



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
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


Leonard P. Handler, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:







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Vice Provost
and Dean of The Graduate School

PASSIVITY AND DESTRUCTIVENESS:
THE RE-INTEGRATION OF AGGRESSION
INTO OBJECT RELATIONS
THEORY

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

James P. Koretz

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ABSTRACT

It was the purpose of this study to examine the theories of the later writers of the British Object Relations School of Psychoanalysis (i.e., Fairbairn, Winnicott, Guntrip) and explore whether their eschewing of Melanie Klein's concepts of aggression/destructiveness as a primary pathological factor and central dynamic force from the earliest period of development was justified, both on a theoretical and heuristic basis.

Based on an exposition of four key arguments for the virtual exclusion of the importance of destructiveness as put forward by these theorists, and a rebuttal of those arguments, it was concluded that aggression/destructiveness as proposed in Klein's model is indeed a crucial dynamic factor. An integrative system of early dynamics was proposed, one which ascribes a major role to destructiveness as a primary pathological and dynamic factor which influences all subsequent development, dynamics, and endopsychic structure while retaining many of the major features and structures of Guntrip's and Fairbairn's system.

A new comprehensive concept of "passivity" was proposed to describe and account for the earliest defensive strategy to contain destructiveness. Such "passivity" was described in terms of the quelling of any initiative action based on aggressive or libidinal urges towards external and internal objects in the service of reducing expression of

destructiveness, and hence reducing phenomenological persecution and annihilatory anxiety. This concept of passivity as a defensive measure was contrasted with Guntrip's use of the term as a primary motivational and pathological force, and it was concluded that this "new" concept of passivity represents a concept of greater theoretical consistency and heuristic value than Guntrip's formulation. Accordingly, Guntrip's concept of a Regressed Libidinal Ego (and schizoid withdrawal) was critiqued and found to be theoretically unviable, and modifications to increase its viability were proposed. Finally, three directions for further application of the concept of passivity as developed in this work were suggested: as a basis for comprehensively defining and differentiating the concepts of "activity" and "passivity"; the development of passivity as a major pathological force itself which inhibits the development of reality testing; and as a diagnostic and conceptual tool in personality assessment and psychotherapy.

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INTRODUCTION

The heart of any psychoanalytic theory lies in the constructs it uses to conceptualize and explain psychopathology. Such constructs both help to define and are dependent upon other basic tenets of each theory: the nature and genesis of motivation, endopsychic structure, dynamics and defenses, and the developmental progression, both adaptive and maladaptive, in each of these areas.

In all psychodynamic theories, and especially psychoanalytic/Object Relations theory, the theory itself and its constructs may best be thought of as an analogy to experience, rather than an actual, or 'factual' representation of that experience. The reasons for this are severalfold: First, the basic phenomenon and constructs under consideration are metaphysical in nature, and do not easily lend themselves to either quantification in number nor description in words (e.g., No one can see or measure an 'internal object'). The construct itself refers to an internal, non-physical process, the manifestations of which are only indirectly observable. Furthermore, many of the phenomena considered by theory are pre- and/or non-verbal experiences (e.g., cognitive and affective experiences and structure in infants). When the 'medium' of words is used to explain the phenomenology of such pre- or non-verbal processes, it cannot but fail to capture and represent them faithfully (Schachtel, 1959). The fact that psychodynamic

theories presenting widely divergent paradigms and constructs all 'work' to one degree or another when put into practice through therapy attests to the idea that there is no one hard set of 'scientific truths' in clinical psychology, but only approximations, or analogies, to such 'truths.'

However, the fact that theory is best seen as an analogy to experience, rather than as a factual representation, does not diminish the usefulness of theory, nor preclude comparisons of utility between theories. Indeed, the yardstick by which the paradigm presented by each theory may be compared is how comprehensive an explanation it provides, both in terms of the breadth of phenomena it can account for, as well as the depth and detail it can encompass in each phenomenon studied.

By these criteria, British Object Relations theory as proposed and developed by W.R.D. Fairbairn, D.W. Winnicott, and Harry Guntrip represents an advance, at least in some respects, over the theories on which its foundations lie (e.g., the formulations of Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein). This is evident in its practical heuristic applications: for example, the success it has had in helping to treat pre-Oedipal conditions, previously thought by Freud to be unamenable to psychoanalytic treatment.

Object Relations theory owes much to the preceding Freudian theory. This is even more true for the theory of

Melanie Klein. The areas of greatest achievement in Object Relations theory, the exploration of the nature and functioning of ego and the internal object world, and the dynamics of their interaction, are directly traceable as outgrowths and modifications of Klein's formulations. As one of the foremost reviewers of the history of Object Relations and Psychoanalytic theory bluntly puts it, "Klein's work made possible the contributions of Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Guntrip" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 221).

Yet the debt Object Relations theory owes to Klein is only partially acknowledged, and areas of her work which could be used to enrich the value of Object Relations theory are ignored, distorted, or rejected outright. Such omissions seem to be justified by the Object Relations theorists, and particularly by Guntrip, by what they see as an obligation to separate out the 'chaff from the wheat' in the cause of establishing a 'true psychodynamic science.' In his introduction to Personality and Human Interaction, Guntrip might as well be referring to the selective endorsement and rejection of Klein's contributions when he states, "I would not wish it to be thought that I . . . throw the baby out with the bathwater" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 19). One of the major foundations of her theory, the basic

premise that destructiveness (or aggression)¹ is a central factor in dynamics and development, is apparently considered by Object Relations theories to be part of the disposable "bathwater," a relic of the instinctual foundations of behavior in earlier psychoanalytic theory which Object Relations theorists fought so vigorously to eschew.

It is a central thesis of this present work that if Object Relations theory had sought to synthesize the Kleinian emphasis on destructiveness as a central pathological factor in the personality, rather than to minimize the import of destructiveness, that it might have emerged as an even more comprehensively useful 'analogy to experience' than it has already proven itself to be. As such, a major aim of this work is to propose modifications of Object Relations theory such that the dynamics of destructiveness as a 'core' pathological force is accounted for in an adequate and viable manner.

It is believed that a carefully defined and comprehensively delineated concept of 'passivity' can be used as a central construct which may provide the basis for this revision of Object Relations theory. A construct such as 'passivity' appears to be a simple concept on the

¹The present writer generally prefers the use of the term 'destructiveness' as it carries with it a more comprehensive connotation of aggression in all its manifestations. However, as most earlier writers use the terms interchangeably, that precedent will apply in this work also.

surface. However, as it will be presented here, it is actually a 'nested' series of inter-related ideas, involving consideration of the nature of and interface between destructiveness, passivity, and activity in psychodynamics, with wide ranging implications for such areas as the genesis and development of endopsychic structure, the nature of defense, the development or inhibition of ego mastery skills and reality testing, play, and the nature of psychopathology.

The ideas involved in building this concept of passivity may be summed up as a series of central hypotheses, the validity of which this dissertation aims to argue for convincingly:

1. Destructiveness is a central pathological factor in dynamics and psychic development from the earliest periods. Concomitantly, its containment is a central problem for healthy development, and the vicissitudes of how and the success with which this problem is handled influences all subsequent dynamics.

2. A comprehensive concept of 'passivity' can be effectively used to describe the earliest defensive strategy employed to contain destructiveness, and in doing so can help to clarify and delineate the dangers and dilemmas destructiveness presents to healthy development.

3. This very strategy, which aims at psychic survival in the earliest periods of development, may itself become a

major obstacle to healthy development if too successfully employed, i.e., if the bad-object world, and the phenomenological persecution and reactive hate which result from it, are severe enough to demand that such a defensive strategy be applied too vigorously. In effect, passivity as a defense employed to contain the pathological force of destructiveness may itself become a malignant force in the personality if relied on too heavily.

The ideas and hypotheses of this work are rooted in the concepts developed both by Kleinian and Object Relations theory. Since Object Relations theory grew from Kleinian theory, they share many assumptions and concepts. However, as noted, in many important areas, most notably in the importance of destructiveness in dynamics and development, they are quite at odds. Therefore, a necessary aim of this work is to integrate such areas of contention between the two theories into a workable whole system of psychodynamics. (Actually, in the case of destructiveness, the task can be thought of as re-integrating the Kleinian emphasis on the importance of destructiveness back into later Object Relations theory in a way that enhances its heuristic and explanatory power.)

However, the aims of this dissertation go beyond reconciliation of differences through re-integration of Kleinian thought into Object Relations theory. The concept of passivity constructed and delineated here will draw from

both Kleinian and Object Relations theory as its foundation. But it will also serve as a synthesis and extension of the two streams of thought such that, hopefully, the concept of passivity can be applied in a way that makes both theories stronger and of greater heuristic value.

Both Object Relations and Kleinian theory can be considered incomplete, but incomplete in a 'complementary' way: Object Relations theory lacks a plausible, comprehensive way to explain the role of destructiveness as a primary force in psychodynamics and development, and includes a distorted and incomplete concept of passivity. Kleinian theory lacks a comprehensive explanation of passivity, as well as missing a coordinating concept for the mechanisms of defense used in the containment of destructiveness. The concept of passivity developed here will aim at filling these gaps. In doing so not only will the explanatory power of the expanded and synthesized theories be enhanced, but many of the existing concepts within them will be better clarified and explained when the concept of passivity is applied to them, e.g., Klein's ideas on annihilatory fear as constituting a fundamental anxiety, Guntrip's idea of the role of schizoid withdrawal and his concept of a Regressed Ego, Fairbairn's concept of object-seeking as a primary motivational force and his idea of a natural alliance between Central and Anti-Libidinal Egos

against the Libidinal ego, and Winnicott's concept of a compliant "false self," to name a few.

It might be noted beforehand that the ideas of Guntrip (since he was the synthesizer and main spokesperson for the Object Relations viewpoint) often become the center of scrutiny and critique when Object Relations theory is examined in this work, especially in regards to destructiveness. From such a critique one might easily gain the impression that the present writer does not hold Guntrip's work in great esteem. This would in fact be a mistaken impression, based on the necessity to focus in this work rather heavily on those areas where this writer believes modification of Guntrip's position would make his theory stronger, and the relative exclusion of those areas where there is no disagreement with Guntrip's viewpoint. The areas of agreement are far greater, although unheralded, in what is to follow. In fact, Guntrip must be paid a great debt in this work, for it is often his ideas and concepts which form the foundation from which modifications are made or suggested. It is hoped that the reader will remember the basis of this debt as he or she proceeds through this work.

In order to accomplish the aims stated here, and convincingly argue for the theoretical validity and heuristic utility of the hypotheses presented, one must proceed carefully, examining and resolving basic issues which precede the delineation of a concept of passivity and

its dynamics in psychopathology. Chapter I begins this process with a review of Freudian, Kleinian, and Object Relations theories with a focus on the etiology of destructiveness and the place it occupies in each theory. Freudian and Object Relations theories are then briefly compared along their major tenets, with an exposition of how Kleinian theory could have served as a transitional bridge between the two theories. (Although, as will be noted, such a bridge was in some respects under-utilized or rejected.) These comparisons serve as a foundation to close the chapter with an examination of why Object Relations theorists chose to mount an attack on the validity of the concept of the death instinct, and how this campaign came to be focused on Klein and the minimization of her ideas regarding destructiveness as a central dynamic factor.

Chapter II deals with the specific objections Object Relations theorists raise to the inclusion of destructiveness as a major force in dynamics, and presents counter-arguments to these obstacles. The aim of the chapter is also to present an integrated theory of early psychodynamics, one which includes Kleinian destructiveness while retaining many of the features and structures of Object Relations theory. In doing so, suggestions are made for modifying Guntrip's idea of schizoid withdrawal in a manner which makes the most sense theoretically. It is in

this chapter that the argument that destructiveness is central to dynamics is made.

Chapter III continues the delineation of the problem of destructiveness in early development and its dynamics, and proposes a concept of 'passivity' as an early defensive strategy used to contain such destructiveness in a bad-object world. The delineation of the genesis and implementation of this defensive strategy are explored, and further consequences of the imposition of passivity for personality dynamics are examined and clinically illustrated. In examining these consequences, further modifications to Object Relations theory are suggested and explored (e.g., a proposed revision of Guntrip's concept of the Regressed Ego).

Chapter IV provides a summary review of the main ideas and conclusions of this work. Additionally, it outlines three main areas where further extension and application of the concept of passivity might be fruitfully explored.

CHAPTER I

DESTRUCTIVENESS: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I intend first to review the theories of Freud, Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, and Guntrip. The main focus of this review is to present each of their views on the etiology of destructiveness, and to some extent the role it has in dynamics, although this latter subject will be covered in more depth when the specific objections the Object Relations theorists have to the inclusion of destructiveness in dynamics and development are considered in Chapter II. Although the focus here is on the etiology and role of destructiveness in each theory, some major features of each theory (e.g., Fairbairn's tri-partite ego system) will also be reviewed, where review of such features can serve as a foundation for further examination of the hypotheses contained in this work.

This review of theories also serves as a base, later in the chapter, for a comparison of the major tenets of Freudian and Object Relations theory, with an exposition of how Kleinian theory could have served as a bridge between the two viewpoints on their critical issues. Finally, the reasons for Object Relations theory's (and particularly Guntrip's) 'vendetta' against the inclusion of destructiveness in a major way will be examined.

II. COMPARISON OF THEORIES: THE ETIOLOGY OF DESTRUCTIVENESS

The major differential between the Freudian conception of the etiology of destructiveness and that of the Object Relations view, is ultimately one of 'nature vs. nurture'; that is, whether aggression, and resultant destructiveness, is an innate proclivity of humankind or whether it is reactive to, and thus ultimately derived from, environmental factors. In looking at the views of Freud, Klein, and the later Object Relations theorists, what emerges can be characterized as a continuum of views ranging from the most innately based (Freud) to the most environmentally dependent view (Guntrip).

Freud

In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud bluntly states his view of human nature regarding aggressiveness:

. . . men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness (Freud, 1961, p. 68).

In examining how Freud arrived at such a perspective, it is worthwhile to look at the development of his concept of a death instinct, since Freud ultimately derives the genesis of destructiveness from it, beginning with Beyond the Pleasure Principle and continuing through his later works, most notably Civilization and Its Discontents. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud presents what came to be

called his "third theory" of the instincts (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 293), postulating a dualism of instincts consisting of libidinal, or self-preservative ego instincts, and the death instinct, characterized as "Eros" and "Thanatos," respectively.

Libidinal, or self-preservative ego instincts, are based on the pleasure principle, the "drive" of the organism to obtain satisfaction. Through contact with reality, the pleasure principle becomes transformed by the ego¹ into the reality principle, which is a roundabout way of achieving the aim of this instinct.

However, pleasure is defined at first by Freud as the reduction of tension in the organism.² Although he later modified this view to that of defining pleasure in terms of a "rhythmic" build-up and release of tension or excitation, he fails to delineate the parameters of this rhythmicity.

Underlying Freud's concept of an instinct is the idea

¹The ego itself is a product of the clash between instinctive need and the frustrations of reality, expressly created out of the inherent, instinctual "id" to mediate between instinctual need and reality.

²This "reduction of tension," and the concept of instincts themselves, are taken from a biological model, in which the 'irritation' or 'excitation' of tissues is taken as the source of 'tension,' and its surcease being regarded as 'pleasurable.' Freud's application of a biological model, or analogy, as a way to talk about psychological events was to bring him unceasing criticism from later Object Relations theorists, particularly Guntrip, as an inadequate metaphor or medium to explicate mental phenomena.

that instincts are essentially "conservative" in nature, in that they follow the "constancy principle," which says essentially that the organism strives to regulate any excitation by 1. Keeping it constant and 2. Keeping it low, i.e., reducing tension to as low a level as possible (in Guntrip, 1961, p. 158).

Using this as a basis, Freud sets the stage for the introduction of the death instinct. However, it is critical to note that the concept of a death instinct was not originally introduced to account for, or tied to, the idea of destructiveness. This is a later addition to this theory. Rather, it was introduced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle apparently to resolve the conflicts in his theory (e.g., the problems posed by insisting that all instincts are libidinal), or more directly, to account for bothersome facts (to his theory) centering around the compulsion to repeat (Riceour, 1970, p. 281). As his theory stood before the introduction of the death instinct, given the constancy principle as a base, the occurrence of a repetition compulsion, the tendency to symbolically repeat unpleasant experiences (with the increase in tension/excitment this brings) should not occur.

Freud explains the repetition compulsion as a representation of a general, primitive instinctual tendency which is "beyond" the pleasure principle, and which defines the nature of an instinct itself:

. . . an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore to an earlier state things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under pressure of external disturbing forces . . . (in Ricoeur, 1970, p. 287).

Having raised the compulsion to repeat to that of an independent (from the pleasure principle) instinctual character, Freud then pushes the concept to the extreme by stating, "the aim of all life is death . . ." (in Ricoeur, 1970, p. 290). That is, just as there is a life instinct, contained in the libidinal impulses, there is a death instinct, which follows the constancy principle, and whose aim is to return the organism to a state completely quiescent and devoid of tension. In effect, there is an instinct to repeat the tension-less state prior to existence, i.e., to return to this passive state by seeking death. Thus a dualism is set up between the libidinal instincts, or Eros, which seek to fight (really, to delay) death, and the death instinct. However, since both instincts share a basis in the constancy principle, (seeking to reduce tension), they "appear as a dramatic overlapping of roles" (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 292).

It is of import to note that in postulating a death instinct, while Freud provides some biological justification of the concept based on observations of lower animals, the only psychical manifestation upon which he bases this postulate, at this point in his career, is the repetition compulsion. As Ricoeur states in referring to the

speculative nature of the death instinct as presented in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, "We must always bear in mind that there is an excess of hypothesis compared with fragmentary and partial verification" (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 282).

However, in later works, notably The Ego and the Id and Civilization and Its Discontents, having reified the phenomenon of the repetition compulsion to an instinctual principle, Freud uses this rather thin foundation to further extend the concept of the death instinct, linking it with the etiology of destructiveness and aggression. As Ricoeur notes, "The death instinct is introduced by the compulsion to repeat; but it is confirmed and verified by aggressiveness . . ." (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 295).

The compulsion to seek a "tensionless" earlier state prior to existence becomes defined as a major aim of the death instinct: to destroy the organism itself through death. The problem of the death instinct, then, becomes its containment, the deflection of this primary aim, in order to preserve the organism. This coincides with the aim of Eros, and indeed the death and libidinal instincts undergo fusion, one of the effects of which is to deflect a portion of the destructive aim of the death instinct away from the organism and "outward onto paths of the muscular apparatus" (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 297), or towards outer objects.

This initial 'taming' of the death instinct, through

fusion with libidinal instincts (although Freud does not delineate exactly how it is accomplished) (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 298), results in sadism, which marks the emergence of the death instinct at the level of an object relation (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 295). The process as proposed by Freud also accounts for the etiology of aggression, as the death instinct, with its aim of destruction, is deflected onto outer objects in the cause of self-preservation. The source and aim of the instinct remains intact, and indeed are immutable according to Freud. Only its object is altered.

Thus, with this formulation of the etiology of destructiveness, Freud is able to arrive at and account for the manifest phenomenon of man, at core, as not being a "gentle creature." Given the foundation of a destructive drive, the only two pathways available for its expression are either towards the self or towards others. With the inception of sadism and the deflection of destructiveness onto others, Freud moves from the personal and biological to the cultural: In Civilization and Its Discontents, the containment of the deflected death instinct is seen as both a cultural and intra-psychic problem, which is solved, at cost to the individual, by again deflecting this innate destructiveness away from others and back towards the self. However, this is done through the agency of the super-ego,³

³The super ego is derived in Freudian theory not from an instinctual base, but as a secondary endopsychic

and employs sadism (in the form of moral persecution) against the ego precisely as persecution against destructive wishes. Thus in a sense, the containment of destructiveness is accomplished by a kind of sublimation of the death instinct (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 301): Its energies are in part placed in the service of the superego and its destructive aim again turned away from others and towards the self, but with the effect of inhibiting further expression of destructive aims.

Klein

Melanie Klein both remained true to, and departed significantly from, Freud's idea of the etiology of destructiveness, and thus served as a key transitional figure between the drive/structural model and the relational/structural model of the pure Object Relations theorists who were to follow and further develop some of her ideas. An examination of the ways in which she both coincided with Freudian thinking and expanded or deviated from it is helpful in understanding the evolutionary nature of Object Relations theory from the Freudian foundation in regards to aggression.

Klein began her work with a dedication to classical drive theory. Indeed, she accepts the concept of an

structure based on identification with, and introjection of, external parental authority.

innately based death instinct (as well as libidinal instincts) wholeheartedly, and the middle period of her work focuses on the inherent destructiveness of the human infant and the problem of its containment. In her view, like Freud's, the death instinct operates as a drive to destroy, and so is deflected away from the organism and onto others. She added to the existing concept of the dynamics of the death instinct, in saying that a portion of it is projected onto external objects, resulting in phenomenological persecution, while the remainder resides within the infant, and is used to attack these persecutory figures (both external and internal) (Segal, 1974, p. 22).

Thus, Klein is in agreement with Freud that aggression, arising from an instinctual base, is pre-experiential, having no necessity for environmental conditions in order to be operative. As Segal states in speaking of Klein's work, " . . . it does not follow that, without a bad environment, no aggressive and persecutory phantasies and anxieties would exist" (Segal, 1974, p. 22). And Klein herself talks of aggression or instinctual energy in classical drive/structural terms when she states " . . . thus we can see the quantities of aggressive impulses . . . have an important bearing upon the predominant mental attitude which we develop" (Klein and Riviere, 1967, p. 112 - emphasis added).

In fact, Klein holds that the object itself is created

by the drive (be it libidinal or aggressive), and arises at first as a phantasy of appropriate objects which could fulfill the instinctual drive's aim. As Greenberg and Mitchell state:

For Klein the drives possess, by virtue of their very nature as drive, inherent a priori images of the outside world, which are sought for gratification, either in love or destructiveness (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 181).

Klein confirms that initially, drives, including destructive ones, determine primary relations to objects, without environmental impact.

It is worth departing here briefly for a larger overview of Kleinian theory, as it will be drawn on extensively in the chapters to come. Libido and aggression, the two great instinctual motivational forces in her theory, are the background against which the 'drama' of personality development is 'played' at all stages. The key question at hand in each stage of development is whether libido, or love, will prove strong enough to overcome, or contain the destructiveness of the death instinct, or hate. This interplay of forces always involves protecting one's loved objects from the destructive effects of aggression.

In what can be considered perhaps Klein's major contribution to the extension of Freudian theory, she delineates the world of internal objects (i.e., unconscious mental representations, or phantasies, of objects, including the qualities, properties, contents and emotions attributed

to or associated with such objects), and the dynamics of this internal object-world in personality development. As noted earlier, such internal objects are a priori, being contained in instinctual drives, and thus arise initially as phantasies of a "good" object which could satisfy libidinal needs, and a "bad" object, one which frustrates these needs, and thus is a proper target for instinctual aggression.

"Bad" objects, imbued with the energy of the death instinct and by dint of their frustrating nature, are experienced phenomenologically by the infant as persecutory, threatening the self, or ego, with annihilation. Klein views the ego in an initial state of unintegration, whose tenuous steps at developing cohesiveness are always threatened by the death instinct and its consequent bad objects. Under such persecution the infantile ego is subject to extreme anxiety and terror, which can be traced as starting with the destructive impulses inherent in the death instinct. Guntrip characterizes Klein's conception of these anxieties well when he states:

A complex anxiety is evoked in the child by his destructive impulses, an anxiety made up of his fear of being himself destroyed by their violence, and the fear of destroying his objects together with the projection of his sadism on to them and the fear that they will retaliate destructively on him (Guntrip, 1961, p. 201).

The internal object world is both connected with external, or real objects, and articulated through a continuous cycle of projection and introjection, all in the

service of keeping "good" objects 'safe' from "bad" or persecutory ones. The child's first real object (or more correctly, part-object), the breast, has projected onto it at various times either aggressive or libidinal impulses, depending on whether it gratifies or frustrates libidinal needs. Both "good" and "bad" breasts are then internalized in the psyche, that is, the images are 'taken in' either to reinforce the sense of goodness the infant has, or to control and contain the badness felt to be threatening him, respectively. Indeed, Klein states that without the internalized "good" breast to sustain it against the threatening destructiveness of bad objects, the weak infantile ego is in danger of "falling to bits" (in Guntrip, 1961, p. 340). Once inside, these internal objects are then related to, either in love and protection or attack and aggression, according to their nature. These aims lead to a re-projection of both good and bad parts of the self, in order to again keep good objects safe and bad ones at a distance from the self. Such re-projection, particularly of bad objects, often derives from the danger of exercising aggression against them once they have been internalized through introjection. As Klein states:

When bad objects are introjected . . . the attack launched upon them with all the weapons of sadism rouses the subject's dread of an analogous attack upon himself from the external and internalized objects . . . (in Guntrip, 1961, pp. 220-1).

It cannot be over-emphasized how important the

continuous cycle of projection and introjection is to the building of the internal world. Although driven by instinctual forces, and beginning with corresponding a priori good and bad objects, the mechanisms of projection and introjection (along with corrolary defensive mechanisms such as identification, denial, etc.) produce an accreted internal object-world. Such a world is a blend both of phantasized and external objects, but has as powerful a phenomenological reality as the external or 'real' world because of its internalization in the unconscious structure of the personality. This internal world becomes, (with the influence of the external world through introjection), the stage upon which the drama of loving and destructive impulses is played.

The earliest period of development is termed by Klein the paranoid-schizoid position: paranoid because the fears are persecutory, and schizoid (the term is borrowed from Fairbairn) because the defensive structure is characterized by splitting of objects. In splitting, the defensive aim is to keep "good" and "bad" object representations apart both temporally and as discrete images, again in the service of keeping the destructiveness of bad objects from overwhelming good ones. Thus, it is by design that the "good" breast which gratifies by feeding is felt to be a distinct and separate entity from, and indeed is not recognized to be the same as, the "bad" breast which is unforthcoming. Klein

states that, in the earliest phase of development, anxiety prevents these split-objects from being integrated into an "ambivalent" object, one which is recognized as having both gratifying and persecutory aspects across time. The anxiety generated in relating to an ambivalent object in the earliest period takes two forms: first, of anxiety about destroying the only source of goodness by destructive rage aimed at the object's current persecutory aspects, and being unable to cope with the resultant grief at the loss of the object; and secondly, anxiety about being destroyed by the imagined destructive aspects of the object in retaliation for one's aggressive intentions.

The successful integration of "good" and "bad" object images (achieved through what I would term the 'detoxification' of one's hate, i.e., the reduction in hate's phantasized omnipotence), heralds the beginning of what Klein calls the "depressive position." Destructiveness and aggression are contained here not primarily by splitting, but by inhibition due to concern about the consequences of one's aggression to the now remembered good aspects of the object. What destructiveness is expressed towards what are now phenomenologically 'whole,' 'ambivalent' objects is ameliorated by the drive for "reparation." This libidinally-based drive is the attempt, both in reality and phantasy, to repair the damage (both

real and imagined) done to one's objects by destructiveness and restore them to their original condition.

To return then to Klein's etiology of aggression: While Klein is in agreement with Freud about the instinctual basis of libidinal and aggressive drives, her emphasis on the object and internal world contains the beginnings of her significant differences with Freud on the etiology of aggression.

First, while it is true that Klein's contention that drives create the object links her to the Freudian view that aggression initially arises from a pre-experiential base, such a contention also departs from Freud on the nature of drives, and has import for the etiology and containment of aggression. Whereas Freud posits that drives (including destructiveness) are "directionless and isolated from the outside world" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 137), and objects become associated with drives only through frustration of instinctual aims, for Klein "the drives themselves possess, through this inherent object-relatedness, many of the features which in Freud's theory were the province of the ego and secondary processes" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 137). That is, the drives themselves contain structured and directional energy which is inherently tied up with objects. As Greenberg and Mitchell note:

Aggression does not refer to a directionless, objectless destructive energy which becomes

attached to objects secondarily for the purpose of gratification. Aggression in Klein's system is an informed, personal, purposive hatred, bound up with specific relations with specific others (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 131).

Klein states that "there is no instinctual urge . . . which does not involve objects, external or internal; in other words, object relations are at the center of emotional life" (in Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 138 -- emphasis original).

Thus, while adhering to the Freudian view that libido and aggression are the motivational energies innate within the individual, Klein redefines the nature of drives themselves. As Greenberg and Mitchell point out:

Drives for her are not discrete quantities of energy arising from specific body tensions but passionate feelings of love and hate directed towards and utilizing the body as a vehicle of expression. Drives, for Klein, are relationships (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 138 -- emphasis original).

While such relationships may have an instinctual, a priori basis, there is a substantial trend in her work to acknowledge the role of the environment in transforming and modifying these inherent imagos, i.e., "real" good objects are "refuges" from instinctual hating (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 139), hate and aggression are tempered by good object experience (Klein and Riviere, 1967, p. 128), as well as being exacerbated by bad ones. As Klein states in her own words:

In my judgment, reality and real objects affect the child's anxiety-situations from the very

earliest stages of its existence, in the sense that it regards them as so many proofs or refutations of its anxiety situations, which it has displaced into the outer world (in Guntrip, 1961, p. 204).

In a sense, Klein's theory consists of the delineation of the struggle to overcome primal instinctual imagos (a priori internal object relations, especially destructive ones) inherent in the infant in order to achieve reality-based relations with external objects. And it is primarily through relations with "real" good objects (by their reinforcement of a priori good objects inherent in the libidinal drives) that this struggle is favorably resolved. Such a formulation gives Klein's conception of containment of aggression a 'transcendent' quality in contrast to Freud's, in that rather than aggression as a force lurking just beneath the surface seeking expression with unwavering strength, the potency of instinctual aggression can be tempered through the build-up of "good" relationships. Furthermore, the drive for reparation constitutes a basis for truly non-defensive activity, in that while reparation arises because of innate aggression, it can in a sense 'evolve' into a more autonomous, creative activity based on both external and psychic reality.

Finally, Klein's position might be summarized by saying that while the etiology of aggression is introduced in instinctual terms, the dynamics of aggression are largely explicated in terms of emotional relationships to others, of

love and hate, rather than Thanatos and Eros. It might almost be said that her theory is two-tiered: On one level, she talks about the interplay of directed, object-related emotions of love and hate. On another level, she places the ultimate etiology of these feelings on an instinctual level.

One can imagine adequate explanations for the etiology of aggression using Klein's relational ideas of the first level, excluding references to instinctual bases of destruction. It is just through such a formulation, by replacing instinctual destruction with a 'relational' foundation, that the later Object Relations theorists account for the etiology of aggression in what appears to be a more economical fashion, without the need for postulating a "death instinct." Ronald Fairbairn at one point calls Freud's concept of the death instinct "superfluous" (in Fairbairn, 1975, p. 166). Donald Winnicott terms the death instinct at one place in his work "unnecessary" (in Greeberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 202). Harry Guntrip, in a more direct and disdainful vein, uses such terms as "biological mysticism" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 208) and "pure unproven dogma" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 413) in referring to the use of the concept of a death instinct to account for aggression.

Fairbairn

Fairbairn was the first of the Object Relations theorists to further develop Klein's relational perspective

with its importance on the object, while jettisoning the underlying biological/instinctual foundations regarding the cause of destructiveness. In order to understand his view of the etiology of aggression, and his rejection of the drive/structural model of Freud and Klein, it is necessary to understand his basic concepts and the meaning he ascribes to psychological terms.

First, Fairbairn's conception of the ego fundamentally differs from that of both Freud and Klein. Rather than being a post-instinctual mechanism for tension-reduction, as Freud would have it, or designating directedness as a quality of the instincts themselves as Klein does (hence her appellation as an "id psychologist"), Fairbairn imputes the properties of energy and direction to the ego itself. Hence, "ego" as used by Fairbairn connotes the concept of the self, rather than a Freudian adaptive mechanism (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 163). He asserts that the ego is present from birth as a "pristine unity," and it not only "has" energy and direction, but it "is" energy itself, which cannot be separated from structure (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 154). Hence, there is no need for the concept of the "id," or a "pool of structureless energy" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 155).

Because of the direction Fairbairn states that this energy takes, his use of the term "libidinal impulses" is far different from Freud's usage of the term. First, the

only meaningful use of the term "impulses," according to Fairbairn, is to describe the dynamic aspects of such ego structures in relation to objects (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 156). Indeed, crucial to his conceptualization of ego structures as consisting of dynamisms in their relation to objects is the idea that the construct of 'ego' has no meaning aside from its relations with objects. As Greenberg and Mitchell state, (for Fairbairn) "The ego is unthinkable except as bound up with objects. . . . An objectless ego is a contradiction in terms" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 165 -- emphasis added).

Secondly, the aim of libidinal impulses is not in gaining sexual (i.e. physical) pleasure from objects, but in securing satisfactory relationships with objects. The inherent need of the infant is for relationships which can satisfy what he terms needs of "infantile dependence." Pleasure, rather than being a primary motivational force, is merely a vehicle for seeking satisfying relationships with others, what might be called an "orienting device," or as Fairbairn calls pleasure, only "a signpost to the object" (in Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 156). Libido, then, if it has a biological foundation in Fairbairn's theory, is a drive to seek satisfying real objects, rather than pleasure or objects based on a priori images. Thus, the implication is that the infant is reality oriented from the start,

rather than only secondarily as a consequence of frustration.

Concomitantly, the idea of an innate destructive drive is alien to Fairbairn's conceptions. When he does speak of aggression in a manner that suggests classical Freudian terms, he makes it clear that aggression exists only as a potential, not a "drive" demanding expression (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 159). This "potential" is activated not by an autonomous instinctual principle, but as a reaction to frustration of libidinal aims for satisfying relationships which meet infantile dependency needs, (primarily with the mother).

Thus, "Freud's dual motivational principles of libido and aggression have been replaced by a single motivational principle - libido - and a powerful reaction to libidinal frustration - an 'anti-libidinal' factor" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 165). Aggression, as a motivational factor, has no place in Fairbairn's theory. Rather, aggression arises as a reaction to deprivation from an unsatisfying relational environment consisting of real people.

Rejecting aspects of the mother, those which frustrate libidinal needs for relatedness, are internalized as bad objects, split-off from consciousness, and identified with in an effort to control them. Two 'types' of internal bad objects are created out of unsatisfying experiences:

"Rejecting Objects" (R.O.), which are made up of the denying and hostile aspects of external objects, and "Exciting Objects" (E.O.), which are introjected images of the tantalizing aspects of these experiences, those aspects of objects which could fulfill the hope of satisfaction, but never do. (Note that for Fairbairn an "object" is simply a person or part of a person, e.g., the mother or breast; internal objects are images of specific aspects of environmental (i.e., external) objects, distorted as they are through the limited perceptual abilities of the infant.) Thus, a hungry infant who does not receive the breast splits and internalizes a "bad" breast (R.O.) which persecutes and rejects, and an "exciting" breast (E.O.) which tantalizes with the promise of satisfaction but never 'delivers' on this promise.

In identifying with these split-off, repressed objects, the "pristine unity" of the ego is split as well, and it is this rending asunder which becomes the 'snake in the garden' in Fairbairn's theory in terms of psychopathology. One part of the ego is split-off to become the "Anti-Libidinal Ego" (A.L.E.), which is identified with (i.e., relating to) the R.O. Another part-ego splits to become the weak, needy "Libidinal Ego" (L.E.), who continually longs for and hungers after the E.O. What remains in consciousness is a 'sanitized' "Central Ego," (or C.E.), which embodies everyday conscious experience and maintains relationships

with equally 'sanitized' external objects (sanitized because their rejecting and unsatisfyingly tantalizing aspects have been stripped away and internalized).

This scheme of the evolution and dynamics of endopsychic structure, which replaces in Fairbairn's theory the Freudian tri-partite structure of id/ego/superego and is fundamentally different from it, is best and most simply understood as the inevitable outcome of Fairbairn's fundamental tenet that object-relatedness is the principal impulse of human beings: The splitting off of the negative aspects of experience allows the C.E. to remain in relation with 'sanitized' good objects in the environment. The other part egos, the A.L.E. and the L.E., are split in order to remain attached to the negative aspects of experience, in order to both control these bad objects and to remain in relatedness, since ego cannot exist unless related to objects. Such stubborn attachments to bad objects form the basis of both psychopathology and resistance in psychotherapy according to Fairbairn, since giving up such objects carries with it the fear of 'ego disintegration' by being attached to no objects at all. Such a prospect is akin to the fear of annihilation of the self -- and Fairbairn's concept of the ego (or part-ego) is best thought of as a 'self', as opposed to a mechanism or structure.

The Anti-Libidinal Ego becomes the "repository for hate and destructiveness" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 166)

in the self, based as it is on an identification with hostile and punitive aspects of the bad objects to which it is attached. However, it is important to stress that the 'aggression' of these bad objects does not originate with the self, but is simply an introjection of what is experienced as the aggression and hostility of the environment, of external objects who 'persecute' the infant by frustrating libidinal needs. Part of the destructiveness of the A.L.E. is aimed at the L.E., to persecute it for its unrelenting weakness and need (akin to the concept of feeling 'strong' or 'real' by identifying with the aggressor, in this case, the parent who cannot tolerate or accomodate the infant's needs). The rest of the A.L.E.'s aggression is re-projected back onto external objects, setting up a cycle of projection-introjection much along Kleinian lines, and it is presumably at this point that aggression makes its appearance as an externally-directed and manifest phenomenon. (Note that Fairbairn does pay acknowledgement to Klein, at least for her delineation of defense mechanisms and concept of the dynamics of object-relatedness.)

However, a few points in which Fairbairn's ideas are in direct contrast to Klein's must be re-emphasized: In contrast to Klein, bad internal objects are not derived from instinctual a priori imagos. Internal objects (which are always "bad" according to Fairbairn), are always derived

from real environmental objects, and are created as a refuge from, and a substitute for, satisfying relations with real objects. Likewise, aggression is not an innate drive demanding expression, but implicitly a completely environmentally based phenomenon, consisting of internalizing environmental frustration, and then re-projecting it back into the environment. Thus, Fairbairn posits what can be called the first "frustration/aggression" hypothesis, in contrast to the "instinctual/aggression" etiology derived from classical theory. A crucial difference between the two theories arises, then, in the view of man as having destructiveness at the core of his being, vs. aggression as a reactive by-product of environmental insufficiency.

It must be noted that much of what has been said here about Fairbairn's views on the etiology, and external expression of aggression are implicit in his work, and are derived by Guntrip in his 'proselytizing' for Fairbairn's views. This holds especially true for the environmental factors in the etiology and expression of aggression, as it was not this that is focal in much of Fairbairn's writings, but rather the intra-psychic dynamics of the self and internal objects.

Winnicott

It is in the work of D.W. Winnicott that the environmental and relational view of dynamics and

development comes to full fruition. However, the implications in his work for the etiology of aggression awaited Harry Guntrip's synthesis of Winnicott's work and Fairbairn's to be made fully explicit. In Winnicott's work itself, these implications are at times obscure and cryptic, but there are reasons for this.

Winnicott proclaimed his adherence to the Freudian/Kleinian tradition of drive theory, and in fact criticized Fairbairn for his rejection of this model. However, while proclaiming such allegiance, Winnicott "aligns himself with Klein and Freud through a combination of assimilation, distortion (of their views) and strategic avoidance" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 202). That is, while protesting that he ascribes to drive theory, Winnicott ignores, distorts or relegates instinctual forces to a purely secondary status in his theory. Rather, his focus is on the self as an entity and its need in "the context of the interaction between the child and the environmental provisions supplied by significant others" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 191). Thus, his approach to human experience lies solidly with the relational/structural model.

To begin with, Winnicott extensively uses the Freudian term "aggressive drive," yet the manner in which he uses it is completely different from Freud and lacks a shared meaning. "Aggression" for Winnicott, although present from

birth, does not refer to a specific instinctual drive but to a general vitality and and motility, what he calls the "natural zestiness" of the infant, and does not, at least in one interpretation,⁴ entail anger or hate (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 206). Of this aggressive drive, which he also calls "the primitive love impulse," he says, "at origin, aggressiveness is almost synonymous with activity" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 206). Thus, at base, the "destruction" in Winnicott's work is "an innocent, nonbelligerent drive for engagement" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 206).

In Winnicott's theory it is purely and exclusively within a relational context which this aggressiveness

⁴Part of the difficulty in correctly understanding, much less interpreting Winnicott's writings stems from his lack of clarity, equivocation, and the fact that he did not produce an entire theory to fit his ideas into. These factors produce a tendency toward confusion of exactly how and which framework to relate such ideas to, both in terms of theoretical orientation as well as time in regard to developmental period. Whether he does indeed mean for the "natural aggression" of the infant to convey a concomitant feeling of hate and anger towards the object is a case in point of his apparent equivocation and lack of clarity. In places, he makes such claims as "There is no anger in the destruction of the object to which I am referring" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 93 -- emphasis added), and " . . . there is a theoretical earlier stage in which whatever (the infant) does is not done in hate. I have used the word 'ruthless love' in describing this stage" (in Guntrip, 1961, p. 402). Yet one can also find passages where he directly contradicts this in referring to the same phenomenon, e.g., "If the word 'love' is used, the most primitive meanings of the word must be included, in which love is crude and ruthless and even destructive. Hate is not absent" (in Guntrip, 1981, p.32 -- emphasis added).

(better read as "motility" or "vitality") operates. The needs of the infant, despite the use of drive terminology, is for the proper environment for the self to grow in its capacity for relational abilities. The problem is not Thanatos vs. Eros, nor even love vs. hate, but whether or not the environment provides what the infant needs to become an autonomous individual while at the same time establishing relations to objects, primarily the mother. As such, the relational environment, outside the infant, becomes the focal factor.

In terms of "natural" aggression or the vitality of the infant, the vicissitudes of its development depend on the type of environmental management which occurs. At first, the infant directs such vitality or aggression at objects (i.e., the mother) without concern for its effects, in a "ruthless" manner. This "ruthless love" (in Guntrip, 1961, p. 402), synonymous with vitality, involves as its prototype the infant hungering after the breast, oblivious to the consequences of his vigorous hungering. As part of the 'zestiness' of 'hungering,' he 'attacks' the breast in reality (and according to Winnicott "destroys" it in fantasy). In attempting to wring out of it all the satisfaction possible, he may hurt the mother, e.g., 'wear her out' in his vigor or actually cause pain to her by biting. The point to emphasize in Winnicott's notion of early aggression is that such 'destructive hungering' is not

intentional on the part of the infant, in the usual sense of the word: Destructiveness is not the primary aim but the incidental by-product of such activity. It may be considered intrinsic in the sense that the phenomena of destructiveness is an inherent part of the activity. Yet the infant, in the 'best' of environments, is unaware of having done lasting damage to the object in the earliest stage of development. Contained in this concept of "ruthless love" (and destruction) is the idea that to become attached to objects by 'hungering after' them, through natural activity, always carries with it the possibility of damaging those same objects. The two are inseparable: There can be no 'naturally zesty activity' without the possibility of such activity carrying potentially destructive consequences along with it. The job of the "environment" (e.g., the mother) is to protect the infant's omnipotent control over its objects, gradually dispelling this illusion until the infant can take responsibility for his or her actions, develop concern about his/her objects, and learn to curb "destructive vitality" on his own.

In practical terms, this means the mother (i.e., the phenomenological environment) should be able to withstand such "ruthless love" without withdrawing from or retaliating against the infant with rejection or hostility. In this way, the illusion the infant has of the invulnerability of his objects and the omnipotence of himself, as well as

keeping the 'boundary' between the two appropriately (for this stage of development) 'fuzzy,' is preserved. If the environment is adequate in providing such protection, aggression eventually comes to be naturally contained by the development of "concern" for the effect of the infant's actions (both in thought and reality) on the object (akin to Klein's depressive position with the ability to integrate split object-images), and a natural process of restitutive gestures evolves on the infant's part in order to ameliorate the effects of his destructiveness (akin to Klein's concept of "reparation").

Failures of the environment to provide a proper context for the slow dissolution of illusory omnipotence are called by Winnicott "impingement," and it is in these environmental failures, or impingements, on the natural growth process that the etiology of truly destructive aggression presumably evolves. One might say that the process is akin to Fairbairn's conception of frustration leading to aggression, but with the role of the environment, rather than concentration on intra-psychic dynamics, more focal.

Before leaving Winnicott, it is interesting (and amusing) to quote him in full to better get a flavor of how he appears to equivocate, leaving all possibilities (e.g., both a Freudian instinctual foundation and a relational one) open, while at the same time giving a firm impression that his sympathies lie with relational explanations.

In Playing and Reality there is a passage in which Winnicott talks of the lusty destruction of the breast by the infant, and then, as if to underscore the vigor with which this is carried out, adds, "I mean the actual impulse to destroy" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 92). A paragraph later he takes the emphasis off the impulse and puts it on the object:

It will be seen that, although destruction is the word I am using, this actual destruction belongs to the object's failure to survive. Without this failure, destruction remains potential. The word 'destruction' is needed, not because of the baby's impulse to destroy, but because of the object's liability not to survive, which also means to suffer change in quality, in attitude (Winnicott, 1965, p. 93).

In the very next paragraph, he acknowledges (in a backhanded way) an instinctual basis for aggression, but then implies that the environment must play a greater role in aggression:

The way of looking at things that belongs to my presentation of this chapter makes possible a new approach to the whole subject of the roots of aggression. For instance, it is not necessary to give inborn aggression more than that which is its due in company with everything else that is inborn. Undoubtably inborn aggression must be variable in a quantitative sense in the same way that everything else that is inherited is variable between individuals. By contrast, the variations are great that arise out of the differences in the experiences of various newborn babies according to whether they are or are not carried through this very difficult phase. Such variations in the field of experience are indeed great (Winnicott, 1971, p. 93).

Finally, in the next paragraph he mis-states the 'orthodox' position on the etiology of aggression,

apparently ignoring the fact that in orthodox (i.e. Freudian) theory it operates prior to experience with external reality, bending this position for his own uses in his conception of the destructive 'drive':

The assumption is always there, in orthodox theory, that aggression is reactive to the encounter with the reality principle, whereas here it is the destructive drive that creates the quality of externality. This is the central structure of my argument (Winnicott, 1971, p. 93).

Guntrip

It is in the work of Harry Guntrip that the implications of environmental failure for the manifestations of aggression become more bluntly explicit. Guntrip, as an analysand and synthesizer of both Winnicott and Fairbairn, combines Fairbairn's frustration/aggression hypothesis with Winnicott's focus on the environment as the chief determinant of aggression, and boldly and directly rejects the drive/structural model of the etiology of aggression. In doing so he puts not only this etiology but all development soundly and unmistakably on an almost exclusively environmental/relational basis.

Guntrip explicitly and flatly rejects aggression as arising from an innate drive, calling the concept of a death instinct an "unscientific and unverifiable hypothesis, one ought perhaps to say mythology . . . the reality of which hardly any analysts have ever been convinced" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 196). Instead, he ties aggression to the

environment, stating, "We can react with aggression when there is something to be angry and aggressive about" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 74 -- emphasis added). Using this frustration/aggression hypothesis, which originated with Fairbairn, Guntrip goes on to define what we have to be "angry about" as the impinging failures of the maternal environment as detailed by Winnicott. He explicitly states that aggression is a phenomenon reactive to impingement from the environment, having no basis in "a death instinct or destructive instinct working from within" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 239).

Making more explicit what is in Fairbairn's writings about the internalization of environmental aggression, he states:

. . . aggressive impulses . . . are a response to a situation of frustration and deprivation. They are not 'innate' qua 'impulses', they are rather being aroused all the time; and not simply by externally frustrating present-day environment but by the way in which frustrations in early development became embedded in the internal structure of the personality itself (Aggressive impulses) are reactions to situations of frustration perpetuated from childhood in the inner, unconscious, psychical world which is played upon the outer world (Guntrip, 1961, p. 76 -- emphasis added).

Guntrip most boldly attacks any concept of 'instinct' as a deterministic force in behavior. The closest he ever comes to endorsing the principle of 'instinct' is in allowing how human beings may have "innate potentials" which

one might call an "instinct." However, he vehemently denies that:

. . . specific impulses exist prior to experience. Rather an innate tendency is a precondition of a specific impulse arising in response to a specific environment (Guntrip, 1961, p. 74 -- emphasis original).

Furthermore, Guntrip removes aggression even further from being a primary phenomenon by stating that it is a defensive (and hence secondary) reaction designed to compensate and obscure the primary feelings of weakness and dependence, in a word, fear, that impingement calls forth (Guntrip, 1981, p. 196). Inherent in this explanation of the etiology of aggression is the view of the ego not as the 'system-ego' of Freud, designed to channel instincts and reduce tension, but as a 'person-ego,' a 'self,' the thwarting of whose strivings for good relationships results in fear and weakness, with aggression as a secondary reaction to this vulnerability.

This relegation of aggression as, ultimately, a reactive by-product and defense against feelings of weakness and fear is of monumental importance, because it changes the basic motivational force in Guntrip's system of dynamics away from destructiveness, away even from Fairbairn's 'object-seeking,' but places it on what he calls the "earliest" reaction to fear-inducing deprivation: withdrawal, or flight, from all object relations (Guntrip, 1981, p. 67). This concept of schizoid withdrawal as the

strongest motivation in the personality (and at the same time the greatest danger to it), is reified in Guntrip's concept (extending Fairbairn's theory of tri-partite endopsychic structure of C.E./ A.L.E./L.E.) of a "Regressed Libidinal Ego" (R.E.), which he terms the "lost core of the personality" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 81). The R.E. is split-off from the weak, needy Libidinal Ego, under pressure of frustration and persecution by 'bad objects,' and seeks relief from the constant hungering and neediness felt by the self by renouncing all object relations. As will be seen in Chapter II, this concept both presents the most formidable challenge to Kleinian conceptions of destructiveness as lying at the heart of dynamics, as well as being at odds with the basic tenets of Fairbairn's theory, in which Guntrip claims the foundations of the concept of the R.E. lie.

III. FREUD AND OBJECT RELATIONS: OPPOSITION OF BASIC TENETS

Although derived from Freudian theory in its psychoanalytic foundations, Object Relations theory in its 'evolved' form contains fundamental opposites to Freudian theory when the basic tenets of the two schools are compared. It is far beyond the scope of this work to resolve all these basic conflicts. Yet, at the risk of some necessary repetition, it is important to summarize and elucidate them. Such basic tenets lie at the heart of each

theory, and serve as basic assumptions which impact on all areas encompassed by them, not merely destructiveness, (although in the following comparison destructiveness will often be focused on to serve as illumination of the differences). More importantly though, as will be more thoroughly examined later, destructiveness became the 'battleground' upon which the 'fight' to establish Object Relations theory's tenets as the most viable was waged. A comparison of these tenets serves to clarify why the struggle over the etiology and importance of destructiveness is such an emotionally charged and over-determined issue, since it is these very foundations of theory that are at stake whenever the argument over destructiveness is raised.

Nature of Roots of Behavior and Motivation

Most obvious in Freud's formulation is that the 'driving engine' of all behavior, including aggression, is contained in innate, instinctual impulses, founded in a biological substrate which cannot fundamentally be altered. Rather, aggression, for example, as instinct, constitutes a fundamental source of blind, undirected energy which relentlessly seeks expression in some form. Object Relations theory, while acknowledging a 'driving force' in the form of object-seeking, holds no inherent fate for the outcome of the striving for good object relationships. Rather, if there is a deterministic factor in the direction of behavior and development, it lies in the environment, in

the types of provisions it supplies to which the infant responds. As the environment is infinitely variable when compared to instinct, subsequent behavior is held to be greatly more malleable, both in its inception and in its subsequent ability to 'change direction' than in Freudian theory.

The Nature of the Ego (and Endopsychic Structure)

In Freudian theory, endopsychic structure (ego, superego, associated defenses, etc.) is not even a primary phenomenon, i.e., present at birth. Rather, the ego is reactive to and resultant of the clash between instinctual drives contained in the id and contact with frustration presented by reality. Being a byproduct of instinctual gratification-seeking, the ego has no energy of its own. Rather, its purpose is to regulate (i.e., minimize) the tension when instinctual activity comes in contact with reality. Thus, Freud's model of mental functioning is called a "drive/structural" or "tension reduction" model. The ego and superego may use instinctual energy in performing their functions, but in doing so they only change the object which instinctual impulses are aimed at, never the source or aim of the instincts themselves, which exist a priori to the higher mental structures and are irreducible and non-malleable.

In contrast, in Object Relations theory the ego is

present from birth (at least according to Fairbairn and Guntrip), rather than being a secondary development from a more basic, instinctual id. More importantly, as noted earlier, the ego not only has energy but is itself defined as energy: The dynamics of ego-object relationships delineate the very nature of the ego. The ego, rather than being a 'routing mechanism' for energy originated elsewhere, is its own 'power source,' and the most important feature of its 'power' is the directedness (toward objects) with which impulses manifest themselves. In Object Relations theory, such self-directedness, arising as a consequence of the view of the ego (or part-ego) as the actor or intender of action, rather than the 'medium' through which impulses to action are filtered, gives rise to the concept of ego as a 'person-' or 'self-ego,' rather than what has been called the 'system-ego' of Freud.

The Role of Objects

Guntrip notes that "aggression . . . (has) nothing to do with frustration" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 66) in the Freudian drive/structural model. That is, there is no 'relational' factor between the self and the object in the etiology of aggression (or the self and the targeting of any object for any instinctual impulse), since the death instinct pre-dates objects and is operative prior to experience. Interaction with objects may influence the choice of specific objects and facilitate tension reduction,

but there is no specific or 'personal' connection between drives and objects that make a significant difference in terms of whether aggression will exist or not. Objects are merely 'vehicles' for the expression and satisfaction of instincts, and this accounts for their ready interchangeability.

'Real' relations, or experience with objects may appear to be of fundamental importance in Freudian theory in determining the strength or nature of such attributes as aggression, since the matrix of relations with environmental objects during the oral/anal/Oedipal phases unfold with unerring regularity and repetition. However, according to the Freudian viewpoint, this is in part an obscuring of the true role of objects in relation to instinctual experiences, as 'vehicles' for instinctual expression. In fact, in the Freudian view the regularity and predictability of object-relations throughout the phases of development is due to the fact that the "drive itself determines the nature of the object" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 39). In "Instincts and Their Vissicitudes", Freud states that the drive "is not originally connected with (the object), but becomes assigned to it only in consequence of being peculiarly fitted . . . (to satisfying its aim)" (in Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 39). Thus, as Greenberg and Mitchell note:

There is no inherent object, no pre-ordained tie

to the human environment For Freud the object must suit the impulse, while for the theorists of the relational model the impulse is simply one way of relating to objects (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 44).

Object Relations theory, in regard to the role of objects, basically reverses cause and effect as stated in Freudian theory. Rather than the drive determining the object, as in Freud's theory, in Object Relations theory it may be said that the object (in relationship with the ego) creates (or activates) the impulse. That is, how the object responds determines to a large degree what behavior or action will be forthcoming from the self. If the object is relationally gratifying, the response called forth is love and satisfaction. If the object frustrates, the impulse is of aggression or withdrawal.⁵ Thus, there is always an intensely personal relationship between ego and object, and it is out of this matrix of connectedness that impulses arise. At base, the differences in the role of objects between Freudian and Object Relations theories is the impact that real objects have on the self and subsequent behavior,

⁵The response 'called' forth is also dependent on the stage of development, i.e., if the object gratifies, the response may be "going on being" in the earliest stage and a more mature concern for and valuation of the object at a later stage (using Winnicott's stages here). If the object frustrates, in the earliest stage the impulse may be towards withdrawal or fear of one's own neediness, or at a later period of development, externally-directed aggression (using Guntrip's schema). The stage-specific reaction is not as important here as the concept of an impulse arising as a result of the action (or what Winnicott would call the "position") of the object.

motivation, and development. In Freudian theory, the impact of the realistic qualities of objects is incidental, except as they coincide with the 'template' of the drive; in Object Relations theory, there is no greater determinant than the qualities of the real object itself.

The Nature of Defense (and the Core of Human Nature)

In Freudian theory, because of the irreducible nature of instincts, the only solution for their containment is defensive. As mentioned earlier, the 'best' possible outcome between instinctual desire and reality is a compromise, in which the desire becomes contained, that is, finds partial, acceptable expression at cost to the individual in terms of the energy which must be expended to maintain the compromise (through defensive mechanisms, the highest of which is sublimation) as well as what Freud calls the "common unhappiness" such a renunciation of instinctual desires creates. In terms of aggression, in Freudian theory there is no way to avoid, outgrow, or 'transcend' what is at the core of humankind's nature. At best, defensive containment consists of compromises between directing aggressive energy either at the self or others, although 'tempering' by libidinal instincts is possible to a degree.

Although defensive processes figure prominently in Object Relations theory, they are again only reactive to 'badness' which has been introjected from outside sources. The philosophical view of man in Object Relations theory is

against a view of human nature in which man must keep innate 'base' desires in check. There is not an inherent 'evil' in man (especially aggression) which must be contained.

Indeed, Guntrip calls the concept of the death instinct a "concept of original sin" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 236), and he views sexual lust not as the expression of a desire that has escaped defensive containment, but as a symptom of a breakdown in object relations (Guntrip, 1971, p. 36).

In the Object Relations viewpoint, man is not 'born corrupt,' and facing the monumental task of taming such corruption with limited and indeterminate results at best. Rather, he is born 'pure,' and is 'corrupted' by a bad environment which is internalized. It is not coincidence that Fairbairn and Guntrip use the adjective "pristine" to describe the neonate's ego. The word conveys more than a unity, it also conveys the view that defensive activity is designed to keep 'badness' from the self, rather than rid the self of an inherent 'badness.' In practical terms, one can say that the desire to keep object relations 'pure' (i.e., good) is what leads to defensive splitting of ego and object. What was once unified (ego) can again be unified, and it is in the premise that the self can again be integrated and made whole, once the effects of 'outside' contamination have been ameliorated, that the theory rests. If people are 'good' in Object Relations theory, it is because it is their nature to strive for good relations with

others. In Freudian theory, such an 'autonomous' goodness is not possible: It may be based in part on reason and reality, identification and introjection, but it is always to some degree in compromise with, and defensive against, built-in motives of self-interest and destructiveness.

The Kleinian Bridge

I would propose that Klein's theories can, and in some cases, did serve as a 'conceptual bridge' between orthodox Freudian theory and Object Relations theory in each of the areas of basic tenets outlined. The basic conflict between Freudian and Object Relations theories stems from the role of instinct vs. environment plays in each. One can see in Klein's formulations a 'middle ground' between each of the oppositions. A degree of continuity is maintained with the orthodox position while at the same time a new emphasis on environmental and relational aspects is contained in the formulations, and with it the room to evolve a position quite different from Freudian theory.

In terms of the 'roots of motivation and behavior,' although arising from an instinctual base, and in this sense being deterministic, Klein's innate drives, as mentioned, are not "blind, undirected" sources of energy which merely seek expression, heedless of in relation to what. Rather, they are inherently structured along relational lines of love and hate to objects. It is this relational tie to the

environment which allows a great deal more room for environmental impact in affecting the evolution of innate drives than in Freudian theory. While the source of the 'driving force' behind behavior is immutable, and thus in opposition to Object Relations theory, the malleability of such drives in response to environmental relations is much more plastic.

In terms of 'endopsychic structure', Klein keeps faith with the Freudian position that the id is primary at birth. However, the most important qualities which the Object Relations theorists ascribe to the ego, the structured, directed nature of its energy in relation to objects, is exactly the qualities which are contained in Klein's conception of the drives contained within the id. This contrasts sharply with Freud's view of the id as a seething, chaotic cauldron of desires.

Likewise, in relation to the 'role of objects,' Klein is allied with Freud in that the relations to objects are determined initially by an instinctual base. Indeed the first objects, being determined a priori, arise from this base before impact by environmental objects. Yet while impulses cannot be said to arise with the object in Kleinian theory, relations with objects may be said to be the determining factor in the vicissitudes of how drives are handled or contained, given that the relational emphasis between self and object is paramount in Klein's theory. As

quoted earlier, Klein states that "object relations are at the center of emotional life" (pg. 25). While such a quote applies to both internal and external objects, in terms of the central question of the place of environmental impact in her theory, one can say that the decisive factor in the fate of instinctual impulses, and the vicissitudes of development, is the quality of the real environment in its relation to the infant. Indeed, it is the preponderance of 'good experiences' with real objects that determine whether hate will be contained so that optimal development can proceed.

Finally, in relation to the 'nature of defense and the core of human nature,' Klein's theory must be classified as akin to Freud's in that we are born with an 'evil', if you will, in the form of aggression (death instinct) which is not 'eradicable' and requires defensive containment. The concept of an innate aggressive drive is, if anything, more central to Klein's work than to Freud's. Yet at the same time, Klein's concept of libidinal drives is less oriented towards bodily satisfaction than towards true valuation of the object, at least in its more mature, evolved form. As noted earlier, while the libidinally based impulse for reparation initially arises as a defensive containment to innate aggression, it can evolve into a more autonomous and truly non-defensive form of creativity. Thus, in Klein's view, while man cannot rid himself of inborn 'base' motives,

he is capable of containing them. Such containment for Klein implies not a 'sorry compromise' as it does for Freudian theory. Rather, containment itself has a transcendental quality to it. Such a feature, derived from an inextricable link between the containment of hate and the further development of the ability to love, means that man is not doomed to contain base motives at cost to his 'self,' but can contain them in the process of enhancing the self's potential.

IV. THE OBJECT RELATIONS 'VENDETTA' AGAINST INSTINCT

As implied, Kleinian theory can serve as a transitional bridge between the main tenets of Freudian and Object Relations theories. At the heart of the 'connecting' possibilities for Kleinian theory is the position she takes in regard to what is the key difference between Freud and the Object Relations theorists in each of the basic tenets: She evolves an important role for environmental influence while retaining an instinctual base. As such, her ideas could have been used fruitfully to develop theory in the direction the Object Relations theorists did, without necessitating a radical break with and rejection of the Freudian paradigm for its foundation.

Yet, this was not to be. The Object Relations theorists used Kleinian theory most selectively; as mentioned earlier, they quickly embraced her emphasis on object relations and

the importance of the internal world. Such a synthesis of parts of Kleinian theory is what makes it possible for a re-integration of Object Relations theory and Kleinian theory to be attempted, as the ground they share in common in this area is indeed large. Guntrip acknowledges this kinship when he states:

. . . her theory of endopsychic structure in terms of internal objects opened the way to a new approach to psychodynamics theory in general, making it a true theory of personality (Guntrip, 1961, p. 214).

Furthermore, he suggests that to call "her theory concerning internal objects and endopsychic structure" of "great value" is an "understatement" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 214).

However, if Guntrip, as spokesperson for the Object Relations viewpoint, felt that Klein's formulation provided evolutionary possibilities from and continuity with Freud's theory in the matter of instinct and destructiveness, this was to him a detriment to be purged rather than an asset to be built upon. The 'synthetic' quality of her work is, in his view, a major fault, and he regards her as apparently too befuddled to recognize the 'true' import of her own work:

Her theory is confused because it inextricably blends the old and the new. Klein's original acceptance of Freudian theory seduced her into believing that her own insights were just a development of his views and she perpetuated his biological terminology, thus distorting the significance of what she saw in her clinical experience (Guntrip, 1971, p. 59).

Not only does Guntrip say that such a synthesis is a detriment, but he accuses her of doing the job badly:

Unfortunately Melanie Klein did not, any more than Freud, overcome the atomistic impulse theory, and she achieved no real unification of impulse-theory into the theory of ego structure. Mrs. Klein has sewn a new patch on an old garment in retaining Freud's instinct theory. . . . she did not follow up the implications of her own discoveries (Guntrip, 1961, p. 355 -- emphasis added).

The "implications" Guntrip feels Klein 'missed' are essentially that the concept of instinct is a bankrupt, outmoded and invalidly "sub-personal" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 29) way to talk about personality. He had no interest in an evolutionary synthesis regarding instinct, but openly advocated a revolutionary theory, a complete break with and rejection of the Freudian foundation of innate, instinct-based behavior.

In a general way, Guntrip's objection to instinct as a useful or valid concept is phrased in terms of objections to Freudian "psychobiology," from which the concept of instinct originated, with its foundations in physical processes and traditional methods of investigation and terminology used in their exploration. Guntrip sees such a viewpoint as a fragmentary approach which deals with isolated concepts such as "mind" and "behavior" but is inadequate to contend with the concept of a human being as a whole person (Guntrip, 1961, p. 31). By eschewing instinct theory, he sees psychology as:

outgrowing its origins in a neurophysiological and

psychobiological philosophy of man . . . into a truly psychodynamic theory . . . that takes full account of his reality as an individual person (Guntrip, 1961, p. 17).

He equates instinct theory as having the same (physically) "scientific" approach as animal psychology, and therefore its discussion of mental life cannot but help to "yield to mechanistic scientific explanation" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 17).

He sums up his viewpoint by stating:

. . . psychodynamic science (i.e., Object Relations theory) studies its objects basically as 'subjects', while traditional science studies whatever it does study as 'objects' only. It is this exclusively objective approach to classical science that fails to do justice to the 'person' as 'subject of experience'. Psychodynamic studies pose a genuine new problem for science, which cannot be handled by the classic scientific methods of investigation and conceptualization (Guntrip, 1981, p. 373 -- emphasis original).

Yet, beneath this general idea that a "new psychodynamic science" is needed to deal with the complexities of 'whole human beings,' are the specific reasons for advocating a refutation of instinct, rather than a synthesis of it. As implied, the heart of each dichotomy in the basic tenets between Freudian theory and Object Relations theory lies with the role of environment vs. innate factors. The concept of instinct is the embodiment of what is innate in human nature. Guntrip saw the newly proposed basic tenets of Object Relations theory as rising or falling on the keystone of the nature vs. nurture argument, because of the determinism implied in the concept of instinct. He failed to consider the proposition that

innate features may be substantially transformed by environment, thus decreasing their deterministic nature. Rather, environment vs. instinct is an either/or proposition for Guntrip.

Given this, if one allows for instinct, in Guntrip's view the basic tenets of theory 'fall' in domino-like fashion in favor of the Freudian viewpoint. The foundations of behavior and motivation are immutably predetermined; the ego and endopsychic structure are reactive and secondary to innate drives; real objects play a peripheral role in personality development; defense must be a process of containment of these inborn drives; and finally, the prospects for human nature as pristine and transcendent, as opposed to being at odds with and spoiled by an innate 'evil,' are dim.

Thus, the 'stakes' being played for with the concept of instinct are, to Guntrip, the very viability of Object Relations theory as distinct from Freudian theory. To 'compromise' by synthesizing the two is to risk losing what he felt was the heart, and unique value, of Object Relations theory. Rather, his aim was to sharpen the distinctions between the two on their basic tenets, and thus to 'do battle' with Freudian theory, to disprove the validity of the opposite tenets and expunge them from theory.

Since instinct, as the conceptual embodiment of innate factors, is the keystone to the differences in basic tenets,

Object Relations theorists, and particularly Guntrip, mounted what is essentially a 'vendetta' against the concept of instinct. The purpose of this vendetta is to totally discredit the concept of instinct and thus, in Guntrip's eyes, to 'win' the battle over basic tenets.

However, while the target of this vendetta is instinct, the 'vehicle,' if you will, by which this battle is waged is more prominently a concerted attack on perhaps the basic tenet of Kleinian theory: the idea that destructiveness is a central dynamic factor from the beginning of life, and therefore must be included prominently in any theory of psychodynamics. To be sure, the concept of instinct itself oftentimes comes under attack directly in Guntrip's writings. However, the most vitriolic attacks are often reserved for the vehicle of this vendetta, the concept of destructiveness/aggression, and with it Klein herself. In effect, Object relations theorists (and especially Guntrip) conduct a systematic campaign to remove destructiveness from any place of primary importance in their theory. It is this rather violent disagreement with (and oftentimes distortion of) Kleinian views on destructiveness, a major basis of her theory, which insured that her ideas would only be used piece-meal, that her potential contribution to the emerging ideas of the Object Relations theorists would not be realized to the fullest extent possible.

V. WHY DESTRUCTIVENESS AND KLEIN BECAME THE 'TARGET'

This campaign against destructiveness begins with the unfortunate (in the present writer's view, as well as erroneous) implication that inevitable destructiveness is necessarily equated with instinct (i.e., death instinct), and thus the two deserve equal disparagement. The attack proceeds along multi-leveled and at times subtle lines. How this attack on destructiveness proceeds, and whether it has merit is the subject of Chapter II. First, let us look at why destructiveness became the vehicle by which the attack on instinct was carried forth.

As this writer sees it, there are several reasons why destructiveness, and Klein, become the central target of the Object Relations vendetta against the concept of instinct. First, there is the factor of how Object Relations theory modifies the basis of Freudian instinct theory, i.e., the relationship Object Relations theory has to Freud's "twin-drive" concept of libido and aggression. Object Relations had a use for the concept of libido. After all, every theory must make use of some motivational principle. "Libido" served this purpose, after it was 'cleansed' of its biological roots, i.e., putting libido forth as a unitary motivational concept on the basis of object seeking, rather than pleasure seeking, as was delineated earlier. Not surprisingly, Object Relations theorists do not focus much on instinct, except to usually denigrate the concept, nor do

they delve very far into what the ultimate base of such object-seeking might be. To ask why object-seeking should be a universal motivational factor that unfailingly makes its appearance in every human being would lead back to biology, a direction that Object Relations theorists clearly do not wish to pursue. Fairbairn only hints at what must be ultimately biological roots when he says that attachment to objects has adaptational or survival value (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 156). Guntrip prefers mostly to ignore the question of the origin of object-seeking libido, or essentially claims that it is a question irrelevant to psychodynamic science. He claims that such a question is phrased in terms relevant to physiology, biology, and neurology, fields which he must be pursued "apart" from psychology: "The physical is not illuminated by 'personal' terminology, nor the 'personal' by physical" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 20). However, quoting Fairbairn in a rare passage where Guntrip is not busy attacking instinct and psychobiology, he does imply quite plainly the role that libido plays in Object Relations theory, softened as it is by the dutiful reference to environmental factors added on at the end:

The goal of libido is the object It is this active, assertive libidinal drive that is psychobiologically predetermined and promoted by internal maturational as well as external stimuli (Guntrip, 1961, p. 131).

In essence, Guntrip admits that libido has the status of an instinctual drive in Object Relations theory, even if he

would never call it by that name.

In contrast to libido, destructiveness/aggression, as founded in and characterized by the death instinct, had no such redeeming or utilitarian value for Object Relations. Since Object Relations theory accounted for aggression as arising solely from environmental sources, and had already found its motivational/biological (however covertly stated) roots in the modified concept of libido, the death instinct was not only a superfluous concept but by dint of this fact it also became the appropriate main target for the attack on the concept of instinct.

It is at this point, where the attack on instinct diverges from criticism of the "twin drive" concept and centers on the death instinct, that Klein and her emphasis on an innate destructiveness becomes the focal target. While Freud originated the concept of the death instinct, it was Klein who made it central in her work, and emphasized destructiveness in relation to it as a central dynamic factor. Guntrip acknowledges Klein as not only the perpetuator of this Freudian concept, but as even perhaps more mistaken than Freud in extending and amplifying it, when he says, "Melanie Klein's theory amounts at this stage to a reorientation of psychoanalysis on the basis of aggression rather than libido as the pathogenic factor" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 201). Later Guntrip adds:

Thus, while Freud leaned too heavily towards the

side of the external origins of the super-ego, Mrs. Klein leans too far over in the opposite direction till at times the super-ego as inwardly directed aggression seems to become a purely subjective development of the death instinct in spite of the fact that her work provides a fully satisfactory developmental analysis of sadism and masochism without need to call in this so-called instinct (Guntrip, 1961, p. 205).

Quite a bit later, Guntrip 'formally' brings up the possible 'charges' against Klein on the grounds of what might be called 'aiding and abetting' the concept of instinct:

If Melanie Klein is to be charged with having produced a doctrine of Original Sin, it could only be on the ground that she persists in regarding the infant's sadism as innate by treating it as a manifestation of Freud's death instinct (Guntrip, 1961, p. 236).

Although he immediately points out that Freud is the originator of the doctrine, he clearly blames Klein for not perceiving that what she attributes to instinct is obviously a reaction to an inadequate environment.

Thus, it is Guntrip's perception of Klein as the standard bearer of the death instinct, which became the main target of the attack on instinct, that opened the way to an attack on an minimization of the concept of destructiveness in general by Object Relations theory.

A second reason for destructiveness and Klein becoming the 'vehicle' for the vendetta against instinct appears to the present writer to be the terribly ambivalent relationship that Object Relations theorists felt towards Klein and her work. On the one hand, they express a great debt to her for providing the foundations upon which Object

Relations theory could be built in her delineation of the dynamics of the internal world. Such gratitude is reflected in Guntrip's earlier quotes about the value of Klein's theory, which are typical of the homage paid to her by all Object Relations writers. I believe the debt felt to be owed to her on this basis made the parts of her theory which were felt to be threatening to nascent Object Relations theory (i.e., destructiveness and the death instinct) all the more so, to the point where they could not be given serious consideration for inclusion in theory. If, as acknowledged by the Object Relations theorists, she was so correct on some things, how could she be so mistaken on others? Guntrip's answer, as mentioned, is that she was "seduced" by her devotion to Freudian orthodoxy, was too confused to "have seen the forest for the trees" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 207), so that:

She elaborated Freud's theory . . . into a fully psychological view of mental development, while retaining Freud's own blindness to the fact that this constitutes a theory different in principle from earlier instinct theory (Guntrip, 1961, p. 207).

One suspects that Guntrip's ultimate reaction, which is to write-out destructiveness entirely as a central dynamic, is in fact an over-reaction to the instinctually-based parts of Kleinian theory which were felt to be threatening. Guntrip may be correct on the concept of instinctually-based aggression, i.e., the argument that it can be accounted for

more economically by environmental causes may be tenable. Yet, to essentially dismiss the importance of destructiveness entirely in the final formulation, and to do this with such vehemence, makes one suspect that there is some element of exaggeration at work in making sure that the 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' parts of Klein's theory retain an extremely sharp distinction, and that 'over-kill' is employed in refuting the unacceptable parts. It is almost as though, once having chased the 'snake from the garden' (i.e., having purged the death instinct from Object Relations theory), Guntrip feels he must attack anything 'snake-like,' lest re-infestation should occur. Although Guntrip would characterize the selective incorporation of Klein as preserving the baby while throwing out the bathwater, the ambivalent relation to Klein appears to lead, often by complex means, to an over-generalization of the attack on instinct to an attack on destructiveness itself.

Finally, destructiveness becomes the object of attack in Object Relations theory because, to Guntrip, the implications of instinct theory, and especially the death instinct, are simply offensive to his concept of the core of human nature. As seen earlier in the comparison of basic tenets between Freudian and Object Relations theory, there is a basic opposition between the two theories on their views of the core of human nature: that of man as having an inherent, pre-determined quality of 'evil' (aggression)

within him which must be contained through defensive compromise, vs. man as innately pristine, and who becomes 'corrupted' by outside influences.

Guntrip, prior to having become a psychotherapist, had been a minister. As such, he had a great personal stake in a humanistic view of mankind, a view which includes a firm belief that man is not permanently 'fallen from grace' due to an ineradicable flaw in his nature which he is unable to transcend. Rather, he believed that man is born in grace, and is ultimately 'redeemable' if he has fallen from that state, given that the fault, or 'corruption', comes from without. It is not by mistake that Guntrip connects the death instinct with "a doctrine of original sin," for the fight over human nature is clearly a question of moral, philosophical, and ultimately religious concepts for him.

When he uses more purely secular terms, it becomes evident that what he objects to in instinct theory are the limitations imposed upon man by the theory's conclusions. What these limitations are, in his view, and how instinct theory inevitably leads to them and thus is the 'culprit' is best seen in the following series of quotes from Guntrip:

He summarizes Freud's view of the nature of culture from The Future of an Illusion as follows:

1. The ideal is culture without coercion which gives free play to instinctive gratification. 2. This however is impossible because man's endowment includes destructive forces Freud regards every individual as an enemy of culture Thus what is

necessary for existence (i.e., civilization) has to be defended against our very nature Freud thinks that although it might seem that a social organization which did not coerce or suppress instincts ought to lead to a satisfying enjoyment of living, it would not work out that way, for there are destructive and anti-social tendencies in everyone, the majority of people are lazy, unintelligent and not prepared to be other than unruly. . . . Freud's theory of culture rests ultimately on the view that aggressive and libidinal impulses are inevitably non-altruistic and represent a basic biologically determined instinctive endowment . . . which cannot be changed.

Thus, human nature is unfitted for, and hostile to, good personal relationships. It is only fitted for exploitation of objects in the interest of biological appetitive needs There is no such thing as a natural good feeling. Only fear can restrain human beings, for their nature is wholly antisocial (Guntrip, 1961, pp. 78-79).

In the final outcome, it is instinct theory which 'dooms' man to a "state of nature" which is worse than Hobbes' view of life as "nasty, brutish, and short" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 79) because "This theory means that the basic conflict within human nature is ultimately irreducible and its final outcome in the victory of the destructive drive is only staved off for a time by compromises . . ." (Guntrip, 1961, p. 66).

Although it is Freudian instinct theory as a whole which is largely attacked here by Guntrip, the onerous and unsatisfactory possibilities regarding human nature in it are largely traced to the destructive aspects of instincts:

The innate pessimism of Freud's total theory springs from the fact that his neurological homeostatic principle (i.e., the principle underlying instincts) involves logically the idea

that a) the basic relation between the person and his environment is hostile, b) that hate is more fundamental than love, and c) that the aim of all life is the reduction of activity even to the point of death (Guntrip, 1961, p. 152).

Thus, all of these 'roots' of pessimism relate to the qualities of the death instinct. As has been seen, Klein was the perpetrator and extender of this concept, and thus once again, the reaction of attacking her central concept of destructiveness in order to rid Object Relations theory of this 'odious' doctrine might be expected. However, in order to pursue this attack one must ignore the ways in which Kleinian theory deviated from Freudian orthodoxy, especially in terms of the possibilities for man 'transcending' his instinctual endowment, as delineated earlier, or dismiss these features as insignificant. This is exactly what Object Relations theory did, preferring to sink, rather than salvage, the concept of instinct, and with it a central place for the concept of destructiveness.

CHAPTER II

DESTRUCTIVENESS AS A CENTRAL DYNAMIC: REFUTATION, REBUTTAL, AND SYNTHESIS

I. INTRODUCTION

Having laid down the bases of the various theoretical positions, and having shown why destructiveness became the target of an Object Relations vendetta against instinct, attention can now be turned to how this removal of destructiveness as a central dynamic is carried out.

The first part of this chapter will concentrate on the four major arguments or objections which Object Relations theory, and especially Guntrip, present against destructiveness as a central dynamic. I have named these four arguments the 'moral,' 'moot,' 'deferred,' and 'replacement' arguments. The delineation of each argument as explicated by the Object Relations theorists is followed by a refutation of the validity of each one.

It is important to note that these arguments are often neither as organized nor presented in as clear-cut a fashion as they will appear here. In fact, the division into four basic arguments is an artificial device on my part in an attempt to summarize and focus what appears to be at the heart of their objections.

Indeed, it would have been better if the Object Relations theorists, and especially Guntrip, had offered a

point-by-point refutation of destructiveness as a central dynamic, at least in terms of the coherence and validity of their arguments. As it is, the attack launched against destructiveness is by turns often piece-meal, vague, distorted, inconsistent, and self-contradictory. For example, in pursuing one or another of the arguments against destructiveness, or in favor of one his basic tenets, Guntrip often contradicts another of his arguments against destructiveness. He rarely stops to note, much less to resolve, these contradictions. Furthermore, it is characteristic of him to often briefly imply an alternate possibility to his formulations, and never again pursue its implications. Thus, he is most open to the accusation with which he charges Klein: of not following his formulations to their logical conclusions, of ignoring and leaving 'dangling' the implications of his own writing. As a result of such 'unmethodical' theorizing, it should not be surprising when Guntrip's own quotes are used as evidence against his points, or alternately, that he should mention or imply the very viewpoint which the present writer is advocating. The arguments as presented represent what appears to be the main thrust of the Object Relations theorists' viewpoints and arguments, what they apparently intended to stand as their major position, rather than an exhaustive cataloging of everything they said. The two are

sometimes different, due to the manner in which they carry forward their arguments, as noted above.

Once the arguments against destructiveness are delineated and refuted, the chapter presents a re-integration of destructiveness as a central dynamic, within the context of retaining the basic overall structure of the Object Relations theorists' system of dynamics, and at the same time accounting for Guntrip's valuable clinical observations on the phenomenon of schizoid withdrawal. Combined into this integrative formulation of dynamics is an inherent critique and 're-interpretation' of Guntrip's dynamic formulation of the earliest period of development.

II. THE 'MORAL' ARGUMENT

It was seen in Chapter I how Guntrip's disagreement with Freudian theory over the core of human nature hinges on the concept of instinct, and in particular, on the death instinct and destructiveness. Guntrip recognizes that the onerous implications that follow from instinct theory are both inevitable and logical (at least internally within the theory) when he says, "Freud . . . pursued a possible negative theory with uncompromising logic to its final conclusions" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 80). He concedes that:

Naturally, if this instinct theory, which is the basis of the whole line of reasoning, were true, then Freud would simply be calling our attention to facts and we would have to make the best we could of the situation (Guntrip, 1961, p. 69).

Thus, in order to preserve his pristine and optimistic view of human nature, Guntrip sets himself the task of disproving the validity of instinct theory, and especially the genesis of destructiveness according to it. One tack he takes in this quest is attacking the premise that destructiveness is innate, arguing instead for an environmental basis. This objection will be addressed in the next section.

However, a good portion of his argument against the import of instinct and destructiveness revolves not around clinical evidence or the logic of the theory (he has already conceded the internal logic of it), but on the basis that the conclusions of the theory are unacceptable and offensive, in that they do not do justice to consideration of people as 'whole human beings,' and therefore cannot be admitted for serious consideration. A main reason for constructing an alternate hypothesis to the instinctual etiology of destructiveness becomes in large part the odiousness of the conclusions of the theory, and not the validity of those conclusions.

It is one thing to argue according to facts, and where Guntrip does this one can weigh the evidence and logic used in making judgments about the merits of his arguments. However, Guntrip often presses his argument on the basis of morality rather than evidence, and comes up with what I call the 'moral' argument against instinct and destructiveness,

(the heart of which, as indicated earlier, is that innate destructiveness is just too pessimistic a view of human nature).

That Guntrip carries forth his argument against instinct and destructiveness on a moral basis is indicated by the language he employs:

Freud is landed in a dilemma that the denial of instinct is necessary for culture and civilization, whilst the gratification of instinct and the relaxation of culture is necessary for health. This pessimistic conclusion should arouse our suspicions (Guntrip, 1961, p. 69 -- emphasis added).

The impression given here is that it is Freud's conclusions and their moral implications that disturb Guntrip, and that his reaction to them is an emotional one is consolidated by his quoting of Walker as a representation of his own views:

Even without the death instinct, Freud's conclusions are pessimistic enough. Even if the goal of the central nervous system is not death, but merely 'the abolition of stimuli', this is something which, by the values at least of Western European civilization, is not much better. We are not offended when we are told how the rest of the body operates homeostatically to maintain its temperature, salinity and so forth, for it is possible to regard this as an excellent arrangement for allowing us to get on with the work that really matters, whether it is the creation of art . . . (etc.). . . . But when we are told that our central nervous system is doing all this simply because its slogan is 'anything for a quiet life', we are outraged and discouraged. Can this be so? Is this the verdict of modern science? (Guntrip, 1961, pp. 150-51)

One can see in this passage three particularly important points: First, that it is the death instinct and therefore

destructiveness that is the 'capper' to the already "pessimistic enough" conclusions. Secondly, that Guntrip's reactions to these conclusions are not of unbiased examination, but of "outrage," because values important to him have been transgressed. If he feels free to criticize Klein for being too 'befuddled' to see the implications of her own work, one might suggest that he, too, is open to the charge of refusing to face and deal logically and with equanimity with implications he finds offensive. Thirdly, it is "modern science" which has burdened us with such odious conclusions.

This last point, that "modern science" is the culprit, is important, because it constitutes the basis of an attempt by Guntrip to mask what is essentially a moral argument on his part by couching it in seemingly more dispassionate and logical terms. As indicated in Chapter I, Guntrip argues that instinct theory, with its roots in physiology/biology, constitutes an inadequate metaphor on which to base a true psychodynamic science, because of its inability to deal with complete human beings in all their complexity. He connects this "scientific viewpoint," as he calls it, as inextricably bound up with the pessimism of instinct theory:

Freud's pessimism, written large in his estimate of human nature in The Future of an Illusion and in his views of the immutability of instincts, especially sadistic instincts, is clearly related to his neurological philosophy and general scientific outlook. Either may be regarded as leading logically to the other (Guntrip, 1961, p. 150).

Ultimately, Guntrip suggests that such a "scientific" (empirically scientific, that is) outlook provides inadequate tools to examine psychological experience. If this is so, such a criticism must be taken seriously, for it appears to rest on a charge of faulty methodology, rather than an appeal to morals or values.

But is this the case? The way in which Guntrip pursues the argument suggests that, underlying a criticism apparently based on valid logical criteria and assessment of acceptable research practices and evidence, is the same moral and emotional arguments.

Guntrip's argument of "faulty methodology" in the "scientific attitude" evolves from a sequence of rather curious logic. He terms Freud's "scientific attitude of complete unemotional detachment" a "schizoid" characteristic (Guntrip, 1961, p. 249). He states that "schizoid intellectuals are bound to be attracted to science as an escape from the pressures of personal relationships, which the schizoid person finds difficult" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 249). Thus, this "schizoid" inability to engage in and understand close personal relationships, which he has said is at the root of the "scientific attitude", makes it unsurprising that ". . . the overwhelming scientific trend in Freud's theory and therapeutic technique should have shaped both in a markedly impersonal way" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 250). Essentially, Guntrip is arguing that Freud's

methodology and theory are impersonal, and therefore unsuited for application to human beings, because they derive from a character flaw in Freud himself! One might be charitable and argue that perhaps Guntrip only refers here to a characterological style, to which everyone is heir in one form or another. However, he clearly goes beyond this, tarring Freud's attitude by association with some of the greatest psychopaths of history:

Freud shares his thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature with Machiavelli . . . (and also with Mussolini and Hitler, who, as dictators are bound to be, were contemptuous of the masses who they thought fit only to be controlled) (Guntrip, 1961, p. 78).

Rather than a reasoned discourse on the methodological applicability of empirical science to psychodynamic science, Guntrip appears to engage in what is more akin to character assassination in this area.

And who, if the "schizoid scientist" is unfit, is qualified to investigate and theorize about personal relationships? The answer is unsurprising, given Guntrip's religious background:

Science is the primarily intellectual investigation of impersonal phenomena, and religion is the primarily emotional expression of personal relationships, from which the schizoid person is detached and which he often consciously dislikes and has little capacity to understand (Guntrip, 1961, p. 250).

By implication, only those involved or sympathetic to religious and philosophic doctrine, like himself and

Fairbairn (and who unlike Freud do not view "science with a capital S and Truth with a capital T" and do not "bow the knee to the scientific Baal") (Guntrip, 1961, p. 250), have the proper personality make-up to pursue this field.

In part, Guntrip is here retaliating to Freud's hostile view of religion as "superstition" and "infatile fantasy" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 249) and taking a holier-than-thou approach in rebuttal. However, the key point is that at least on the question of human nature, Guntrip bases his arguments for the discrediting of instinct theory, and with it judgment on the central position of destructiveness, as valid or not on a moral basis rather than on clinical, logical, or heuristic criteria. This approach to theory critique is ". . . a bit like criticizing the 'big bang' theory of the origin of the universe because of its implication for the eventual fate of the cosmos" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 214).

On moral grounds, there is no question that Guntrip is correct that instinct theory, and the view of destructiveness as an intractable problem, is a very pessimistic and undesirable proposition. But by putting such an argument on the basis of value judgments, Guntrip's own arguments stand or fall on his own implicit proposition that: ". . . a kindly theory is a better theory, or a kindly theoretician a better theoretician" (Schaefer, 1976, p. 118). Of course, this proposition is insupportable on

logical grounds, and with such an obvious inadequacy it undermines any of the arguments for minimization of destructiveness as a central factor which Guntrip makes on the basis of moral arguments.

III. THE 'MOOT' ARGUMENT

One of the arguments of the Object Relations theorists against destructiveness as a central dynamic factor is implicit in the battle they wage over the etiology of destructiveness with Freudian/Kleinian theory. If aggression is innate, it must be central because it is by definition an intractable problem requiring containment. However, if it is a reactive by-product to environmental frustration, it is not intrinsic in the nature of humankind. Thus, theoretically it is neither an inevitable nor an intractable problem, and at the very least by implication, it is not central to dynamics.

Although never stated this plainly, the 'linkage' between the etiology and the importance of aggression pervades many of the arguments the Object Relations theorists put forth in the process of promoting various tenets of their theory. For example, in attacking the idea of destructiveness as instinctual, Guntrip (1971, pp. 34-39) draws a contrast between sex as a biological appetitive need that takes on interpersonal significance (i.e., libidinal object attachment), and thus can be considered primary, and

aggression on the other hand, which shows no biologically appetitive characteristics and thus is always a function of interpersonal relations. The conclusion of making libidinal needs primary and aggressive ones secondary (because they are reactive to the environment) is seen in another of Guntrip's works, in which he states, "But if, indeed, the capacity to love is the basic element in human nature, then the problem (of eliminating aggression and destructiveness) is not intrinsically intractable" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 424 -- emphasis original). Thus, one sees how, typically, the importance of aggression becomes equated with and wedded to its etiology in Object Relations theory.

The 'linkage' between the etiology and importance of aggression is further strengthened, again by implication, in the argument that Guntrip and Fairbairn put forth that, theoretically, an aggression-free person is possible if only given the right environmental provisions to begin with. As Fairbairn states, "Thus, I do not consider that in the absence of frustration the infant would direct aggression spontaneously towards the libidinal object" (in Guntrip, 1961, p. 317). Guntrip, taking a more global view, posits that a conflict-free, and thus by implication 'internalization-free' and aggression-free psyche is imaginable:

If we imagine a perfectly mature person, he would have no endopsychic structure in the sense of permanently opposed drives and controls. He would be a whole unified person whose internal psychic

differentiation and organization would simply represent his diversified interests and abilities, with an overall good ego-development, in good object-relationship (Guntrip, 1981, p. 425).

In arguing that aggression is environmentally derived, the extension of this view is that if environmental deprivation and frustration are absent, then so is aggression. The implication of this view is that aggression is not the inevitable, deterministic factor inherent in instinct theory, and thus it is not necessarily a focal, primary factor.

In point of fact, the present writer contends that the implied 'linkage' between the etiology of aggression and its importance in dynamics is wholly unjustified, precisely because aggression is an inevitable phenomenon in humankind. Because of this, the argument over etiology is entirely moot in regards to both the appearance of aggression and its dynamic functioning. Furthermore, it is the Object Relations theorists' own statements, made during the course of attacking or defending other points, (and which are rarely followed up on or pursued for their implications) that support this contention. Let us see how this can be shown.

The idea of a pristine, aggression-free psyche must remain forever theoretical, for in practical applications it runs into a simple but insurmountable obstacle: that neither a society, nor a single individual has ever been observed that is devoid of aggressive characteristics or

urges. This is too glaring an anomaly for Object Relationists to ignore. Indeed, it is a fact which they are compelled to explain, since it appears to support the instinctual view that aggression is universal because it is innate. Guntrip finds that he must agree with Freud's observation that men are not "gentle creatures," and admit that the ubiquity of aggression as both a societal and individual phenomenon is "an accurate description of our state of affairs" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 17). However, Guntrip refutes the idea that this omnipresence of aggression is proof of the existence of a destructive instinct. Rather, he argues that it is due to "the result of frustration in early development which became embedded in the internal structure of the personality itself" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 76). Thus, according to Guntrip, Freud mistakenly ". . . equated average or general immaturity with innate constitutional make-up" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 83 -- emphasis original).

Why is "average immaturity" so widespread? In accounting for the ubiquity of aggression, Guntrip must acknowledge that environmental deprivation and frustration, in the form of less-than-perfect mothering, is itself universal and inevitable:

We have no experience of an infant, from his point of view, without a bad environment. No environment can ever be perfect, but, what is even more to the point, the infant is so weak and helpless that what is not from our point of view bad, can seem so to him because he is so vulnerable. Here is all the possibility of bad

object experience, fear and anger, arising with even the best of mothers (Guntrip, 1981, pp. 415-416 -- emphasis original).

This is not an inadvertant comment, for the point that environmental deprivation is a universal constant is repeatedly reinforced both by Guntrip (1961, p. 339; 1971, p. 139) and Fairbairn (1952, p. 8; 1952, p. 56).

Guntrip claims that the use of the concept of a death instinct is an "unnecessarily tortuous" way to account for the the appearance and ubiquity of aggression (Guntrip, 1961, p. 85). It is uncertain that the positing of universal frustrations encountered in infancy is really a more elegant accounting of this phenomenon. Ultimately, the present writer would hold that there appears to be no way to conclusively prove one of the two etiologies over the other, precisely because they arrive at and agree upon the same phenomenological result of the universal appearance and inevitability of aggression. And it is this agreement on the manifest inevitability of destructiveness which renders the argument over etiology specious in regards to the importance of aggression in dynamics.

The argument over etiology has obvious impact for whether a theoretically aggression-free psyche can exist, and thus is relevant to the question of whether or not aggression constitutes an 'innate evil.' However, since by Guntrip's own admission frustration is unavoidable from the beginning of existence (Guntrip, 1971, p. 138), in

practical terms aggression is inevitable. At the same time that Guntrip holds that without a death instinct, the problem of aggression is not intrinsically intractable, he must admit that it is practically intractable (Guntrip, 1981, p. 424). And with this admission, the 'linkage' between the etiology of aggression and its inevitability (and thus its importance as a primary phenomenon) fails to hold any validity. The problem in Guntrip's writing is not that he fails to admit to the ubiquity of aggression but that he fails to make it explicit that by such an admission, the 'linkage' by implication to the importance of destructiveness is no longer valid. Or, to be more accurate, this is almost the case. In one passage where he is in the midst of arguing that destructiveness is not an "ultimate" need as are libidinal ones, he rather surprisingly, by the casual way in which it is done, accedes to the point that:

Once aggression is in the works, its ad hoc analysis is not much affected by whether with Fairbairn we hold that frustration and deprivation originate it, or with Mrs. Klein that they only intensify it as an innate impulse (Guntrip, 1961, p. 343).

Startlingly, Guntrip has with this statement implicitly clinched the very point this writer has been arguing: that the etiology has no bearing on the dynamic workings or importance of destructiveness. Of course, he fails to conclude this. In fact, it is a prime example of statements which he makes and then leaves 'dangling', never following

them up to their conclusions nor resolving the inconsistencies which they raise.

Such a statement can serve as a base for a preliminary integration of the Object Relations and Kleinian views of the dynamics of destructiveness, and a summarization of my point about the 'mootness' of the etiological argument. This preliminary integration can be represented as simplified 'schematic' of the genesis of destructiveness:

1) Death	----->	2) Environmental	----->	3) Persecution
Instinct		Frustration/		(phenomenological)
(Klein)		Deprivation		
		(Guntrip)		

-----> 4) Destructiveness/Aggression

Guntrip argues that the death instinct (1) is a superfluous concept, because the resultant dynamics of destructiveness are adequately accounted for solely from environmental frustration. Whether this is so, or whether, as in Klein's schema, environmental frustration serves to reinforce and activate pre-existing instincts, the appearance and dynamics of what occurs once aggression has been 'begotten' by either of these two accounts is inevitably identical: The phenomenological persecution resultant from innate and/or environmental sources results, through cycles of projection and introjection, in the appearance of destructive urges. As Guntrip notes, once

such urges have arisen, their source should no longer influence the course of dynamics.

Indeed, if the 'moral' and 'moot' arguments were the only ones which Object Relations theorists made in objection to destructiveness as primary, one could be satisfied with the present refutation of this idea and let the 'schematic' of dynamics as presented stand. However, beyond these two arguments the Object Relations theorists present further, and seemingly more substantial and serious obstacles to the integration of destructiveness in early dynamics. Such objections will necessitate a more complex scheme of integration. It is towards these arguments that attention will next be turned.

III. THE 'DEFERRED' ARGUMENT

Even if one concedes that the 'moral' and 'moot' arguments are specious or inappropriate, Object Relations theory presents another obstacle to the view that destructiveness is primary and focal by deferring destructive aggression to a later, and hence less central, period of development. Essentially, this argument begins with the proposition that 'purposive' destructive aggression, involving anger and hate, are primarily problems arising in depressive position dynamics, being either non-existent or without a real role in earlier stages of development.

All three of the major Object Relations theorists point to this claim in one form or another. Fairbairn (1952, pp. 49-50) contends that aggression only makes its appearance as a "late oral" (i.e., depressive position) problem, and that prior to this period bad objects are not reacted to with hate, but only with rejection. He makes the differentiation between the dilemma of whether "to love or to hate" as belonging to the late oral period, while the question of "to love or not to love" is characteristic of the early oral, or schizoid position (akin to Klein's paranoid-schizoid period). Fairbairn further states that the disposition of one's hate, and the control of aggression, is only a problem after a state of ambivalence towards the object has been achieved (Fairbairn, 1952, pp. 53-57).

Similarly, Winnicott's division of dynamic stages, i.e. 'pre-moral' vs. 'moral,' or 'pre-ruth' vs. 'concern,' may (as noted in Chapter I) be interpreted to relegate the appearance of anger and hate towards objects, and with it truly destructive aggression, to the depressive stage, after split object-images have begun a rudimentary integration. As was pointed out earlier, such an interpretation would rest on the lack of the infant's intentionality in his attack upon objects, and with this lack of 'purposiveness,' anger or hate would be presumed to also be absent.

Guntrip, in a more elaborate exposition of the argument, subsumes and extends both Fairbairn's and

Winnicott's arguments for the 'deferral' of aggression to the depressive period, and so it is his formulations that will primarily be addressed here. Guntrip's relegation of aggression as characteristic of depressive, and therefore higher-level dynamics starts with the premise that hate and anger, which are characteristic of aggression, do not figure into more basic dynamics. He states destructive aggression is a reaction to frustrating objects, and characterizes this as:

the problem of hate, or love made angry. It is an attack on a hostile, rejecting, actively refusing bad object. It leads to depression for it rouses fear that one's hate will destroy the very person that one needs and loves, a fear that grows into guilt (Guntrip, 1981, p.24 -- emphasis original).

However, he says that "there is an earlier and more basic reaction" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 24) than hate and anger, which is the reaction of fear and weakness in the face of frustrated need. Depression is a "moral problem" of our "badness," while fear and weakness characterize an earlier, pre-moral dynamic setup (Guntrip, 1981, p. 134).

We will look more closely at this "earlier reaction" subsequently, but first, let us take exception to Guntrip's contention that hate, anger, and aggression belong solely to higher-level, depressive dynamics. By employing one of Guntrip's apparent inconsistencies, this can be done using his own words to describe the earliest stages of development. To wit: "The infant is so helpless that his natural needs are extremely urgent, and if they are not

quickly met, panic and rage develop" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 31 -- emphasis added). Guntrip also states that in the inevitable instances where the natural vigor of the infant is met with maternal frustration, "He may grow at first angry and demanding . . ." (Guntrip, 1981, p. 32 -- emphasis added), and if ". . . no satisfactory solution is found . . . the combination of natural vigor, natural anger, and natural fear develop into hate" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 32 -- emphasis added). And again, "The frustration of libidinal need for good object relations both arouses aggression and intensifies libidinal need . . ." (Guntrip, 1981, p. 67 -- emphasis original).

Thus, by Guntrip's own reckoning, anger, hate, and aggression do indeed appear prior to the depressive level of development. What becomes of these feelings and how do they fit in dynamically? In part, Guntrip simply ignores the implications of these statements, concentrating instead on the reaction of fear and weakness which he holds to be primary. However, he does appear to deal with the problem of early destructiveness at least in part by asserting that it is fundamentally different in nature from later, or depressive, destructiveness.

Whereas he states the problem of depressive level dynamics is "love grown angry," an "earlier simpler reaction" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 26) is "love grown hungry" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 241), which he claims is at the the core

of an earlier "schizoid" problem. Of this "earlier" reaction, he states:

When you cannot get what you want from the person you need, instead of getting angry you may simply go on getting more and more hungry, and full of a sense of painful craving, and a longing to get total and complete possession of your love-object so that you cannot be left to starve. . . . it rouses the terrible fear that one's love has become so devouring and incorporative that love itself has become destructive. Depression is fear of loving lest one's hate should destroy. Schizoid aloofness is fear of loving lest one's love or need of love should destroy, which is far worse (Guntrip, 1981, p. 24).

Thus, the fear of one's love as destructive, fear of destroying objects through needs and facing phenomenological abandonment¹, is the type of destructiveness which Guntrip proposes to replace destructiveness involving hate. The simplest refutation of the deferral of the dynamics of destructiveness would be to merely point out that 'a rose by any other name is still a rose,' i.e., semantic differentials aside, destructiveness is still attributable to the earliest period of development, despite what Guntrip chooses to call it or cloak it in.

However, the matter may go deeper than words, and deserves closer examination. The key characteristics of

¹It would appear logical that the results of the phantasy of destroying all of one's objects (whether through devouring greediness or anger) is phenomenologically perceived at a primitive level as abandonment by objects, i.e., the resultant absence of objects and one's aloneness likely becomes the focal factor of experience, rather than the cause-and-effect relationship that led to this state.

Guntrip's concept of early destructiveness, in contrast to what he terms "depressive aggression" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 342), are that fear and greed replace anger and hate. But are anger and hate truly not a part of early dynamics, as Guntrip suggests? The contention that Guntrip is mistaken, or at least that he is not giving a full account of the situation, is supported by three sources or arguments.

First, as noted, there are Guntrip's own statements, in which he uses such words as "anger," "rage," etc. to describe the infant's earliest reactions to frustration. He fails to follow up on the implications of these statements or to reconcile them with his fully explicated ideas on early destructiveness, but this does not mean that such feelings simply disappear or are unimportant. His failure to do so appears to reflect more on the non-comprehensiveness of his theory.

Secondly, when he talks of "love as destructive," he is borrowing, in part, on Winnicott's concept of the "naturally zesty" activity (love) of the infant turned greedy under conditions of frustration. However, he runs up against a problem because, as Guntrip notes, Winnicott sometimes "speaks of this 'destructive primitive love' as simply 'hate'" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 32). (Here Guntrip is referring to Winnicott's "destructive primitive love" as the natural impulse to object-related activity, prior to contamination by frustration.) One is tempted to ask, by way of refuting

Guntrip's idea that hate is not a factor in pre-depressive experience, "Why not simply take Winnicott at his word, and accept that when he implies 'hate' is present prior to frustration, he means it?"

Guntrip goes to great pains to escape this 'trap' of condoning the idea of pre-frustration hate, contending that it is a misnomer on Winnicott's part to call the naturally zesty activity of the infant 'hate,' because "we can hardly say that the infant is intentionally ruthless" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 32). However, even if Guntrip is correct in this contention, in laying out this position he apparently unintentionally argues against his own viewpoint that hate is initially a depressive-level phenomenon:

It seems to me to guard best against confusion to keep the term hate for pathologically destructive need which once brought into being may persist throughout life (Guntrip, 1981, p. 32 -- emphasis original).

Since this "pathologically destructive need," the overwhelmingly "greedy hunger" of the infant under deprivation, is of the earliest developmental period, Guntrip's equivalence of this term with "hate" again contradicts his own position that "hate" (as well as anger) belong to later developmental levels.

Thirdly, and most importantly, anger and hate virtually 'disappear' from Guntrip's account of early dynamics because Guntrip only 'tells half the story' of these dynamics. However, the 'half' that he tells is essentially correct,

drawing attention away from the 'half' which is ignored. This is the seductiveness of his theory: that because he gives a viable accounting of one kind of early dynamic, the role of aggressive destructiveness, involving anger and hate, becomes easily obscured and overlooked. I do not mean to be unnecessarily obscure about the 'missing' dynamics in Guntrip's theory. It is only that it is a complex matter, which takes some effort to clarify.

Guntrip's early destructiveness of "love grown hungry," and the fear that accompanies it, is a Libidinal Ego (L.E.) phenomenon. That is, it is the 'natural' hungering of the ego for objects, when faced with frustration, that becomes insatiably 'greedy' and necessitates splitting from the Central Ego. It is the tantalizing but unforthcoming Exciting Object which provides the frustration. The 'greediness' of the L.E. is what Guntrip apparently means when he terms it "aggression," for he states, "In the L.E., aggression is in the service of libidinal needs" (Guntrip, 1961, p. 365). However, as noted, Guntrip holds that such greediness is not truly aggressive in the intentionally destructive sense. Furthermore, the "more basic" fear reaction is placed as a function of the L.E.: fear of devouring the object, and of the 'ego-weakness' of being aroused but helpless to obtain any kind of satisfaction.

However, Guntrip also connects this L.E. state with persecutory anxiety (Klein's paranoid-schizoid position).

He states, "It is the libidinal ego . . . in which the persecutory pressure is felt" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 73); and, "To relate in terms simply of fear sets up the paranoid state . . . (whereas to relate in terms of aggression sets up the depressive position)" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 101); and also, "(In) a frightened ego . . . (the struggle to remain in relationships) On a more primitive level this exposes the ego to persecutory paranoid anxieties" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 147).

As noted, Guntrip gives a viable account, and cannot be faulted as far as he goes. However, what he leaves out of this account is the concomitant reaction that almost certainly occurs along with fear in paranoid dynamics: the reaction wanting to also actively destroy the frustrating object, not out of hypertrophied love/need, but because of the anger and hate which such frustration arouses.

One can agree with Guntrip that it is the L.E. which is persecuted in the paranoid position. However, to see more clearly how Guntrip 'sidesteps' this reaction of anger and hate, one must look more closely at what or 'who' does the persecuting.

In one place, Guntrip clearly implies that it is the Exciting Object (E.O.) which is felt to be the persecutor, by means of its "tantalizing refusal" of needs (Guntrip, 1981, pp. 24-25, 70). There is no argument with this position, as the E.O. must logically appear

phenomenologically to the infant as a persecutor. However, at the same time, Guntrip appears to relegate the Anti-Libidinal Ego as an agent of persecution as a creation of depressive phenomenon: "The depressive (in contrast to the paranoid or schizoid) sees the object as a hateful denier, or in Fairbairn's terms, a rejecting object to be destroyed" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 25 -- emphasis added). Such apparent relegation of the A.L.E. to the depressive period is reinforced by Guntrip's description of depressive phenomenon as "moral persecution" for one's aggression. However, one must question whether indeed Guntrip can be serious about the implications here: namely, that the A.L.E. is not created or does not come into play until the depressive period, since there is no basis in Fairbairn's original work for believing that there is any time differential in the splits which result in the L.E - E.O. / A.L.E. - R.O. ego complexes.

We may give Guntrip the benefit of the doubt that he does not intend to exclude the A.L.E. as a persecutory agent in the earliest period, since he later states, "Inevitably the libidinal ego is hated and persecuted by the anti-libidinal ego as well as by the rejecting object (for its ever active and unsatisfied desires)" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 72).

However, the crux of the matter lies in the source and nature of the A.L.E.'s hateful persecution of the L.E. At this point in his career, Guntrip puts the emphasis on the

identification with an incorporated rejecting environment:

. . . the attachment to the rejecting object results in an anti-libidinal ego based on identification which reproduces the hostility of the rejecting object to libidinal needs (Guntrip, 1981, p. 72 -- emphasis original).

What is completely absent from this formulation is the aspect of reactive anger and hate on the part of the L.E. which becomes incorporated into the A.L.E. through splitting, projection, and introjection, and constitutes what can be called a 'return of the split' when it reappears as persecution of the L.E. by the A.L.E.

The A.L.E. is not simply an accretion of an introjected 'real', 'bad' environment, distorted as it is by primitive perceptual abilities, as Guntrip contends in this passage (due, I think, to his insistence on both children and patients only as 'victims' of external aggression, rather than active progenitors of it as well). I would contend that the A.L.E. is in part a product of the reaction of destructive, intended anger and hate (although reactive, if you like) generated by the L.E., which then becomes split-off because of the danger of its destroying needed objects and/or provoking retaliation in kind by them. Such anger is not only split, but it is also projected onto the outside environment, and then re-incorporated into the A.L.E., based on identification with the rejecting object. This angry aggression is then used to persecute the L.E. for its neediness in the fashion outlined by Guntrip.

The crucial difference between Guntrip's formulation and the one stated by the present writer is that while we can both agree that the A.L.E.'s persecution is in part a result of an incorporated 'bad environment,' this writer holds that it is also in part a result of the split-off, projected and introjected destructive hate of the L.E. as an early reaction to frustration. By projection, this hate is 'overlaid' over the 'real,' 'bad' environment, making it seem all the more 'bad.' In sum, it appears likely that it is also an authentic angry reaction of the self, not merely an incorporated reflection of the environment, which is turned upon the L.E. to suppress libidinal neediness.

Curiously enough, this interpretation of A.L.E. dynamics involving internally generated hate is supported and suggested in an earlier work by Guntrip in which he states:

Fairbairn traces self-destructive impulses to the infant's struggle to cope with internal problems, by using 'a maximum of his aggression to subdue a maximum of his libidinal need', thus turning the full force of his aggression and hate felt against those who deprived him of satisfaction against himself in an attempt to stop himself from having any wants that could be denied. This technique of self suppression is structurally organized and consolidated as a part of the ego itself split-off and repressed . . . (as the) anti-libidinal ego . . . (Guntrip, 1961, p. 344).

In his later work, Guntrip obscures the role of self-generated anger leading to self-punishment as an early phenomenon by saying it is the depressed person (i.e., more developmentally advanced) who "turns his anger and

aggression back against himself" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 25 -- emphasis added) leading to guilt and "moral persecution" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 57). The result is "paralysis" by depression, of the ego not "doing anything at all for fear of doing wrong" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 83). However, he also belies (again in his later work) the fact that this dynamic of angry aggression turned inward belongs with the earliest pre-moral period, and is not merely a higher-level form of "moral persecution" by such statements as, "The paranoid individual faces physical persecution (as in dreams of being attacked by murderous figures)" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 57).

The key word in this passage is "murderous": It is an actively angry, hostile and destructive emotion that involves the intention to destroy. Where does such a feeling come from in this pre-depressive level of development? It seems that Guntrip would have us believe that it either does not exist at this level, or is merely an incorporation of a bad environment. As has been seen, using Guntrip's own statements, the generation of such an intentionally destructive emotion most likely also involves a reaction of anger and hate at the level of development prior to the depressive period: hate, originally directed at external persecutors, which is turned back against the self through the agency of the A.L.E. Moreover, precisely because it has undergone splitting, projection onto the outer environment, and re-incorporation through the A.L.E.,

it can be confused as having originated solely with outside figures, such as the "murderous figures" in the dream Guntrip mentions.

V. THE 'REPLACEMENT' ARGUMENT

The argument which poses the most serious challenge to the view of destructiveness as a central dynamic is put forward by Guntrip, and consists of what amounts to the replacement of aggression (and persecutory fear as well) with passivity, in the form of 'schizoid withdrawal' as the most basic, powerful, and dangerously pathological force in personality development and dynamics. How passive schizoid withdrawal attains this status will be examined in a moment, but first let us look at the genesis and dynamics of the phenomenon as laid out by Guntrip.

As noted earlier, Guntrip states that fear is a more basic reaction than anger to impingement and frustration. He further claims that there are two basic reactions to fear, "fight and flight" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 147). "Fight" is defined as the fight to remain in object relations. In a frustrating environment, only bad object relations can be engaged in, leading to the paranoid position and persecutory anxiety. "Flight" means to withdraw from all object relations, in order to escape fear and persecutory anxiety.

Guntrip reifies this urge to withdraw from all object contact as a structurally existing and persisting part of

the psyche, which in fact becomes the most powerful part. Using Fairbairn's tri-partite system of endopsychic structure (C.E./A.L.E./L.E.), Guntrip posits a "final split in the infantile ego" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 88 -- emphasis original). Under the fear of persecution, and despairing of finding surcease from bad object relations, a portion of the weak, needy L.E. splits off and renounces all attempts at object relationship. As Guntrip states:

The only other choice open to him, if he finds this 'bad object-relations' position intolerable, is to take flight mentally from his environment, and escape the provocation to hate by ceasing to feel anything consciously at all for his bad world, i.e., to become withdrawn and schizoid . . . (Guntrip, 1981, p. 155).

Guntrip calls this part-ego the Regressed Ego (R.E.). It is described as "Winnicott's . . . 'true self' hidden away in safe storage to await the chance of a favorable rebirth" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 81), much like a seed, finding conditions impossible for growth or even survival, remaining dormant, awaiting a change for more favorable conditions to emerge. It is furthermore described as consisting of "unevoked potentialities which have never yet emerged" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 81 -- emphasis original). Guntrip is unsure whether the R.E. feels itself to be "frozen in cold storage (frozen in fear perhaps) or whether it feels hidden . . . in the warmth of a hallucinated interuterine condition" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 74).

Furthermore, the appearance of the split, passively

regressed R.E. is a universal occurrence, although the 'amount' of ego, and concomitant vitality in the personality that gets put in 'cold storage' may depend upon the type, severity, and duration of the persecution encountered, which is variable from individual to individual. The argument for the universality of this psychic structure is based on the ubiquitous absence of perfect mothering.

As noted earlier, Guntrip stated that, given the primitive cognitive and emotional abilities of the infant, even what appears to be non-impinging to the adult may be experienced as persecutory to the child. The present writer tends to agree with this observation. Distress in infants is likely to have a phenomenologically 'timeless' quality, in the sense of being without bounds, without a foreseeable 'endpoint' in time. Thus, it is likely experienced as a 'hellish' state that has no foreseeable end. Indeed, it is likely perceived as having always existed, wiping out the memory of the previous 'good' state that preceded it. This is consistent with the notion of the most prominent defense at this state -- splitting, as well as what one might expect of the infant's primitive ability to 'hold' a previous experience across time and in memory at this stage. However, one must also note that the argument which Guntrip uses to substantiate the universality of the final, schizoid split, is exactly the same argument used earlier to

substantiate my point about the lack of good mothering making the appearance of aggressive urges universal.

Having delineated the concept of schizoid withdrawal and the R.E. according to Guntrip, we can now explore how it comes to be understood as the most powerful, and dangerous force in personality dynamics in his view. First of all, it is the most basic reaction to impingement and frustration:

The frustration of libidinal need for good object-relations both arouses aggression and intensifies libidinal needs till the infant fears his love-needs as destructive towards his objects But at this earliest stage it leads to the schizoid withdrawal, a simple fear reaction, away from the danger of devouring and therefore losing the love-object (Guntrip, 1981, p. 67 -- emphasis original).

In addition to being the most basic reaction to impingement, Guntrip claims that the R.E. constitutes the deepest and most fundamental layer of personality:

The regressed ego denotes, not a freely available generalized 'fear and flight' reaction, but the deepest structurally specific part of the personality, existing in a settled attitude of fear, weakness, withdrawal and absolute dependence It represents the most profoundly traumatized part of the personality and is the hidden cause of all regressive phenomena . . . (Guntrip, 1981, p. 77 -- emphasis original).

In contrast to the two pre-Oedipal developmental positions of Fairbairn (depressed/schizoid) and Klein (depressive/paranoid-schizoid), Guntrip posits three distinct developmental positions: Depressed (guilt burdened), Paranoid (persecutory), and Schizoid (regressed),

with Schizoid being the deepest and most primitive of them (Guntrip, 1981, p. 57).

While he states that the R.E. split is effected to preserve an ego, to keep the 'alive' part of the self from being completely crushed by persecution, the withdrawal from all object relations itself sets up the greatest threat to the on-going ego: "What seems to promise security in one sense is feared as annihilating in another" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 83). That is, by cutting all ties to objects through inward passive flight, the ego is exposed to "fear of ego-loss by depersonalization" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 83): the emptying of the ego of all objects, creating the annihilatory fear of the ego, or self, of 'disappearing' without objects to relate to, since, "The importance of object relations lies in the the fact that without them an ego cannot develop". An ego without object relations becomes meaningless" (Guntrip, 1981, pp. 91-92 -- emphasis original).

Guntrip equates this experience of objectlessness with "psychic death" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 83), and claims it is the "ultimate and worst danger" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 83). He bases this claim on the premise that it is possible to "grade the dangers to which the ego feels exposed" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 83) along the lines of his three positions, with the schizoid one of lack of any objects being the worst:

Thus no objects involves the fear of ego-loss by depersonalization, bad objects (paranoid position)

involves the fear of ego loss by disintegration under destructive persecution (and) Ambivalent object relations (depressive position) involve fear of loss of the ego . . . through the paralysis of depression (Guntrip, 1981, p. 83).

He adds:

Of all the ultimate terrors, my clinical experience suggests that the last and worst is set up precisely by . . . self isolation, namely the feeling of being a 'psyche in a vacuum', all out of touch, all out of relationship, empty of experience, and so to speak collapsing in on itself . . . unable to be an 'ego' (Guntrip, 1981, p. 238 -- emphasis original).

At the two other levels of the personality, with their associated psychic structures, the individual attempts to keep in contact with objects, even if they are 'bad' object relations. Thus, these levels of personality "belong to a higher level, that of the struggle to remain in object relations" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 68), because:

Both persecutory anxiety and depressive anxiety are object relations experiences, while the schizoid position cancels object relations in the attempt to escape from anxiety of all kinds (Guntrip, 1981, p. 57 -- emphasis original).

However, schizoid withdrawal attains its 'ultimate dangerousness' not only because of its effects within the part of the self structured as the R.E., but also because of the effect the R.E. has upon these 'higher' levels of the personality which struggle to remain 'alive' in relationship to objects. Although the R.E. is basically 'incommunicado' with the rest of the personlity, it still exerts a tremendously strong regressive pull on it:

The part of the self that struggles to keep in

touch with life feels intense fear of the deeper and more secret, withdrawn self, which appears to be endowed with a great capacity to attract and drawn down more and more of the rest of the personality into itself (Guntrip, 1981, p. 64 -- emphasis original).

The manifest, conscious, observable phenomena which are the result of this inward schizoid withdrawal and regressive pull are what Guntrip calls typical schizoid characteristics: Feelings of derealization, loneliness, aloofness, passivity and lack of vigor, emotional flatness and deadness, etc.

Although Guntrip fails to specify how the R.E. exerts such great influence while at the same time being out of touch with all objects and other psychic structures, he is clear that this passive, regressive pull of the personality to 'collapse in upon itself,' i.e., the tendency of 'higher' levels of functioning to also regress and disappear down this 'black hole' at the deepest level of personality, constitutes the greatest threat to functioning.

It is of crucial importance to draw attention to the fact that this regressive psychic collapse generated by the R.E. becomes the absolute foundation of psychopathology in Guntrip's system of dynamics, and even more importantly, becomes the "predominant motivation in human experience" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 215 -- emphasis added). This reification of withdrawal as the primary motivational force is highlighted by his application of the term "instinct" to it, a term usually reserved only for

disparagement because of its deterministic implications:

If we are to speak of instincts, then the deepest cause of psychopathological phenomenon is not sex or aggression, but fear and the instinctive reaction of flight from the outer world of real and bad objects in infancy (Guntrip, 1981, p. 212).

This can be said to be the 'keystone' upon which Guntrip's argument to replace aggression with passivity as the central dynamic ultimately rests: If passive withdrawal is the basic motivational force in the personality, and a pathological one at that, then it requires containment to prevent the 'ultimate danger' of ego disintegration by depersonalization. With the urgent need for containment at all costs, the 'higher' levels of personality dynamics are not merely less 'central' or 'basic' than passivity and the R.E., but are seen by Guntrip as essentially created to fulfill this containment function, forestalling passive regressive collapse by keeping the ego in touch with objects, even if they are bad. As Guntrip claims, "Bad object-relations are better than no objects at all . . ." (Guntrip, 1981, p. 149). Thus, 'higher' levels of personality dynamics, seeking to remain in what he calls the 'fight' mode of relating (i.e., paranoid, depressive), are seen as merely defensive creations against the dangers of passivity:

If, however, the deepest danger is regression to passivity, we must regard all states, psychotic as well as neurotic, in which an 'active' ego

struggles and suffers, as defences (Guntrip, 1981, p. 79).

(As will be seen later, this supposition of passivity as the greatest danger is a large and dubious 'if'.) And again:

. . . the paranoid and depressed positions or both can be used as a defence against the schizoid position. When an individual is inwardly menaced by an involuntary schizoid flight from reality and depersonalization . . . he will fight to preserve his ego by taking refuge in internal bad object fantasies of a persecutory or accusatory kind (Guntrip, 1981, p. 58).

Furthermore, all of Kleinian dynamics are relegated to a merely defensive reaction to passive withdrawal in Guntrip's view: "This is indeed the rationale of creation and maintenance of the Kleinian internal object world: it is a defence against ego loss" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 73).

Additionally, it is particularly aggressive destruction which is portrayed as created by, and defensive against, the 'deeper' schizoid danger: "To relate in terms simply of fear sets up the paranoid state, which can pass over into the cold-blooded defence of mere destructive aggression" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 101 -- emphasis added). Guntrip justifies this proposition of aggression as defense on the supposition of:

Mankind's universal preference for feeling bad but strong rather than weak and afraid. The 'depressive' diagnosis focuses our attention on our badness, the 'schizoid' diagnosis fixes it on our weakness (Guntrip, 1981, p. 134 -- emphasis original).

Using this premise that "human beings prefer to feel 'bad somebodies' rather than weak non-entities" (Guntrip, 1981,

p. 137), he concludes that "the chronic aggression which has always served to be the hallmark of 'man' is but a defence against and a veneer over basic ego-weakness" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 129).

These statements about the rest of personality functioning, and particularly aggression, being purely defensive phenomena are not idly made. Rather, they are constantly repeated throughout Guntrip's later theory (Guntrip, 1981, pp. 57-58, 73, 75, 79, 83, 101, 129, 134, 143, 149), as well as re-emphasized through the use of italics, exhortations, and other assorted 'bells and whistles.'

Refutation of Guntrip's Concept of the R.E.

If Guntrip is correct in his assertion about the structural nature of the R.E. and its dynamics, then we must agree with him that aggression and destructiveness are only a reactive/defensive offshoot of passivity, which is the major force in the personality. The present writer strongly believes, however, that Guntrip is either mistaken or only partially correct in many of his tenets in this area. Since so many of these tenets are grounded in his concept of the R.E., a natural place to start is to critique this concept to see whether it makes theoretical sense. This writer believes it can be convincingly shown that it does not make sense in the way in which Guntrip presents it.

Although Guntrip claims that the R.E. and its dynamics are simply a logical extension of Fairbairn's system of dynamics, in which he states the foundations of his own theoretical formulations lie, what he proposes is in fact antithetical and contradictory to many of Fairbairn's basic postulates (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 214). Guntrip's thesis that the primary motivation becomes the seeking of objectlessness is in direct contrast to Fairbairn's over-riding motivational principle of object-seeking: Following this principle, bad object relations are created and adhered to at all costs in the absence of good ones, according to Fairbairn. In effect, "Guntrip has stood Fairbairn on his head" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 215).

Most importantly for the theoretical validity of Guntrip's concept of the R.E., is Guntrip's claim that it is a permanently existing "structure" in the personality, and that it exists in a state of objectlessness. Whether, in fact, a state of objectlessness is possible according to what Guntrip claims to be the theoretical underpinnings of his concept is extremely dubious.

As detailed in Chapter I, Fairbairn states that 'ego' can only exist and be defined in terms of its dynamic relations to objects. If psychic structure must be defined on this basis, what can be the nature of ego in relation to no objects? According to the premises of the theory, to

which Guntrip claims adherence, the question is absurd, akin to asking the question, "What is the sound of one hand clapping?" As noted earlier, Guntrip at one point states, "An ego without objects becomes meaningless" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 92). One might more correctly say 'an ego without objects becomes impossible!', if theoretical viability is to be taken into account.

In addition, lack of conceptual clarity and 'fuzziness' concerning exactly what the R.E. consists of throws further doubt on its conceptual validity. One would think that clearly defining the structure and contents of the R.E. would be crucial to its viability as a concept, given the tremendous power it wields in the psyche. Guntrip criticizes Freud for the rigidly mechanistic working he ascribes to psychic structures such as 'ego' and 'id.' Whatever their conceptual shortcomings may be, at least such structures were well defined according to their content. Yet, despite reifying the R.E. as a psychic structure with a definite reality to it, as a definite 'part' or 'place,' if you will, as opposed to a "transitory phenomenon," Guntrip's delineation seems to all but disappear when looked at closely.

For example, as noted earlier, he describes the contents of the R.E. as "unevoked potentialities frozen in cold storage" (Guntrip, 1981, pp. 74, 81), awaiting the proper conditions for re-birth and growth. One

is forced to ask what exactly a 'frozen potentiality' consists of? That which is a potential is not yet a reality, but only a possibility. Thus, the very substance of the concept appears to evanesce under critical examination. In another place, Guntrip suggests that the R.E. lives in a "hallucinated reproduction of the interuterine condition" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 88 -- emphasis original), and differentiates this longing to return to the womb from object-related fantasies involving the breast. Yet, as Greenberg and Mitchell note:

. . . it is not clear why the womb, any more than the breast, represents an objectless state rather than a particular form and representation of exciting object (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 214).

In sum, it might be said that the contrast between the clarity and solidity of Fairbairn's conception of psychic structure when compared to Guntrip's 'fuzziness' and the ephemeral quality of the concept of the R.E., parallels a contrast in the theoretical viability of the two conceptions of psychic structure and their dynamics.

VI. INTEGRATION OF DYNAMICS (AND FURTHER CRITIQUE OF GUNTRIP)

In addition to being open to refutation on the validity of the overall theoretical concept of the R.E., Guntrip is also open to refutation or substantial modification of the specifics of early dynamics which he proposes in connection with this concept. However, before proceeding along these

lines, it is important to acknowledge that his clinical description of the phenomenon of schizoid withdrawal and its characteristics of interpersonal avoidance, lack of libidinal interests, sense of futility, etc., are extremely perceptive, useful, and real, even if the dynamics and supporting structures which create it according to Guntrip are found wanting.

If one eschews these dynamics and structures, how are such phenomena to be adequately represented and accounted for? This is what the present writer wishes to address next. In effect this writer would like to propose an 'integrative' system of early dynamics -- one which re-integrates destructiveness back into Object Relations theory as a central dynamic, in a way which is consistent with the basic structure of the Object Relations theorists' system of dynamics, and in a way which also adequately accounts for schizoid phenomena, placing them in proper perspective. Part of this 'reworking' of Object Relations is in effect an attempt to 'salvage' what is most valuable from Object Relations' theory while integrating it with the Kleinian emphasis on destructiveness.

Such an integration will of course substantially modify or refute many of Guntrip's tenets on the flow of early dynamics, and thus will serve as a critique for his theory as it now stands. This critique in part consists of points already argued for extensively (e.g., destructiveness being

present from the earliest period of development), as well as modification of the specific dynamics of schizoid withdrawal. This latter portion of the critique is a natural extension of the overall theoretical critique of the R.E. already explicated.

Rather than offering this continuing critique beforehand, this writer feels that the arguments proposed will be clearer and more easily understood if they are both included as a part of the exposition of integrative dynamics, as well as a post-facto examination once the system has been outlined. However, let me briefly state at the beginning the principles which are being argued for, and on which such an integration is founded:

1. Withdrawal is neither a 'primary' nor ultimately omnipotent force in the personality, but is rather initially reactive and continuously interactive with destructive impulses.

2. Fairbairn's view that it is object-relatedness, not withdrawal, which is a primary aim and motivation in the personality is the more viable view.

3. Destructiveness, not withdrawal, is the 'first cause' in the sequence of pathological dynamics, and thus belongs to the earliest phase of development. Furthermore, it represents an equal, if not greater danger than passive withdrawal.

4. Schizoid withdrawal exists not as a 'structure' in

the personality such as the R.E., but as a transitory 'phantasy' which is part of a dynamic of oscillation between destructiveness and withdrawal.

Let me begin this integration/critique with the presentation of a 'schematic' of early dynamics which expands on the one presented earlier in the chapter:

- 1) Death Instinct ----> 1A) Frustration/Deprivation ---->
- 2) (Phenomenological) Persecution ---->
- 3) Fear and Hate (Wish to Destroy) ---->
- 4) Projection (Due to Retaliatory Fears and Wish to Preserve Objects) ---->
- 5) Intensified Persecution (Anxiety of Being Destroyed) --->
- 6) Attempted Withdrawal (Anxiety of Being Destroyed through Abandonment or Depersonalization) ---->
- 7) Oscillation between 5) and 6)

To explain this sequence in depth along the lines of the principles espoused: As seen under the 'moot' argument, the subsequent course of dynamics is not altered whether one chooses to believe in a death instinct (1) which exacerbates frustration and deprivation (1A) by bad objects, or simply in the latter, eschewing the concept of a death instinct. Both conceptualizations lead inexorably to the phenomenological experience of being persecuted (2) by bad objects (e.g., the breast which withholds is experienced as an active tormenter, rather than as a disinterested or neutral object). This leads to the inevitable reactions of

the self to this persecution: fear and hate (3), and with hate, the wish to angrily destroy the threatening object.

While Object Relations theorists, as amply noted, deny or minimize the destructive reaction of hate in early dynamics I hold it to be central to the subsequent dynamic developments of this period, because it carries with it the danger of annihilation in two ways: First, if such hate resides within the self and is acted on (even in phantasy), it may provoke persecutory objects to greater active persecution (along the lines of Klein's "talion principle"), and with it the threat of destruction of the self by actively hostile outside forces. Secondly, if one acts on this hate, and entertains the phantasy of destroying all of one's objects, with the hope that persecution may end, one also destroys the hope that bad objects may be coaxed into becoming benign ones, and one is faced with annihilation through abandonment. That is, one may face a wasteland with no objects to relate to.

As a consequence of these dangers, hate and aggression in the self must be gotten rid of lest its consequences result in annihilation. This is attempted through projection (4), in which the destructive urges of the self are attributed to outside objects.

However, this 'solution' only exacerbates the situation: Bad objects only become intensified in their persecutory qualities (5). They now carry their initial

persecutory quality due to their willful deprivation, plus the force of the infant's own projected hate and destructiveness which is overlaid on them. How this 'amplification' of the infant's own reactive hate and destructiveness represents a 'return of the split,' through the agency of the A.L.E., and is then used to persecute him has been thoroughly explicated under the 'deferred' argument presented earlier, with its cyclical course of projection/introjection of destructiveness. Thus, the infant reacts with even greater hate and fear of annihilation, and is spurred to further projecting to rid himself of the noxious effects of his own hate, perpetuating the cycle.

Thus, steps (3) through (5) may be accurately conceived of as a 'negative feedback loop' (hereafter referred to as 'NFL'), in which distress and terror constantly escalate through amplified input (phenomenological persecution) and output (projection of hate and destructiveness) in a cyclical fashion.

The importance, as well as the malignancy, of this cycle cannot be emphasized too strongly for several reasons. First, hate (and destructiveness) are the 'first cause' of this cycle and are what keeps it operant. Remove or ameliorate this cause (through a cessation of persecution, or on a larger time scale through 'good experiences' (Klein) or 'good enough mothering' (Winnicott and Guntrip), and one

finds the only ultimately 'healthy' way to interrupt this malignant cycle in primitive dynamics. Secondly, since this cycle is initiated in the earliest stage of development (when splitting is the predominant defense), its inception and how it is handled definitively color the rest of psychic development. Although dynamics may be conceptualized differently when good and bad objects are integrated in the depressive position, and destructiveness becomes a topographic (conscious vs. unconscious) rather than a temporal (splitting good vs. bad objects across time) problem, not only the nature of dynamics but also whether a position of ambivalence can be achieved and consolidated depends upon the prevalence of destructiveness and the success of its containment in early dynamics. Furthermore, it is important to realize that Guntrip's dynamics of the depressive position, of turning anger upon the self in a persecutory manner, actually starts and is better applied to this earlier period (through the 'NFL' cycle). Although there are some differences with the dynamics of the depressive period with this inward-turning of anger, the fact that it occurs in the earliest periods has great import for the concept of passivity as a defense, as will be seen in the next chapter.

It is also of note that a clinical example of this reinforcing and escalating 'NFL' may be observed in infants in the form of 'affect storms' which develop and increase in

intensity with no apparent buffering or regulating mechanisms. The distress of infants in such a state appears to be like a fire feeding upon itself: Infants appear at such times not so much to be 'in distress' as to 'be distress' with all their being (Dr. Jack Barlow, personal communication).

To return to the schematic sequence of dynamics: If the cycle of 'NFL' is not broken by the return of a good object (and satisfaction of needs), the infant may feel so persecuted that he gives up hope of finding surcease from what experientially is a truly hellish place. He may phantasize about finding relief by withdrawal from all objects (since all in present consciousness are bad, persecutory ones), and make attempts to move in this direction (6). However, such phantasies and urges bring about the renewed danger of annihilation by abandonment. Although Guntrips terms this ego-loss by 'depersonalization,' the emptying of the ego of all objects, the present writer thinks it is somewhat akin to the danger mentioned earlier of phenomenological abandonment by destroying all objects. In support of this view, this writer would point out that any phantasy or attempt to disengage oneself from object relations also appears phenomenologically on a primitive level as abandonment by objects. A manifestation of this may be seen in the borderline patient who typically rejects all attempts by the

therapist to make relational contact, and then complains of the therapist's being "cold," "distant," and "indifferent." Furthermore, one may see the workings of projection here, and the conversion of distress into experiential persecution even in the withdrawal process -- further evidence that all (psychic) actions are object-related at some level, rather than object-less.

One can agree with Guntrip completely that object-seeking in a 'bad' object-world only brings pain and the threat of annihilation by active persecution. This frustration in object seeking is the genesis of hate and fear, which initiate the 'NFL.' The first 'solution' towards ending this cycle, finding a 'good' object, seems impossible when one is in the midst of the cycle. The second 'solution' is to stop hungering after objects completely, in fact, to escape from their temptations, since this hungering only serves (phenomenologically) to make objects appear more persecutory, and concomitantly makes the threat of annihilation through persecutory destruction appear more immanent.

It is true that a renunciation of objects serves to break the cycle of the 'NFL': Without libidinal hungering, frustration stops, and fear and hate are no longer of such immediate consequence. However, as soon as one begins contemplation of withdrawal, what seems to be a kind of 'deliverance' turns out to be a danger equal to that of

active destruction: the fear of being destroyed through abandonment.

It is here that Fairbairn's dictum that attachment to objects is necessary becomes manifest. In its simplest form, one simply cannot survive as a self without such attachment. Guntrip's description of the phenomenon (and threat) as "ego disintegration" is well put, for without relation to objects there can be no ego according to Fairbairn's system.

This leads to a crucial difference between the system presented here and the one proposed by Guntrip: Objectlessness is a fear of imagined disintegration of the self, rather than an actual 'state' and ego structure. As has been shown, if one succeeded in relinquishing all ties to objects, the self would indeed 'disintegrate' and cease to exist, a state which is theoretically impossible. Rather, I propose that as one begins to withdraw or phantasize withdrawing from objects, before one can, if it were indeed possible, renounce all relationships and 'disintegrate' the self, the terror of annihilation in such a prospect drives one back toward seeking relatedness. It is the phantasy of severing ties to objects, albeit a powerful one, and its imagined consequences rather than the actual achievement of this state which drives one back into relationships. This may seem like a small point, but it is crucial to differentiating the presently outlined system of

dynamics from that of Guntrip's, in which such a state of withdrawal is claimed to be not only phantasized but achieved, and crystallized as an ego structure in the R.E. As demonstrated, such a concept does not stand up to theoretical or practical scrutiny.

Guntrip, as noted, claims that the 'ultimate' and most 'powerful' threat to the personality is that of ego depersonalization. This writer holds that this is clearly not the case. Rather than a fear of such ego disintegration being the primary anxiety (and motivation), and the rest of the personality a defense against it, this writer believes that it is more accurate to say that one is 'caught' between a fear of annihilation by abandonment (depersonalization) and an equally terrifying fear of annihilation through active destructive persecution by bad objects. To claim, as Guntrip does, that one form of annihilation is more terrifying than another holds little sense. Both, with essentially the same imagined end-result, are equally potent: Annihilation is annihilation, whether it comes through abandonment and depersonalization or through a more active persecutory aggression.

Thus, in a 'bad' object-world, what likely occurs is a dynamic oscillation between poles (7): between fear of annihilation by persecution and fear of annihilation by abandonment and imagined dissolution of the self (depersonalization). This might best be conceptualized as a

'double approach-avoidance conflict,' in which the valence of the poles shift depending on the position of the ego: When persecuted by bad objects, and in the escalating 'NFL' of (3) to (5), one is driven to seek relief by attempting to escape from all object relationships, as described earlier. However, as soon as one moves in that direction, the danger of annihilation by abandonment comes to the fore, and one is driven back again to seeking a way to find satisfactory object relationships. This oscillation itself becomes a malignant cycle which is essentially unsolvable in a satisfactory way without intervention by 'good' object experiences.

Guntrip gives a good clinical account of the results of this cycle in his description of what he calls the "in and out programme" (Guntrip, 1981, pp. 36-39) typical of the schizoid personality: to withdraw from activity and interpersonal contact only to become terrified of this mortification of the self, and to burst forth with renewed activity towards objects.

However, in contrast to the acuity of his clinical description, one can summarize the shortcomings of his conceptualization of the dynamics of the phenomena:

To begin with, he defines such phenomena almost solely in terms of a result of the primary motivational force of withdrawal in the 'static,' structurally persisting R.E. As seen, it is more profitably interpreted in terms of the

dynamic double approach-avoidance conflict described above. Furthermore, contrary to Guntrip, such an oscillation is not governed solely by either seeking the 'seeming' safety of withdrawal nor fleeing from its dangers. The opposite pole of object-relating has equally strong 'pushing' and 'pulling' valence, based on the equally fearsome prospect of persecutory annihilation or the attractiveness of the hope of good relations with objects, respectively.

The idea implied here, that both object-seeking and withdrawal can serve as a defense against the other, depending upon the 'position' of the ego at a given time, is addressed in only a superficial manner by Guntrip. He mentions the idea in his writing, but does so only extremely rarely. There are apparently only two places in all his work where this possibility is brought up, once directly and once by implication, respectively (Guntrip, 1981, p. 148; Guntrip, 1971, p. 62).

When the possibility is directly mentioned, it is in the context of arguing for aggression as the "main defence" against schizoid flight. The possibility of an oscillating two-way defense is mentioned as a 'throw-away' tag line, in passing. As seems characteristic of Guntrip in such matters, the idea is neither pursued for its implications, nor, for that matter, is it ever mentioned again.

In contrast to the fleeting attention given this possibility, one is overwhelmed by the frequent and emphatic

zealousness with which he promotes the idea that object seeking is merely and solely a defense, as noted earlier. Given the ubiquity of this barrage, the idea of a 'dynamically alternating' defense is all but lost.

Finally, one must note that while Guntrip grounds the entire concept of the "in and out programme" in flight and withdrawal as a primary motivational principle, in fact the 'first cause,' the sequence of dynamic events which is the genesis of these phenomena, is the attempt to escape the consequences of hate and destructiveness. Therefore, schizoid withdrawal may be more properly conceptualized as an attempt to deal, ultimately, with the containment or banishment of destructiveness, rather than vice-versa. If one must designate a 'primary' force in these early dynamics, destructiveness is the more logical candidate, since it both antedates withdrawal as well as serves as the 'driving force' which perpetuates the malignant cycles of this developmental period as delineated in this chapter.

CHAPTER III

PASSIVITY AND DESTRUCTIVENESS

I. INTRODUCTION

Guntrip's concept of passivity, as embodied in schizoid withdrawal and the Regressed Ego, is a peculiarly comprehensive and at the same time incomplete concept. It is comprehensive, because it refies what Guntrip defines as passivity as both the primary motivational, as well as pathological, force in the personality, enshrined as persisting intrapsychic structure as the Regressed Ego. It is incomplete, because it denies a central role to destructiveness as a primary malignant force requiring containment.

As has been amply argued, while many features, especially clinical ones, of Guntrip's system are highly valuable, some of his fundamental contentions (as noted earlier) about the nature and dynamics of passivity are unviable and/or unsupportable. It is intended in this chapter to propose a concept of passivity and its dynamic functioning which is central to early dynamics, but which is substantially different from Guntrip's conception of these terms.

Before going into detailed explanation, let me propose the crucial features and differences between this new conception of passivity and Guntrip's:

1. Passivity, rather than a primary motivational force based on withdrawal from object relations, is instead better understood as a primitive defensive strategy aimed at survival in a persecutory world. As such, one of its aims may be said to be to allow one to remain in contact with objects, while staving off the prospect of being destroyed by 'bad' or persecutory objects.

2. Destructiveness and aggression, being the primary danger in the earliest period of development, are what this defensive strategy is ultimately aimed at minimizing and containing. Although reduction in fear is also aimed at, since it is what causes immediate distress, this fear is not the primary danger, as Guntrip would have it. Rather, as has been shown, annihilatory fear has its genesis in one's own destructive urges, and thus is subservient to these impulses.

3. Some of the features which Guntrip ascribes to the R.E. can be better understood as attributes of the Libidinal Ego in a state of persecutory fear and anxiety. Furthermore, the concept of the R.E. itself may be salvagable, but only if modified to an object-seeking, rather than solely object-withdrawing structure, as well as only if it is conceptualized as a structure derivative of passivity, rather than being the progenitor of passivity.

II. THE OBJECT-WORLD AS THE ONLY VIABLE ONE IN WHICH TO 'LIVE'

To begin this revision of Guntrip and to evolve this new concept of passivity, let us first add more detail to the concept of destructiveness leading to an 'oscillation' between prospects of annihilation by persecution and ego disintegration by abandonment, respectively. I would hold that to call this an 'oscillation' is somewhat misleading, in that from a dynamic point of view, the danger and prospect of persecutory annihilation is much more important and plays a more active role in shaping subsequent dynamics.

To explain in more detail: The phantasy of withdrawal from a 'bad-object world' is never an achieved state, since, as examined previously, as soon as one begins to move in this direction, the threat of annihilation by phenomenological abandonment and ego disintegration appears imminent. One quickly discovers that the seeking of objectlessness through withdrawal is an unsatisfactory, indeed impossible, solution to persecution in a bad-object world. In this sense, Guntrip is correct that withdrawal (if only as a transitory attempt to move in this direction as a phantasy) drives one back into object relations, albeit 'bad' ones.

However, contrary to Guntrip, the futility and failure of withdrawal as a 'solution' to a persecutory world is not a continuing primary motivational force which must be

contained at all costs. Rather than being primarily a defensive measure, the flight back into object relations may be better viewed as a 'forced' acknowledgement of a fundamental reality: As distressing as it is to face living in a persecutory world, there are no other options. One can, and indeed does, live in a state of persecution, albeit a tormented state. There is no viable state one can 'live' in without objects.

Thus, the non-viability of attaining a solution to persecution through the seeking of objectlessness by withdrawal, makes the phantasy of withdrawal serve, not as a motivation, but as a 'wall' or 'boundary stop' that one runs up against. It serves as a reminder and acknowledgement that there is no avenue of escape from a persecutory world by simply renouncing contact and withdrawing from it. In effect, all the 'exits' are blocked, and one is 'trapped' in such a world.

That the failure of withdrawal as a viable solution to persecutory object relations 'forces' one to live in such a bad-object world leads to several important features of this schema of early dynamics:

First, given the reality that there is no viable alternative to living in such a world, the need for a solution to the problem of persecution, of some measure of surcease, becomes more immediate. Second, the 'action,' as it were, the unfolding of dynamics, largely takes place

in the world of objects, since no other 'arena' exists in which to 'live.' Thirdly, since one is 'forced' to live in such a world, the possibility of annihilation by persecution becomes all the more threatening, and the immediate task, indeed the only other viable solution, is to find a means for survival in such a hostile world until conditions are or can be changed. Thus, the immediate need is for survival in such a world where persecutory destruction appears imminent, and in surviving, 'buying time' with the hope that bad objects can somehow be transformed into benign ones. Lastly, it must be noted that both the need to 'live' in such a world, given the lack of alternatives, the need to find some survivable accomodation to bad objects, (i.e., some relationship with them that does not precipitate one's destruction), coupled with the inherent hope, however slight, that bad objects may become more benign, all attest to the correctness of Fairbairn's view that it is object-relating that is the primary dynamic, the main 'thrust' if you will, of the ego. To figure out a strategy for survival in a persecutory world is a function of working out an object-relation, rather than a cutting of all contacts, as Guntrip maintains.

III. THE PROBLEM OF DESTRUCTIVENESS AND SURVIVAL

In early dynamics, in a predominantly bad-object world, the problem is annihilatory anxiety and fear, either through

active persecution or abandonment. However, as extensively argued in the last chapter, all annihilatory fear has its genesis in destructive impulses, for it is destructiveness in reaction to libidinal frustration that starts and perpetuates both the 'Negative Feedback Loop' as well as the 'oscillation' between the threat of persecutory annihilation and that of abandonment. The 'key' to decreasing distress, the crucial factor in both survival in a persecutory world as well as in stopping the cause of 'oscillation' is the neutralization of destructiveness. As noted in earlier chapters, in a developmental sequence with an adequate amount of 'good' experiences (which may also be conceptualized as the caretaking figure functioning as an adequate container of destructive impulses), such containment of destructiveness, and a concomitant decrease in fear and distress, occurs as part of a natural and healthy developmental progression. However, in a world dominated by bad-object experiences, such containment of destructive impulses not only becomes a more urgent matter of survival, but must be a process of 'nipping destructiveness in the bud.' That is, one must discover a means to minimize the root cause of distress, and thereby 'short-circuit' the malignant cycles which lead to such distress due to annihilatory threats. Furthermore, such a task must be accomplished in the absence of the aid and

refuge which reality-based 'good' objects can provide in this process.

IV. PASSIVITY AS A DEFENSIVE STRATEGY TO CONTAIN DESTRUCTIVENESS

In the previous chapter, the present writer agreed with Guntrip in his contention that object-hungering in a bad object world leads only to pain. However, it was also contended that the pain is in large part a result of destructiveness visited upon the self as a 'return of the split,' such destructiveness arising, or at least being activated and reinforced, as the result of frustrated object hungering.

The minimization of destructiveness as a 'solitary' achievement (i.e., unaided by good-object experience) is accomplished by the minimization of action in relation to reality-based objects. (There is a likely exception to this caveat against initiative action towards objects: It is quite likely that one may still pursue an unreal, 'idealized' phantasy object. Hence, the adjective 'reality-based' is used in conjunction with objects here. This exception will be further explained at the end of the chapter.) This means, in one sense, neither acting on libidinal needs nor in response to what anger resides within the self, and which is normally, according to Klein, used to attack bad objects. Essentially, one takes a passive stance

in relation to initiation of any action towards objects. In effect, by refraining from acting on libidinal needs, one reduces the reactive rage and destructiveness produced when such needs are frustrated by objects, and with this decrease in destructiveness, one ultimately reduces its being revisited on the self in the guise of persecution.

Destructiveness is further squelched by refraining from any action in regards to the rage felt in reaction to deprivation. Thus, by reducing to the extent possible the generation of destructive urges and wishes through the adoption of such a 'passive strategy,' one keeps a bad and threatening world from becoming more so.

It must also be noted that passivity, defined here as a defensive strategy, differs from the general use of the term with its connotations of merely 'doing nothing' by default. True, in employing passivity one refrains from initiative action. Yet, the nature of passivity might be better characterized as 'doing nothing with a vengeance': That is, the passive stance of refraining from action is adhered to with tremendous tenacity, and in this sense it is better considered as an active phenomenon. Its essentially active nature is illustrated in such instances as that of working with an entrenched obsessive in psychotherapy: When prodded to take initiative action, the massive resistance encountered against moving in such a direction is a prime example of the nature of passivity as a position stubbornly

and vigorously adhered to, rather than simply a lack of active investment or response which is commonly associated with the word.

One may wonder whether the suppression of action as regards libidinal needs as part of a defensive strategy of passivity is not akin to Guntrip's designation of the renunciation of object hungering as part of schizoid withdrawal, the movement away from all object relations. The two are indeed not the same, and it is important to point out the differences. First, passivity as defined here is a strategy to remain in contact with objects to the extent possible, rather than to flee from relations with them. By suppressing acting on needs, by 'laying low' as it were, one hopes to survive, in effect 'buying time' until a way may be found to turn bad objects into benign ones. What is gained by employing such a defensive strategy is the maintenance of survivable relations with objects, however ungratifying, (one might say masochistic¹), such relationships are.

Furthermore, libidinal needs are not renounced in the sense that Guntrip states they are in the case of passive schizoid withdrawal. Rather, they are still very keenly felt, but one is too terrified to take any action on them

¹The implication for the concept of masochism is that it is not a state in which one enjoys pain, but one in which a considerable measure of pain is seen as the most viable way to survive, to retain a tie to an object.

towards reality-based objects, for fear of the phantasized annihilatory consequences. This suppression, as it were, of action in relation to libidinal desires is qualitatively different from a true renunciation of desires and objects, as Guntrip proposes. In fact, as will be seen later when the 'exception' to suppression of libidinal activity is discussed, the fact that one is always seeking an object relation, however covert such seeking may be, conforms again to Fairbairn's dictum of object seeking as a primary, ineradicable impulse, rather than the 'seeking of objectlessness' which Guntrip posits.

In the keenly felt neediness of an ego afraid to act on its libidinal longings one may find a more accurate application of Guntrip's attribution of the terror of feeling 'all out of touch' which he ascribes to the R.E.: In such a state, one is indeed 'all out of touch' with any real objects towards which might actively express such needs. One tends to feel hopelessly cut off and alone, and such feelings may be the genesis of rescue fantasies common among primitive patients. Additionally, one fears to express such needs towards what may appear to be more benign external objects, because of the imagined dire consequences should such objects in fact not be receptive to fulfilling needs but react with hostility. The lack of activity based on needs is not indicative of their absence or renunciation of the needs themselves, but only of the cautious and covert

manner in which they find any external expression at all. In what might be viewed as a variation on a type of rescue fantasy, one patient expressed this as "being very still, not drawing attention to myself, but hoping someone will notice and come to help. I'm grateful for whatever crumbs I get." Of note in this example is the lack of initiative action on the part of the patient, it being too dangerous to engage in. All activity must begin with the object, rather than with the self.

Guntrip's characterization of destructiveness at this stage of development as "fear of loving, lest one's love should destroy" takes on a different meaning in light of this new concept of passivity and its dynamics. The present writer is in agreement with Guntrip in terms of the outcome of suppression of acting on libidinal needs, especially as regards his clinical account of the devitalization that characterizes schizoid states. However, the statement might more accurately be amended to say 'fear of loving, lest through the destructiveness aroused one be destroyed' (via projection/introjection/self-persecution), rather than merely a fear of devouring the needed object, as Guntrip would have it. Furthermore, it was mentioned in Chapter II that what Guntrip attributes to depressive dynamics, i.e., the ego refraining from doing anything for fear of doing wrong (Guntrip, 1981, p.83), can be applied in principle to earlier dynamics as a part of the passive defense: fear of

doing anything for fear of being destroyed.

The equivalence of fear of initiative action with persecutory destruction (and, at a depressive level of development, with one's more direct destructiveness towards others as well) underlies what might be termed a primary characteristic and manifestation of passivity: the fear of the consequences should one act. Guntrip largely ignores this characteristic in his description of early (i.e., schizoid) states, due, the present writer believes, to his tendency to insist that anxiety over consequences is primarily a product of concern for an object in the face of destructive impulses, which is characteristic of later (depressive) development. However, if one accepts the argument put forth here that destructiveness is operant in the earliest period and results initially in anxiety over the survival of the self, rather than the object, it is clear that the anxiety over the consequences of action is a more basic developmental dilemma.

One may quite correctly raise the issue that the squelching of action on libidinal needs is itself likely to be experienced as persecutory, especially given the lack of self-other differentiation at this stage, and therefore itself gives rise to anger and destructiveness in reaction to this persecution. It is a point well taken, for although the squelching of action on libidinal needs may avert some of the anger arising from the frustration that would be

encountered in acting on these needs in a bad-object world, some anger is likely to be generated as a product of this self-suppression itself.

It was noted earlier that passivity as a defense involves both suppression of action on anger as well as libidinal needs. This 'surfeit' of anger which is a by-product of the process of the defense itself requires especially strong defensive efforts to remain quelled, because of the dangerously explosive possibilities it represents. Essentially, any urge towards activity based on this pent-up reservoir of anger must be 'sat on' especially hard, given that, at a primitive level of development, one's hate is imagined to be omnipotent. The phantasized retaliation of objects, were such anger to be acted upon, would insure one's destruction post haste. The enormous fear of imagined consequences may be said to provide much of the force that keep such an 'angry volcano' plugged.

The clinical manifestation of this powerful self-suppression of action, especially in regards to anger, may be taken from Fairbairn's description when he says:

Much of the schizoid individual's anxiety really represents a fear . . . of violent outbursts of precipitate action . . . occurring. This fear commonly manifests itself as a fear of going insane or a fear of imminent disaster (Fairbairn, in Guntrip, 1981, p. 101).

Although Fairbairn, according to Guntrip, "attributed schizoid withdrawal only to fear of losing control of

aggressive impulses, or of libidinal impulses felt in an aggressive way" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 162), one can see that the defensive strategy of passivity is aimed in good part at 'controlling' such impulses by refraining from acting on them (because such action is too terrifying), and thus preserving a measure of contact with objects. Such a view is bolstered by the clinical evidence provided by patients when this passive defense begins to crack. When patients begin to overcome their squelching of action and denial of anger, often the first consequence is their becoming conscious of a great deal of anger and blame directed at parental figures which were felt to demand the self-suppression of needs in order to survive. Such anger is most often accompanied by a great deal of anxiety concomitant to the awareness of such feelings -- a reaction that has become so ingrained and 'automatic' as an integral part of the passive defense that it is for all practical purposes an entrenched part of the personality. Such anxiety might be viewed as the product of living under an internal 'reign of terror' which kept action and anger in check for so long that the first steps towards rage (or, for that matter, moving towards libidinal attachment to real objects) are inevitably accompanied by apprehension about persecution and punishment. Thus, a dynamic justification is provided for Fairbairn's clinical observation about the fear of precipitate action. This writer has found this

especially pertinent in cases of paranoia, where loss of control of aggression (and expected massive retaliation by the environment) seems to be a basic underlying fear, one which is sometimes countered by self-reassuring statements of what a passive person the patient sees themselves to be.

Furthermore, an additional feature of Fairbairn's dynamic system might be clarified here, having to do with the structural apparatus which enforces passivity. He (as well as Guntrip) speaks of what might be called an 'alliance' of the Central and Anti-Libidinal Egos against the Libidinal Ego in repressing needs. (However, Fairbairn calls this confluence of aims between the C.E. and A.L.E. not an 'alliance' but a "co-belligerance" (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 118). He terms the repression of both the A.L.E. and L.E. by the C.E. "direct repression," and the suppression of L.E. neediness by the A.L.E. "indirect repression" (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 173). In this model of C.E./A.L.E./L.E. functioning one may see the structural conceptualization of how libidinal aims are crushed and passivity is enforced, as the force of repression directed at the L.E. is amplified through the C.E./A.L.E. 'alliance,' and experienced (particularly in A.L.E. repression of the L.E.) as persecution.

However, while Fairbairn constructs a viable endopsychic model with respect to structure and dynamics, he somewhat misses the point in his explanation of ultimately

why such an 'alliance' is formed. His answer to this question involves essentially the positing of the avoidance of expressing libidinal needs per se in a rejecting environment as the 'bottom line' of defensive functioning. This is evident in his conclusion that:

When the process of direct and indirect repression are taken into account, it becomes obvious that libidinal components in the psyche are subjected to a much greater measure of repression than aggressive components (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 173).

While the idea of an alliance between the C.E. and A.L.E. in suppressing libidinal needs can be agreed with, one must object to the latter part of Fairbairn's statement as incorrect given what has been said about passivity. What Fairbairn fails to take into account in his formulation is that libidinal needs are suppressed by the C.E. and A.L.E. in the service of reducing and suppressing the activation of aggressive urges. In light of this, his implication that suppression of libidinal needs has a greater priority in the psychic economy than aggressive ones is misleading at best.

Furthermore, in addition to the original justifications Fairbairn gives for enforcing the splits between the L.E. and the A.L.E. and the repression of both by the C.E. (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 172), the concept of passivity as a strategy to contain destructiveness lends an additional reason for these defensive measures: As mentioned earlier, it is not only libidinal needs but also anger which is suppressed in the defense of passivity. The splitting off

of the L.E. and its repression helps to isolate this anger and make its expression (in action) more unlikely. Similarly, in as much as the A.L.E. becomes the 'repository' for anger which escapes such containment, the split enforced by the C.E. between the A.L.E. and the L.E. tends to have a 'damping' effect on the amount of hate, or persecution, which the A.L.E. can direct at the L.E. Such a 'brake' on the A.L.E.'s persecution is not entirely effective, as some amount of persecution is required to begin and perpetuate the malignant cycles of which passivity is born. Yet it prevents the A.L.E. from reigning completely 'uncontrolled,' and persecuting the L.E. 'out of existence' as it were. In less conceptual terms, the repression and split of the L.E., and especially of the A.L.E., by the C.E. may be thought of as the mechanism by which the 'angry volcano' created by the enforcement of passivity (as mentioned earlier, pp. 141 - 142) is kept 'plugged.'

It should be noted that not all action is refrained from in the 'passive defense,' but only initiative action, rooted as such action is, in either libidinal or destructive urges. Such a criterion can be applied to distinguish 'true' activity from 'false' activity, the hallmark of the latter being defensive or diversionary in its aims. Within the context of passivity, (false) action still takes place along two inter-related dimensions. The first of these is compliant action. Compliant action is basically action in

response to the perceived demands of the environment, what appears to be the 'safest' response available, i.e., a response which first, has relatively known consequences, and in this respect may be regarded as somewhat stereotyped; and secondly, is aimed at placating, rather than possibly provoking, persecutory figures.

Winnicott correctly calls such activity in response to demands imposed by the environment responses to "impingement" from the environment, and characterizes such responses as a part of the "false self on a conformity basis" (in Guntrip, 1981, p. 188). Such a characterization highlights the contrast between the initiative nature of 'true' activity originating with the self's own needs for expression vs. the reactive nature of most 'false' activity which is generic to passivity.

Whereas Winnicott places the "false self" with its compliant activity structurally in the province of the Central Ego, residing in the consciousness of everyday awareness, Guntrip sees it as a system encompassing both Central and Anti-Libidinal Ego functioning in collaboration to product a "conformist self in which creativity and originality have had to be sacrifices for safety" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 190). The present writer believes Guntrip's view to be the more correct one, for it encompasses what this writer earlier termed the Central/Anti-Libidinal Ego 'alliance' which imposes and

perpetuates the passive defense: aimed 'inward' to suppress expression of libidinal and destructive 'action,' and aimed 'outward' to insure that only compliant action is taken towards reality-based objects.

Furthermore, Guntrip somewhat unwittingly reinforces the present writer's contention that the passivity implemented as a product of this C.E./A.L.E. structure is a defensive strategy aimed at survival in a persecutory world when he says that the false self is a defensive system resulting from a "struggle to stay alive and discover a modus vivendi . . ." (Guntrip, 1981, p. 190 -- emphasis original). Although he means it as a defensive system against inner ego weakness and need, such a characterization is perhaps better seen in the sense of discovering a means for survival by compliant action in the face of the threat of persecutory annihilation.

In infants, a manifestation of such compliant action (or perhaps better termed 'reaction') may be seen in the case of mothers who proudly announce what a "good" child they have, one who "never cries or complains, and is never a bother when I'm busy," little realizing that such symptoms are likely not a sign of true good-naturedness or satisfaction on the infant's part but a learned response aimed at minimizing its own distress at the non-responsiveness of the mother to its needs, who has unwittingly called for such a compliant response. In cases

of infants extremely traumatized (either physically and/or psychologically) when needs are expressed, the response of passivity may be so severely implemented that they appear to have 'given up' completely, and are largely unresponsive to stimuli, a condition that sometimes leads to physical death without apparent concomitant physiological cause. Another example of passive conformity in response to impingement, pertinent both to complying with external demands in place of needs as well as suppressing anger, is that of the mother who demands affection from her infant, and becomes, sometimes subtly, rejecting or angry when such a 'satisfactory' response is not forthcoming. Such infants (and children) learn to be 'happy' and 'responsive' babies in the presence of the caretaking figure, but such behavior does not denote a state reflective of satisfied needs, but rather a response aimed at warding off persecution.

The second type of activity that is allowed, and indeed called for, in conjunction with passivity may be seen as activity largely in reaction to this felt compulsion for compliance, and the 'smothering' of the self and its needs that such compliance involves. There is the need to deny and block out the psychic pain and anger caused by the deprivation of one's needs, which is felt first because of persecutory deprivation and then doubly so by the need to comply and quash spontaneously activity in order to insure survival. In essence, as intimated earlier, the process of

passivity only serves to make the pain of deprivation more acutely felt in some senses.

The activity in reaction to the increased poignancy of one's 'emotional starvation' is the avoidance of these emotional and psychic realities, because in recognizing and 'facing' them, in giving them a rightful 'place' in consciousness, one is liable (indeed, compelled) to 'act' on them. The prospect of such 'true' action would raise distress and anxieties about retaliation (and survival) to unbearable levels. Thus, further justification is provided for the splitting off of libidinal and destructive urges and feelings and their repression, direct and indirect, by the C.E. and A.L.E. Such avoidance of needy and angry feelings is often manifest as the outwardly emotionally flat, detached impression which Guntrip ascribes as a primary schizoid characteristic. It is not that such feelings are absent, but only that they are normally so disconnected with direct conscious experience that one feels 'empty' and like 'an automaton.'

Such avoidant activity as a part of passivity might best be exemplified, at a slightly later stage of development, in the "manic defense" described by Klein (in Segal, 1974, pp. 82-91). Such a defense is characterized by furious activity (both mental and/or motoric). However, such activity is aimed at denial of inner psychic realities (e.g., that one has damaged an object through

destructiveness; that the object has value; that one cannot repair the damage, etc.). Additionally, manic states point up another contrast between such avoidant activity and 'true' activity: Whereas 'true' activity is adient, i.e., object-seeking, avoidant activity is ultimately aimed at both denying and preventing an important tie to a reality-based object, and thus serves the aims of passivity par excellence in keeping recognition of and action on object hunger quelled. This feature is characterized by the grandiosity that often accompanies manic states, in which overt denigration and contempt for the object is aimed at bolstering the feeling that one does not need the object in any way, thus blotting out the threat that such neediness carries with it.

A phenomenological description of the state of the ego and the implementation of the 'passive strategy' may help to clarify and solidify what has been said about it to this point:

In a bad-object world, one is threatened with imminent destruction by seemingly malevolent, angry bad objects which torment one. Such objects are regarded with the utmost sense of danger. It is in the aim of placating persecutory figures, and thus avoiding provoking them to one's demise that the core of passivity, the active pursuit of avoidance and compliance, is found. The primary problem encountered is that in a phenomenologically capricious environment it is

not at all clear which actions will bring retaliation, so that all spontaneous activity tends to become indiscriminately suppressed, for fear that one will make the 'wrong move,' the one that will unleash the destructive potential upon oneself. Activity itself becomes an unmapped 'mine field,' where a mis-step has potentially serious, and phenomenologically imagined fatal consequences. Thus, whereas Klein says she names the "paranoid position" thusly because anxieties are persecutory, in the paranoid position 'gone wrong' the threat of persecution becomes so potent and deadly that vigilance and fear become the central aspects of functioning. The effects of this 'passive strategy,' if vigorously enough employed, tend to persevere through all later developmental periods and into adult life. Its manifestation takes the general form of anxiety accompanying the facing of novel situations, where what constitutes a 'safe' response is unclear. Situations which call for creativity, originality, initiative, and risk-taking or decision-making are dreaded and tend to be avoided, or if they are unavoidable, produce considerable anxiety and a constant struggle against slipping into immobility and paralysis.

Finally, it is of note that even on an unconscious level, one need not be aware that it is one's own needs and destructiveness arising out of frustration that leads to the adoption of a passive strategy, the active pursuit of

avoiding spontaneous action in the service of reducing and/or avoiding provoking greater persecution. One need not have the conceptual awareness of the connection between one's own destructiveness and consequent persecution for this system to operate. Rather, in a phenomenological sense, one is aware of a sense of dread and anxiety that accompanies any contemplation or urge towards spontaneous activity. There is a constant sense of imminent disaster, of possible holocaust, which may be disconnected from any apparent cause, other than a felt dangerousness of the objects of one's world.

This dread and anxiety is the phenomenological manifestation of the fear of consequences in relation to action, which was posited earlier as a basic developmental dilemma (pp. 141 142). However, in thinking through the effects of this dilemma beyond the earliest developmental period, one must consider whether the fear of the consequences of action does not constitute a 'core problem' which serves as a common thread across developmental periods, although modified by increasingly sophisticated defensive techniques, as well as modification of the threat perceived in accordance with better reality testing as development proceeds (i.e., a progression from from fear of bodily destruction to fear of loss of body part (Oedipal crisis), to a more reality-based fear of loss of love of the object).

It is an intriguing question, and backing for the view presented here may be taken from the example of the obsessive personality. Supposedly, the obsessive represents a fairly high level of 'neurotic' development. Yet one may point to the chief characteristic of obsessiveness, immobility and indecisiveness precisely because of the tremendous anxiety over the consequences of action, and ask whether what is being observed is not the recapitulation of a more basic, 'paranoid' (because of the perceived threat) problem, contained with more sophisticated defensive techniques, as opposed to a truly 'later' developmental problem which has less in common with earlier dilemmas.

Similarly, one can conceptualize hysteria as a sophisticated defensive technique again aimed at an earlier problem involving the danger inherent in initiative action, i.e., by using diffuse and global cognition, one 'blurs out' the perception of threat in relation to action. The hysteric is relatively free to act (at least in comparison to the obsessive), but tends to do so impulsively, since the cost of such 'freedom' is the relinquishing of more critical and vigilant cognitions which would temper action, but would also bring the potential threat that accompanies such action into clearer focus. Additionally, such a conceptualization, embodying the 'blurring out' of perception and cognition of threat in relation to action, would help to explain the high

degree of denial characteristically associated with hysteria.

Although there are some differences between the paranoid 'position' and paranoia as a personality structure, the sense of dread and imminent disaster, the fear of consequences and the impending sense of threat which appears to be at the core of both, makes for consideration of whether paranoia does not constitute a 'core' psychopathological condition. It may be that all other forms of disorder represent either a more developmentally advanced elaboration of and/or a defense against this most basic dilemma. It would be both worthwhile and interesting to see in a more formal study whether the clinical lore is born out: that in both controlled regression in therapy as well as in uncontrolled decompensation (e.g., functional obsessives often decompensating (when they do) to paranoid schizophrenia), what is eventually uncovered is a core of paranoid functioning and its attendant problems.

V. PASSIVITY AND THE NATURE OF CONTINUING OBJECT ATTACHMENT

This writer would like to close this chapter by elaborating the 'exception' which was mentioned earlier to the moratorium on initiative activity imposed by the passive strategy for survival. This 'exception' is encompassed by the larger topic of the nature and form of object attachment within the context of passivity, and as such this topic

provides an entryway into consideration of this area.

It may be argued that the annihilatory fear of a persecutory world is in itself not enough to account for why one submits to and maintains the strictures of passivity demanded by such an 'internal police state' in regard to expression of libidinal aims. The preceding discussion made mention of 'hope' that persecutory figures may somehow become benign. The question must arise: What is the basis for such hope that sustains one in continuing to crush initiative action towards external objects, rather than simply welcoming death by annihilation, given the level of fear and pain in living in such a bad-object world?

The answer may be twofold. First, it appears likely that what can be called an 'allegiance' often develops towards the A.L.E. and its demands, and may be considered a part of the dynamics of the false-self system. What is meant by allegiance is this: The A.L.E. both demands refraining from acting on libidinal needs, and appears as a very powerful and compelling force. One complies with its demands, not only out of fear, but also in all likelihood out of a desire to share in its apparent omnipotence. (Guntrip, in his rather excellent section on A.L.E. functioning and the motives for sustaining it (Guntrip, 1981, pp. 178-211), recognizes that not only does the A.L.E. persecute the L.E. and in doing so confers a sense of strength, even if only over the self, but that the

relationship is bi-directional. That is, because of the seeming power the A.L.E. exercises, as well as the object-tie to internalized parents it is composed of and represents, ". . . the libidinal ego does not seem to be able to give up its persecutor. Clearly the motivation of this function is more complex than we have yet considered") (Guntrip, 1981, p. 200).

In effect, one forms an 'allegiance' to the A.L.E., in what can be seen as taking the A.L.E. to be one's object. (Guntrip talks of conditions where, ". . . the central ego may be all but captured by the anti-libidinal ego" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 189). He might consider the applicability of this statement to the libidinal ego, as well. Klein (paraphrased by Segal) also alludes to this possibility when she talks of a defense against persecution "by idealizing the persecutory object itself, and treating it as an ideal") (Segal, 1979, p. 27).

Following Fairbairn's dictum of object attachment as a must, one becomes powerfully attached to an object, but the powerfully bad objects of the A.L.E. (as well as its manifestations in external objects). The result is an actively willful 'knuckling under' to its demands for self-suppression. The imagined 'payoff' is that one will share in its power. This process can be illustrated by the following unconscious phantasy: "If I comply perfectly in submitting to A.L.E. demands and achieve a state of perfect

passivity, I will be rewarded with perfect nurturance. In effect, the 'persecutory veil' will lift and a 'perfect object' will appear, with which I can be united."

Clinically, the general manifestation of this phenomenon may appear as a drivenness in one's actions, a sensitivity and submission to expectations by outside authority which become amplified beyond all realistic reason, and perfectionistic striving. However, such striving is usually devoid of self-satisfaction attributable to the mastery gained by such striving, but instead has a merciless quality driven by fear of not 'measuring up.' This separates it from more mature 'Oedipally-based' competitiveness in which the prominent factors are satisfaction at achieving mastery of tasks and comparisons of self with real, external competitors. By way of illustration, the recent example of Kathy Ormsby comes to mind, a championship collegiate runner who had just set a women's record for distance running. In a subsequent race, unable to keep up a record-setting pace, she ran from the track in the middle of the race and attempted suicide by jumping from a bridge (Newsweek, 6/16/86, p. 68).

Perhaps the best specific example of this 'allegiance' to the A.L.E. in the extreme, the dedication to being perfectly passive as an 'art' to be pursued, rather than merely a terror to be avoided, is to be found in cases of anorexia. In anorexia the goal is apparently to rid oneself

of a body completely, so that one neither has desires which can be frustrated nor needs any external source of nurturance. The concomitant phantasy to following such an essentially 'passive' regime is not the reality-based idea that one will die when such a state is achieved, but that one will have attained 'perfection' and be 'free.'

The second 'answer' to how 'hope', and object-relatedness as well, are kept alive in a personality largely dominated by the 'police state' of passivity involves the 'exception' to active object seeking mentioned earlier: the attachment to an unreal 'idealized' phantasy object. Such a phenomenon may be seen as a corollary development to the 'allegiance' to the A.L.E. and its demands for passivity. It will be recalled, as noted earlier, that the essence of the strategy of passivity consists of refraining from any action, other than compliant or avoidant, in relation to reality-based objects. Such action is squelched because of the decrease in subsequent frustration and destructiveness, and thus enhances survival prospects by the lessening of persecution. However, this caveat against initiative action need not apply if the object of such action meets two conditions: first, that it not be a 'reality-based' object, and thus cannot capriciously frustrate independent of one's desires; and secondly, that its existence remain quite hidden from the 'higher' levels of the personality (i.e., levels relatively closer to direct contact with external

reality and consciousness), such as the A.L.E. and C.E., and thus a degree of protection is provided against persecutory retaliation in response to such initiative activity. The creation of and attachment to a rather completely unreal, ideal phantasized object fits these criteria.

However, it is not merely the possibility of or opportunity for such criteria being met that makes the creation of such a self-object dyad likely. Rather, taking into account Fairbairn's dictum that object-seeking is the primary motivational principle in the personality, the persecution against initiative seeking of reality-based objects enforced under the regime of passivity makes the creation and seeking of an unreal, 'ideal' object almost imperative. Blocked from seeking more externally-based objects, one is forced further 'inward' (in terms of depth of personality layers) and 'backward' (in terms of distance from external reality) to find some form of satisfaction, to find an object towards which to express libidinal aims. In its simplest terms, such a development represents the retreat largely to phantasy life to obtain satisfaction, but satisfactions which are illusory because the phantasy is so radically divorced from reality. It is the setting up of the mind as a place to live 'in,' rather than an apparatus to live 'with.' In more technical and mechanical terms, this attachment to an unreal, ideal object may be thought of

as an attempted 'solution' to the problem of excess libido 'bottled up' under passivity.

Despite the 'hope' that an 'ideal' object can help foster by keeping at least a part of the self active despite persecution, the creation of such a phantasy object, and the part of the self attached to it (or perhaps 'fused with it' is a better phrase, given the necessarily primitive and diffuse nature of this self-object dyad) represents a pathological structure, divorced as it is from any solid reality base.

Having laid the basis of the creation and operation of such an 'ideal' object, let me digress for a moment to clarify the differences between 'reality-based' and such 'unreal' objects. The two terms 'reality-based' and 'unreal' are not absolutely accurate, in that they do not stringently reflect a complete reality or phantasy foundation for an object (nor do they absolutely distinguish internal from external objects). Rather, the terms are used as a reflection of the degree to which an object has a reality base, and in some cases, the relative accessibility of such objects to conscious experience. To explain further: The term 'reality-based' objects encompasses not only truly real, external objects in the environment, but also, for example, A.L.E. (internal, relatively unconscious, rejecting) objects. The reasons for this inclusion are twofold: first, that A.L.E. objects, while not 'real'

objects in the external sense, are founded in good measure on external objects (i.e., a 'bad' introjected external environment), however distorted by primitive cognitive processes and elaborated in phantasy such objects may be. Conversely, external 'real' objects are not wholly 'real' in the sense that phenomenological perception of them has been distorted by phantasized projections onto them. Secondly, such 'reality-based' objects as I have termed them are relatively more accessible to conscious or near-conscious experience than is a phantasized 'ideal' object, given that, for reasons explained previously, such an ideal object and the part of the self in relation to it is by necessity the most radically 'hidden' (i.e., repressed and split-off) part of the self.

In contrast, an 'unreal,' 'ideal' object has relatively little basis in external reality, consisting largely of (in comparison to 'reality-based' objects) elaborated phantasies in accordance with one's needs or desires, and, as noted, is much 'further away' from the conscious level of experience. Yet 'unreal' is not an absolute term as applied here either. In the genesis of such an object, I would think that the 'seed' from which the phantasized object is subsequently elaborated is quite likely a reality-based experience. That is, it is likely that a truly real experience of satisfaction is taken as the 'starting point' of such an object, and then elaborated in completely unrealistic ways

as the press of being unable or forbidden to find nurturance or satisfaction in the external world dictates.

One may point to an example from Freud and extrapolate perhaps the earliest, and one of the simplest, examples of the generation of an ideal object: Freud talks of the infant, in the absence of a real desired object (i.e., the breast), hallucinating the wished-for object (Freud, 1957, p. 39). Of pertinence here is that while the hallucinated breast (and all further elaborations of it) are completely unreal, such a phantasy must have its roots in the experience of a real breast that at one time gave satisfaction. Similarly, this writer would propose that the elaboration of all ideal objects coalesce around a 'grain' of real satisfactory experience. Such an idea helps to explain how patients who have experienced the most severely neglectful and downright damaging environments still inevitably manage to harbor (however unconscious or covert they are) phantasies of perfect nurturance. Within such harsh environments there must have been at least moments of 'good' experience which have subsequently been encapsulated and built upon in phantasy.

To return again to the topic of the 'ideal' object itself: The basis in established theory for the creation and pursuit of such a phantasized object may be seen in Klein's work, in which she essentially posits that good objects are internalized along with, and split off from, bad

ones. Furthermore, the distortion of such objects through idealization is proportionate to the threat from persecutory objects, resulting, through exaggeration of the good qualities of the object (as well as from libidinal desires for perfect nurturance) in an 'ideal' object (e.g., an 'ideal' breast) (Klein, 1977, p. 7). The resultant 'ideal' object is itself a pathological structure and a source of pathological grandiosity if, because of the too persecutory nature of 'bad' objects, its 'goodness' is exaggerated too extremely, resulting in excessive splits between good and bad objects, and consequent failure to achieve object integration and the establishment of an ambivalent (i.e., depressive) relation to objects.

It was indicated earlier that under the intense internal persecutory pressure generic to passivity, such an ideal object, as well as the part of the self in relation to it, must be radically split off from the internal world of bad objects, as well as from conscious experience.² Klein would conceptualize such radical splitting as the process of protecting one's good objects from being overwhelmed by bad ones. While such a conceptualization is useful, the extreme splitting and repression of an ideal object may also be fruitfully conceptualized in terms of the extreme disruption

²Except, perhaps, in the case of rigidly enforced 'vertical' splits which allow conscious manifestation of such objects while preventing any contact with bad or reality-based objects.

the emergence of such a self-object dyad would have on the other parts of psychic functioning in a system dominated by the passive defense. That is, if allowed to come in contact with bad/persecutory internal objects, the existence of such libidinal activity in the midst of such an internal 'police state' would bring tremendous persecution in an effort to squelch such activity. In effect, the A.L.E. would be spurred to unprecedented rage at the violation of its demands for banning of such activity. If such a self-ideal dyad were to come in contact with external objects and reality, the resultant dissonance between the perfectly nurturing nature of the ideal object and the frustration encountered in reality would be too great. The failure of splitting and repression of this self-object may be seen, for example, in states of psychotic agitation where there is a rapid oscillation between grandiosity and extreme terror of being destroyed. Often, the polar extremes of the meeting of omnipotent good and bad objects results in the experience of being 'torn to bits.'

VI. THE SALVAGING OF THE CONCEPT OF A REGRESSED EGO

Finally, one might consider whether, if Guntrip's concept of the Regressed Libidinal Ego can have validity as a structural concept, it is not in the form of this 'ideal' self-object dyad. The idea as presented in this treatise shares a good number of features with Guntrip's conception

of the R.E.: It is the most deeply hidden, split-off and repressed part of the self, and its characteristic of being a part of the self where initiative activity may still take place, however untempered by reality demands, meshes with Guntrip's idea of the R.E. as the nucleus of the 'true self,' the 'lost core of the personality' and a repository for 'hope' in a persecutory world. Furthermore, the ideal self-object dyad must be a result of splitting from the L.E., in order to remain 'hidden' and thus safe from contact and persecution by the A.L.E. That this ideal self-object dyad is not identical with the L.E. is seen by the nature of the objects pursued by each: The 'Exciting Object' of the L.E. may be considered both a 'reality-based' and 'bad' object, consisting as it does largely of introjected and split aspects of external objects which are unsatisfying. Thus, the 'direction' pursued by the L.E. is in essence 'outward.' The part of the self attached to the 'ideal' object is in pursuit of a relatively unreal object which is perfectly nurturant and 'good,' even if rather completely phantasized. Thus, the 'direction' of this part of the self is 'inward,' away from external reality. Almost literally, it is in 'pursuit of a dream.' The 'inward' orientation of the ideal self-object dyad corresponds with Guntrip's idea of the R.E. as a flight 'inward,' away from the world of both real and bad objects.

However, there are important differences between the

two concepts, the most prominent being tied with this idea of 'inward flight.' Guntrip's R.E. 'flees the field' of bad object relations and seeks a refuge 'inward' to escape persecution, resulting in what has been called the seeking of objectlessness, an idea which, as seen in Chapter II, does not stand up under scrutiny. In contrast, the conception presented here not only encompasses this flight from the persecution generic to passivity, but extends it further by saying that it is not only a flight from bad objects, but also a flight (or pursuit) towards a perfectly good, if unreal, object. Thus, Fairbairn's idea that an object is always sought is preserved. Far from being a 'frozen potential' in 'cold storage,' as is Guntrip's R.E., this 'part-self' is in rather furious libidinal activity with a completely unreal, ideal object.

One might wonder why Guntrip insists on the R.E. as an 'objectless' ego, why he never arrived at the above formulation. The answer is apparently to be found in his (as well as Fairbairn's) belief that there is no need for the internalization of good objects, other than as conscious pleasant memories which promote good ego development (Guntrip, 1981, p. 21). In his system, an internalized object is by definition bad or unsatisfying (as opposed to Klein and Winnicott, to whom internalized good objects, in non-pathological and non-extreme form, are an essential foundation from which healthy development is promoted).

Thus, Guntrip is bound by his own theoretical bias from considering an obvious criticism such as the one Greenberg and Mitchell make, and thus Guntrip is prevented from making his conception of the R.E. more viable, i.e.:

It is not clear why the regressed ego is seen as withdrawn from all objects rather than seeking a particular phantasized object of an infinitely perfect and totally supportive nature (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, p. 214).

A great deal more could be said about the ideal self-object dyad, given its importance in psychopathology because of both its 'hidden' and 'crazy' (due to its development without and 'away from' reality constraints) nature. The idea has been included rather briefly here as an acknowledgement of the 'flip side' of the persecutory part of internal object relations.

However, important as such a concept might be to pathology, it is still a derivative of and consequent to passivity and its manifestations. It is important to keep in mind that such a structure does not by itself represent the core of pathology in the personality, but is itself a product and consequence of the regime of passivity which necessitated the creation of such a hypertrophied and hidden 'ideal' object. In essence, it is the implementation of a passive strategy for survival in a bad-object world, in the service of reducing persecution, that has driven all initiative activity so far 'underground,' and set one in the direction of the pursuit of phantasy for satisfaction,

having made the pursuit of real satisfaction too terrifying and dangerous an enterprise in which to engage.

To summarize, then, the features of this new concept of passivity as delineated in this chapter: Passivity may be seen, in one sense, as the active process of avoiding taking libidinal or aggressive action in relation to 'reality-based' objects. In respect to its most prominent phenomenological manifestation, the crushing of any externally-directed urges towards 'object-hungering,' it may be likened to Guntrip's concept of passive withdrawal from object relations.

However, in contrast to Guntrip's formulation, passivity as defined here is not a primary motivational force which lies at the base of personality functioning and is founded in cutting ties to objects. Rather, it is better seen as a defensive strategy aimed at survival in a persecutory world, with the concomitant aim of preserving ties to 'reality-based' objects to the extent possible. That is, it is aimed at keeping a persecutory world from becoming more so, at staving off the threat of annihilation by 'stabilizing' to the degree possible relations with bad objects, both internal and external. Furthermore, it is not passivity which must be contained as a pathological factor per se, as in Guntrip's concept. Passivity may be thought of as a pathological factor in the sense of its 'unhealthy' aspects of driving one away from moving in external and

reality-based directions. However, to arrive at the true core of pathology in the personality one must look further, to the factor which passivity itself is constructed to contain: destructiveness, and the annihilatory anxieties which are engendered when such destructiveness is not able to be contained 'naturally' through adequately good experiences with external objects.

Finally, the concept of a Regressed Ego (R.E.) exisiting as a persisting psychic structure, and resulting from a further split from the L.E., may be a viable concept, as delineated in this chapter. However, it is better conceived of as seeking an idealized, phantasized object, rather than no objects at all. Furthermore, it is better conceptualized as a consequence of passivity, rather than being synonymous with its operation, as Guntrip suggests.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This present work may be summarized with two general statements: first, that the dynamics of destructiveness have great import from the earliest period of development, and therefore should be accounted for in a comprehensive psychodynamic theory; and secondly, that passivity, as a comprehensively developed concept, is of marked heuristic value in describing the earliest processes used to contain such destructiveness and their resultant phenomenological manifestations, especially in the absence of its containment provided by a more 'natural,' 'healthy' developmental progression.

In arriving at these conclusions the theoretical conceptualizations of Freud, Klein, Guntrip, Fairbairn and Winnicott were reviewed with an emphasis on the etiology and dynamics of aggression/destructiveness in each. From this review was drawn an opposition between the basic tenets of Freudian theory and Object Relations theory. It was shown how in each case the key to these fundamental differences in theoretical conceptualization, at least in Guntrip's view, rested on the disagreement over whether human behavior, development, and dynamics have their foundations in innate (i.e., instinctual) forces as Freudian

theory posits, or whether environmental (i.e., relational) influences are the dominant factor, as Object Relations theorists believe. It was further explored how Melanie Klein's theory could have provided a 'conceptual bridge' between Freudian theory and later Object Relations theory, as it provides for a synthesis of both instinctual and relational factors in dynamics and development.

However, Guntrip, as the spokesperson for the Object Relations viewpoint, chose to argue against, rather than synthesize, the concept of instinct into Object Relations theory, believing as he did that the inclusion of the concept of instinct diluted, if not negated, what he believed was unique in Object Relations theory. It was explored how and why this attack on the concept of instinct became focused on the concept of the death instinct, particularly in regard to the use the Object Relations theorists had for the concept of libido as a motivational principle (albeit modified to having a relational foundation), while the concept of a death instinct remained antithetical to their formulation of the etiology of destructiveness. With this attack on the death instinct, the Object Relations theorists' fight to establish their tenets as the most viable also inevitably focused on the minimization of destructiveness as important in early dynamics. Since destructiveness was focal and prominent in Klein's work, even more so than in Freud's, she also became the target of

this attack. In effect, destructiveness as a central dynamic was 'written-out' of Object Relations theory, and along with it, a large part of Klein's potential contribution to the continued evolution of that theory.

The manner in which the Object Relations theorists, and particularly Guntrip, pursued this attack against destructiveness as an early and central dynamic was characterized by four central arguments: First, in the 'moral' argument presented by Guntrip, it was seen that in part his objections to the inclusion of destructiveness, while couched in terms of a debate over scientific methodology, actually were based on moral grounds, and thus are not relevant to a logical or heuristic critique of destructiveness as a relevant dynamic.

Secondly, in the 'moot' argument it was shown that the linkage implied by Guntrip between the concept of instinct and the appearance of destructiveness as a primary dynamic force is not a valid one. That is, whether the death instinct holds up as a valid theoretical concept is not tied to whether the idea of early destructiveness is also valid. By Guntrip's own admission, whether one attributes destructiveness to an instinctual source or whether one sees its genesis in an environmental, relational framework, the subsequent dynamics involving destructiveness are unchanged: Both the death instinct and environmental frustration are experienced phenomenologically as persecution, to which hate

and destructiveness follow as a natural result.

Thirdly, in the 'deferred' argument, Guntrip tacitly admits that destructiveness is of import in dynamics, but he holds that it is not a factor in the earliest period of dynamics. Rather, Guntrip claims it is a creation and problem of the later, depressive period, when the struggle is in dealing with an integrated, 'ambivalent' object. Guntrip's argument hinges on his contention that in the earliest period frustration is reacted to not with anger and hate but solely with fear and weakness. Such fear and weakness lead to 'greedy hungering' after the object, which Guntrip contends is a type of destructiveness distinct from later destructiveness involving anger and hate. Guntrip's contentions, particularly that anger and hate are not generic to the earliest period of development, were countered by several means: first, through his own statements in which he appears to admit that hate is present in the earliest period, as well as his reliance on Winnicott's formulations, which also seem to contradict Guntrip's contentions. More importantly, it was argued that while Guntrip's contention that fear and weakness are a reactive by-product of frustration in early dynamics may be quite valid, a concomitant reaction which he fails to acknowledge is of intentional and destructive anger and hate towards frustrating objects. The fact that the A.L.E. becomes a 'repository' for such anger (after it is projected

and then re-introjected), and is experienced as self-persecution, can obscure the self as the genesis of these emotions: Since they seem to come from 'outside', it is easy, although not conceptually complete, to attribute all of the A.L.E.'s 'hate' as a reflection of an incorporated environment, as Guntrip does.

Fourth, Guntrip presents the most formidable objection to destructiveness as a primary dynamic by 'replacing' it, along with persecutory fear, with passive schizoid withdrawal from all object relations as both the primary motivational, as well as the most potent pathological force in the personality. Subsequently, Guntrip claims that all other dynamic aspects of the personality, including those involving destructiveness, are merely defensive constructions in reaction to this primary danger, which he claims is universal. The motivation for passive schizoid withdrawal and the seeking of objectlessness is reified by Guntrip as persisting psychic structure in the form of the Regressed Libidinal Ego (R.E.). However, Guntrip's concept of the R.E. and passive schizoid withdrawal was critiqued and found to be unviable as he describes it not only because of the lack of clarity and substance he provides in delineating it, but more importantly, because his conception violates the very foundation of dynamics which lie at the base of his theorizing. That is, according to Fairbairn's system of dynamics, to which Guntrip claims adherence,

object-seeking is a fundamental and necessary property of an ego, and there can be no ego without it.

Based on the findings of these previously explored topics, a system of dynamics was proposed which while preserving many of the features and structures of Object Relations theory, re-integrated the Kleinian emphasis on destructiveness as a primary dynamic, and as a force which is present from the earliest period of development. Furthermore, it was proposed that uncontained destructiveness constitutes the primary pathological force in the personality, constituting the initial force which sets in motion and perpetuates malignant cycles in personality dynamics. The primary danger of destructiveness, as manifest phenomenologically, is of annihilation through persecution. It was argued that such persecution has its genesis in large part in one's own destructive urges, and is re-visited upon the self through cycles of projection and introjection as a 'return of the split.'

In connection with this proposed 'integrated' system of dynamics, it was argued that, in opposition to Guntrip's conception, schizoid withdrawal is better viewed as a transitory phantasy, rather than an achieved psychic state and structure. Additionally, it was argued that anxiety about persecutory annihilation is at least an equal, and likely a greater danger than of ego disintegration

(phenomenologically perceived as abandonment) that Guntrip connects with schizoid withdrawal. This proposition was justified on the bases that: First, the reaction of schizoid withdrawal is subsequent to and resultant from annihilatory fear; and secondly, that withdrawal from object relations represents a 'failed solution' to the problem of destructiveness and subsequent persecution. It was concluded that Fairbairn's dictum of object-relating as the primary motivation in the personality is the most viable view. Furthermore, it was concluded that while there may be an 'oscillation' between object-withdrawal and object-seeking, that object withdrawal as a 'failed solution' to the problem of destructiveness represents a dynamic 'dead-end,' always returning one to some form of object-seeking. It might be further concluded here that such an 'oscillation' may be acknowledged as a continuing dynamic feature in a personality, as characterized by Guntrip's "in and out programme." However, such attempts at withdrawal are perhaps best viewed as a dynamic 'holding pattern' or 'sideshow' in the sense that one is inevitably returned to the main arena of dynamic development, which is found in some form of object-relating.

A concept of 'passivity' was introduced and elaborated to account for how destructiveness is contained in the absence of its 'natural' containment by enough good-object experience encountered in healthy development. The essence

of passivity is in the quelling of initiative action based on libidinal or angry impulses in relation to reality-based objects. It was explained how such a caveat against action, strictly enforced, contains destructiveness and keeps a persecutory world from becoming more so, and thus keeps annihilatory anxiety from becoming unbearable. Thus, passivity may be thought of as a defensive strategy for survival in a persecutory world. Furthermore, a differentiation was made between 'true' and 'false' activity, the latter consisting of action towards reality-based objects which is still permitted, and indeed required, under the regime of the passive defense. However, such 'false' action is based on compliant and avoidant aims in response to placating a persecutory environment and obscuring psychic realities of pain and deprivation, rather than being based on one's authentic personal desires. The relation of such activity, and associated endopsychic structure which engenders and enforces it, to the Object Relations theorists' concept of a 'false self' system was explored.

Some clinical manifestations of the passive defense were also examined, whose chief phenomenological characteristic may be summarized as a fear of consequences should one engage in truly initiative action towards reality-based objects. Furthermore, it was proposed that this characteristic fear of consequences may signify a 'core

problem' involving passivity which links the problems of different developmental periods. Such a proposition deserves further study, for if its validity is verified, it would have import for further development of both theory and therapeutic approaches and foci. (For example, using the concept of fear of consequences as a central pathological problem, the idea of 'ego coverage' in treatment by the therapist may be conceived of as containing (or 'taking upon oneself') the anxiety of the patient sufficiently so that the patient may feel safe enough to begin to overcome the paralysis of passivity and experiment with engaging in initiative action. Such ego coverage is necessary to nurture this process to the point where the patient's reality-testing is strengthened. That is, where he or she comes to have insight that the imagined catastrophic consequences connected with such actions do not, in fact, occur; or if negative consequences do in fact happen, insight can be gained into the part the patient plays in making them a self-fulfilling prophecy.)

Furthermore, it was proposed that the concept of a Regressed Ego, if it is to have conceptual validity as endopsychic structure, is best viewed as an 'exception' to the caveat against activity imposed by the passive defense. However, in contrast to Guntrip's concept of the R.E., the one proposed here is based on active object-seeking, but activity which seeks a phantasized, unreal ideal object.

The driving of such activity 'underground,' (i.e., away from both reality and contact with 'higher' levels of endopsychic structure), is best seen as the result of passivity, rather than as a major characteristic of passivity itself.

This writer would conclude, then, that based on the arguments presented and examined in this work, first, that the Kleinian view that destructiveness is a primary pathological factor in personality development from the earliest period is the more viable view, when compared to Guntrip's conception, which is that destructiveness is ultimately a secondary, defensive, and later development. More importantly, it is proposed and concluded here that the conception of passivity as explicated in this work is a more viable one than that formulated by Guntrip. This claim of being more viable rests on two premises, which it is hoped have been amply demonstrated in this work. First, it is more viable than Guntrip's concepts on a theoretical basis, both from the standpoint of being more internally consistent as well as being more successful in avoiding contradiction with the underlying principles of the main body of Object Relations theory (e.g., that libido is primarily object-seeking). Secondly, it is a more viable concept in the heuristic sense, as discussed in the Introduction to this work, of providing a more comprehensive and consistent explanation of phenomena. It is hoped that this is demonstrated by the concept's ability to subsume under it

(and/or illuminate more fully) such areas, concepts, and phenomena as destructiveness in early dynamics; object-seeking as a continuing primary motivation; the phenomenon of schizoid withdrawal; the concepts and functions of activity and passivity in personality dynamics; and the delineation and development of endopsychic structure (including a viable concept of the the Regressed Ego, the delineation of a more fully explanatory A.L.E./C.E. 'alliance,' as well as the operation of a 'false self' system).

It would be a mistake to hold that the concept of passivity discussed here is more 'correct' than Guntrip's, as 'truth' is a relative thing, applicable more to physical facts than theories of psychological phenomena, which, after all, are analogies to experience and can never quite capture the 'truth' of an experience, as posited in the Introduction. The concept of passivity as presented here is perhaps best seen as an extension and modification of Guntrip's concepts, as it is ultimately grounded in Guntrip's and the other Object Relations theorists' formulations. Still, the hope is that as an 'analogy' to experience, the concept of passivity provides a more comprehensive and heuristic analogy than has been devised previously.

However, it might also be noted that the concept of passivity does not merely extend Object Relations theory by re-integrating Kleinian destructiveness. It might be said

that the product of such a concept may also add to Kleinian theory and lead to a new cross-fertilization between it and Object Relations theory. Specifically, Klein's theory appears to be an admirably comprehensive analogy to experience in its invention and delineation of individual defense mechanisms involved in the containment of destructiveness, e.g., projection, introjection, identification, denial, etc., and their various dynamic combinations. However, Klein never arrived at a 'coordinating concept' for this excellent exposition of defense mechanisms, other than the rather general aim of keeping good objects protected from bad ones. The malignant personality forces in her theory may be characterized as all having an active nature to them. It is believed that the concept of passivity, an idea which is rather completely absent from her work in conceptual terms¹, can be seen as providing such a 'coordinating concept' for these defense mechanisms, couched as passivity is here as the specific overarching defensive strategy for early containment of destructiveness in a bad-object world.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The avenues that one might explore in extending and/or applying the concept of passivity developed in this work

¹In fact, none of Klein's works even index the term 'passivity.'

lead in many directions, and are too numerous to explore in any significant depth here. However, this writer would like to briefly examine three of the most prominent of these possibilities for further exploration, which are in fact inter-related.

A More Comprehensive Definition and Differentiation of Activity and Passivity

The first of these areas revolves around the question "What constitutes the essence of activity and passivity? How can they be definitively differentiated?" The present writer believes the question is more complex than it appears. One might contend that it has already been answered in the present work: i.e., Activity is initiative action towards reality-based objects. Passivity is the quelling of such action. However, such a definition does not actually define activity, but rather describes it. What constitutes action itself is left undefined.

The commonly understood usage of the terms "activity" and "passivity" leads to the idea that they are polar opposites, at least in terms of motoric activity, i.e., active vs. inactive, dynamic vs. static. It appears that many psychological theories rely on this common usage, never feeling the need to define it much further. Yet such a dichotomy along motoric lines appears inadequate when the concepts of 'true' and 'false' activity, as examined in the body of this work, are applied. As implied in the earlier

discussion of these concepts, activity and passivity may at times share characteristics and 'mimic' each other when only the criterion of motoric action is applied. That is, one may be engaged in furious motoric action, as seen in the "manic defense," but with the aim of avoiding recognition of and adaptation to reality; such an aim is generic to passivity. Conversely, refraining from motoric action, as in delaying gratification, is at times a component of 'true' activity, with the ultimate aim of securing libidinal needs in accordance with recognition of reality demands. Yet such 'true' activity carries with it no ostensible motoric component. Thus, motoric action when defined as synonymous with activity, and used as the criterion to differentiate activity from passivity, founders on the concepts of 'true' and 'false' activity.

Offering a more comprehensive description of 'true' activity may help lead towards a definition of the essence and nature of activity itself. Extending and synthesizing ideas about activity, passivity, and the drive to mastery contained in the works of White (1963), Rappaport (1967), Klein (Segal, 1974), and Winnicott (1971), the present writer would propose the following as a more comprehensive description of what constitutes 'true' activity: 'True' activity is action (motoric and/or psychic) in relation to both the external environment as well as the internal, psychic environment. It is based on a recognition of both

external and psychic realities, and is aimed at mastery over and adaptation to (the problems presented by) these environments. As such, a shorthand description of 'true' activity might be: Action, either motoric and/or psychic, which is appropriate to and enhancing of mastery based on consideration of these realities.

What constitutes 'action' still remains undefined in this more comprehensive description. Yet the stated aim of 'true' activity, the enhancement of mastery, may help towards a definition of what constitutes action. The question becomes, in effect, "What is it that enhances such mastery?"

This writer suspects that if this area were to be explored thoroughly, the roots and hallmark of 'true' activity, and the enhancement of mastery, would be found in the ability to 'play.' By the term 'play,' what is meant is an extension of Winnicott's (1971) concept of this idea, which might be characterized as: the capacity to symbolize one's objects (both internal and external) and manipulate and mix freely and think flexibly about the attributes of those objects (within certain reality constraints²). This

² This restriction on the flexibility in object manipulation and symbolization 'within certain reality constraints' is added to differentiate constructive or 'true' action, which is ultimately reality-oriented, from the plasticity of symbolization which characterizes psychotic thinking, but which avoids and violates reality considerations rather completely. Such 'activity,' but

flexibility in symbolization and thinking is in the service of adapting to and mastering the imperatives of both internal and external reality. (In effect, one 'plays around' with the attributes of internal and external reality in the service of discovering solutions to the problems presented in the convergence of these two realms.) Since it was previously stated that playing is at the root of 'true' activity, the above characterization of play may be taken as synonymous with activity, and it may serve as a working definition of 'true' activity.³ It is also of import to note that activity is therefore primarily a mental phenomenon of symbolizing abilities, which may or may not lead to motoric action.

In its primitive inception, such 'play' (and 'true' activity) may be seen in what Winnicott calls "transitional phenomena" (Winnicott, 1971, pp. 1-26). For example, in the absence of a needed breast, the infant may take a blanket

without structure along realistic lines, is seen for example in relation to an unreal 'ideal' object as discussed in Chapter III.

³It might also be re-emphasized that to characterize 'true' activity as 'play' is not in contradiction to the description of 'true' activity given in the body of this work, (i.e., initiative action towards reality-based objects, both internal and external). Rather, such a current characterization is an extension and amplification of this earlier description. To 'play,' with its characteristics of experimentally assigning and mixing of attributes of objects (and self), may be seen as an amplification of what is meant by the term 'to initiate,' as in 'initiative' action.

and symbolize in it some comforting aspects of the breast, while at the same time retaining some 'reality' aspects of the blanket itself. In doing so, the infant gains some measure of 'mastery' and control over a situation which otherwise would only promote anxiety and anger at frustration. In its most mature form, such 'play' may be seen in 'thought experiments' such as those conducted by Einstein in formulating Relativity Theory. The key element which led to his discoveries were the suspension of the 'commonsense' assumptions about physical reality, allowing him to explore and 'play' with 'what if' situations and their consequences for physical laws and causality. The apparent link between play, 'true' activity, and creativity which emerges in these examples is not happenstance: Play may be thought of as synonymous with 'true' activity, and may be considered as the foundation of all creativity.

Crucial to this definition of 'true' activity and play is the one element which constitutes the prerequisite to engage in such activity: the freedom to flexibly manipulate one's objects in symbolic fashion. It is by focusing on this characteristic that one might also define the root and essence of passivity. If the definition of activity is a mentally based phenomenon involving the ability to engage in play, then passivity is also at root a mentally based phenomenon, involving the inability or inhibition of this freedom to engage in such play. In essence, because of the

fear of phantasized disastrous consequences, in passivity one dare not, and indeed cannot 'imagine' the attributes of persecutory objects (and the self) as anything but what they currently appear to be. One dare not 'experiment' or 'play' (i.e., act) in relation to these attributes. Rather, one is so 'transfixed' by their dangerousness that one only responds to what appears to one as their compelling and inflexible reality.⁴

Passivity as a Major Block to Reality Contact

If the foregoing definition of activity and passivity is found to be valid and valuable, one implication that might deserve further study is the idea of passivity as constituting a major block to the development of reality testing across succeeding developmental periods. Indeed, passivity may be thought of as interfering with the maturation of normal developmental abilities of subsequent periods.

How passivity functions to seriously inhibit the development of reality testing might best be illustrated by exploring the accomplishments needed to achieve depressive-level functioning. The ability to integrate split-object

⁴It need not be added that in passivity one fears to imagine novel courses of action 'even in thought' in relation to such persecutory objects, for, given the definition of activity as a mental phenomenon involving symbolization, action itself is in a sense synonymous with or subsuming of imaginative or creative thought.

imagos into one 'ambivalent' object is predicated according to Klein (1977) and Winnicott (1979) on the capacity of the infant to engage in "reparation." Reparation consists essentially of the symbolic (and real) activity of the infant which is aimed at restoration (in phantasy and reality) of the object which is felt to have been damaged as a result of the infant's destructive urges. As such, the heart of reparation may be said to consist of 'true' activity and play as defined earlier.

The results of repeated cycles of reparative activity is what this writer would call (summarizing and paraphrasing Klein) the 'detoxification' of one's hate and destructiveness. This detoxification comes about because of two crucial effects of successful reparation. First, the infant discovers that he or she can 'handle' the effects of his/her destructive 'acts.' In this discovery that he/she can 'make good' again what is felt to have been damaged, the confidence grows that one need not simply suppress all action on destructive urges, but indeed one can 'master' the consequences of these urges. Thus, the 'activity' (of reparation) promotes the freedom to engage in further 'activity' (the freedom to give greater expression to destructive impulses). Secondly, as a result of reparative activity the phantasy of the omnipotence of one's destructiveness becomes modified in a more reality oriented direction. By the object's repeated demonstrable

ability to survive his or her attacks, the infant discovers realistic limits to the imagined power of his/her destructiveness. In effect, that the imagined disastrous consequences of putting destructive urges into action have not occurred constitutes a 'lesson' in reality, resulting in the infant becoming less afraid of his or her destructive urges, and leading to increased freedom to experiment with activity.

However, reparation, as a form of 'true' activity or play, requires exactly those abilities for symbolic representation and flexibility which are absent or inhibited in passivity. Thus, if the defensive regime of passivity is too strictly enforced or too broadly implemented, one is unable to 'detoxify' one's hate through reparative activity. Reality testing would suffer severely, as the phantasized omnipotence of one's destructiveness remains unchallenged since one dares not 'create' the opportunity to see the actual effects of destructiveness in reality. One never 'discovers' reality because of the caveat against (true) action that would lead to this discovery.

Most importantly, the inability to contain destructiveness through reparative activity would seem to lead to an even greater reliance on the more primitive passive defense to contain such destructiveness. That is, since the 'myth' of the omnipotence of one's destructiveness is never deflated by its meeting with reality, the infant

becomes increasingly afraid of any action based on such destructiveness. Consequently, the infant is forced to 'contain' it by further use of the only 'tool' at hand to do so: passivity, the further self-restraint of action based on destructive urges. Thus, just as (true) activity leads to greater freedom to engage in and further develop the capacity for action, as seen above, passivity tends to beget further passivity. The applicability of this idea to Guntrip's characterization of the internal bad-object world as a "static internal closed system" (Guntrip, 1981, p. 198) which forms the core of resistance to change in therapy might also be a topic for further examination.

Passivity as a Diagnostic and Conceptual Tool

Finally, one might further explore the idea of using the degree and nature of passivity in patients as a type of 'diagnostic barometer' of the type and degree of pathology in the personality. Guntrip argues for the Regressed Ego (R.E.) as being a universal, inevitable phenomenon to some degree in every personality, based on the inevitability of environmental frustration leading to persecution (p. 105). The same argument can be used to contend that, given what is inevitably to some degree a persecutory environment, the implementation of passivity as a defensive strategy is also a universal phenomenon in the personality, at least to some degree.

The extent to which such a strategy has been forced to

be employed, with crippling effects upon further maturation and development (as discussed in the previous section), might be used as a diagnostic measure of pathology. In more concrete terms, the suggestion being made here is that asking the question "To what degree is the patient free to engage in (true) activity (mental and/or motoric), and to what degree is he or she inhibited by internal strictures from engaging in activity?" may be a useful way to conceptualize psychotherapy cases, formulate planned interventions, and assess outcomes of psychotherapy.

Furthermore, it is not only a matter of degree of passivity, but also determining the qualitative aspects of passivity in patients which may be useful in conceptualizing cases and planning treatment interventions. Within a personality, passivity may be implemented with such severity around some issues that the patient is effectively paralyzed in relation to action around those issues, while having a relatively complete degree of freedom of action in relation to other issues.

An exploration of what causes this type of selectivity or variation in passivity might lead to the clarification of the nature of destructiveness itself. Although Winnicott's work is often obscure at times in his discussion of destructiveness (Winnicott, 1971, pp. 90-93), it appears that implicit in his discussion is a crucial point relevant both to explaining how passivity can be selectively

implemented as well as to the nature of destructiveness. The point is as follows: that every engagement in 'action' carries with it the possibilities for destructiveness. However, whether the potential for destructiveness inherent in action becomes 'actualized' depends on whether the relational context between infant and caretaker defines such action as destructive. If an action becomes defined in such a way as destructive, it then requires containment, at which point passivity enters this picture as a means of providing such containment.

A common example (albeit somewhat exaggerated) might help make what is meant here less obscure. To intend to marry is not by itself a destructive action. However, it becomes defined as such when the mother of the son who intends this clutches her chest at the news and (verbally or non-verbally) conveys the message, "Do what you like. But rest assured that by doing so you are killing me." It is in the context of the relationship that action takes on (or does not take on) destructive meaning.

In a broader sense, one may see the same process of destructiveness being defined by the relational context, and connected with specific areas or issues in Mahler's description of the issues relevant to different developmental periods (Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, 1975). For example, in the "practicing phase" of about 10-18 months of age, the issue is whether the mother encourages the infant in its

discovery and exploration of the wider world, the non-maternal environment, or whether she discourages and punishes such attempts at psychological separation from her. If the mother defines such exploratory activity as destructive to her, she may discourage it by cutting off "emotional supplies" to the child when he or she engages in such activity. One can easily see how the child may become 'passive,' i.e., refrain from taking any initiative (unapproved) action in this area for fear of the consequences. However, such a relational definition of destructiveness may be applied only to the issue of psychological separation from the mother, while the child is relatively free to engage in and develop abilities which do not relate to this issue or threaten this psychological vulnerability of the mother. Thus, one can see how passivity may be applied 'differentially' across issues, making some types of activity too dangerous to engage in while having little impact on other areas.

Finally, it should be made clear that this brief exposition of implications for future study is by no means meant to be regarded as a rigorous or conclusive examination of these areas. Rather, they are what might be fruitful directions in which to extend the foundation provided by the main body of this work.

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