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The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Japanese Politics

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University of Tennessee at Knoxville

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Part I: Introduction

On November 11th, 2011, speaking at a televised press conference, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said, “I am determined to preserve Japan’s traditional culture, its beautiful farming villages. But in order for Japan, which has built its prosperity on trade, to pass on its affluence to future generations, it must tap into the vitality of the Asia-Pacific region,” according to Hiroko Tabuchi of the *New York Times*.¹ With that dramatic speech, Prime Minister Noda made the official decision to seek to join negotiations for a regional free trade agreement that would create the largest free trade area in world history, the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Why did Prime Minister Noda decide to seek to join negotiations? Surely the Prime Minister was aware of the stated goals of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership's publicly stated goal, according to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement signed by founders Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, is to reduce the tariffs between member countries to zero for all goods and services by 2015.² Japan would have the highest tariffs among the current negotiating countries. Rural Japan has enjoyed many tariffs on foreign goods that protect its domestic agricultural producers and removing them would cause a potential political backlash. Japan's average agricultural import tariff is 58 percent of the price of the product, four times the average agricultural import tariff of the United States, 12 percent, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.³ Indeed, meeting the requirements of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement would take a large and radical reorganization of national economic policy and cause much pain for the agricultural lobby, a vocal group in Japan.

Next, meeting the requirements of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement for the free flow of goods, services, and capital would require Japan's government to reduce many internal import restrictions such as its strict safety rules. Why would Prime Minister Noda take such a

political risk? The Democratic Party of Japan's appeal to voters when it won control of the Japanese House of Representatives in 2009 wasn't the party's desire for free trade. According to their website, the Democratic Party of Japan's platform is to create a “society which guarantees security, safety, and fair and equal opportunity for each individual.”⁴ The Democratic Party of Japan's control of the upper house is held with a coalition with the People's New Party, a rural center-right party with close connections with the largest Japanese agricultural lobby group, JA. Prime Minister Noda risks losing his control of the National Diet by making public moves to join the TPP, there by alienating his party's coalition partner.

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda's decided to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations because Noda thinks that Japan is a trading nation, and that building favorable free trade agreements is the top foreign relations goal of Japan. Additionally, Noda took into account the political groups that oppose joining, the agricultural lobby, the LDP and the PNP versus the political groups that support joining, the big business lobby, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, China-hawks in the DPJ, and the United States.

This paper will examine Japan's long, slow process of market liberalization by reviewing Japan's trade policy since 1952, specifying what kept Japan from latching on to market liberalization and market openness, and identifying recent FTAs signed by and regional trade associations entered by the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan. This paper will examine the factors affecting Noda's decision to join TPP talks including foreign political interests and domestic economic interests that support joining and the domestic agricultural interests that oppose it. Finally, this paper will examine Noda's own statements about the decision and the international support and skepticism about Japan's intentions in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Part II: Japan's History of Market Liberalization

Japan established protectionist measures in the 1950s and only progressively lowered import restrictions on foreign goods and capital in order to gain greater market access in foreign countries through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and much later in the World Trade Organization. Conversely, Japan has actively engaged in regional economic integration since its first suggestion of the Intra-Regional Trade Promotion Talk in 1957, but it has been reluctant to sign regional trade agreements opting instead for the broader agreements through organizations such as GATT and WTO. Once this approach no longer seemed feasible, Japan signed many regional free trade agreements after 1999, but Japan's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership is unique in that Japan could lose its agricultural protections, which have been the cause of failed FTA negotiations in the past.

When Japan regained its independence after the occupation, the top priority of its government was economic recovery. Japan recovered to its pre-war gross national product of 1936 only by 1955.⁵ Japan suffered from hyperinflation. Japan continued the rationing of food and basic supplies for years after the war. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, charged with control over Japan during the occupation, produced relative stability using substantial economic and food aid from the US to fill Japan's needs. Once Japan gained its independence, the Japanese government decided to focus its economic policy on a model that is now called "export-led industrialization." In this development model, a developing country makes policies that favor businesses that export goods for foreign consumption. Export-led industrialization takes advantage of high consumer demand in foreign countries and low production costs in the developing economy. Due to low taxes, low production costs, and demand in foreign countries, the country's businesses and their employees prosper. Then, the

developing country uses that money to pay for its imports, invest in its infrastructure and labor force, and build domestic consumer demand over time. Japan made this developmental model famous.

Following this model the Japanese government established economic and foreign policies that benefited export-focused businesses. Japan gave long-term low interest loans to export-focused businesses, allowed export-focused businesses to vertically integrate into *keirestu* conglomerates, did not tax businesses income made from exports, and, finally, raised tariffs on imported goods and established import quotas to protect new businesses. As a developing country, Japan had to import all of its industrial machinery and technology to produce its exports, so Japan had a negative balance of trade for many years. The Japanese government saw raising import tariffs and enforcing import quotas as a way to reduce its dependence on foreign imports and boost domestic businesses and hiring. Initially the import tariffs and quotas covered nearly every good that Japan could import. Japan had 462 items under import quota until 1962.⁶ While raising tariffs and imposing import quotas definitely increased consumer prices, the Japanese textile industry and other non-durable goods saw a golden age in the 1950s and 1960s. Japanese tariffs accomplished their goal of giving their domestic businesses a boost during the sensitive time of Japan's budding independence.

One special category of goods had especially protective tariffs: agricultural products. Japan has had more people on its main islands than it could support since the Taisho period, Japan has had to import food from foreign countries. After signing the Japanese Instrument of Surrender in 1945 to the Allied Powers, the Allied Powers forced Japan to relinquish its colonies. Japan was cut off from its source of food, Korea. Japanese agricultural production was very low. Additionally, even though agriculture was struggling, Japanese agriculture was its largest

employer with 50% of its working population employed in farming, forestry, and fishing.⁷ When the occupation ended, the Japanese government placed very strict bans on agricultural imports.

Another protective measure that the Japanese government took to assure the future of its domestic agricultural industry was subsidization. The Japanese government decided to give subsidies to domestic farmers to prevent them from driving themselves out of work by price competition with each other. Many of these subsidies for farmers and tariffs on imported agricultural products are still in effect today in Japan. These subsidies are the subject of much scorn from foreign businesses whose products would be competitive otherwise and from foreign political leaders who wish to make money from Japanese markets.

Later in the 1950s, Japanese cabinets understood that Japan had to allow foreign goods to be sold on Japanese soil if they could expect Japanese goods to be sold on foreign soil. Thus, Japan's interest in free-trade began. Members of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) continued to pursue punitive import tariffs on goods from Japan after World War II. Japan saw this as dangerous to their recovery, but the U.S. also saw this as dangerous to its strategic interest in a strong, prosperous Japanese bulwark against communism in Asia. Due to the U.S.'s bargaining, Japan became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955. Japan pursued policies of free trade along the guidelines of GATT membership. Becoming part of GATT meant that Japan had to make each member country of GATT a *most favored nation* (MFN), meaning that Japan had to treat every GATT member with the basic membership requirements of the same low tariffs and high import quotas for every GATT member country.⁸ This measure is intended to expand trade liberalization in general and to minimize favoritism in the international economy. Sixteen other member countries of GATT applied Article XXXV of the agreement to Japan, however, allowing for countries to deny full

membership status to Japan, thus denying its MFN status. Japan's chief goal in participation in the next meetings of GATT was to have these discriminatory tariffs lifted, and Japan succeeded in 1964 in having most European countries treat Japan as a full GATT member.

Japan entered into economic conferences for the reductions of tariffs and the adoption of regional standards. The first proposed Asian economic conference for tariff reduction that Japan was heavily involved in was the Intra-Regional Trade Promotion Talk of Committee for Asia and the Far East of the United Nations (IRTPT). Japan proposed this consultative group for East Asian countries in the UN in 1957.⁹ The Japanese-led IRTPT became a forum for discussing regional trade issues, but the representatives of the talks were not empowered in their home countries to implement any policies that the group discussed.

Instead, the Organization for Asian Economic Cooperation was born out of the same group for East Asian nations in the UN in 1961, and it involved a council of ministers composed of foreign ministers of member states. Decisions of the group would be binding, and high government officials would over-see the implementation of group policies. Support for the plan was tepid from East Asian governments, for it would require a radical risk and financial burden for many newly developing countries in the region.

The next three opportunities for Japanese involvement in Asian regionalism betrayed Japanese anxiety over agricultural protections. The Japanese government rejected a preferential trade agreement (PTA), that would have shared preferred trading status with several south East Asian nations in 1967, another with ASEAN in 1977, and an Asian Lomé Convention in 1975. The reason as analyzed by Shintaro Hamanaka of the Sheffield Center for Japanese Studies is that the successive Prime Ministers felt that the resulting loss in agricultural competitiveness and unemployment would spell bad results in National Diet elections.

This should not fool one into thinking that Japan wasn't willing to spend money for Asian development and regionalism. Japan actively supported East Asian economic development in the 1960s with the creation of the Asian Development Bank in 1966, which was largely financed by Japan. Like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank makes loans to developing economies in East Asia without the same regulations, politics, or debt collection practices of the World Bank. As opposed to FTAs where Japanese businesses would be put on an even level playing-field, Japan was willing to invest in these countries through the ADB because it contributed to Japanese influence over South East Asia.

In the 1980s, however, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials began to see a regional group to address Asia-Pacific trade issues as more advantageous to the export of Japanese products than bilateral trade discussions. MITI officials wanted to make an economic forum where Japan could wield a large influence, but it realized that other East Asian nations would be skeptical of the group if it were to be dominated by Japan. Therefore, MITI invited the U.S. into APEC, and Japan joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) in 1989, where it would eventually seek to join the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2011.

Japanese governmental policy became much more open to lowering tariffs on imports in the 2000s and even signed a FTA with ASEAN in 2002. Why did government policy go against precedent? One of the many changes in the 1980s and 1990s for Japan was the internationalization of Japanese companies due to the increased value of the Japanese Yen due to the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the economic stagnation of Japan in the 1990s. Japanese companies became even more interested in investing and buying businesses in East Asia and Western countries. Additionally, Japanese reforms of the banking sector and the relaxation on restrictions on foreign investment in Japanese companies in 1994 meant that encouraging the

free flow of capital into Japan became a national priority. These changes were fertile ground for Asia-focused FTAs.

The world of multilateral tariff reduction changed in the 1990s as well. The World Trade Organization ceased to serve the same purpose as the avenue for world wide tariff reductions, and became the avenue through which countries led lawsuits over trade issues. Instead, countries pursued regional free trade agreements. Among WTO countries, Japan and South Korea were the only countries that did not have any FTAs until 1998, when Korea announced its intentions for a FTA with Chile. Furthermore, competition with South Korea became a major reason for signing FTAs. Japan signed its first FTA with Singapore in 1999, and another with Mexico in 2000. Japan entered negotiations with ASEAN in 2002 for an “economic partnership agreement.” Today, Japan has free-trade agreements with ASEAN, Chile, Brunei, India, and Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, and Switzerland.

What you can tell from this list of countries that have signed FTAs is that Japan has never signed an FTA with a country that is a major exporter of rice. One exception to this rule is India, which whom Japan has an FTA and also large tariffs on rice. Prime Minister Noda's decision to join negotiations to become part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, of which the U.S. is already a negotiating partner, is controversial because Japan may have to lose those protections for farmers in the name of getting its manufactured and technological goods to sell abroad.

Part III. The Democratic Party of Japan's Treatment of Free Trade Agreements

This section will examine the Democratic Party of Japan's attitudes toward the opening of Japanese markets and the signing of regional Free Trade Agreements(FTAs), pacts that eliminate or nearly eliminate tariffs on goods exchanged between the countries. In order to understand Noda's decision to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, one must understand the party's position on

the issue of East Asian regionalism and market openness.

Democratic Party of Japan is a catch-all center-left political party. It is liberal on social issues, but on economic issues the Democratic Party of Japan favors a social liberalism approach. Social Liberalism is a political movement that supports government intervention into the economy to address unemployment, health care, and education, but only insofar as it enables the population to compete equally in a liberal capitalist system. For example, the Democratic Party of Japan once it came into power in 2009, it passed more support for single mothers and jobless benefits for the unemployed (a social redistributive action), but the party has also signed FTAs signed with India and Peru (a classical liberal action).

Japan and India agreed to lower their tariffs on the other's goods 94% within ten years. Former President of the Democratic Party of Japan and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seiji Maehara signed the agreement in Tokyo in 2011.¹⁰ The Democratic Party of Japan sees market openness as good for Japan and believes that the agreement will help Japanese businesses who want better access to the emerging middle class in India, however, there are major caveats to the term "free trade" in this FTA. Japan is still keeping its huge tariff on imported rice, and India is still keeping its import on assembled vehicles. So Japan still has not signed an FTA that threatens its farmers. This typifies the Democratic Party of Japan's approach to FTAs, openness to trade so long as it is not politically risky. Thus, Noda's decision seems even stranger considering the party always goes to great pains to protect Japan's agriculture. Why would he voice support for something so politically risky? Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda's decided to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations because Noda thinks that Japan is a trading nation, and that building favorable free trade agreements is the top foreign relations goal of Japan. Noda thinks that the future of Japanese prosperity is worth the political risk of angering the agricultural

lobby.

Part IV: The Trans-Pacific Partnership

The Trans-Pacific Partnership itself is a multilateral free trade agreement between New Zealand, Chile, Brunei, and Singapore. It had its start in APEC conferences. Founded by Australia in 1989, APEC was meant to be the preeminent institution for East Asian regionalism, to help address key trade issues in East Asia and the Pacific. It failed miserably at this purpose. The two key structural weaknesses in the original charter for the organization are that agreements are based on voluntarism and consensus and it has a very small secretariat with no ability to enforce or monitor the agreements it makes. Japan participated in this institution and was one of the key conservative figures in the group that opposed making resolutions binding and emphasized discussion rather than negotiation.¹¹

Dissatisfied with the inability to accomplish anything within the normal running of APEC, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in 2005 which committed their four governments to reducing the tariffs between their countries by 90 percent by 2006 and to zero by 2015.¹² It follows the typical arrangements of FTAs in that it contains guarantees for the free flow of goods, rules of origin to identify goods for free trade, trade remedies, the removal of technical barriers to trade, services, intellectual property, competition policy, and government procurement. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a comprehensive free trade agreement to say the least, and, as it stands now as a four nation agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership represents maybe the greatest breakthrough in Asian regionalism since the formation of ASEAN.

On September 22nd, 2008, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab announced that the U.S. would seek to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership.¹³ Two months later, Australia, Vietnam and

Peru announced their intention to join. Malaysia, Canada, Mexico, The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan have expressed their interests in joining. Twelve rounds of negotiations have taken place, and the broad outlines of an agreement have been promoted by the member countries. The White House writes that the agreement includes, “industrial goods, agriculture, and textiles as well as rules on intellectual property, technical barriers to trade, labor, and environment.”¹⁴ The U.S. has a lot to gain by being the heavyweight in what could be the largest trade bloc in the world, with 40% of the world's GDP.

Part V: Interest Groups against Joining

Japan's greatest obstacle to being part of this new free trade zone is its farmers and the agricultural lobby. Japan has strong protective tariffs on its agricultural products and high subsidization. Japan established these tariffs to make sure that rural agriculture can still be profitable for a private farmer, and established large subsidies to keep the farmers from competing and driving themselves out of business. The more realistic reason that Japan goes through this trouble is that it is an island nation and it cannot produce enough food to feed its population, keeping an internal source of food from going out of business could be vital if Japan were to lose its food sources due to war or trade conflicts. The historical reason is that under the old 1955 election rules, rural areas had more political voice than urban areas because rural areas had fewer votes to elect more members of the Diet. Electoral districts did not account for population changes. The agricultural lobbies, especially JA, organize to protect the farmers' interests and speak louder than some of the world's largest companies such as Toyota Corporation, who desire the Trans-Pacific Partnership and want Japan to join.

Another group that is against Japan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership is the Democratic Party of Japan's coalition partner, the People's New Party (PNP). PNP is a small

party in the Japanese Parliament that votes together with the ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan. It is a center-right party that supports government programs. It specifically formed after Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi lost one of his many attempts to privatize the Japanese Postal Service and Postal Savings Bank. Being a conservative party, the PNP enjoys the support of rural citizens who would be the most hurt by this agreement. Therefore, the PNP has pledged to pull apart from the Democratic Party of Japan if Prime Minister Noda chooses to join TPP negotiations.¹⁵ Ultimately, Noda chose to join and the PNP did not withdraw from the coalition, so the effectiveness of the PNP's posturing in a coalition in the Japanese Parliament is clearly limited.

Part VI: Pro Trans-Pacific Partnership Interests

There are, of course, many interest groups that support joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The big business lobby, *Keidanren*, sees a great opportunity to expand into markets that currently are difficult for Japanese companies to penetrate because of tariffs on Japanese goods. According to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), "The nation's automakers would gain 140 billion yen (\$1.8 billion) in annual revenues if Japan joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade pact, which would eliminate tariffs."¹⁶ Consequently, the large exporting companies in Japan who already have globalized to take advantage of the comparative advantage of business operations in multiple countries can freely operate without paying import tariffs. This is where the METI gets the 140 billion yen in revenue figure. The big business lobby definitely supported Noda agreeing to join the talks.

In every political decision there must be some concern for the balance of power. It is especially true for East Asia. Japan and the U.S. have competed against China for influence in the budding institutions of Asian regionalism. China made great strides toward its own Asian

trade bloc when it signed the ASEAN+China FTA in 2001. Japan quickly signed its own FTA with ASEAN in 2002. Japan feels that it must form regional trade organizations to compete against China. Thus, China-hawks in Japan support joining the TPP.¹⁷

Korea and Taiwan have signed their own FTAs with the U.S., and noticeably Japan hasn't. The Trans-Pacific Partnership could be the best way for Japan to regain some ground as a major trading partner for the world's largest economy. Additionally, the U.S. and Japan have had much trouble with establishing a FTA when they have been completely invested in the process. Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru in 1996 was told that the U.S. was investigating the potential effects of a Japan-U.S. FTA. MITI conducted its own investigation and found that a Japan-U.S. Treaty would worsen the trade deficit between Japan and the U.S..¹⁸ Joining the TPP may be the only opportunity that Japan will get to tap into the deep consumer demand of the U.S.. The U.S. may be more willing to accept a larger trade deficit with Japan if it means an even larger economic presence in East Asia.

Part VII: Prime Minister Noda's Motivations for Joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership and its Aftermath

Prime Minister Noda's fundamental reasoning for joining the TPP is that Japan is a free trading country, free trade agreements must be a chief priority of Japanese foreign relations even if they run counter to protected interests. One might call this the "Noda Doctrine." No sitting Prime Minister has been willing to challenge the agricultural lobby in this way since the 1994 Political Reforms. While the "Noda Doctrine" could be considered sound economics, it could be bad politics. Depending on the fate of Noda's sales tax hike, Japan could fall off the wagon of trade liberalization in east Asia.

The phrasing of Noda's announcement reveals Noda's tightrope walk to gently prepare the

public for the idea of Japan's participation in the TPP Noda said that he had, “decided to enter into consultations toward participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.”¹⁹ Noda was aware that he couldn't commit Japan unconditionally to participation in the negotiations without losing the support of his party. Later Noda has even had to indicate that he would protect the interests of the farmers in his country for fear of losing public support. According to Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, 46% of the Japanese public support Japanese participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.²⁰ But as the DPJ potentially approaches elections caused by dissolution of parliament because of gridlock over the sales tax increase, the DPJ and Noda would have to campaign in rural areas. If this is the case, the DPJ and Noda would certainly never mention TPP talks. This situation could relegate TPP negotiations to a low priority for the Prime Minister.

Noda specifically focused on economic growth through foreign trade as his reason for joining the TPP. Noda said in his press conference, “But in order for Japan, which has built its prosperity on trade, to pass on its affluence to future generations, it must tap into the vitality of the Asia-Pacific region.”²¹ Noda is voicing the popular concern that because of its stagnating economy, Japan is falling behind other countries and must have FTAs to share in the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region. Noda is also arguing that if Japan does not sign on to this FTA, Japan may not be as affluent tomorrow as it is today.

The chief opposition party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), has criticized Noda for being willing to put all goods and services available for free trade. The LDP wants agriculture, insurance, and automotive parts off of the negotiating table.²² If LDP politicians get their way, it's unclear what would happen to the other FTAs that Japan is negotiating, such as an ASEAN+3 (China, Korea, and Japan) FTA. Previous LDP administrations have signed ten bilateral free

trade agreements in the 2000s, so Japan would not suddenly become protectionist, but Japan would miss out on becoming part of what could be the largest free trade area in the world if it were to opt out of the TPP.

The Japanese public is somewhat in favor of join the TPP, though one-third of the public doesn't know what the TPP is. 46% support the measure while 28% oppose it according to a poll by newspaper Asahi Shimbun.²³ While the public enjoys rustic farm villages, the Japanese public is more concerned about Japan's slow economic growth and how to get the Japanese economy growing again. There is still a loud sector, though, of the Japanese public that supports protection for farmers and subsidies. Thousands rallied in Tokyo on April 27th, to protest Japan's negotiations to join the TPP. One lobbying organization that protested was Japan's Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenchu), who said that, "Abolishing tariffs without exceptions and reviewing regulations means that the pact forces us to fight unarmed against the United States and Australia, where farms are huge."²⁴

Americans have expressed doubts about the Japanese resolve to cut tariffs on imported goods as required by the terms of the TPP Agreement. There is no special exception for agriculture as the LDP would like. TPP members Brunei, Vietnam, Chile, Peru and Singapore, and Malaysia have already accepted Japanese participation. It seems that the U.S. is the largest obstacle to Japanese participation because Washington wants Japan to be willing to put agricultural products and automotive parts up for free trade. According to the American Automotive Policy Council, "The AAPC opposes Japan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations at this time. Japan remains the most closed auto market to imports in the developed world and the automotive sector currently represents 70% of the total U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Japan. Japan's trade barriers in the auto sector cannot be addressed easily or quickly, and

will needlessly slow down the negotiations.”²⁵

However, U.S. interests are fundamentally served better by a TPP that includes Japan than a TPP that does not. Japan’s economy is larger than all other TPP members, if you remove the US. If the U.S. is serious about shifting focus toward East Asia, the U.S. needs to include Japan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. While President Obama has not promised U.S. support for Japan's joining, in a recent meeting with Prime Minister Noda he has acknowledged the benefits of Japan's entrance to the FTA, “We instructed our teams to continue our consultation regarding Japan's interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would benefit both our economies and the region.”²⁶

Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership could mean another round of tariff cutting that would make consumer prices in Japan fall, and make life easier to live in Japan for some and smaller, poorer countries more affluent by having access to Japanese consumers. If the TPP succeeds, people living in Asian countries could have a much brighter future.

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