Date of Award

8-2017

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Major

Business Administration

Major Professor

Terry L. Neal

Committee Members

Daniel P. Murphy, Lauren M. Cunningham, Donald J. Bruce

Abstract

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) added a multitude of financial oversight responsibilities to the audit committee of public companies. These responsibilities increased the amount of time each audit committee member needed to devote to each committee served, leading to concerns amongst regulators and the investing community that audit committees that were overboarded and serving on multiple other board seats would be unable to effectively monitor the companies they represented. I find that these concerns are undue. More overboarded audit committees have adequately adjusted to their increased workloads in the decade since SOX to such a degree that they have lower misstatement frequencies than less overboarded committees. By contracting in additional auditor effort or retaining higher quality auditors overboarded audit committees have found responses that aid in their monitoring. These responses lead to positive financial reporting outcomes when audit committees accept the limitations imposed by being overboarded. Overall, I find that more overboarded audit committees are able to remain effective monitors of the financial reporting process.

Available for download on Wednesday, August 15, 2018

Files over 3MB may be slow to open. For best results, right-click and select "save as..."

Included in

Accounting Commons

Share

COinS