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LOCKE AND MR. SPECTATOR:

ASPECTS OF VIRTUE

A Dissertation

Presented for the

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Degree

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine The Spectator and John Locke's works on education and understanding in order to determine corresponding ideas on the intellectual and moral nature of man. As this study shows, a number of parallel thoughts do exist, even though evidence of direct influence of Locke on The Spectator cannot be fully determined. What may be concluded from these parallels is that at the beginning of the eighteenth century Englishmen made certain assumptions about themselves and their social relationships that were recorded by Locke and Mr. Spectator.

For that period the most significant assumption about education, and the one from which all others seem to grow, is that man must be taught right from wrong. Such an assumption makes education, both formal and informal, of utmost importance for it indicates that parents, teachers, and the general community all share considerable responsibility in determining the actions and beliefs of individuals.

The aim of education for Locke and Mr. Spectator, then, was the virtuous man, a man who realizes that happiness is found only through proper behavior. For them, a man is motivated to virtue by demonstration that virtue

is rewarding; likewise, he is made to see the wrong of sin by demonstration that sin brings pain either on earth or in a future life.

This conclusion, shared by Locke and Mr. Spectator, two of the most widely read writers of the early eighteenth century, resulted from their having held common beliefs about man's nature. In Locke this nature is explained in the language of the philosopher. In The Spectator, on the other hand, the same view of human nature is the basis of the periodical's intention to work for the general improvement of the nation.

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CHAPTER I

THE NECESSITY OF IMPROVEMENT: THE SPECTATOR AND LOCKEAN PSYCHOLOGY

The Chinese by way of politely cursing an enemy wish on him "interesting times," times without quietness, dignity, order, or production. The curse, it seems, would always work, for in this life only saints and abject sinners can say that their determined purpose has been fulfilled. Both are able to point to their lives as a whole accomplishment with nothing undone and nothing ambiguous. Apparently the rest of us must be content with far less. The life of an age, too, may be similarly cursed: its quietness giving way to war; its dignity destroyed by madmen; its order corrupted by doubt; its production is, therefore, incomplete. Every age gives way too quickly to another, and the minds that mold a particular age inevitably fail to express it in its entirety. Even now we can live in the shadow of a life two thousand years past and feel the impact of its beginning.

John Locke, who himself lived through the interesting times of civil war, revolution, religious doubt and prejudice, and the "new" science, contributed to making more such interesting times in the century that followed his death. Though the product of a man of "quiet thinking,"

Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding excited "a religious controversy so intense that it might be considered a climax even for the turbulent Seventeenth Century."[1] His contributions to making new times was, in fact, so vast that one might say that with him what we recognize as distinctly eighteenth-century thought began. He effectively undermined the concept of innate ideas, formulated a political doctrine that for decades seemed indestructible, conceived a system of education that appears viable even at the present, and took philosophy from the university metaphysicians and gave it to laymen. He, as all thinkers inevitably do, simultaneously destroyed and created, and he was, as all thinkers are, both vilified and lauded for his efforts. By his detractors Locke was accused of inconsistent use of such key words as idea and perception, of unsystematic thinking, and of ignorance of his presuppositions.[2] But a "shapely theoretical" structure lay beyond Locke's intentions.[3] The philosopher dealt with what interested him and with what seemed to be true from his own self-awareness. Furthermore, he confronted what was unknown and admitted what was

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[1]Kenneth MacLean, John Locke and English Literature of the Eighteenth Century (1936; rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 5.

[2]James Sutherland, English Literature of the Late Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), p. 349.

[3]Ibid.

unknowable. He did, in essence, point to mysteries, to things hidden from man's mind and confessed his personal limitations.

Ultimately, as truth must and sometimes does, Locke won out. The eighteenth century was now ready for Locke's ideas. It found his plain-style approach to philosophy rewarding and appropriate, and it saw in his writing a formal presentation of what it already half believed. Locke was able, says Ernest Tuveson, to compromise in the same way that the Glorious Revolution was a compromise; he put into words what men wanted to hear about themselves and their world.[4] As we might apply Tuveson's comments on The Spectator, Locke "seems to only summarize, clearly and succinctly what every thoughtful man believes."[5] In fact, Locke spoke clearly to a century in which all educated men were amateur philosophers like the Earl of Shaftesbury and amateur scientists like Samuel Johnson. Before the century was very old, his was the mind that all thinkers had to confront. Certain men are, in other words, mountains for other men to either move or climb. The authors of The Spectator were, in this way, climbers.

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[4]"Locke and the Dissolution of the Ego," Modern Philology, 52 (1955), 159.

[5]Imagination as a Means of Grace (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1960), p. 92.

In order to introduce Locke in an anthology of eighteenth-century writing, one might with certainty, as did David James, say that the philosopher had a mind that was "eminently fair, and could not easily delude itself; and he must have known that his empiricism could not be elevated into a neat and watertight doctrine."[6] The anthologist might further say that Locke's writings rested solidly on a foundation of Christian morality and common sense. Such an introduction might also serve to introduce The Spectator. The essays, too, were fair and honest. For one thing, the authors, with only occasional irony, allowed their readers to express their own views. Also, though Addison, as Edward and Lillian Bloom point out, held firm to a "ramrod morality," he could back away when principle conflicted with a real situation.[7] C. S. Lewis observes this same deference to reality when he says that Addison did not let any abstract system stand in the way of his recognition of excellence.[8] The Spectator, moreover, proposed to be no more than random observations on matters of general interest; like Locke's

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[6]The Life of Reason (New York: Longmans, 1949), p. 92.

[7]Joseph Addison's Sociable Animal (Providence, R.I.: Brown Univ. Press, 1971), p. 45.

[8]"Addison," Essays on the Eighteenth Century Presented to David Nicol Smith (1945); rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1963, p. 1ff.

own recorded thoughts, the essays in themselves never fully assumed the shape of doctrine. And, surely, common sense and Christian morality lie behind the pictures of myriad virtues and vices in The Spectator. In general, because Addison, Steele, and the rest felt that metaphysics could only lead to frustration, they inclined always toward common sense and practicality and avoided inconclusive disputations or inquiries. But just as An Essay eventually concludes with the significant idea that God and virtue are knowable, Mr. Spectator leads his readers to God through the exercise of Christian virtue.

Looking further, at least three other parallels may be discovered between Locke and The Spectator. Addison, Steele, and Locke were all men of practical affairs who eschewed the unknown for basic matters that could be believed beyond reasonable doubt. For them all, from the beauty of a mind well filled with knowable perceptions comes an unassailable morality. Sutherland asserts that in preparing The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke read the New Testament as though for the first time. As a result, the philosopher found the work reasonable and lacking in undue difficulties. With this reading, Locke attempted to call Christianity back "to its origins," to "scrape off the theological accretions that had collected upon it."[9] On

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[9]Sutherland, pp. 344-345.

another level, the authors of The Spectator tried to remove obtrusive affinities from society and, in doing so, to clarify this society's functions.

The philosopher and the essayists, furthermore, use the same introspective methods in their roles as—so Shakespeare calls seekers after truth—"God's spies." One of the clearest points that emerge from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is the personal origin of Locke's ideas. The philosopher examined his own mind and its workings as well as his own observations. To Locke's way of thinking, men could know their own experiences but not the reality which may lie beyond these experiences. What reality there is exists within the mind and must be searched for there.[10] Mr. Spectator, too, observes and thinks and, from both, creates new ideas. Both rely on lengthy introspection rather than simple and straightforward action to inspire their production.

Last of all, Locke and The Spectator essayists approached their readers in the same manner. Generally, each addressed his readers in a tone that was both helpful and almost casual, for each believed that he wrote for the benefit of a "common reader." Locke always kept this reader

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[10]Tuveson, "Locke and Dissolution," p. 166.

in mind "from beginning to end, making intelligibility and precision the standard for his writing."[11] In fact, if there was no clear notion of the mind's operations before 1690 as Tuveson says, a major part of the blame can be laid on the philosophers themselves. Even a cursory reading of those contemporaries of Locke known as the Cambridge Platonists would reveal a set of ideas totally at odds with that other strong Augustan tradition, the increasingly practical-minded one. If Locke was widely read and accepted, it was because his more significant ideas were comprehensible to most men.[12] As for The Spectator, more often than not it was written for the least informed readers: women of mode and their male counterparts, the fops, the beaux, and the "starers" of London society. From all evidence, Mr. Spectator's audience understood it, profited from its reading, and even wrote letters to itself through the means of the series. The expertise which Mr. Spectator used to keep the attention and the confidence of the often fickle audience he selected for himself is skilled, but for the present, one example may serve. Mr. Spectator himself never spoke of childrearing and only in passing of education;

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[11]Sutherland, p. 353.

[12]"Locke and Dissolution," p. 161.

instead, these matters were left up to various letter writers. For he apparently suspected that in these areas his audience would be skeptical of the opinions of a middle-aged bachelor. In brief, Locke and Mr. Spectator spoke to what in their time was an extraordinarily large audience; they were interested in improving their readers' lives by improving their minds; and they frequently spoke to these readers on their own level.

Such parallels as these seem to confirm Smock's observation that the entire spirit of The Spectator is Lockean.[13] It is not, therefore, just the many direct allusions to Locke that make the essays Lockean, but the series as it exists as a whole. As Bonamy Dobrée says of Addison, The Spectator brings together ideas that make up "the general vision of the educated men of the time."[14] And, like Locke, The Spectator is great because of its ability to formulate a "masterly synthesis and statements of ideas and themes which were emerging [in the eighteenth century] but had not yet been explicitly formulated"; these writers, who in opening the century set its tone, brought

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[13]George E. Smock, "John Locke and the Augustan Age of Literature," Philosophical Review, 55 (1946), 270.

[14]English Literature in the Early Eighteenth Century: 1700-1740 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1959), p. 110.

together "the intellectual elements of the time" in "new and vastly significant relationships."[15]

But of course The Spectator was not the sole literary production to feel Locke's influence. Kenneth MacLean, in John Locke and English Literature of the Eighteenth Century, has written of the general appearance of Lockean ideas in creative literature, especially in Sterne. Beyond the certain fact that many eighteenth-century writers accepted Locke's major ideas and incorporated them into their works, there are two of MacLean's points which are of great concern to this study.

First of all, MacLean says that the admiration Samuel Richardson and Lord Chesterfield had for Locke "suggests that the truth of this philosophy [in An Essay and in Thoughts concerning Education] was a levelling force and fostered intellectual democracy."[16] And second, Locke's denial of innate ideas led to the belief that it was both possible and necessary to formulate "a rational morality of principles to make up for the want of an instinctive morality."[17] The two concepts may be put together to form

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[15]Tuveson, Imagination as a Means of Grace, p. 93.

[16]MacLean, p. 39.

[17]Ibid., p. 27.

the idea that all levels of society must receive a full but not the same range of knowledge: if a person learns what is appropriate to his class, then he is morally equal to any member of any other class. It was the combined issues of learning and morality that most forcefully characterized the eighteenth century both in artistic production and philosophical thought. The motive behind the century's concern for these two is clearly expressed by A. P. Humphreys.

> The tenets of the intellectualists arose from the desire to put ethics on as sound a basis as physical law—to find the same sort of axioms of right and wrong, independent of tradition or opinion, as were indisputable in geometry and, by pointing them out, to gain for them the same sort of assent as the propositions of Euclid exactly from all who understood them. The bases of morality were not only to be as firm as those of science—they were to be detected in much the same way, by a reasoning as calm, even if its methods were deductive rather than inductive.[18]

In fact, formulated morality became more significant than religion because it has "universal consent" and was "capable of demonstration."[19]

Along with the opinion that morality could be consciously formed came the idea of moral and intellectual improvement. Throughout the century we find the likes of

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[18]"'The Eternal Fitness of Things': An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Thought," Modern Language Review, 43 (1947), 89.

[19]Edward A. Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom, "Addison's 'Enquiry After Truth': The Moral Assumptions of His Proof For Divine Existence," PMLA, 65 (1950), 201.

Jonathan Edwards consciously striving for moral advancement and recording his progress in journal entries. Edwards' Personal Narrative is, as Robert F. Sayre puts it, "an inquiry into sincerity in religious behavior."[20] Edwards examined his mind to discover the state of his soul in much the same manner that Locke used to discover the extent of human knowledge. Edwards' Narrative is, furthermore, filled with references to the benefits he received from reading Locke.[21] "The man of Locke," said Emerson, "is virtuous without enthusiasm, and intelligent without poetry."[22] Locke, like Addison and Edwards, would probably have rejected the unions of virtue with enthusiasm and intelligence with poetry—had he thought of them at all. He and the men who followed his guide were intent on building quite another set of values.

Benjamin Franklin, too, says in his autobiography that he gave himself certain "projects" designed to exercise his self-control and, thus, improve its moral stature. The

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[20] The Examined Self (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), p. 36.

[21] See, for example, Edwards' discussion of mixed modes in Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957), p. 358 ff.

[22] The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. E. W. Emerson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1903-1904), X, 255.

second section of the Autobiography describes his famous effort to reach moral perfection. "I made a little Book," says Franklin,

> in which I allotted a Page for each of the Virtues [He had found thirteen.]. I rul'd each Page with red Ink, so as to have seven Columns, one for each Day of the Week, marking each Column with a Letter for the Day. I cross'd these Columns with thirteen red Lines, marking the Beginning of each Line with the first Letter of one of the Virtues, on which Line & and its proper Column I might mark by a little black Spot every Fault I found upon Examination to have been committing respecting that Virtue upon that Day.[23]

With such careful moral bookkeeping, Franklin could "live without committing any Fault at any Time" and "conquer all that either Natural Inclination, Custom, or Company might lead" him to.[24]

Franklin's elaborate approach may be unusual, but his aim to acquire virtue through proper and deliberate behavior is advocated by Locke and Mr. Spectator. The essayist, for example, is frequently concerned with the social interaction of the sexes as a means for moral improvement, the one sex benefiting the other. In one essay, Mr. Spectator says,

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[23] Autobiography, ed. Verner W. Crane (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 113.

[24] Ibid., p. 114.

> As this mutual Regard Between the two Sexes tends to the Improvement of each of them, we may observe that Men are apt to degenerate into rough and brutal Natures, who live as if there were no such Things as Women in the World; as on the contrary, Women, who have an Indifference or Aversion for their Counterparts in human Nature, are generally Sower and Unamiable, Sluttish and Censorious.[25]

Furthermore, in Spectator No. 446, we find Addison saying,

> Were our English Stage but half so virtuous as that of the Greeks or Romans, we should quickly see the Influence of it in the Behaviour of all the Politer Part of Mankind. It would not be fashionable to ridicule Religion, or its Professors; the Man of Pleasure would not be the compleat Gentleman; Vanity would be out of Countenance, and every Quality which is Ornamental to Human Nature, would meet with that Esteem which is due to it.

Here it seems apparent that virtue is acquired, learned under the influence of the theater, which acts as the good teacher. With both examples, virtue is the result of a force outside the individual, and the outside force at times seems to cause a reaction contrary to natural human inclination.

In Locke's Essay, the philosopher draws together his major point about the origins of ideas by saying, "so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about

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[25]Donald F. Bond, ed., The Spectator (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), 5 vols. All subsequent references shall be made parenthetically according to issue number.

ideas received from objects of sense or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain unto."[26] Locke shows that all ideas originate through experience, and it was the intention of The Spectator's authors to provide experience in order to educate according to Lockean principles.

As one more example of how this idea was assumed by so many writers of the century, we might turn to James Boswell, whose journals often show an introspective mind and a desire to find moral improvement. Just at random we might look at the entry for December 21, 1762. On that evening, Boswell says, he met a little boy whom a "young jade" had cheated out of a sixpence on a purchase of gingerbread nuts. Since the diarist appreciates the distress the boy will be in when he returns home without the money, he replaces the lost sixpence. "Such a little incident as this," he concludes, "might be laughed at as trifling. But I cannot help thinking it amusing, and valuing it as a specimen of my own tenderness of disposition and willingness to relieve my fellow creatures."[27] Boswell begins

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[26]Alexander Campbell Fraser, ed., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1894; rpt. New York: Dover Publications, 1959), Bk. II, Ch. xii, par. 8. All subsequent references shall be made parenthetically by book, chapter, and paragraph numbers.

[27]London Journal, 1762-1763, ed. Frederick A. Pottle (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950), pp. 99-100.

the London Journal with "A man cannot know himself better than by attending to the feelings of his heart and to his external actions, from which he may with tolerable certainty judge 'what manner of person he is.'"[28] Such a statement could just as easily have been written by Edwards or Franklin, or by Locke or Mr. Spectator. Boswell, too, frequently resolves to do better and to restrain certain appetites; he says he must give up certain evil ways, that he must be strong in his resolves. On October 3, 1765, he writes to Rousseau that though he has backslid slightly, he is determined to summon his "inclinations back to virtue."[29]

Franklin, Edwards, and Boswell believed that by inflicting certain tasks on themselves and by examining certain areas of their minds they were learning morality and that, subsequently, they were advancing themselves in the world and in their own souls. Not one of the three believed that he could by nature be as stalwart as he was by training. Except for Boswell's extravagant flights, such as his cow imitations at the theater, and Edwards' frequently bizarre sense of compassion, their opinions of morality coupled with learning float in the century's

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[28]Ibid., p. 39.

[29]Boswell on the Grand Tour: Italy, Corsica, and France, 1765-1766, ed. Frank Brady and Frederick A. Pottle (New York: McGraw Hill, 1955), pp. 3-4.

mainstream, a chief source of which is John Locke. A pattern of learned morality and moral improvement stretches across the century, becoming part of the century's assumptions and revealing what Perry Miller calls "the Augustan strain of piety,"[30] which apparently took the forms of introspection and morally uplifting lessons.

As moral improvement progresses, the personality changes. Little associated with the personality is permanent; change is inevitable because the specific sensations which make the personality and its moral fabric change. As teachers, Locke and Mr. Spectator needed merely to provide the proper sensations or subjects for reflection and frequent encouragement in order to institute reform, reform that tended to entrench the status quo. We might see, then, that on the basis of learned morality and personal improvement the criminal may be reformed, the ignorant educated, and the insane treated with compassion. Addison puts the matter in one light when he says that custom "is indeed able to form the Man anew, and to give him Inclinations and Capacities altogether different from those he was born with" (Spect. 447). It is custom, he continues, that makes "every thing pleasant to us" and that renders "what was at first an Exercise . . . an Entertainment." Having knowledge of this characteristic of custom, even "the most

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[30] The New England Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 1939), title of Chapter I.

sensual and irreligious Man [may be taught] to overlook those Hardships and Difficulties which are apt to discourage him from the Prosecution of a Virtuous Life" (Spect. 447). Through his reflections Locke is able to define separate ideas and customs that create the individual ego, just as The Spectator defines piece by piece the "social ego." But in both cases the ego remains indistinct. From Locke's examination of memory, we may conclude that so long as memory remains clear, an idea is fixed in the ego. To Locke, Ernest Tuveson explains, "the personality itself is a shifting thing; it exists, not through a lifetime as an entity, but almost from hour to hour."[31] The Socrates who awoke yesterday may be different from the Socrates of today. That is, because of changes undergone in sensations which constitute the context of the consciousness and therefore of the personality. The Renaissance mind, by way of contrast, thought the personality, or ego, was a continuing reality often immune to the influence of reason and experience; the essence of each individual with his particular moral condition is, it was thought, inescapable. Robert Burton sought a moderation rather than a cure for melancholy, and Sir Philip Sidney may have Astrophel address Stella on the weakness of reason before passion:

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[31]"Locke and the Dissolution of the Ego," p. 168.

Who will in fairest book of Nature know
How virtue may best lodged in beauty be,
Let him but learn of love to read in thee,
Stella, those fair lines which true goodness show.
There shall he find all vices' overthrow,
Not by rude force, but sweetest sovereignty
Of reason, from whose light those night-birds fly,
That inward sun in thine eyes shineth so.
And, not content to be perfection's heir
Thyself, dost strive all minds that way to move,
Who mark in thee what is in thee most fair.
So while thy beauty draws the hear to love,
As fast thy virtue bends that love to good.
But, ah, Desire still cries, "Give me some food."
(Astrophel and Stella LXXI)

Apparently Mr. Spectator's goal of moral improvement was fulfilled. As one subscriber wrote, "Your writings have made Learning a more necessary Part of good Breeding than it was before you appeared: That Modesty is become Fashionable, and Impudence stands in need of some Wit, since you have put them both in their proper Lights" (Spect. 461). The intriguing question is how Mr. Spectator achieved his goal, how he took his readers in hand and made learning and modesty valuable parts of their lives. The essayist transformed his readers by offering them day after day a series of experiences; each experience made the reader waking yesterday and the reader waking today distinct personalities. No one essay, like no usual experience, makes a radical change; but a series of essays, like a series of similar experiences, each carrying the message that man must and can be better than he is—a series of lessons makes all the difference.

CHAPTER II

DIRECT REFERENCES TO LOCKE IN THE SPECTATOR

The way to demonstrate quickly the presence of Lockean thought in The Spectator is to examine the direct references to Locke in the periodical. Locke's name appears in eighteen essays and in one he is called "one of the greatest modern Philosophers." Only twelve names—one being Milton's, who is given special attention—appear more often. The others are Dryden, Cicero, Alexander the Great, Aristotle, Homer, Horace, Ovid, Plato, Plutarch, Shakespeare, and Virgil. Of these names, however, at least half appear only slightly more often than Locke, and of them only Dryden comes as close to being Mr. Spectator's contemporary as Locke does. Of course, such a nose-counting approach is by no means a demonstration of any final influence—how often, we might ask, must Milton mention the Bible before we realize how greatly it contributed to his thought and writing?—but it does give the reader at least a partial clue as to who and what occupied the essayists' minds as they wrote The Spectator.

In five of the essays Locke is mentioned only in passing—at least twice in a humerous manner. In fact, the very first time "Mr. Locke" appears directly in the serial

it is ironically. In Spectator 37, Mr. Spectator tells his reader that a lady named Leonora received him in her library. Fascinated by the idea of a literary lady, the gentleman gave the room his careful attention. The furniture and the careful way quartos were divided from folios with arrangements of an apparently extensive collection of china capture his interest through much of the essay—as it must have captured the lady's. The books, "got together, either because she had heard them praised, or because she had seen the Authors of them," display eclectic taste or eclectic buying habits. Newton, "The fifteen Comforts of Matrimony," a collection of compliments to pay on various occasions, and Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding all vie for the lady's study hours. Though Mr. Spectator is too polite to say so, certain small matters touched on here and there indicate that Leonora frequently does not give her full attention to the book open before her. Locke and The Grand Cyrus seem to have been read at the toilette; one contains a pin and the other a paper of patches. The New Atlantis hides a key. Book marks, no doubt, but also indications of where the books have passed.

A similar cursory reference to Locke is in the letter from Abraham Thrifty (Spect. 242). Mr. Thrifty has two nieces who are, to use his phrase, "female Virtuosos." In their everlasting disputes on the "abstracted Ideas of

Things," the old man is prevented from enjoying his tobacco and, apparently, his very life. To ease his situation, Thrifty asks Mr. Spectator to admonish Kitty and Molly with the proper reading for females, learned books being improper. Though neither Locke nor Mr. Spectator would seriously object to intelligent women reading philosophy, they would object, and did, to anyone's getting wrong ideas from his reading as a result of imperfect discrimination of the reasonable and unreasonable. From what the letter says, either the nieces have not read Locke or, if they have, they grossly misunderstood him. It might be suspected that they have at least glanced through the Essay, for in their disputes they do bring up matters that are also discussed by Locke. Kitty and Molly tell their uncle that his senses are not to be trusted, that snow is not white, that names are totally arbitrary, and that pleasure and pain are imaginary. Of course, what they have to say stands in direct opposition to Locke. The senses, though often misleading, are vital to understanding; words, though not things, must conform to custom; and the matter of the color of snow is mocked by Locke in his discussion of the abuse of words (Essay III.x.11). Perhaps the letter goes to show that a paucity of learning is dangerous, especially in regard to domestic tranquility.

The letter does, in a comic plea for deliverance, show the full extent of the ignorant abuse of words in philosophic wrangling. Kitty and Molly, though thinking they do their uncle a service, merely serve to confuse him in matters he finds perfectly clear. The confusion that too often issues from philosophic explanations is stoutly condemned by Locke:

> In the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end; comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications; and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification of these moral words there is no end. These ideas of men's making are, by men still having the same power, multiplied in infinitum. Many a man who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text of Scripture, or clause in the code, at first reading, has, by consulting commentators, quite lost the sense of it, and by these elucidations given rise or increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place.
>
> (Essay III.ix.9)

What is said here about human and divine laws may also, as the case of Mr. Thrifty shows, be said of natural laws. It is clear to him that more often than not he may trust his senses, but the confusing "elucidations" from Kitty and Molly carry him to despair.

Three further essays allude briefly to Locke. In one written by Budgell, the philosopher's name is used to support a concept that he surely would have found disagreeable. In this essay, Budgell attacks atheism, concluding

that believers should deal with atheists by turning "their own Weapons upon them, which are those of Scorn and Mockery" (Spect. 389). He has, however, two more rational arguments to use against them. One is that religion enjoys "the general Consent of Mankind." The other is that "the greatest and most eminent Persons of all Ages have been against [atheists], and always complied with the publick Forms of Worship established in their respective Countries, when there was nothing in them either derogatory to the Honour of the Supream Being, or prejudicial to the Good of Mankind." Listed as such great and eminent persons are Plato, Cicero, Bacon, Boyle, and Locke; and in the case of Locke, Budgell is correct in saying that he had no great tolerance for atheists. In part, however, Budgell leaves the company of Locke when he says that most men consent to the existence of God for three possible reasons: God is knowable even to persons of ordinary abilities with a minimal exertion of reason; God is part of traditional knowledge; or, "the Idea of God is innate and co-existent with the mind itself." Locke would never have accepted such an idea as this last, since he directly says that though God has not made knowledge of himself innate, "having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness" (Essay IV.x.1). Man, Locke concludes, knows that something exists; nothing creates itself,

and so something creative had to exist from eternity; eternal being must be knowing and powerful; thus, man knows there is a God (Essay IV.x.2-6). We,

> from what we experiment in ourselves, got the idea of existence and duration; of knowledge and power; of pleasure and happiness; and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without; when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex idea of God.
>
> (Essay II.xxiii.33)

Furthermore, Kenneth MacLean sees in Budgell's essay an indication of the misapplication of Locke's ideas by lesser, even unscrupulous, men who, delighted to find evidence that would disprove the existence of God, believed the Hottentots to have no idea of Deity. Locke's reference to the Hottentots, MacLean explains, was intended "to demonstrate merely that the idea of God, whose existence is unquestioned, is not innate."[1]

Penance Cruel's letter in Spectator 533 uses an anecdote concerning Locke to reprove lewd language and unfit behavior. It seems that Miss Cruel was subjected to "indecent Discourse" so foul that she could not in modesty repeat it. Calling her treatment "a kind of Rape," she indignantly writes: "Why should not every Contributor to

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[1] John Locke and English Literature, p. 31.

the Abuse of Chastity suffer Death? I am sure these shameless Hell-Hounds deserve it highly." The anecdote, which demands good manners in public and profitable uses of time, says that Locke was once invited to dinner with Lords Halifax, Anglesey, and Shaftesbury. After the meal, the Lords began a card game "where the bad or good Success produced the usual Passions of Gaming. Mr. Lock, retiring to a Window, and writing, my Lord Anglisey desired to know what he was writing: Why, my Lords, answered he, I could not sleep last Night for the Pleasure and Improvement I expected from the Conversation of the Greatest Men of the Age." The Lords were justifiably abashed by this lesson from the master, and a conversation fit for great minds ensued. Even though no philosophic point is made in this anecdote, the reader might see in it some of the qualities of Locke's mind that possibly attracted Mr. Spectator; the philosopher evidences the serious, straightforward, and diligent character which Addison and Steele made manifest in their own creation.

Moreover, this vignette, one of a multitude about great men, represents one of Mr. Spectator's favorite teaching devices. Everyone, he instructs his reader, should make himself familiar with the lives of the great so that their virtues may be imitated and their faults shunned. Especially significant are the final moments of men of

superior abilities. Addison, pointing to how frivolous much of life seems when compared to facing eternity, says that "there are no Ideas strike more forcibly upon our Imaginations, than those which are raised from Reflection upon the Exits of great and excellent Men" (Spect. 133). Later, when Steele approaches the subject of death, the reader is told that "there is Nothing in History which is so improving to the Reader, as those Accounts which we meet with in the Deaths of eminent Persons, and of their Behaviour in that dreadful Season" (Spect. 289).

In the series of essays on the Pleasures of the Imagination, Addison concludes his discussion of the final causes of imaginative pleasure with the point that God "has made every thing that is beautiful in all other Objects pleasant, or rather has made so many Objects appear beautiful, that he might render the whole Creation more gay and delightful" (Spect. 413). In this essay the author is particularly concerned with the joy that the sight discovers in Nature's kaleidoscope of colors; for without colors, he says, Nature would present "a rough unsightly Sketch." The human soul, he continues, cannot possibly be denied such pleasure; and when it is separated from the body, the soul surely will receive color perception "by some other Occasional Cause, as they are at present by the different Impressions of the subtle Matter on the Organ of Sight."

To fully understand the impetus of Addison's thought, one must remember that Locke said that color was not a primary quality of bodies. Rather than a quality within a body itself, color is the reaction of sight and mind at perceiving an object. In other words, when a person sees color he is not merely automatically recording a characteristic of the body he sees; his imagination, doing its work with the color before the sight, feeds the spirit. The only characteristics of bodies that do not depend upon perception and imagination for their existence are those primary qualities of bulk, figure, number, situation, motion, or rest (Essay II.viii.23). All other qualities, including that of color, are those Locke calls sensible qualities (Essay II.viii.23).

To demonstrate his point, Locke gives two examples. First, porphyry appears to be white and red, but when it is denied access to light, the colors disappear. "Can any one," he asks, "think any real alterations are made in the prophyry by the presence or absence of light; and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphyry in the light, when it is plain it has no color in the dark?" (Essay II.viii.19). Second, Locke says, "Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body, but an alteration of the texture of it?" (Essay II.viii.20). Of

course, unlike Molly and Kitty, one must not assume that because the imagination is actively engaged in the perception of color that color lacks reality or that our minds mislead us when we see green as green or brown as brown. Color, as are indeed all sense perceptions, is necessary for knowledge. Locke's point is merely that color is not primary to bodies but instead is a quality that cannot be distinguished from our own senses. Without the ability to perceive and the presence of light, there are no colors; only motion, rest, number, and the other primary qualities are present in bodies whether they are perceived or not. And Addison's point is that because using the imagination is pleasurable and color operates upon the imagination, then the perception of color is pleasurable. After exploring the sense-pleasure theorem, Mr. Spectator expatiates upon the Lockean concept of wit and judgment.

The first truly significant reference to Locke in The Spectator appears in No. 62—an expansion of Locke's famous distinction of wit and judgment made in his discussion of simple ideas of reflection. The mind, he says, "perceives two ideas to be the same, or different" (Essay II.xi.1). And from the mind's ability to distinguish and then to verbalize similarity or dissimilarity come wit and judgment:

> And hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common observation,—that men who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgment or deepest reason. For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion; wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore is so acceptable to all people.
>
> (Essay II.xi.2)

The same distinction between wit and judgment apparently forms the basis of Sir Richard Blackmore's Essay upon Wit, though this writer is clearly less objective in his expressions than Locke. Blackmore says that

> It is evident, that Wit cannot essentially consist in the justness and Propriety of the Thoughts, that is, the Conformity of our Conceptions to the Objects we conceive; for this is the Definition of Truth, when taken in the Physical Sense; not in the Purity of Words and Expression, for this may be eminent in the Cold, Didactick Stile, and in the correct Writers of History and Philosophy: But Wit is that which imparts Spirit to our Conceptions and Diction, by giving them a lively and novel, and therefore an agreeable Form.[2]

To this distinction Addision adds that wit must give both delight and surprise to the reader. To compare the

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[2]Sir Richard Blackmore, Essay upon Wit, Augustan Reprint Society, Ser. 1, No. 1 (May, 1946), par. 4.

whiteness of snow to the whiteness of milk does not delight and, in consequence, cannot be wit. Such a comparison Locke, in his chapters on complex ideas, calls an idea of relation, that is, the comparison of ideas "in respect of extent, degree, time, place, or any other circumstances" (Essay II.xi.4). Addision, furthermore, goes on to distinguish true and false wit. True wit "generally consists in this Resemblance and Congruity of Ideas" and "in the Resemblance of Ideas." False wit, on the other hand, lies in the "Resemblance of Words" and "sometimes single Letters." Addison in his comments adds nothing fully new to Locke's distinction, as he himself admits by saying that his essay is intended to "add to it, by way of Explanation."

Because he uses such words as pleasant, agreeable, and lively to describe it, Locke must have had something like Addison's "true wit" in mind when he composed his definition of wit. The problem of false wit, except as it becomes an abuse of language, did not capture Locke's attention. The concern it had for Addision, however, goes toward indicating the overriding purpose of The Spectator. Addision's readers, being for the most part people of material substance and breeding, or at least people who aspired to substance and breeding, would have attempted to shine in conversation as did all people in the eighteenth century. If we may judge from the diaries, letters, and

such writings and comments of the time, we might conclude that wit was of prime importance to one being known as a good conversationalist. In such conversation we might expect to find a good bit of foolish chatter as witnessed in the stupidities of Sir Fopling Flutter and, later on, Sir Benjamin Backbite. Even in what is primarily a literary discourse, Addision cannot lose sight of his educational purpose: to encourage his readers not only to distinguish true from false wit but to avoid puns, quibbles, and anagrams. And, most surely, he would want his readers to see the absolute shallowness of such rhymes as these:

> Sure never were seen two such beautiful ponies!
> Other horses are clowns, and these marcaronies!
> Nay, to give 'em this title I'm sure isn't wrong—
> Their legs are so slim and their tails are so long.

Having considered true and false wit, the periodical then proceeds to the combined subjects of time and knowledge. On the topic of time Mr. Spectator says he often considers

> Mankind as wholly inconsistent with itself in a Point that bears some Affinity to the former. Though we seem grieved at the Shortness of Life in general, we are wishing every Period of it at an end. The Minor longs to be at Age, then to be a Man of Business, then to make up an Estate, then to arrive at Honors, then to retire. Thus although the whole of Life is allowed by every one to be short, the several Divisions of it appear long and tedious. We are for lengthening our Span in general, but would fain contract the Parts of which it is composed. . . . Thus, as fast as our Time runs, we should be very glad in most parts of our Lives that it ran much faster than it does. Several Hours of

> the Day hang upon our Hands, nay we wish away whole Years; and travel through Time as through a Country filled with many wild and empty Wastes, which we would fain hurry over, that we may arrive at those several little Settlements or imaginary Points of Rest which are dispersed up and down in it.
>
> (Spect. 93)

Time in general weighs very heavily on everyone's hands; we wish and wait for what is to come and do not make profitable use of the present. In a somewhat truncated form, Mr. Spectator borrows from Locke to substantiate his views. The passage from An Essay which he read says that

> we have our notion of succession and duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of duration but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year; of which duration of things, while he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not it would be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind, without variation and the succession of others.
>
> (Essay II.xiv.4)

From his consideration of this passage, Mr. Spectator assumes that time may be spent admirably and without the usual pain that accompanies the idleness and profitlessness that go with wishing for what is to come. In fact, we may effectively lengthen our lives if we entertain "a quick and constant Succession of Ideas" (Spect. 94). The making

of a full and fruitful life as well as a life to be enjoyed is the goal Mr. Spectator has in mind for his readers. "The Hours of a wise Man," he concludes,

> are lengthened by his Ideas, as those of a Fool are by his Passions: The Time of the one is long, because he does not know what to do with it; so is that of the other, because he distinguishes every Moment of it with useful or amusing Thought; or in other Words, because the one is always wishing it away, and the other always enjoying it.
>
> (Spect. 94)

Later in the series Addison further insists that time be used to improve the quality of life. The misuse of time far too often becomes the weight that eventually and tragically crushes life. To bear witness to this waste, Addision gives his reader a sample from the journal of a man recently dead. Just one day's record will point up the fact that "if we look into the Behaviour of many whom we daily converse with, we shall find that most of their Hours are taken up in those three Important Articles of Eating, Drinking and Sleeping":

> Monday, Eight a Clock. I put on my Cloaths and walked into the Parlour.
>
> Nine a Clock ditto. Tied my Knee-strings, and washed my Hands.
>
> Hours Ten, Eleven, and Twelve. Smoaked three Pipes of Virginia. Read the Supplement and Daily Courant. Things go ill in the North. Mr. Nisby's Opinion thereupon.
>
> One a Clock in the Afternoon. Chid Ralph for mislaying my Tobacco-Box.
>
> Two a Clock. Sat down to Dinner. Mem. Too many Plumbs and no Sewet.
>
> From Three to Four. Took my Afternoon's Nap.
>
> From Four to Six. Walked into the Fields. Wind, S.S.E.

> From Six to Ten. At the Club, Mr. Nisby's Opinion about the Peace.
> Ten a Clock. Went to Bed, slept sound.
> (Spect. 317)

Addison obviously views this monotonous regimen as odious since the time could more profitably be spent in, for example, personal improvement such as the contemplation of ideas or of the validity or invalidity of personal bias.

When the subject of ghosts is explored in Spectator 110, Addison invokes Locke's doctrine of the association of ideas to show the prejudice some have toward darkness. The habitual association many make between darkness and goblins, says the philosopher, is erroneous,

> yet let but a foolish maid inculate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives, but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.
> (Essay II.xxxiii.10)

Walking near the ruined abbey on Sir Roger's estate, Mr. Spectator, under the spell of the gloomy landscape, understands the association between darkness and ghosts. The ruined abbey, the graves, the croaking ravens, the solemn elms "naturally raise Seriousness and Attention; and when Night heightens the Awfulness of the Place, and pours out her supernumerary Horrors upon everything in it, I do not wonder that weak Minds fill it with Spectres and Apparitions." Not long afterwards, such murky associations

would be sanctioned if not encouraged by the popularity of the gothic novel. But in the opening years of the eighteenth century men were "reasonable." Darkness per se is no better and no worse than light; what difference there is, other than in certain natural phenomena such as the setting of the sun, exists solely in the human mind. Animals, for example, may feed during the day and rest at night, but their attitude toward the one seems no different from their attitude toward the other. Addision's intention in this essay is not, however, to discourage belief in ghosts. Rather, as he earlier says, he aims "to pull the old Woman out of our Hearts . . . and extinguish those impertinent Notions which we inbibed at a Time that we were not able to judge of their Absurdity." Half believing in ghosts himself, Mr. Spectator finds a certain delight in the thought that "all the Regions of Nature swarm with Spirits" and that he may engage "with such an innumerable Society" (Spect. 12). Though he calls fear of the supernatural "ridiculous Horrours," Mr. Spectator thinks "a Person who is thus terrify'd with the Imagination of Ghosts and Spectres much more reasonable, than one who contrary to the Reports of all Historians sacred and profane, ancient and modern, and to the Traditions of all Nations, thinks the Appearance of Spirits fabulous and groundless" (Spect. 110). Man, unlike animals, plants, and inanimate existence, needs to believe in an unseen world, and such belief is given him as part of his condition as a man.

In clarifying his thoughts on perception, Locke explains how each animal is given the ability to perceive according to the conditions of its life. "We may," he says,

> from the make of a oyster or cockle, reasonably conclude that it has not so many, nor so quick senses as a man, or several other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that cannot move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an inconvenience to an animal that must lie still where chance has once placed it, and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?
>
> (Essay II,ix.13)

With this paragraph, quoted in Spectator 121, Addision brings into focus two of Mr. Spectator's favorite concerns. First, he takes Locke's comments as an example of divine providence which gives each creature what is necessary for its survival and happiness and which encourages it to live according to its nature. Providence, as it is generally interpreted by Mr. Spectator, creates in each person, in fact in each living thing, certain powers that if fully developed and exercised can make him great in his particular way. Providence has also given us certain limitations which, though we may find them burdensome at times, we must learn to live with and trust to God that they are given us with purpose. Borrowing from Epictetus, Mr. Spectator tells his readers that

> We are here . . . as in a Theatre, where every one has a Part allotted to him. The great Duty which lies upon a Man is to act his Part in Perfection. We may, indeed, say that our Part does not suit us, and that we could act another better. But this . . . is not our Business. All that we are concerned in is to excel in the Part which is given us.
> (Spect. 219)

A person's part may be particularly determined by sex, and thus "Men and Women ought to busie themselves in their proper Spheres, and on such Matters only as are suitable to their respective Sex" (Spect. 57). Or, as Budgell once rather smugly explains, our assigned roles may be determined by income and we must dress according to our "Quality and Estate" (Spect. 150). Like the oyster and cockle, each person is given his role and all that he needs to fulfill that role; nothing is omitted and nothing extraneous is given. Such an allocation of sensibilities and powers reflects "the wisdom and goodness of the Maker" (Essay II.ix.12), and, because the "Universe is a kind of Theatre," its variety can "raise in us Pleasure, Amusement, or Admiration" (Spect. 387).

The second concern, developed more fully later in The Spectator, is that of the chain of life. Marjorie Nicolson points out that there has always been an interest in the minute and that neo-Platonic thought interpreted Nature as a plenum formarum. "As faith and reason postulated the existence of a series of orders above man," she continues,

"reason at least anticipated a priori the possibility of the existence of minute orders below the human, animal, and vegetable kingdoms. The proof of the actual existence of such a world of minute life came as no surprise or shock."[3] Locke, living in an age of great scientific discovery—which included the microscope—saw that "in all the visible corporeal world" there were "no chasms or gaps" (Essay III. vi.12). From observations of fish who fly like birds, birds whose flesh is as cold as that of fish, mammals who live in the sea, and amphibious seals, Locke concludes that life exists above and below man. With his characteristically quiet enthusiasm Locke declares:

> And when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the species of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are beneath.
>
> (Essay III.vi.12)

Addison, too, took an interest in the life of creatures below man, including the miniature. In water, he explains, "you find the same Creature that is drawn at large, copied out in several Proportions, and ending in Miniature" (Spect. 543).

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[3] Science and Imagination (Ithaca, N.Y.: Great Seal Books, 1956), p. 72.

Combining the concept of plenum formarum and providential disposition of appropriate senses, Addison in another essay observes the degrees by which

> the World of Life advances through a prodigious Variety of Species, before a Creature is formed that is compleat in all its Senses, and even among these there is such a different degree of Perfection in the Sense, which one Animal enjoys beyond what appears in another, that though the Sense in different Animals be distinguished by the same common Denomination, it seems almost of a different Nature. (Spect. 519)

Both Addison and Locke see this variety in sense and species as a blessing bestowed by God on his earthly creation. We might go so far as to assume that only an earth teeming with life in uncountable forms could approach a true reflection of God's own variety and life force. "The exuberant and overflowing Goodness of the Supream Being" is the final law Addison receives from seeing that there is no matter "that does not Swarm with Life" (Spect. 519). Like Newton, neither of these men was content with making observations without drawing moral conclusions, for the ultimate knowledge of the one and the ultimate lesson for the other is always God—a God responsible for an inimitable and innumerable quantity and quality of creation.

In ways resembling the "prodigious Variety" Locke and Mr. Spectator see in sensible life, the "interspersion of Evil with Good, and Pain with Pleasure in the Works of Nature," (Spect. 387) gives indications of God's goodness. This

interspersion not only reveals God's own motives but also leads human beings to choose good over evil and pleasure over pain. In order to encourage his readers to cheerfulness, a quality both good and pleasurable, Mr. Spectator enumerates several benefits accopmanying it. First, it promotes good health by blocking those "repinings and secret Murmurs of Heart" that give "inperceptible Strokes to those delicate Fibres of which the vital Parts are composed." What most of all motivates cheerfulness is the beauty and variety of the world. Fields of grain, though they bring to the farmer's mind thoughts only of the harvest, may seem beautiful. Such places as rocks and deserts where nature's dual purpose of usefulness and entertainment is not completed—even such places give singular pleasure to those who experience them. But, warns Mr. Spectator, many evils "naturally spring up amidst the Entertainments that are provided for us." The explanation for this puzzling combination, of the way beauty disguises good, evil, and usefulness as flowers hide seeds, is found in the passage from Locke which Mr. Spectator quotes:

> Beyond all this, we may find another reason why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain, in all things that environ and affect us; and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with;—that we, finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him with whom there is fullness

> of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.
>
> (Essay II.vii.5)

Two essays in The Spectator invoke Locke's name in their examinations of words and language. The first of these is in the series on Paradise Lost. In the fifth entry in that series, No. 291, Addison outlines the general qualifications necessary for making a good critic, one of which is the critic's mastery "of all the Elegance and Delicacy of his Native Tongue." Towards this mastery, Addison recommends a familiarity with Locke's Essay. Though it is not clear that Addison is recommending the Essay's style for imitation, Addison does ask that the critic follow the practical advice presented in Book III, "Of Words." The abuses of language chastised in Chapter X of that Book and the remedies suggested in Chapter XI would most certainly be useful to any ambitious critic. We might consider, for example, the second abuse of words examined by the philosopher—the inconsistent use of them. Sensible men would shun an accountant who one day used the symbol 3 to indicate the idea of three and the next day used the same symbol to represent the idea usually assigned to 8 (Essay III.x.5). Likewise, if a critic, because of ignorance confuses the terms sentiment and bathos and if, because of insensitivity to the ideas behind the terms, he fails to distinguish one from the other, such a critic should be ignored;

he has tried, "with a certain Cant of Words, to pass himself off for what he most certainly is not: "a most judicious and formidable Critick" (Spect. 291).

Budgell, in his definitions of modesty and assurance, tells the reader specifically that he himself strives to avoid the two abuses of words that even more than the others get in the way of clear communication of ideas, namely using words without a clear idea to stand behind them and applying them inconsistently. Of course, Locke says, the best way to communicate an idea is to present the leading qualitites of an idea by showing. In the case of substance, the object itself may be presented. In mixed modes of morality, however, the process is more difficult. Since the parts of a mixed mode are scattered and exist together only in the mind, "it is only by words enumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names stand for" (Essay III.xi.18). Attempting to make morality as demonstrable as mathematics, Budgell analyzes the mixed modes of modesty and assurance. His definition of modesty, for example, may be broken down into words that represent eight simpler ideas: "reflection," ingenious mind," "man," "commit action," "self-censure," "fancy," "expose," "censure from others." Similarly, Budgell's definition of assurance may be resolved in this way:

saying
doing
not
uneasiness
emotion
> indifferent thing
> in mind (reflection)

Again, we see how in The Spectator, with its intention of popular consumption, philosophical method is used to teach morality on a practical level. Locke's own use of "morality" was abstract, divorced from man's daily actions. Budgell, keeping his ideas close to his readers with the conclusion that "the Practice of Virtue is the most proper Method to give a Man a becoming Assurance in his Words and Actions" (Spect. 373), teaches these same readers social action with the same words that teach abstract morality; for, as is typical in The Spectator and in the century, the two cannot be separated either in theory or private practice.

Probably the most significant contribution made to The Spectator that was not written either by Addison or by Steele is the four-part discourse on education offered by Budgell in the guise of an anonymous correspondent. In the second of this series, Budgell compares the merits of private and public education and, as did Locke, concludes that the advantages of the first raise it far above the second. Unlike Locke, who merely preferred one to another, Budgell's comments approach outright condemnation. "A private

Education," he observes, "promises in the first place Virtue and good Breeding, a publick School manly Assurance, and an early Knowledge in the Ways of the World" (Spect. 313). Later he adds that "a private Education seems the most natural Method for the forming of a virtuous Man; a publick Education for making a Man of Business. The first would furnish out a good Subject for Plato's Republick, the latter a Member for a Community over-run with Artifice and Corruption." Budgell's strongest evidence against public education derives from the correspondent's own experiences in one of "those little Seminaries" to which parents send their sons. The first of his "rural Masters" put excessive demands on his charges and used the correspondent "barbarously for not performing Impossibilities." The second was overly indulgent, allowing the students to neglect their studies for odd jobs about the kitchen and stable. The writer, however, stuck to his lessons, only to be the "worst used of any Boy in the School."

The real basis for Budgell's preference lies, however, in the virtue that accompanies private education. Though he inexplicably changes the wording and structure of a passage from Locke's Some Thoughts concerning Education, Budgell turns to Locke for a supporting opinion:

> If I keep [my son] always at home, he will be in danger to be my young master; and if I send him abroad, how is it possible to keep him from the contagion of rudeness and vice, which is so every

> where in fashion? In my house, he will perhaps be more innocent, but more ignorant, too, of the world, and being used constantly to the same faces, and little company will, when he comes abroad, be a sheepish or conceited creature.
>
> (Thoughts 70)

Both Locke and Budgell give parents the difficult choice of a sheepish and virtuous son or a knowing and rude one. But, they agree, sheepishness may be avoided and knowledge of the world easily attained, even after the student has passed childhood. Vice, which is acquired from public education is, on the other hand, a more tenacious malady and, consequently, should be avoided. If a young man is lost to virtue, warns Locke, he can seldom be reclaimed.

Of Budgell's four essays on education, it is almost certainly the third which most clearly unites learning and virtue, two subjects so vital to the philosophy of both Locke and The Spectator. Budgell's proposed intention in this essay is to offer "Methods, by which I conceive Boys might be made to improve in Virtue, as they advance in Letters" (Spect. 337). Before he proceeds to these methods, however, the author insists that merely punishing a student for vice is not sufficient to teach him virtue; as Locke has explained, punishment for vice may carry one to "imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness," but punishment does not necessarily bring pleasure, especially the pleasure of virtue. Likewise,

the simple recitation of Latin and Greek sentences can do no more than teach a boy grammar. Instead, the good teacher should ask the student's opinions of an action or phrase and whether he judges it good or bad. In the same manner, Locke holds a low opinion of mere rote learning, or any learning that does not couple lessons with virtue:

> But till you can find a school, wherein it is possible for the master to look after the manners of his scholars, and can show as great effects of his care of forming their minds to virtue, and their carriage to good breeding, as of forming their tongues to the learned languages; you must confess, that you have a strange value for words, when preferring the language of the ancient Greeks and Romans, to that which made them such brave men, you think it worth while to hazard your son's innocence and virtue for a little Greek and Latin.
>
> (Thoughts 70)

Once more, only when learning aims at the formation of complete virtue is it justified. If the target lies elsewhere, then the learning is pointless, the student corrupted, and the master blameworthy.

Though the problems of virtue and God are intimately, in fact inextricably, joined, Mr. Spectator does not nearly so often treat God as he does virtue. One of the few times that God is the subject for examination receives its impetus from Locke's authority. God, as He may be presented as a subject for human explanation, creates problems without end. The more the mind contemplates the deity, the more difficulties it encounters. What

difficulties are encountered are the result wholly of human limitations. Locke, anxious to prove that reflection and sensation alone foster ideas, takes up his refrain once more with his conclusions on the complex idea of God. We have, he has previously said, no ideas that do not come from ourselves, and since we cannot personally know infinity, omniscience, or any of the other attributes of God, we must derive these attributes from our own experiences. Our minds in formulating the complex idea of infinity, for example, simply multiply finitely the limited experience with time that we all have. The same sort of multiplication is involved in our understanding of omniscience: we do not have this power ourselves, but we can on the basis of our own limited knowledge imagine unlimited knowledge. Locke's conclusion is that

> if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find that we come by it the same way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God, and separate spirits, are made of the simple ideas we receive from reflection: e.g. having, from what we experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration; of knowledge and power; of pleasure and happiness; and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without; when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex idea of God.
> (Essay II.xxiii.33)

Locke's intention is to show the source of our knowledge of God. To this explanation, Addision adds his

own speculations. These speculations, it must be pointed out, go beyond Locke's more stubborn pragmatism. The philosopher would have suspected the validity of such inconclusive visions because they cannot be even partially substantiated in the only ways that human beings can know anything without doubt—through sensation or reflection. Addision admits that we know God's goodness through "some small Rays and short imperfect Strokes in ourselves," but he continues that though God may have the virtues we see in ourselves, it is "a very high Presumption to determine whether the Supream Being has not many more Attributes than those which enter into our Conceptions of him" (Spect. 531). A metaphysical discourse such as this is unusual enough in The Spectator to be remarkable; but Addision, in keeping with the intention of the series, has a very practical goal for his speculations. God is so great, so far beyond human abilities, that Mr. Spectator cannot help but ask, "What can we then think of those who make use of so tremendous a Name in the ordinary Expressions of their Anger, Mirth, and most impertinent Passions?" Such a use of God's name is "Horror and Prophaneness." Even suppositions without firm proof are opportunities for the reform of social misbehavior. A man may let his mind wander into the abstract, as the mind of a reasonable being does sooner or later, but he must apparently never confuse such upward-bound thoughts with the

practical or functional knowledge which Mr. Spectator thinks necessary for virtuous behavior in social situations. Just as a man's thoughts cannot rightly exist apart from his physical and reflecting worlds, his morality cannot exist unless it is exercised with frequent contact with other men and the situations they cause. Such exercise not only confirms the strengths of one's virtue but also contributes to the creation of personal identity. Identity is, at its most sophisticated, knowledge of one's internal self gained through the interaction of values. This identity is distinct from man's physical being.

Mr. Spectator has a clear opportunity to demonstrate the divorce of personal identity from physical substance in his retelling of the tale of King Fadallah and Queen Zemroude (Spect. 578). Though it might be suspected that on this occasion the essayist had more interest in the tale than in the lesson, how we know who and what we are would be of utmost importance in any consideration of human knowledge. For his part, Locke says that in order to understand self, one must first understand the term person, which is

> a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is

> always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that which he calls self:—it not being considered, in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances.
>
> (Essay II.xxvii.11)

Later, after noting that in such times as sleeping we have no thoughts, Locke concludes,

> I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e. the same substance or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal identity at all . . . . For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances.
>
> (Essay II.xxvii.12)

All this discussion, Mr. Spectator assures his readers, stands behind the story of the king who, tricked by the wicked dervish, enters into the bodies of a doe, a nightingale, and finally a lap dog before he is allowed to return to his original substance. During his years-long peregrinations, the consciousness of the king remains the same; he is always able to identify who he is despite the changes in what he is.

The human soul, which constitutes the essence of human identity, may contain, like God himself, qualities that remain unknown to man. Thus, though King Fadallah knows well enough who he is, his self-awareness is only partial. Addison feels sure, however, that all qualities,

whether they be realized or not, are given by God to lead men to happiness. Of course, ultimate happiness lies only with the Almighty from whom come the faculties that create spiritual joy. Borrowing from Tillotson, Addision says that

> God Almighty is capable of making the Soul happy by Ten Thousand different Ways. Besides those several Avenues to Pleasure which the Soul is endowed with in this Life; it is not impossible, according to the Opinions of many eminent Divines, but there may be new Faculties in the Souls of good Men made perfect, as well as new Senses in their glorified Bodies.
> (Spect. 600)

What good there may be in a man exists as well in God; this we know. Similarly, we can know that with the body the soul not only perceives through the senses but also derives pleasure from the senses. But because qualities of spirits are ultimately unknowable, they may possess abilities that we do not possess and, even more significant, are incapable of imagining (Essay II.xxvii.9 and IV.iii.6). In both cases, we return to the "prodigious Variety" Locke and Mr. Spectator see in nature. God has an infinite variety of good attributes, one of which gives man his variety of senses. Only in variety, says Addison, is the soul perpetually delighted, and, once separated from the limiting body, the soul's full share of happiness is discovered. The soul, moreover, acts as a whole. Though it has diverse powers, any pleasure it receives from any one of its faculties is pleasure for the whole soul. It is only for the

sake of convenience, Addision repeats from Locke, that we analyze the soul into its various known powers and functions such as understanding, willing, and imagining.

From his considerations, Addison draws a series of conclusions about the happiness of the soul:

> Seeing then that the Soul has many different Faculties, or in other Words, many different Ways of acting; that it can be intensely pleased, or made happy by all these different Faculties, or Ways of acting; that it may be endowed with several latent Faculties, which it is not at present in a Condition to exert; that we cannot believe the Soul is endowed with any Faculty which is of no Use to it; that whenever any one of these Faculties is transcendently pleased, the Soul is in a State of Happiness; and in the last Place, considering that the Happiness of another World is to be the Happiness of the whole Man; who can question but that there is an infinite Variety in those Pleasures we are speaking of; and that this Fulness of Joy will be made up of all those Pleasures which the Nature of the Soul is capable of receiving.
>
> (Spect. 600)

The most important faculty, then, the source of the greatest pleasures without which there is no other pleasure is that which gives knowledge of the Almighty.

Thus, in nearly a score of direct references to John Locke in The Spectator, a number of significant points are made which, if pursued, clearly show parallels between philosopher and periodical. These parallels, in brief, point to the fact that both Mr. Spectator and Locke are careful observers of a world in which they see a variety of weakness and strength, vice and virtue, ignorance and inspiration, pleasure and pain. From all this mixture, they,

in their efforts to understand and to order, conclude that knowledge alone leads to virtue and that the virtue of a rational mind, especially as it is manifested in social action, draws man to the pleasurable understanding of God.

CHAPTER III

AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND THE SPECTATOR

I. INTRODUCTION

We begin, therefore, with Locke's epistemological theories which were adopted by the authors of The Spectator for use in teaching specific moral lessons to a specific audience. For it is his epistemology that clarifies the three main areas in which Mr. Spectator sought to educate his readers: man's social, moral, and political being. In each of these areas, man must be virtuous and one of these areas must never contradict another. As Steele says, "Particular Acts of Beneficence would be a pretty Cement of Society and Virtue" (Spect. 472). To Locke, virtue is the chief aim of education, lessons in grammar, mathematics, and the rest coming second. In Some Thoughts Concerning Education the philosopher expresses his views succinctly:

> It is virtue then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education; and not a forward pertness, or any little arts of shifting. All other considerations and accomplishments should give way and be postponed to this. This is the solid and substantial good, which tutors should not only read lectures, and talk of; but the labour and art of education should furnish the mind with, and fasten there, and never cease till the

> young man had a true relish of it, and placed his strength, his glory, and his pleasure in it.
>
> (Thoughts 70)

It seems that the idea of virtue's pleasure is the clue here. Simply making a man acquainted with virtue is not sufficient to make him virtuous. He must be supplied with an activating motive, especially the acquisition of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The promise of the reward of pleasure and the threat of pain together will persuade men to virtue. Pain serves not only to preserve our bodies—as excessive heat warns us that we might be burned—but also to lead us to God. When we find "dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the enjoyments which the creation can afford us," we "might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him with whom there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore" (Essay II.vii.52). Furthermore,

> The consideration of the reason why they [pleasure and pain] are annexed to so many other ideas, serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the Sovereign Disposer of all things, may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries: the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all understanding.
>
> (Essay II.vii.6)

Knowledge of God as the ultimate knowledge is the lesson repeated throughout Locke's epistemological works. It is God and knowledge of Him that permeate all human action, or all "right" action. A man participating in a social

situation behaves virtuously and, thus, obtains pleasure, avoids pain, and increases his understanding of God. This pattern is the one which Locke saw and which seems to inform the spirit of The Spectator.

What is important in reading The Spectator in the light of Locke is to determine what the average reader would have derived from An Essay. Locke was not writing for the philosopher or schoolman, but such parts of his writings as Book II must have seemed impossibly involved to all but the most dedicated readers. Thus, we may read An Essay trying to grasp the clear and broad outlines, those ideas which Mr. Spectator would have found useful in teaching his readers. A man, we feel sure, may fall under the general influence of another and, almost unawares, make extensive use of the other's habits of mind. He may, for example, diligently practice Christian morality and profess himself a Christian without being able to refer to any specific part of the Bible or to any theological writings that clarify or justify his behavior. Nevertheless, he may be able to retain the spirit of the source of his ideals even though lacking in specific knowledge. While The Spectator's authors knew Locke's works and had specific knowledge of them, in writing their essays they made little use of the more subtle or abstruse arguments. Locke's thorough examination of the problem of personal identity, as

we have seen, is reduced in The Spectator to a brief paragraph and illustrated by Ambrose Phillips' mundane tale of King Fadallah and Queen Zemroude. Thus, the essays distill Locke's conclusions into a draft for the popular palate and make the abstract concrete.

II. TABULA RASA AND THE TEACHING OF VIRTUE

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding begins with Locke's famous denial of innate ideas, the theory of the human mind as a tabula rasa void of all except the power to receive ideas and to reflect. The significance of Book I in coloring the whole of Locke's epistemology has, of course, been the subject of many investigations,[1] and two of its issues have clear bearing on The Spectator. First of all, the denial of innate ideas with its ultimately spiritual basis favors the sensuous and material aspects of life—the practical or social. Second, the absence of innate virtue and knowledge of God necessitates the teaching of virtue and God. Because man is limited to his own senses and reason—not by any means a crippling limitation—he can understand all things in only a limited way; spiritual insight is a combination of physical and intellectual

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[1]See, for example, Sterling Power Lamprecht, The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Locke (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962); and the prolegomena to Arthur Campbell Fraser's edition of An Essay (rpt. New York: Dover 1959), p. lviii ff.

sensations. If men are to know at all, they must realize the source of their powers and develop them; the chase after other matters is futile. If, however, men realize the true source of their knowledge—themselves and things of the earth—then knowledge can be properly and fully developed. Locke's denial of innate moral principles is supported with a remorseless catalogue of man's evils. The ease with which civilized nations commit immoral acts seems to deny innateness.

> View but an army at the sacking of a town, and see what observation or sense of moral principles, or what touch of conscience for all the outrages they do. Robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure. Have there not been whole nations, and those of the most civilized people, amongst whom the exposing their children, and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice; as little condemned or scrupled as the begetting them? Do they not still, in some countries, put them into the same graves with their mothers, if they die in childbirth; or dispatch them, if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars? And are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or expose their parents, without any remorse at all?
>
> (Essay I.ii.9)

Man is capable of every horror many may think of, and only through the use of reason and the acquisition of learning may true civilization be achieved.

In The Spectator these two points are easily found. In No. 469, Mr. Spectator explains the virtues to be sought and the vices to be avoided by men who seek high office.

The fact that he is concerned with practical social affairs indicates the sensuous and material spirit of Locke. Mr. Spectator is not interested in virtue in the abstract; rather he speaks to real men who might occupy real positions of importance. Also, the very act of writing the essay demonstrates his disbelief in innate ideas; after all, there would be little point in telling a man what he already knows. A man of benevolence and compassion, says Mr. Spectator,

> becomes a Blessing to the Publick; He patronizes the Orphan and the Widow, assists the Friendless, and guides the Ignorant: He does not reject the Person's Pretensions who does not know how to explain them, or refuse doing a good Office for a Man because he cannot pay the Fee for it. In short, tho' he regulates himself in all his Proceedings by Justice and Equity, he finds a thousand Occasions for all the good-natured Offices of Generosity and Compassion. (Spect. 469)

Justice, equality, generosity, compassion—all these are virtues to be taught to the man of high office.

> Man is unfit for such a Place of Trust, who is of a sower untractable Nature, or has any other Passion that makes him uneasie to those who approach him. Roughness of Temper is apt to discountenance the Timorous or Modest. The proud Man discourages those from approaching him, who are of a mean Condition, and who most want his Assistance. The impatient Man will not give himself time to be informed of the Matter that lies before him. (Spect. 469)

Modesty, gentleness, and patience, too, are teachable virtues. As the essay concludes,

> It has been observed, that Men of Learning who take to Business, discharge it generally with greater Honesty than Men of the World. The chief

> Reason for it I take to be as follows. A Man that has spent his Youth in Reading, has been used to find Virtue extolled, and Vice stigmatized. A Man that has spent his Time in the World, has often seen Vice triumphant, and Virtue discountenanced. Extortion, Rapine, and Injustice, which are branded with Infamy in Books, often give a Man a Figure in the World; while several Qualities which celebrated in Authors, as Generosity, Ingenuity and Good-Nature, impoverish and ruin him. This cannot but have a proportionable Effect on Men, whose Tempers and Principles are equally Good and Vicious.
> (Spect. 469)

Men, being equally disposed to evil as to good, must be led to the good. If a child is left untrained, his chances of becoming vicious are equal to his chances of becoming good. To ensure the triumph of goodness, constant training and example are necessary. One may assume, too, that a man though generally disposed to evil may, given good council, be reformed.

This essay, then, is Lockean in many ways, not the least of which is the fact that the essayist gives the philosopher's ideas a distinctly social context. A man of learning, a man who wishes to reform his vices, is an asset to society as a whole because he aims at becoming "a Blessing to the Publick." Nevertheless, the acquisition of knowledge alone does not fulfill any man's social or moral functions. Acquiring knowledge and thinking, bringing with them the assumption of action, transforms the "cloistered virtue" Milton despised into an equally despised "cloistered learning." Most noticeably, Mr. Spectator himself embodies

this union of learning and action. Though normally a sedentary man, one who avoids the usual behavior of men in the close contact of business, pleasure, and family, he feels compelled to contribute to mankind, through his own particular turn of mind, what he knows. By his own actions he implies that even a retiring man must contribute to the public good, avoiding the excuse that shyness holds him back. It is the world that is to be educated, and it is every man's duty to contribute. These are two facts that can be clearly seen in the attitude of the Club members.

The advice that the Club members give Mr. Spectator about the subjects of his reflections might further serve to illustrate this combination of individual ability and the duty to teach. In Spectator 34, the members of the Club appear anxious that their literary friend not malign their own interests and parties. Each man speaks for his own side until the essayist says, "I found every Subject of my Speculations was taken away from Me, by one or other of the Club." Eventually, however, the clergyman reconciles all differences with a maxim that almost serves to verbalize the whole of Mr. Spectator's intentions: "Vice and Folly ought to be attacked where-ever they could be met with, and especially when they were placed in high and conspicuous Stations of Life." With this sentiment the others must concur. The minister's special interest, as is

Mr. Spectator's, is not that of a particular party but of mankind as a whole, and it is to the benefit of this whole, through the writings of Mr. Spectator, that he directs his "Strength of Argument and Force of Reason." This essay concludes with the promise "never to draw a faulty Character which does not fit at least a Thousand People; or to publish a single Paper, that is not written in the Spirit of Benevolence, and with a love to Mankind." Humanity as a whole and not individual preference is the primary point at this juncture in the argument.

Though the overly eager defense of party is generally condemned by Mr. Spectator, he does not fail to realize that defense of one's interests when made with the proper and reasonable spirit may serve to educate. One example is Sir Andrew's defense of merchants against the attacks from Sir Roger. The Carthaginians, says Sir Roger, were noted for breaking their oaths because in a trading society such as theirs, the acquisition of money was more important than the means to it. Like the clergyman earlier, Sir Andrew, because of his own experiences and insights, can defend his profession against the baronet. First of all, Sir Andrew points out that merchants have done great good for the public, that through their work they have salaried men and thus made them independent of the bounty of charity. And second, expressing a view he holds in common with such

economic theorists of the century as Adam Smith, Sir Andrew says that the proper use of wealth by one man enables money to filter down to the lower reaches of society and thus enriches all. A person who stays entirely in the company of men who think like Sir Roger or who does not know such merchants as Sir Andrew would miss the lesson, this experience of another man's life. It becomes the duty of Sir Andrew not only to defend himself against what is most likely an unfair argument, but also to reveal his own personal store of knowledge to those who do not have it. One of Mr. Spectator's correspondents expresses this duty well by means of the familiar metaphor of the theater:

> The Soul of Man is an active Principle. He therefore, who withdraws himself from the Scene before he has played his Part, ought to be hissed off the Stage, and cannot be deemed Virtuous, because he refuses to answer his End.
>
> (Spect. 613)

III. EXPERIENCES: PLEASANT AND UNPLEASANT

Once he feels certain that he has substantially demonstrated that neither speculative nor practical principles are innate, Locke moves to Book II where, in the longest and most difficult section of An Essay, he demonstrates the true source of human knowledge—experience. In experience, he says,

> all our knowledge is founded; and from it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring. (Essay II.i.2)

The human being, then, perceives objects around him before considering them. When he is aware that his mind is operating upon these objects, then he begins to realize that he is reflecting and the second source of simple ideas is open to him. Eventually, Locke determines that these two sources of human ideas may be combined in four ways: (1) ideas from one sense; (2) ideas from more than one sense; (3) ideas from reflection only; and (4) ideas from a combination of reflection and sensation.

The ideas from one sense involve perception of colors, odors, tastes, sounds, and textures. These ideas come directly from the object to the individual. When a man sees a red rose, a combination of sight and linguistic ability tells him the color of the bloom. Even if he cannot name the color, he is able to distinguish the color called red from the color called yellow. Also, having the power to retain sensations in the mind, the man may be able to see a similarity between the red rose and the red poppy or to realize that the rose that was red yesterday is still red today. Likewise, in winter he may recall the summer's

rose and in his mind experience the sensation of red again. Perhaps he may even want to reproduce the color in some way, as he might dye his stockings red; or he might want to reproduce the whole rose as a painting; or he may want to convey his experience with the rose to some other person. If the man chooses to follow one or all of these alternatives, he has learned from his experience. But before he can learn, the man must have certain powers. If one is a normal man, he is born with these powers; and if one power is missing or weak, then the man's ability to learn—and communicate his learning—is lessened by that much.

First of all, therefore, the man must have whole senses. If he is blind, then he can never experience color. But this power of the mind, called perception, is not merely the organs of sense being affected by outward objects; rather, it is the organs of sense being affected and the individual being aware that they are affected (Essay II.ix.4). Thus, because the perception is the result of the mind operating upon the sensations brought in by the senses, it is both a power that men are born with and an idea. Though a power necessary for knowledge and the most simple ideas of reflection, our perception must occasionally be aided by judgment. The perception, apparently, can act only on what the senses bring it and is unable to change, or modify, or reject what is given it.

As a result, although a solid black sphere appears to the sight to be a flat disc, because we may have had experiences with shapes in solid colors, our judgment steps in to caution that what our sight perceives as a disc might actually be a globe. Only the support of an additional sense—touch, for example—can finally confirm or deny our initial impression.

The second power of the mind, or "faculty of the mind" as Locke calls it, is retention. It is easily seen how this power is allied to that of perception in the way judgment enters into our decisions to call a shape spherical rather than circular. The power of retention takes two forms: first, it keeps ideas in our heads so that they may be contemplated; second, it enables us "to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight" (Essay II.x.2). Since we cannot actually sense what is not present, when we call a memory in our minds we are having a new experience, an experience with, for example, color that is not sensory but intellectual. Just as a man's ability to perceive may diminish with age or from accidents which cause loss of sight or hearing, a man's power to retain may fade. Sense impressions that are not repeated or impressions received in childhood but not received again almost always fade, "leaving no more footsteps or remaining

characters of themselves than shadows do flying over fields of corn, and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there" (Essay II.x.4).

Other powers of the mind, joined by Locke in a single chapter, are discerning, compounding, comparing, and abstracting. It is in his discussion of discerning that Locke distinguishes between wit and judgment. Essentially, what the philosopher insists upon here is that each idea be clear in the mind and that there be no ambiguous or misleading overlapping. Addision's false wit would be a confusion of ideas as wrong as the confusion of the tastes of sugar with gall on the palate of a feverish man (Essay II.xi.3). But some ideas do resemble others in such circumstances as degree, time, and place; and the mind, in order to have its full powers and receive its complete share of ideas, must see these relations. Another power, that of composing, enables the mind to progress from simple to complex ideas, and thus it is the power which most clearly makes man's mind a complex organ. The final power of the mind is that of abstracting, the use of words "to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas" (Essay II.xi.9). Similar in process to comparing, the mind sees a correspondence among milk, chalk, and snow and comes to call the correspondence whiteness, without necessarily having any one of the particulars in mind. Whiteness is

thus abstracted from snow, chalk, milk, and all other things particular that are white. It is the power of abstraction alone that fully separates men from brutes, for brutes have in some degree or another all the other powers.

The simple ideas of diverse senses—space, extention, figure, rest and motion—and the simple ideas of reflection—thinking and willing—are for the moment only mentioned by Locke in his consideration of simple ideas. When he comes to examine the ideas from both sensation and reflection, however, he introduces a problem whose solution constitutes one of the minor themes that run through An Essay.

An Essay, proposing as it does to search out the true sources for human knowledge, supplies the reader with an explanation of the mind's actuating motive when it introduces the topics of pleasure and pain. In addition to giving the mind a purpose for acquiring ideas, these sensations unite all ideas:

> Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation and reflection; and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our minds within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain. By pleasure and pain, I would be understood to signify, whatsoever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or anything operating on our bodies. For, whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c., on the one side, or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c., on the other, they are still but different

> degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain, delight or uneasiness; which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.
>
> (Essay II.vii.2)

Indeed, not only do pleasure or pain unite all ideas, but also there seem to be no ideas at all without either pleasure or pain. In determing whether or not the soul constantly thinks, Locke asks, "If the soul doth think in a sleeping man without being conscious of it, I ask whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery?" (Essay II.i.11). If the soul, in other words, does not experience one of these two sensations, it cannot be thinking; for unless a man's mind acts as a computer which merely absorbs willy-nilly all information, correct and incorrect, moral or immoral, that is fed to it, the mind must evaluate all ideas as either pleasurable or painful or, more significantly, as either virtuous or malicious.

To his readers Addision explains the continuing presence of pleasure and pain with a fable about two families. The first lives in heaven with Jupiter and has a child, Pleasure, the daughter of Happiness and Virtue. The other family's child is Pain, the descendant of Misery, Vice, and the Furies. Jupiter, deciding that mankind is too wicked to enjoy eternal pleasure but too good to be tormented without relief, sends Pleasure and Pain to earth.

The planet is theirs, he tells the pair, if they can decide on how it should be divided. At first they agree "that Pleasure should take Possession of the Virtuous, and Pain of the Vicious part of that Species which was given up to them" (Spect. 183). But they discover that no man could be so clearly divided between one or the other. Eventually a marriage is proposed, and Pain and Pleasure "are such constant Yoke-fellows, and that they either make their Visits together, or are never far asunder. If Pain comes into an Heart he is quickly followed by Pleasure; and if Pleasure enters, you may be sure Pain is not far off." Though the marriage is satisfactory to Pain and Pleasure, it does not suit Jupiter's intention. He decides that those men who are mostly wicked in their lives should, on their deaths, be sent to hell, and those who are mostly good shall live in heaven with Happiness, Virtue, and the Gods.

Later in An Essay, Locke directly expresses his belief that pleasure and pain are the motives behind our reactions to all ideas:

> If this [pleasure and pain] were wholly separated from all our outward sensations, and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention, or motion to rest. And so we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may so call it) run adrift, without any direction or design, and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In which state man, however furnished with the faculties of

> understanding and will, would be a very idle, inactive creature, and pass his time only in a lazy, lethargic dream.
>
> (Essay II.vii.3)

A mind's native ability to learn is insignificant if one does not exert proper effort toward knowledge, and proper effort often entails long and difficult work. To be idle and neglect one's talents is nearly a crime against one's own mind. Such an idea was probably not far from Steele's mind when he said that "the Gifts of Nature and Accomplishments of Art are valuable, but as they are exerted in the Interests of Virtue, and governed by the Rules of Honor" (Spect. 172).

Locke introduces one last significant passage on pleasure and pain with the question, "whether it be in Man's power to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompanies any sort of action?" The philosopher's answer is affirmative. "Men may and should correct their palates," he insists,

> and give relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the body, and like that too may be altered; and it is a mistake to think that men cannot change the displeasingness or indifferency that is in actions into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power . . . . Habits have powerful charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be easy in the omission of, actions, which habitual practice has suited, and thereby to recommend us . . . . Fashion and the common opinion having

> settled wrong notions, and education and custom ill habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of men corrupted. Pains should be taken to rectify these; and contrary habits change our pleasures, and give a relish to that which is necessary or conducive to our happiness.
>
> (Essay II.xxi.71)

What Locke says in this passage may equally be applied to something as trivial as learning to eat and appreciate a strange food or to something as significant as resisting the evils of a complacent society. And, one feels sure, the philosopher would see no contradiction in such a spread of values, for the psychological principles involved with the one are the same as with the other.

Bringing together these many passages that—in Locke and The Spectator—speak of pleasure and pain, we can see two issues emerge. First of all, reward or punishment with corresponding pleasure or pain accompanies all actions, thoughts, and passions; second, evil thoughts and actions may be exchanged for good, thus transforming pain into pleasure. Overarching both of these points is the necessity for work, work for the benefit of the individual and eventually, for the benefit of mankind.

It is Steele who clarifies the virtues of effort when he shows the effects of idleness:

> Indolence is, methinks, an intermediate Stage between Pleasure and Pain, and very much unbecoming any Part of our Life after we are out of the Nurse's Arms. Such an Aversion to Labour creates a constant Weariness, and, one would think, should make

> Existence it self a Burthen. The indolent Man descends from the Dignity of his Nature, and makes that Being which was Rational meerly Vegetative: His Life consists only in the meer Encrease and Decay of a Body, which, with Relation to the rest of the World, might as well have been uninformed, as the Habitation of a reasonable Mind.
>
> (Spect. 100)

To avoid this "meer Encrease and Decay" as well as to find benefit in occupying the "empty Spaces of Life," one may devote himself to social virtues. Such an occupation not only benefits the individual by making his life less empty and by leading him to a sense of personal satisfaction, but it also serves greater mankind. Addison adds to Steele's thoughts when he says that

> To advise the Ignorant, relieve the Needy, comfort the Afflicted, are Duties that fall in our way almost every Day of our Lives. A Man has frequent Opportunities of mitigating the Fierceness of a Party; of doing Justice to the Character of a deserving Man; of softening the Envious, quieting the Angry, and rectifying the Prejudiced; which are all of them Employments suited to a reasonable Nature, and bring great Satisfaction to the Person who can busy himself in them with Discretion.
>
> (Spect. 93)

Some passions—joy, hope, sorrow—are almost if not entirely spontaneous and, though giving us either pleasure or pain, are morally neutral. Joy, for example, comes with all good things from God, but human joy is neither a sin nor a virtue in God's eyes. Man's job with such passions is to understand their source and their purpose. Other passions—envy, for example—are to be exorcised because

they stand in the way of happiness. Still other passions, though good and natural, must be developed before their full power and benefit may be felt; love would probably be the most significant of these, especially love of God.

In one paragraph Mr. Spectator unites with the idea of pleasure the idea of developing the passions through effort:

> The entire Conquest of our Passions is so difficult a Work, that they who despair of it should think of a less difficult Task, and only attempt to Regulate them. But there is a third thing which may contribute not only to the Ease, but also to the Pleasure of our Life; and that is, refining our Passions to a greater Elegance, than we receive them from Nature. When the Passion is Love, this Work is performed in innocent, tho' rude and uncultivated Minds, by the mere Force and Dignity of the Object. There are Forms which naturally create Respect in the Beholders, and at once inflame and chastise the Imagination.
>
> (Spect. 71)

Here Addision, with the practicality typical of The Spectator, does not expect extraordinary behavior from his readers; instead he calls for the regulation of the passions rather than their "entire Conquest." Moreover, Addison thinks that when a man undertakes the admirable action of denying his own fame in order to praise the virtues of others, he must not do so in a spirit of self-mortification; rather, he must act "as one who has turned his Ambition into a right Channel" (Spect. 532). We might even speculate that the author of such thoughts would have preferred the

rationality of St. Thomas Aquinas to the emotional power of St. Francis. Mr. Spectator's practicality would not, however, have found fault with Locke's somewhat more high-minded expectations of human self-control. Violent passions, Locke says, interfere significantly not only with one's ability "to consider thoroughly and examine fairly," but also with one's happiness.

> But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our passions, so that our understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed give its judgment, being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends; it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things; and not permit an allowed or supposed possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, any desire of itself there, till, by a due consideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our minds suitable to it, and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it.
>
> (Essay II.xxi.54)

Actions, like passions, are of two sorts: beneficial and destructive. Eating and drawing back from a fire, Locke argues, are spontaneous actions, given us by God in order to preserve our bodies. One must avoid, on the other hand, not only malicious assault or murder but any crime, whether perpetrated or contemplated, that might bring unhappiness to the victim as well as to the perpetrator. Moreover, because of the happiness which accompanies them, such actions as charity must be cultivated.

In both cases, man is obliged to expend mental and physical effort in order to seek some actions and passions and to avoid others. Though on first sight such attitudes may perhaps appear consciously selfish, many significant thinkers in the eighteenth century believed each man was obliged to be happy. In fact, Steele calls happiness man's duty to himself and insists that each man "place himself in a constant Attitude for the Satisfaction of his Being" (Spect. 100). It was, after all, the active and energetic pursuit of happiness that the reforming idealists of the American Revolution believed should stand with life and liberty.

It is not the lot of man on earth, however, to be constantly happy, nor should prolonged happiness be desired. The key word in the phrase in the Declaration of Independence is, after all, pursuit, not guarantee. As we have seen, the extensive mixture of pleasure and pain indicates God's goodness (Spect. 387). It is our human minds with their human limitations that prohibit us from seeing the possible benefits that arise from what appears to be reasonless pain. Providence sees "the whole System of Time and Things together" while "we cannot discover the beautiful Connections between Incidents which lye widely separated in Time, and by losing so many Links of the Chain, our Reasonings become broken and imperfect" (Spect. 237). Not only is pain necessary in the fulfillment of God's plan for

humanity, but also pleasure is often a hindrance to a fulfilled life. "It is a very melancholy Reflection," says Steele,

> that Men are usually so weak, that it is absolutely necessary for them to know Sorrow and Pain to be in their right Senses. Prosperous People (for happy there are none) are hurried away with a fond Sense of their present Condition, and thoughtless of the Mutability of Fortune. Fortune is a Term which we must use in such Discourses as these, for what is wrought by the unseen Hand of the Disposer of all Things.
>
> (Spect. 312)

Elsewhere, speaking of earthly pleasures, Steele says,

> When Pleasure is made the chief Pursuit of Life, it will necessarily follow that such Monsters as these [rogues with the reputation of wit, false friendships, arguments with relatives, and the like] will arise from a constant Application to such Blandishments as naturally root out the Force of Reason and Reflection, and substitute in their Place a general Impatience of Thought, and a constant Pruriency of inordinate Desires.
>
> (Spect. 151)

A man expecting only pleasure and never putting himself to those pains which gratify and reward his own spirit and which cause happiness in others is a man misled. "Pleasure" seizing a man like an addictive drug "will not give him Leisure for any good Office in Life which contradicts the Gayety of the Present Hour" (Spect. 151).

Locke, too, sees constant pleasure and the desire for pleasure as a weakness of mind as well as a source of error:

> The cause of our judging amiss, when we compare our present pleasure or pain with future, seems to me to be the weak and narrow constitution of our mind . . . . The present pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whole mind that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent: or if among our pleasures there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance, yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures . . . . And therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the present evil, before all things, as the first necessary condition to our happiness; let what will follow.
>
> (Essay II.xxi.66)

From the thoughts of Locke and Mr. Spectator, it appears that man knows pain more often and more emphatically than he knows pleasure; and pursuing pleasure, as it is his obligation to do, he must be careful not to succeed completely, for such success can only undermine his capacity for compassion and his ability to rationally distinguish the true value of his thoughts and actions.

But, once more, this pursuit must be made. Locke declares the limits and functions of pleasure and pain and Mr. Spectator gives them application. In order to clarify this application we might examine a number of essays under three headings: first, present happiness or pain is not permanent; second, unhappiness has specific causes which may also have specific reliefs; third, good thoughts and actions are rewarded ultimately with happiness, though in man's narrow view the reward may not always be apparent.

The reader is effectively warned of the impermanence of happiness and pain—the first heading—with a device that once was called the unsolicited testimonial. In such testimonials in The Spectator the writers are either completely reformed or asking for help to relieve their discomfort. They all, however, profess to have interest only in leading others around the traps into which they fell. Those testimonials that fit quite well into the pedagogical context of The Spectator are from older people who confess the weakness of their youth or who warn others, particularly the young, of what lies ahead in old age. Presumably, old age like death will come to us all, and we all necessarily must prepare while we have the opportunity. One man of sixty-five writes, as he says, "like a Criminal to warn People to enter upon what Reformation they please to make in themselves in their Youth, and not expect they shall be capable of it from a fond Opinion some have often in their Mouths, that if we do not leave our Desires they will leave us" (Spect. 260). This man's appetite for life's pleasures has increased with the decline in his ability to satisfy them. Because he has continued long after he should to pursue the pleasures of youth, he can enjoy none of the pleasures of age. His only statisfaction, as cold as it is pitiful, is that in two and a half years he will have an estate of fifty thousand pounds.

It is to be noted, however, that this witness does discover some pleasure in life. To another, such an estate would seem an inadequate substitute for family pleasures, friends, and the feelings of self-satisfaction and completion that should occupy a man's last years. Mr. Spectator's correspondent may be deluding himself, seeing comfort in money the way a poor man insists that health is everything when health is all he has. Both the correspondent and the poor man, clinging to what they have, find a source for hope. Many readers would think the two men objects of pity, but such an attitude may not be entirely appropriate. It was vain, says Locke, for the ancient philosophers to inquire

> whether summun bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation: and they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plums, or nuts, and have divided themselves into sects upon it . . . . If, therefore, men in this life only have hope; if in this life only they can enjoy, it is not strange nor unreasonable, that they should seek their happiness by avoiding all things that disease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. (Essay II.xxi.56)

With this example of pleasure, Mr. Spectator implies that deciding for another what is most hopeful and most pleasurable is part of no man's prerogative; and he with the growing estate rightly adds variety to human life by caring for what others may scorn.

Another man likewise reached old age unprepared. I am "extremely troubled with the Gout," he says, "but having a strong Vanity towards being pleasing in the Eyes of Women, I never have a Moment's Ease, but I am mounted in high-heel'd Shoes with a glased Wax-leather Instep" (Spect. 48). This old man has better fortune than the other, however, because while he was suffering during a dinner party the host forced him to exchange his impractical shoes for a pair of comfortable ones. The letter concludes, "The return of Ease made me forgive the rough Obligation laid upon me, which at that Time relieved my Body from a Distemper, and will my Mind forgever from a Folly."

The second man is able, with some encouragement, to exchange pain for happiness. The source of his pain was the evil of vanity and from it he learned, even though by such a slight means as a pair of high-heeled shoes, that wrong passions are punished. The other man is not so fortunate. Since his wrong passions cannot at sixty-five be moderated, he cannot remove the source of his pain; and since men have some sort of happiness as a goal, he can only relieve himself with the thought of great wealth. Though it is not said, we might reasonably assume that these men were not always unhappy. At some point the vanity of the one and the pursuit of sensual pleasure in the other must have given happiness. If so, then what they once did which

caused happiness was right, for, as Locke says, or judgment of what is at present good or evil is always right. Where we make mistakes is in estimating what will be good or bad, pleasing or painful in the future (Essay II.xxi.60-61). From the example of these two men it was hoped that the reader might form some sort of idea of the limits of old age and prepare to meet them.

The other testimonials in The Spectator generally follow the same pattern and maintain the same intention as these two. "B.L.," for example, was duped by an imitation countess at a masquerade and writes to Mr. Spectator of his humiliation "for the Benefit of those who may possibly be as vain young Coxcombs as my self" (Spect. 8). Another correspondent, Alice Threadneedle, recounts her reformation from wenching and warns against "a Sett of idle Fellows about this Town" who have no more to do than "to write Letters, send Messages, and form Appointments with little raw unthinking Girls, and leave them after Possession of them without any Mercy to Shame, Infamy, Poverty, and Disease" (Spect. 182). Alice's letter is particularly interesting because it combines a warning to raw girls with the suggestion that those women who have already been misled by "idle Fellows" do not necessarily have "to go upon the Town, as the Phrase is." They may instead take up work "in an obscure Place," removing themselves from those they knew in more distressing times.

All four of these examples manifest an inability to distinguish present gratification from the possibility of future pain. It is the unreasonable and exaggerated pursuit of pleasure, especially physical pleasure, that leads ultimately to unhappiness. Once a man has chosen error, however, he may exchange it for good. Similarly, a man enjoying happiness may inadvertently fall into grief and public censure. As Addison remarks, "Whilst [a man] is capable of changing we may be forced to retract our Opinions" (Spect. 349).

Although the general impression received from Locke and Mr. Spectator is that pain is a more prevailing and affective sensation than pleasure, The Spectator more often shows happiness than unhappiness. When "S.P." was sixteen, for example, he inherited an estate of two hundred pounds a year, and, because he had no one to guide him, he quickly became one of the "idle Fellows" Alice Threadneelde chastizes. "The natural Consequence of this, was," he says,

> that my Companions and I could not well be supplied without running in Debt, which I did very frankly 'till I was arrested and conveyed with a Guard strong enough for the most desperate Assassine, to a Bayliff's House where I lay four Days, surrounded with very merry, but not very agreeable Company. As soon as I had extricated my self from this shameful Confinement, I reflected upon it with so much Horror, that I deserted all my old Acquaintance, and took Chambers in an Inn of Court, with a Resolution to study the Law with all possible application. But I trifled away a whole Year in looking over a thousand Intricacies, without a Friend to

> apply to in any Case of Doubt; so that I only lived there among Men, as little Children are sent to School before they are capable of Improvement, only to be out of Harm's Way.
>
> (Spect. 330)

Soon, however, the young man is taken in by a relative who gives him "the Love of a Brother." "S.P." concludes his letter,

> Thus, Mr. Spectator, by this Gentleman's Favour and Patronage, it is my own Fault if I am not wiser and richer every Day I live. I speak this, as well as by subscribing the initial Letters of my Name to thank him, as to incite others to an Imitation of his Virtue.

A second letter is from a scholar, Will Cymon, who confesses that

> By conversing generally with the Dead, I grew almost unfit for the Society of the Living; so by a long Confinement I contracted an ungainly Aversion to Conversation, and ever discoursed with Pain to my self, and little Entertainment to others.
>
> (Spect. 362)

His life passes in this way until, as he says,

> I became an ardent Lover, and passionate Admirer of the beauteous Belinda: Then it was that I really began to improve. This Passion changed all my Fears and Diffidences in my general Behaviour, to the sole Concern of pleasing her . . . . My thoughts grew free and generous, and the Ambition to be agreeable to her I admired, produced in my Carriage a faint Similtude of that disengaged Manner of my Belinda.

To explain the source and strength of his passion, Will goes on to an account of his mistress's character:

> Belinda has from a great Wit, governed by as great Prudence, and both adorned with Innocence, the Happiness of always being ready to discover her real Thoughts. She has many of us, who now are her

> Admirers; but her Treatment of us is so just and proportioned to our Merit towards her, and what we are in our selves, that I protest to you I have neither Jealousie nor Hatred toward my Rivals.

Most of those who write to Mr. Spectator of their reformation and new-found happiness attribute their success, in one way or another, to an exercise of will, as Locke says all such changes are willed (Essay II.xxi). With these last two letters, however, a new element is entertained. Man as social being derives much of his strength from others. If he lives alone, as Will Cymon did, he makes himself miserable; and after long communication with only himself, his public actions make others equally miserable. The young heir in the other letter was most unhappy when he was alone; his "merry, but not very agreeable Company" is no more adequate society than, admirable as they may be in proper position, prolonged association with dead geniuses.

Such testimonials as these indicate that reform of wickedness and the accompanying embrace of happiness dramatize for the readers of The Spectator the Lockean fact that pain can be, through an act of will, or sometimes with the aid of the good will of another, exchanged for pleasure. The more usual method, however, is the straightforward enumeration of rules for behaviour. Such a list appears at the end of a letter from a man whose wife has been misled. He offers this list, he says, so that "the truly

virtuous Wives may learn to avoid those Errors which have so unhappily misled mine" (Spect. 328). His three rules are

> First, In mistaking the proper Objects of her Esteem, and fixing her Affections upon such Things as are only the Trappings and Decorations of her Sex. Secondly, In not distinguishing what becomes the different Stages of Life. And, Lastly, The Abuse and Corruption of some Excellent Qualities, which, if circumscrib'd within just Bounds, would have been the Blessing and Prosperity of her Family, but by a vicious Extream are like to be the Bane and Destruction of it.
>
> (Spect. 328)

Such principles, usually in the form of Polonius-like maxims, are generously larded throughout The Spectator.

These principles serve not only to describe the right road to happiness but also to exhort the reader. In other words, Mr. Spectator acts for his readers the same role Belinda plays for Will Cymon and the kind relative plays for "S.P." At one point, for example, while pursuing his frequent concern with sexual indiscrimination, the essayist shifts from the lovers to their illegitimate children. Until men are so civilized that they have only lawful children, says Mr. Spectator,

> I would earnestly exhort them to take Care of those unfortunate Creatures whom they have brought into the World by these indirect Methods, and to give their spurious Children such an Education as may render them more virtuous than their Parents.
>
> (Spect. 203)

The encouragement is clear. Until illegitimacy is no more, Mr. Spectator will suggest reform and point to how fathers

can relieve the misery of their children while they atone for their own crimes.

Such fathers as who "make their Pleasure their Business" must, of course, endure certain discomforts in order to follow the advice they are given. Discomfort is, however, frequently the price to be paid for happiness. One of Mr. Spectator's tests for determining whether or not good nature arises from the body or the mind is

> whether or no we are able to exert it [good nature] to our own Disadvantage, and employ it on proper Objects, notwithstanding any little Pain, Want, or Inconvenience which may arise to our selves from it: In a word, whether we are willing to risque any part of our Fortune, our Reputation, our Health, or Ease, for the Benefit of Mankind.
>
> (Spect. 177)

Sacrifice and pain may accompany any reform, but the resulting happiness and reward are more than adequate recompense. Each man must consider, says Addision, "that the Exercise of Virtue is not only an Amusement for the time it lasts, but that its Influence extends to those Parts of our Existence which lie beyond the Grave" (Spect. 93). For Locke the promise of future punishment for a wicked life or happiness for a good one is so evident that

> though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure: which yet is, for the most part, quite otherwise, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession; nay, all things rightly considered, have, I think, even the worse part here. But when infinite happiness is put into one scale, against infinite misery in the other; if the worst

> that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without madness run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery; which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard.
> (Essay II.xxi.72)

Pleasure and pain, immediate or anticipated, in an afterlife motivate human action and give men a reason for acting. But even though the initial impulse of all men is to alleviate present pain and avoid those situations that give pain, it is man's duty to think beyond the present circumstances to his own future happiness and the happiness that his goodness allows others. It is Steele who encourages The Spectator's readers "to produce other Men's Merit" even at one's own expense. "And when you have got so far," he continues, "you will find it a greater Pleasure then you ever before knew, to be zealous in promoting the Fame and Welfare of the Praise-worthy" (Spect. 532). Such thinking neatly solves a number of social problems, the greatest of which is providing men with a reason to exist at peace with their neighbors. Behaving with virtue is pleasurable in itself; it benefits others and makes them, in turn, more willing to return kindness; and it stores up good deeds in heaven which shall eventually lead the virtuous man to happiness greater than what is on earth.

The examples of reform and advice for reform so far considered range from the outright criminal to the silly.

There are, on the other hand, two specific forms of potential vice held under suspicion not only by Mr. Spectator, but also a number of other eighteenth-century moralists: habit and custom. Benjamin Franklin specified custom and company as sources of error in his Autobiography; and if one reads enough in The Spectator, he gets the impression that any headlong rush into society is potentially dangerous. We might assume that if a reformer believes that individual men need improvement in things great and small, he must surely believe that the company of men is the origin of much personal vice. To introduce a discussion of mourning customs, Steele says,

> The most improper things we commit in the Conduct of our Lives, we are led into by the Force of Fashion. Instances might be given, in which a prevailing Custom makes us act against the Rules of Nature, Law, and Common Sense.
>
> (Spect. 64)

Though he is always extolling social virtues, Mr. Spectator in no way, then, advocates a blind following after mass behavior; the art of pleasing has decided limits.

As with the testimonials of reform, the examples of custom's hold on men range from the very particular—and often amusing—to the heavily didactic. One example of the first is in a letter from a man whose wife is "A Woman of Quality." "Nothing in our House," the husband laments,

> is useful but that which is fashionable; my Pewter holds out generally half a year, my Plate a full Twelve-month; Chairs are not fit to sit in that were made two Years since, nor Beds fit for anything but to sleep in, that have stood up above that Time. (Spect. 308)

No doubt this man's life is as unfortunate as his wife's is foolish. While pursuing her own vain pleasures she makes her husband unhappy. As some people lead others to happiness, some are sources of pain. To create pain in someone else, especially when the pain cannot possibly bring eventual happiness, is the greater vice. Such action destroys the moral fabric of the actor and, by arousing violent thoughts and actions in others, destroys their well-being as well.

The clearest cause of ill custom is education, both academic and professional. Many "of those ill Habits Men are subject to," says Budgell, are not only the results of "their different Ages and Tempers," but also "the particular Profession or Business in which they were educated and brought up" (Spect. 197). Lawyers, for example, "are shewing in common Talk how zealously they could defend a Cause in Court, and therefore frequently forget to keep that Temper which is absolutely requisite to render Conversation pleasant and instructive." Likewise, "Men who had been bred in Arms, preserve to the most extreme and feeble old Age a a certain Daring in their Aspect: In like Manner, they who

have past their Time in Gallantry and Adventure, keep up, as well as they can, the Appearance of it, and carry a petulant Inclination to their last Moments" (Spect. 318).

But as we have seen, habit is not irreversible. In fact, the very nature of habits can give a man "Inclinations and Capacities altogether different from those he was born with" (Spect. 447). It is indeed, habit that enables a man to endure the change from the temporary pleasures of vice to the sometimes troubling pleasure of virtue. If something our reason tells us is good appears at first to be unpleasant, we may feel assured that habit has a "wonderful Efficacy in making every thing pleasant to us" (Spect. 447). To illustrate the power of habit, Addison gives two brief examples:

> A Person who is addicted to Play or Gaming, tho' he took but little delight in it at first, by degrees contracts so strong an Inclination towards it, . . . that it seems the only End of his Being. The Love of a retired or busie Life will grow upon a Man insensibly, as he is conversant in the one or the other, 'till he is utterly unqualified for relishing that to which he has been for sometime disused.
> (Spect. 447)

Will Cymon, the victim of a habitual retired life, finds that speaking in public is at first a great and painful experience for him; but with time, he also discovers the one habit is modified for another.

Habit and custom, though the cause of serious vice, may also be the means of salvation. Following Hesiod, Addison says,

> The Gods . . . have placed Labour before Virtue; the way to her is at first rough and difficult, but grows more smooth and easie the further you advance in it. The Man who proceeds in it, with Steadiness and Resolution, will in a little time find that her Ways are Ways of Pleasantness, and that all her Paths are Peace.
>
> (Spect. 447)

Therefore, in order to enjoy the blessings of heaven, man must develop "Habits of Virtue"; for virtue is hardly natural in the sense that it comes easily or that it is always man's first concern. Rather, man is disposed to take the easy way, the way that brings him immediate pleasure and keeps him from immediate pain. The principles of pain and pleasure, then, act as a two-edged sword that must be understood fully and used cautiously. When Addision says that "Heaven is not to be look'd upon only as the Reward, but as the natural Effect of a religious Life" (Spect. 447), he informs his readers of the true nature of habit and custom. They not only make life pleasant or unpleasant here on earth, but they prepare each man for his future. What one is accustomed to in this life shall be continued in the next. So it is that

> those evil Spirits, who, by long Custom, have contracted in the Body Habits of Lust and Sensuality, Malice and Revenge, an Aversion to every thing that is good, just, or laudable, are naturally seasoned and prepared for Pain and Misery.
>
> (Spect. 447)

The conclusion one might reach, therefore, is that those who are unhappy lack the moral and, often enough,

the physical courage necesary to be happy. Such a conclusion is, however, incomplete. To it we must add two others which may be understood through Locke's discussion of will and desire. It is the will, according to Locke, which determines the removal of unhappiness. "Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind," the philospher says,

> But that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good: either negative, as indolence to one in pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure.
>
> (Essay II.xxi.33)

It is this uneasiness that leads to action, for

> When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in—which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness—what industry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every man's observation will satisfy him.
>
> (Essay II.xxi.34)

But human will has distinct limitations. Willing a thing to be so or to quit produces nothing. Action alone is the "proper and only object of the will" (Essay II.xxi.41). When Mr. Spectator draws his portraits of despondent, piqued, and distracted men and women, he illustrates the ultimate futility of human existence—the inability to act. Before they may find human happiness, he tells his readers, they must accept the observation that "the Actions of Men follow their Passions as naturally as Light does Heat, or as any other Effect follows from its Cause" (Spect. 408).

As does Locke, Mr. Spectator sees action as an outgrowth of will. For example, true modesty, he believes, "must be an Act of the Will, and yet it always implies Self-Denial" (Spect. 484). A man, he says, may have a strong desire to do good; but if he is sheepish and does nothing out of mistaken understanding of the nature of modesty, he should not blame anyone other than himself. It is not the world's cruelty that makes a man indolent or retiring, happy or unhappy, but his own will in conflict with his own inability to work.

Looking further, we find that Spectator 480 consists of two letters which may become more meaningful if they are read in the light of Locke's interpretation of will and action. The first letter is from a retired courtier to Prince Pharamond of France. The courtier, Jean Chezluy, has been asked to return to court so that he may be properly honored for his services to the state; but instead of accepting, M. Chezluy protests that though he respects his prince he would be far happier if allowed to remain sequestered in the country. The life that this man has chosen is a quiet and, in many ways, an inactive one, but he has chosen it; this life was not imposed on him by others nor was he forced into it by circumstances he could not control. His style of life is, in essence, an action which came from his will.

The second letter in Spectator 480 is from a man born "of low Fortunes and great Modesty." This man, who has worked as a law clerk and is admired by his employer, has spent his free time learning Italian and French. Now he has the opportunity of becoming more active in the world by going abroad with a gentleman. The courtier Chezluy swapped a public for a private life while the clerk actively seeks to become a man of the world. These are two entirely different lives, but they resemble one another in that each is the result of the will of the individual. The courtier is happy in the country where he has placed himself and a turn to court would cause him unhappiness. The clerk, for his part, is dissatisfied with his modest job and acts on the desire that he hopes will bring pleasure.

In order for a man to be moved to action, two criteria must be established. First, he must will the action:

> Convince a man never so much, that plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him see and own, that the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury: yet, as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneasiness in it, he moves not; his will never is determined to any action that shall bring him out of it.
>
> (Essay II.xxi.35)

Second, if uneasiness comes upon a man, he must determine that it can be removed:

> For, the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action, for some end,

> cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable: that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to lose its labour; for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore very great uneasiness move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: they in that case put us not upon endeavours.
>
> (Essay II.xxi.41)

It may be possible, then, for a man not to realize that his condition is an unhappy one, or at least not to know that he could be happier. Moreover, he must be convinced that his condition can be changed; if it cannot, he must not only learn to tolerate his uneasiness but search for happiness elsewhere, as a man generally out of countenance may find happiness in a large fortune.

It would seem then that The Spectator, with not only its railing against vice but also its suggestions for reform and how to make one's own way through life, attempts to stir the reader's will and drive him to action. We might read, then, the letters and essays about unhappy people and see how they either lack the strength to act, cannot determine which action is best for removing unhappiness, or do not know their own unhappiness. The essay on the envious man may serve as a starting point to show how, by exposing the pain and perversion that accompany envy, the envious man may be reformed, making himself and others happier. The "Wretched and Apostate State" of envy gives a man "Pain upon all Occasions which ought to give him Pleasure" (Spect. 19).

Such a man relieves himself with "those little Blemishes and Imperfections that discover themselves in an Illustrious Character," that is, in the discomfort of others. In this way he resembles those

> who find a Pleasure in contradicting the common Reports of Fame, and in spreading abroad the Weaknesses of an exalted Character. They publish their ill-natured Discoveries with a secret Pride, and applaud themselves for the Singularity of their Judgment which has searched deeper than others, detected what the rest of the World have over-looked, and found a Flaw in what the Generality of Mankind admires.
>
> (Spect. 256)

Lastly, the envious man is never so happy as when he breeds pain and unhappiness. Surely, Mr. Spectator would assume, no one would choose to exist in such a state as this, leaving as the only possible alternatives that the envious man does not know otherwise what to do or, because of habit of mind, that he cannot see that he himself is unhappy.

When he describes the manifestations of vice, as he does in the essay on envy, Mr. Spectator apparently hopes that merely attracting attention to the weakness will make some reader realize that he could be a happier person. Faults in social behavior, especially as they are committed because they are improper for a particular sex, come in for close description in The Spectator. What these particular faults have in common with personal weakness is that not only is the guilty one discomforted but so also are those

around him. The young woman who uses such gross phrases as "Stomach aked," "stuck in her Teeth," and "all over in a Sweat" does not know that she is discomforted. After all, a person made uncomfortable cannot help but react, and he who causes the discomfort must notice, at least eventually, a change in atmosphere. The "Cott-Quean," likewise, gives more ill-ease to others than to himself. This sort of man, says his wife, "is more a Woman than I am" (Spect. 482). Though she calls him "a very good-natured Husband," she would "rather he was a Man of a rough Temper, that would treat me harshly sometimes, than of such an effeminate busy Nature in a Province that does not belong to him."

Now the Cott-quean may transform himself with some effort, as may the foul-mouthed lady; if they do not, it may be because they lack the will, seeing no acceptable happiness that could result, or they do not see their actions as faults and causes of unhappiness. On the other hand, such persons as the Cott-Quean's wife who write to Mr. Spectator on such subjects do not seem especially desirous of instituting change in those they complain of; their purpose seems to be primarily directed toward venting their unhappiness with words. They and those who give uneasy desires, if they be aware of their flaws, suspend their right to act. The greatest freedom men have, says Locke, is that they "can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining

their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires" (Essay II.xxi.53). To prevent "all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives," each man is given the "power to suspend the prosecution of this to that desire; as every one may experiment in himself" (Essay II.xxi.48). It would seem that in these two cases the happiness resulting from the removal of inappropriate vocabulary and actions would not be commensurate with the effort needed for their removal. Though the wife of the Cott-Quean is distressed by her husband's behavior, he is, as she admits, a good husband in other ways. She could, after all, be married to someone much worse. Petty, insignificant annoyances far too often block the light of real worth. If reform is necessary, the effort of it should be directed toward those great faults whose removal would mean distinct improvement in one's situation. Effeminate men and ladies who say sweat may be objectionable, but much more objectionable are prostitution and the fathering of illegitimate children. Mr. Spectator and Locke have a scale of values that is in general clear to them; for them there is little problem in determining significance and trivia, moral and immoral.

The wife of the "poor idle drunken Weaver in Spittle-Fields" has greater reason for complaint. She, after

saving her pennies for a long while, invests in a lottery and to her amazement wins (Spect. 242). Her husband in the meanwhile has stolen the ticket and sold it for drink. When she tells him of their good fortune, he replies, "You lie you Slut, you have no Ticket, for I have sold it." The wife's desire to improve the lot of her family leads her to the action of buying the lottery ticket, while her husband's desire for drink leads him to theft. There is, of course, no way for the wife to remove her pain; the action is past and cannot be undone. The husband failed to suspend his desire until he had "fairly examined the good or ill of it," and as Locke warns, such failure leads to "all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults." If the Cott-Quean should suspend his desire to putter about the kitchen, he and his wife would hardly be better off; moreover, cleaning up one's vocabulary may make some difference in one's life, but surely not as significant a difference as if the weaver should give up drink and idleness. Man may, indeed, change himself, but he must use his reason to determine which faults deserve the effort and which do not.

But all this emphasis on individual faults and ways of curing them must not obscure an important point, that for Locke and Mr. Spectator the pain felt by any individual is stimulated by other people as often as happiness comes from the good influence of others. The discomfort of any

one of us is not limited solely to him who feels the pain; the pain, instead, radiates out from the sufferer, touching those all around. It is, then, social reform that lies at the center of Locke's consideration of pleasure and pain just as it is social reform that motivates The Spectator. With their emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities, Locke and Mr. Spectator do not allow blame for personal unhappiness to be laid on society; but they do see community woes emerging from the pain of individuals.

The letter from a whore seems to confirm such a conclusion. "There are Crowds of us whose Manner of Livelihood has long ceased to be pleasing to us," says the prostitute. And since her life has become painful, she naturally seeks to change it. She finds, however, an insurmountable obstacle in her path. It is neither her own inability to act nor a lack of will; rather, as she tells Mr. Spectator, the street girls who would give up their sins "would willingly lead a new Life, if the Rigour of the Virtuous did not for ever expel us from coming into the World again" (Spect. 190). It is bad enough that a woman would be a prostitute in the first place; but when she attempts to reform and is prevented from doing so by the very people who should encourage moral conformity in the community, both her pain and the community's are increased. She is uneasy in her position and wills that it

would change, but she is stopped from the action that should logically extend from her will. Such an impediment Locke would call a gross infringement on the woman's liberty. For if pursuit of happiness is the greatest right of all men, the woman in being denied happiness is denied her right as a human being. The girl, however, cannot blame "society" for her present unhappiness any more than she can blame it for her becoming a prostitute in the first place. She had at least some freedom of choice, and still does. Likewise, the virtuous cannot justify their intolerance with an appeal to community standards. As individuals they may choose to ignore such standards in this matter and act, instead, as compassionate individuals who allow each man the right to happiness. Both prostitute and virtuous acted, and act, as free agents.

Not only may a community inhibit change in a person, but personal weakness also may block an individual's improvement. Anthony Freeman, for example, writes that he is a man indisposed to give offence, even if it means disobliging himself. In many daily situations such a personality would be admirable. In order to add to the smooth operation of society, a man should control his desire in matters that do not seem to warrant great attention. But Mr. Freeman is taken advantage of by his wife. Soon after his marriage, he writes, his wife noticed his willingness to "bear little

Inconveniences rather than dispute about them" (Spect. 212). But from this, he continues, "it soon came to pass, that if I offered to go abroad, she would get between me and the Door, kiss me, and say she could not part with me; then down again I sat." Ultimately, Mr. Freeman came "to live the Life of a Prisoner of State." In this case, the wife's unwillingness to let go her desire to have her husband near her has perverted a healthy desire into a serious discomfort for her husband. Moreover, the husband's normal willingness to acquiesce to others has been carried to an unreasonable degree. Happiness certainly lies in freedom, not in being a prisoner, of the state, of any other groups, or of an individual.

The story does not end happily. Mr. Freeman's friend, Tom Meggot, offers to effect a rescue. When the wife realizes the collusion, "she burst out she was exposed, she was deceived, she was wronged and abused"; she throws her teacup into the fire, and calls Meggot "a pretending Coxcomb, a Medler"; she throws scalding water on her husband and attacks his periwig (Spect. 216). Meggot appeals to Mr. Spectator:

> In a Word, Sir, I am afraid we are upon a thing we have not Talents for; and I can observe already my Friend looks upon me rather as a Man that knows a Weakness of him that he is ashamed of, than one who has rescued him from Slavery.
>
> (Spect. 216)

What is to come of this explosion is anyone's guess, but we might conclude that merely acting toward change is not enough to effect happiness; the action must be performed by one who knows how to handle the matter.

The success others have in solving their problems may guide some to success of their own devising. But in keeping with the assumptions that pain is a more efficient guide than pleasure and that dramatic representation is more effective than "the wisest Maxims and Instructions that can be given us" (Spect. 299), Mr. Spectator offers the letter of Sir John Enville, a man who has no happiness great or small and who cannot escape his predicament. After amassing a considerable fortune through trade and being knighted, Sir John's ambition led him to marry an indigent gentlewoman. Foolishly, Sir John signed a marriage contract that allowed his wife a free hand in spending his money and rearing his children. In consequence, she changed his name from Anvil to Enville, made him support her arrogant though penniless family, introduced fashionably idle servants, and spent his money with a lavish hand. What is more, she encouraged her children to think little of their father and his background. She has, Sir John says, "begged me more than once to converse with the Children as little as possible, that they might not learn any of my aukward Tricks" (Spect. 299). Matters have progressed too far in

Sir John's life for him to turn back. He cannot alter his wife's disposition, undo the damage she has done to their children, or cancel the contract that gave her such extensive command over his money. Like the prostitute who wants to leave her old life, Sir John is prevented. His only recourse is to accept that to which he is bound no matter what sorrow he feels. Again, however, it is he who proposed to his wife, and it was he who freely signed the marriage contract, and it was his own ambition that led him to seek a woman of quality as a wife. If a man finds that his right to be happy has been curtailed, he must seek the origin in his own weakness.

It is those who are not weak, then—those who have strong wills and the freedom to act, those who aim at attainable goals—that are happiest. And, as we have seen, strength and freedom are the essentials of goodness; for only a strong man is able to direct his thoughts, actions, and passions into those fields that are of greatest benefit to both individual and community. A quick sketch of a happy person is Aurelia, a woman who

> delights in the Privacy of a Country Life, and passes away a great part of her Time in her own Walks and Gardens. Her husband, who is her Bosom Friend, and Companion in her Solitudes, has been in Love with her ever since he knew her.
>
> (Spect. 15)

Aurelia embodies the lesson that

> True Happiness is of a retired Nature, and an Enemy to Pomp and Noise; it arises, in the first place, from the Enjoyment of one's self; and, in the next, from the Friendship and Conversation of a few select Companions.
>
> (Spect. 15)

In sharp contrast, Fulvia "lives in a perpetual Motion of Body, and Restlessness of Thought, and is never easie in any one Place when she thinks there is more Company in another" (Spect. 15). If it is uneasy desire that spurs actions, then certainly Fulvia is in a constant state of uneasiness. Presumably, chasing willy-nilly after one thing and then another is the mark of a mind that either expects too from life or cannot distinguish the sterling from the base.

A similar contrast is made between Laetitia and Daphne. The first, being a great beauty, grew into "no more than Nature made her, a very beautiful Outside" (Spect. 33). Her sister, however, "found her self obliged to acquire some accomplishments, to make up for the want of those attractions which she saw in her sister." So the contrast extends into all aspects of their personalities, leaving Laetitia "sullen, grave, and disconsolate" and Daphne "chearful, open, and unconcerned." As one might expect, it is Daphne who marries first. It is she who has disciplined herself and who has understood that one who remains as nature made her amounts to very little. In one of Addison's best paragraphs—

> Half the Misery of Human Life might be extinguished, would Men alleviate the general Curse

> they lie under, by mutual Offices of Compassion, Benevolence and Humanity. There is nothing therefore which we ought more to encourage in our selves and others, than that Disposition of Mind which in our Language goes under the Title of Good-Nature— (Spect. 169)

particular attention should be paid to the word encourage. With it Addision implies that compassion, benevolence, humanity, and good-nature do not effectively exist in a man unless they are cultivated. To be happy with himself and others, a man must have more than nature gives.

One might get the impression from these examples that the actions which cause happiness are all modest in scope, and the impression would be accurate so far as the lives of most men are modest. Since Locke points out, however, that different men are satisfied with different pleasures, any consideration of happiness must include those men who can be content only with extensive fame (see Essay II.xxi.56; cited previously). Will Hopeless responds to Mr. Spectator's essay praising the retired life by pointing out that "Titles and Honors are the Reward of Virtue: We therefore ought to be affected with them" (Spect. 613). Though Hopeless himself is "chained down in Obscurity" and must rest content with adding "to the Splendor of the Throne," he is able to see the variety necessary in human activity. If a secluded life benefits one man, he should have it; but by no means should it be forced on another. On the other hand, another person

may be capable of pleasing himself and aiding others through actions that bring public acclaim; he, likewise, should be free to seek his own happiness without insisting that others look into the same corners.

The man who pursues wide acclaim is driven by uneasy desires that the retired man does not feel. If we understand that passions in the following passage is equivalent to what Locke calls desires, we can see not only how working in the public arena brings happiness to both individual and community, but also how it promotes the correspondence between will and action.

> The Use therefore of the Passions, is to stir it [the soul] up and put it upon Action, to awaken the Understanding, to enforce the Will, and to make the Whole Man more vigorous and attentive in the Prosecution of his Designs . . . .
>
> It was necessary for the World, that Arts should be invented and improved, Books written and transmitted to Posterity, Nations conquered and civilized: Now since the proper and genuine Motives to these and the like great Actions, would only influence virtuous Minds; there would be but small Improvements in the World, were there not some common Principle of Action working equally with all Men. And such a Principle is Ambition or a desire of Fame, by which great Endowments are not suffer'd to lie idle and useless to the Publick, and many vicious Men over-reached, as it were, and engaged contrary to their natural Inclinations in a glorious and laudable Course of Action.
>
> (Spect. 255)

On the road to fame, however, man encounters a number of impediments. His desires betray

> the ambitious Man into such Indecencies as are a lessening to his Reputation. He is still afraid

> lest any of his Actions should be thrown away in private, lest his Deserts should be concealed from the Notice of the World, or receive any Disadvantage from the Reports which others make of them.
> (Spect. 255)

Further, he is naturally vain and his ambition is always suspect. Too great modesty and too great ambition are both fraught with dangers. A man may believe himself happy with either extreme, but for his own good and the good of those around him he must discipline those passions and turn them into a more moderate course. One must not be so self-effacing or withdrawn as to appear a dolt or become inactive, nor must he give the impression of self-aggrandizement. Or, to put the matter another way, one must come as close as possible to emulating that favorite of readers of The Spectator, Sir Roger de Coverley.

Sir Roger is probably the most interesting single figure in The Spectator, including the narrator himself; and one way to understand this interest he generates is to see in him the ideal of eighteenth-century success as well as a dramatic representation of The Spectator's appeal to men who appreciate moderation. Sir Roger carefully balances a retired country life with an active interest in the doings of London; he lives to satisfy himself as best he can, but also he keeps in mind his public responsibility. He does indeed suffer from pains he cannot remove, but then—so the retort would run—all men do. He lives with that great

though negative blessing, minimal pain. Sir Roger's life lies not far beyond the attitude of the correspondent "T.B." who asks Mr. Spectator to modify the adivce he gives his readers. Happiness, he writes, "is not to be arrived at in this Life, therefore I would recommend to you to talk in an humbler Strain than your Predecessors have done, and instead of presuming to be happy instruct us only to be easy" (Spect. 196).

In twenty-seven essays, most of them falling between Nos. 100 and 131, Mr. Spectator gives his readers bits and pieces of information about his often stubborn but always intriguing friend from the country. More than any other Club member and more than any other particular subject, Sir Roger held the attention of Mr. Spectator. Reading these twenty-seven essays together, one gets a fairly complete though disjointed picture of a type of personality set in a series of specific eighteenth-century situations. The overall picture resembles, in its completeness, that which one now may find in Spoon River Anthology and Under Milkwood or in any number of "collections" such as Sherwood Anderson's Winesburg, Ohio or Irving's The Alhambra.

The first time the reader sees Sir Roger in action he is airing those ideas being discussed here: man must pursue personal pleasure and simultaneously enrich the public. "Every man," says the knight,

> who terminates his Satisfactions and Enjoyments within the Supply of his own Necessities and Passions, is, . . . in my Eye as poor a Rogue as [the man who does not think beyond 'a warm Fire and his Doxy'].
>
> (Spect. 6)

And he lays down the rule

> That the whole Man is to move together; that every Action of any Importance is to have a Prospect of publick Good; and that the general Tendency of our indifferent Actions ought to be agreeable to the Dictates of Reason, of Religion, of good Breeding; without this, a Man . . . is hopping instead of walking, he is not in his intire and proper Motions.
>
> (Spect. 6)

"That the whole Man is to move together" may be taken as the motto for all men who will be happy: neither shy not bold, idle nor forever fatigued, selfish nor sacrificial, but always a studied balance between all extremes.

For the most part, men see that moving together is a basic source of happiness. Yes, it is true that when moderation becomes an ideal the result is a general levelling of outward appearances. Highs and lows of personal emotion and artistic creation are seemingly lost. But it is only seeming. One surely does not have to express anger in order to lash out at its cause before anger may be felt. Expression of emotion is outward show, not feeling. Although the highs and lows are there, they are restrained in order to bring all the elements of human existence into harmony.

The dictates of reason, religion, and good breeding presume the existence of natural laws which unite "all men,

despite distinction as personalities and individuals" in "underlying psychological constituents" and in "their dispositions toward the identification of moral good and ill."[2] These natural laws do not seek to oppress or destroy any human impulse or earthly pleasure. Instead, their goal is balance and restraint. We may rightly regulate our passions, but we must use caution that "we should quite extinguish them, which is putting out the Light of the Soul; for to be without Passion or to be hurried away with it; makes a Man equally blind" (Spect. 408).

Sir Roger, following these dictates, is both satisfied with himself and applauded by the public. It is observed that

> He receives a suitable Tribute for his universal Benevolence to Mankind, in the Returns of Affection and Good-will, which are paid him by every one that lives within his Neighbourhood.
>
> (Spect. 122)

The knight does not seek this applause from an eager desire for power or fame; rather, he accepts it as a reasonable reward for honesty and benevolence. Again, some might see a secret pride here, believing that those whose sole concern is to do good will be anonymously benevolent. Crouching behind every public show of goodness, says the cynic, is a secret selfishness. Probably the accusation of selfishness

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[2]Edward A. Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom, "Addison and Eighteenth-Century 'Liberalism,'" Journal of the History of Ideas, 21 (1960), 572.

would be supported by the eighteenth-century citizen if the public show involved ostentation. With its concern for examples and with imitation of good men, however, hiding one's light completely would have been a form of social injustice. The public needs outward show of virtue in order to know what virtue is and how it might be of use. Complete anonymity denies the public not of heroes but of men to admire. Men such as Sir Roger derive inward pleasure from their benevolence, and their pleasures is fulfilled by the rewards of recognition. The objects of his benevolence, for their part, find in his goodness a respite from pain and, in having Sir Roger as a model, know how to prolong their own pleasure and pass it on to others.

Ultimately, each man knows and can distinguish pleasure from pain whether it be the result of physical sensation or of mental activity. "It is not enough," Locke says, "to have determined ideas [of our actions], and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of ideas." Our greater concern is "to know whether such actions . . . are morally good or bad" (Essay II.xxviii.4). "Moral good and evil," he continues,

> is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us, from the will and power of the lawmaker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call reward and punishment.
>
> (Essay II.xxviii.5)

These laws whose observation or breech results in happiness or pain are of three often overlapping sorts. First, divine law is that "which God has set to the actions of men" (Essay II.xxviii.8). Second, civil law is that "rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it" (Essay II.xxviii.9). And third, the law of opinion or reputation, also called philosophical law, is that which is deemed good or bad by particular men and societies and which is supposed to be applicable everywhere and to be in accord with divine law. It is this last law that is most often the measure of virtue and vice. "It is no wonder," says Locke,

> that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice, should, in a great measure, everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which the law of God hath established; there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws he has set them, and nothing that breeds such mischief and confusion, as the neglect of them. (Essay II.xxviii.11)

Public opinion is the clue to understanding Locke's attitude toward this third sort of law. Pleasure and pain as well as virtue and vice are experiences of the earth, and on the earth men live with one another. Looking through The Spectator at such personalities as Sir Roger de Coverley, one can appreciate how closely Locke's idea parallels Mr. Spectator's. If Sir Roger is content and happy with his life, it is in large measure because his good

actions are rewarded with the approval of other men. A man may certainly derive secret satisfaction from his actions, but eventually all men need the reassurance that what they do is worthy of the approval of society.

Man, in the more sophisticated manifestations of his social structures, has given to the public at large the general disposition of force, and he is allowed to direct personal force against another man only to the extent that the laws of his country allow. Yet, adds Locke, these same men who have resigned much of their force to others

> retain still the power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whome they live amongst, and converse with: and by this approbation and dislike they establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice.
> (Essay II.xxviii.10)

So it is that to be happy means, at least in part, to avoid those practices that entail censure from others. In a decent society no individual should encounter a conflict among the three types of law. Civil law and philosophical law should be in harmony with the law of God as the highest law. Locke admits that there is notable variation from place to place and time to time in what is praiseworthy or discredited; but for the most part, he believes, laws are "kept the same everywhere" (Essay II.xxviii.11).

It is in Addison's series on the pleasures of the imagination, however, that The Spectator's considerations of

pleasure and attendant happiness move from the entirely social realm into the more personal and aesthetic. In this eleven-essay series (Spect. 411-421) Addison distinguishes primary qualities and pleasures of bodies from secondary qualities and pleasures of bodies. Primary qualities are those attributes inherent in any object and the pleasures of it arise from seeing the present object. The object must be natural or manmade but not an artful reproduction of an object in nature. An object's secondary qualities are its powers to produce ideas by means of primary qualities; these qualities cannot exist apart from the ideas they produce. Secondary pleasures arise from the sight of objects that are not present, as in a painting when the imitation is imaginatively compared to the original in nature.

From this brief outline one can see the emphasis Addison places on the sense of sight. For him, in fact, imagination relies more on the power of observation than on intellectual ability. Once more, the implication is levelling: imagination, exercised through the senses that all men have, becomes more and more acute the more it is used. The effect, as Ernest Tuveson observes, is spiritually improving; by degrees, any man who will be aware may raise himself "to a perfect state of perception."[3]

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[3] Imagination as a Means of Grace, p. 95.

Perfect perception can only indicate perfection of the imagination.

The concern with sensation is clearly Lockean. As man develops his imagination through his senses, he combines the two types of experience Locke sees as the origins of human knowledge—sensation and reflection. With both Mr. Spectator and Locke, the knowledge men have of reality is bounded by individual perception, and such a boundary creates a close correspondence between what is within and what is without. The world outside of the individual is real because his senses tell him it is so. Reality is always the term that applies to what is sensed and reflected upon. Emotions and memories are as real as any physical object that may be seen or touched. To deny either proposition is to undermine man's determination to know anything; and if man despairs of his ability to know, the justification for action is accordingly eliminated. Happiness, the hoped-for-outcome of the removal of uneasy desires, can never be achieved; for when happiness, against the experience of sensation and reflection, is thought to be illusive the motive for its active pursuit is lost.

Of course, the most notable connection between this series in The Spectator and Locke's epistemology is the importance that each places on sensation as a source for ideas. As Addison says, sight

> furnishes the Imagination with its Ideas; so that by the Pleasures of the Imagination or Fancy . . . I here mean such as arise from visible Objects, either when we have them actually in our View, or when we call up their Ideas into our Minds by Paintings, Statues, Descriptions, or any the like Occasion. (Spect. 411)

The mind, he continues, retains, alters, and compounds "those Images which we have once received, into all the Varieties of Pictures and Visions that are most agreeable to the Imagination." Addision distinguishes the mere perception of an object from the pleasure that the object gives as Locke distinguishes looking in the sun by day and thinking of it at night (Essay IV.ii.14). The one is an immediate physical encounter that cannot be resisted and the other is entirely reflective and, to a degree that varies from individual to individual, controllable.

We are conscious, says Locke, of the difference between reality and our memory of it, just as we are conscious that external objects are necessary for knowledge. If one should argue, he adds, that dreams may be produced without external objects and have the same reality as memory, Locke replies with these answers:

> 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple or no: where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being so actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain, that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire actually esists without us: I answer,

> That we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses; this certainly is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be.
>
> (Essay IV.ii.14)

Imaginative pleasure is to be sought diligently and developed earnestly because imagination and its stimulant sensations are powers given man by God. Each man knows that he has imagination capable of being excited by nature and art, and he knows that this excitement gives him pleasure that is acceptable to his society. This acceptability—combined with pleasure, especially that pleasure which comes from the sight of nature—demonstrates the glory of the Almighty as well as the conformity of philosophical with divine law.

IV. WORDS AND THE TEACHING OF VIRTUE

Throughout The Spectator the essayists are concerned with that practical knowledge which all reasonable men may acquire in order to find happiness and contentment. In order to clarify their ideas, they take special pains with words. The end of the seventeenth century saw a revolution in, among other things, the nature and use of language. Almost all studies of the language theories of the time say that because of the increased insistence on precise meaning and standardization of language in the interest of scientific

accuracy, language became less "eloquent," turning instead to the plain style earlier advocated by Francis Bacon and then by Thomas Spratt and the Royal Society. That style frequently called Ciceronian was suspected since it seemed more concerned with ornament than meaning and since the embellishments often obscured what meaning was there.[4] From all the attention given the subject in the seventeenth century by the likes of Bacon, Jonson, and Locke, it seems that what men came to realize more clearly and to say in increasing numbers was that though language was the blessing of God given to man for his development and supremacy, it was just as often a handicap. Linguistic communication, in order to be clear, had to align itself with "things" in order to make a series of distinct and appreciable "points."[5] Judging from Book III of An Essay it seems that Locke believed that the limitations of the reader's mind and experience as well as the often inexact correspondence of words to things and to ideas were ever-present obstacles. In order for man to communicate more clearly Locke suggested

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[4]This seems to be the general conclusion of George Williamson in The Senecan Amble (London: Faber, 1951).

[5]See, for example, A. C. Howell, "Res et Verba: Words and Things," ELH, 13, No. 2 (1946), 131-142; rpt. Seventeenth Century Prose, ed. Stanley E. Fish (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 187-199.

certain rules that, if agreed upon, would narrow the gap between the intention of the writer's mind and the understanding in the reader's.

Since the writer cannot effectively control his reading public, he has recourse only to making sure that he understands language as fully as possible, making sure that any blame for a lapse in communciation is not solely his. In attempting to explain these facts about language, Locke first lays down the proposition that since words arouse ideas in the mind of the reader, the writer should be careful that he uses the word which arouses the idea he intends to communicate. The idea aroused by a particular word is always arbitrary, there being no natural correspondence between word and referent. It is also true, he believes, that

> common sense, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligently.
>
> (Essay III.ii.8)

Those words called general terms—"all the great business of genera, and species, and their essences"—are the most common. With these general terms, men are able "to consider things, and discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge" (Essay III.iii.20).

When Locke comes to the names of simple ideas, he insists that for various reasons these terms are undefinable. Any writer who suspects that his reader may not be familiar with the particular name he is using for a simple idea may increase understanding only with a synonymn. Furthermore, to attempt a definition of a simple idea leads only to foolish wrangling and, eventually, to the reader's confusion—for two reasons. First, since any definition attempts to clarify the several parts of an idea, an idea that has no parts but is a whole cannot be defined (Essay III.iv.7-10). And second, simple ideas are received by the mind through the senses; thus, no number of words alone can convey their meaning (Essay III.iv.11-14).

Mr. Spectator, a practical man concerned for the most part with the practical affairs of daily living, does not find it necessary to define or explain the names of simple ideas. Likewise, the names of simple modes, which Locke sees as little different from names of simple ideas (Essay III.iv.17), never need clarification beyond an occasional synonym for those names with which the reader may be unfamiliar.

Similarly, when using the names of mixed modes, Mr. Spectator need not have specific examples in mind nor must he communicate specific examples. A man's impression of a mixed mode exists almost wholly in his understanding. As Locke says,

> When we speak of justice or gratitude, we frame to ourselves no imagination of anything existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of those virtues, and look not further; as they do when we speak of a horse, or iron, whose specific ideas we consider not as barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original patterns of those ideas.
>
> (Essay III.v.12)

Furthermore, the names of mixed modes indicate

> the real essences of their species. For these abstract ideas being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real existence of things, there is no supposition of anything more signified by that name, but barely that complex idea the mind itself has formed; which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that on which all the properties of the species depend, and from which alone they all flow: and so in these the real and nominal essence is the same.
>
> (Essay III.v.14)

Thus, Mr. Spectator likewise speaks of gratitude when he begins his essay abstractly, assured that his reader need not have at this point a specific idea to consider. "There is not," he says,

> a more pleasing Exercise of the Mind than Gratitude. It is accompanied with such an inward Satisfaction, that the Duty is sufficiently rewarded by the Performance. It is not like the Practice of many other Virtues, difficult and painful, but attended with so much pleasure, that were there no positive Command which enjoined it, nor any Recompence laid up for it hereafter, a generous Mind would indulge in it, for the natural Gratification that accompanies it.
>
> (Spect. 453)

The author goes on to say that God is due man's gratitude and points out that gratitude "exalts the Soul into Rapture" and "produces a very pleasing Sensation in the Mind"

(Spect. 453). But beyond specifying exaltation, rapture, and pleasing sensation, the essence of gratitude is never delineated; for in order to understand the essay, the reader need not look beyond the abstract idea.

From the very nature of names of mixed modes, they can seldom if ever be used with precision. These names

> have seldom in two different men the same precise signification; since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own—from that which he had yesterday, or will have to-morrow.
>
> (Essay III.ix.6)

These names are further obscured by the fact that they

> for the most part want standards in nature, whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of discourse, and suited to its own notions; whereby it designs not to copy anything really existing, but to denominate and rank things as they come to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made.
>
> (Essay III.ix.7)

So it is with all words that there are clear possibilities of misunderstanding. But Locke establishes five rules that, though they and none others can finally ensure absolute clarity, may decrease the possibility of error. First, no writer should use a word unless he has an idea attached to it (Essay III.xi.8). Second, in the case of mixed modes especially, a writer must attach distinct, determinate ideas to each word (Essay III.xi.9). Third, the writer must remember the common ideas attached

to words and use them accordingly (Essay III.xi.11). Fourth, the writer should declare the meaning of each word he uses. Locke explains that this last remedy may be accomplished in one of four ways: (1) simple ideas may be defined with either synonymns or examples; (2) mixed modes, though they are abstracted from nature, may be "perfectly and exactly defined"; (3) substances may be declared by showing and defining; and (4) the ideas of substances must conform with real things (Essay III.xi.14-24). Fifth, and finally, a writer must use each word consistently, never using it to name one idea the first time and another idea the next.

Certainly Mr. Spectator would have faulted neither these fine suggestions nor Locke's warning of the inherent dangers of verbal communication. To both writers words are the auditory manifestations of the mind's workings, and what occurs within a man's mind determines not only his words but his actions. Two Spectator essays in particular establish parallels between words, action, and thought while giving the lesson that the three do not always operate together. The inner man, Mr. Spectator says, may often be read in his appearance for

> Every Passion gives a particular Cast to the Countenance, and is apt to discover itself in some Feature or other. I have seen an Eye curse for half an Hour together, and an Eye-brow call a Man Scoundrel. Nothing is more common than for Lovers

> to complain, resent, languish, despair, and dye, in dumb Show.
>
> (Spect. 86)

In fact, he continues, pointing to the frequent disparity between thoughts and words, "I think we may be better known by our Looks than by our Words; and that a Man's Speech is much more easily disguised than his Countenance."

On another occasion the Spectator Club's divine protests against spoken civilities, saying that

> he was convinced that the many Professions of Kindness and Service, which we ordinarily meet with, are not natural where the Heart is well inclined; but are a Prostitution of Speech, seldom intended to mean Any Part of what they express, never to mean All they express.
>
> (Spect. 103)

The divine further notes that "Men's Words are hardly any Signification of their Thoughts." His despair over the abuse of language, however, is not founded so much on linguistic concerns as on morality. Abused language, it seems, is wrong because it obscures the truth, and the parson feels justified in his complaint that

> Sincerity and Plainness are out of Fashion, and that our Language is running into a Lie; that Men have almost quite perverted the use of Speech, and made Words to signify nothing . . . .
>
> (Spect. 103)

By applying one word or phrase to another idea, these unfelt "Professions of Kindness and Service" violate Locke's suggestion for clear language. More than vagueness, however, is involved. If at the bottom of virtue are reason

and honesty, the abuse of language, especially deliberate abuse, is vice. It is not reasonable for it disjoints thought and words. It is dishonest because it obscures true thought, making a man seem something other than what he is.

Clarity, then, enables words to mean all they express and to inform rather than confound a reader. Budgell criticizes those writers who deliberately conceal "their Meaning under obscure Terms and Phrases" or who "write without any Meaning at all" (Spect. 379). Although these men may not be liars, their language hides truth which may be beneficial to others. Budgell illustrates his point with the story of the discovery of "Rosicrucius's Sepulchre." The man who opened the tomb set off a mechanism that destroyed the "ever-burning Lamps of the Ancients" which the dead man had rediscovered. The destruction, said the Rosicrucian disciples, was the result of their master's resolve that "no one should reap any Advantage from the Discovery." Actions of all sorts, the reader is encouraged to conclude, must be made to serve. When they do not, they become unnatural and vicious.

Unservicable obscurity is the subject of another and lighter essay in which Mr. Spectator ironically asks that

> certain Men might be set apart as Super-intendants of our Language, to hinder any Words of a Foreign Coin from passing among us; and in particular to

> prohibit any French Phrases from becoming Current in this Kingdom, when those of our own stamp are altogether as valuable.
>
> (Spect. 165)

The letter accompanying this request is from a young man in the army who writes to his father about a recent battle. The letter is so filled with the likes of "reconnoitre," "Gens d' Arms," "Gasconade," and "Charte Blanche" that the poor father could not guess, beyond that something significant has transpired, what had happened to his son. Neither could the parish curate interpret the letter. Although the problem presented by the soldier's letter is minor and indicates a national pride that has little to do with language itself, it does reflect a great fault, for like a lie it misleads and does no service to anyone. It is true enough that language reflects inward thoughts and attitudes and that any linguistic failure not the result of mental retardation is bred by a disregard of the truth.

V. THE CERTAINTY AND ERROR OF MORALITY

It is, however, the idea of morality that is real, not so much the word that it is called by. A word may reflect but it does not surpass either ideas or actions. A vicious action remains vicious no matter how cleverly it is disguised, for the true nature of an action, as Mr. Spectator says, will always reveal itself (Spect. 351).

Using his natural reason as his guide, any man may with certainty know the good or ill of his behavior. If he should use the language of one to describe the other, he merely betrays himself; what is proper stands above his words. The certainty and clarity of virtue are the interest of a correspondent who says,

> I know not any Thing more pernicious to good Manners than the giving fair Names to foul Actions; for this confounds Vice and Virtue, and takes off that natural Horror we have to Evil. An innocent Creature, who would start at the Name of Strumpet, may think it pretty to be called a Mistress, especially if her Seducer has taken Care to inform her, that a Union of Hearts is the principal Matter in the Sight of Heaven, and that the Business at Church is a mere idle Ceremony. Who knows not that the Difference between obscene and modest Words, expressing the same Action, consists only in the accessory Idea, for there is Nothing immodest in Letters and Syllables. Fornication and Adultery are modest Words, because they express an evil Action as criminal, and so as to excite Horror and Aversion: Whereas Words representing the Pleasure rather than the Sin, are for this reason indecent and dishonest. (Spect. 286)

For his part, Locke determines the surety of morality by drawing parallels between it and mathematics:

> All the discourses of the mathematics about the squaring of a circle, conic sections, or any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any of those figures: but their demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no. In the same manner, the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat: nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world that exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that

> pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed nowhere when he writ but in idea.
> (Essay IV.iv.8)

Locke continues that even though moral ideas are conceived and named by man, he cannot make of them what he pleases:

> No confusion or disorder in the things themselves, nor the reasonings about them; no more than (in mathematics) there would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in the properties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a man should make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles: that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another.
> (Essay IV.iv.9)

Robbery, for example, is as absolutely a sin as a triangle is a triangle, and a flood of words cannot make either what it is not.

An essay of Steele's on the duties of the Christian indicates both the absence of confusion and disorder in determining moral standards and the separation of these standards from ordinary practice. It is, says Steele, because of the ignorant man's "unlovely Constraint" in matters of religion and the deceit of the hypocrite "that the Word Christian does not carry with it at first View all that is Good, Worthy, Friendly, Generous, and Heroick" (Spect. 356). Continuing, he insists that the behavior of the ignorant and the hypocritical do not, or should not, affect anyone's confidence in the tenets of Christianity, for these men do not have those virtues that are important to the true Christian:

> The Man who suspends his Hopes of the Reward of worthy Actions till after Death, who can bestow unseen, who can overlook Hatred, do Good to his Slanderer, who can never be angry at his Friend, never revengeful to his Enemy, is certainly formed for the Benefit of Society: Yet these are so far from heroick Virtues, that they are but the ordinary Duties of a Christian.
>
> (Spect. 356)

If a man's moral duty is, then, natural, clear, and ordinary, the appearance of vice must be the result of a man behaving in an unnatural or eccentric manner. Locke puts the sources of error, including vice, into four such categories: want of proofs, inability to use proofs, unwillingness to see proofs, and misunderstanding of probability (Essay IV.xx.1). To Locke the lack of proof does not mean nonexistent proof, but the failure of the individual to find existent evidence. If, he says, a man lacks leisure to learn and lives like "a packhorse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards in a narrow lane and dirty road," he cannot be much blamed for his ignorance (Essay IV.xx.2). But this drudging man is not "so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul, and inform himself in matters of religion" (Essay IV.xx.3). Though perhaps a naive view of wretched povery to the social consciousness of the twentieth century, Locke's statement demonstrates his belief that though a man may know nothing else he may know virtue. Even the man whose errors arise from the

second cause—inability or want of skills—may be virtuous to the degree that his mental condition allows.

The most reprehensible cause of error, however, is lack of will, for it has the curse of idleness. With considerable vehemence Locke chastens the idlers:

> How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls, who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes, or a patched coat, and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse patches and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased chance, or their country tailor (I mean the common opinion of those they have conversed with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contemners of knowledge, to be found in things they are concerned to know.
>
> (Essay IV.xx.6)

These men have no excuse for their ignorance for they have all the requirements necessary for a wholly virtuous life—the leisure, the fortune, and the intelligence. But Locke's admonitions against these idlers focus only on the harm they do themselves. Mr. Spectator, as is his wont, is even more interested in the harm they do to the community:

> Those whose great Talents and high Birth have placed them in conspicuous Stations of Life, are indispensably obliged to exert some noble Inclinations for the Service of the World, or else such advantages

> become Misfortunes, and Shade and Privacy are a more elgible Portion. Where Opportunities and Inclinations are given to the same Person, we sometimes see sublime Instances of Virtue, which so dazzle our Imaginations, that we look with Scorn on all which in lower Scenes of Life we may our selves be able to practise. But this is a vicious Way of Thinking; and it bears some Spice of romantick Madness for a Man to imagine that he must grow ambitious, or seek Adventures, to be able to do great Actions. It is in every Man's Power in the World, who is above meer Poverty, not only to do things worthy but heroick. The great Foundation of civil Virtue is Self-Denial; and there is no one above the Necessities of Life, but has Opportunities of exercising that noble Quality, and doing as much as his Circumstances will bear for the Ease and Convenience of other Men; . . . . Men of publick Spirit differ rather in their Circumstances than their Virtue; and the Man who does all he can in a low Station, is more an Hero than he who omits any worth Action he is able to accomplish in a great one. (Spect. 248)

The unwillingness to do one's duty by maintaining or improving standards of virtue involves a double catastrophe. The individual's soul is endangered, and he threatens the happiness and ease of his fellowmen.

Although less dangerous, misunderstanding of probability, Locke's fourth cause of error is more complex than the other three. Involving the acceptance of false or doubtful propositions as true principles, these wrong measures of probability, as Locke calls them, have four significant causes—two from principles formed from without the individual and two from his own nature (Essay IV.xx.7-17). The first external cause is accepting principles that are often believed even in the face of concrete

fact. These false principles may be instilled in a child's mind to eventually become "riveted there by long custom and education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again" (Essay IV.xx.9). Here may lie the source of self-indulgence, fear of witches and ghosts, and the myriad of superstitions that plague child and man. Religious beliefs—Locke specifies transubstantiation—under this heading may become so strong

> that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie, rather than admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets.
>
> (Essay IV.xx.10)

The second external cause is accepting authority as the source of truth. It is this cause that gives rise, especially in religious concerns, to the problem of enthusiasm, a problem Locke spends a whole chapter outlining (Essay IV.xix). When the conceit of the enthusiast, he says,

> carries all easily with it, when got above common sense, and freed from all restraint of reason and check of reflection, it is heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper and inclination.
>
> (Essay IV.xix.7)

The men who form political and religious opinions are not, Locke admits, motivated solely by a love of truth (Essay IV.xx.17). So it seems when a man gives readily into these opinions before examining them critically, he makes himself

liable for error. Mr. Spectator, echoing this idea, says that religious enthusiasm bears traces of madness and that the enthusiast himself may come to believe that his intemperate thoughts indicate the Divine working within him (Spect. 201). Moreover, the man who believes in his own ideas despite evidence against them is both stupid and vicious (Spect. 243). Both of these causes come from a man's refusal to follow his reason and trust his own senses either because of ignorance or because of prejudice that makes him want to preserve some cherished assumption.

Two further wrong measures of probability are more the result of personal inclinations than outside authority. The first of these Locke calls "received hypothesis" or conclusions drawn from correct and accepted data. Men suffering from this error do not fully defy their senses or close their minds to new information. They do, however, resist change and go to lengths to explain away contrary opinions (Essay IV.xx.11). Such error may be seen, in Locke's illustration, in the example of the professor who has reached his conclusions "with no small expense of time and candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard" only to be "overturned by an upstart novelist" (Essay IV.xx.11). Hardly anyone could persuade this professor that what he has taught his students for thirty years is a lie. Surely, the professor will find it difficult or

impossible to "turn himself out stark naked, in quest afresh of new notions." Instead, he will pass the remainder of his life mustering a defense for the ideas that perhaps only he alone believes.

The second error from personal inclination is the result of predominant passions. A man, says Locke, may tell another man who is in love

> that he is jilted; bring a score of witnesses of the falsehood of his mistress, it is ten to one but three kind words of hers shall invalidate all their testimonies.
>
> (Essay IV.xx.12)

The lover may exercise his power to suspend judgment. When two ideas agree—as the behavior of the mistress and the testimony of the witnesses may—a man can no more refuse to know than he can refuse to see objects before his eyes (Essay IV.xx.16). However, Locke continues,

> though we cannot hinder our knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived; nor our assent, where the probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all the measures of it; yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent, by stopping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth.
>
> (Essay IV.xx.16)

In his role as teacher and reformer, Mr. Spectator sets himself the task of forcing his readers to continue inquiry and to see the agreement of ideas. Given the ability of the human mind to change, improve, and readjust its thoughts, his task is eased. Of the causes of error

only one—want of skill and inability—cannot be fully corrected either by experience or the good arguments of education. Where a man's own experiences fail him, or he fails them, a teacher may step in to expose error and suggest the way to reform. It is the teacher's function, and the function of Mr. Spectator, to see that inquiry and assent are not stopped, especially the assent to virtue.

CHAPTER IV

LOCKE'S EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS AND THE SPECTATOR

I. ESSAYS ON EDUCATION

Though An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is the product of a mind concerned with theory and philosophical generalizations, both in his writing and in his own career as a teacher, Locke did not ignore practicalities. While tutor in the Cooper household and as university professor, he confronted flesh and blood students whose learning problems were real and immediate. Theories aside, the philosopher had to become the teacher confronting the day-to-day problems of contributing to the development of another intellect and personality. For its part, the work of Mr. Spectator had to become even more strongly embued with the practical. His habit was to show a variety of vices and virtues which his readers could reasonably emulate or scorn in their daily activities. And having a vaster class than Locke, his problems and the responsibilities he accepted were even greater.

Starting with the assumption that man is "a rational agent in command of his wants and desires, seeking always to act virtuously,"[1] Locke built his theories of learning and

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[1]John Yolton, Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970), p. 23.

established the main goal of education. In Essay IV.xii.11, he says that man's "proper science and business" is morality; the only clear knowledge given to a man is that there is a God and that he is obliged to discover his duty to Him. The teaching process is designed, therefore, to enable man to know God and to create in him a life devoted to those actions that God finds most satisfactory. The moral man who is the result of a successful education is one whose beliefs and actions go beyond any specific religion, one whose life is made on "a pattern of good behavior than man [is] to practice."[2] Since it is, then, that morality is found more in action than in belief, the good teacher guides his students to those actions that are most proper.

Though learning was by no means discounted in Locke's scheme, it was considered only an adjunct to the greater necessities of good manners and virtue. To see a general indication of these values, one has only to notice that far more than half of the 216 sections in Some Thoughts Concerning Education deal with the student's attitudes and that academic knowledge is dealt with quickly. During Locke's lifetime and after, says George C. Brauer, Jr. in The Education of a Gentleman, it was supposed that excellence in education

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[2]Bloom and Bloom, "Addison's 'Enquiry After Truth,'" p. 200.

could not be founded on purely academic grounds.[3] With this supposition behind him. Locke was able to formulate the careful instructions set forth in Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding.[4] Likewise, Mr. Spectator readily and repeatedly emphasizes proper—that is, moral—behavior and, except when the persona is assumed by Addison, minimizes most academic matters. In regards to books, Mr. Spectator encourages the reading of those that lead to "improvement."

A considerable number of The Spectator's essays deal directly with the education of children and such related subjects as schoolmasters and parents. These essays, it seems, owe a debt to Locke's educational writings in that both equate education with experience. The good teacher provides the proper experiences for his pupil and points out those times when either the experience is morally wrong or the student has misinterpreted the virtue of it.

In the first chapter of his study of gentlemanly education, Brauer investigates the importance of virtue in the making of a gentleman and points out, first, that the

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[3]George C. Brauer, Jr., The Education of a Gentleman (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 52-113.

[4]These works are cited from The Educational Writings of John Locke, ed. John William Adamson (New York: Longmans, Green, 1912). Future citations shall be abbreviated Conduct or Understanding and followed by section number.

techniques a teacher was to use in making a virtuous man of his pupil were discussed at length by eighteenth-century pedagogues, and, second, that though there were some points of disagreement many of the significant techniques found voice in Locke. Outlining the techniques advocated by Locke in Some Thoughts, Brauer says that the student was to be taught virtue and a sense of honor by precepts, examples, cautiously given rewards, and, if all else failed, punishments. Every weakness had to be observed and immediately treated so that selfishness was replaced by generosity, cruelty by kindness, and lies by honesty. Companions and servants were carefully screened, for from them the student could learn vices. As for his teachers, they were chosen primarily for their virtue and their ability to instill virtue in the student.[5]

When they come to consider the education of children, a number of essays in The Spectator propose techniques similar to these. Perhaps the most nearly complete of these essays is the series written by Budgell: Spectator 307, 313, 337, and 353. In these essays, like Locke in Some Thoughts and Conduct of the Understanding, Budgell speaks of the importance of teaching virtue beginning early in the child's life and of consistently and uninterruptedly maintaining the lessons into maturity. Neither Locke's nor Budgell's ideas,

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[5]Brauer, p. 22.

Brauer makes clear, were unique to these writers, but rather were accepted pedagogy through most of the Restoration and eighteenth century.

The first of these four essays, Spectator 307, like the last, encourages matching the child's ability with the education he receives. On the plea that each child is different in ability, Budgell asks the reader to see the weakness of an educational system that allows "forty or fifty Boys of several Ages, Tempers and Inclinations, [to be] ranged together in the same Class, employed upon the same Authors, and enjoyned to the same Tasks" (Spect. 307). A parent must not, he warns, assume his child is capable of doing the same work with the same skill as his fellows. This warning is made because such an assumption appears commonly in parents. "The Humor is," says Steele, "that any thing which can happen to any Man's Child, is expected by every Man for his own" (Spect. 192). In another essay Steele presents his readers with a letter from a man acquainted with a lady whose son "has Parts of the middle Size, neither shining nor despicable, and has passed the common Exercises of his Years with tolerable Advantage" (Spect. 364). Unfortunately for this boy

> the Mother is become invincibly persuaded that her Son is a great Scholar; and that to chain him down to the ordinary Methods of Education with others of his Age, would be to cramp his Faculties and to an irreparable Injury to his wonderful Capacity.
> (Spect. 364)

In other words, the wrong type of education can put a stupid man into an intellectual occupation and an intelligent man into an occupation that does not do justice to his abilities. As Budgell observes, "I have known a Corn-cutter who with a right Education would have been an excellent Physician." In addition to making the child frustrated, mismatching student and education weakens the nation. Wrong education "starves Posterity, and defrauds our Country of those Persons, who, with due Care, might make an eminent Figure in their respective Posts of Life." So it is that the man who "runs his Head against a Pulpit" does neither himself nor his country service.

The form that the proper sort of education should take is discussed in the second essay in the series. Here Budgell examines the relative benefits of public and private education. In general Budgell endorses Locke's view that virtue is more easily taught privately in the student's home than in the company of a class of other boys. However, Budgell is at pains to show that a privately educated child is innocent of the dangers of the world and ignorant of social graces. This ignorance and innocence often leave the child, once he is on his own in the world, prey to the world's corrupting influence. Budgell suggests that Locke's solution of having neighbors visit and converse with the child is an inadequate means of preparing him for the world.

Conversation, the essayist insists on this side of the argument, is far from enough, and contact with only a few people, neighbors included, fosters dullness. Furthermore, Budgell offers to argue that public education is superior on the grounds that, first of all, "rural Masters" are too often ignorant and cruel and, second, that the public benefits from what the individual child has learned from contact with other children. A child educated at home, it is assumed, may be virtuous, and his virtue may contribute to public well-being; but his virtue, if he is shy and retiring, is not of significant benefit to any but himself. The world may be full of moral dangers to a young man, but these dangers, even some immoral actions according to some men, often can eventually lead to actions that benefit the whole nation. As Budgell says,

> That a Boy who forms Parties, and makes himself popular in a School or a College, would act the same Part with equal Ease in a Senate or a Privy-Council; and Mr. Osburn speaking like a Man versed in the ways of the World, affirms, that the well-laying and carrying on of a Design to rob an Orchard, trains up a Youth insensibly to Caution, Secrecy and Circumspection, and fits him for Matters of greater Importance.
>
> (Spect. 313)

But Budgell goes on to say that teaching a boy "Caution, Secrecy and Circumspection" in this manner makes a "Member for a Community over-run with Artifice and Corruption." The

point of the episode seems to be that when public good and reputation conflict with private virtue, public good and reputation must take precedence.

Budgell's example of orchard robbing, though credited to Osborne, also appears in Locke, but Locke's conclusion is the reverse of Osborne's. To those parents who allow their young children to misbehave in small things Locke gives the warning that graver matters may result. In childish theft Osborne may see indications of future ability, but Locke observes the situation in a colder light. Fathers, says Locke, because they notice that active men are successful, feel that aggressive action in their sons foretells greatness. Osborne's advice is an encouragement to these fathers. For Locke, however, such parental pride is misdirected and inconsistent with the moral end of education:

> I must take liberty to say, that he that lays the foundation of his son's fortune in virtue and good breeding takes the only sure and warrantable way. And it is not the waggeries or cheats practised among school-boys, it is not their roughness one to another, nor the well-laid plots of robbing an orchard together, that make an able man; but the principles of justice, generosity and sobriety, joined with observation and industry, qualities which I judge school-boys do not learn much of one another. (Thoughts 70)

From what Budgell says, Osborne seems willing to take the risk involved in encouraging a boy in minor dishonesty in order to encourage potential leadership. Locke, on the other hand, remains constant in his view that what one does

in youth determines not only adult behavior but also whether or not the adult will be happy or unhappy. Ignoring a schoolboy jaunt is a great risk, Locke advises, for high-spirited misbehavior may spell maliciousness and vice as readily as fortune and greatness.

Instilling a clear and consistent understanding of virtue is, therefore, the most significant aim of education. Because of this aim Budgell devotes the third essay to those "Methods, by which I conceive Boys might be made to improve in Virtue, as they advance in Letters" (Spect. 337). From this essay one might surmise that Budgell was not entirely immune to the genteel tradition of anti-intellectualism Brauer believes originated in the Middle Ages. After the Restoration, Brauer says in his chapter on the intellectual aims of education, the importance of learning did not necessarily decline; but clearly the emphasis put on it by some writers, Locke among them, did decline. Primarily, he says, "the fashionable antipathy toward learning" was in part the result of "the relationship between learning and pedantry."[6] It is not enough, says Budgell, for a student to understand his Latin and Greek lessons or to do "the usual Exercises, as they are called in the School-phrase" (Spect. 337). Instead the students should be able—in fact

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[6]Ibid., p. 52 ff.

encouraged—to give "their Opinion of such an Action or Saying, and obliged to give their Reasons why they take it to be good or bad." Similarly, instead of mere grammar and copying, the student "should be tasked once or twice a Week to write down his Opinion of such Persons and Things as occur to him in his Reading." Such work "would soon strengthen his Judgment in what is blamable or praiseworthy, and give him an early seasoning of Morality." It would seem that seeking knowledge which does not function in social or financial spheres is wasted effort.

The last essay in Budgell's series on the education of youth proposes several ideas designed to give the students "a right Turn for the World, and enable them to make their Way in it" (Spect. 353). Here Budgell exhibits the same suspicion of pedantry that appears in the third essay. Learning, he argues, has one of two functions

> either to render a Man an agreeable Companion to himself, and to teach him to support Solitude with Pleasure; or, if he is not born to an Estate, to supply that Defect, and furnish him with the Means of acquiring one.
>
> (Spect. 353)

Budgell goes on to say that "The one [educates himself] to raise himself a Fortune, the other to set off that which he is already possessed of." It is the education of the second sort of man that is too often neglected by educators, for as the first essay laments, too many unqualified students are

subjected to academic educations that serve only to frustrate them and force them into occupations for which they are by nature unsuited. Taking The Spectator's usual reformist rather than descriptive stance, Budgell says,

> The Fault therefore of our Grammar-Schools is, that every Boy is pushed on to Works of Genius; whereas it would be far more advantageous for the greatest part of them to be taught such little practical Arts and Sciences as do not require any great Share of Parts to be Master of them, and yet may come often into Play during the course of a Man's Life.
>
> (Spect. 353)

Budgell's thoughts in these four essays touch on a number of general topics, but they all are practical in a way that the eighteenth century would have found acceptable. Especially admired would be the insistence on matching education with the student's ability, or "nature." Locke, too, accepted this idea, saying,

> There is, it is visible, great variety in men's understandings, and their natural constitutions put so wide a difference between some men in this respect, that art and industry would never be able to master, and their very natures seem to want a foundation to raise on it that which other men easily attain unto. Amongst men of equal education there is great inequality of parts.
>
> (Conduct 2)

Elsewhere, he adds that his thoughts are far from conclusive because generalizations about education cannot treat all the possibilities of human nature:

> The variety is so great, that it would require a volume; nor would that reach it. Each man's mind

> has some peculiarity, as well as his face, that distinguishes him from all others; and there are possibly scarce two children who can be conducted by exactly the same method.
>
> (Thoughts 216)

This correlation, however, like that of form and function, may often cripple the student's development by leading him to conclude in the face of a difficult task that a particular subject is profitless or that he has no talent for it. Anticipating the possibility of this danger, both Locke and, if the intentions to improve the readership might serve as demonstration, Mr. Spectator believe that most men can do more to improve themselves then they do at present:

> I think there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment, which are overlooked and wholly neglected. And it is easy to perceive that men are guilty of a great many faults in the exercise and improvement of this faculty of the mind [understanding], which hinder them in their progress, and keep them in ignorance and error all their lives.
>
> (Conduct of Understanding 2)

Furthermore, this correlation, with its disproportionate emphasis on action, can lead, as it seems to do with Osborne's conclusion, to emotional and moral corruption. The popular psychologist Rollo May in his study of aggression reflects on the vital relation between action and self-identity, saying that one cannot be adequately maintained without the other. But, he continues, action without reflection creates violence and uncivilized, maladjusted behavior.[7]

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[7]Rollo May, Power and Innocence (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 19-75 passim.

Budgell's essays maintain a reformist's tone when they treat this corruption: they warn against private education and ignorant tutors, and they condemn pedantry and support the individual's responsibility to the well-being of the nation. But this limited and immediate advice seems secondary to the moral standards that Budgell expects of the students and in which Mr. Spectator instructs his readers. Though only one of Budgell's essays is directly concerned with fostering virtue in the child, they all, like most of The Spectator essays, have virtue as a secondary or implied subject. As we have seen, Mr. Spectator shows his readers the way to virtue—that is, to ultimate pleasure—and the avoidance of vice—which is ultimate pain. In a role roughly analagous to that of Father, Mr. Spectator guides his reading "children" down a path that though often seeming unattractive is the only true and right way to human happiness. The child must learn to trust his parents and teachers, knowing that though he finds a task difficult he must not for his own sake abandon it. He must on trust accept the fact that his frustrating and laborious way to understanding and virtue has its eventual rewards.

The first 146 sections of Some Thoughts Concerning Education deal for the most part with establishing in the student the physical and emotional conditions that would best enable him to receive the lessons in behavior and

academic subjects. Locke proposes that the training of children begin in the cradle, for the impressionable mind of an infant can be easily swayed to what are bad habits. The parents of an infant succumbing to their "natural affections," may "think they may safely enough indulge [the child's] little irregularities, and make themselves sport with that pretty perverseness, which they think well enough becomes that innocent age" (Thoughts 34). When an indulged child is an adult, "that pretty perverseness" implanted by his parents becomes, much to their regret, so deeply instilled that it cannot be driven out. A parent cannot, Locke rightly insists, expect a selfish and obstinate child to grow into a man who is kind and generous, for how the first is treated determines how the second behaves.

The first duty of a parent, then, is to demonstrate to his child that his desires are not always indulged. As Locke says,

> If therefore I might be heard, I would advise, that, contrary to the ordinary way, children should be used to submit their desires, and go without their longings, even from their cradles. The first thing they should learn to know, should be, that they were not to have anything, because it pleased them, but because it was thought fit for them. If things suitable to their wants were supplied to them, so that they were never suffered to have what they once cried for, they would learn to be content without it; would never with bawling and peevishness contend for mastery; nor be half so uneasy to themselves and others as they are, because from the first beginning they are not thus handled. If they were never suffered to obtain their desire by the impatience

> they expressed for it, they would no more cry for other things than they do for the moon.
> (Thoughts 38)

So it is that what a child receives from his world is what the concerned parent believes the child needs. The parent first governs his child through fear and awe, and in later years, with love and friendship (Thoughts 40-42). A child should not, however, be taught fear and awe through beatings, but through private chastisement and by rewards given in public. Especially should rewards be given when a child performs some action which is not naturally pleasurable to him. Rewards for actions which the child enjoys or which he would do with no encouragement serve merely to encourage him in the indulgence of personal cravings (Thoughts 43-62). If, however, the child performs some action he abhors but which is necessary to his education and for developing his sense of morality, then a reward demonstrates to him the true nature of pleasure and pain: that virtuous actions, though they may seem difficult and even punishing, give more and lasting happiness than the pursuit of hollow self-gratification of immediate desires.

At the basis of Locke's view of the treatment of the young child and infant lies the idea of self-denial, that there is more to a successful and happy life than individual cravings. Denial of self determines happiness because the man who is able to resist giving in to his whims is a

pleasant companion to others; other people are content with him and he is content with himself. Delight and uneasiness, Locke has said (Essay II. vii. 2), are the motivating forces in all human activities; but some actions, though not pleasurable to the uninformed or the malformed mind, are necessary to the orderly progress of personal and national life. A child, for example, may not want to give up one of his toys to a companion, but generosity must be encouraged. When a child denies himself his own pleasures, he should be praised. He will see that the act of self-denial brings him the smiles of his parents and a deepened friendship of his companion. Though he might have been happy himself by keeping the toy, he must be brought to realize that he will get even greater happiness by eschewing a selfish pleasure. Those humans not encouraged to self-denial as children cause misery as adults, as one of Mr. Spectator's correspondents indicates. A man writes in to complain of a wife whose expenses on her "accomplishments"—dancing, sewing, painting, foreign languages, and the like—cause him financial difficulty (Spect. 328). The fault of the wife's extravagances may be laid on her being "the only Child and darling Care of an indulgent Mother" (Spect. 328). The seeds sown by the mother bear fruit that reduce the husband to "the most anxious miserable Man of Earth" (Spect. 328).

It is, of course, on the parents that the initial burden of educating the child falls. It is the parents who give the child his first lessons in self-denial and who serve as the child's first example of virtuous behavior. In his educational writings, as elsewhere, Locke holds closer to example than to words as the most effective way to teach. "Virtues and vices," he addresses the father, "can by no words be so plainly set before their understandings, as the actions of other men will show them" (Thoughts 82). Locke continues,

> This is a method to be used, not only whilst they are young, but to be continued, even as long as they shall be under another's tuition or conduct. Nay, I know not whether it be the best way to be used by a father, as long as he shall think fit, on any occasion, to reform anything he wishes mended in his son; nothing sinking so gently and so deep, into men's minds, as example.
>
> (Thoughts 82)

So it is that through his example the weakness and strength of a parent are taught his child, and any parent who wishes his child to be virtuous must first himself be virtuous. Furthermore, the example set by parents should not only be moral but consistent. A child must not be punished for one dishonest act and complacently admired for another. Similarly, the parents must not expect to indulge themselves in an action while denying it in their child. To the father Locke says,

> If anything 'scape you, which you would have pass for a fault in him, he will be sure to shelter himself under your example, and how then you will be able to come at him, to correct it in the right way, I do not easily see. And if you will punish him for it, he cannot look on it as a thing which reason condemns, since you practise it; but he will be apt to interpret it the peevishness and arbitrary imperiousness of a father, which, without any ground for it, would deny his son the liberty and pleasures he takes himself.
>
> (Thoughts 71)

In short, says Steele,

> It is not only paying Wages, and giving Commands, that Constitutes a Master of a Family; but Prudence, equal Behaviour, with readiness to Protect and Cherish them, is what entitles a Man to that Character in their very Hearts and Sentiments.
>
> (Spect. 202)

The essayist concludes that "All Superiority which is not founded on Merit and Virtue, is supported only by Artifice and Stratagem" (Spect. 202).

The father should not, however, in his desire to give the impression of virtue become stiff and cold. As his child matures, the father should admit him more and more into his company as a friend and, depending on the nature of the child himself, speak to him less and less in a tone that implies command or authority (Thoughts 97). Locke says that he cannot but see some wrong in fathers "who love their sons very well, but so order the matter, by a constant stiffness, and a mien of authority and distance to them all their lives, as if they were never to enjoy or have any comfort from those

they love best in the world, till they had lost them by being removed into another" (Thoughts 96). In his own observation of one father and son, Mr. Spectator lays the fault of the son's mismanaged life on "a certain Severity and Distance which his Father used towards him" (Spect. 192).

A number of letters sent to Mr. Spectator bear witness, in fact, to the misery caused by overly strict parents. Such parents are worse than those who are negligent, for they are unnatural. "Of all Hardness of Heart," writes Addison, "there is none so inexcusable as that of Parents towards their Children." Any man, he continues, who is able to live without feeling natural tenderness for his child

> debases his Mind even below Brutality, frustrates, as much as in him lies, the great Design of Providence, and strikes out of his Nature one of the most Divine Principles that is planted in it.
> (Spect. 181)

One of these letters is from a boy whose father constantly complains of the cost of schooling. The boy is an interested and capable scholar, but he is fearful whenever he must ask his father for another book. He concludes his letter by asking Mr. Spectator to

> perswade Parents to encourage their Children when they find them diligent and desirous of Learning. I have heard some Parents say, they would to any Thing for their Children, is they would but mind their Learning. I would be glad to be in their Place.
> (Spect. 330)

The father of this boy is not unlike the mother in Spectator 364 who exaggerates her son's abilities. Both parents frustrate their children, and through their powers as adults and parents lead their children to lives not of their own making and not of their own desiring.

In his commentary on another letter, Mr. Spectator observes that "The Obedience of Children to their Parents is the Basis of all Government, and set forth as the measure of that Obedience which we owe to those whom Providence hath placed over us" (Spect. 189). Even so, he adds, the tenderness of parent to child is more important to the survival of the species than duty of child to parent. It is human nature, he concludes,

> that the receiving of Favors should be a less Inducement to Good-will, Tenderness and Commiseration, than the conferring of them; and that the taking Care of any Person should endear the Child or Dependant more to the Parent or Benefactor, than the Parent or Benefactor to the Child or Dependant. (Spect. 189)

Closely woven into the father's desire for a virtuous son is his natural satisfaction in seeing his own life and his own values continued by the next generation. But only when the father is amiable and willing to admit his son into his confidence as someone more than an unwilling dependent can the father hope for the son to recognize the value of the father's style of life and adopt it for his own. Obviously, no good man wants his son to be a scoundrel, and

to avoid that eventuality he must give considerable attention to the education that ensures continuity of accepted virtues. "It is very natural," says Steele,

> for a Man of a kind Disposition to amuse himself with the Promises his Imagination makes to him of the future Condition of his Children, and to represent to himself the Figure they shall bear in the World after he has left it. When his Prospects of this Kind are agreeable, his Fondness gives as it were a longer Date to his own Life; and the Survivorship of a worthy Man to his Son, is a Pleasure scarce inferior to the Hopes of the Continuance of his own Life.
>
> (Spect. 192)

So it is that a virtuous son stands as a blessing and a memorial to his father; and through the example of the father and the father's efforts, the virtues admired by the community are propagated.

The many dangers along the way to virtue and its attendant happiness may be avoided with the instruction of a good parent. Without such instruction, unhappiness is inevitable. In fact, to Mr. Spectator the responsibilities of a parent are so great that almost the whole of a child's life is of his making. Quite unequivocally Steele says that "The Calamities of Children are due to the Negligence and Misconduct of Parents, those of Age to the past Life, which led to it" (Spect. 431). To illustrate the truth of his fearsome statement, Steele publishes letters from a newly wedded couple, both of whom were abused in some way by their parents. The bridegroom's father so feared his son's

becoming spoiled by an excess of pleasure that he denied his son all pleasures entirely. In school the father instructed the son's masters to treat him severely and without regard to his great estate. At the university, the son lived "in scandalous Poverty and Want" (Spect. 431). When it came time for the young man to marry, he chose his bride because he could not be worse off with her than he was with his father. One might wonder how a child will react if after having always been denied the smallest pleasure he suddenly discovers that the source of his torment is removed. The father's genial declaration that his son "may speak to him like another Gentleman" seems to come too late to be effective. Locke's advice is that the softening relationship between father and son be gradual, coming by degrees as the son matures; the father in Steele's example expects too sudden a change in an attitude that he himself has cultivated through his son's first twenty-one years.

For her part, the bride was not allowed contact with the public for many years and, in consequence, "grew tall and wild" (Spect. 431). In her isolation from her mother and from proper company, she took to a long series of bad habits: eating trash, chewing oatmeal, crunching on dirty tobacco pipes, licking chalk, nibbling on wax, munching coal, and swallowing bits of gravel from the drive. These habits, not only unseemly, were detrimental to her health, and the

once plump, rosy-cheeked girl became a half starved skeleton. When accused of neglect by the girl's father, the governess assured him that the orders from the mother insisted that the girl was never to be crossed in her desires. In being denied nothing she craved, this child did serious injury to herself; had Locke's injunction against indulgence been heeded, this bride would not have had to look back on her youth with such melancholy.

Another letter, this one from a father pleased with his son, supports Mr. Spectator's and Locke's view that the father's function is to see that what is best in his life is duplicated in his son's. "I am," the father begins, "the happy Father of a very towardly Son, in whom I do not only see my Life, but also my Manner of Life, renewed" (Spect. 263). The father, of course, is delighted with his child, but he says that more importantly his child's good behavior strengthens the bonds between other parents and children:

> I will be bold to say, my Son has, by the Applause and Approbation which his Behavior towards me has gained him, occasioned that many an old Man, besides my self, has rejoiced. Other Men's Children follow the Example of mine, and I have the inexpressable Happiness of over-hearing our Neighbors, as we ride by, point to their Children, and say with a Voice of Joy, There they go.
>
> (Spect. 263)

The influence of virtue, spreading beyond those people immediately involved, acts as a positive factor on others, who in turn serve as examples to still others. So it is

that Mr. Spectator's correspondent can add another example to the many that insist that what occurs within the family unit has a profound effect on the fortunes of the nation: "The Power and Subjection between [father and son] when broken, make them more emphatically Tyrants and Rebels against each other, with greater Cruelty of Heart than the Disruption of States and Empires can possibly produce" (Spect. 263). The circle spreads wider and wider, increasing with each outward step the individual's burden of responsibility, until it becomes clear that all human endeavors are bound together by the family and the family's obligatory function to prepare the next generation.

In fulfilling their obligations, however, parents are not to destroy their children's natural inclinations. Rather, they are to direct these inclinations into proper, morally acceptable channels. The mind of a child, says Steele, is as disposed to cultivation as plants in a garden. Neglecting the plants causes poor growth and the incursion of weeds. Proper cultivation, on the other hand, produces leaves, flowers, and eventually fruit. "And these Fruits," he continues, "when they arrive at a just Maturity, and are of a good kind, afford the most vigorous Nourishment to the Minds of Men" (Spect. 455). Though one seldom finds "a Plant vigorous enough, to have (like an Orange-Tree) at once beautiful shining Leaves, fragrant Flowers, and delicious

Fruit," the cultivation of all types of plants, like the proper cultivation of all types of minds, should be pursued if a successful garden is to be had. Just as the nature of a plant is not to be perverted by the gardener, the passions of men are not to be warped. As Mr. Spectator says of religion and philosophy, the purpose of education is "not so much to extinguish our Passions, as to regulate and direct them to valuable well-chosen Objects" (Spect. 224).

Ambition, for example, is one trait Mr. Spectator believes all men share; the only difference is that some men aspire to ends more refined than others. Ambition, however, "is frequently perverted to evil and ignoble Purposes; so that we may account for many of the Excellencies and Follies of Life upon the same innate Principle, to wit, the Desire of being remarkable" (Spect. 224). This desire is supplied by nature, but in human society what nature instills cannot, for fear of misdirection, be allowed to develop by chance. It is, therefore, through education that the "general Appetite for Glory" is directed "to this or that particular Object."

Man, as a natural creature endowed with certain crude and unformed passions and abilities, must not be allowed to be only what nature made him. He is, as we have seen, a plant, but one needing cultivation. He is also, in another analogy, "like Marble in the Quarry, which shews none of its inherent Beauties, till the Skill of the Polisher

fetches out the Colours, makes the Surface shine, and discovers every ornamental Cloud, Spot and Vein that runs thro' the Body of it" (Spect. 215). Nature covers man's soul with "Vice, Ignorance and Prejudice" but though "Discourse of Morality, and Reflection upon human Nature, are the best Means we can make use of to improve our Minds." The readers of The Spectator are further warned that "strange Disorders are bred in the Minds of those Men whose Passions are not regulated by Virtue, and disciplined by Reason." Though this picture of human nature may appear repulsive, nowhere in The Spectator or in Locke's writings is it conclusive. Over and again both put emphasis not so much on what man is like in his natural crudeness as on what he may be, that is, on his potential to become something greater than what he is at present.

On the road to virtue and reason, however, a child may encounter more than irresponsible parents; he may have to contend with ignorant and cruel schoolmasters. "Many of these stupid Tyrants," Steele says of these masters, "exercise their Cruelty without any Manner of Distinction of the Capacities of Children, or the Intention of Parents in their Behalf" (Spect. 157). He continues by saying that

> we have so many Hundred unaccountable Creatures every Age whipped up into great Scholars, that are for ever near a right Understanding, and will never

> arrive at it. These are the Scandal of Letters, and these are generally the Men who are to teach others. (Spect. 157)

Though these incompetent men believe "the Sufferings of the Scholar's Body are to rectify the Mistakes of his Mind," Steele maintains "that no Boy who will not be allured to Letters without Blows will ever be brought to any thing with them."

Steele's essay provoked a letter from a man who has been some time out of school but who clearly remembers the schoolmaster who terrified his childhood. In dramatic fashion he writes,

> Many a white and tender Hand, which the fond Mother has passionately kiss'd a thousand and a thousand Times, have I seen whipped till it was covered with Blood: perhaps for smiling, or for going a Yard and half out of a Gate, or for writing an O for an A, or an A for an O: These were our great Faults! Many a brave and noble Spirit has been there broken; others have run from thence and were never heard of afterwards. (Spect. 168)

Thus the function of education is perverted and the great goal of happiness through knowledge and virtue is missed. With the proper sort of teacher, Mr. Spectator's correspondent concludes, "We might then possibly see Learning become a Pleasure, and Children delighting themselves in that, which now they abhor for coming upon such hard Terms to them" (Spect. 168).

Following this letter is another, this one from a young man whose teacher contrasts sharply with that of the older man. This fourteen-year-old boy praises his master by saying that "From the Gentleman's great Tenderness to me and Friendship to my Father, I am very happy in learning my Book with Pleasure" (Spect. 168). As he should, according to Locke's suggestions, the boy's teacher guides his scholars with kindness rather than with corporal punishment. He has so ingratiated himself that, his students say, "We think it the greatest Punishment in the World when he will not speak to any of us" (Spect. 168).

Though this portrait is not drawn at length, the reader may conclude that the boy's teacher is the sort Locke had in mind when he wrote Thoughts Concerning Human Understanding:

> The great work of a governor is to fashion the carriage, and form the mind; to settle in his pupil good habits, and the principles of virtue and wisdom; to give him by little and little, a view of mankind; and work him into a love and imitation of what is excellent and praiseworthy; and in the prosecution of it, to give him vigour, activity, and industry. The studies which he sets him upon, are but, as it were, the exercises of his faculties, and employment of his time, to keep him from sauntering and idleness, to teach him application, and accustom him to take pains, and to give him some little taste of what his own industry must perfect. For who expects, that under a tutor a young gentleman should be an accomplished critic, orator, or logician; go to the botton of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or mathematics; or be a master in history or chronology? Though something of each of these is to be taught

> him: but it is only to open the door, that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an acquaintance, but not to dwell there . . . . But of good breeding, knowledge of the world, virtue, industry, and a love of reputation, he cannot have too much: and if he have these, he will not long want what he needs or desires of the other.
>
> (Thoughts 94)

We can see in this description that such traits as cruelty have no place in the attempt to form a virtuous man, that a certain lack of perfection is to be tolerated, especially in a child, and that the tutor is to instill a particular attitude toward a life whose aim is happiness and goodness more than intellectual ability and financial prosperity. The tutor who, in his insistence that lessons be given precedence over right action, falls short of Locke's ideal and fails to some degree to live up to his responsibility to his students and to his nation. In the hands of parents and tutors is the responsibility of a child's future happiness, and while he may still be susceptible to influence, they form the values the child will have through his life.

It seems clear enough that to Locke and Mr. Spectator education is primarily a matter of training in behavior and that the success or failure of a man's education is determined by how well attitude and action coincide to make him a man of industry, good cheer, and kindness. To neither spectator nor philosopher, however, are academic affairs to

be discounted entirely. Putting learning last, says Locke, "will seem strange in the mouth of a bookish man" (Thoughts 147), but

> When I consider what a-do is made about a little Latin and Greek, how many years are spent in it, and what a noise and business it makes to no purpose, I can hardly forbear thinking that the parents of children still live in fear of the school-master's rod, which they look on as the only instrument of education; as a language or two to be its whole business.
>
> (Thoughts 147)

Greek and Latin, Locke adds elsewhere, are necessary knowledge only for a scholar; and if later in life a man should want to learn Greek, "he will then easily get that tongue himself" (Thoughts 195). Latin, however, is, as Locke says, "absolutely necessary to a gentleman" (Thoughts 163). The objection the philosopher makes to Latin comes from the technique often used to teach it—beatings. Instead of the method of corporal punishment, parents should hire for the son's instruction a man who speaks Latin to "talk constantly to him" (Thoughts 166). Or as an alternative, the child may be taught "by taking some easy and pleasant book, such as Aesop's Fables, and writing the English translation (made as literal as it can be) in one line, and the Latin words . . . just over it in another" (Thoughts 167). With these languages, as with all learning, a tutor

> should remember, that his business is not so much to teach [his student] all that is knowable, as to

> raise in him a love and esteem of knowledge; and to put him in the right way of knowing and improving himself, when he has a mind to it.
>
> (Thoughts 195)

Learning, Locke thus allows, is a necessary but not the primary business of education. One has only to understand that a virtuous and wise man is valued above the scholar to realize the true place of learning in life.

Nevertheless, the extensive use of modern and classical writers in The Spectator and in Locke's essays proclaims how valuable learning was to the men who produced the essays. Examples from history abound, and epigrams from learned men open each issue. In short, to read The Spectator is to receive an education in academics as well as in practicalities. All of these learned allusions, however, are seldom used for their own sake. Instead, they appear as supportive illustrations for other points. Reading of the weaknesses of great men, writes Addison after relating an anecdote of Tully and Brutus, can give "a Man a thorough Insight into his Personal Character, and illustrate several Passages in the History of his Life" (Spect. 562). Elsewhere Budgell defends the periodical against those men who say that The Spectator has "prostituted Learning to the Embraces of the Vulgar" (Spect. 379). In his answer, he declares that a responsible man must communicate what he knows in order to

improve the quality of the lives around him. The detractors are told that

> There is certainly no more sensible Pleasure to a good-natured Man, than if he can by any Means gratify or inform the Mind of another. I might add, that this Virtue naturally carries its own Reward along with it, since it is almost impossible it should be exercised without the improvement of the Person who Practices it. The reading of Books, and the daily Occurrences of Life, are continually furnishing us with Matter for Thought and Reflection.
> (Spect. 379)

The danger that Locke and Mr. Spectator see in academics is the possible degeneration of learning into pedantry, learning divorced from a virtuous pursuit of happiness and the reasonable negotiation of daily life. The pedant that they despised closely resembles Ogden Nash's Professor Twist:

> I give you now Professor Twist,
> A conscientious scientist.
> Trustees exclaimed, "He never bungles!"
> And sent him off to distant jungles.
> Camped on a tropic riverside,
> One day he missed his loving bride.
> She had, the guide informed him later,
> Been eaten by an alligator.
> Professor Twist could not but smile.
> "You mean," he said, "a crocodile."

The bookish man, writes Mr. Spectator is an essay concerned with different kinds of pedants, can talk of nothing but his books and "is a very indifferent Companion" (Spect. 105). He is the one who "does not know how to think out of his Profession, and particular way of Life." Mr. Spectator continues that the worst sort of bookish pedant is "endued

with a very small Share of common Sense" and he has "read a great number of Books without Taste or Distinction." "Shallow Pedants," the essay concludes,

> cry up one another much more than Men of solid and useful Learning. To read the Titles they give an Editor, or Collator of a Manuscript, you would take him for the Glory of the Common-Wealth of Letters, and the Wonder of his Age; when perhaps upon Examination you find that he has only Rectify'd a Greek Particle, or laid out a whole Sentence in proper Commas.
>
> (Spect. 105)

Even so, pedantry may glitter enough to impress the ignorant, to make them think that what they hear is real learning. In explaining the epigrams that introduce his essays, Mr. Spectator facetiously compares himself with the two rural ministers

> who endeavoured which should outshine one another, and draw together the greatest Congregation. One of them being well versed in the Fathers, used to quote every now and then a Latin Sentence to his Illiterate Hearers, who it seems found themselves so edified by it, that they flocked in greater Numbers to this Learned Man, than to his Rival.
>
> (Spect. 221)

The rival's congregation dwindled with each passing Sunday until he discovered the secret of the other minister's success and resolved to out-Latin the competition. To this end

> he digested into his Sermons the whole Book of Quae Genus, adding however such Explications to it as he thought might be for the Benefit of his People. He afterwards entered upon As in praesenti, which he converted in the same manner to the Use of his

> Parishioners. This in a very little time thickned his Audience, filled his Church, and routed his Antagonist.
>
> (Spect. 221)

It is concluded that since the "natural Love of Latin . . . is so prevalent in our common People" a little well-placed learning along with a willingness to be agreeable does no harm to business.

II. EDUCATION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

Man, as The Spectator emphasizes, is a creature of social habit whose strength and weakness are as much the result of interaction with other men as they are of personal will. In fact, though Locke indicates that the individual may change himself for the better through his own determination (Essay II.xxi), the individual cannot utimately—in fact, in many cases should not—improve himself without some encouragement either directly from other people or indirectly by observing the behavior of others. It seems clear enough from Locke and The Spectator that the errors of an improper education may be corrected if the individual desires the change, but it is just as clear that someone else must point the way to change, must serve as a model of what the individual wants to become. In a Christian society the ultimate model is, of course, Christ. But to the moderate sensibilities of Locke and Mr. Spectator, though Christ is

an ideal, any human attempt to be Christ-like must fail on the grounds that human beings simply lack the emotional and moral faculties necessary for such an imitation. Human beings, in other words, are best served by human models. Just as Locke emphasizes that children must not be expected to be accomplished in arts, sciences, or virtue, Mr. Spectator in his encouragement to his readers tells them that they defeat themselves if they set unreasonable goals, goals that lie beyond their intellectual and emotional abilities. Thus, parents and teachers have the duty to ensure that the children in their charge do not need so much to change as to improve themselves, building as adults on the foundation prepared for them when they were young. If the foundation of a life should be weak, an adult may still find models that guide him to the sort of person he wants to be. Though parents and teachers often fail as guides, a man may find someone else to serve, though not so well perhaps, in their stead. This substitute parent may be a spouse, a friend, or even a fiction such as Mr. Spectator.

Consideration of The Spectator shows that the vices discussed are almost all the result of Locke's three major faults of education: indulgence, neglect, and severity. These faults become vices in themselves: indulgence of a child, for example, is a vice for it eventually causes unhappiness both to the child and the parent. All three

faults, furthermore, serve as bad examples to any who may observe and imitate them. Similarly, the virtues of kindness, generosity, unselfishness, and industry in a man are the result of having admired those virtues elsewhere. In emphasizing the social nature of man, The Spectator clearly demonstrates how the happiness of virtue and the misery of vice proliferate. The virtues that come of one man's imitation of another serve to educate those men and women with whom he comes in contact.

Though man is naturally drawn to contact with his kind, the proper manner of living in society must be taught, his natural instincts refined and tempered just as his uncultivated passions must be adjusted. The result of Mr. Spectator's efforts to reform social behavior are the essays which demonstrate that immoral action is the result of indulgence, neglect, and severity in the individual and that these vices were acquired through his education; moreover, and worse, the individual transfers these vices to others. Also he demonstrates that the virtues of generosity, kindness, unselfishness, and industry are acquired by means of limitation of proper models.

To a mind disposed to elevate action over thought, perhaps the greatest fault is sloth, or what Locke calls "sauntering." Locke says that this

> lazy, listless humour, that idly dreams away the days, if of all others the least to be indulged, or permitted in young people. It is the proper state of one sick, and out of order in his health, and is tolerable in nobody else, of what age or condition soever.
>
> (Thoughts 208)

The danger of idleness is twofold: first, it undermines health, for as Locke says, a good mind without health functions poorly (Thoughts 29); second, "sauntering" indicates "an indifferency for future things" and "may be attributed to a want of foresight and want of desire" (Thoughts 126). An absence of desire seems to spell an inability to improve because ability, in Locke's view, is attendant on the will. Furthermore, neglect of the future, either national or personal, indicates a serious lack of responsibility, a flaw in national unity and vigor. In all, Locke's arguments for activity center, as do his ideas of virtue, on the two charges of self-improvement and social benefit.

Mr. Spectator, too, advances the necessity for physical action. Though he generally disapproves of hunting as an over-indulged pastime of stupid squires, he says that exercise is necessary for "The Preservation of Health, and keeping all the Organs of the Soul in a Condition to execute her Orders" (Spect. 116). After citing Pascal's scorn of activity, the essayist concludes that "Had that incomparable Person . . . been a little more indulgent to himself in this Point, the World might possibly have enjoyed him much longer."

More serious than undermining health, however, is the moral weakness inherent in idleness. A letter to Mr. Spectator from "Samuel Slack" avows that "Indolence is a Stream which flows slowly on, but yet undermines the Foundation of every Virtue" (Spect. 316). "And it is to no Purpose," he continues, "to have within one the Seeds of a thousand good Qualities, if we want the Vigour and Resolution necessary for the exerting them." In a similar vein, Steele in an earlier essay asks,

> Would it not employ a Beau prettily enough, if instead of eternally playing with a Snuff-Box, he spent some part of his Time in making one? Such a Method as this would very much conduce to the publick Emolument, by making every Man Living good for something.
>
> (Spect. 43)

As an active principle like education itself, virtue cannot be locked into abstractions. Though poor health may be a personal calamity, failure to be more than one is or to be less than one should be is a social disgrace; and because idleness means missing opportunities for happiness, it implies unhappiness and vice.

Sloth may also directly be a vice, for the idle may "lye as a Burden on the Species, and be the only useless Parts of the Creation" (Spect. 583). Labor and industry are obligations of all men, says Mr. Spectator, and one activity that benefits both individual and posterity is planting trees. Planting, he says, is one of the works of man that

increases in worth with the passage of time, whereas all others begin their decay the moment they are complete. Furthermore, planting has a moral motive: it arises "from the Love which we ought to have for our Country, and the Regard which we ought to bear to our Posterity" (Spect. 583). The man who plants trees is akin to the father who teaches his son virtue and sees his own values continued after his lifetime has passed. The man who donates his efforts to the land improves all and makes himself, his neighbors, and his nation stronger; and the beneficiaries are the same when he makes himself the virtuous father of virtuous sone. Mr. Spectator's example of planting demonstrates how pervasive was the cult of action, and how he encouraged his readers to see even their most passing actions in social terms, to see how each man is the keeper of all others.

Keeping other men, however, hardly means doling out money to street beggars, for to do so is no more than an indulgence that discourages improvement. To hand out money to a common beggar, Sir Andrew Freeport lectures Mr. Spectator, is to hire him to sit still, to pay him "the Wages of Idleness" (Spect. 232). This rather harsh view is modified somewhat by Sir Andrew's theory that idle beggars should be employed and that in the form of employment charity toward them would be shown. Beggars, because they contribute nothing to society, little deserve the compassion of men who,

like Sir Andrew, make their own way and leave the world more prosperous than they found it. No good comes of charity to the unproductive, says Mr. Spectator, and those "christian and tender Minds" who give into pleas "in the Name of Heaven and all that is sacred" support men whose conditions are never relieved (Spect. 232).

Though compassion is a great virtue, a man must use his reason to determine worthy recipients. To give indiscriminately to all who appear to be in need is inappropriate, for "could there be a more cruel Piece of Railery upon a Man who should have reduced his Fortune below the Capacity of acting according to his natural Temper, than to say of him, That Gentleman was generous" (Spect. 346). Instead, generosity, having as "its Basis and Support Frugality," should work "in a Man from the Convictions of Reason, not from the Impulses of Passion." Generosity, we might conclude, is part of man's social responsibility, but this responsibility extends only to those who, in being aided, may in their turn aid others. As the charitable man acts morally, denying himself in order to give happiness to others, the recipient of his bounty must perform the same moral action, A beggar, whose need is never diminished, can never respond to charity with charity; the mutually supportive parts of a harmonious society are weakened by his endless poverty, and the example of his life cannot teach virtue.

Likewise, one must use reason to determine that not all action is admirable. Mr. Spectator recommends that work and rest must succeed one another so that "neither becomes a Habit, or takes Possession of the whole Man; nor is it possible he should be surfeited with either" (Spect. 232). Idleness, then, is not in itself a vice; prolonged or habitual idleness is. Work, too, though generally desired, is not always a virtue. "The Busie World," The Spectator's readers are told, "may be divided into the Virtuous and the Vicious: The Vicious again into the Covetous, the Ambitious, and the Sensual" (Spect. 624). Idleness is dismissed as inferior to both virtuous and vicious, and of the two active types less effort is necessary to be virtuous. Referring to the struggles of both moral and immoral lives, Mr. Spectator hopes to persuade his readers that in goodness they lose nothing (Spect. 624). Though "Man is made an active Being," he must be cautious in performing the right action, an action that is moral and one that is improving rather than one that merely gives selfish pleasure.

One pleasure that affords considerable personal satisfaction and, in spite of arguments to the contrary, fulfills social obligations is benevolence. In developing his ideas on this virtue, Henry Grove stresses the dual nature of man, saying,

> Man may be considered in two Views, as a Reasonable, and as a Sociable Being; capable of becoming himself either happy or miserable, and of contributing to the Happiness or Misery of his Fellow-Creatures.
> (Spect. 588)

The reasonable part of man's nature, as pointed out in Spectator 232, demands that charity be productive. At the same time, however, a too-ready watch over self-concern is unacceptable when the goal is social harmony. Without tempering by benevolence, Grove is able to conclude, "Self-Love . . . would quickly run all Things into a State of War and Confusion" (Spect. 588).

Locke, too, finds human duality a ready explanation for the necessity of teaching generosity. Training in liberality, he argues, "will make brothers and sisters kinder and civiller to one another, and consequently to others" (Thoughts 110). What is more, such training, bringing "a return of kindness, both from those that receive it, and those who look on," flatters the child's natural desire for good reputation. Eventually, "good-nature may be settled in [children] into a habit, and they may take pleasure, and pique themselves in being kind, liberal, and civil to others" (Thoughts 110). The virtues of kindness, liberality, and civility, though significant above all in achieving social harmony—as idleness and selfish indulgence breed disunity—must be fostered with care. Though he may be drawn to his fellows, man's inclinations to dominance and

his reasonable insistence on self-preservation make training in these areas a matter of vital interest in all nations that would be called civilized.

The social difficulties experienced by many of the characters in The Spectator are the product of uncivilized desire for dominance over other men, usually in some manifestation of vanity. The idle man may rob himself of his life (Spect. 100) and productive men of their efforts (Spect. 583), but the vain man, the man who indulges himself, actively creates a social havoc. Of course, vanity with its physical and emotional indulgence covers so wide a range that we may with the Old Testament author cynically conclude that all human activity is ultimately vain. But not always is yielding to vain desires wrong-headed, for personal satisfaction, though possibly vain, is both necessary to human motivation and acceptable to reason. The point to consider is whether or not personal satisfaction interferes with the general happiness of society. To illustrate, The Spectator occupies its attention at one point with "Idols," those young women whose time "is wholly taken up in the Adorning" of their persons (Spect. 73). Mr. Spectator warns these women that in their efforts to attract men they neglect "those inward Ornaments which are not to be defaced by Time or Sickness." Fastidious attention to outward appearances, he leads his reader to believe, stands frustrated before the

ravages of time; the idol's efforts in dress and cosmetics must become more and more intense with every day. Even so, her attempts at ornamentation leave her no more than an aging, embittered woman. And since unhappiness is contageous, her vanity is painful to others than herself.

The story of Brunetta and Phillis is a more specific example of the dangers of this sort of vanity (Spect. 80). These two women were friends from youth, but as they matured, the neighborhood began to compare them on the point of personal beauty. Thus, a rivalry between the two old companions grew until they arrived "by natural Steps into an irreconcileable Hatred." The tale continues that

> What made their Enmity the more entertaining to all the rest of their Sex was, that in Detraction from each other neither could fall upon Terms which did not hit her self as much as her Adversary. Their Nights grew restless with Meditation of new Dresses to out-vie each other, and inventing new Devices to recall Admirers, who observed the Charms of the one rather than those of the other on the last Meeting. (Spect. 80)

Their final clash comes when Brunetta dresses her Negro maid in a petticoat made from the same fabric as Phillis's ball gown, a grand coup for Brunetta. The last the reader sees of Phillis she is "in inconsolable Despair." This story may be amusing in its excess, but it demonstrates clearly how personal vanity infects a great many people. Not only are the two women involved but the neighborhood and the men who would court them. The defeat of Phillis, moreover, would

create animosity in her supporters against Brunetta and her supporters. We might speculate that Brunetta was not able to rest on this victory, for having made her reputation as a woman of the world she must spend more time than ever maintaining that reputation. When one's strengths are founded on vanity such as Brunetta's, defeat, either from misjudgment, or approaching age, is inevitable.

Similar disruptive vanity is illustrated in the essays on male and female jilts (Spect. 187 and 288). The coquette, writes "Charles Yellow," is not so bad as the jilt, for the coquette is so enraptured with herself that she does not care for the opinions of others:

> The Coquet is indeed one degree towards the Jilt; but the Heart of the former is bent upon admiring her self, and giving false Hopes to her Lovers; but the latter is not contented to be extremely Amiable, but she must add to that Advantage a certain Delight in being a Torment to others.
>
> (Spect. 187)

Her self-indulgence makes her unproductive and disruptive for "the Happiness of a Jilt consists only in the Power of making Others uneasie" (Spect. 187). The male jilt, or "fribbler" as Mr. Spectator calls him, is not a jot better (Spect. 288). The fribbler makes his addresses to a young woman only to grow cool the minute he notices that she has become responsive. His behavior is contemptible because it reveals an ambiguous and irresolute mind. Worse still is that his attentions to a young woman make her unable to love

another; the tender feelings that promote social harmony are wrenched and perhaps even destroyed by the woman's disappointment. Both jilt and fribbler have more concern for themselves than for others, and in their manner of promising more than they are willing or able to give they express their desire to manipulate the emotions of those men and women unhappy enough to be affected by them.

A conceited insistence on self-importance becomes, however, even more serious when it prompts intellectual controversy. William Butler Yeats realized that man's opinions can devour his kindest regards and in "A Prayer for My Daughter" wrote,

> An intellectual hatred is the worst,
> So let her think opinions are accursed.
> Have I not seen the loveliest woman born
> Out of the mouth of Plenty's horn,
> Because of her opinionated mind
> Barter that horn and every good
> By quiet natures understood
> For an old bellows full of angry wind?
> (ll. 57-64)

With the same kind of bluntness, Addison speaks against the dangers of political prejudice:

> A Man must be excessively stupid, as well as uncharitable, who believes that there is no Virtue but on his own Side, and that there are not Men as honest as himself who may differ from him in political Principles. . . . Men of Virtue, though of different Interests, ought to consider themselves as more nearly united with one another, than with the vicious Part of Mankind, who embark with them in the same civil Concerns.
>
> (Spect. 243)

No better are religious ideals when carried beyond the limits of reason. Zeal in religion is motivated, in Addison's analysis, by pride, self-interest, and ill-nature. The religious zealot sets himself above those whose opinions differ from his own, thinking that he is the wiser man when in actuality his own religious principles are no more than "Matters of Opinion and Speculation" (Spect. 185). For one, the malicious man justifies interrupting the happiness of his fellowmen "by making him believe he does God a Service, whilst he is gratifying the bent of a perverse revengeful Temper. Overall, the cruelty of religious zeal, as with any opinion of intellectual superiority, may harbor the double sin of indulgence and ineffectuality:

> But when I find the Instruments [the religious zealot] works with are Racks and Gibbets, Gallies and Dungeons; when he Imprisons Men's Persons, Confiscates their Estates, Ruins their Families, and Burns the Body to save the Soul, I cannot stick to pronounce of such a one, that (whatever he may think of his Faith and Religion) his Faith is vain, and his Religion unprofitable.
>
> (Spect. 185)

This is not to say, of course, that training a child in religious devotion is discouraged, for devotion abides throughout a man's life and gives him "sublime Ideas" while it "warms and agitates the Soul more than with sensual Pleasure" (Spect. 201). But, Addison warns,

> When the Mind finds her self very much inflamed with her Devotions, whe is too much inclined to think they

> are not of her own kindling, but blown up by something Divine within her.
>
> (Spect. 201)

And so, "Enthusiasm has something in it of Madness."

In men and women—jilts, fribblers, political and religious zealots—what comes of vanity but profitless ruin on all sides? When a human being ruins another, no one benefits. And without benefit, with unhappiness attendant, runious action can only be immoral. Prejudice, that vain elevation of self over others, Locke calls "a fault and an hindrance to knowledge" as well as a "great cause of ignorance and error" (Conduct 10). Believing "that there is no Virtue but on his own Side" (Spect. 243), a man sees the mote "in his brother's eye, but never regards the beam in his own" (Conduct 10). In the face of truth a man may cling to his prejudices because he will not "plainly confess it is prejudice governs him" or because the prejudice is "some beloved presumption that he desires to rest undisturbed in" (Conduct 10). In either case, the prejudiced man cannot live harmoniously with other men because he is too interested in shoring up what he accepts as his superior wisdom to be distracted by truth and virtue.

A man's prejudices and his sense of moral superiority, both of which he may use for dominance, often lead to conscious lying. In another essay on political parties, for example, Addison wonders why

> Men of Probity, who would scorn to utter a Falsehood for their own particular Advantage, give so readily into a Lie when it becomes the Voice of their Faction, notwithstanding they are thoroughly sensible of it as such.
>
> (Spect. 507)

One reason these otherwise honorable men lie for party's sake "is the doing good to a Cause which every Party may be supposed to look upon as the most meritorious" (Spect. 507). Such a lie conforms to the principles of neither "natural Religion or Christianity," and a man should "not tell a Lie to gain any temporal Reward by it, when he should run the hazard of losing much more than it was possible for him to gain." Certainly a man who fights to impose his vain sense of supremacy on his neighbors may succeed, but always at the price of his own virtue. Again the example of Brunetta and Phillis may demonstrate how harmful an unreasonable concern for the glorification of self over the happiness of others may be.

When a man fails to consider the happiness of his fellowmen in his actions he dissolves the binding source of individual happiness—virtue. He also is ill-bred. Though reason allows each man to find his own way to happiness, reason also demands that he consider the community when he determines a course of action. This double consideration of self and others constitutes breeding as Locke explains it in Thoughts Concerning Education:

> There are two sorts of ill breeding; the one, a sheepish bashfulness; and the other, a misbecoming negligence and disrespect in our carriage; both which are avoided by duly observing this one rule, Not to think meanly of ourselves, and not to think meanly of others.
>
> (Thoughts 141)

Thinking meanly of one's self is not, Locke carefully explains, humility so much as lack of assurance, the cure of which is keeping proper company. The cure of thinking meanly of others is, first, to acquire "a disposition of the mind not to offend others" and, second, finding "the most acceptable and agreeable way of expressing that disposition" (Thoughts 143). Action is the acceptable expression of attitude:

> that general good-will and regard for all people, which makes any one have a care not to show, in his carriage, any contempt, disrespect, or neglect of them; but to express, according to the fashion and way of that country, a respect and value for them according to the rank and condition.
>
> (Thoughts 143)

The outward forms of good breeding—removing hats, bowing, and the like—are easily learned and, if children should neglect them, may be occasionally overlooked. The internal part of good breeding is more important and, thus, should occupy more of the teacher's attention.

Good or ill breeding is, then, determined by two standards: attitude and action, the second revealing the first. These standards may be illustrated by examination of two forms of ill breeding castigated by Mr. Spectator:

staring and railing, both of which reveal disrespect on the part of the starer or railer and both of which cause unhappiness in the one who is stared at or railed against. The starers are those who "without any regard to Time, Place, or Modesty, disturb large Company with their impertinent Eyes" (Spect. 20). Much of the appropriate action of men is determined by custom, but the starer believes himself unbound by the customs that demand modest behavior in public places:

> While the Generality of the World are fettered by Rules, and move by proper and just Methods, he who has no Respect to any of them, carries away the Reward due to that Propriety of Behaviour, with no other Merit, but that of having neglected it.
>
> (Spect. 20)

The starer thus sets himself above the demands of accepted forms of action and in so doing demonstrates his contempt for his fellowmen who do not. The railer, too, evades the general rule of kindness. In conversation he drops "Hints which revive what a Man has a mind to forget for ever, and deserves that all the rest of the World should" (Spect 422). The railer even more clearly than the starer ignores Locke's rule "not to think meanly of others" because he consciously neglects to consider the feelings of others:

> To say a thing which perplexes the Heart of him you speak to, or brings Blushes into his Face, is a degree of Murder; and it is, I think, an unpardonable Offence to shew a Man you do not care, whether he is pleased or displeased.
>
> (Spect. 422)

What both starer and railer lack is respect for other men. And, furthermore, though they may find mirth—that "Flash of Lightening" that "glitters for a Moment"—they lack cheerfulness which is "fix'd and permanent" (Spect. 381). The cheerful man's "imagination is always clear, and his Judgment undisturbed: His Temper is even and unruffled, whether in Action or in Solitude." So content is the cheerful man with himself that he can coexist with his kind without rancor and in harmony. His disposition "naturally produces Love and Good-will towards him;" and his affability "raises the same good Humour in those who come within his Influence." It would seem from Mr. Spectator's praise that the social virtues eventually find their origin in good cheer. And possible they do if a man finds his happiness in virtue. The cheerful man obviously delights in the company of both himself and society, and if his delight is not in callous treatment of others, he is both a virtuous man and a model of virtue.

Good and ill breeding do have, however, the common characteristic of uniting attitude with action. On the other hand, the two standards of breeding may not conjoin and the result is hypocrisy. Since one can demonstrate inward feeling only through outward show—and in regards to good breeding the show is often a matter of customary form—hypocrisy is not only a great danger to maintaining a proper

intercourse between men but also readily parades itself under the guise of sincerity. If a man is well bred because he feels true respect and value for other men, then masking one feeling with the actions of another indicates the greatest contempt.

In general, there are three types of hypocrisy: the modish, the vicious, and the unconscious. In his examination of the three, Addison writes,

> The modish Hypocrite endeavours to appear more Vicious than he really is [the vicious], kind of Hypocrite more Virtuous. The former is afraid of every thing that has the Shew of Religion in it, and would be thought engaged in many Criminal Gallantries and Amours, which he is not guilty of. The latter assumes a Face of Sanctity, and covers a Multitude of Vices under a seeming Religious Deportment.
>
> (Spect. 399)

The third sort of hypocrisy is that

> by which a Man does not only deceive the World, but very often imposes on himself; That Hypocrisie, which conceals his own Heart from him, and makes him believe he is more virtuous than he really is, and either not attend to his Vices, or mistake even his Vices for Virtues.
>
> (Spect. 399)

This third sort seems both more and less dangerous than the other two: more because a man may cuase unhappiness without knowing why or even that he does; less because unconsciousness implies that this sort of hypocrite is not beyond help, that revelation of his fault may bring about his reform. The first two types are hypocrites consciously

and, therefore, the contempt their hypocrisy indicates is overtly malicious. The third sort, however, may be a kind man who will immediately take steps to correct his vice. One way he may reform is to be cautious of

> those Actions which proceed from natural Constitution, favorite Passions, particular Education, or whatever promotes our worldly Interest or Advantage. In these and the like Cases, a Man's Judgment is easily perverted, and a wrong Bias hung upon his Mind. These are the Inlets of Prejudice, the unguarded Avenues of the Mind, by which a thousand Errors and secret Faults find Admission, without being observed or taken Notice of.
>
> (Spect. 399)

These "unguarded Avenues" are the same as warned against before: indulged desires, undirected natural abilities, and education. All of them arise from either poor or improper training as a child or from living an unexamined life as an adult.

The hypocrite who puts on the face of virtue but who is deficient in its source is by far the commoner sort as well as the most dangerous. Though he leads others from truth into error and misery, he himself knows that man's inclination to virtue is more acceptable than vice. It is because of this knowledge that he appears as he is not. Observing the hypocrite's manner of hiding his villainy, Mr. Spectator concludes that it speaks well of the beauty of virtue:

> The Hypocrite would not be at so much Pains to put on the Appearance of Virtue, if he did not know it was the most proper and effectual Means to gain the Love and Esteem of Mankind.
>
> (Spect. 243)

Though in his actions the hypocrite may be well bred, the respectful attitude that is the source of good breeding and social harmony is missing. In order that a man be happy he must be content with himself as well as with others; there is no self-contentment in the hypocrite because he can never seem what he is and he lives constantly with the knowledge that his true self is unacceptable to his society.

The ritualized nature of man in social circumstances makes easy the hypocrite's practice of deceit. A carefully executed bow may cover scorn as a pleasant-seeming smile may disguise contempt. The object of the scorn or contempt can only know the bow or the smile; the remainder may at best be only surmised. It is in outward show, however, that one may unmask the hypocrite. Wanting true feeling, the hypocrite may, in desperate attempts to persuade his company of his sincerity, tend to excess. In one essay, for example, Steele uses mourning customs to illustrate the hypocrite's imtemperance. The hypocrite, he says, measures a man's sorrow by the degrees of sighs and tears. Because, he continues, hypocrites have no sincere feelings,

> they imagine the Seat of Love and Friendship to be placed visibly in the Eyes: They judge what Stock of

> Kindness you had for the Living, by the quantity of Tears you pour out for the Dead; so that if one Body wants that Quantity of Salt-water another abounds with, he is in great Danger of being thought insensible or ill-natured.
>
> (Spect. 95)

Unknown to the hypocrite, action alone is not the hallmark of feeling, as a man who has true compassion for his fellows knows. Using something of Addison's distinction of mirth and cheer, Steele concludes,

> As Laughter does not proceed from profound Joy, so neither does Weeping from profound Sorrow. The Sorrow which appears so easily at the Eyes, cannot have pierced deeply into the Heart. The Heart, distended with Grief, stops all the Passages for Tears or Lamentations.
>
> (Spect. 95)

Of course nothing can be put into the human heart or mind that nature did not intend. The hearts of some men are more tender or more hard than the hearts of others; in a like way some minds are eager for books and others for the marketplace or the battlefield. But after they acknowledge these differences, Locke and Mr. Spectator confidently assume that all men are united by certain basic passions, abilities, and needs: the passion for self-indulgence and the desire to please others; the ability to think and to know even though on different levels and in different occupations; and the need to alternate work and rest. Their assumption leads them to believe that the union of mankind may be strengthened by education—education which is the regulation of passions,

the installation of virtue, and the supremacy of action. The goal of their educational theory is a virtuous man—a happy, peaceful, and productive man. Education, their theme runs, is the way to virtue as virtue is the way to happiness.

CHAPTER V

THE SPECTATOR AS TEACHER

Although Mr. Spectator was eclectic, varied, and a powerful force in many ways, it is not obvious that his theories of education, of human development, are in general those of John Locke. Human beings, they agree, are subject to unending change as a result of their disposition to learn through sensations and reflection. Sensations, which Locke says are the first source of human knowledge, remain the most effective force throughout life; but without the additional quality of reflection, true virtue would not be possible. The psychological system devised by Mr. Spectator and Locke indicates that it is through reflection on actions and sensations that a man can know the rewards of virtue and achieve them in a methodical and reasonable manner. If a man, they say, should obey only those sensations which give him immediate pleasure he could hardly be more than selfish, never allowing his own narrow interests to give way to the demands of harmonious community life. Alone, sensation tells a man about himself; the combination of sensation and reflection, on the other hand, tells him about himself among others and with God. Both writers believe that either through sensation or through reflection, all that is in a

man's mind, including virtue, came there through some means of experience. From their views, it may be concluded that if virtue, that which Locke is wont to call good breeding and self-denial, is the primary goal of that regulated series of experiences called education, then anyone aiming at teaching another must first present experiences that demonstrate the desirability of virtue and then provide opportunity for reflection. By means of words The Spectator aims to provide both experience and reflection for the improvement not only of its readers but of the entire community:

> I shall publish a Sheet-full of Thoughts every Morning, for the Benefit of my Contemporaries; and if I can any way contribute to the Diversion or Improvement of the Country in which I live, I shall leave it, when I am summoned out of it, with the secret Satisfaction of thinking that I have not Lived in vain.
>
> (Spect. 1)

With his thoughts, then, Mr. Spectator proposed to improve, and with his illustrative stories he provides models only slightly less effective than any other model for human imitation.

For this purpose of teaching his age Mr. Spectator seems admirably qualified. Though "without ever medling with any Practical Part in Life," he knows the workings of the statesman, soldier, merchant, artisan, husband, and father (Spect. 1). In short, Mr. Spectator asks that his

readers "see I am not altogether unqualified for the Business I have undertaken." Though he may be unable to provide his readers with first-hand experiences of his own or, because of the verbal medium of the essays, with actual sensations, he is able to relay the experiences of others and to grant appropriate reflections on their behavior. His way of life may deny him immediate experience with the lives he examines, but it does permit him the ability to see weakness, "As those Standers-by discover Blots, which are apt to escape those who are in the Game" (Spect. 1). This, too, is the manner of the teacher: to point out those weaknesses that, unobjectionable though they may seem to the student, must be removed in the interest of improvement. So it is that as a teacher Mr. Spectator provides experiences in and reflections on virtue. This virtue, however, is not that of the expert, the theologian discoursing on metaphysics or the merchant on trade, but the virtue of a man whose expertise does not go beyond that of an observer, a perceptive man who tries to turn the actions and thoughts of experts into matters that he can use in his daily life. Mr. Spectator's virtue is essentially human, a virtue with a keen sense of human limitations.

Locke, too, was concerned with defining the limits of human understanding and ability. Though he found them notably circumscribed, he believed them adequate for personal

satisfaction and practical accomplishment. Locke explains these limitations in the systematic language of the philosopher as Mr. Spectator explains them in the language of daily life. The essay form of Mr. Spectator's explanations is fragmentary—as essays, though developed ideas, propose to be no more than brief excursions into a thought. The way in which these essays move from topic to topic, seldom dwelling on an idea for more than three or four scattered issues, gives the effect of multiple experiences. In a single day a man may receive a multitude of sensations and experience a multitude of thoughts. Though surely no one thought or sensation may adequately explain either him or his personality, all of them together may. Likewise, no one essay in The Spectator may fairly represent the aim of its creators or the preoccupations of the eighteenth century. But all six hundred and thirty-five function as six hundred and thirty-five personal experiences from which the reader—even today—may learn something of the century's assumptions about virtue and about teaching methods.

In all, the theories of virtue that Mr. Spectator follows fall generally into five basic assertions:

1. Virtue is a combination of thought and action.
2. Virtue is teachable and, therefore, subject to changes by time, place, and situation. Its variations, furthermore, prevent it from being the exclusive province of the Christian.

3. It and its opposite are discovered in both significant and insignificant actions.
4. It is as prevalent as vice.
5. It benefits both individual and society.

A man may come to accept these assertions by observation of other men as well as through his own sensations and thoughts. In addition, the reader may observe the virtuous actions of the characters in The Spectator, including those of Mr. Spectator himself, and use them as models for his own behavior. He may learn from them as well as he can learn from observing flesh-and-blood men around him. The added benefit of The Spectator is that the reader has a guide who like Locke's governor does not expect his students to "go to the bottom of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or mathematics" but who opens the door to "good breeding, knowledge of the world, virtue, industry, and a love of reputation" (Thoughts 94).

The techniques which Mr. Spectator habitually uses to guide his readers to virtue may be illustrated by one of the very early essays, one which also demonstrates that true virtue combines thought and action. In Spectator 6 Steele writes that men are often more concerned with having "the Reputation of Wit and Sense, than Honesty and Virtue." He continues that though it may sound contradictory, "a wise Man is not always a good Man." Steele concludes this essay

with the story of the old Athenian who arrived too late at the theater to find a seat appropriate to his station. Some young Athenians gestured to him that he should sit with them, and so

> The good Men bustled through the Crowd accordingly; but when he came to the Seats to which he was invited, the Jest was to sit close, and expose him, as he stood out of Countenance, to the whole Audience. The Frolick went round all the Athenian Benches. But on those Occasions there were also particular Places assigned for Foreigners: When the good Man skulked towards the Boxes appointed for the Lacedemonians, that honest People, more virtuous than polite, rose up all to a Man, and with the greatest Respect received him among them. The Athenians being suddenly touch'd with a Sense of the Spartan Virtue and their own Degeneracy, gave a Thunder of Applause; and the old Man cried out, The Athenians understand what is good, but the Lacedemonians practise it.
>
> (Spect. 6)

This essay, first of all, not only provides an example of active virtue but distinguishes carefully between the state of simply knowing what is proper and the art of behaving properly. In the form of an anecdote the message comes as close as words can to providing concrete models for the readers to imitate. Though a child cannot directly know his parents' sensations and thoughts, he can imitate their actions on the faith that behind them lies a virtuous mind. Likewise, though the reader can get no nearer the characters in Steele's story than the words allow, he can accept on faith the fact that proper action is inspired by proper attitude and, then, attempt to form himself along similar lines.

Furthermore, the sort of virtue praised in Steele's anecdote is within the grasp of all men. Based on the simple instinctive respect for superiors, it is more easily attained by men than are wit and good manners. Last, Mr. Spectator joins his anecdote with appropriate interpretation and moral exhortation. Overall, then, the essay teaches by a union of example and moral; and in order not to frustrate the reader by holding up the impossible for him to imitate, it keeps the recommended virtue within his grasp.

The very existence of The Spectator with its intention to educate and reform implies that virtue is a state that is developed in a man rather than one he has automatically by right of humanity. Furthermore, since it is the nature of things that experienced or older men teach the inexperienced or younger, virtue is most often an acceptance of traditional values. A father, we are told, educates his son not only to benefit the son but also to carry on the father's values (Spect. 263). Though one may teach a child virtue, often a miscarriage in the teaching process denies the child a particular virtue, as childhood indulgence inhibits or denies benevolence in the adult. When dealing with human abilities and personalities, the danger of falling into unconscious error is great. The father who is severe with his son, for example, is not so in order to torment his child, though that is the effect of his actions.

Instead, his intentions are honorable. The result of his intemperate actions may produce an unhappy child and one to whom the virtue of self-denial is equated more with torment than with pleasure. Similarly, the mother who expects more of her child than he is able to produce denies the child a happy life. Although in both cases the parents intend to teach virtue and maintain traditional values, their intentions are frustrated by incorrect procedures.

The teacher himself may be misled in terms of what is virtuous and what is not. "Celimene," for example, writes to say that the care of a young woman has been given her, a young woman "without any acquired Improvements" (Spect. 66). As Mr. Spectator points out, Celimene, in her failure to distinguish good or virtuous action from fine or frivolous action, is attempting to introduce her charge to a number of artificial actions which do not indicate a virtuous mind. Celimene complains that the girl

> knows no Way to express her self but by her Tongue, and that always to signifie her Meaning. Her eyes serve her yet only to see with, and she is utterly a Foreigner to the Language of Looks and Glances . . . . I have bestowed two Months in teaching her to Sigh when she is not concerned, and to Smile when she is not pleased; and am ashamed to own she makes little or no Improvement.
>
> (Spect. 66)

This confusion of fine and good breeding is far too common, says Mr. Spectator. Parents allow their daughters excessive time in ornamenting their persons, learning to hold their

heads in a particular way, sighing in a manner acceptable in polite society, and walking with a constrained grace. To a point none of these ornaments can be condemned, but when they abet a kind of social hypocrisy, they become enemies to truth and reason.

Since virtue is partially a matter of tradition and, like all human knowledge in Locke's view, must be acquired, it follows that what is signified by virtue will in certain instances vary from one culture to another and often from one time and person to another. Locke says that what is sin or virtue seems not "engraven in men's minds" because

> it will scarcely seem possible that God should engrave principles in men's minds, in words of uncertain signification, such as virtues and sins, which amongst different men stand for different things: nay, it cannot be supposed to be in words at all, which, being, in most of these principles very general names, cannot be understood but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical instances, the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves. (Essay I.ii.19)

Man knows from observation that certain actions are punished and others rewarded; however, he does not know which is which by nature or without guidance. The moral standards shared by different religions are the apparent result of shared experiences. Because each man can learn through experience that benevolence creates harmony and pleasure, a pagan and a prince of the Church may perform similar actions

and call them virtues. Thus by observation of actions a man may know sin from virtue both in his own country and in a foreign country.

Mr. Spectator illustrates this well known theory of Locke by printing the impressions of the Indian king Sa Ga Yean Qua Rash Tow of a service at St. Paul's. The king's "naive" reactions demonstrate that English virtues appear foolish to an outsider and that because the outsider does not know the distinction between espoused ideal and practice he may see the true extent of a nation's virtue. The king writes that the English

> set apart every seventh Day as sacred: But upon my going into one of these holy Houses on that Day, I could not observe any Circumstance of Devotion in their Behaviour. There was indeed a Man in Black who was mounted above the rest, and seemed to utter something with a great deal of Vehemence; but as for those underneath him, instead of paying their Worship to the Deity of the Place, they were most of them bowing and curtsying to one another, and a considerable Number of them fast asleep.
>
> (Spect. 50)

Had the king wanted to become an Englishman he had only to observe and imitate action; if he succeeded, no one could accuse him of behaving incorrectly. Furthermore, from his observations the king shows that although he is a pagan he is more sensitive to the obligations of man to God than the Christian worshippers in London. The king, using his natural reason, knows that bowing, curtseying, and sleeping are not acceptable forms of worship.

It is in action, then, that virtue and sin are known, not in words, for virtue is acceptable action abstracted from words (Essay I.ii.19). No doubt the congregation the Indian king saw in St. Paul's would tell him that they do their duty to God by attending church and that proper attitude is necessary for successful worship. Their words and their actions, as the king would readily see, would not correspond. It is, in short, through his deeds that a man is known. A man must act and his actions must be proper. If he does nothing he may not be overtly sinful; but to do nothing is to be a burden on the community, and through his inaction he tells observers that idleness is not necessarily condemned. The Indian king observes that, though ingenious, the young men of England are fearfully lazy for he saw "young lusty raw-boned Fellows carried up and down the Streets in little covered Rooms by a Couple of Porters, who are hired for that Service" (Spect. 50).

What Mr. Spectator seems to require in the example of the Indian king is no more than a reverent attitude in church: wakefulness, tranquility, and attention. Furthermore, as we discover one hundred and fifty issues later, because these qualities are part of a man's natural disposition, they do not lie beyond the ken of ordinary abilities:

> It is certain, the Propensity of the Mind to Religious Worship; the Natural Tendency of the Soul

> to fly to some Superior Being for Succor in Dangers and Distresses; the Gratitude to an invisible Superintendent which rises in us upon receiving any extraordinary and unexpected good Fortune; the Acts of Love and Admiration with which the Thoughts of Men are so wonderfully transported in meditating upon the Divine Perfections; and the universal Concurrence of all the Nations under Heaven in the great Article of Adoration, plainly shew that Devotion or Religious Worship must be the effect of a Tradition from some first Founder of Mankind, or that it is conformable to the Natural Light of Reason, or that it proceeds from an Instinct implanted in the Soul it self.
>
> (Spect. 201)

In addition, the method that Mr. Spectator uses in the reflections of the Indian king resembles that which he uses throughout the series—the outsider whose naïveté reveals flaws. This is, of course, the same method used by Montesquieu in Les Lettres Persanes and later in Goldsmith's letters from the world citizen Lien Chi Altangi. The humor of the Indian king's description may be found in a number of Mr. Spectator's attempts to make church attendance a time for worship rather than a social gathering. A letter from Jenney Simper, to cite one example that may also serve to show how a person's moral nature is revealed even in trivial actions, asks Mr. Spectator's aid before, she says, I "grow a very aukward Creature at Church, and soon have little else to do there but say my Prayers" (Spect. 282). Miss Simper attends church "to hear divine Service and make Conquests," but her second objective, directed toward Sir Anthony Love, is thwarted by the Christmas greenery the clerk has used to

decorate the church. The baronet's pew, she laments, is so well hidden by the foliage "that all my Batteries have no Effect. I am obliged to shoot at Random among the Boughs, without taking any Manner of Aim."

Mr. Spectator witholds comment on Miss Simper's dilemma to allow the clerk, Francis Sternhold, to speak. The clerk's avowed intentions are to save the young men of the congregation from the lady's eyes and to preserve the dignity of the service (Spect. 284). He accuses Miss Simper of "rowling her Eyes round about in such a Manner, as plainly shewed, however she was moved, it was not towards an heavenly Object." Though it seems that Mr. Sternhold's solution is as extreme as Miss Simper's behavior, the lesson inherent in their conflict is that in church one's attention should be on the Almighty and not on baronets or flirts.

Keenly aware of the discrepancy between what the Indian king may be told about worship and what he observes in St. Paul's, Mr. Spectator seems to believe that there is an ideal virtue to which men must aspire and that a teacher's job is to match this virtue with action. The Spectator shows people acting in a way that is acceptable to the society they keep, but their action in no way is an indication of general acceptance or a measure of the virtues they should have. Those well bred women like Celimene may be suitable for certain social situations, but their version of

proper behavior should not be entirely approved of. Such women must be made to realize the error in their standards and then modify their actions to conform to the improved standards. Action, then, measures inward virtue, and the place to begin reform is in attitude. Parents, teachers, and reformers such as Mr. Spectator all have a hand in forming proper attitudes and all must make an effort to promote ideal virtue over what is simply acceptable action.

Given the almost unlimited possibilities of human error, however, the manifestation of vice is probably as frequent as the appearance of virtue. As a matter of fact, encouragement to virtue and censure of vice appear more often in The Spectator than pictures of virtue. Steele himself takes notice of this habit when he says that he "had not been frequent enough in the Mention and Recommendation of the industrious Part of Mankind" (Spect. 552). This neglect, however, should not be read as a belief that men are depraved; instead, it would be more accurately understood as a belief in man's ability to change. Certainly holding up the examples of good men may cause reformation, but to anyone with an interest in human nature it is clear that few men think themselves wicked or vicious. With his interest in reform, therefore, Mr. Spectator is obliged more to expose vices and to call them what they are than he is obliged to depict virtue. Furthermore, it seems that too frequently

congratulating men on their virtue can possibly lead to self-satisfied complacency. The frequent appearance of vice in The Spectator may also be explained by the type of vice most often examined. Though he is occasionally concerned with prostitution, indebtedness, and, once or twice, with drunkenness, the vices that appear in the essays seldom show men as debased or brutal. Instead, the vices are those common ones that touch men in their daily lives. The vices Mr. Spectator attempts to reform are those, one might say, of men who are basically sound of spirit and mind but who need prodding now and again to be better.

Locke, too, believes that though men are given to many weaknesses, few are vicious and deep enough not to respond to lessons properly taught. Speaking of the most obstinate children, he admits that one or two blows "mingled with admonitions between" can serve to put them on the right path (Thoughts 87). He continues that should

> It be any father's misfortune to have a son thus perverse and untractable, I know not what more he can do but pray for him. But I imagine, if a right course be taken with children from the beginning, very few will be found to be such. . . .
>
> (Thoughts 87)

Though reformers do not usually suggest prayers as a means of adjusting criminals, Locke's opinion does show an optimism about human nature shared by Mr. Spectator. Few vices, they

seem to agree, are so pervasive that they cannot be pulled out by an appeal to reason and a higher morality.

In the great gallery of portraits in The Spectator the most admired are not those who merely behave in an approved manner but those who manage, even against pressure from others, to be guided more by moral ideals than by moral realities. Lying, for example, is a common weakness among men and to an observer its frequency may spell acceptance. In an essay on political parties, Mr. Spectator says that some otherwise honest men feel justified in lying for their party's sake. These men believe, he continues, that the crime is outweighed by the practical benefits their faction and, ultimately, the community will derive from their dishonesty (Spect. 507). The community, however, can never be served by dishonesty because a moral ideal which finds lies repulsive is the only basis for lasting harmony. About lying, Mr. Spectator says,

> It is hard to personate and act a Part long; for where Truth is not at the Bottom, Nature will always be endeavoring to return, and will peep out and betray her self one time or another. Therefore if any Man think it convenient to seem good, let him be so indeed, and then his Goodness will appear to every Body's Satisfaction; so that upon all Accounts Sincerity is true Wisdom.
>
> (Spect. 352)

Truth, as are all virtues, is based on natural impulses refined. Not only is lying immoral but it opposes nature and the God from whom the nature of things is derived.

Addison further develops this idea in an explanation of Plato's description of God: "Truth is his Body, and Light his Shadow."

> According to this Definition, there is Nothing so contradictory to [God's] Nature as Error and Falshood. The Platonists have so just a Notion of the Almighty's Aversion to every Thing which is false and erroneous, that they looked upon Truth as no less necessary than Virtue to qualifie an Human Soul for the Enjoyment of a separate State.
>
> (Spect. 507)

Though generally out of sympathy with Platonic thought, in matters of moral ideals Locke, too, found a point of agreement with the ancient philosopher. It is dangerous, says Locke, to accept principles before they are examined, "especially if they be such as concern morality, which influence men's lives, and give a bias to all their actions" (Essay IV.xii.4). And so believing, he may assert that

> he who, with Plato, shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his thoughts raised to other contemplations than those who look not beyond this spot of earth, and those perishing things which are to be had in it.
>
> (Essay IV.xii.4)

A man's actions must, as Mr. Spectator and Locke jointly insist, conform to reason and nature on their highest levels and not ill-naturedly ape the actions of those around him.

One of Mr. Spectator's most direct statements on the necessary union of thought and action is the essay in which he distinguishes faith and morality. The first is "whatever is revealed to us in the Holy Writings, and which we could

not have obtained the Knowledge of by the Light of Nature" (Spect. 459). Morality, on the other hand, is "all those Duties to which we are directed by Reason or Natural Religion." Though some men, he continues, may neglect one or the other, "the perfect Man should be defective in neither of these Particulars." It is faith, it seems, that must be taught, that rests on the experience of tradition, that varies from nation to nation, and that may be difficult to comprehend. A man, then, may be virtuous though he has no full comprehension of faith. In this essay Addison explains that though both faith and morality are necessary in making a perfect man, morality is the one that is invoilate. "A Person," he says, "may be qualified to do greater Good to Mankind, and become more beneficial to the World, by Morality without Faith, than by Faith without Morality." Furthermore, because morality is clearer to human understanding than is faith, a man finds "all Civilized Nations of the World agreeing in the great Points of Morality, as much as they differ in those of Faith." Though not innate ideas, the morality that Addison seems to consider here comes from man's natural reason and from common experiences that tell mankind that some actions bring pain and others bring pleasure. In general, Addison gives his greater emphasis to virtuous action so long as the action is motivated by the light of nature and not disguised by lies or hypocrisy.

Although their goal may have been the perfect man, Locke and Mr. Spectator have too clear an understanding of human limitations to believe that imperfection means a failed life. Rather, the lesson they offer is that, though limited and often weak, man must learn that his duty to himself and, through himself, to society is to work toward perfection, to strive for a life that balances the elements of happiness, virtue, and action. What they ask of man is that he be the best he can be and never rest content with what he is. Both Locke and Mr. Spectator believe that the individual man is constantly changing both within and without and that with these changes he must modify his actions and his beliefs. But to them change must be synonymous with improvement and not with mere novelty. For them change is an upward progression that begins with an unformed mind and personality possessed of only certain very basic impulses and that continues, so long as life holds, to that complex of ideas they call a virtuous life.

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