its restoration. Minister Reinsch was also in agreement with his fellow foreign service officers as to the unofficial, the de facto cause of China's problems--the presence of Japan. His most burning desire was to persuade Japan to cease its military and economic support of the Northern militarists. He felt that an agency, the War Participation Bureau, was most responsible during 1918 and 1919 for facilitating the close relationships between Japan and the Tuan militarists. Ostensibly, the War Participation Bureau was an Allied project for the fighting of the European war in China, though largely supported by Japanese money and staff. It was in actuality the method whereby Tuan members were paid off by the Japanese; all Japanese loans to China went to the Tuan militarists for their military expenses. Reinsch described for the State Department many "official" actions of the Bureau's troops, who, while acting for China, were actually carrying out Japanese policy. "The entire Japanese policy in China

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[28]Sammons to Polk, telegram, September 25, 1919, 893.00/3240, RG59 NA; Sammons to Reinsch, letter, May 17, 1919, 893.00/3136, RG59 NA.

is actually based upon interference by way of supporting certain men and groups," he concluded.[29]

Minister Reinsch perceived that the North-South Peace Conference was against the Chinese militarists' goals, for a constitution, a parliament and the disbanding of their armies would effectively emasculate their power. As a complement to the Japanese obstructions at the Conference, Reinsch interpreted the Tuan clique as bickering, wasting time to cause delays and displaying attitudes which impeded any progress at the Conference. But Reinsch also felt that the Southern party was partly to blame. They displayed an irresoluteness at the time when political courage was required. Not having a strong position, they gave in too easily at the conference table and fell into intrigues to build up troops to strengthen their position. The Japanese, Reinsch agreed with Sammons, wished to delay the Peace Conference not only to help their position in Paris, but also in order to build a strong military force in the North with Chinese troops dependent upon Japan. Thus they could thwart any outcome of the Conference that might be at variance to the maintenance of militarism in North China. The only way Japan could gain respect, "which has been lost to all parties," would be to drop its militarist plans and give full moral support to the Shanghai Peace Conference, abstaining from any condition which would present an

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[29]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, May 17, 1919, 893.00/3131, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, March 2, 1919, 893.00/3062, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, March 10, 1919, 893.00/3040, RG59 NA.

obstacle to its work. All other actions by Japan would leave the Chinese state of affairs unchanged.[30]

What Reinsch wanted was to somehow take the initiative away from Japan. As the situation stood, the North's militarists were in possession of Japanese arms and money that gave them a sense of power. A continuation of this status quo would leave Japan dominant in China; the initiative would remain with them. Reinsch tried to convince the State Department to grasp the initiative at the Shanghai Conference by proposing a definite plan of reorganization, one which put the United States in a position to advise and assist economically. There was no reason to interfere in China's internal affairs beyond the disbanding of all China's armies and the assuming of the administration of China's finances until they got on a firm base. If this could be accomplished, the West would no longer need to worry about China's politics. Once free, he naively reasoned, the people would stay away from militarism, elect a strong parliament and civil governor and furnish their nation with efficient government. China would soon be irretrievably lost to Japan unless this were done. Reinsch felt that China's civilian leaders desperately needed some kind of concrete assurance. Otherwise, the situation in China would soon crystallize beyond America's ability to deal with it, leaving

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[30]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, June 6, 1919, 893.00/3180, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, March 11, 1919, 893.00/3043, RG59 NA.

East Asia as "a source of great danger. Prevention," he pleaded, "will be infinitely easier than the cure."[31]

On the thirteenth of May, 1919, the Shanghai Peace Conference disbanded when Southern negotiators delivered an ultimatum to the North. The Canton government was weary of negotiations and the numerous intrigues of the North and the Japanese to delay or dissolve the Conference. Sun Yat-sen had even compromised on the issue of a parliament, saying that it was not requisite to a unified China. As a method of determining exactly where the North stood on certain issues, an ultimatum was issued, calling for: (1) a rejection of the Paris settlement of the Shantung question; (2) a declaration of annulment of all secret covenants, pacts and agreements between China and Japan, and punishment of those responsible for them; (3) the immediate disbandment of the War Participation Army and other Northern armies; (4) the removal of warlord rule in China. Reinsch interpreted the walkout by the North at the Shanghai Conference as caused mainly by the two latter provisions of the Southern ultimatum. Acceptance of these would have debilitated the Peking government, depriving it of its raison d'etre.[32]

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[31]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, March 27, 1919, 893.00/3062, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, June 4, 1919, 893.00/3179, RG59 NA; Reinsch to Polk, telegram, July 12, 1919, 893.00/3167, RG59 NA.

[32]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, May 17, 1919, 893.00/3131, RG59 NA.

The settlement of the Shantung question at Paris gave Japan an uninterrupted hegemony in the province, and proved to be the minister's worst trial. He found it hard to face the Chinese students as the representative of China's "best friend." He later recalled:

> Probably nowhere else in the world had expectations of America's leadership at Paris been raised so high as in China. The Chinese trusted America, they trusted the frequent declarations of principles uttered by President Wilson . . . . It sickened and disheartened me to think how the Chinese people would receive this blow which meant the blasting of their hopes and the destruction of their confidence in the equity of nations.

Reinsch felt that Woodrow Wilson had let China down and that a movement against America equal in its vehemence as that against Japan would be forthcoming. By insisting on the right solution in Paris, Reinsch said, the United States could have saved the Far East. Although it had promised to restore Shantung "with full sovereignty," Japan reserved its economic rights there. This was the crux of the matter to the minister. "The ownership by a foreign government of a trunk railway reaching from a first-class port to the heart of China could not be correctly termed an economic right." It was a question of political rights, something "American policy had tried to prevent for decades."[33]

Those few weeks after the May 4, 1919, reception of the Paris Peace Conference news were especially tough for Reinsch and

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[33]Reinsch, American Diplomat, 361, 360.

other Americans in China. He was very impressed with the numbers, the power and the nationalistic activism of the Chinese students in the May Fourth Movement. The movement was coupled first with an extremely effective boycott of Japanese goods that reduced the volume of trade between the two Asian nations by 70 per cent, and second with a general strike by most of China's workers. The movement, recalled Reinsch, "gained momentum like an avalanche thundering down a mountain. Its fury was concentrated on the attempt to force the dismissals of . . . three officials, who were, in the popular mind, guilty of trading away the national birthright." He pointed out that the boycott was so effective even Japanese bankers were put on the blacklist, and Japan's ships bringing other nations' goods were not allowed to unload. The Chinese government in Peking finally yielded on June 11, dismissing the three hated officials. Reinsch felt the most important action to come of the Movement was a realization that public opinion had wrung from the Chinese government a specific surrender. He interpreted this small concession as a beginning of a forthcoming movement of national self-recovery for the Chinese. He dared to believe that this was the Chinese solution to the Chinese problems. Realizing the other Powers would not help it alleviate the problem of Japan, China had assumed this task itself, beginning by making itself strong, its government responsive.[34]

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[34]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, September 10, 1919, 893.00/3235, RG59 NA; Reinsch, American Diplomat, 369, 372.

The two peace conferences and their aftermath proved to be Reinsch's last battles in Peking. He felt that China still required foreign understanding and aid, and that as Minister of China, ironically, he was in the worst position to arouse this interest abroad. More could be done in the United States than by staying in China. On June 7, 1919, Reinsch submitted his resignation to President Wilson, sending a personal accompanying letter expressing his view of Japanese-Chinese relations and the recent events at Paris. This letter reveals the motivations of Paul Reinsch as America's representative to Peking.

First, he felt that America's very presence in China was at stake. He feared that Americans would be permitted to live in China only on the sufferance of others and that American education, missionary and economic enterprises would be lost. Japan was undeniably the culprit. He pleaded with Wilson not to listen to Japan as it talked about its friendship with China, or the restoration of Shantung, or of loyalty to the League of Nations; the facts of Japanese aggressions had to be taken into account. It had to be made clear that "her purposes are unmistakable and that the methods utilized to effect them will by no means be tolerated." Then he outlined Japan's "purposes:"

> [They] are the stirring up of trouble and revolution, encouragement of bandits and pirates, morphia, financial corruption, misleading of the press, refusal of just satisfaction when Americans are injured in order to gain prestige for absolute power, and . . . official duplicity, such as the disavowal of knowledge when loans are being made to the Chinese Government by leading Japanese banks and the subsequent statement by the Japanese minister that these loans were private arrangements by "merchants."

It was vital, when viewed in this light, that there had to be more official United States support of American merchant activity and the constructive elements of Chinese national life itself. The total absence of State Department and United States government support during the European war drove General Tuan and his party "into the arms of the pro-Japanese agents. Instead of support we gave China the Lansing-Ishii Note." China, with its millions and its infinite potential for power, had to be an ally of the United States and a cornerstone of the security of the United States. The situation in Europe seemed to have priority because it was nearer, he complained. "[T]he desires of Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia and Greece are infinitesimal in their importance to the future of America compared with those of China."[35]

In the first years of his service Reinsch had recommended more loans and business activity by Americans to convince Japan of their sincerity of purpose in upholding its open door; Japan was involved in China in chiefly economic ways. Yet as the Japanese took more license in the political affairs of China, so too did Reinsch advocate a policy of fighting fire with fire. His desire to guide Northern politics so they would be more sympathetic to the United States was not motivated by a wish to "Americanize" China, but to give the country a chance to find its own political path without the pernicious presence of Japanese influences. Reinsch had visions of China

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[35]Reinsch, ibid., 365-366.

becoming a strong ally for the United States in the Pacific. Realizing the boundaries the State Department had placed on American involvement in the country, Reinsch developed, particularly in the Shanghai Peace Conference, what he felt to be an acceptable plan of American investment and guidance to help China realize its strength. It was to be a tutelage role not unlike that America had displayed to Japan in the nineteenth century. The only cultural assumption to be discerned in Reinsch's recommendations was that the Chinese people, in their violent eschewal of the secret coerciveness of the Japanese influences, would readily welcome the alternative American plans for Chinese government and national life. But it must be remembered the United States was in reality the only Western power in China which desired a redefinition of the Sino-Japanese relationship; Reinsch recognized that only America at this time could lend its constructive forces to the Chinese to counter the destructive tendencies of Japan's China policy. Reinsch could not understand the logic of the United States government, which assisted all the other Allies financially, but could not contribute one dollar toward the maintenance of an independent China.

The year 1917 was a turning point for Sino-Japanese relations. It was also a turning point for both the United States and its foreign service officers in China, albeit in different ways. The entrance of the United States into the war in Europe caused Americans to shift what focus they had in Asia towards Europe, which in turn caused an increase in Japan's influence in China. These shifts of focus evoked from the American diplomatic personnel in China an increased number

of dispatches describing the Sino-Japanese situation and its effect upon the American presence there. The losses which the foreign service officer believed were incurred by the United States were, in his eyes, more than offset by gains made by Japan in China. Whereas in the previous chapter it was seen that American losses in China were feared as much as Japanese gains, the officers in 1919 reacted more to the increasing power of Japan on the mainland. In North China particularly, there was little else for American business to lose. They described how the initiative for independent action by the United States to counter Japan slowly became lost. The Paris Peace Conference dictates all but sealed the doom of the American initiative in China. It was ironic as the officers' communications increased, their readers in Washington seemed correspondingly unaware of and unable to respond to them. In 1917 one reads of the "entering wedges" and the "germs" of Japanese influence in North China. By 1919 these wedges had become to the consuls great blocks of political and economic power in a very diseased country. Throughout the period the tone of their citations was accusatory, relentlessly denouncing. World-wide considerations as P. S. Heintzleman had articulated were absent. The focus of the American foreign service officers was entirely within China.

Their motivations were varied. No two perceived the Japanese threats to China in the same way. All were committed to the economic open door for America. But even this may have been secondary in their minds in 1919. To Reinsch the economic opportunity for Americans was almost as important as China's sovereignty; some, such as E. Carleton

Baker, displayed more anti-Japanese sentiment than commercial concerns. Defamations of Japan's character, often vehement, were employed by all to add emphasis to their dispatches. The cultural open door became more of a motivation for the officers. With the realization of America's decline in China came a corresponding increase in the hope for an Americanized influence in the politics, in the social mores and in the culture of China. While concrete evidence for these manifestations is small, this cultural assumption caused the consuls to react to the Japanese from an American standpoint. Were they in Japan's position, the officers would never own morphia shops, establish corrupting ties with China's leaders or engage in militarism as a means to policy goals. They were motivated by cultural morality and emotion. Whether or not this indicates an overstating of the Japanese pervasiveness is very difficult to judge. Certainly there was something to their reports, as all agreed that Japan held special problem status for the Chinese and Americans, and as all came to share similar opinions and motivations with regard to the presence of Japan. Moreover, in the provinces where there was no Japanese permeation, there were no reported violations of the open door principles.

It is probably a valid conclusion that these reports were in the main true and factual, but they were also at times overstatements of Japanese aggression based on an overestimation of the ability of the Chinese to help themselves. By overstating the Japanese perniciousness, the weaknesses of the Chinese could be more easily rationalized. No doubt that the Japanese aggravated the warlord

rivalries and the North-South contention, but these problems were products of earlier times when Japan had a small role in China. As none communicated this realization, it is doubtful that they entertained thoughts of a troubled China without Japan. China was constantly presented by the diplomatic personnel as a country with the potential for reform. Without Japan they assumed China would adopt Western political and economic mannerisms. In 1919, however, these assumptions and beliefs were more pipe dreams than reality.

III. HOPEFUL NATIONALISM

To the partisans of Woodrow Wilson and his new moral diplomacy, it seemed as though Japan's international intrigue to gain Shantung had won in 1919 as much as America's isolationists had failed both China's and the foreign service officers' last, faint hope for an increased American presence in China. China had failed to enlist the United States as its lawyer in Paris. Those Americans who wished to be its attorney were few. Because he compromised the Shantung question in favor of the League of Nations issue, President Wilson disappointed many of the foreign service officers in China. They placed little hope in the League to solve the Shantung question. Many resigned themselves to the fact that the Paris Peace Conference was the last place where America could have seized the initiative. The failure in Paris seemed convincingly final. Their pleas to the State Department for increased political action ceased; it was a time of observation.

To Japan, America's failure was its success. Its claims to Shantung were free at last from any type of diplomatic revocation. Even so, the time between the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference in late 1921 was Japan's most difficult period covered in this study for the perpetuation of its military, political and economic gains in China. It faced a politically and socially aroused China which tried as best it could, within the limits of its weakness and diplomatic solitude, to rid itself of Japanese influence.

The most significant event to the foreign service officers between 1919 and 1922, and indeed one of the more momentous events in modern Chinese history, was the May Fourth Movement. Beginning with a student protest in 1919 when it was learned that the Paris Peace Conference had given a favorable decision to Japan on the Shantung problem, the movement acquired a larger following and a broader meaning in the months and years to come. The movement's members hearkened back to the sentiment aroused by the Twenty-one Demands of Japan in 1915 and the Shantung question settlement in 1919, promoting an anti-Japanese nationalist campaign coupled with a "vast modernization movement to build a new China through intellectual and social reforms."[1]

The May Fourth Movement was very strong in many cities; its economic boycott persisted well into 1921 in many areas. The American foreign service officers perceived that it had two effects on the Japanese presence in China. First, while Japan did not change its policy of maintaining its supremacy in China, in some instances it did change its tactics, becoming less visible as it sought to increase its control. Second, Chinese resistance to Japan required the island nation to exert more effort to sustain its existing influence already in China. In fact, some officers perceived Japanese stagnation in China, with occasional retreats of Japanese influence. In the summer of 1921, many reported Japan to be pursuing a much

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[1]Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement, 1.

less aggressive policy in China. This, with Japan's promised retreat from Shantung in 1922 at the Washington Conference, indicates that Japanese militarist leaders reacted to significant opposition which came from anti-imperialist groups within their own country. A student movement in Japan led by the intellectual Yoshino Sakuzō enjoyed the height of its anti-imperialist, democratic influence at the same time Japan agreed to reduce its professed interests in China, possibly explaining in part why Japan seemed to accept a lesser role on the mainland.[2] The parenthetical events between the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference was to all parties involved--the Chinese, the Japanese and the Americans--a time of change in one's relationship with the other. But the period's most pronounced new quality was the wide latitude of anti-Japanese hatred on the part of the Chinese. Those foreign service officers who observed the boycott and other forms of agitation were all in agreement on one point: Chinese public opinion would not accept the status of Shantung as handed down at Paris. It was still a question to which the Chinese demanded a favorable resolution.

During the summer of 1919 and continuing through 1920, the American foreign service officers were preoccupied with the May Fourth Movement and its effects upon Sino-Japanese relations. After they recovered from their surprise at the movement's

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[2]Jansen, Japan and China, 238-241.

spontaneity, they seemed pleased to observe the strong, indigenous and persevering nature of the movement. Of all the foreign service officers who commented on them, only one expressed a pessimistic attitude. The others viewed the May Fourth Movement as a beneficial opportunity for China; they explained its direction and focus as necessary if the Chinese were to throw off Japan's heavy influence in their internal affairs. Without exception the officers in South China expressed their feelings toward the movement in favorable and extensive reports, emphasizing the well organized, peaceful and nationalistic natures of the movement. With their own hands tied, preventing action against Japan in China, they saw the nationalistic events of 1919 and 1920 as the only light by which China could guide itself. Somehow, Japan had to be removed from its extensive presence in China. The foreign service officer felt that only a diminished Japanese presence would allow China first to gain again its national sovereignty and second, this "new China" would allow an increased American economic role there.

With the exception of the heavily Japanese-controlled Fukien area, South China experienced a widespread nationalist movement in 1919 and 1920. The foreign service officers observed merchant strikes which spread inland from the coastal port cities. Often these merchant unions developed a system of inner control whereby they punished their recalcitrant and less patriotic members. Cadre teams scoured the countryside in search of rural support. Most laborers at one time or another were on strike and Japanese currencies were blacklisted. National industries were stimulated in order to counter

Japanese goods. Through it all the American foreign service officer commented on the sweeping nature of the movement on the people and the active movements it spawned in the name of anti-Nipponism and Chinese nationalism. They were sensitive to the losses of Japan and the gains of China. Yet only one consul, P. S. Heintzleman, commented on the movement's bearing on the American open door. Heintzleman, as seen before, withheld his subjective comments about Sino-Japanese-American relations and concentrated on America's stature in China. With his cohorts heavily involved with the gains China was making at Japanese expense, Heintzleman kept his focus on American interests in the Hankow area, saying that despite the economic setbacks Japan experienced at the hands of Chinese students, American gains were negligible. This consul was the one observer for the State Department who felt the open door was more America's economic opportunity in China than a protection of China's national sovereignty.[3]

With the exception of the Fukien area, Southern protestors had no fear of reprisal from a Japanese military intervention. As the May Fourth Movement found expression near and within Japanese spheres of influence, however, the role of Japan as intervener increased.

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[3]Pontius to Reinsch, letter, June 18, 1919, 893.00/3183, RG59 NA; Pontius to Reinsch, letter, July 11, 1919, 893.00/3204, RG59 NA; Pontius to Tenney, letter, January 17, 1920, 893.00/3307, RG59 NA; Meinhardt to Tenney, letter, September 20, 1919, 893.00/3239, RG59 NA; Wyers to Tenney, letter, January 28, 1920, 893.00/3328, RG59 NA; Heintzleman to Tenney, letter, February 10, 1920, 893.00/3331, RG59 NA.

Secretary Albert Ruddock in Peking discovered that Japanese acts of indiscretion in Peking were largely responsible for augmenting student agitation. For example, the Japanese first ordered and then demanded the dismissal of the Peking area President of the Chamber of Commerce for his participations in anti-Japanese activities. At another time Japanese troops forcibly dispersed an anti-Japanese demonstration. But Ruddock also perceived that the students commanded a favorable public opinion; they were exonerated from any blame of wrongdoing in the public eye. He prophesied, however, that the pro-Japanese members of the Peking government's cabinet would "precipitate a crisis" soon in order to call in more Japanese troops to the area. Students in the city of Kaifeng, Honan, which is near Shantung, also clashed with authorities over the boycott. The consul in that district, Jay C. Huston, relayed that it was generally well known that Japan endeavored to extend its influence over Honan province; some of the province's higher officials were already "tools" of the Japanese. In South Manchuria in the city of Antung, vice-consul C. J. Spiker felt that the area's small Chinese merchant population could not withstand a boycott because Japanese controlled most of the business. Any attempts at independent action by the Chinese merchants would immediately bring retaliation by the Japanese. The vice-consul did append an encouraging word, imparting that he had found out that when there was an alternative to certain

Japanese goods, these alternate imports usually supplanted the Japanese manufactures.[4]

While as optimistic as their cohorts in the South, the foreign service officers in the North concluded that Japan's powerful hold there prevented any significant gains of the students in their attempts to undermine Japan's influence. No matter how small the actions of the May Fourth Movement were, however, the officers picked them up as noteworthy, demonstrating their sense of optimism and their hopes that Chinese nationalism might reduce Japan's stature in China. With even more reason, the officers in the North turned to the sovereignty of China aspect of the open door principles. As seen in the previous chapter, the foreign service officer reflected a belief that America was beginning to lose its equality of opportunity in North China. As these losses became more widespread and finalized after the Paris Peace Conference, they increasingly used the principle of the integrity of China as a tactic to convince the State Department to recover the lost opportunity.

Only Consul-General Edwin S. Cunningham saw the May Fourth Movement in negative terms. The Shanghai boycott to him was a failure due to its lack of support and the goals which he saw in the movement. A China hand since 1915, he said that no one took as serious, including himself, the radical stance displayed by the

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[4]Ruddock to Colby, telegram, November 23, 1920, 893.00/3685, RG59 NA; Huston to Colby, telegram, December 23, 1920, 893.00/3723, RG59 NA; Spiker to Tenney, letter, January 27, 1920, 893.00/3327, RG59 NA.

National Students' Federation in Shanghai. In April of 1920, the Federation issued a communique to the President and Cabinet of China (Peking), berating them for knowingly allowing "the enemy" (Japan) to bluff them into secret treaties which had compromised China's integrity. It demanded a full disclosure of these secret treaties within four days; any delay would brand the officials as traitors. But no one followed the students, Cunningham said. Even his sympathies were not allied with theirs. The martial law imposed by the pro-Japanese government ensured the failure of the boycott.[5]

The American foreign service officers' response to the May Fourth Movement was an initial fear that it might be directed against the United States and other settlements in China. Minister Reinsch had described a decline in American prestige among Chinese officials. Because the United States refused to be drawn into the nationalistic activities, he said, the opinion of the United States government had dropped a few points with these officials. The Chinese people, however, could not find fault with America in their attempts to lay blame for their nation's internal conditions.[6] When the

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[5]Cunningham to Colby, telegram, June 1, 1920, 893.00/3377, RG59 NA.

[6]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, September 10, 1919, 893.00/3234, RG59 NA. Bolshevism was never mentioned by an American foreign service officer in connection with the May Fourth Movement. In his doctoral dissertation, David L. Wilson concluded that it was 1921 before American foreign service officers were even concerned about Bolshevism. Even when it commanded their attention, it was never connected with the Chinese population. David L. Wilson, The Attitudes of American Consular and Foreign Service Officers Toward Bolshevism in China, 1920-1927, unpublished dissertation (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1974), 16-31 passim.

officers realized the students had restricted their wrath to an anti-Japanese creed, they grasped its potential as a tool to offset the Japanese influence in China, to rebuild through indigenous efforts the integrity of China. It was to most officers a pleasant surprise to witness the boycott's perseverance. With one exception, the diplomatic personnel provided the students with favorable reports. Whatever atrocities committed against Japanese or against recalcitrant Chinese merchants to bid them join their cause were largely overlooked. Only Heintzleman wrote about the American open door and this was about its losses in spite of the Japanese boycott. Most consuls emphasized the potential for a strong and independent China, for they assumed that a free China meant more opportunity for American economic penetration. That hope was rampant among the officers, for in at least one part of China's national life it seemed that the country was finally awakening; the prospects for an increased awakening among other more influential elements of China's sovereignty looked favorable. They did not entertain the possibility that a free, nationalist China might also want to exclude American business and trade.

The foreign service officer held more illusory than real hopes for the awakening of China and its transformation into a strong nationalist country. The May Fourth Movement, while it was a broad-based movement of allied Chinese against foreign encroachment, was not a paradigm for national unification nor a plan for government in the unlikely event of a Japanese quitting of the mainland. The foreign service officer at times seemed to connect that which was

unable to be correlated, namely that the united protest against Japan also contained elements of a united coalition for China's rule. The combination of a North-South division, independent warlords and Japanese support of many militarists insured that unification remained in the distant future.

The political unification, indeed, still appeared bleak. Unification to the foreign service officer meant that Japan would no longer be a deciding influence in the policies of the Chinese government. They felt a unified China would mean a stronger nation which could dodge Japan's intrigues with more authority and power. Unification would also help the ailing position of the United States within China. From a cultural standpoint, because they saw republican currents in the political systems espoused by the South, they felt that when unified, China would retain the United States as its friend because the two nations' political systems would be similar. Economically, a strong and friendly China would make America's open door efforts there more fruitful. Yet action had to come soon. As Paul Reinsch put it, China would soon be lost unless more definitive assurances could be made to the leaders who represented civilian rule and national unity.[7]

Charles D. Tenney, a resident of China since 1886 and the Minister ad interim to China after Reinsch left in 1919, described the situation as "critical." From Peking, he saw that there was a

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[7]Reinsch to Polk, telegram, March 27, 1919, 893.00/3062, RG59 NA.

new wave of Northern military activity conspiring to attack the South. The amount of Japanese backing of these forces discouraged the Southern President and Tenney feared that the Southern government would collapse. Charles R. Crane was appointed the new Minister to China in March of 1920. Though this was his first diplomatic post in China, his extensive travels in China left him with perceptions and opinions which seemed in agreement with other foreign service officers in China. He felt there was no issue of popular, constitutional government in this struggle between the North and South. Instead, the goal of military conquest of the opposition was uppermost in the minds of both sides' militarists. Left alone, the fighting would terminate due to a lack of funds. However, he reported, economic assistance arrived daily from Japan. Even Sun Yat-sen, he believed, had close connections with the Japanese, leaving the minister to conclude that Chinese popular opinion was the strongest anti-Japanese force. Crane found it "necessary to state" that the Japanese influence was clearly and strongly behind the militarist activity in China. This left the "outlook for [the] formation in the near future of a strong, united democratic government . . . [as] most discouraging . . . . China has never been more demoralized since the nineties." China was a bankrupt nation, he concluded. He anticipated a new era of Japanese loans to the Chinese in order to fight their civil war. He warned the State Department of the absurdity in waiting for

internal peace and united government as prerequisites to American participation in consortium in China.[8]

Jacob G. Schurman, author and president of Cornell University, received his appointment to Peking as Minister in June of 1921, replacing Charles Crane. Schurman held many of his predecessor's concerns, but unlike Crane, he had a more favorable impression of Chinese people and was optimistic about the open door's future. Though he considered the Chinese people as "morally, intellectually, industrially [and] financially sound and capable of great achievements," he did have some reservations. First, the gentry class which had led China and given the countryside stability for hundreds of years was absent; the warlord rule made for a very bad system of administration. Second, the Peking government with all its militarists and Japanese influences had to be replaced. "Only [the] Chinese can solve China's problems, and they will do it in a Chinese way . . . .

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[8]Tenney to Colby, telegram, June 4, 1920, 893.00/3365, RG59 NA; Crane to Colby, telegram, July 10, 1920, 893.00/3385, RG59 NA. In 1909, Charles Crane was appointed Minister to Peking in a political move by the Taft administration. As a lifelong traveler to the Orient, Crane seemed to be a qualified choice for the job. Yet his violent anti-Japanese statements and his coterie of similarly minded friends which he wished to take to Peking with him soon alienated the administration. Furthermore, Crane advocated an independent policy for the United States in which America eschewed any cooperation with any other power, particularly Japan. Crane began speaking out against cooperative consortiums with Japan which Wall Street bankers and the administration were involved in. The administration fired Crane before he could leave for China. In 1920, Crane was the same type of brash, opinionated man. The climate of opinion in America, however, was more sympathetic to his anti-Japanese convictions. Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door, 60-82, 177.

Japan's machinations have hitherto given [the] republic little chance to develop politically . . . ."[9]

This was a most revealing expression of opinion, unique only to Schurman among the foreign service officers. Here, he called for the removal of Japan's political influences from the Chinese government. In the assertion that only the Chinese could solve its own problems, he did not ask for the removal of all foreign elements present in China. Instead, he saw foreign economic penetration, like that of the United States, as acceptable. The problems China experienced and the ones Schurman felt had to be solved were more political in nature than anything else. He held Japan responsible for the problems pertaining to China's sovereignty.

His opinion was that the Peking government was both financially and politically bankrupt, for it did not "command obedience" or hold the people's respect. Furthermore, the South held little power except in the Canton area, and the influential local warlords supported neither. China's political system needed several more years to stabilize. But as the Chinese were learning the "difficult art" of self-government, they had to pay off and disband large armies, suppress warlord aggrandizement and liquidate immense national debts. He predicted the political evolution of China would be accompanied by local revolutions and frequent backslidings. Yet Schurman placed the highest of hopes in the Chinese people to come through.[10]

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[9]Schurman to Hughes, telegrams, December 3 and 4, 1921, 893.00/4148, RG59 NA.

[10]Ibid.

Meanwhile, the commercial nations represented in China had to display patience and allow China a long period to straighten its internal affairs. As far as America was concerned, Schurman believed that the fundamental policy of open door in China should be maintained and applied to new conditions as they arose. He especially emphasized the integrity of China, for the economic open door had made little progress against the Japanese policies of domination in China; a greater emphasis by the United States upon China's territorial and administrative sovereignty would build upon the already existing good will felt by the Chinese towards Americans. This was America's "valuable asset" in China. Schurman thought this equally advantageous to China and America, for to be regarded by the Chinese people as "their special friend" would place the United States in a special position in at least an economic way. Schurman called for increased American business activity in China, for the United States had "far more capital" to invest than any other power. "These first years after [the] war are America's golden opportunity here," he wrote. He saw great potential for the United States investor competing with other nations, other than Japan, which were beginning to expand after the war. As a special friend to the Chinese, he reasoned, Americans might be able to obtain preferential treatment over other powers.[11]

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[11] Ibid.

The prognosis for Chinese unification was not favorable according to the American foreign service officers. But neither did they see it as terminal. As we have seen, Schurman best expressed the hopeful future that the officers saw for the Chinese people. The sentiment voiced in the May Fourth Movement had not matured into political power as yet. To match the power of Japan or the militarists in China was yet a long way off, and neither militarist nor Japanese wished to relinquish their foundation of control. On the contrary, Japan tried to increase it, especially in Manchuria.

Four American officers observed events in Manchuria. All pointed out that Japan had greatly increased its power and influence in the area, with the open door as America and China had known it almost completely gone. Consul Albert Pontius, transferred from Canton to Mukden in September of 1919, reported that in the eight months he had been there he saw the Japanese increasing their influence in Manchuria. With Shantung recognized by the world as "belonging" to the Japanese, the consul believed they pursued a policy which would give to Manchuria the same status as Shantung. The port city of Darien on the Liaotung Peninsula of South Manchuria was the focus of an intense Japanese drive in 1921 to establish its currency as the dominant medium of exchange. The silver currency there, said Pontius, underwent a supplantation in favor of the gold yen, which forced all Chinese merchants to switch to the new currency. It was a "death blow" to these native merchants. Although they strongly protested the change, Japan's power caused them heavy losses

and many business failures, which the consul said were sucked up by the Japanese merchants.[12]

The protest by the Chinese merchants nevertheless went on. For example, one hundred seventy Chinese shops in Darien went on strike. They returned loans from the Japanese amounting to two million yen to Japan's Bank of Chosen. The Chinese Foreign Office, Pontius pointed out, protested to the Japanese Legation in Peking about the currency exchange, but were denied the right to even lodge a protest. All matters of sovereignty in Manchuria, claimed the Japanese, rested with them. Diplomatic channels were the only recourse the Chinese possessed. After a summer of great hardships suffered by both sides in Darien, strongman Marshall Chang Tso-lin deprecated the Japanese government for a return to the status quo. Chang Tso-lin was politically independent from Japan, and though he received loans from Japanese agents, he never let these affect his sentiments. Pontius attributed the Chang petition and the continuous strike by the Darien merchants as the deciding factors in the November 15th abandonment of the gold yen policy by the Japanese. He interpreted the Japanese as having failed in their radical scheme, but this incident proved to Pontius that Japan's policy to China had

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[12]Pontius to Hughes, telegram, May 17, 1921, 893.00/3907, RG59 NA.

not changed. The island nation, he believed, was still interested in maintaining its position of paramountcy.[13]

Consul Albert Pontius did perceive that the Japanese were assuming less of an overt political role in Manchuria in favor of increased economic and cultural extensions. Instead of attempting to control the warlord government officials in Manchuria with loans and other types of rewards, the Japanese shifted their focus to the control of the Chinese merchant. They were interested more in the profits that might be made than the actual control of political policy. Besides, to control the Chinese commercial activity meant a degree of political control in Manchuria. The Bank of Chosen, Pontius cited as an example, had appropriated ten million yen for its branch banks in the Mukden area. Mitsubishi, a large financial corporation in Japan, had invested in Manchurian sugar. More branch lines of the South Manchurian Railway had been planned. "In other words," he wrote, "South Manchuria is rapidly becoming a Japanese possession." Competition with the United States was sparse, he lamented. America's handicap in the competition for the Chinese market came in part from its high prices. He said the Chinese could only pay for the cheaper, shoddier Japanese goods and services. When in the rare event a Chinese contract was awarded to the United States, Pontius always reported of it in the most favorable of terms. He

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[13]Pontius to Hughes, telegram, June 2, 1921, 893.00/3928, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, October 26, 1921, 893.00/4129, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, December 9, 1921, 893.00/4174, RG59 NA.

expressed concern about American prestige in Manchuria, for he recognized the Japanese had more stature among most of the Chinese merchants because finance capital was needed and the yen came cheaper than American money. He concluded that the yen, however, tended to make more permanent the Japanese control over Manchuria.[14]

From Harbin, consul Harry Edward Stevens observed that Japan had engaged in many practices in order "that China be reduced to a state of weakness." The government of Japan for a long time had striven to produce chaos in Manchuria. Its motive, he said, was to prevent China from having any control in the all-important railway zone. Even were China to offer cash for the Chinese Eastern Railway near Harbin, Japan would turn it down, as it sought to do "everything possible to prevent China [from] buying the China Eastern Railway." With the railroad in Japanese hands, Stevens concluded that Japan had the paramount position in North Manchuria. He shared a belief with many consuls that the country which controlled the rail lines controlled the surrounding countryside both economically and politically. He could understand why Japan did not want to see China master any railway zone.[15]

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[14]Pontius to Hughes, telegram, July 21, 1921, 893.00/3987, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, August 9, 1921, 893.00/4026, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, October 12, 1921, 893.00/4119, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, January 19, 1921, 893.00/4224, RG59 NA.

[15]Stevens to Colby, telegram, July 20, 1920, 893.00/3412, RG59 NA.

As a civil and judicial authority for the State Department in China, vice-consul C. J. Spiker in Antung used a sensitive eye with which to "indict" Japanese in Antung for their extensions of influence. In what he described as a "decisive step in the dispute between the local Chinese and Japanese officials," he related that the Japanese had erected a small police station on the main road leading into Antung. Located just beyond the boundary of the Japanese settlement, he complained that there was little chance of its removal. Within the confines of the Japanese settlement itself, there was a notorious vice district flourishing under the immunity of the foreign settlement. He had no doubt that in addition to the prostitution and gambling there, the Japanese were the distributors of drugs and their accessories to the Chinese population in the area. Finally, Japan was guilty of a strict control of the Yalu River traffic. He interpreted Japan's numerous examinations of junks, steamers and barges with American goods on board as a violation of the open door.[16]

There was an incident near the Korean-Manchurian border in October, 1920, which was proof enough to Minister Crane that Japanese policy had not changed over the years. On the contrary, it seemed that Japan aimed to make Manchuria another "Shantung." The incident involved Chinese bandits, Russians and about one hundred Koreans who raided the city of Hui-ch'un, killing some Japanese and burning

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[16]Spiker to Tenney, letter, January 27, 1920, 893.00/3327, RG59 NA.

several of their buildings in the city. Though Crane did not interpret this raid as a political event aimed against the Japanese, he felt the Japanese interpreted it as such for they issued a communique complaining about the dangerous elements of the territory and the need for the deployment of Japanese troops there to restore order. This was inevitably done, causing Crane to believe Japan would feel justified to take strong measures and keep a permanent garrison there, especially as Hui-ch'un was in the strategic area where the Korean, Siberian and Manchurian borders coincided. After a month of silence, the Japanese minister in Peking communicated the "terms" China had to agree to before the troops would withdraw. First, the Chinese government had to restore and be responsible for the maintenance of order and stability in the Hui-ch'un area. Second, the Chinese were to dispatch a sufficient number of troops in order to effectuate this. Third, the Chinese government had to guarantee that Koreans would not make the area a headquarters for operations again; and fourth, the Chinese government had to promise to give its assent to a recall of Japanese troops if required again. Peking withheld its approval of the latter two demands, but agreed to the first two. Consul Albert Pontius near the area of the incident reported the Japanese felt that China could not control the frontier area and had decided to leave Japanese troops there for an indefinite period. This was exactly what Crane had expected. Until this incident Japanese influence in Manchuria had been confined primarily to the rail zones. He hoped that General Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria would remain "Chinese" in order to effectively counter other Japanese violations of China's

sovereignty. It was probably on account of his military strength that the Japanese troops withdrew from Hui-ch'un in April of 1921.[17]

The American foreign service officers in Manchuria told of an increased Japanese presence there. Through the use of an incident, a currency switch and various minor practices detrimental to the Manchuria Chinese, not to mention the American open door there, it can be seen that the Japanese were indeed concentrating their efforts in Manchuria. Relegated to the role of observers, the foreign service officers in Manchuria could do nothing against Japan's build up of power there. They recognized the two tenets of the open door as almost entirely lost; they accepted Japan's supremacy in Manchuria yet remained opposed to it. The officers worried about the entrenchment of Japan of the Chinese mainland, an infestation which made it impossible for other nations and cultures to gain access there. They could muster little hope for an amelioration of China's national sovereignty status, for with Japan in control of China's main natural

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[17]Crane to Colby, telegram, October 14, 1920, 893.00/3618, RG59 NA; Pontius to Colby, telegram, December 21, 1920, 893.00/3717, RG59 NA; Crane to Colby, telegram, December 23, 1920, 893.00/3729, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, April 8, 1921, 893.00/3885, RG59 NA. Minister Crane believed General Chang to be the preventing force for a military occupation of Manchuria by Japan. After this incident he reported that Siberia seemed to be the new tantalizing interest to the Japanese at the present. His view was that Japanese agents were fostering instability and unrest with a mind to take over in Siberia; Crane to Hughes, telegram, September 5, 1921, 893.00/4095, RG59 NA. Although Japan was to withdraw the troops, it actually changed their uniform and kept them in the area as police forces spread out in several small cities. "This action . . . shows the shrewdness of Japan's diplomatic policy towards the Chinese." Pontius to Hughes, telegram, May 17, 1921, 893.00/3907, RG59 NA.

resource and industrial areas, the political unification and strengthening of China was even more remote. Unification, as seen above, held both cultural and economic potential for America.

Shantung was Japan's, and Manchuria was fast becoming a Japanese possession. Fukien in the South was virtually forgotten by Japan in order to streamline its China policy; Japan limited its plans to the domination of North China. From Shantung, the American officers told of various practices of the Japanese, all familiar to them by now, designed to keep the province and its vital railways tightly within Japan's grip. They saw it as a time for consolidation there.

Before his leave-taking of China, Minister Paul Reinsch reported that "from Shantung comes a constant stream of complaint from Chinese of the arbitrary and overbearing action of Japanese military authorities there." Many Chinese were arrested while in the Shantung Railway zone for having in their possession nationalistic literature (anti-Japanese tracts) or on suspicion of being connected with anti-Japanese demonstrations. The Chinese students disturbed the peace of Shantung quite often, prompting the Japanese nationals there to call for a "mailed fist" policy in China by Japan. Reinsch doubted the Sino-Japanese relations there would improve. The symbolism of Shantung was great for either side.[18]

An unknown consul who signed his name simply as "K" told of more military activity along the Shantung Railway. Since the

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[18]Reinsch to Lansing, telegram, September 19, 1919, 893.00/3235, RG59 NA.

Japanese takeover in that province, he reported, their garrisons stationed themselves at numerous strategic points along the road, reducing the power of Chinese guards to the point where they could not even approach the railway at all. Japan's influence and jurisdiction extended well beyond the thirty li (about ten miles) railway zone. Furthermore, the crucial port of Tsingtao was "completely taken over" by Japanese merchants through quiet infiltration and the forced selling of Chinese properties to the Japanese.[19]

Clarence Edward Gauss was an experienced China observer, having served in China since 1907. From his consular post in Tsinan, Shantung, Gauss perceived both Japanese and Chinese as alert and watchful. The anti-Japanese agitation by the Chinese was "subdued, yet smoldering." They intensely hated and feared the Japanese. Recognizing this, said Gauss, "cautious and restrained" marked the tone of Japan's policy in a "studied effort" to avoid Chinese and foreign criticism. Japan had ended its open aggression but relinquished no control. Gauss came to the opinion that there was little more to be gained in Shantung short of a complete sovereignty over "an enraged people and a province deep sunken in debt." The boycott had collapsed early in 1921, causing the people to become demoralized while waiting for a solution to their problem. They refused, however,

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[19]"K" to Polk, telegram, January 24, 1920, 893.00/3456, RG59 NA. Though the identity of "K" could not be established, it is a certainty that the United States government knew who he was. The emphasis of his several reports was on military and tactical affairs, indicating that he was most likely a military attache.

attempts by Japan to open direct negotiations with Chinese over Shantung. The lesson of Paris for China was to distrust its own officials when dealing with the Japanese. Too many times the negotiations had come under the influence of Japan and had compromised the trust of the people. Even at that time, reported Gauss, Japanese were employed as officials in the provincial governor's office, the police departments and other bureaus.[20]

As the Washington Conference of 1921 approached, consul Walter A. Adams in Tsingtao noted an increased number of brigandage episodes, interpreting them as Japanese-prompted for the purpose of exposing China as a nation unable to govern Shantung without Japanese help. He told of the method of operation used in brigandage operations. The Japanese would load the bandits at night on the Shantung Railroad in Tsingtao and other stations. When they reached the target area, the train would slow down to allow them to jump the train. Then the bandits terrorized and pillaged a town and burned it to the ground.[21]

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[20]Gauss to Colby, telegram, January 24, 1921, 893.00/3769, RG59 NA; Gauss to Hughes, telegram, January 31, 1922, 893.00/5237, RG59 NA. Consul Albert Ruddock in Peking sensed that public opinion in China was so strong against the settlement of the Shantung question by direct negotiations that no cabinet in China could withstand the pressure and survive. All hope was for outside pressure as the matter drifted and Japan was allowed to become more entrenched. Ruddock to Colby, telegram, September 1, 1920, 893.00/3545, RG59 NA.

[21]Adams to Hughes, telegram, March 23, 1922, 893.00/4295, RG59 NA.

Shantung, concluded Minister Schurman, was hopelessly bankrupt and unstable. No American foreign service officer disagreed with this. They agreed without dissent that Japan was primarily responsible for the province's condition. There was a conspiracy afoot by Japan to push Shantung into instability and then show the Powers at the Washington Conference its condition was the fault of the Chinese nationalists and brigands. As the conference approached and as it progressed, the officers in China sent an increasing number of messages from Shantung about conditions there in the hope there might be some action taken by the Powers. They realized the open door principles were lost completely there. Japan would have to be politically and culturally removed from Shantung were these principles to be reinstated. Their main worry seemed to be a fear of Japanese entrenchment on the mainland of Asia. If Japan's record since 1914 was any indication of the future, Japan would slowly expand from its base in Shantung, until all of China was "Japanned." Schurman feared a spilling over of the problem in Shantung into the rest of the country. A generation of Japanese were growing up in Shantung, who, for all intents and purposes were native to the land. Through their special position, the Japanese owned the desirable real property, business, political offices and economic concessions in Shantung. Schurman and his cohorts did not expect these concessions ever to shrink.[22]

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[22]Schurman to Hughes, telegram, September 16, 1921, 893.00/4114, RG59 NA.

For reasons left unexplained, the foreign service officers portrayed the Japanese in the rest of China as less hostile, less aggressive and more conciliatory in their China policy during the summer of 1921. Albert Ruddock, the Secretary at Peking, thought Japan's interventions in China's political and military affairs suffered atrophy while economic policies experienced new directions. He told of a "nightmare" of the one hundred fifty million gold yen loan debt of China and how Japan redoubled its efforts for its repayment. Japanese troops, however, had withdrawn or relocated away from some of China's trouble spots. Consul Samuel Sokobin told of Japan's "moving every stone" in its image-rebuilding efforts in his area. Having observed the North China area since 1914, he too felt Japanese militarism and political influences were on the wane while the Japanese businessman attempted to prove he was a different creature from his militarist compatriots. Even if true, added Sokobin, the anti-Japanese attitude on the part of Shanghai residents had increased. Walter A. Adams in Hunan could report of no foreign power encroachments on the province's government. Yet Japan, with its "preponderating" mining and business interests, controlled more economic power than any other nation. And in Nanking, consul John K. Davis discerned no Japanese influence in the government offices

there. He even felt the warlord government in Nanking strong enough to resist any Japanese attempt to infiltrate its offices.[23]

At the same time, Albert Pontius in Mukden imparted that General Tso-lin was on a new ascendancy phase in his power in Manchuria. Happily, this kept the Japanese influence at bay and he even reported sensing that it had declined. Chang's firmness seemed to be working. "Whatever one can say about Tuchun [warlord] control," he said, "it must be said that since Chang's rise to power, Manchuria has enjoyed peace when compared to the rest of China's revolts, famine and depression." Under this turn of affairs more American business infiltrated into Manchuria. Mining, heavy military trucks for Chang, agricultural implements, pharmaceutical drugs and supplies, automobiles and industrial raw materials all experienced a growing presence in Manchuria at the hands of American businessmen. Yet the Americans were not competitors against the Japanese. Prices still remained high and the Japanese could easily undersell, albeit with shoddier goods. The important point to Pontius was the improvement of the economic open door for the United States. There was a

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[23]Ruddock to Hughes, telegram, September 9, 1921, 893.00/4113, RG59 NA; Ruddock to Hughes, telegram, April 2, 1921, 893.00/3862, RG59 NA; Sokobin to Cunningham, letter, May 26, 1921, 893.00/3963, RG59 NA; Adams to Hughes, telegram, September 5, 1921, 893.00/4087, RG59 NA; Davis to Hughes, telegram, September 9, 1921, 893.00/4098, RG59 NA.

symbolic, if not substantial, alternative for the Manchurian businessman to choose from.[24]

The overriding concern of America and its foreign service officers in China, however, was the settlement of the Shantung question. They emphasized the bad state of affairs in this focus of world attention, indicating their sentiment about the open door principles had made a decided shift to the principle of China's territorial sovereignty. Appointed as a consul to China in 1907, Clarence Gauss in Tsinan reported Japanese control there was as next to complete as possible. Both in China and in its province of Shantung, the Chinese exhibited an attitude of expectancy that full Chinese sovereignty might be restored. Several times since the Paris Peace Conference Japan approached Chinese officials suggesting bilateral negotiation of the question. But public opinion balked at this with "panics" and "outbursts of spontaneous resentment" in the cities where student agitation was strong. The Chinese could not trust their own leaders.[25]

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[24]Pontius to Hughes, telegram, August 24, 1921, 893.00/4057, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, June 24, 1921, 893.00/3960, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, July 12, 1921, 893.00/3987, RG59 NA; Pontius to Hughes, telegram, December 9, 1921, 893.00/4174, RG59 NA.

[25]Gauss to Hughes, telegram, September 1, 1921, 893.00/4070, RG59 NA; Tenney to Lansing, telegram, January 22, 1921, FRUS 1920, three volumes (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935), I, 814; Davis to Hughes, telegram, January 27, 1922, 893.00/4250, RG59 NA.

Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes was concerned enough to listen to the Chinese pleas for mediation. Against his original plan, he brought the Shantung question to the floor at the Washington Conference for discussion. With thirty-six meetings in two months of oft-interrupted talks, the United States (led by former China hand J. V. A. MacMurray), Great Britain, China and Japan discussed the various elements of the Japanese presence in Shantung. The central issue boiled down to the Shantung Railroad. Japan was willing to relinquish all rights in Shantung save for a slowly decreasing control over this railway; they wanted the Chinese to pay for the road with a fifteen-year Japanese loan. Included in the terms was the provision for Japanese advisors and technicians to share in its operation until the loan was fully repaid. Chinese negotiators refused this. They wanted to pay cash immediately or use the Chinese currency for payment of the loan, assuming immediate control over the railroad. However, Japan was unwilling to risk the value of the Chinese money. Urging compromise, Hughes convinced each side to moderate. On February 4, 1922, they signed a treaty which restored the "full sovereignty" of Shantung to China, but allowed the Japanese control of the railway for at least five more years, but for no more than fifteen.[26]

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[26]Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), 157-166 passim. Japan finally returned the railway in October, 1930.

The American foreign service officers thought that Japan's economic supremacy in Shantung and China was not disturbed by the Washington agreements. Though Japan had pledged in the Nine Power Treaty to "respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," neither this promise nor the retrocession of Shantung greatly disturbed Japan's economic dominance (and concomitant political influence) in China. It was all well and good for Japan to agree to remove her troops, but the bottom line in Shantung, as J. V. A. MacMurray expressed, was who controlled the railway. Japan meant to control the province with its monopoly on the road. He reminded the Department that what Japan did with the railroad was different from what China would do with it. Japan's interest in the area could be appreciated, wrote consul Walter Adams in Tsingtao, when one recognized the fight that Japanese delegates to the conference made to retain their nationals' control of the Shantung Railroad, insisting China pay for it with a long-term Japanese loan. During the interim, control would be exercised by Japan. Adams predicted that the Japanese would retain possession for longer than the five years agreed to at the conference.[27]

The American foreign service officers in China perceived another disappointment for China and the American open door in the

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[27]MacMurray to Hughes, memorandum, September 15, 1921, 793.94/1284, RG59 NA; Adams to Hughes, telegram, February 16, 1922, 893.00/4252, RG59 NA.

fact that Manchuria and the Twenty-one Demands remained undiscussed. Japan left Shantung and went to Manchuria, said Schurman. In exchange for its "loss" of the former German territory, Japan received Manchuria as a "special prize." The American diplomatic personnel in China could not see that the Washington Conference had changed anything. For the rest of the year 1922, their reports about Japanese in China were similar to previous years. For example, Minister Schurman told of continued civil strife caused by Japan to warrant a slow or stalled evacuation of its troops from China. The proposal to withdraw its troops was "good propaganda" to placate the Chinese people and the negotiators in Washington, but G. C. Hanson noted an increase in Japanese troops in Harbin. Here they began to patrol the streets. Consul Robert Warren in Manchuria reported of increased bandit activity near the Korean border which prompted Japan to dispatch extra "police" on what he felt was a pretense to increase its militaristic policy there on the excuse of protecting its nationals. Clarence Gauss felt Japan had an obvious interest after the Washington Conference to keep China split. While Japan had agreed in Washington to withdraw troops as conditions allowed, Gauss believed it willfully denied stability to many regions. The Japanese press constantly reported China's inability to take the reins of power in other places. He also believed it odd that immediately after the Washington Conference the unrest, the fighting and hostile military conditions began anew and continued for months. The Chinese people got what they had wanted in Washington and were satisfied; the fresh violence was attributed to Japan by Gauss and

his fellow consuls. It is significant that no American foreign service officer in China predicted a decline in the real power of Japan in China.[28]

The American diplomatic personnel in China in 1919 believed China's last recourse to regaining its dignity as a nation was lost in Paris. The Washington Conference similarly frustrated and disillusioned; the initiative for at least five more years remained safely in Japan's control. But that is not to say that the status quo of 1922 was identical with that of 1919. Japanese in China set a policy of priority there which held on tightly to those areas thought crucial for Japan's economic and strategic interests. Thus, Fukien became less important, supplantation of the currency in Darien failed without a Japanese battleship in its harbor and the summer of 1921 had Japan trying to rebuild its image for the approaching Washington Conference. Any gains were made in Manchuria. Japan de-emphasized politically aggressive policies in order to present a better image.

Heartened by the May Fourth Movement, the foreign service officers expressed their optimism about its potential for a strong China. The officers, however, read into it unreal scenarios of China's potential. As long as the boycott and the Movement lasted,

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[28]Schurman to Hughes, telegram, May 6, 1922, 793.94/1339, RG59 NA; Schurman to Hughes, telegram, June 28, 1922, 893.00/4515, RG59 NA; Hanson to Hughes, telegram, May 18, 1922, 893.00/4476, RG59 NA; Warren to Hughes, telegram, July 10, 1922, 893.00/4533, RG59 NA; Gauss to Schurman, letter, March 23, 1922, 893.00/4323, RG59 NA.

there was all the more hope for the twin tenets of the open door, notwithstanding the unlikelihood of the rectification of the North-South conflict. The economic open door was forgotten by the consuls, for in the Japanese-controlled areas it had been non-existent for several years. Thus, the emphasis on China's territorial integrity superseded in 1919 and 1920 most thoughts by the officers of the elusive China market. When a "thaw" came in the summer of 1921, the suddenness and the comparative successes of the open door, when compared with earlier years, excited the American consuls in North China. But the point to be made is that Japan was still the initiator of the more effective China policy. The Americans responded only when Japan allowed it. In their more sober moments, the foreign service officers protested first and foremost China's loss of sovereignty in the North. Finally, Japan remained the culprit in East Asia for the officers. The State Department in Washington, especially Hughes, knew keenly of the officers' desire to clip the wings of Japan, to lower its stature in North China. The Secretary of State tried to take on Japan himself in Washington, but the best he could do was to "freeze" the Pacific through stop-gap compromises. Both America and Japan continued to interpret the open door in their respective, traditional manner. As for the American foreign service officer, all the esoteric, double-edged talk in Washington's meeting rooms did not change the "battlefield realities" of China.

CONCLUSIONS

During the Washington Conference, an East Asian expert at the State Department commented, in an understatement, that "some nations have failed either to understand the letter and the spirit of the open door policy or have deliberately chosen to disregard both."[1] American foreign service officers in China would have agreed with this statement. Since 1914, they had seen Japan as the one nation which had most violated the letter and spirit of the open door principles. In 1914, it was apparent that their attitudes toward Japan contained mistrust, which escalated to hostility as Japanese activity in China increased. Not a single year passed in which they suffered no new disappointment or frustration from Japan. From the Twenty-one Demands episode, which crystallized officer sentiment and fears concerning Japan, to the Washington Conference, which they felt was a license for Japan to exploit Manchuria, these Americans closest to the realities of Japanese policy were unanimously agreed on one point: Japan was a power in China that the United States had to oppose. Its influence was detrimental to both principles of the open door policy and to the cultural open door. Throughout the period of this study the

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[1]Memorandum by Stanley Hornbeck, "The Open Door Policy in China," Washington Conference Papers; cited in Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 147.

foreign service officers saw and reported Japan's many violations of the various open door connotations.

Only one consul, P. Stewart Heintzleman, wrote specifically of the problem of Japan in a context which included other areas besides China. He was fearful of possible Japanese expansion into the Pacific. The rest of the officers used the narrower national or provincial perspectives to view the events happening around them. Paul Reinsch, while he talked about the "grave consequences" of Japan in China, never described exactly what these consequences would be or where they would occur. There was an inconsistent degree of objectivity in the officers' reports. Many allowed moral indignation, extremes in language and a general tone of subjectivity to become a standard part of their language to the State Department. When the United States government became distracted in 1917 with the World War, the officers increased their moral objections to Japan in an effort to be heard. While their pleas for American intervention in China almost ceased after the Paris Peace Conference, they still reacted to Japan in the same manner. The initiative of the United States in China, they felt, was lost at the peace table in Paris.

There is an interesting correlation between the officers' wish for the United States to have this initiative in China and their motivations for the type of open door they advocated. Between 1914 and 1917, they felt the United States had the greatest opportunity to become an independent power in China, to have the dominant position among the nations represented there. In these years they pushed

both tenets of the open door policy--America's commercial equality of opportunity and the territorial integrity of China--, for both America's interests in China and the sovereignty of China had not been compromised by Japan's power as in the later years of this study. The cultural open door--the political-social-economic reform--was present in the officers' minds, yet they did not bother to stress it as long as they believed the initiative could be taken by the United States, and as long as American business in China seemed satisfied. Beginning in 1917, however, as the United States government assumed less interest in Chinese affairs, Japan challenged American economic gains and began to drive its competitors out of North China. Without United States backing, the officers began a shift in focus. As American business in North China dwindled, the foreign service officers dropped their emphasis on American dollars. They came to emphasize China's territorial sovereignty as a tactic to persuade the State Department to shore up American business in China and to pursue an "American" solution to China's problems. For some officers this tactic became an end in itself. Most, however, used it to supplement their arguments for the commercial open door. In Japanese-controlled North China, the Chinese would have to regain their administrative control before the commercial and cultural open doors for the United States could open again. The officers realized that only the attainment of these three interrelated open door goals could produce a more favorable climate for American penetrations in China. As the supremacy of Japan continued until 1922 and beyond, the foreign service officers maintained and augmented these shifts

of motivation and focus. Since the United States and China had Japan as a common foe (but for different reasons), they assumed that the interests of China coincided with American interests and hopes there. The background of most officers did not allow them to accept in good faith the growing power of Japan and the "system" it had imposed upon China. They believed in an inherent superiority of the United States over that Oriental upstart nation.

The foreign service officers did not stop and question whether the Chinese wanted the United States to cooperate or compete with the Japanese in China. If the United States had the initiative, the independent, dominant China policy as these officers advocated, Japan would have had trouble keeping an economic foothold in China. The Chinese merchant would have suffered under such an arrangement; the officers admitted American goods and loans were handicapped by their high prices. Through their emphasis on American supremacy, they belied an insensitivity to the economic life of the Chinese. What was a tactic against Japan to the foreign service officers was the threat of an American monopoly to the Chinese merchants. Though there were several incidents the officers cited to the contrary, such as the gold yen scheme by the Japanese in Darien, the Japanese monopoly of foreign business in China benefited the Chinese more than an American monopoly would have. That which most foreign service officers concerned themselves with was the underhanded and unfair methods by which Japan had gained its supremacy, not the welfare of the Chinese.

An interesting and important belief of many officers was their perception of Japan as both China's and the United States' pre-eminent problem in Asia. In 1914, Japan's ascendancy was feared as much as America's loss of position in China. As the years progressed and the latter fear became reality, Japan came to represent the worst form of problem for China. The foreign service officers gradually expressed more and more the opinions that lead one to conclude that they believed the Japanese presence was a part and a cause of every problem China faced. "Japan out of China," was their cry. Then, and only then, they believed, China's and America's problems in China would miraculously cease. As much as these Americans detested Japan, they placed an unreal faith in China's ability to reform along a Western paradigm. If Japan could be forced out, they reasoned, China could quickly resume the aborted goals of the 1911 Revolution, and Western traditions would find a more fertile ground for growth. The truth of the matter was, however, that China's problems were larger, more historical and more extensive than any Japan had produced.

The foreign service officers' fallacy on this points out their lack of competent expertise and knowledge about China. Many could not even read or speak the Chinese language. They misjudged the nationalism of the May Fourth Movement, reading into it a strong anti-Japanese conviction but not anti-foreignism in general. They did not grasp that it also had a strong, but broad, anti-foreignism element which surfaced more visibly in later years. Unable to understand this new nationalism, they may have hearkened back to times

when simple solutions like gunboat diplomacy and unequal treaties provided an outwardly obedient China. The American foreign service officers were proof in this respect that they had joined the countless other foreigners both before and after the time period of this study who did not understand China, yet acted as if they did. Even when Jacob Schurman predicted that only the Chinese could solve their problems, he did not base this upon an indepth knowledge of the Chinese, but rather upon a reaction against the Japanese political influence in Chinese affairs.

Considering the limits of their understanding about China and Japan, it is easy to understand why the foreign service officers were a constantly frustrated group. It is doubtful that the State Department had any better understanding of East Asian problems. It was fearful of taking unpopular steps which could lead to more Japanese entrenchment in China, so it did virtually nothing until 1922. The lot of the American foreign service officer was one of constant confusion based on the actions of an aggressive Japan, the inaction of his native country and the sometimes delusive perceptions about the country he was in.

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APPENDIX


HARBIN
(MAYNARD, JENKINS, STEVENS, WARREN)
MANCHURIA
(HEINTZLEMAN, 1914-17, BAKER, PONTIUS)
MUKDEN
(MACMURRAY, REINSCH, TENNEY, RUDDOCK, CRANE, SCHURMAN, ARNOLD)
(JAMESON, SPIKER, DAVIS)
ANTUNG
PEKING
(HEINTZLEMAN, 1918-19, FISHER)
TIENTSIN
KOREA
TSINAN
(GAUSS)
(ADAMS)
TSINGTAO
Shantung
(HUSTON)
K'aifeng
YELLOW SEA
CHINA
JAPAN
(CUNNINGHAM, SAMMONS, SOKOBIN)
SHANGHAI
EAST CHINA SEA
HSIANGT'AN
(DENBY)
(HANSON)
FOOCHOW
FUKIEN
TAIWAN
(MEINHARDT)
CANTON

VITA

Marc Stephen Mullinax was born in Louisburg, North Carolina, on June 2, 1956. After attending public schools in Cary, Laurinburg and Raleigh, North Carolina, he skipped his senior year of high school in order to attend Mars Hill College in 1973. There he concentrated in Asian and American History, graduating in May of 1977 with a Bachelor of Arts degree. Having no set career plans, he applied to the University of Tennessee for admission to its History Department and began work for a Master's degree in September of 1977. Requirements for this degree were completed in early 1979, and the degree awarded in March of 1979.

The author is a member of the Alpha Chi National Honor Society and the Phi Alpha Theta History Society, both of Mars Hill College. He enjoys many non-historical pursuits, the most notable of which is bicycle racing; in 1974 he was the state champion of North Carolina. Another interest is travel. In the fall of 1976 the author went on a camping trip around the world, concentrating his time in Southern and Eastern Asia.

After obtaining teaching certification in the spring of 1979, the author will go back to Asia in order to teach for a few years before pursuing any further degrees.