



5-2012

Benevolent Intentions: Hospitality, Ethics and the Eighteenth-Century Novel

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Recommended Citation

Saxton, Teresa R, "Benevolent Intentions: Hospitality, Ethics and the Eighteenth-Century Novel. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2012.
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Benevolent Intentions:
Hospitality, Ethics and the Eighteenth-Century Novel

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Teresa Renee Saxton
May 2012

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to recognize a few individuals who have been instrumental to my success and the writing of this dissertation. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. John Zomchick, for sticking with me through my many years at the University of Tennessee; I hope you continue to lend your insights and practical wisdom to many students to follow. Many thanks to all those who have served on my committee Dr. Robert Stillman, Dr. Misty Anderson, and Dr. Judy Cornett; the insight and advice you provided greatly enriched this work. A special thank you to Dr. Jenn Fishman; without your incredible brainstorming and organizing skills this project would have taken many more months to complete. My deepest gratitude also goes to Dr. Misty Krueger; your guidance and mentorship throughout my graduate experience have been invaluable, and I would not be the scholar I am today without you. Thank you as well to my fellow graduate students who supported me along this process: Matthew Raese, Taryn Norman and Katie Burnett. Finally, a thank you to Matt Saxton, my husband and the most benevolent person I have met; thank you for being my fellow guest on this journey.

ABSTRACT

“Benevolent Intentions: Hospitality, Ethics and the Eighteenth-Century Novel” describes how representations of hospitality in British novels of the last half of the eighteenth century engage new ethical questions raised by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers. The novels explore a philosophical turn towards intention from the vulnerable position of the guest. As opposed to traditional conceptions of hospitality that combined ideals of hospitality with culturally specific actions, the new hospitality portrayed in the eighteenth century novel exhibits suspicions about hospitable actions and seeks instead to establish benevolent intentions in both host and guest. I argue that the host position is particularly mistrusted: benevolent hosts are exposed to be weak and ineffective, while bad hosts are shown to be a greater threat to the guest because of their ability to mask selfish designs under the outward signs of hospitality. I trace how these exposures of the potential dangers in hospitality reveal the guest’s difficulty in making accurate judgments about the host’s intentions, thereby creating anxiety in the guest. I examine representations of hospitality in five novels: Henry Mackenzie’s *Man of Feeling*, Sarah Fielding’s *The Adventures of David Simple*, Tobias Smollett’s *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker*, Charlotte Lennox’s *Sophia*, and Frances Burney’s *Cecilia, or, The Memoirs of an Heiress*. The guests in these novels respond to the host’s weakness or corruption by seeking hospitality in fellow guests; because the guest position requires a passive response to others’ needs and two guests approach the relationship as equals, the guest-guest exchange of hospitality exemplifies the ideal of benevolent intentions in practice. This relationship imposes new restrictions on the practice of hospitality, limiting its practice to like-minded individuals. These new restrictions threaten the ideal of hospitality. In many of these novels, the imposed limits cannot be enforced, and the hospitable company is forced to open its doors to hostile or self-seeking hosts. Ultimately, these novels reveal a tension in the ethics of hospitality: benevolence and limitations to benevolence are necessary and at odds, leaving the guests in a quandary of how to balance a necessary self-interest against an ideal of benevolent intention towards one’s fellow man.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1787, Vicesimus Knox's *Essays Moral and Literary* was published.¹ Among his reflections on the state of British literature and culture is this reflection on the moral state of hospitality:

The days of Elizabeth have been extolled as the days of genuine hospitality. The doors were thrown open, and, at the sound of the dinner-bell, all the neighbouring country crowded to the smoking table. These were happy times, indeed, says the railer against modern refinement. Yet it has been justly doubted, whether this indiscriminate hospitality was laudable. There was something generous and magnificent in the idea, and it gave the nobles of the land the influence of kings over their neighbourhood. Yet if its motive and its moral effects are considered, it will appear to be justly exploded. It proceeded from the love of power and from ostentation, and it produced gluttony, drunkenness, and all their consequent vices. (315-316)

Here, Knox questions any nostalgia for an older country house ethic of hospitality. Interestingly, Knox does not take issue with the act of hospitality itself, which, with its open doors and crowded tables, was certainly “generous” and hospitable. Instead, Knox objects to the motivation for such hospitality; because he finds such motivation springs “from the love of power and from ostentation,” he no longer reads the act as generous or “magnificent” but as a producer of further vices. Indeed, by connecting this hospitality to such inhospitable intentions, Knox no longer sees such acts of welcome as emblematic of good hospitality but a sign of “indiscriminate” hosting. For Knox, open doors and crowded tables are *too* open and crowded; a less “indiscriminate” hospitality would be more virtuous.

In this passage, Knox identifies two large changes in the ideal of hospitality that took place in the eighteenth century. First, intentions became markers of ideal, virtuous hospitality; second, “indiscriminate” hospitality fell under a cloud of suspicion, thus generating a need to impose limits and conditions on hosting. This project investigates how eighteenth-century literature was instrumental in formulating these changing values. The novels of 1745-1780,

¹ Knox was a minister and head of Tonbridge School. His *Essays* and *Elegant Extracts* were popular at the turn of the century.

written a generation before Knox's confident revision of Elizabethan hospitality, are preoccupied with ethical questions raised by the exchange of hospitality. These novels explore the motives behind hospitable and inhospitable actions and the limitations such motives depend on. Throughout these works, hospitality is depicted as an anxious, uncomfortable and confusing experience; rather than offering community and welcome, hospitality produces concern about others' intentions, one's own intentions, and the nature of the pursued relationship. Now suspicious of the country house idea of hospitality—with its “dinner-bell” and “smoking table”—literary hosts and guests work to establish a new ethical standard, and new standards of limitation, for the exchange of hospitality.

In so doing, these novels describe hospitality in its more modern form of practice, in which the public house or inn aids the common traveler and private hospitality is offered in more limited ways. At the same time, by placing these new standards and limitations in context, these novels also question the nature of hospitality as an ethic: what are the host's and guest's obligations if hospitality is determined by intention? New standards of disinterested motives confuse the practice of hospitality because neither host nor guest can be assured of the other's intentions. New requirements for limitations impose regulation on an inherently uncontrollable exchange that depends on a range of actors, conditions and cultural norms. In essence, these novels introduce a new understanding of hospitality but, as they do so, they also undermine the ethic they create by exposing its uncontrollable and unpredictable nature.

Two particular trends in these novels serve to create this paradox. First, eighteenth century novels emphasize the guest rather than the host position. Guests, as recipients rather than instigators of hospitality, have less control over limiting the exchange and less authority to judge intentions. In such a position, the flaws of the new system are made apparent and visceral in the guest's discomfort. Second, though this new hospitality emphasizes judging and limiting, hospitality remained a passive virtue of service to another. This passivity, because of the new emphasis on intention, required more than just serving another's physical needs but also made emotional openness necessary. This very passivity, in fact, became a marker of the disinterested intentions necessary to offer virtuous hospitality. At the same time, however, this passive nature makes the demands to limit and judge before offering hospitality more difficult. Thus, I will

argue that the novels put forward a new system for hospitality, while simultaneously exposing its weakness as an ethical standard.

The Nostalgic Past: Practice and Ideal

The problems of hospitality depicted in eighteenth-century novels are indicative of a problem inherent in the hospitality system—namely that hospitality is both an ethical ideal and a social practice. Though both forms of hospitality are designed to structure human behavior, their approaches for doing so differ. The ethical ideal functions on a theoretical level and encourages the greatest possible achievements in openness and service; the social practice of hospitality, on the other hand, offers a logistics of action to determine normalized behaviors for inviting a guest to one's home and providing them comforts like food and shelter. Because of these different approaches, ideal and practice rarely correspond. Indeed, Jacques Derrida and other recent critics have pointed to the impossibility of putting hospitality's ideal into practice.² Derrida distinguishes between the Law (ideal) and the laws (practice) of hospitality and argues that the two are in essential contradiction. The Law requires one "to give the new arrival all of one's home and oneself...without asking a name, or compensation, or the fulfillment of even the smallest condition" (*Of Hospitality* 77). This giving of the self opposes the laws of hospitality, which seek to preserve the authority of the host and provide "rights and duties that are always conditioned and conditional" (*Of Hospitality* 77). While hospitality idealizes the host's openness and generosity, this ideal is difficult to put into practice because such complete generosity would bankrupt the host emotionally and financially. Yet, any attempt to codify the ideal and protect the host in practice will necessarily work against the ideal. This paradox is central to the novelistic investigation of hospitality in the eighteenth century; while the novels propose an

² Derrida's theory of hospitality contends that hospitality is "the impossible," a term that Derrida also uses to describe gifts, forgiveness and mourning in his works. In their introduction to *God, the Gift, and Postmodernism*, John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon define Derrida's "the impossible" as "a dream and a desire for something *tout autre*, of something that utterly shatters the present horizons of possibility, that confounds our expectations, that leaves us gasping for air, trying to catch our breath" (3). They also investigate Jean Luc-Marion's competing definition, which emphasizes not the waiting or the desire but the actual experience of "what these prior constraints declare impossible...what does not have to be...something whose givenness neither objectivity nor being can contain" (6). For more on Derrida and Marion's work and the appropriation of their definitions of the impossible by postmodern critics, see Caputo and Scanlon, 1-19.

ethics of generosity and benevolence, the contexts and characters of the narrative reveal the difficulty of putting such an ideal in practice.

Yet Knox's quotation indicates an additional problem for the eighteenth century—agreeing on an ideal of hospitality. Knox criticizes an ideal of hospitality wherein the host's duties are limited to the actions of providing literal openness of the home through food, drink and lodging. By critiquing the motives for and consequences of these actions, Knox suggests that ideal hospitality should not proceed “from the love of power and from ostentation” or lead to “vices.” While the older practice Knox criticizes required only physical openness and not the giving of oneself that Derrida defines, the new ideal that Knox implies does begin to incorporate this moral denial of the self and the corresponding denial of the desire to gain power and position. Thus, the eighteenth-century hosts and guests also faced a conflict of how to define the ideal of hospitality: would it be judged by the actions of hospitality or the motivations that spurred such action?

Studies of early modern hospitality suggest that this question was not as pressing in England before the eighteenth century. Rather, the conflict between ideal and practice was framed in terms of the extent of the physical offering of hospitality. Indeed, the loss of Elizabethan hospitality Knox's contemporaries mourned failed to fulfill its own ideals. When the “neighbouring country crowded to the smoking table,” the list of guests remained limited and the events themselves rarely occurred outside of the Christmas feast days. Felicity Heal's history of early modern hospitality finds that, for all the later nostalgia, hospitality was often lacking.³ Though highly spoken of, hospitality was rarely offered to those outside the host's class or family, and strangers were often treated with reserve (Heal 394). Any hospitality beyond the simple duties of feeding and lodging one's family and giving charity on holidays was often politically motivated, and hosts expected a reimbursement in the form of social prestige or political position (Heal 73). Hospitality beyond these limits was rarely offered in early modern England despite society's general praise of such acts.

³ Heal's book-length work provides the most thorough and complete study of early modern hospitality. Other studies that include discussions of hospitality in England tend to emphasize politics, economics, or social hierarchies and thus fail to offer the level of detail about practice and rhetorical ideal found in Heal's work. As such, much of the following section draws more heavily from Heal's work than other scholars.

Even if the practice of hospitality was actually quite limited, there existed an ideal of hospitality that valued openness and charity. Much like Knox's contemporaries, "railers" against eighteenth-century culture used the ideal of hospitality as a "rhetorical weapon" (Heal 403). This early modern rhetoric, unlike Knox's in his moral essay, showed less concern about motive and consequence and instead emphasized action.⁴ More to the point, early modern constructions of the Elizabethan ideal suggested that action and motive were inseparable and a courtier's actions directly displayed a generous interior.⁵ Though concerns of "dissimulation and hypocrisy" were raised against specific men, the ideal supported the notion that public hospitality reflected a moral interior (Heal 105). The act of openness, then, would suggest a corresponding openness in the heart of the host. The ideal itself, however, began with action and was only radical in its call for equal openness to "the neighbour *and* the stranger, the rich *and* the poor" (Heal 3). The acts performed for the guests were what determined the moral integrity of the host.⁶ Though action often failed to meet the ideal, the ethical standard measured actions and public behavior.

The separation between practice and ideal in early modern England was partly caused by the ideal of hospitable openness competing against a tradition of hospitality that worked to preserve social hierarchies. The exchange of hospitality itself presupposes a hierarchy because the host enjoys authority and power in his ability to bestow or withhold the invitation of welcome. This position of authority limits the ideal of hospitality as well; rather than relinquish his power, the host offers hospitality "on the condition that he maintains his own authority *in his own home* ... and thereby affirms the law of hospitality as the law of the household" (Derrida, "Hostipitality" 4). Derrida finds a radical ethics in the disruption of this authority, a disruption that the ideal of hospitality seems to promote. Yet, hospitality has traditionally worked to support

⁴ Among these are James I and Charles I's decrees to the nobility to return to their country estates to provide hospitality to their surrounding communities and 1615 broadside listing "Certaine wholesome Observations and Rules for Inne-keepers, and also for their Guests, meet to be fixed upon the wall of every Chamber in the house." (London: J. Beale, 1615. *Early English Books Online*. Web. 27 October 2011.) For more on the rhetoric of hospitality, see Kari Boyd McBride's *Country House Discourse in Early Modern England: A Cultural Study of Landscape and Legitimacy*.

⁵ This belief was closely aligned to the Renaissance idea of "sprezzatura," a means of hiding the training behind an art or behavior so to present it as occurring naturally. The term was popularized by Baldassare Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier*.

⁶ Ben Jonson's *To Penshurst* provides a literary example: the poem praises the acts of hospitality at the country manor, such as providing food and wine, providing comfortable rooms and grounds, and establishing prosperity in the neighborhood. Motives for providing this hospitable estate, and the host and hostess themselves, are noticeably lacking.

rather than disrupt hierarchies of class and authority. In her work on postcolonial hospitality, Mireille Rosello notes that the ideal of hospitality often hides cultural systems' support of oppressive social structures. While the ideal of hospitality "blurs the distinction between a discourse of rights and a discourse of generosity, the language of social contracts and the language of excess and gift-giving," the rhetoric surrounding the ideal can be used to "[mask] ruthless forms of non-rights" (9).⁷ Hospitality was certainly used in the early modern period to maintain social distinctions and confirm power structures. Rather than relinquish his authority, the host used hospitality to display his superior wealth and position.

The rhetoric surrounding hospitality was in fact used to support and justify the host's superior position in the early modern period. Hospitality was used by the host to prove worth and maintain separation from lower, more dependent, guests. Even for those guests of equal rank, the host often used hospitality, and the rhetorical position it offered, as a political tool, displaying his merit as a way to get preferment (Heal 6).⁸ The rhetoric surrounding hospitality in the early modern period thus allows for motives of self-interest and even encourages them. In practice, it was used as an exchange system whereby both host and guest could gain. In this economy of hospitality, the host offers material comforts and social connections; the guest, in response, must return the hospitality with some expression of gratitude often in the form of "prayers and praise" (Heal 192). The host confirmed or added to his social prestige, and the guest entered this social hierarchy with the hopes of using his skills of conversation and accommodation to gain further favors from the host. Promoting the exchange of both tangible and intangible goods, early modern hospitality embodied motives of self-interest that contradicted the larger ideal, even as this ideal underlay the exchange.

By the eighteenth century, both the ideal and the hierarchy supported by hospitality had been weakened. Indeed, the practice of hospitality lessened considerably for many reasons. First, economic changes upset old hierarchies and simultaneously disturbed old methods of hospitality

⁷ In fact, Rosello is one of the few contemporary critics to think of hospitality as a practice in her study of postcolonialism and hospitality. Studying the hospitality in its cultural and historical use, Rosello insists that hospitality "exists through constantly reinvented practices of everyday life that individuals borrow from a variety of traditions—from what their parents have taught them, from what they identify as their own traditional background—and practices that are sometimes similar to, sometimes different from, a supposedly shared norm" (7).

⁸ Queen Elizabeth, for example, famously used the status of the guest to enact her political desires. For more on her "progresses" or tours of the English countryside, see Archer, Goldring and Knight, 1-25.

that depended on and supported those hierarchies. Among these economic changes was the growth of a commercial hospitality industry that rendered hospitality from country estates largely unnecessary.⁹ Moreover, political upheavals associated with civil war further disrupted the old hierarchies on which hospitality depended; as sides were taken in the rebellion, strangers and outsiders were targeted with suspicion and found less welcome in homes. More gradually destabilizing to the hospitality exchange was the growth of the central state and the transition of peers and gentry to a more urban life, where opportunities to gain influence and participate in “the world of civility and fashion” were more easily pursued (Heal 402).¹⁰ Finally, a growing secularism and Protestant emphasis on faith over works questioned the act of offering hospitality.¹¹ Taken together, these social changes all threatened traditional hospitable exchange and so forced a redefinition of hospitality.

The eighteenth century, then, saw a period of flux in the system of hospitality. The ideal of hospitality faced a debate of definitions: was hospitality to be defined by intentions or actions? The answer, I will argue, became increasingly defined by an intentional ethic, an ethic that determined morality based on the motives that inspired the action rather than on the consequences of the action.¹² Yet, at the same time, the old conflict of how to match practice and ideal remained, even as this ideal was shifting definitions. To further complicate the debate, ideal and practice are difficult—perhaps impossible—to separate. Derrida attempts to mediate this problem through a paradox; he argues that “*the unconditional law of hospitality needs the laws.*” Without them, The Law “would risk being abstract, utopian, illusory” and, as such, would never enter the realm of practice. Though these laws “contradict The Law, or at any rate threaten it,

⁹ Heal finds that, by the end of the seventeenth century, the inn system was well established but points to evidence that this system had made early progress in the medieval era as the alehouse culture expanded (395-396).

¹⁰ The gentry had been moving to the city throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century, a practice which so noticeably disrupted the hospitality exchange that Elizabeth I, James I and Charles I all issued decrees ordering the nobility back to their estates in times of economic trouble. During and following the civil war, however, no such decrees were issued.

¹¹ Protestantism still highly valued charity, and John Calvin numbered it among the signs of a soul destined to be saved. However, Calvinism and other Protestant sects encouraged the giving of charity and the building of institutions rather than the offering of personal hospitality. Though Max Weber famously argued that Calvinist ethics discouraged charity in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, this claim is too strong for the eighteenth century. For more on the institutions of charity in the eighteenth century, see Hugh Cunningham and Joanna Innes, eds. *Charity, Philanthropy and Reform: from the 1690s to 1850*. London and New York: Macmillan Press, 1998.

¹² By intentional ethic, I refer to what philosophers call “virtue ethics.” However, I chose to use the term intentional ethics to underscore one of the primary tenants of virtue ethics—the agent’s motivations for acting.

sometimes corrupt or pervert it,” the laws also give The Law a possibility of existing in the world (*Of Hospitality* 79). Though dependent on one another, ideal and practice do not coincide and often result in an abstract ideal disconnected from the public practice. To understand the eighteenth-century debates over hospitality, then, I will turn to literature because it offers perspectives on both ideal and practice. Since novelists depict both the public manifestations of hospitality and the internal dispositions of the characters who offer, refuse or accept hospitality, novels offer a view of the changes and debates hospitality faced in the eighteenth century.

The Philosophical Shift: From Action to Intention

The ideal of hospitality explored in eighteenth-century novels was a product of a larger intellectual movement found in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. This philosophy helped define and promote ethical ideals based on intention. This shift was a part of the larger philosophical Enlightenment; as Cartesian ethics spread throughout Europe and the British Isles, philosophers began to privilege the individual and explore the human psyche.¹³ An ethics of personal motives became a part of this movement; rather than be defined by family, occupation, or social position, an individual came to be identified by disposition and intention. At the same time, personal and public morality were being defined by these personal intentions. My concern here is not to paint a sweeping picture of Enlightenment philosophy but to show how—even in texts from a variety of philosophical backgrounds—ethics was becoming more and more concerned with intention rather than action.

In particular, my interest lies in the philosophies of the British Isles and those that promote intentional ethics and influenced many of the novels of the second half of the century.¹⁴ I will draw from works by four philosophers: Pierre Bayle’s *Philosophical Commentary on These Words of the Gospel, Luke 14.23, “Compel Them to Come In, That my House May Be Full”*; Richard Cumberland’s *Treatise of the Laws of Nature*; Francis Hutcheson’s *Inquiry into*

¹³ For readings of this philosophical turn towards individuality, see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 127-176 and J.B. Scheewind, *The Invention of Autonomy*.

¹⁴ Scholars of eighteenth-century fiction have commonly made connections between the philosophical movements and literary trends of the century. Sentimental novels in particular have garnered attention for their use of moral sense theory derived from John Locke’s work and promoted by Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith. Modern critics, including Barbara Benedict, Liz Bellamy, Scott Paul Gordon, Lori Branch, Wendy Motooka and Adela Pinch, among others, draw connections between the social work of the eighteenth-century novel and philosophy.

the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; and Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. These works were written across the Restoration and eighteenth century, with dates ranging from the 1660s to the 1750s from various philosophical schools, yet all define disinterested intentions as ethical. Bayle, a contemporary of John Locke, writes on tolerance from a less political and more personal position than his peer to denounce religious persecution;¹⁵ Bayle contends that moral behavior and religious belief depend on the motivations behind them. Cumberland, a member of the Latitudinarians, offers this school's most thorough response to Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*;¹⁶ countering Hobbes' view that all human action is motivated by self-interest, Cumberland argues that moral action demands a disinterested intention. Hutcheson, a proponent of the moral sense theory, responds to a later proposal of natural human selfishness put forth by Bernard Mandeville;¹⁷ Hutcheson counters that humans instead respond to a moral sense that guides actions towards disinterested ends. Finally, Smith, writing as a contemporary of the novelists discussed in this project, proposes that disinterested intentions are the most ethical but also the most difficult to consistently pursue.

Though these texts do not directly address hospitality, they do share hospitality's chief ethical concern—how to best treat one's neighbor.¹⁸ This ethic certainly has Christian connotations, most notably in the Love Commandment found in both Matthew and Luke's gospel which called for Christians to love their neighbor as they love themselves. Indeed, each of the philosophical texts discussed here is influenced by Christianity and the Christian beliefs that surrounded and defined each of the philosophers: Bayle reinterprets Biblical texts to convince both Catholic and Protestant readers to be more tolerant, Cumberland finds God's will in the

¹⁵ The two men's works were published simultaneously but separately; there is no evidence that either man influenced the other and it seems as though they never met, despite Locke's travels in exile and Bayle's later friendship with Locke's student, the Earl of Shaftesbury. For more on the relationship between Locke and Bayle's work on tolerance, see Alex Schulman, 328-60 and Perez Zagorin, 240-288.

¹⁶ On Cumberland's education as a Latitudinarian and the importance of his response to Hobbes, see John Parkin's foreword to Cumberland's treatise, pp.x-xvi. The Latitudinarians sought to prove the rationality of Christianity and its contributions to a greater good. For a discussion of the impact one of its most popular members, George Tillotson, had on English preaching, see James Downey, 6-29.

¹⁷ Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees, or, Private Vices, Publick Virtues* was first published in 1705 as just the poem, "The Grumbling Hive: or, Knaves Turn'd Honest" and then reissued with extensive prose additions to explain the poem in 1714. Mandeville's initial poem received little attention but his revised text was denounced by a number of contemporary thinkers as an attack on Christian values.

¹⁸ I share Nancy Snow's sense of hospitality as an "application of the broader virtue of benevolence to the specific relationship of host and guest." Defining hospitality as "an expression of benevolence... [is]to imbue it with a depth that the virtue would otherwise lack" (7).

individual,¹⁹ Hutcheson concedes that God is the source of our moral sense,²⁰ and Smith, perhaps the least directly concerned with Christianity, rewrites the Love Commandment to illustrate his theory of sympathy.²¹ Despite these Christian influences, these texts approach ethics from a secular perspective; in fact, the earlier philosophers define their work as secular as a means to validate their message.²² Without the aim of advancing any religious position, these texts consider how ethical criteria outside of the Christian doctrine help guide interpersonal interactions. Hospitality is essential to that goal because it is itself a secular ethic meant to determine behavior in this world and to facilitate interactions between strangers—including strangers in faith.²³ These philosophies argue for the importance of good intentions in determining the morality of an action; in so doing, they help define hospitality as an intention.

As early as the 1660s, this ethical shift to use intention for moral judgments can be seen in Pierre Bayle's call for religious tolerance in a *Philosophical Commentary on Luke 14.23*, 'Compel them to come in, that my house may be full'. A Huguenot exiled from Catholic France, Bayle argues that personal conviction as a motive to act is vital to moral and religious belief.²⁴ Bayle begins by defining motives as "Acts of the Mind" and argues that physical actions "are approved by God only in proportion to the internal Acts of Mind from whence they proceed"

¹⁹ In one of many examples of how Cumberland conflates nature and God, he contends that "our Mind is, by the Light of Nature, let into the Knowledge of the Will or Laws of God" (252). For more on Cumberland's discussion of the Will and God, see Jon Parkin, "Probability, Punishments and Property: Richard Cumberland's Sceptical Science of Sovereignty."

²⁰ References to the design of a deity or higher being are made throughout the work. In one example, Hutcheson looks at the order of the universe and asks, "what possible room is there left for questioning Design in the Universe? None but the barest Possibility against an inconceivably great Probability, surpassing every thing which is not strict Demonstration" (53).

²¹ Smith's use of the Love Commandment will be discussed in more detail later in this section.

²² The earlier philosophical texts explored here emphasize their secular position. Bayle opens his text by proclaiming that he will "leave it to the Criticks and Divines to comment on this Text in their way" and instead examine the text from "Principles more general and more infallible than what a Skill in Languages, Criticism, or Common-place can afford." To do so, Bayle claims that he will not look at religious matters but at those of "natural Reason" (66-67). Likewise, Cumberland writes in his introduction that he "purposely contain'd myself wholly within the Bounds of Philosophy, and have therefore abstained from Theological Questions" in order to more directly respond to Thomas Hobbes' claims in the *Leviathan* and not dissolve into "dispute with Mr. Hobbes about the Sense of Scripture" (280-81). Those texts written later in the century also take secular positions but no longer feel the need to justify this approach.

²³ The Parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10. 25-37) follows Luke's version of the hospitality commandment—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself"—with a story that illustrates the hospitable neighbor is not defined by faith but by the feeling of compassion and response to another's need.

²⁴ For more on how these earlier religious persecutions and questions shape Bayle's life and work, see Elisabeth Labrousse's biography, *Bayle*.

(76). These “Acts of the Mind” are separate actions that occur internally and often influence physical behavior. This duality of action—in the mind and external to it—is used to promote religious tolerance; force should not be used to convert a person because physical threats cannot sway internal “Acts of the Mind.” Indeed, these internal acts are of more importance than their external counterparts, and physical actions, to be ethical, must respond to these internal acts. This privileging of internal “Acts of the Mind” restructures ethical standards around the individual rather than the community and has consequences for how social interaction is judged. Bayle uses an example of almsgiving to illustrate the nature of this change.²⁵ According to his philosophy, merely giving alms no longer constitutes a moral act; rather, the mind must also agree with the morality of the act. Thus, almsgiving is immoral if the alms are given when the giver imagines the receiver is undeserving and is moral only if the giver believes the receiver to be worthy (222-25). In this example, Bayle insists that an act such as almsgiving is only moral if the mind’s action corresponds with the physical action. Thus, Bayle finds that motive is more important than the act itself in determining the ethical nature of a situation: “of the two Actions, one of which we call good, the other bad, the good being done against the Instincts of Conscience, is a greater Sin than the bad Action done from the Instincts of Conscience” (221). Bayle thus works to rewrite ethical standards to privilege intentions over action. By defining these intentions as an alternative type of action, he seeks to encourage his peers to calculate these intentions, along with the traditionally judged external actions, into their moral systems of thought.

Philosophers in England were also debating the importance—and nature—of intention to ethical standards. Thomas Hobbes’ conclusion in his 1651 *Leviathan* that human motivation was primarily selfish was viewed with alarm by his contemporaries.²⁶ Working to redeem humanity from this negative definition, philosophers scrambled to describe human motivation as disinterested and social. Among those who responded to Hobbes, Richard Cumberland designed the most extensive and thorough rebuttal to reclaim human intention as a valid indicator of ethical action in his *A Treatise of the Laws of Nature*. Cumberland’s long response to Hobbes

²⁵ For more on Bayle’s unusual, narrative style of philosophy see Thomas M. Lennon’s in-depth analysis, *Reading Bayle*.

²⁶ There is debate among modern scholars whether this pessimistic simplification of Hobbes’ philosophy is fair and accurate; however, many of Hobbes’ contemporaries certainly read his work in this way. For more on seventeenth-century reactions to Hobbes’ theories, see John Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700*.

attempts to establish humans' natural perfection; he based this thesis on his interpretation of the Love Commandment, which he redefines as the "general Law of Nature" or "the greatest Benevolence of every rational Agent towards all" (292).²⁷ Following this Law, Cumberland argues, will lead society at large as well as the benevolent agent to the greatest good. If each person chose to follow this Law, then his or her actions would, as a matter of course, lead to hospitable ends. Knud Haakonssen summarizes Cumberland's argument as a proposal that "true happiness lies only in one's perfection and perfection only in *intentionally* contributing to the common good, that is, in making God's will one's own" (*Natural Law* 35). Indeed, the idea of will, like Bayle's "Acts of the Mind," turns attention to human intention and how these intentions correspond to physical actions. Cumberland claims that "whatever a Man can will, he can also resolve to effect the same, as far as it is in his Power" (473). This will is defined as intention but also, according to Cumberland, "assumes the complete Nature of an End," thereby asserting control over action and consequence as well (473). Will, then, like the "Act of the Mind" attempts to bridge the gap between action and intention; at the same time it privileges intention as the source of action and the determiner of consequence.

Cumberland's work became more popular in the eighteenth century when it was translated from its original Latin to English in 1727.²⁸ Yet, by this time, the emphasis on intention had been adopted and expanded by the moral sense philosophers. Francis Hutcheson's *Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* was a contemporary of the Cumberland translation and proposed a similarly optimistic view of human motives. This optimism is reflected in how Hutcheson's theory is based on an internal moral perception he calls the moral sense. His first thesis maintains that "some Actions have to Men an Immediate Goodness; or, that by a superior sense, which I call a Moral one, we perceive Pleasure in the Contemplation of such Actions in others, and are determin'd to love the Agent, ... without any

²⁷ J.B. Schneewind notes that Cumberland opens his treatise with two biblical quotations that offer love as the ultimate Christian law: Matthew 22.37-39, which outlines the two commandments to "love the Lord, thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind" and to "love thy neighbor as thyself," and Romans 13.10, which says "Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." Schneewind then likens Cumberland's philosophy to a justification of these hospitable laws in order to "show that love is the core of morality, and law only its instrument" (102).

²⁸ Cumberland's work was certainly not ignored in the seventeenth century; in fact, three editions of the Latin text were printed before 1700. The work was also adapted into a shorter text in 1701 and reprinted in Latin in 1720 before an English translation was produced by John Maxwell. Jon Parkin speculates in the Foreword of the Liberty Fund text used here that the translation was fueled by Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of Bees* (xvii-xix).

View of further natural Advantage from them” (88). This moral sense, like Bayle’s “Acts of the Mind” and Cumberland’s “will,” guides humans to ethical action in the world. Those actions which elicit positive responses from the moral sense are ethical and are themselves thought to spring from moral intentions. Like his predecessors, Hutcheson continues to consider motive to be the chief determiner of ethical behavior. Indeed, actions without proper intentions are found unethical, and “external Motions, when accompany’d with no Affections toward God or Man, . . . can have no moral Good or Evil in them” (101). Hutcheson insists that moral judgment of an act should be based solely on the intention that motivates the action rather than on the action or its consequence.

But Hutcheson’s theory does differ from earlier philosophies that were concerned primarily with the actors in an exchange and therefore found the chief stumbling block for their theories in proving an association between intention and action. For example, this problem of association is inherent within Bayle’s ethical system. One cannot, after all, know without doubt whether a beggar is worthy of alms. Thus, for Bayle, the problem of judging is the problem of belief itself—what if we believe in error? Bayle’s answer is to accept the logical conclusion such false belief would have on his ethical construct. Bayle contends that “a Murder committed from the Instincts of Conscience, is a less Sin than not committing Murder when Conscience dictates” (249). Murder and other sinful acts, if they are believed to be just, are moral acts *because* the intention was to do right.²⁹ Bayle’s conclusion is rather unsatisfactory because it ultimately condones the very persecution he writes against. Cumberland’s theory approaches the problem of association differently, arguing that rationally determined probabilities will inform actions to produce the desired end. Cumberland argues that “whereas we know not what shall hereafter happen, we may, nevertheless know what is possible” and logically work through which possibilities have the greatest probability of leading to the intended result (492). Through this crucial connection, Cumberland provides a philosophy that allows intention, action, and consequence to easily coincide—perhaps too easily to be believable in a flawed world.³⁰

²⁹ For a discussion of how this conclusion fits into Bayle’s larger philosophy see Lennon, 81-101.

³⁰ J.B. Schneewind ponders this happy conflation and argues that Cumberland is proposing a world view of social harmony in his work. See Schneewind, 101-117.

Hutcheson inherits this difficulty but, unlike his predecessors, does not approach the problem from the actor's perspective. Rather, Hutcheson introduces an observer who can more easily stand back from the action and determine the probable intentions of the actors.³¹ Yet, this approach also has a flaw; the moral sense is determined not by the actor but by an observer, and this new position creates new problems of perception. Because intention occurs in the mind, it is difficult for an observer to determine what intentions are influencing the actions produced; moreover, good intentions do not necessarily lead to good consequences, and actions are not always an accurate means of judging intention. Hutcheson acknowledges that "Human Laws however, which cannot examine the Intentions, or secret Knowledge of the Agent, must judge in gross of the Action itself." The judgments of the observer must work as though it is possible to determine the intention, "presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain'd, which we are oblig'd to attain" (131). The observer is to act as responsibly as he can in his judgment of others' intentions but cannot completely overcome the limitations of the physical world. Intention, which is of utmost ethical importance, cannot be accessed by the public observer much as the consequences cannot be foreseen by the actors.³² Thus, the observer perspective Hutcheson introduces might overcome the problems of associating intention and action faced by the actor but introduces a new problem of judgment in properly assessing the connection between intention and action. While the actor cannot determine the outcome of his intentions, the observer cannot be sure of the intentions of the actors. While this observer stance is designed to make the connections of intention, action and outcome more easily connected, it ultimately raises more difficulties for determining the now essential intentions of actors.

By the mid-eighteenth century, the era in which the novels in question were being written, the ethical importance of intention was well established. The corresponding problems of understanding which actions would lead to the intended outcomes and identifying intentions from physical actions were also established. These trends are apparent in the work of Adam

³¹ The observer position as a moral standpoint had been popularized in the previous decade in the *Spectator*, a newspaper that used the persona of a detached observer to comment on the vices and virtues of public life in England.

³² Daniela Gobetti reads this paradox as both a "source of problems for Hutcheson's thought" and "an important symptom of the changing nature of moral discourse, and of the changing relationship between morality, legality, and politics" (118). Gobetti cannot answer for the problem of perception in Hutcheson's work but does connect this problem with the developing political and legal systems that mark our modern world.

Smith, who continued to privilege motivation as an ethical standard but tempered the dependence on intentions with an array of corruptions and barriers that complicate such an ethics. Intention still remains central to morality, but its ability to be exercised is questioned more intensely. Smith agrees that “the only consequences for which [the actor] can be answerable, or by which he can deserve either approbation or disapprobation of any kind, are those which were some way or other intended, or those which, at least, show some agreeable or disagreeable quality in the intention of the heart, from which he acted” (93). Intention is found to be the determinant of morality. Actions and consequences remain less important but, for Smith, they tend to problematize the ability to discern intention. As Hutcheson’s theory began to suggest, humans, limited to basic observation, must use action and consequence to judge. Smith argues that, though intention is what should determine the “whole merit or demerit” of an action, these are private and thus “beyond the limits of every human jurisdiction.” Thus, Smith claims, we function through a necessarily flawed system wherein “men in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not for their designs and intentions” (105).³³ Intention is clearly the standard by which judgments should be made, but actions are the only accessible object to judge.

Smith turns even further towards the observer’s perspective, asking even actors to take up the viewpoint of a disinterested observer. Like Hutcheson, Smith finds that every man possesses the means to be benevolent and reach an idealized morality; he argues man knows right from wrong because a “demigod within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct” creates, “in the mind of every man, an idea of this kind, gradually formed from his observations upon the character and conduct both of himself and of other people” (247). Though each man possesses this “demigod within the breast” with the capacity for benevolence, Smith qualifies that each person will only be so good as the “delicacy and acuteness” of their observations (247).³⁴

³³ V.M. Hope claims that Smith actually proposes two systems of ethics, one based on the merit and demerit of an action and the other on propriety and impropriety. See Hope, 88-100.

³⁴ Yet, despite discussion of how human behavior often fails to meet an ideal of open, active hospitality, Smith’s philosophy continues to insist on the potential of a naturally benevolent nature and strengthens this position in subsequent editions. Wendy Motooka argues that, in each revision of *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith deals less and less with the particulars of life or the active application of moral sentiment, which thus allows him to insist more and more on the ideal of the impartial spectator within each man (211). She argues that Smith, by emphasizing the universal potential of benevolence, creates a flawed system that only works “when everyone agrees...when it is least needed” (220). The ideal, which Smith acknowledges is difficult to maintain, is only explicated within the theoretical works of philosophy; in a messier world, the ideal of benevolence is far less easily discerned from self-interested behavior.

Benevolence may still be a natural response in this theory but it requires training and diligence to turn this benevolence into action. This qualification of universal benevolence reflects Smith's tendency to dwell on the difficulty of removing the obstacles to benevolence, a tendency that distances Smith from Hutcheson. His use of the Love Commandment illustrates this move: "As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us" (Smith 25). For Smith, even actors in an exchange of hospitality are required to take an observer's perspective. Rather than act on the love of neighbor, the actor is asked to step back and observe what that love is and then apply it internally rather than externally. By revising the commandment, Smith emphasizes neither active love of neighbor nor benevolent intentions towards others but rather explores an internalized consideration of another's perspective and potential intention. When applied to hospitality ethics, the result is a host whose perspective and distance from self allows for greater benevolence but does not suggest that this intention will lead to action as was proposed by earlier philosophers.³⁵

The ethics of intention and the problems it creates parallel the ethical problem of hospitality: the ideal relies on judgments of the actors' intentions but practice, by necessity, can only consist of action and consequence. The ethical questions introduced in these philosophical texts are apparent in the system of hospitality as well. As intention became the ethical standard in the eighteenth century, hospitality became increasingly defined by the benevolent intentions thought to promote its ideal. The questions surrounding intentional ethics thus are applied to the hospitable exchange: how can an intention of open hospitality be translated into action and how can its consequences be predicted? How can the observer of hospitality determine from viewed actions the intentions of the actors in the exchange? These two questions—one of association, one of perspective—are crucial to the ethical inquiries found in the eighteenth-century novel. These novels often take the perspective of the protagonist, a limited perspective which illustrates the difficulties of reading another's intentions. Likewise, these novels explore ethical obligation through plots of action, placed in the contexts of a larger world; this approach details the

³⁵ Wendy Motooka discusses the "circularity" of Smith's moral claims and the eighteenth-century responses to the inactive nature of Smith's ethics in *The Age of Reasons: Quixotism, Sentimentalism and Political Economy in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, 205-220.

problems of association as actions and intentions are both vital to the ethical practice of hospitality. These novels use hospitality to work through the dimensions of these questions and possible solutions to the problems of association and perception.

Literary Ethics: Guests in Context

Eighteenth-century novels investigate these two questions but approach intention as an ethic from a different perspective. The early philosophy discussed here was concerned with actors in what would be considered the host position—those actors in the position to offer hospitality, charity, or welcome—and the later philosophy viewed ethical exchanges from the detached perspective of an observer. Novels—and narrative in general—tend to focus on the guest perspective, following the stories of questing heroes, pilgrims, travelers, orphans, or exiles as they seek shelter and kindness from the strangers they meet on their journeys.³⁶ Eighteenth-century novels, which repeatedly take these characters as their central focus, approach the ethical questions of hospitality from this guest perspective. This shift in perspective emphasizes the cultural and social changes of the eighteenth century. The marginalized guest position resembles that of Britain's new social voices in their vulnerabilities to authority and their lack of guidelines for behavior; these new Britons, including migrating Scotsmen and women, responded to their surroundings much like hospitable guests. The complications of this shifted perspective are evident in the depictions of the common scene of a carriage ride in the novels. Not a traditional form of hospitality, the carriage ride becomes a site for hospitality as travelling guests meet together in a space that requires each traveler to accommodate the other. However, in these scenes, there is no host but a wide spectrum of guests from diverse backgrounds and varying philosophical foundations. The lack of host in these scenes emphasizes the complexities of the guest perspective; asked to be both welcoming of others and wary of harm, these guests in the eighteenth century are asked to navigate a complex social system of social and ideological diversity. For example, a carriage ride depicted in Sarah Fielding's *David Simple* brings together the characters of a clergyman, an atheist, and a fop; without a host, these guests must themselves

³⁶ As their philosophical predecessors, modern ethicists also predominantly write about the host rather than the guest. The works of Derrida, Caputo, and Tracy McNulty discussed in this work all investigate the obligations of one who hosts. Concerned primarily with how this host might encounter the Other with more openness, they overlook the ethical standpoint of the guest.

manage their interactions and ride peacefully despite their conflicting worldviews (161). The guest's moral obligations we find in this scene and others are multiplied in the eighteenth century. Further complicating the guest perspective, questions of hospitality and its obligations are generally framed for the host or observer, asking for judgment of whether to act prior to an exchange or whether the act was good after the exchange. Novels, by taking up the guest perspective, offer important insight into the ideals and practice of hospitality from within the exchange itself.

This point of view is immediately troubled; the questions of association and perspective framed for the host and observer are unsolvable to the guest. For the first, the nature of the guest position requires passivity; the guest must set aside prejudice and ambition to receive accommodation. Moreover, the guest's duties are to respond to the host's lead and be receptive to the host's own position. As such, guests are rarely in a position to control action; no matter their intentions, their ability to act on them is limited. Second, the guest is thoroughly involved in the hospitable exchange and so cannot view the situation from the position of an observer. Often in a position of dependency, the guest is unable to see the motivations behind his received hospitality or predict the outcome of his acceptance of it. Thus, the guest can ask how to translate intention to action but faces more difficulty completing that transaction. Likewise, he can, and must, attempt to see the motivations behind a host's hospitality but, from within the transaction, is often misled or confused. The novels' carriage scenes highlight the uncomfortable ethical position of the host. Placed into a carriage with strangers, the guest must evaluate the other travelers. Mackenzie's *Man of Feeling* illustrates these problems. Harley seeks to accommodate his fellow travelers by taking a seat although he knows "being driven backwards always disagreed with him" (99). His desire to make his companions more comfortable is limited, and his self-sacrifice seems foolish since it cannot make any one else's ride more enjoyable and even threatens to make the ride less pleasant for all. Despite his good will towards his fellow guests, Harley also immediately begins to scrutinize their "physiognomy" to reveal their characters; as a guest, he attempts to observe his company though the narrative reminds the reader of Harley's ill-luck with the practice in London, suggesting that Harley will have similar difficulty discerning the characters of his companions. As both host and observer, then, Harley is largely ineffectual in this scene. Though not designed for describing an idealized exchange, the guest

position is well-equipped to fully investigate the problems of practicing hospitality and, more particularly, of practicing the new ethical ideal of hospitality so concerned with intention.

Indeed, the guest position exposes the discomfort of guest dependency and the difficulty of determining the ethical nature of hospitality. As an actor in the ethical exchange, the guest is necessarily concerned with the nature of that exchange. But in the eighteenth century, this concern expanded to include the host's intention as well as his actions. Because the ethical value of the exchange is determined by intention, the guest must observe the situation and analyze the associations between action and intention. This change in ethical focus takes hospitality from the authority of the host—who traditionally had to determine the worthiness of the guest—and places it with the guest—who now must judge the intentions behind his welcome into a household. The guest takes on the traditional host duty of calculating the morality of the exchange but, unlike the traditional host, is concerned not with his own intentions and actions but with those of the host. Though holding ethical responsibility, the guest does not have the power to act on his judgment. Instead, the guest must view the exchange from the perspective of a detached observer in order to more accurately read the host's intentions. In the carriage scenes mentioned above, for example, the traveling guests must attempt to uncover the intentions of their fellow travelers; Harley attempts to read "physiognomies" and Cynthia, a guest in *David Simple*, finds herself labeling her companions as "the Clergyman,--the Atheist,--and the Butterfly" according to the behaviors she observes (161). These observations, however, leave little room for action in the literal confines of the carriage. These new duties of observer and host do not negate the former role of the guest. This role is necessarily passive and follows the "customary parameters" of the host's household, passively accepting "the goods and services" that the host considers hospitable (Heal 192). The very essence of the guest's role is reactionary as he responds to the hospitality of the host. Thus, the need for the guest to determine the intention of his host asks for this role to be reevaluated. The guest must remain passive but also a detached arbitrator. While the guest's earlier duties were merely to make judgment of himself easy by providing confirmation of his own identity (Heal 215), the guest now had to search into the private identity of the hosts to determine the morality of their hospitality. Both of these demands on the guest produce impossible situations—the guest cannot be responsible for the

ethics of exchange if unable to act and the guest cannot see the exchange as an observer when involved in the exchange.

Literature was particularly suited to explore this relationship because literature had traditionally used the guest's perspective to discuss hospitality and its ethics. The guest position had always been an anxious one, and scholars have noted this trend.³⁷ These anxieties have generally been rooted in the physical exchange and the vulnerability of the guest. Though susceptible to the bad intentions of the host, the guest is only concerned with those intentions that are manifested physically. Starting with ancient Greek tales of heroic journeys, narratives use the guest position to explore the ethics of welcome and gratitude. Greek and Roman epics, for example, follow a journeying hero, who must often act as a guest along the journey and meets with a range of exemplary good and bad hosts. In these narratives, hospitality is encountered as an action in a series of plot points.³⁸ Steve Reece breaks down these points into moments of "arrival, reception, seating, feasting, identification, bedding down, bathing, gift giving, and departure" to argue for hospitality as a culturally and generically coded event that produces a system of hierarchy and reciprocity. Gifts pass from the host to the guest with gratitude and some sort of reciprocation asked in return (Reece 35). The guest's primary function in such tales is to offer reassurances of his identity and purpose in travelling. Reece considers this revelation of the guest's identity the "most critical element" in the hospitable exchange and one that determines the nature of hospitality and its potential for exchange (25). These depictions of hospitality, then, dwell on the ethics within the actions themselves. The host and guest are expected to perform their own duties and ethical values are only questioned when these duties are not performed. These responsibilities also support hierarchies; the guest's duties are more passive and involve primarily giving information when requested. The host's duties require more action, and his ability to be a good host depends entirely on his ability to provide the proper stages of hospitality.

³⁷ The following will explore those scholars who speak specifically of host-guest relationships; however, connections to the anxious guest position can be seen in the foundations of modern narrative study. For example, Joseph Campbell's "hero's journey" or Northrop Frye's "theory of modes" both discuss literature's propensity to follow a hero along a journey of discovery that results in either integration or separation from a larger society.

³⁸ For example, Odysseus is taken off course from his journey home, where he is host, and made a guest (or hostage) to Lotus-eaters, Aeolus, Circe, Calypso, and the Phaeacians in a series of adventures.

Medieval romances are structured like classic epics as they follow the heroics of a knight on a quest. As he journeys, the knight often finds himself in the role of guest who must interpret the actions of the host to determine any danger to himself or those he has pledged to protect. This judgment tends to be primarily concerned with the performance of the exchange and the social hierarchy it upholds rather than motivations for the action.³⁹ Instead, romance uses the figurative power of hospitality to establish a hierarchy and obligations for the guest to negotiate. Matilda Tomaryn Bruckner reads these hospitable exchanges in medieval romance as “a rite which validates or invalidates the social identity of all those involved” while it “confers or confirms status” (117). The guest and the travelling adventurer can use hospitality to receive favors from the court or other forms of social prestige. Hospitality is not just an action that offers room and board but it also serves as an “instrument of social identity, [or] a proof or test of his merit” (Bruckner 119). The knight must then use these instances of hospitality to further confirm his valor or personal merit. The ethics depicted in the medieval narratives are concerned with external markers of social position and the fulfilling of social obligations. They offer critiques of host’s motives only so far as these motives upset the social hierarchy or cause a failure to fulfill social responsibilities.⁴⁰

Early modern texts continue to use the guest’s position to explore the ethics of social exchange through the guest’s vulnerability. Increasing diversity within the social systems on which exchange depends—always a factor for the traveler—becomes of greater ethical importance in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Charles Ross notes that, what he terms the “custom of the castle” disrupts an universal sense of ethics because it suggests that proper behavior is dependent on the traditions of a specific place and thus primarily a “social construction” (Ross 85). The guest, when entering a castle, is asked to determine the conventions specific to that estate and act according to the host’s expectations and demands, and this interpretive act begins to demand that the guest judge his host’s intention. Ross sees this literary use of custom shifting in the early modern period; Spenser’s *Fairie Queene*, for example, no

³⁹ For example, in *Lanval*, the eponymous hero is offered ideal hospitality by a fairy lady and then receives poor hospitality from Queen Guinevere and King Arthur; though Guinevere is shown to be motivated by jealousy. *Lanval* is notably uncouth about deciphering such motivations. Likewise, Sir Gawain must guess at the motivations of the Green Knight to be beheaded and to threaten beheading his guest.

⁴⁰ In the examples offered in the previous note, *Lanval* critiques the lust and greed of the court hosts and *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight* questions the pursuit of honor, the fickleness of the host’s requests.

longer limits morality to “doing the right thing” but also insists on “a man’s knowing right from wrong” (16). Ross finds that in these situations where the guest is asked to judge the host the knight finds an “inability to perform” (16). The problem of guest passivity is immediately apparent in these formative texts and suggests a burgeoning concern with the personal motivations that drive the public social system. Early modern drama and poetry continue to explore the nature of hierarchies but use the guest position to question the ethical obligations of the host and the nature of the exchange. Daryl Palmer sees the use of a host character in drama as immediately invoking “questions of societal order and survival” (28). Indeed, the host character often signifies political disruption in this period and the guest’s point of view is often utilized to display that worry.⁴¹ Philip Sidney’s *Arcadia*, for example, includes a king who retires from his political obligations and the hospitable entertaining his position expected, thus leaving his kingdom vulnerable to attack. Here and elsewhere, Sidney shows that the “other side of hospitality is warfare between the ranks” (Palmer 56). By allowing for a power vacuum, the king has asked his subjects to compete to move upward in the social hierarchy. Hospitality in the early modern period remains concerned with physical exchange; yet, by proliferating the ways such exchange could proceed, literary representations begin to explore the causes behind hospitality’s deficiencies.⁴²

As civil war, economic change, religious questioning and the growth of London disrupted the enactment of hospitality in the seventeenth century, it also shifted the depictions of hospitality in literature. Many aspects remained, including the central focus on the travelling guest; however, this guest was no longer a noble hero but often a common man or, increasingly, a woman. Moreover, the locale and identity of the host changed. Much eighteenth-century fiction follows the travel of a protagonist from his or her home in the country to London. In the city, they search for hospitality, not at the country estate, but at court, in coffee-houses, markets, plays, and public parks. The hosts are not landed gentry in control of the surrounding community, but any individual with more social or political power than the travelling

⁴¹ Shakespeare’s *Macbeth* offers a notable exception with its emphasis on the host and hostess.

⁴² Other early modern forms celebrate the idea of good hosting that specifically supposes a stable political state. Country-house poems, for example, detail the hospitality of a host by celebrating the order that host maintains on their estate. It is this order that allows them to keep their guests so comfortably.

protagonist. Often, after the failure of these hosts, hospitality is sought from peers and even those of lower orders. Indeed, these novels often look for hospitality in new places from members of all social classes. In this varied world, these novels try to establish how good hospitality is given and how to recognize good hospitality when it was offered. The successes and failures these texts depict work to define the problems of hospitality as well as a new ideal; at the same time, however, these texts indicate new challenges or threats faced by hospitality in a changing environment.

Literary Hospitality: New Problems of Exchange

Eighteenth-century novels bring together an ethical standard that prizes intention, a cultural form that controls moral practices, and a literary emphasis on the guest. As a result, depictions of hospitality in these texts navigate intention, practice and the guest position and expose the ethical changes and struggles faced during an exchange. In exploring the new ethics of intention, these novels reveal the difficulties of problems of associating intention with action and problems of perceiving intention from action and highlight how these problems affect the hospitable practices meant to build relationships. Moreover, by viewing these relationships from the guest perspective, the novels discussed here make clear the anxieties surrounding hospitality and the specific vulnerabilities of the guest. In understanding these vulnerabilities, eighteenth-century novels propose and accept limitations in the practice of hospitality. These novels make clear that limitations are necessary to protect those involved in hospitable exchanges but, at the same time, make known the difficulties of maintaining such limitations. As a result, these novels propose limitations as a solution to problems of perception and association only to suggest that limited hospitality is impossible in an uncontrollable world.

Chapter one investigates the turn to intention during the eighteenth century and the resulting problems of association that derive from this shift. These problems, connected with the host who is responsible for making his actions conform to and express his intentions, are most notable in philosophical texts which take the host's position as the ethical standard. I will return to the treatises of Bayle, Cumberland, Hutcheson and Smith, which all address problems of diversity; in a world constantly encountering new cultures and their ethical traditions, normative practices thought to reveal specific intentions were called into question. These philosophers

accept that such diversity makes choosing actions that accurately reflect intention all the more difficult. Looking closely at these works, this chapter argues that philosophy fails to reconcile this diversity and its subsequent problems associating actions with intentions. Instead, philosophers point to narrative as a better way to resolve differences between the host's and guest's expectations because narratives provide a context of practice against which the actions of individuals involved in an exchange can be examined.

Thus establishing literature as a potential ethical force in the eighteenth century, this chapter turns to an example of hosting in literature in the character of Harley, the focus of Henry Mackenzie's *Man of Feeling*. While most narratives take the perspective of the guest, this text closely follows the life and death of a hosting character. More importantly, though two-dimensional examples of hosts abound in literature, Mackenzie's work delves into the psyche and motivations of the host, almost obsessively portraying the emotional responses that drive Harley's benevolent behavior. Reading this text closely, however, reveals that intentional ethics do not resolve problems of association when context and characters are provided. Instead, Harley proves to be a startlingly inactive and ineffective host, unable to change his environment despite his flawless intentions. Indeed, as this chapter shows, the host position is weakened by an intentional ethic that fails to prescribe how an environment can be controlled by the host.

Chapter two considers the fate of the guest when good hosts, like Harley, are weakened or removed from the system. Without a strong guiding force, the guest must rely on his own judgment when pursuing hospitality. Still dependent on the care and service hospitality provides, the guest is increasingly asked to determine the motives of the host; however, the guest is particularly ill-equipped to perceive any ulterior motives behind a host's hospitable actions. This chapter investigates the depictions of bad hosts in the novel, ranging from classic negative examples, such as misers and spendthrifts, to new forms of negative hosts who prey on the guest through the use of deceptive hospitality. To do so, I will look at four texts which will frame the next three chapters: Tobias Smollett's *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker*, Charlotte Lennox's *Sophia*, Sarah Fielding's *The Adventures of David Simple*, and Frances Burney's *Cecilia, or, Memoirs of an Heiress*. In each of these four texts, the central character is made to withstand the hospitality of bad hosts. I will show that, vulnerable to all hosts, these guests' reactions to these

negative forms of hospitality range from disgust to discomfort to debilitating anxiety that correspond to the nature of deception in the offered hospitality.

To help make this claim, chapter two uses gift theory, and particularly the work of Pierre Bourdieu, to illustrate the steps of an exchange of hospitality. Gift studies shares with theories of hospitality a concern with both ideals and practices as well as an awareness of cultural norms. By likening the guest-host relationship to that of the giver-receiver, the depth of the perception problem becomes clear. Though bad hosting is always a threat, only those forms of predatory hospitality that conceal themselves behind seemingly benevolent actions disrupt the psyche of the guest. In other words, it is only when the guest is deceived that hospitality is portrayed as threatening to the guest and destructive to the larger system of hospitality. The novel thus contends that bad hosting, made possible by the weakening host position, exacerbates the guest's problems of perception, which can in turn undermine the entire system of hospitality.

Indeed, chapter three contemplates how guests attempt to restructure the hospitality systems to combat their vulnerability to deceptive hospitality. Though hosts have the traditional power to limit hospitality by accepting or rejecting guests, the guests of these novels place limits on hospitality by cutting out the host position entirely. Noting the weakened position of the host, these guests create a society of like-minded guests. This society is open only to those guests that exhibit ideal guest behavior, specifically disinterested motives and passivity to the desires of others. In these closed environments, the guest is no longer vulnerable to the host, and the exchange of hospitality is pursued in an equal exchange.

The ideal guest behavior, however, manifests itself differently in male and female guests. Defense against bad hosts depends to a certain extent on the financial and social positioning of the guest and a resulting capability to leave the exchange; only female guests are shown to be made more vulnerable by a passive, disinterested state. Though their male counterparts might suffer emotional turmoil because of their passivity, they do not risk physical harm; instead, the benefits of their disinterested care for others outweigh the potential risks to their persons. Chapter three addresses this gender split and argues that men like Matthew Bramble and David Simple have the ability to limit their hospitality to other guests in order to act more comfortably; in this society of guests, these men are prized for the openness, passivity and disinterestedness that formerly weakened their social position. Female guests, on the other hand, are routinely

shown to require a more limited expression of these prized traits than their male counterparts; instead, the use of reason and control of personal desire is particularly valued in female characters. The women discussed in this chapter—Cecilia Beverley and Sophia Darnley—are both depicted as moral characters because of their ability to use reason to combat their natural tendencies towards passivity, openness and disinterest which leaves women vulnerable to desires or deceits of others. Passivity, a gendered trait in these texts, is shown as a potential danger to the women that possess it; though disinterest is still highly prized and necessary to the exemplary behavior of these women, reason must be used to limit the company worthy to receive their hospitable attention. For both male and female guests, limitations and exclusions are necessary to the exchange of safe and agreeable hospitality.

These exclusions, however, do not result in unequivocally happy endings in these novels. Rather, as chapter four argues, these new limits are questioned even as they are proposed in the texts. In each of the novels discussed here, the hospitable relationship is changed into a familial one; through marriages and discoveries of kinship, hospitality is overwhelmed by the more permanent and stable bonds of family. This shift suggests that hospitality as an ethic cannot exist without its trademark of openness to others; instead, such limits cause hospitality to be replaced with an alternative value system. Moreover, in several cases—those of *David Simple* and *Cecilia*—the loss of hospitality is not glossed over by a comedic end to the novel. Rather these two texts dwell on how the world cannot be excluded from the newly-established circle of like-minded guests but constantly intrudes into the limited world and makes such attempts to limit social interactions futile. Thus, the eighteenth-century novel undermines the very theory of hospitable limitations it puts forth.

These novels suggest, then, that there is no good answer to the problems of association and perception in hospitality ethics; any attempt to mediate the intentions of others results in limitations that effectively displace hospitality as an ethic. The only means to maintain hospitality, these texts suggest, is to remain open to the very problems that the ethics creates. This paradox—one that modern day thinkers still face and one that still plagues the practice of hospitality today—defines the eighteenth-century novel as it approaches the revolutions and social upheavals of the Romantic Era. Depicting the journeys of average guests, these texts reveal a world of changing ethical standards and values that remains unstable throughout the

century. At the same time, they expose the struggle faced by individuals who were caught between traditional and new ethical systems and remind the reader of the discomfort and vulnerabilities felt by the guest in an unreliable world.

CHAPTER ONE: THE DEATH OF THE HOST

The emphasis on intention in hospitality ethics replaces an older system more interested in the active responsibilities of the host; this ethical shift begs the question of how the host might adapt to an intentional system. This question haunts some eighteenth-century narratives, but in Henry Mackenzie's *Man of Feeling* it is the very subject of the narrative. Mackenzie's novel shows a host so exhausted by the benevolent welcome intentional ethics demands that he weakens and dies; the ethical ideal, his death suggests, is unable to adapt to the more materialistic world. The narrative thus explores the implications of the death of the host for hospitality's ethical choices and reciprocal obligations. In so doing, Mackenzie's narrative tells of the death of traditional hospitality. By further examining the tenets of the philosophical thinkers from the introduction, I will show that the new emphasis on intention deprives traditional hospitality of the rather simple scheme of beneficence and obligation that organized social relationships of an earlier time. I will argue that, in its place, the ethical responsibilities of the host are transferred to a guest whose own vulnerable position perpetuates the weakening of the hospitality system.

Mackenzie begins the *Man of Feeling* (1771) with a narrative prelude presenting the novel as a found text. In this prelude, the reader meets the narrator after the events recounted in the text have already occurred. The curate, the owner of the found text who gifts the papers to their later "editor," describes the supposed narrator as

a grave, oddish kind of man...The country people called him The Ghost, and he was known by the slouch in his gait, and the length of his stride. I was but little acquainted with him, for he never frequented any of the clubs hereabouts. Yet for all he used to walk a-nights, he was as gentle as a lamb at times; for I have seen him playing at te-totum with the children, on the great stone at the door of our church-yard. (48)

Marked as a ghost, the narrator is a man without a place in society. He fails to attend clubs and participate in the community but instead lives detached from social life only to be observed as an eccentric by the active members of society. Though clearly still a physical man with a "slouch"

and a “stride,” this ghost lacks any position or place to identify him within the adult world. Rather than participate in the public sphere, *The Ghosts* limits his actions to walking at night and playing games with children, a choice that marks the narrator as detached from social influence and without significant influence himself. Associated here with the graveyard by name (“Ghost”), personality (“grave”) and physical proximity (he plays “on the great stone...of our church-yard”), the narrator functions as a link between worlds. As a ghost lingers between the living and dead, *The Ghost* wanders between a living world of exchange and interaction and a lost world of ideals. When we first hear of *The Ghost*, he is a liminal figure, between rather than of the worlds of the living and the dead.

In the events that the text recounts, however, *The Ghost* takes part in exchanges of hospitality. Indeed, as a character in the text, *The Ghost* fulfills the traditional duties of the guest. He is the guest of two exemplary hosts who express the good intentions of the new hospitable ideal: Harley, the hero and primary focus of *Man of Feeling*, takes *The Ghost* in when “the malevolence of fortune” leaves him with few friends (135); and Ben Silton, the late head of Silton Hall remembered in the text as an honest and welcoming man of sense and virtue, is the idealized former host of *The Ghost*. In this recounted past, *The Ghost* lived actively as the guest, Charles, a man searching for welcome in a world of discomfort. When he receives hospitality from Harley and Silton, Charles praises their welcome with the gratitude of an ideal guest.⁴³ Each mention of Silton is followed by an effusive interruption of praise, often accompanied by tears.⁴⁴ Likewise, Charles displays his appreciation of Harley’s hospitality with his own concern for Harley’s well-being on his deathbed (135). In each case, however, the accommodating host dies, and Charles’ praise must be expressed in the past tense in the narrative. Their deaths indicate the loss of good hosts but also deprive Charles of his position as ideal guest; without the benevolent hosts Harley and Silton, Charles is no longer an ideal guest. Indeed, the narrative opens on Charles spitefully harassing a lapdog who is napping on Silton’s old chair rather than

⁴³ The behaviors of an ideal guest include public expressions of gratitude and uncomplaining acceptance of the host’s offers of hospitality (Heal 192).

⁴⁴ For example, the narrator sheds a tear to the memory of Silton when recounting his visit to Silton Hall after his death (51) and offers extended praise, replete with dashes and exclamation points, when he recounts Harley meeting Silton (104).

acting the part of grateful guest (50); though still welcomed into Silton hall, Charles is unable to fulfill his duties as a guest when the hosts themselves are less accommodating.

When he loses the company of these two idealized hosts, Charles also loses his own social position. No longer participating in the hospitality cycle, Charles is outside the system and becomes the Ghost of the novel's introduction. He maintains a connection to the system, however, by elegizing the loss of his two benefactors in writing, memorializing them in the text he creates. In this writing, The Ghost takes on some of the duties of a host, introducing others to the idealized behavior of his former hosts. Indeed, The Ghost's strong narrative voice functions as an authoritative guide to the proper reflections on the events in Harley's life; this authority and ability to guide the reader establish the narrator as a host-like figure to the reader. Yet, though a hosting figure, The Ghost is not a true host: he does not publish his work but leaves it to be found; he does not welcome the reader into his own life or identity, but presents the life of another; his text is not welcoming but fragmented and dependent on the interpretive work of the reader. As such, The Ghost as narrator functions more as a guide to the reader—able to show a life but lacking the authority to invite others to be a part of it. This reserved position means that The Ghost's narrative differs from traditional hospitality in its passivity. In this way, the narrator's passive position maintains important connections to the guest's position. Though The Ghost possesses the openness and "gentleness" necessary to offer hospitality, his ability to act is limited and thus remains in the passive position of the grateful guest. Burdened with a sense of responsibility to fulfill the ethical obligations of the host and to memorialize the host's ethical work but also unable to regain an active connection with society, the narrator becomes a transitory figure between guest and host and becomes a ghost in his attempt to blend the two positions.

The Ghost exists outside hospitality but still comments on it, mourning the loss of strong hosts throughout the novel; whereas many other texts depict hosts neglecting their duties and the loss of a working system of hospitality, Mackenzie dwells on the loss of actual hosts who took their obligations seriously. While other texts make clear that *something* is lacking, Mackenzie's text identifies the lack. Mackenzie does so, I will argue, by directly addressing the philosophical turn to intentional ethics that defined the eighteenth century. This turn begins with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy, which argued for a new moral emphasis on good intentions.

The new ideal of benevolence towards others, however, is complicated by the diversity of lived experience, an experience that literature is better suited to explore. Indeed, whereas philosophy is primarily concerned with active choice more in keeping with the host's duties, literature has traditionally used the guest's perspective to explore diversity, commenting on the range of host behaviors and the dangers of bad hospitality. Mackenzie builds on this tradition, using the guest perspective to explore how an intentional definition of hospitality threatens the existence of the host. When the guest begins to judge the intentions behind the host's welcome, he takes over many of the duties of the traditional host; whereas the host was previously asked to judge character and worth to determine whether to extend an invitation, the guest now makes such ethical judgments; however, as Mackenzie's *Ghost* illustrates, these responsibilities cannot be acted upon—the guest cannot invite. Though the guest may intend to welcome others, he often lacks the ability to fulfill that intention. This fiction shows that, when the guest is made responsible for determining the legitimacy of hospitable intentions, the hospitality system becomes unstable because the guest had no authority—literally no place—to enact this ideal. Outside of a hierarchical system, the roles of guest and host and the duties associated with each became difficult to define. As Mackenzie's *Ghost* disappears, leaving behind only his remembrances of a working system, eighteenth-century novels depict how ill-defined roles of host and guest question the possibility for the ideals of hospitality to be enacted in the world.

The Problem of Diversity

Ideals of hospitality became increasingly defined by intentions. As I discussed in the introduction, philosophy encouraged this shift in ethical standards, proposing that the goodness of an action depended on the actor's intention. Yet these same philosophies uncover the problem of association inherent in intentional systems: the ability to predict the connection between intentions and the actions and consequences they produce is unstable. For the primary actor—in the case of hospitality, the host—this instability is one of predicting association; good intentions do not always produce good results. Moreover, the available courses of action that would reveal good intentions were diverse and dependent on context. Benevolence might be universally admired, but the actions that were considered to be evidence of benevolence varied widely. This diversity of action was both particularly true and relatively new in the eighteenth century. Even

among Christian religions, prescriptions for charitable behavior ranged broadly, and new contact with foreign cultures furthered a sense of relative ethics.⁴⁵ For hospitality, this variety meant that no one method of hosting was prescribed and a host might consider certain behaviors, such as constant attendance on a guest or queries into his travels, to be hospitable, whereas the guest might find such behaviors invasive. To produce the desired association, the primary actor or host needed not just good intentions but the knowledge and luck to properly act on those intentions.

The very philosophers who proposed intentional ethics struggled to overcome this problem of association in their texts and show clear guidelines for choosing which actions reflect good intentions. These thinkers identify the root behind the association problem as one of diverse ethical codes. Indeed, basing morality on intention was a means to combat diverse cultural codes of behavior; with so many systems for moral action available, intention was seen, in some ways, as a more accurate indicator of the ethical value of a particular action. If many codes exist to regulate activity and all are accepted systems, then the only universal code would be one based on the intentions that inspire this range of action. Intentional ethics, then, might narrow ethical standards to their root source but did not clarify which system to pursue or how to practice this ethics. The individual consequently had much more responsibility in choosing how best to respond to an intention. The following philosophers attempt to guide the individual choice while struggling to overcome the diversity of choice.

Bayle perhaps knew this diversity best; a Huguenot within Catholic France, his *Philosophical Commentary* incorporated the idea of diversity into his ideal for universal tolerance. He claims that religious tolerance is necessary because there is no way to ensure universal belief in one religion. Indeed, each religious belief claims the right to persecute believers of other faiths. But Bayle takes this position even farther to argue that diversity of intention also exists. He notes, “I have firmly believ’d a thousand things in some part of my Life, which I am far from believing at present; and what I now believe, a great many others I see of as

⁴⁵ Such differences were reported as part of the Grand Tour. Travelers debated the relative hospitality of the countries visited. Though religious differences were mentioned frequently, the perception of hospitality was not based on religion; Catholic Italy was generally considered very hospitable while Spain was not, while Protestant Germany was considered inhospitable even as the cities of the Netherlands were praised. For more on British perceptions of hospitality in Europe, see Jeremy Black, *The British and the Grand Tour*, 41-59. Trade to the Middle and Far East also created knowledge of cultural differences; though these accounts discuss hospitality, they often include the perspective of a merchant encouraging trade rather than a tourist evaluating guest accommodations. For more, see Robert Markley, *The British Imagination and the Far East, 1660-1730*, 104-144.

good Sense as my self, believe not a tittle of: my Assent is often determin'd, not by Demonstrations which appear to me cou'd not be otherwise, and which appear so to others, but by Probabilitys which appear not such to other men" (94).⁴⁶ Here, Bayle admits his own diversity of thought and questions the accuracy of his thought process, while at the same time admitting that his, and others', beliefs are often unable to be proven. Bayle only rehabilitates the ideal, then, to promote not an active hospitality, but a passive lack of judgment upon non-believers. The diversity of belief compromises the host position; Bayle no longer encourages the host to perform to an ideal of an open house, but simply asks him not to "compel" non-believers to accept his mind-set by threat of violence.

Cumberland, too, notes the problem of diversity for the benevolent ideal but maintains the possibility of his ideal even within a diverse world. Knud Haakonssen notes that Cumberland's "value-pluralism" is what makes his theory stand out within the large number of attacks on Hobbes' theories. Cumberland's theory supposes that "People have the ability to find a wide, indeed, an unspecifiable range of things valuable; hence human motivation is complex and constantly changing. More particularly, it is not possible to reduce human motives to mere self-interest, let alone a concern just with self-preservation, as Hobbes is supposed to have done" (Haakonssen, *Natural Law* 33).⁴⁷ By making human motives more complex than self-interest, Cumberland both allows for a benevolent idealism and opens up his moral system to diversity. While avoiding the negative view of human nature Hobbes proposes, Cumberland fails to address the problems of idealistic conflict that Bayle asks his readers to overlook and also suggests that benevolence can never be the sole motive for human interaction.⁴⁸ As such, the

⁴⁶ Indeed, Bayle knew he had to have been convinced in error at least once. Raised a Protestant, Bayle briefly converted to Catholicism while attending a Jesuit college. At the time of his conversion, he was fully convinced of the Catholic teachings but as convinced in the Protestant beliefs when he reverted back to his Huguenot faith a few years later.

⁴⁷ Whereas Haakonssen reads diversity as strengthening Cumberland's opposition to Hobbes, J.B. Schneewind finds that diversity weakens Cumberland's philosophy. He explains that Cumberland's theory supposes that "no two true propositions can be inconsistent," thus allowing that what is permissible in one context, such as stealing to combat starvation, need be permissible in another. Schneewind observes that "it is interesting that Cumberland does not see this principle as in any way threatening his claim that we are to maximize the good in each of our acts. He sees it, rather, as bringing home to us the blessings of mutual dependence in a harmonious universe. Avoiding the inconsistency of judging like cases differently is a source of social harmony" (115). Thus, Schneewind argues, Cumberland's philosophy depends on ignoring diversity and instead emphasizing universal happiness.

⁴⁸ Cumberland's translator, John Maxwell, had difficulty following this logic, noting contradictions in Cumberland's theories on self-love and benevolence. He added extensive footnotes to Cumberland's treatise to attempt to explain

universalism of his benevolent ideal is questioned. The host may have a number of reasons for inviting his guests in or offering them hospitality, including interested and disinterested ones; his intentions are ethical only if the interested motives do not supersede the disinterested ones. By blending motives, Cumberland makes intentional ethics more practical but exacerbates the problem of association. The actor, or host, must now also determine which intentions are influencing his actions more and not just which would best reflect his intentions.

Hutcheson effectively sidesteps the problem of diversity by separating intention and action; ideal, benevolent intentions, he claims, precede action and so precede the moment of public judgment. He admits that, while man is intuitively benevolent, the means to enact benevolence might vary. In other words, while the intention remains ideal, the actions and consequences that come from that motive can vary. D.D. Carey points to Hutcheson's nation-building examples as an indication of his problems of accounting for diversity. When Hutcheson introduces "the bold, liberty-loving country and the timid, peace-loving country," he proposes that both countries arrived at these opposite ideals using the moral sense. Moral sense, influenced by cultural ideology, determines the particular actions and consequences of individuals (Carey 176). Though mankind all agree on the proper motivations for action, they disagree on what will provide the greatest good. Diversity thus makes Hutcheson's benevolent ideal hard to identify within the practical world.⁴⁹ In a hospitality scenario, each host may offer good intentions to their guest, but each might practice a different way of doing so. The ultimate morality, however, has been determined prior to the actual hosting and is not contingent on the actions themselves or the guest's interpretation of them.

Smith, building on Hutcheson's moral sense that reacts prior even to conscious motive, admits that practical rules of morality are hard to determine. He qualifies moral philosophy in

this paradox. For example, he acknowledges the potential to object "That, according to our Author's Scheme, the Principle of Self-Love is more strong and uniform than that of Benevolence." He rejects this critique but then argues for its place in Cumberland's overall philosophy: "I don't see, that our Author has advanced anything from which it particularly follows, 'That we desire our own Advantage more strongly than that of others.' However, I am of the Opinion that it is so in most People, and that it is not inconsistent with Virtue: Nevertheless I believe there are some, of so exalted and generous a Disposition, as to entertain as great, nay, a greater, Desire of the general Good of Mankind, than of any private Advantage" (Cumberland 606).

⁴⁹ Daniela Gobetti argues that Hutcheson tries to reconcile this diversity by privileging man's "natural sociability" over self-interest. But, as Gobetti points out, the "the epistemological facts" skew any means to judge whether sociability or self-interest have inspired action, thus leading Gobetti to contend that Hutcheson creates a separate "juridical mode" that allows for logical judgment in the world (111-122).

general by noting that “the general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which determine what are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship, are in many respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require so many modifications, that it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them” (Smith 174). Even what he considers the most stable virtue, gratitude, allows for many exceptions, and the rules governing behavior as to how or when to show gratitude remain vague and open to diversity. The general virtues are much less clear when one attempts to describe them in detail.⁵⁰ The diversity in even defining these terms that Smith points out causes difficulty for understanding norms of hospitality; hosts are unsure how to act, and guests are unsure how to respond.

It is the problem of diversity that most often plagues these moral philosophies, particularly those that suggest a moral sense theory or propose sensibility as a virtue. Wendy Motooka evaluates the downfall of this eighteenth-century trend and argues that the “pejorative” sense of sentimentalism arises from “moral diversity, for moral ideas can be recognized as ‘sentimental’ (pejoratively) only in the context of plausible alternatives. Moral ideas in the absence of such alternatives are never dismissed as sentimental, rather they are accepted as self-evident truths” (21).⁵¹ Indeed, as the century advanced, sentimentalism became increasingly ridiculed and the benevolent ideals that were often supported by sensibility were dismissed in the wake of other moral options.⁵² It became harder and harder to believe the disinterested assertions of a host when practical motives of self-interest were also available to explain behavior. The problem of association could not be reconciled and so riddled the ethic that it caused the demise of moral sense theories. In some ways, the same demise came to an ethic of hospitality. The

⁵⁰ Richard Teichgraeber argues that Smith overcomes this problem of diversity in practice by his theory of a “correspondence of sentiments” which would allow one to pursue his own interests while also requiring him to attend to others’ interests. This balance, Teichgraeber contends, successfully mediates the diversity (115); while Smith certainly promotes understanding, a “correspondence of sentiments” is not shown to overcome the diversity of cultural and personal expectations encountered in a hospitality exchange.

⁵¹ Motooka sees this move as an influence of skepticism, which dwelled more extensively on the subjective nature of moral judgment. Marking Hume as the quintessential skeptic, Motooka argues that he, and other skeptics, helped expose the diversity of moral behaviors and subjectivity of moral judgment (20).

⁵² Philosophically, this new thought might be characterized by Immanuel Kant’s privileging of “understanding” over “sensibility.” Though still building on moral sense philosophy and seeing the value of sensibility as a means of gathering information, Kant’s theory emphasizes that how we process this information is of primary ethical importance.

diversity of choice for welcoming guests coupled with the distrust of intention made it difficult for the host to reconcile his intentions and actions in the eyes of the public. With weakened standards for action, the host struggled to continue to offer hospitality. It is this process of diminishing the host's power to act that eighteenth-century narratives explore.

An Ethical Narrative

Novels, and narrative in general, approach the ethical problems the host faces with greater flexibility in explaining the diversity of ethical choice. Able to follow the contexts of an ethical quandary, novels can portray how choices are made, implemented and evaluated. It is perhaps because of the lack of particularity in the philosophical ideals that many of their own proposers turn to narrative as a philosophical vessel. Both Hutcheson and Smith suggest that narrative can explore more fully the benevolent ideals that their philosophies espouse. Hutcheson, for example, recommends fiction's flawed rather than ideal characters because they resemble more closely those we see in real life and because the reader will be more "touch'd and affected by the imperfect Characters" and thus more likely to condone their virtuous behavior (43). Likewise, Smith recommends the works of "poets and romance writers" for moral improvement because of how well they "paint the refinements and delicacies of love and friendship, and of all other private and domestic affections" (143).⁵³ While these two philosophers offer their own works to uncover the principles behind morality, they suggest that narratives are a better source for virtuous instruction. These philosophers hope that narrative's use of particular contexts and characters can effectively display how best to overcome problems of association and act in ways that reflect their good intentions.

What these early philosophers noted in their own theories, contemporary philosophers and scholars have discovered as well.⁵⁴ Martha Nussbaum, most famously, uses her background in philosophy to argue for the ethical lessons found in literature. She finds that novels "characterize life more richly and truly—indeed, more precisely—than an example lacking these

⁵³ C.L. Griswold makes the connection between Smith and narrative quite literal, contending that Smith's ideal ethical figure is a theater critic able to switch between the narrative action and observation.

⁵⁴ A branch of narrative theory is, in fact, devoted to exploring the ethical nature of narrative. This school of thought advocates for ethics to consider the position of narratives and argues that the very structure of narrative mimes our ethical thought. Many of these critics, including Nussbaum but also Wayne Booth and James Phelan are used throughout this study.

features ever could; and they engender in the reader a type of ethical work more appropriate for life” (47).⁵⁵ The detail and depth, indeed the diversity, of narrative offers the reader more practicable and instructive moral direction. Similarly, philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre argues that narrative is where contemporary morals might have a chance to re-emerge in today’s society. He finds narrative essential to virtue and argues that “any specific account of the virtues presupposes an equally specific account of the narrative structure and unity of a human life and *vice versa*” (243). Morality and life, he contends, are thus understood through narrative; narrative is essential to understanding ethics, and, without it, the ideals become separated from real life. Thus, narrative presents an opportunity for the practice of hospitality to work through an ideal hospitality exchange and show how to overcome problems of association. However, narrative’s own purpose, I will argue, has a different, though perhaps as powerful, ethical goal to pursue.

The novel, unlike philosophy, is more concerned with the recipient and his ethical response to diverse possibilities than with the actor and his diversity of choice. While it was the responsibility of the actor to properly match intention and action, the recipient must judge actions and results to determine intention. These ethical struggles are often depicted as scenes of hospitality; a guest receives hospitality but must decipher his host’s intentions for self-preservation.⁵⁶ Faced with diversity, the guest also faces trouble deciphering the connections between action and intention. This trouble, however, is not a problem of association but one of perception; the guest’s primary concern is not in choosing which actions reflect his intentions but in determining his host’s intentions from his actions. These judgments certainly affect the guest’s actions. Even as the guest evaluates his situation, he is also required to respond to the host with gratitude. In a position of dependence, the guest must evaluate how best to act on his own intentions and how best to respond to the host. These duties are often in conflict, making the guest position even more ethically complex. It is perhaps because of this level of complexity that

⁵⁵ Nussbaum also maintains that literature is more helpful than life itself for thinking through moral choice because, “in the activity of literary imagining we are led to imagine and describe with greater precision, focusing our attention on each word, feeling each event more keenly—whereas much of actual life goes by without that heightened awareness, and is thus, in a certain sense, not fully or thoroughly lived” (47).

⁵⁶ For example, a common theme in eighteenth-century novels is the plight of the female guest, who must judge if she is invited as a guest for disinterested reasons or because of the lust of her host. This was a common theme in Samuel Richardson’s influential novels, *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded* and *Clarissa, or the History of a Young Lady*.

narrative more often takes the guest and his ethical situations as their subject, despite its potential to work through problems of association.

One of the few novelists to create a protagonist in the host's position in the eighteenth century is Henry Mackenzie in *Man of Feeling*.⁵⁷ Mackenzie's central figure, Harley, is a host; yet the narrative is told by his guest and, as the novel progresses, his experiences in the exchange of hospitality take more and more precedence. At the same time, the story closely follows Harley, who, though clearly a rather disempowered host, still retains the estate and abilities to host others even if his fortune is small and his personality eccentric. While a large portion of the narrative shows Harley traveling and staying in London, he consistently orders his own space, holds the power to welcome others into his company, and controls his own moral action without applying to others for counsel or direction. As such *Man of Feeling* offers a rare inquiry into the host's problems of association. Yet, ultimately the novel reveals exactly how perplexing the problem of association and hosting by intention can be. Mackenzie's novel defines the host as one stymied by the good intentions necessary for ethical hosting; Harley's disempowerment rejects the possibility of the benevolent ideal proposed in the philosophical treatises. When a host is filled with *only* disinterested ideals, he is unable to overcome problems of association and, often, unable to act or to act effectively.⁵⁸ This weakness is manifest in many of Harley's hospitable actions: he gives money to beggars but does not materially change their position, he enjoys the company of two gentlemen in what he believed to be an ideal exchange but discovers that he has only "hospitably" aided their gaming schemes. In a scene that clearly illustrates Harley's benevolence and impotence, Harley meets an inmate at Bedlam, a woman whose ill-fated love results in the loss of her sanity. Harley responds benevolently, shedding a tear, giving a coin, and sympathizing with her story; at the same time, however, Harley's benevolence is never practiced as hospitality. He extends no welcome, offers no protection, and is unable to even comfort the woman. Harley's benevolent intentions result in his tearful and hurried exit (x-

⁵⁷ Many eighteenth-century novels include characters in the hosting position, but not protagonists. One of the most famous is Allworthy in Henry Fielding's *Adventures of Tom Jones*. It is worth noting, however, that this ideal hosting figure, a man willing to treat the stranger as his own son, is, like Harley, a disempowered host consistently misjudging those he accepts into his house and falling prey to the manipulations of others.

⁵⁸ This inability to act or effect the larger world is a popular criticism of Harley and the man of feeling character in general. Perhaps the most vocal and influential critic is R.F. Brissenden who refers to Harley as "pathetic" and an "epicene, impotent, passive, almost completely ineffectual character" (255, 251). Though other critics soften their rhetoric, they agree that Harley is unable to radically change and better the world around him.

x). Though perhaps Harley felt unauthorized to host in this position, his reaction to feel for others but not extend welcome is typical. Mackenzie's text thus turns to the guest's position as an ethical standard. Portraying Harley's hosting through the voice of one of his guests, the reader's sympathies and attention are shifted away from the protagonist and host Harley and towards the narrator as guest. Harley's death makes clear the exhaustion inherent in the problem of association. Harley, always filled with good intentions, has difficulty acting on those intentions; those actions he does decide to pursue, however, seem to further weaken Harley as he sacrifices his own interests. Overcome by the demands of hosting, Harley wastes away, leaving behind his guest to provide a moral voice.

Certainly the eighteenth-century novel still offers an ideal—and often a benevolent ideal—to the reader, but the formal elements of the text, the need to develop both character and plot and to offer some sort of conflict, ensure that this ideal is never unquestioned or unqualified. The goal of narrative is not to present a clear standard for behavior as philosophy tries to do but to push new ethical thoughts by questioning norms and offering new illustrations of behavior. Yet, it is perhaps this limiting of context that makes narrative a better way to explore hospitality; able to ask questions of practice and ideals, narratives can provide the nuance hospitality ethics require. Indeed, narrative assures the reader of the need to strive for ethical ideals and search for practical systems that can approximate the results desired; novels thus promote an ethics of intention but also place it in a situation that would allow for good practice.

Eighteenth-century novels were quite aware of their potential as moral guides as the convention of boasting their virtuous teachings in introductions illustrates.⁵⁹ Henry Mackenzie takes this trend one step farther in *Man of Feeling*. The introduction is a narrative itself that depicts a literal transference of ethical power from philosophy to narrative through the curate and Editor's exchange of texts. Mackenzie introduces the inner text by allowing his readers to hear the manner in which the curate has disliked it. Indeed, the curate has been using the narrative as wadding for the hunting expedition he and the Editor have been engaged in. The Editor,

⁵⁹ Many eighteenth-century novels advertised themselves as ethical tales meant to guide a young, and often female, readership to better decisions. The prefaces of the first publications of authors are particularly prone to that sort of advertisement: Sarah Fielding's first publication of *David Simple* is advertised as a "Moral Romance" (2); Samuel Richardson promotes his *Pamela* as a text aimed "to divert and entertain" and "to instruct, and improve the Minds of the Youth of both Sexes" (31); and even Tobias Smollett's *Roderick Random* promises to show the "contrast between dejected virtue and insulting vice" (xxxiii).

however, rescues the narrative and its reputation, exchanging his wadding text with the curate. The Editor, we discover, had been using a work of philosophy—“part of an edition of one of the German *Illustrissimi*”—to load his shot. The reader is then made privy to the Editor’s much more favorable opinion of the narrative, an opinion that led him to publish the text. As the reader is introduced to the text through the perspective and values of the Editor, the novel that follows is clearly represented as more enlightening than the philosophy formerly in the Editor’s possession.⁶⁰

Indeed, the novel approaches its philosophical teaching very differently than does philosophy and even rejects several of its approaches as being untenable in real life situations. The narrator, for example, at times rejects the ability to understand the causes of human emotion. To explain Harley’s love for Miss Watson, he does not look for causes and effects, or original impulses. Instead he claims that “In times not credulous of inspiration, we should account for this from some natural cause; but we do not mean to account for it at all; it were sufficient to describe its effects” (58). Here, the narrator clearly asks different ethical questions than does philosophy. Rather than query origins, the narrator acknowledges a skeptical public and looks to the less controlled realm of Harley’s actions. These actions, the narrator tells us, “were sometimes so ludicrous, as might derogate from the dignity of the sensations which produced them to describe. They were treated as such by most of Harley’s sober friends, who often laughed very heartily at the awkward blunders of the real Harley, when the different faculties, which should have prevented them, were entirely occupied by the ideal” (58). Instead of asking the philosophical questions about Harley’s emotional state and care for others, the narrator separates the idealism of benevolence and its execution from the real abilities and character of Harley. While the “real Harley” “blunders,” the ideals he espouses occupy his mind and have real effect on his actions. Yet the narrative here contends that it is not interested in the philosophical ideal, proving its existence or describing its “natural cause.” Rather, narrative looks to its “effects” and in doing so shows the complexity of an ideal of benevolence. Although his feeling of benevolence results in Harley’s humiliation, it is also the cause for admiration.

⁶⁰ Barbara Benedict follows this unusual framing of the story and argues that the reader, like the Editor, “learns from exemplary fiction, read privately, not from rational proofs” and suggests that Mackenzie designs his novel to best reflect this ethical approach to teaching the public virtue (120).

The host's practical position is separated from its ideal and instead contends with a reality of diversity. When Harley must decide whether to visit the prostitute he has befriended, he worries about the possibility that she has been lying to him about her situation to extort money and favors. After some hesitation, Harley decides to proceed with his promised visit because "to calculate the chances of deception is too tedious a business for the life of man!" (84). Harley's actions cannot rely on being sure of others' intentions. Instead, he must trust in the goodwill of others in order to remain benevolent. But while in this quandary he has judged correctly and he is successfully able to use his influence to reconcile the woman and her father, he more often fails to notice immoral behavior and corruption. The novel thus complicates the very notion of a benevolent ideal. The man of feeling represented in the novel is certainly filled with the sensibility, tolerance, and good intentions that the philosophers suggest as part of the moral framework necessary to the ideal host; but the outcomes and actions that these same philosophies propose will reasonably follow from such intentions are noticeably lacking. The narrative cannot provide a guide to hosts concerning how to avoid problems of association; in fact, Mackenzie still supports the very approach to hospitality that causes these problems.

Ethics, Distance and *Man of Feeling*

The ethical standards presented in *Man of Feeling*, then, do not offer a system of how to act but instead explore how an ethic of intention might function in the world—to limited success. Harley is often shown observing others' distress and perhaps relieving it with a little money; he does not, however, address the larger social issues creating their distress. While this inactivity can be seen as unethical, particularly from a modern standpoint, eighteenth-century culture proposed an ethics of observation to cultivate a greater awareness of moral obligations. Addison and Steele's *Spectator* papers and Smith's "impartial Spectator" asked their readers to step back from the world and analyze others' intentions.⁶¹ Indeed, it is a similar emphasis on Harley's benevolent intentions and their lack of real impact on the world around him that has caused *Man of Feeling* and its central character to be criticized as passive.⁶² This ethics of observation

⁶¹ For more on how the detached form of the Spectator narrative informs its ideological goals, see Michael G. Ketcham's *Transparent Designs: Reading, Performance and Form in the Spectator Papers*.

⁶² See note 58.

requires personal distance from the situation, even as it asks the viewer to identify with what is virtuous in the scene.⁶³ Eighteenth-century authors similarly create narrative distance, asking readers to contemplate the narrative and identify with the virtue presented therein.⁶⁴ *Man of Feeling* creates distance through two narrative frames; an Editor introduces the text and occasionally interrupts its performance, and a narrator relates the narrative, intruding his own opinions and experiences into Harley's life. Harley, at two removes, is thus presented to the audience for observation as a character of ethical interest.

The double frames of this narrative create distance between the character Harley and the reader, and similar frames are the most common distancing effect discussed by critics seeking to understand the ethics of observation in eighteenth-century narratives. R. F. Brissenden notes the novel's particular emphasis on observation and argues that it calls for moral judging from the audience but criticizes that this call is not for "moral action" but for "moral discrimination." This distinction indicates the growing importance of intention rather than action or outcome in narratives. As narratives increasingly show "the conflict of motives within the minds of characters" rather than in an active morality (119), the reader is increasingly asked to consider models of behavior based on intention. Barbara Benedict ultimately claims this emphasis on judging motive creates distance between reader and character. The episodic nature of eighteenth-century narratives, including *Man of Feeling*, is used to create examples of behavior that "conjure a social context and the conventional values of restraint, discrimination, and moral hierarchy." In doing so, however, Benedict claims that these novels "seek to draw the reader back from too fervid an identification with the character and into a balanced evaluation of their behavior and moral standards" (10). Benedict's view suggests that eighteenth-century narratives did not seek to create an involved reading experience where the reader identifies with the characters (12). Rather, the reader remained detached in order to glean the moral of the story. Likewise, Patricia Spacks argues that it is the voyeuristic nature of Harley's behavior that distances the reader from Harley's perspective; Harley's sympathy towards those in need

⁶³ Narrative theory suggests distancing is a means of controlling ethical messages. For more on how distance functions as an ethic, see James Phelan, *Experiencing Fiction: Judgments, Progressions, and the Rhetorical Theory of Narrative*, especially 199-215.

⁶⁴ Because *Man of Feeling* follows the host and then guest movements, it is one of the few novels to create distance at two removes. Most novels attempt to build their ethic at one narrative remove from the protagonist.

“dramatizes the separation between victims and agents of providence so forcefully as to make them seem virtually members of different species.” She claims that the episodic nature of the text and the “plotlessness” and passivity of its main characters are attempts to “deny separation among people” that ultimately fail (*Desire* 121). According to Spacks, the reader is unable to interact with the characters and this lack of action and interaction exacerbates the gap between individuals. Maureen Harkin, editor of the latest scholarly release of *Man of Feeling*, argues that it is not just Harley’s passivity but also his own inability to judge that creates this distance. Indeed, Harley’s judgment is suspect in the text as he is shown repeatedly being duped by sharpers and imposers in London. Harkin claims that the reader reacts to this poor judgment by feeling distanced from Harley and “superior” to him (331-32). The reader is aware or at least suspicious of Harley’s judgment as he makes his way through London, losing money to gamblers, poorly navigating the political bribery game, and mistaking the rank and character of “gentlemen” he meets along the way. This awareness ultimately serves to separate the reader from Harley’s viewpoint. All of these scholars see distance within the text and attribute it to the elements of the character himself.

But to dwell on the reader’s distance from Harley misses the much more complex way that the narrator creates distance in the text. Some critics have argued that the narrator is the source of the reader’s distance rather than Harley himself. For example, Ildiko Csengei argues that

the description of Harley’s mind...simultaneously reveals the speaker’s own narrative and epistemological standpoint. When describing Harley, the narrator interprets Harley’s way of reading the world...The exposure of Harley’s distorting vision is at the same time the narrator’s self-exposure, and a confession of his own epistemological skepticism. His framework of thought is embedded in its context of contemporary philosophical ideas on subjectivity and perception. (957)

The narrator reveals himself in his description of Harley’s experiences and his insight into Harley’s motives. Though the narrator observes and describes Harley and his surroundings, he cannot present Harley’s intentions without his own mediation. Csengei sees this distance from Harley’s perspective as a means of improving the reader and ultimately argues that it closes the gap among character, narrator, and reader. Referring to Harley as a mirror, he argues that Harley

“reveals more about those who read him than about Harley himself...[H]e is never the subject in question, but instead brings about a shift in focus, turning both the narrator and the reader into men of feeling” (954). In this construction, the reader and narrator become like Harley even if they do not identify as Harley while reading. In fact, the narrator often uses irony to expose when Harley’s judgment is flawed; unlike Harley, the narrator is not fooled by the corrupt men he finds in London and, because of the focalization of the text, neither is the reader. Benedict addresses this satiric nature of the narrator as a source of distance from Harley, but sees both narrator and character as distanced from the reader. She argues that the narrator’s tone “condemns the literary refinement of feeling that replaces judgment with a self-regarding emotion wrongly portrayed as sympathy.” Benedict continues to explain that this ironic distance is created by a “double frame of two narrators, each of whom represents an ironic variation on the theme of the title” (118). Benedict defines these two variations as the “self-conscious, literary taste” of the Editor and the “outraged morality” of *The Ghost*, a disembodied narrator (119). In both cases, Benedict sees both narrator and Editor separating themselves from Harley and his moral faux pas.⁶⁵

Csengei and Benedict, I would argue, have identified a more likely, though perhaps not the complete, source of distance in the effect of the narrator’s commentary on Harley’s choices and judgments. The reader is kept from feeling emotions with Harley from early in the narrative. This distancing goal is evident in the manner in which the narrator relates Harley’s love for Miss Walton. The narrator describes Miss Walton in details that emphasize her unremarkableness:

Her complexion was mellowed into a paleness, which certainly took from her beauty; but agreed, at least Harley used to say so, with the pensive softness of her mind. Her eyes

⁶⁵ However, Benedict stretches this framing and satire to argue that Mackenzie does not intend any sort of reader identification with the text—not with Harley, the narrator, or the Editor. Instead, Benedict argues that all are flawed and “Mackenzie supplied no model of balanced feeling; rather he condemns several literary types of sentiment for sifting feeling out of social reality” (119). The radical distance Benedict supposes is perhaps well taken in regards to the Editor. He introduces the text with a self-conscious display of how sentimentalism is viewed by the public and a critique about how it is read. He describes the text as “a bundle of little episodes, put together without art, and of no importance on the whole, with something of nature, and little else in them. I was a good deal affected with some very trifling passages in it; and had the name of a Marmontel, or a Richardson, been on the title-page—’tis odds that I should have wept” (48). To respond with such a tongue-in-cheek manner to the narrative causes the reader to begin the text already distanced from both narrator and implied author. Instead, the reader is focused on his or her own role as reader and expectations of narrative. As a result, the reader wonders which perspective, the curate’s or the Editor’s, to trust. The narrator, on the other hand, has a clearer cut relationship with Harley and with the reader as the next section will discuss.

were of that gentle hazel-colour, which is rather mild than piercing; and, except when they were lighted up by good-humour, which was frequently the case, were supposed by fine gentlemen to want fire. Her air and manner were elegant in the highest degree, and were as sure of commanding respect, as their mistress was far from demanding it. Her voice was inexpressibly soft...The effect it had upon Harley, himself used to paint ridiculously enough; and ascribed to it powers, which few believed, and nobody cared for. (56)

From such an unremarkable appearance and personality, the reader might like Miss Walton but does not love her with Harley's passion. In fact, the narrator insures reader distance through his own careful separation from Harley's feelings. He qualifies his praise of Miss Walton by placing it solely in Harley's view—"at least Harley used to say so" or "the effect it had upon Harley." At the same time, he qualifies his harshest views by associating them with a sarcastic reference to "fine gentleman." The effect of this description of Miss Walton is that the reader does not actually see her, but instead is introduced to her reputation as seen by others. The reader is not introduced to Harley's feelings in order to identify with them but instead views Miss Walton much as the narrator does—as a kind and generous woman but not interesting enough to capture our attention. The effect of this is also to distance the reader from Harley; rather than observe Miss Walton with Harley, the reader is shown their relationship as observed by the narrator.

Thus the narrator is seen to be distanced from the character Harley. But even this distance is more complex than separation between narrator and character. Each of these critics has missed a crucial element of *Man of Feeling*—the narrator is a character within the text. This character may distance himself from many of Harley's judgments and viewpoints but also connects himself to Harley as a friend and, I would argue, a guest. The two share a host/guest dynamic that shifts the ethical force of the novel to the narrator's state as a guest. Indeed, the guest's responsibilities—gratitude, receptivity, responsiveness, passivity—become more important in the text. The character as guest, not narrator, allows the reader to experience Harley as a host without personal distance or the problem of association distance attempts to overcome. Mackenzie thus illustrates the ethical shift of literature away from the host and his problems of association and towards the guest perspective. At the same time he avoids the guest's problems

of perception, showing the reader first the clear benevolence of the host. Not worried about deciphering Harley's intentions, Charles—and the reader—are able to admire his hospitality.

The Disappearing Host and the Ghostly Guest

Indeed, Charles does not face the problem of perception that other guests do but is assured of the good intentions of his host. The first two-thirds of the novel establish Harley as a benevolent ideal. Never self-interested, Harley's good intentions are proven through the relation of his fragmented interactions with others. The last third of the text marks the narrator's entrance into the text as Harley's friend and a shift in sympathetic approach to Harley as a host, a fact commonly overlooked by critics. Well informed of Harley's good intentions, Charles never faces a problem perceiving the motivations behind Harley's hospitality. Indeed, Harley now actively realizes his role as host and is shown inviting Edward, his old steward fallen on hard times, and his grandchildren as guests into his home; he hosts them according to an ideal, setting up Edwards in a comfortable home on the property and even helping work his land.⁶⁶ Harley's ideal hosting also includes welcoming Charles, allowing the narrator to emerge physically in the text. Losing the sense of self-conscious distance found in the narrator's voice early in the text, Charles interacts and identifies directly with Harley. Assured of his host's aim, Charles abandons the doubleness of his earlier narrative where he was simultaneously observer and character as well as the doubleness of many guests, who must both serve another and protect oneself.

Instead, Charles is a part of Harley's world and relates Harley's motives as they would be received by a separate person; in other words, Charles no longer announces the inner thoughts of Harley directly to the reader, but instead finds them physically. For example, he discovers Harley's sentiments concerning Miss Walton left "on the handle of a tea-kettle, at a neighbouring house where we were visiting; and as I filled the teapot after him, I happened to put it in my pocket by a similar act of forgetfulness" (126). This amount of detail concerning how the narrator learns about Harley's thoughts or actions is new to the narrative style. The disembodied voice of *The Ghost* has taken on a physical body—one that eats and drinks, wears clothing, and

⁶⁶ This example of hospitality follows an older model of estate ownership where landowner shows connection with tenant. For more on how this rhetoric is used in the eighteenth-century, see Virginia Kenny's *The Country-House Ethos in English Literature, 1688-1750: Themes of Personal Retreat and National Expansion*.

is capable of being distracted from the Harley narrative. Moreover, the relationship between Harley and the narrator is given more distinction. The narrator claims that “Harley was one of those few friends whom the malevolence of fortune had yet left me: I could not therefore but be sensibly concerned for his present indisposition; there seldom passed a day on which I did not make inquiry about him” (135). The narrator Charles is discovered to be friends with Harley, and the gaps in the text leave more questions concerning this character’s situation than in Harley’s. The reader is not made privy to the specific causes of the narrator’s deeper affection for Harley, but it is clear that the narrator is no longer sarcastic about Harley’s sentimentality but feels gratitude and friendship towards him. These emotions work to create a deeper relationship with the reader as well. No longer is Harley’s observation the focus of the narrative; rather, the reader now encounters the despair and difficulty of Harley’s life with the narrator. No longer kept at a distance, the reader is asked to feel for Harley what the character narrator does, namely friendship, gratitude and concern.⁶⁷

This relationship with Harley resembles that of another guest-host relationship in the text; Charles had previously been the guest of Ben Silton and mourns the loss of this ideal host throughout the narrative. Indeed, the very first fragment offered to the reader begins not with Harley but with a scene featuring Silton and Charles. The narrator makes clear that what he mourns is the loss of a host:

He is now forgotten and gone! The last time I was at Silton hall, I saw his chair stand in its corner by the fire-side; there was an additional cushion on it, and it was occupied by my lady’s favourite lap-dog. I drew near unperceived, and pinched its ear in the bitterness

⁶⁷ At this point of the novel, the narrative distance between reader and narrator more closely resembles that of other eighteenth-century novels; the reader is able to identify with the characters as they are presented in the text at this simpler, singular distance. Yet in the case of *Man of Feeling*, current reception of the novel suggests that this identification does not always occur. The critics discussed earlier, for example, dwell on distance and irony (and Benedict goes so far as to claim that Mackenzie did not aim at identification with the sentiments of the narrative but created a parody of the sensibility narrative). These reactions might reveal some complications that obscure this relationship for the contemporary audience, because today’s audience is separated from the narrator’s perspective by different cultural values and realities. Modern day readers find it more difficult to accept several of the narrator’s positions. Among these is the particular language of mourning. Filled with exclamation points and high prose, the narrator’s eulogies are too overwrought to be felt as loss for many current readers. The fact that the book is so often mistaken to be *about* Harley suggests participation in the narrator’s perspective. The reader, by joining in the narrator’s perspective, forgets his presence and instead feels with him.

of my soul; the creature howled, and ran to its mistress. She did not suspect the author of its misfortune, but she bewailed it in the most pathetic terms; and kissing its lips, laid it gently on her lap, and covered it with a cambric handkerchief. I sat in my old friend's seat; I heard the roar of mirth and gaiety around me: poor Ben Silton! I gave thee a tear then: accept of one cordial drop that falls to thy memory now. (50-1).

Without Silton, Charles clearly feels unwelcome at Silton hall. Though the trappings of hospitality are still there—a roaring fire in a comfortable room filled with happy guests—the narrator is unable to enjoy them. Certainly, some of this distance is caused by the loss of his friend; however, the quality of hosting is also diminished. The hostess coddles her lap-dog, a traditional symbol of idle luxury, in the scene, suggesting a motive to display wealth and prestige to a crowd rather than enjoy the company of a friend. Moreover, this passage also highlights the irreplaceable nature of the host. Charles mourns Silton in the past tense here but also in the present. Each time his grief is equal and draws the same response of a tear. The discomfort the narrator feels in this first episode displays how the loss of an ideal host leads to the dissolution of social connection in general.

Ben Silton reappears in the narrative to nostalgically reinforce this loss, this time in conversation with Harley as he makes his journey home. The two men and their exchange of benevolent ideals links them as exemplars of hospitality. Sharing the disinterested mindset necessary to host well, the loss of both men signals the loss of good hosts in general. Indeed, at the end of this interaction between the two hosts, the narrator draws the reader back to his state of mourning: “And Silton indeed it was; Ben Silton himself! Once more, my honoured friend, farewell! –Born to be happy without the world, to that peaceful happiness which the world has not to bestow! Envy never scowled on thy life, nor hatred on thy grave” (104). In mourning the loss of Ben Silton, the narrator predicts his similar mourning of Harley seen at the end of the text. In both cases, Charles mourns the loss of a friend and host. This insertion of the narrator's emotional state into the narrative also serves to draw attention to the guest perspective. In this case, the narrative explains how the narrator detaches himself more and more from society with the loss of each ideal host until the curate and townspeople consider him a Ghost.

Man of Feeling, then, is a text to explain how Charles, a flesh and blood character, becomes a man so detached from his neighbors that he is called The Ghost. The answer to this

“how” lies not within Charles’ own character but in his state as a guest. As such the narrative follows the host’s movements and not Charles’ own. Yet, because Charles is defined by his guest status, the death of the host requires his own character to falter. The Ghost described at the start of the narrative is what is left of the guest’s identity when the host is lost. Ultimately, what Charles experiences is the death of his host and the loss of an ideal. Harley’s generosity and openness, indeed the very passiveness that makes him a good host, also leaves him vulnerable. Unable to pursue his own self-interest, his love for Miss Watson, Harley weakens and dies. His slow demise reveals a crucial problem in the ideal for a host, namely, complete openness is impossible to maintain. But Harley’s death also reveals the vulnerability of the guest. Without an ideal host, Charles also fades, becoming the ghost who narrates the story. Mackenzie’s text, then, reveals that the host’s problem is larger than one of association but lies in the very possibility of practicing an ideal. Likewise, *Man of Feeling* reveals that, as problematic as the ideal is to the host, the true sufferer is the guest. If the ideal host does not exist in the world, then the guest is left to protect himself from the cruelty of the world, including the cruelty of other hosts. It is no surprise, then, that Charles’ ultimate narrative function while a guest is mourning the loss of ideal hosts and the possibility for hospitality.

When both hosts have died, the narrator is left to chronicle his own actions and intentions; the novel ends with the narrator’s thoughts as he places himself fully in the setting of the story. Rather than hover in the background of a scene, here the narrator is the focus and the text turns to the present tense to drive home his presence. The narrative ends with the narrator’s declaration: “I sometimes visit his grave; I sit in the hollow of the tree. It is worth a thousand homilies! every nobler feeling rises within me! every beat of my heart awakens a virtue!—but it will make you hate the world—No: there is such an air of gentleness around, that I can hate nothing; but, as to the world—I pity the men of it” (139). The host, indeed the ideal host, has died, carried along in his illness by the very exertion and giving that the ideal of hosting demands. The guest, however, is left behind, lonely and uncomfortable. The narrator’s final line of pity to the world bemoans the lack of hospitality to be found in it. Without the ideal host, virtue, the narrator suggests, cannot exist in the world. The memory of this virtue—“every nobler feeling”—remains in the guest, but, unable to host, he cannot spread this virtue. Instead, he pities

others, and, if the curate is right about the character he defines as The Ghost, does not reestablish hospitality but absents himself from the exchange entirely.

As such, *Man of Feeling* is less a text about specifics of virtuous behavior and more a text mourning the loss of a stable morality. The mourning reveals that hospitality as a moral system has lost its controlling force; without proper hosts to lead the exchange, immoral hosting dominates and guests are left unprotected and unaccommodated. Without these hosts, the ideal guests are unable to remain involved and active in the system and the system itself can collapse. Mackenzie's text, then, reveals the new problems that are caused if the problem of association is overcome; if the host is able to perfectly match his intentions with his actions and the guest is able to set aside worries about the host's intentions, they both become vulnerable. Harley wastes away, dying from his complete openness to others and inability to pursue his own desires. Likewise, Charles disappears, leaving behind only a fragment of both men's relationship. Intentional ethics, it is seen, have changed the exchange and the conception of morality to emphasize the motives and interior life of the actors; they do, however, at a price that weakens the external practice of hospitality. The following chapters will look at how eighteenth-century novels attempt to construct guest obligations to fill the role of this lost host and overcome the weaknesses intentional ethics bring to the hospitality exchange.

CHAPTER TWO BAD HOSTS AND ANXIOUS GUESTS

In *The Adventures of David Simple*, Sarah Fielding introduces the character Cynthia through her position as a guest in the house of an unnamed lady of fashion. Though educated and of genteel birth, Cynthia has been denied an inheritance or any means to support herself and is completely dependent on her host. This dependency earns Cynthia the label of “toad-eater,” a derogatory term for a guest seeking to gain from the host.⁶⁸ Cynthia describes the label to David:

It is a Metaphor taken from a Mountbank’s [sic] Boy’s eating Toads in order to show his Master’s Skill in expelling Poison: It is built on a Supposition, (which I am afraid is too generally true) that People who are so unhappy as to be in a State of Dependence, are forced to do the most nauseous things that can be thought on, to please and humour their Patrons. And the Metaphor may be carried on yet farther, for most People have so much the Art of tormenting, that every time they have made the poor Creatures they have in their power *swallow a Toad*, they give them something to expel it again, that they may be ready to swallow the next they think proper to prepare for them: that is, when they have abused and fooled them, as *Hamlet* says, to the top of their bent, they grow soft and good to them again, on purpose to have it in their power to *plague them the more*. (103)

Cynthia reevaluates the use of “toad-eater” to describe an inhospitable guest by returning to the term’s etymology.⁶⁹ She notes that, as the Mountbank’s boy is asked to swallow poison, the guest, rather than the host, is asked to accept inhospitable behavior because of his dependent state. The power relations in this scenario place the guest in an uncomfortable situation wherein she is “forced,” “tormented,” “abused and fooled” by her host in order to display the host’s

⁶⁸ There are few outright definitions of the term in the eighteenth century but plenty of context clues. Just briefly, toadeater is considered a synonym for adulator in several translation dictionaries, and Lord Chesterfield includes in his instructions to his son advice that “indiscriminate familiarity will either offend your superiors, or make you pass for their dependent or toad-eater” and lower one’s own station by the appearance of dependence (42).

⁶⁹ There is circumstantial evidence that Fielding was successful in recasting the term. Following the publication of *David Simple* (1744), the term is used to chastise hosts. Toad-eaters are considered victims of poor hosting in several later novels, including Frances Brooke’s *The Old Maid* (1764), Frances Burney’s *Evelina* (1779), Sarah Gunning’s *History of Coombe Wood* (1783), Miss Smythies’ *History of Lucy Wellers* (1754), and the anonymous *History of Lady Emma Melcombe* (1787). Interestingly, these novels are all written by women, perhaps gendering the use of the term.

“skill”; here, however, the skill is not “expelling Poison” but bestowing gifts on the less fortunate. As the original toad-eater was forced to eat poisonous toads in order to bolster his master’s reputations for dispelling poisons, so the metaphoric toad-eater is asked to withstand poor hospitality in order to improve the host’s reputation for good hospitality. In this telling, the term toad-eater should reprove a host who keeps her guest captive and submissive through conscious acts of hospitality but, as Cynthia points out, the term is applied as a slander to guests like Cynthia in order to ridicule their state of dependence.

Cynthia’s uncomfortable position as toad-eater raises several points of concern about the eighteenth-century system of hospitality and the guest’s position within that system. First, Cynthia’s situation illustrates the problem of perception for the guest; the guest must judge the intentions of the host but can only evaluate actions. Cynthia originally believed her relationship with her host to be mutually rewarding; she interpreted her host’s invitation and early signs of welcome as motivated by friendship but later learns of her host’s more selfish motives. From her original position within the exchange, however, Cynthia has difficulty determining whether she is a toad-eater or an honored guest. Second, even with her gained knowledge of the host’s intentions, Cynthia is unable to extract herself from the exchange. She is dependent and as such must remain a guest and be labeled a toad-eater. Cynthia’s situation thus highlights the vulnerabilities of the guest: guests cannot see the completion of hospitality from within the exchange nor, when they chance upon a clear and objective view, can they act on their new knowledge.

Emphasizing the anxieties and vulnerabilities of the guest position, eighteenth-century authors describe exchanges of hospitality wherein hosts prey on the guest’s weaknesses. Many of these hosts see hospitality as an economic exchange, either literally as a form of a financial gain or, like Cynthia’s host, as a metaphorical gain of prestige and social placement. Because a hospitality exchange was still marked by external signs of welcome, such as the offering of food or housing, these self-interested exchanges were called hospitality without regard to new ethical distinctions. I will argue that these self-serving approaches fail to follow an ethics of hospitality that demands the creation of a mutually dependent relationship between the host and guest. The traditional hospitable relationships of mutual trust, reciprocal service, and shared need were reduced to one-sided attempts to gain from another that required little interaction. In each

scenario explored below, the hosts seek to gain from their hospitality without returning these gains by fulfilling their responsibilities to their guests. Because of the selfish intentions behind bad hospitality, these exchanges share much with economic relationships where one party seeks to gain from another. These selfish exchanges result in guests feeling anxious not only about their hosts' intentions but also in questioning the very nature of hospitality itself. This chapter will argue that, although bad hosts are not new to literature, the eighteenth-century host is particularly threatening to both the larger social order and individual psyches. By revealing the motivation behind hospitality and exposing bad intentions, eighteenth-century novels illuminate problems not just in the character of particular hosts but also in the very system of hospitality.⁷⁰ Indeed, as I will argue, the very questioning of host motive and awareness of guest vulnerability is necessitated by an intentional ethic and complicates the relationship between host and guest. In particular, I will show how eighteenth-century novels use concepts of credit and reputation and their relationship with hospitality to build a distrust of hospitality and the power dynamics in the relationships it creates.

Traditional Threats to Hospitality

Vestiges of older critiques of hospitality remain in eighteenth-century novels; indeed, not every representation of bad hosting undermines the larger system. In fact, bad hosts who fail to upset the order of exchange abound in many eighteenth-century novels. These hosts misuse the hospitality system but their failures do not upset a sense of hospitality as a system but rather suggest misunderstandings concerning how hospitality should be offered. Their failures are generally not of cunning but of personality; selfish rather than malevolent, these hosts simply fail to consider the needs of their guests alongside their own. Their selfishness, however, often leads to guests being held as hostages or left unprotected. Generally seeking financial gain or social prestige, these hosts see hospitality as a way to fulfill these desires rather than as a social responsibility to accommodate others. These forms of negative hospitality have been

⁷⁰ Virginia Kenning notes a similar transition between the seventeenth-century country-house poem and how its conventions are used in the eighteenth century; she attributes this change to both a "widespread consciousness of the fragility of social constructs" that led to a "reassertion or adjustment of the idea of the good society" and to new emphasis on the individual that forced a "new ethic" (2-3).

traditionally denounced in literature,⁷¹ and eighteenth-century novels treat them as conventional objects of satire. These hospitality missteps thus fail to create hospitable relationships but also do not disrupt the system and thus do not produce moral anxiety in the guest.

Among these satirized forms of hospitality are misuses of personal economics or traditional social hierarchy. Both forces were linked to negative virtues in the eighteenth century. In fact, economics and ethics were discussed in the same texts. While Smith sectioned his moral treatise from his work on commerce to some degree, many other philosophers did not. Among the more popular texts, David Fordyce included a chapter on “social duties of the commercial kind” in his *Elements of Moral Philosophy*, and Samuel Pufendorf discusses ownership, contracts and financial authority in his *On the Duty of Man and Citizen*. Hutcheson’s *A System of Moral Philosophy* also included commerce as an important part of a moral life, and George Blewitt wrote an entire thesis on the overlap of morals and economics entitled, *An Enquiry Whether a General Practice of Virtue Tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Benefit or Disadvantage of a People*. These texts, among others, establish commerce, economics, and capitalism as well as the social hierarchies these systems disrupted as part of the moral practice of daily life.

Literary and historical scholars have noted how these changing commercial interests and structures redefined ethics in the eighteenth century. J.G.A. Pocock’s work links capitalism and corresponding changes in power structures to a new sense of private virtue. Michael McKeon finds the origins of the novel lie in “questions of virtue” that “internalize the emergence of the middle class and the concerns that it exists to mediate” (22). Liz Bellamy contends that a commercial pursuit of self-interest “began to be presented as the duty of the individual” in a new capitalist system and thus become incorporated into moral codes (3). Deidre Lynch argues that fictional characters helped bridge the gap between the new commercial system and ethics, offering characters as a way to explore new “social relations in their changed, commercialized world” (4) but also as a way to receive “moral training and self-culture” through reading character (10). These critics and others find that new economic systems of exchange disrupted

⁷¹ Examples fill the western tradition of literature and its sources. The Gospel of Luke alone, for example, includes parables against miserly behavior—the Parable of the Unjust Steward (16:1-13) and of the Rich Fool (12:13-21)—as well as warnings against the pursuit of luxury—the Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (16:19-31).

the older moral code;⁷² novels integrated these codes and offered moral judgment on capitalism and new ethics.

In many cases, these cultural changes are addressed as having negative impacts on the hospitable exchange in the novel, disrupting old systems of hospitality that depended on noblesse oblige and the social hierarchy from which it derived.⁷³ Yet, in the novels explored here, these negative impacts are generally the source of satirical lampooning rather than complications to character or integral movements in plot. As such, they are easy to see as negative forms of hospitality and also easier for the characters to set aside. Clearly immoral, these representations of hospitality rarely cause the characters more than a moment's discomfort and are easily laughed away by the reader. Indeed, the threats these behaviors pose to hospitality are fairly traditional. Self-interest in the form of miserliness, luxury or snobbery has always hindered the delivery of hospitality. These negative forms of hospitality are included in the eighteenth-century novel but do not cause a large philosophical restructuring of ethical standards.⁷⁴ Easily identified, though not easily combated, these forms of hospitality create uncomfortable situations for the guest but do not ask them to reevaluate their conceptions of what hospitality looks like. Primarily the source of satire and direct criticism, these traditional forms of negative hospitality are used only to introduce the larger problems hospitality was facing in the eighteenth-century: namely the unstable relationship between the host and guest and the increasing demands on the guest in the hospitable exchange.

⁷² Two collections of economic texts from the eighteenth century include discussions of morality and virtue. Stephen Copley introduces the economy section of his *Literature and the Social Order in Eighteenth-Century England* with the claim that "In the humanist tradition, discussion of political and economic affairs is conducted in explicitly moral terms" (3). Henry Clark lists among the topic discussed in his *Commerce, Culture, and Liberty: Readings on Capitalism before Adam Smith*, "the role of commerce in fostering civility and sociability, the effects of commerce on the fabric of community life, [and] the dangers to moral virtue posed by increasing prosperity" (ix).

⁷³ This sense of loss is perhaps the cause for the nostalgia for older orders of hospitality. Many novels of the earlier eighteenth century certainly contain this nostalgia. Eliza Haywood's *Fortunate Foundlings* includes praise of the hospitality found in the French nobility in what is presented as a more stable social hierarchy; Smollett's first novel, *The Adventures of Roderick Random*, also looks nostalgically back on older forms of hospitality as the hero ends the novel returning to his place as head of a country estate.

⁷⁴ Barbara Zonitch sees the critique of both luxury and aristocratic snobbery as promoting a new middle-class culture, defined by "emotional self-regulation and economic frugality." Such a culture, she argues changes the nature of the country estate and its hospitality from one that "paraded the signs of aristocratic patrimony" to one that "modestly displayed...regulation and charity" (27-8). Virginia Kenning agrees, exploring a tradition in the country house poem that investigates luxury only to contrast it to a more proper hosting in the virtues of "good stewardship, simplicity, right use, frugality" (6-7). While I agree that hospitality shifted in this way in the eighteenth century, I would attribute the shift to new concepts of credit and reputation discussed later in this chapter.

In many novels, the miserly host is easily dismissed by the guest and rejected for his lack of hospitality. The easy target of satire, this host is often introduced and dismissed with the language of ridicule. For example, Tobias Smollett spends little of his considerable satiric power on Mr. Pimpernel in *Humphry Clinker*, where he is dismissed by Matthew Bramble as “a sordid miser” whose despotism is “truly diabolical.” Bramble finds Pimpernel’s inhospitality influences all other areas of his life and lists his evils, marking him a “brutal husband, an unnatural parent, a harsh master, an oppressive landlord, a litigious neighbour, and a partial magistrate” (161).⁷⁵ This list of invectives is hardly witty but does offer a clear signal to the reader that the treatment Bramble received as a guest was not ideal. The guests enter Pimpernel’s home, only to leave quickly with a negative judgment and a desire not to return. The narrative follows this desire and neither Pimpernel nor his particular brand of miserliness is heard from again. Frances Burney similarly dismisses miserliness as opposing basic needs of hospitality. In *Cecilia*, Mr. Briggs is the only guardian of the three her uncle appointed that Cecilia absolutely refuses to live with. Finding his house dirty and unwelcoming, Cecilia, who could laugh at how Briggs’s miserliness leads him to make a spectacle of himself, ultimately judges him to be filled with “parsimony, vulgarity, and meanness” and labels him the “lowest and most wretched of misers in a city abounding with opulence, hospitality, and splendor” (374). Though Cecilia should live with him as his ward, she rejects his house because of its miserly inhospitality.⁷⁶ Briggs is certainly more involved in the narrative and plot than Smollett’s Pimpernel but his miserly behavior effectively negates him from becoming a host or playing a larger part in the narrative.

In these same novels, Smollett and Burney also explore the opposite of miserliness, luxury. Though luxury causes more discomfort to the guest characters than miserliness, it is also easily identified as a marker of inhospitable behavior. Smollett and Burney each relate luxury to a distant, irresponsible host. Smollett creates the character of Mr. Burdock, Mr. Pimpernel’s

⁷⁵ David Punter notes that Pimpernel is not just a member of the influential landed gentry but also a justice of the peace. Punter points out that not only is Pimpernel deficient as a responsible host but also as a J.P. because of his previous work as an attorney and consequent “association with the other side of the legal profession, his acquaintance with the recesses of legal ideology, which stains his judgments” (55).

⁷⁶ Though rejected as a suitable host, Margaret Doody points out that Briggs is an unconventional miser because his “buoyant assurance” and happy nature set him at odds with the “misery conventionally associated with misers” (123).

cousin, and describes his house as “a great inn, crowded with travelers” (153).⁷⁷ Mr. Burdock’s hospitality is generous and welcoming but, because it insists on displaying his wealth, fails to form the proper relationships between guest and host. Thus, Burdock’s home is little more than an “inn” or “ordinary” where “mine host seems to be misplaced.” Bramble critiques Burdock’s absence, claiming “I would rather dine on filberts with a hermit, than feed upon venison with a hog” (153). Such a claim emphasizes the importance of the relationship created through hospitable exchanges and criticizes Burdock for his distance from his guests.⁷⁸ The same sentiment is repeated by Burney; Mr. Harrel, Cecilia’s guardian consistently in the pursuit of luxury, “seemed to consider his own house merely as an Hôtel” where Mr. Harrel himself was to be served and accommodated rather than fulfill his own obligations to serve and accommodate his guest. Mr. Harrel and his wife may keep an “acquaintance [that] were numerous, expensive and idle” but their relationships with these acquaintance are pursued to fulfill their own needs and the duties of the host are ignored for the pursuit of wealth and prestige (53). Rarely present in their own home, the Harrels fail to accommodate Cecilia’s needs.⁷⁹ Luxury, in both instances, is denounced as too economically hospitable; comparing these houses to inns or hotels, Burney and Smollett suggest that the estate owners are not true hosts but commercial venturists. Thus, luxury, like miserliness, is exposed as a hindrance to proper hospitality.

Yet, unlike miserliness, luxury is not easy to escape. Smollett revisits the coldness that luxury creates in the hospitality cycle in his description of the Baynards, and Burney complicates the Harrels’ characters to illustrate the temptation that luxury creates for a host. In particular, the problem the Baynards and the Harrels face is that they cannot afford the luxury they live in. Both families face stifling debt yet continue to pursue luxury to gain prestige among their neighbors. Such competition hints at difficulty forming relationships of respect and common pursuit.

⁷⁷ I.C. Ross claims Burdock and Pimpernel are the “counterparts” of Bramble and Dennison, a farmer who manages his estate without luxury or miserliness (187-188).

⁷⁸ Michael Rosenblum sees this irresponsible hosting as a theme in Smollett’s work. Studying all five of Smollett’s novels, he concludes that Smollett’s image of a bad society is “one which recognizes no values and has lost the sense of obligations and distinctions upon which social class depends” (560). Taken together, these confluent displays of bad hospitality suggest Smollett sees financial constructs as a threat to social order; his characters, however, maintain the power and foresight to combat these flaws.

⁷⁹ As this luxurious lifestyle entraps Cecilia, it also entraps the Harrels. D. Grant Campbell notes that the luxurious lifestyle seems similar to “intoxication and addiction” in the novel, “a mental dependency upon an alluring lifestyle that ruins the finances, wastes the physique, and overwhelms the intellect” (136). The luxurious lifestyle, and its counterpart of gambling, directly opposes Cecilia’s own desires for an ordered, rational life.

Indeed, this competition among neighbors affects their behavior towards guests: the Baynards leave Bramble and his travelling companions waiting in a “*temple of cold reception*” for “above half an hour,” and the Harrels repeatedly expose Cecilia to company and parties of pleasure that she would rather avoid. Both situations leave the guests uncomfortable in their hosts’ homes. Yet, Cecilia and Bramble are insistent in upholding their duties as guests to these hosts; unlike the misers, the host of luxury is an object to reform in the novels, and the guests attempt to rearrange the hosts’ approach to hospitality by stifling the pursuit of luxury. Though Bramble is successful where Cecilia is not,⁸⁰ the discomfort felt by these guests is caused by their easy identification of the flaw in the hospitable exchange and their attempt to rectify that problem from a position that demands subservience to the host’s ways of living. Luxury, then, might be a larger threat to hospitality than miserliness but also one that the guest can attempt to revise.

As easily identified but less easily combated is the behavior of the old nobility. A traditional giver of hospitality, this social class was redefining its role in the hospitable exchange in the eighteenth century and a traditional emphasis on social hierarchy produced its own form of negative hospitality. Smollett and Burney also turn their satiric critique here and detail how the reserve of the nobility made the relationships that hospitality requires more difficult. Both Smollett and Burney ridicule the snobbery of the elite and the resulting demand for respect from the guest as both unnerving and unproductive. Bramble complains of his treatment at the hands of Lord Oxmington, where he attended a “fashionable meal served up with much ostentation to a company of about a dozen persons, none of whom we had ever seen before.” These circumstances are not mediated by the host who, Bramble complains, “is more remarkable for his pride and caprice, than for his hospitality and understanding” and who “considered his guests merely as objects to shine upon, so as to reflect the luster of his own magnificence” (260). Bramble’s chief complaint, then, is that the host’s attitude of superiority effectively turned his guests into objects rather than welcomed guests. Bramble finds this behavior most threatening and so refuses to maintain his role as grateful guest; he attempts to pay the servants for his meal and offers to duel Oxmington, an offer that would force the lord to see Bramble as his social

⁸⁰ Interestingly, neither Bramble or Cecilia sees any real hope in reforming their luxurious hosts until one of the spouses dies. These texts then suggest that luxury is in part connected to the morality of the married state and the habits created by this relationship.

equal.⁸¹ The situation quickly becomes more absurd when Bramble sends his friend, the ex-soldier Lismahago, to offer his challenge but even Lismahago's abuse at the hands of Oxmington's servants underscores the inhospitality and violence that a reliance on noble superiority causes for the guest. Bramble is, however, unable to gain his desired retribution for Oxmington's inhospitality; instead, Oxmington remains distant and Bramble and his companions are further ridiculed. Though able to read the problem in the exchange, Bramble is left powerless to respond.

Burney also uses the last of Cecilia's three guardians to depict a similar version of noble snobbery. Mr. Delvile takes great pride in his family history and insists on being treated with respect by his guests though he fails to return that respect. He, like Oxmington, has all the external trappings of a good host but lacks the proper demeanor; his house is "grand and spacious" if outdated and his servants are "profoundly respectful." Yet Cecilia complains that the house was too "gloomy" and "while it inspired awe, it repressed pleasure" (97). Of larger complaint is Mr. Delvile's behavior; he makes his guests wait and remains so focused on the running of his daily life that he fails to take any interest in his guest Cecilia (98). Even at his castle in the country, Mr. Delvile insists upon distancing himself from his neighbors in order to display his superiority; the castle has few guests because Mr. Delvile had "offended all the neighbouring gentry, who could easily be better entertained than by receiving instructions of their own inferiority" (460). Mr. Delvile's snobbery thus makes any relationship—even the traditional relationship between host and guest—impossible.⁸² His care to distance himself from all others around him results in his failure to uphold the traditional responsibility of the nobility to offer hospitality. Cecilia, like Bramble, remains unable to respond to Delvile's inhospitality, and the narrative ultimately exaggerates Delvile's distance by placing him outside of Cecilia's marriage negotiations with his son.

⁸¹ I.C. Ross views Oxmington as Smollett's commentary on the nobility at large, who have "lost not only virtue but even civility" by being influenced by the middle class's "rage for luxury" and "imitation the nobility's dereliction of their social duty" (187).

⁸² Delvile's snobbery leads to a closed hospitality; so concerned with his own prestige and how he is stationed in a hospitality exchange, Delvile fails to welcome others. Indeed, Doody notes that Delvile's obsession with "maintaining a position" is literalized in his hosting "as he literally maintains a position in ungallantly refusing to rise from his chair to greet [Cecilia]" (124).

These versions of hospitality are clearly marked as improper exchanges in these novels, but these types of exchanges have been marked as improper throughout literary history. Midas's pursuit of luxury resulted in his loneliness as he turned all those around him into gold; Shakespeare's Shylock and Ben Jonson's Volpone, who rivaled one another as most reviled miser on the Renaissance stage, both died alone; Chaucer's Prioress is so concerned with maintaining the laws of good manners that she fails to create relationships with people and instead dotes on animals. Though the critiques by Smollett, Burney and their contemporaries modernized the manifestations of these traits, the behaviors they ridicule are traditional threats to hospitality. As such, they certainly make the guest uncomfortable but it is physical, not psychological or philosophical, discomfort. These clear and immediate threats to hospitality are thus more easily set aside as representations of immoral behavior. However, these critiques do indicate an awareness of the exchange implicit in hospitality and how that exchange must be carefully navigated as a set of relationships and not just the flow of goods and services. In other words, these authors acknowledged hospitality as an exchange but insist on an ethical and relational component in the exchange.

An Exposed Economy

Indeed, when a hospitality relationship is not honored, not only that exchange fails but the system of hospitality falters. As the potential for selfish motives becomes uncovered in the eighteenth century through intentional ethics, the guest begins to distrust the giving of hospitality. Uncovering selfish motives for the host's behavior, the guest starts to doubt signs of hospitality. The position of the "toad-eater" that started the chapter illustrates this loss of trust in the system. Noticing the host's selfish intentions, the toad-eater, unlike the guest of the miser or snob, does feel psychological and philosophical disorder. Such is certainly the position of Cynthia in Fielding's *David Simple*. When she perceives her host's deception, she becomes disenchanted with her host, her own position, and the possibility of good hospitality. Still ensnared within the exchange system, she feels anxiety over how to act now that the system and the self-interest it sought to hide is exposed. Cynthia's inferior position in the exchange, though always present, becomes a threat to the exchange when it is made apparent through her host's treatment of her: "To her Usage was owing all my Misery; for by that time I had been with her

two or three Months, she began to treat me as a *Creature* born to be her *Slave*” (105). Cynthia’s description here clearly identifies her disenchantment with her hospitality exchange; she styles her placement not as a guest but as a slave compelled to remain in the service of her host, respond to her demands, and receive no compensation in return. Relegated to an object or commodity for exchange, Cynthia is unable to embrace her role in the hospitable exchange. The ideal of hospitality interrupted, the toad-eater too must rewrite her understanding of the exchange cycle.

Cynthia certainly did not expect to be treated as an inferior member of the hospitable exchange when she entered into it. Rather, Cynthia expected a more ideal exchange of shelter and protection from her host in exchange for her gratitude and friendship; though financially dependent on her host, Cynthia believes that her host is dependent upon her for the opportunity to fulfill her civic duty and the gratitude Cynthia supplies. In fact, Cynthia did not initially resent being dependent on her sponsor nor did she desire hospitality without some sort of exchange. When Cynthia entered the agreement, she hoped only to deserve the offered hospitality:

The Lady I went with, had something very amiable in her Manner, and at first behaved to me with so much Good-nature, that I loved her with the utmost Sincerity, I dwelt with pleasure on the Thoughts of the Obligation I owed her, as I fancied she was generous enough to delight in conferring them; and I had none of that sort of *Pride, by Fools mistaken for Greatness of Mind*, which makes People disdain the receiving Obligations: for I think the only Meanness consists in accepting, and not gratefully acknowledging them. (102-3)

Here, Cynthia is clearly expecting an exchange of good nature and manners for obligation and gratitude in her role as the guest. Willing to pay the price by incurring these obligations and feeling grateful, Cynthia hopes her host will in part be paid for the pleasure she feels in aiding a woman in distress. This anticipated exchange consisted not just of exchanged goods but also of exchanged behaviors that would work to create a bond between host and guest. Cynthia begins her toad-eater life, then, feeling a sense of closeness and attachment to her host and believing her host felt a similar sentiment. In Cynthia’s imagined exchange, the gain that each party hopes to acquire is not economic but social. Had both participants shared a value for this trait, their hospitable exchange could have remained the happy relationship Cynthia hoped for. Cynthia’s

host, however, ruins such benevolence by her selfish behavior and lack of respect for her guest; she accuses Cynthia of selfishly using their relationship for her own gain, while at the same time claiming her continued hosting as a sign of her own benevolence.

Cynthia's early idealism, however, suggests that there is some room for self-interest in a hospitality exchange. If each party is able to gain from the relationship, the exchange would still be successful. In the way this potential exchange includes both goods and services circulated between individuals for mutual gain, it begins to resemble an economy but not a barter or moneyed economy. Rather, hospitality in practice, if not ideal, is most easily likened to its close cousin, the gift economy.⁸³ A gift economy exchanges tangible items but these items represent and build a relationship between giver and receiver.⁸⁴ Because these exchanges involve complex social navigations that are intricately interwoven with the gifts exchanged, they function according to cultural norms often hard to define. As such, gift economies, like hospitality, are both a theory of ideal interactions and a practice contingent on its human players. These players exchange goods or services but also gain and give social stability, prestige, and community through the more material exchange. The relationships built through gift economies, and hospitality as well, are the most valuable pieces of the exchange and also are what separates these economies from market economies. By absenting the relationship that hospitality is meant to build, Cynthia's host fails to address the ethical obligations inherent in the exchange.

Gift economies build these obligations by building relationships through what Pierre Bourdieu calls "symbolic capital."⁸⁵ Unlike the goods found in a money or barter economy,

⁸³ Gift giving practices were noted on many eighteenth-century accounts of encounters with new cultures but seems to have declined as an interest following the Napoleonic Wars, when (unlike hospitality) mention of gift-giving practices in other cultures became rare. See Harry Liebersohn, *The Return of the Gift: European History of a Global Idea*: 3.

⁸⁴ According to Linda Zionkowski and Cynthia Klekar, the gift "must remain distinct from commodities and wages...[and] this required direct involvement in the lives of dependants" in order to turn dominant social relations into ones of attachment (3-4).

⁸⁵ Unlike many anthropological studies, Bourdieu's theories remain detached from a specific culture or time and instead dwell on the basics behind gift economies in general. Certainly anthropological studies make larger claims about the functioning of gift economies in general. Indeed, Marcel Mauss's *The Gift* is an important text for both philosophers and anthropologists. However, because his conceptions originate from a tribal culture, as do the works of many of his predecessors, it is more difficult to draw parallels between his findings and the world of eighteenth-century Britain. Unlike many philosophical studies, his work insists on exploring how worldly contexts affect this system of exchange. Likewise, many of these philosophical works also discuss real-world situations. Jacques Derrida's work, for example, includes discussions of the current immigration debate in France. However, these works, when they do comment on current events, do so from a post-modern perspective anachronistic to thinkers of

symbolic capital includes a shared value system for specific cultural traits such as “recognition, honor, [or] nobility” (“Marginalia” 234). In order for exchanges of gifts or hospitality to work, the participant must acknowledge this value system; indeed, the potential for exchange is “only available to agents endowed with dispositions adjusted to the logic of ‘disinterestedness’” who are willing to sacrifice in order to obtain these traits (Bourdieu, “Marginalia” 235). The exchange of such symbolic capital relies on the shared perspective of the exchange participants.⁸⁶ This dependency manifests itself in a relationship between the participants; because each relies on the other for recognition of the desired traits, both participants, regardless of more tangible states of dependency, require the other’s participation. When Cynthia’s host fails to sacrifice yet continues to expect to gain symbolic capital, the hospitality relationship suffers. Her selfish behaviors fail to note her dependency on Cynthia’s acknowledgement of her hospitable actions; instead, the host demands social recognition for only the mere act of housing and feeding Cynthia devoid of any intention of making Cynthia comfortable.

Thus, the relationship between Cynthia and her host is injured by the bad intentions of the host but also in the ways these selfish intentions are manifested in practice. Not only does the host abandon any attempts to serve Cynthia but she also fails to consider practices of welcoming that adjust to the specific contexts of each exchange and the common ground that helps individuals determine how to behave. Performing only literal actions of hospitality—housing and feeding a guest—Cynthia’s host does not perform any additional acts to increase her guest’s comfort that are less easily prescribed. Indeed, hospitality requires a balance of rules of conduct and flexible negotiations between guest and host that Bourdieu calls “practical logic.” He claims that this balance amounts to a “stylistic unity which, though immediately perceptible, has none of the strict, regular coherence of the concerted products of a plan” (“Practical Logic” 194). Exchanges of hospitality, then, depend on a system of norms but not rules. These norms involve

the eighteenth century. Thus, Derrida’s conception that the gift cannot be recognized by either host or guest in order to be a gift; rather it exists as the idea of *the impossible*. This approach to gift-giving, as I hope will become apparent in this chapter, is not part of the eighteenth-century mindset.

⁸⁶ Mireille Rosello notes that, in practice, hospitality works best when based on similarities between the agents. If the host and guest share at least “the impression that they share the same assumptions about what it means to be hospitable, they both have agency: they can share the responsibility for formulating an objection to a given rule, their strong dislike of another, their attachment to a different principle” (171). Under these conditions, the host and guest can reshape or debate the laws of hospitality; without such similarity, however, such compromise or discussion is not possible.

strategic handling of methods of exchange, including time between exchanges, displays of gratitude, and returns adjusted to personal position. These methods of exchange, as practical logic, are flexible but are also easy to misinterpret or handle improperly; each participant must properly judge how, what, and when to return or offer an exchange. Yet when completed, this cycle of exchange can create “durable relations of dependence” that allow a society to function smoothly (Bourdieu, “Marginalia” 239). While Cynthia has attempted to respond to this logic by returning gratitude for hospitality, her host breaks the cycle of exchange by refusing to accept her gratitude or offer continued welcome and thus revealing the fragile nature of hospitality.⁸⁷ Bourdieu’s system implies, however, that had Cynthia received a timely and well-mannered return to her gratitude from her host, it is possible their relationship could have continued to thrive and offer both participants pleasure.

Unhappy, yet still dependent on her host, Cynthia is unable to escape her negative relationship. Because a dependent guest, Cynthia remains not only vulnerable and inactive, but also uncomfortably aware of her vulnerability now that her host’s intentions have been exposed. Thinking of her host’s future reactions rather than what she is obligated to return in the exchange, Cynthia complains that she cannot speak or be silent or complain about her treatment without risking her host’s displeasure and the potential end of the exchange. Yet, despite this treatment, Cynthia must remain a guest and her ethical choices are all unappealing. She tells David, “I think it impossible to be in a worse Situation. She had raised my Love, by the Obligations she had confer’d on me, and yet continually provoked my Rage by her Ill-nature: I could not for a great while, any account for this conduct [sic]: I thought if she did not love me, she had no Reason to have given herself any trouble about me, and yet I could not think she could have used me in that manner, if she had had the least Regard for me” (105). The relationship Cynthia relates to David still maintains vestiges of the symbolic system, and Cynthia feels responsible for the obligations she has accrued. However, the assumptions about intention the symbolic capital relied on are exposed, and Cynthia is made aware of the intentional ethics to be judged—the “Reasons” her host would “give herself any trouble” about her. Despite this

⁸⁷ Elliot argues that gifts naturally combine self-interested and disinterested motives. However, within any gift exchange is “a necessary escape hatch” which insists that “obligations may be refused and the gift may be used for purposes entirely beyond the giver’s intent.” For Elliot, this very “unpredictability” is “what makes a gift exchange different from a market exchange” (121).

objective contemplation of her uncomfortable situation, Cynthia is unable to act in the exchange but instead feels anxiety about her position.⁸⁸

This anxiety is rooted in the fact that, as a guest, Cynthia still has ethical responsibilities to her host but is also charged with judging the host's actions and intentions. As such, Cynthia is both an active participant in her own hospitality exchange as well as an observer of it. This dual position insists on remaining involved in the exchange of hospitality but also observing from outside the hospitality exchange. However, because the hospitable exchange is not available to its participants as an observational ethics, it fails to fit in with the eighteenth-century's popular moral standards for spectatorship and sympathy. Lauded in both natural law and moral sense philosophies, observational ethics promised to regulate behavior and instill a disposition of disinterestedness necessary for hospitality. However, as the century progressed, this observational lesson designed to train for in-the-moment behavior was applied to the actor as well. Adam Smith famously encouraged his readers to listen to "the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct" (137) that could evaluate one's own behavior from an objective position. Smith calls on his readers to absent themselves from exchange altogether and judge their relationships with others "neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality between us" (135). Taking a perspective of an outsider, Smith proposed, will help the actors choose ethically. The problem for the guests and hosts involved in exchanges, however, is that the very nature of the exchange insists that they do not have an objective perspective and cannot know what to expect but must act all the same.

Moreover, by absencing oneself from the exchange, the guest makes apparent the mechanics of hospitality and the symbolic capital on which it functions. The enactment of hospitality, however, depends on these mechanisms remaining hidden. Bourdieu insists that the gift exchange must remain a "collective self-deception" among those in the exchange and cannot "become public knowledge" or be "publicly proclaimed"; to attempt to look "through the eyes of

⁸⁸ Bourdieu marks this as a sign of what would occur if the mechanics of the gift economy were exposed; then, "the uncertainty, even anxiety, linked to anticipation" of the future effects of the exchange would strengthen and emphasize the "relation of domination" that these exchanges rely on ("Marginalia" 234).

a third person” threatens to reveal the self-interest in a hospitable exchange in the drive to gain symbolic capital (“Marginalia” 232). Though Bourdieu certainly does not believe in the possibility of disinterested benevolence that eighteenth-century philosophers proposed, his notion of collective self-deception marks a paradox in the eighteenth-century hospitality construction. Because intention was so important to the exchange, the guest was required to be suspicious of the host’s behaviors, and this suspicion threatened to uncover any pursuit of symbolic capital in the exchange. At the same time, the detached observer also threatens to remove herself as an actor from the exchange altogether, making their own participation in the exchange more wrought.⁸⁹

Indeed, Cynthia entered her hospitality exchange without worries of deception, concerns about the hospitality system, or beliefs that she could not fulfill her obligations. Her behavior early in the hospitality relationship was based only on the assumption that her host was benevolent and the hospitality system would create a cycle of reciprocity. Her ease in misreading her host’s disposition, however, is part of the practical logic of hospitality. Because the hospitality exchange is temporal and particular, it is impossible for the participants to predict or see their exchange objectively. Referring to the continued gift exchange as a “cycle of reciprocity,” Bourdieu argues that the obligations that drive this cycle “exist only for the absolute gaze of the omniscient, omnipresent spectator, who, thanks to his knowledge of the social mechanics, is able to be present at the different stages of the “cycle.” Within the exchange, participants are offered the chance to refuse a gift or not return one (“Practical Logic” 190). Only retrospectively is Cynthia able to see the flawed exchange for what it is; when her host’s behavior halts the cycle by failing to offer a return for Cynthia’s gratitude, Cynthia begins to worry about her host’s intentions, the very nature of hospitality and her passive position in the exchange.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Liz Bellamy reads this passivity as a response to the more economic lifestyle available in Britain. She argues that “while the sphere of virtue is clearly recognized as private, the scope for private virtue is limited by the growing acceptance of self-interest as a legitimate code of behavior” and characterized a resulting moral distrust as a “conflict between a masculine, competitive economic ethos and a more feminized private code, which recognized the limited role of the individual within a complex community, but sought to stress the importance of affective values of sympathy and generosity” (132).

⁹⁰ As the century progressed, it seems that the practice of gift-giving was questioned more widely. Harry Liebersohn cites the 1788-1795 court case of Warren Hastings, former East India Company governor of Bengal, as a marker of a changed view of the gift in late eighteenth-century England. Hastings was tried by Edmund Burke for accepting

Bad hosts thus reveal the fragility of the hospitality cycle. By exposing hospitality's dependence on a shared value system and a hidden cycle, bad hosts threaten more than just one particular exchange of hospitality but the whole institution and the social system it perpetuates. Moreover, the exposure of hospitality's potential for self-interest alters the guest position. Seeking host intentions, the guest is tasked with more moral responsibility; no longer only responsible for her own actions in an exchange, the guest must also serve as arbitrator of the system; such additional responsibility, coupled with an inability to act, produce the problems of perception that make the guest so anxious. Eighteenth-century narratives explore the fragility of hospitality and the vulnerability of the guest by continually exposing the self-interest of hosts and thus the machinations of hospitality. This chapter will turn to two ways the cycle and self-interested motives are revealed in literature but potentially hidden in hospitality: through the pursuit of credit and reputation.

Delayed Credit

Indeed, eighteenth-century novels repeatedly depict the hidden deceits of bad hospitality as the cause of more internal discomfort for the guest. One such deceptive form of hospitality is a relationship based on credit;⁹¹ like the economic sense of hospitality discussed above, the hosts in these relationships seek some sort of financial gain from their guests.⁹² Unlike the miser or luxury seeker, however, these hosts seek economic gain based on a credit system that includes delayed gratification. Because the hospitality system includes delay, the credit-seeking host is more difficult to identify than miserly or luxurious hosts. Hospitality includes norms that ask

bribes that Hastings defined as gifts necessary to be accepted for orderly rule. Liebersohn marks this time period as one in which gift exchange went from being "taken for granted in European society" to one in which it had become "so contrary to rational administration that its legitimacy in the Hastings controversy was hard to reconstruct. Once intrinsic to European society, the language of the gift had become submerged and problematic" (26). See Liebersohn, 9-26.

⁹¹ According to Miranda J. Burgess, credit had both economic and moral connotations in the eighteenth century, particularly for women. A woman could be valued both for the financial gains she could bring to a match as well as the moral credentials she displayed in her character. Burgess argues then that "financial theorists and conduct writers share responsibility not only for the co-existence of moral and financial registers in the concept of credit, but for their mutual contamination as well: as a woman's reputation for sensibility tends to be seen by moralists as an economic matter, so economic theorists tend to view financial credit as a moral issue" (137).

⁹² D. Grant Campbell finds a larger eighteenth-century concern with credit and the ways in which it created a "false appearance of prosperity" that was ultimately unrealizable. Reading the sermons of the day, he claims that credit is represented as "a sinful dream, from which the sinner must awake to a ruin which suggest both a personal confrontation with death and an apocalyptic vision" (136). Thus, credit was an emblem of deception.

participants to remain obligated to the initial giver in order to build a relationship; to remain in debt is to allow the other participant a time as the dominant member in the exchange, and the returned gift was designed with its recipient in mind and to inspire a cycle of exchange. The financial credit system followed the same time lag but without the relationship or the cyclic nature; the lender gave money and sought interest in return. While the borrowing member was subservient to the lender, the potential for a reversed exchange does not exist and the only way to perpetuate the relationship was for one member to become further and further indebted. Because acting within the moment of exchange, the guest can easily read a credit exchange for one of hospitality; while they believe they are building a relationship and entering a cycle of exchange, their host hopes either to gain interest or use their guest as collateral. As a result of these mismatched interests, these situations are filled with anxiety for the guest as he questions his role in the hospitality exchange.

The most notorious depiction of these credit relations is found in the character of Mr. Harrel in *Cecilia*. He uses Cecilia, his ward, for collateral on his loans. In debt for gambling and maintaining a luxurious lifestyle, Mr. Harrel sees Cecilia's fortune and person as a way to pay back his financial obligations. Cecilia, however, enters his house believing she is viewed as a friend by Mrs. Harrel and a moral obligation by Mr. Harrel. Cecilia does not become aware of Mr. Harrel's intentions until after his death, when she meets his creditors. Then, Cecilia discovers that her guardian had promised her as a "prize" to both Sir Robert Floyer and Mr. Marriot in exchange for the cancellation of his debt to each of them (433). He had likewise placated his creditors with assurances that Cecilia would repay them when she came of age. Upon learning of Mr. Harrel's plots, Cecilia "saw now but too clearly the reason" for Mr. Harrel's odd treatment of her (435) that had before been unclear because interpreted according to a hospitality rather than a credit relationship. Because Mr. Harrel was always able to postpone his obligations, Cecilia remained unaware of her position as collateral. She continued to perceive herself as a guest and thus acted as a member of an ordinary hospitality exchange and made her decisions based on these assumptions.

Though certainly Cecilia had some indications of Mr. Harrel's mistreatment of her, she continually attributed this mistreatment to his pursuit of luxury alone and not to the credit he was gaining through her. However, Mr. Harrel's most provoking behavior indicates his dependence

on his guest and the reversal of their positions in the hospitality exchange. In these moments, Cecilia feels her greatest discomfort in the Harrels' house. Particularly unnerving is Mr. Harrel's dependence on Cecilia's to pay his debts in private and then require her presence in public. In one instance, he forces Cecilia to go to the Pantheon after she had paid his debt to a group of tradesmen. He insists that if Cecilia is not in attendance, "every dirty tradesman in town to whom I owe a shilling, will be forming the same cursed combination those scoundrels formed this morning, of coming in a body, and waiting for their money, or else bringing an execution into my house"; Cecilia's unwilling presence is, according to Mr. Harrel, "the only way to silence report" and keep him from financial ruin (273). Cecilia recognizes an element of captivity in this moment and resents having to protect her host from his debts. However, she still reads her captivity as being caught in a life of luxury rather than a relationship based on credit. Cecilia hopes her loan will inspire a reformation in the Harrels' lifestyle and lead them to attend fewer parties of pleasure and commission no more projects which they cannot afford. In her belief in the hospitality exchange, Cecilia hopes for a return of her sign of friendship but, of course, waits in vain.

Cecilia, exacerbated by being forced to immediately return to luxury in a public outing, agrees to attend her host but also begins to more seriously pursue other options for hospitality. Her resulting resolution to move to the Delvilles, however, further reveals Mr. Harrel's dependence on his guest.⁹³ Mr. Harrel needs Cecilia to remain in his house to subdue his creditors; Cecilia, believing she is merely a guest, is surprised and confused by the panic her announcement to move causes. Both Mr. and Mrs. Harrel beg Cecilia to remain, and their supplications make Cecilia feel both "ashamed and shocked" and disrupt her notions of morality; she tells her friend "it is painful to me to refuse, but to comply is for ever in defiance of my judgment—Oh, Mrs. Harrel, I know no longer what is kind or what is cruel, nor have I known for some time past right from wrong, nor good from evil!"(396). Placed in a position of collateral, Cecilia loses her ability to distinguish moral value; as the hospitality cycle is

⁹³ D. Grant Campbell reads Cecilia's discomfort in the Harrel's and her desire to leave as a result of her different economic approach to her wealth. Because she "practices economic restraint in a society whose pattern of expansion depends on the abandonment of such restraint," Cecilia is unable to understand how her actions fail to complete their intended results. As Campbell notes, "her caution at a time of risk causes fear; her payments at a time of unstable credit cause a stampede; her liberality at a time of hostility and suspicion awakens greed" (141).

disrupted, so too is Cecilia's capacity to judge it. Aware that something is wrong with her presence in the house, her full understanding is delayed until the extent of the Harrels' dependency is revealed. The hospitality cycle is broken, but Cecilia as the guest, because of the delayed demands on her and her polite patience for a return, is unable to choose her actions from the objective position she gains after the fact. As a result, she loses the portion of her inheritance from her parents to the debts of Mr. Harrel. Ultimately, her status as collateral for the loan makes her a hostage in the house of her hosts and compromises the morality of the exchange of hospitality. As Mr. Harrel converts his hosting into a financial investment, he threatens Cecilia's status as a guest and thus the morality of the entire exchange of hospitality.

Indeed, these exchanges are distressing in part because Cecilia is forced to take on the traditional roles of the host. She, as guest, should be the member in debt to her host; however, Mr. Harrel's borrowing places him in debt to her while he also maintains his control as host over her behavior. Thus, Cecilia feels moral uncertainty as she allows her host to extract money and her attendance from her. Unlike the delay of return in a hospitality system which builds relationships between host and guest, the delay in the credit system seeks only financial gain and specifically designs not to build relationships. D. Grant Campbell explores the implications of the credit system in *Cecilia* and notes that credit creates "a false appearance of prosperity, an appearance which is highly unstable, and whose inevitable termination in ruin advances and recedes according to the fluctuation of rumor and financial confidence" (136). The relationships they build, I would argue, have the same characteristics: unstable, based on rumor, and always on the cusp of ruin. Because credit is designed to financially improve the position of one of the participants and no symbolic capital is included in the exchange, credit relationships can never create the cycle of reciprocity that hospitality relationships do. Cecilia's discomfort, then, arises not just from her different economic habits and dislike of luxury but also from her belief that she is functioning in a different system. Unaware of the creditory behavior surrounding her, Cecilia continues to act on the assumption of a hospitable relationship.

Burney relates the relationship between Cecilia and Mr. Harrel to the reader from Cecilia's own limited perspective. The reader experiences with Cecilia the doubts concerning Mr. Harrel's motives and the discomfort of his quests for money. Like Cecilia, the reader is surprised by his suicide and only learns the extent of Mr. Harrel's treachery after his death.

Burney creates an additional credit relationship—that between Cecilia and Mr. Monckton—in the novel that allows the reader a more objective view of the relationship throughout the story. Whereas the reader remains close to Cecilia’s position as participant in her relationship with Mr. Harrel, Mr. Monckton’s interested motives are immediately revealed. In fact, Cecilia’s relationship with Mr. Monckton is introduced as one of credit: “Pleasure given in society, like money lent in usury, returns with interest to those who dispense it: and the discourse of Mr. Monckton conferred not a greater favour upon Cecilia than her attention to it repaid” (9). Cecilia thus sees their relationship as one in which both participants are “mutually gratified” (9). Foreshadowing the disparities between usury and hospitality the relationship exposes, Cecilia here believes that each party gives and repays in a cycle like that of a hospitality exchange. However, Cecilia’s misinterpretation is immediately revealed by the narrator, who informs the reader that Mr. Monckton “had long looked upon her as his future property; as such he had indulged his admiration, and as such he had already appropriated her estate, though he had not more vigilantly inspected into her sentiments, then he had guarded his own from a similar scrutiny” (9). Mr. Monckton sees the relationship differently than Cecilia, viewing her not as the pupil for his guidance but as an object of interest to be obtained through his investment of admiration and hospitality. Indeed, though Mr. Monckton does not think of Cecilia as collateral as Mr. Harrel does, Mr. Monckton does expect to gain her person and her fortune through his investment of the symbolic capital of hospitality. In doing so, however, he fails to “inspect” Cecilia’s feelings and interests and consequently sets up a shallow relationship much like that between Mr. Harrel and Cecilia.

Because she sees their relationship as one of hospitable exchange, Cecilia continues to misread Mr. Monckton’s intention throughout the novel. She repeatedly feels a sense of gratitude and obligation to him for his advice, particularly when it concerns money matters. She borrows money from Mr. Monckton in order to repay the loans she incurred to pay off Mr. Harrel’s debts. Cecilia reads this act as one of “kindness [that], as she suspected not his motives, seemed to spring from the most disinterested generosity” (437). The reader, however, is made aware of Mr. Monckton’s calculations for his own interest. He hoped that “by giving her pleasure,” he could gain the additional “gratification” of her fortune (437-8). While Cecilia received hints of Mr. Harrel’s motives because of their reversed power dynamics, she remains unaware of Mr.

Monckton's desires because she remains in the guest position as the person who is obligated and in debt. Though Monckton does all he can to maintain the appearance of a hospitable exchange, his ulterior motives ultimately destroy the exchange and Cecilia's vision of their ideal hospitality exchange. Mr. Monckton continually acts to preserve his interest in Cecilia and is eventually caught in his plot to stop Cecilia from marrying young Delvile. Exposed as a creditor rather than a host, Mr. Monckton loses Cecilia's trust, along with all the debts of obligation he had inspired. Like Mr. Harrel's creditory relationship, Mr. Monckton's pursuit of Cecilia as an object negates the relationship that hospitality is designed to inspire. Thus, Cecilia misconstrues the intentions of her hosts in two very different credit relations. Her confusion about their inhospitable treatment marks the moments in the text when Cecilia feels moral discomfort; following her understanding of their ulterior motives, Cecilia questions not only her ability to practice hospitality but also her understanding of the very nature of hospitality exchange.

Other eighteenth-century protagonists are also duped by credit relationships as hosts attempt to gain their money as interest for their hospitality. David Simple, the protagonist of Sarah Fielding's work, offers a masculine version of a guest used as a source of income.⁹⁴ David is treated as an investment by his brother, Daniel, who fakes their father's will to exclude David. Like Mr. Monckton, Daniel pretends great love and respect in order to earn David's trust. Like Cecilia, David believes their relationship is one of hospitality and imagines they are so closely connected that their personal possessions cannot be distinguished. The narrator, however, quickly lets the audience know that Daniel merely put on the "Appearance of Friendship" and "was in reality one of those Wretches, whose only Happiness centers in themselves; and that his Conversation with his Companions had never any other View, but in some shape or other to promote his own Interest" (9). Daniel's kindness towards his brother, then, is merely designed to win the entirety, rather than his half, of the family inheritance. Once this goal is obtained (through the forgery of his father's will), Daniel "threw off the Mask" and begins to treat his

⁹⁴ James Kim argues that *David Simple* as a narrative is structured around market concerns. He reads David's travel as one of "affirming the citational logic of market value," noting in particular how David learns the values of his acquaintances by hearing their characters "discredited" and exposed by a later potential friend (485). Such a cyclic way or revealing worth suggest that "in the fallen world of modernity, value depends not on the putatively intrinsic worth of things, but rather on an all too corruptible system of competing citations" (484). Gary Gautier, however, reads this same cycle of replaced value as a sign of subjectivity without closure; because each subsequent character is revealed to be deceptive, such a quest for friendship reveals that "interior truth is as yet elusive" (206).

brother poorly. Seeing his kindness to David as an investment for his future acquisition of the family fortune, Daniel fails to follow proper protocol of hospitality towards David once his objective is complete. As such, his position resembles Mr. Monckton's approach to Cecilia: he too sees an investment of symbolic capital as the means to obtain a financial gain.

Indeed, David and Daniel's relationship, though brotherly, is closely connected to that of hospitality in Fielding's novel. David searches for a true friend, whom he defines by a relationship of equal reciprocity. This friend would be perfectly disinterested, one "whose every Action proceeded either from Obedience to the *Divine Will*, or from the Delight he took in doing good; who could not see another's Sufferings without Pain, nor his Pleasures without sharing them" (68-69). David envisions this friend as a member of his household, wherein the friends would return favors of host and guest to one another in an idealized, perfectly reciprocal, exchange of hospitality. David had seen his brother as a friend of this sort, imagining that they shared interests and goods to be exchanged in a cycle of mutuality. When David becomes a literal guest of Daniel's house, however, he discovers that this mutual exchange does not exist. David had believed his brother, like himself, would be "extremely happy...in continually sharing with his best Friend the Fortune his Father had left him" (12). Daniel, however, makes it his objective to make David uncomfortable in his house in order to further secure the family fortune from his brother. He "resolved it should not be long before [David] felt that Dependance" that Daniel had tricked him into (13) and sets to work treating him as an unequal member in their relationship. But Daniel delays his behavior here as well, gradually slackening his attentions and encouraging his servants to do likewise. David, assuming he and his brother are still functioning in a system of equal exchange, fails to see the ulterior objective of his brother, and continues to act according to a system of hospitality.

As a result, Daniel's behavior, when finally revealed as inhospitable, causes David much mental anguish. David becomes impassioned by his mistreatment, and Daniel uses this passionate response to justify his inhospitable behavior. Meeting with no compassion from his brother, David "could not account for such a Difference in one Man's Conduct" (15) and flees the house "as fast as he was able, without considering where he was going or what he should do (for his Mind was so taken up, and tortured with his Brother's Brutality, that all other Thoughts quite forsook him.) He wandered up and down till he was quite weary and faint, not knowing

where to direct his Steps” (16). Though he left home without his possessions or money, “his Mind was in so much anxiety, it was impossible for him to spend one Thought on any thing but the Cause of his Grief” (16). This mental anguish and the difficulty David finds in providing for his basic needs in such a state indicates the extent to which Daniel’s creditory relationship has upset David’s basic perception of the world.⁹⁵

Like Cecilia, David is also made the target of credit scheme involving marriage. Having regained his fortune, he is taken into the home of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson extends hospitality to David in order to encourage him to marry his daughter; he considers making David a guest in his home “the wisest way to engage *David* to Affection” (27). He likewise instructs his daughter to treat him with hospitality, and she complies “with cheerful Smiles, and Good Humour” (27). But David discovers this scheme to win his fortune through marriage when he overhears Miss Nanny Johnson debating whether to marry David or a wealthy Jewish merchant. Shocked at the father’s encouragement of his daughter to accept the wealthier suitor and at Miss Nanny’s lack of feeling, David is once again in mental anguish. He discovers that his money has been the cause of his host’s warmness and his daughter’s welcome. Yet rather than feel angry, David finds himself torn on how to react; feeling “Amazement” instead, David “could hardly persuade himself that he was in a Dream. He was going to burst open the Door, and tell her he had been witness to the Delicacy of her Sentiments; but his Tenderness for her, even in the midst of his Passion, restrained him” (34). Faced with the revelation of the terms of exchange, David is unable to act and instead remains passively outside the door. Unsure what to think of Miss Nanny’s conversation, he determines to allow her to break their engagement. Yet even as David once again resolves to leave an inhospitable house, he has difficulty understanding or believing his situation. He admits he was “several times tempted by her Behaviour to think he was not in his Senses, when he fancied he over-heard her say any thing that could be construed to her Disadvantage” (36). Faced directly with his host’s selfish motives, David has difficulty

⁹⁵ David is made homeless through improper hospitality but he is not made captive. Likewise his perceptions of his host are injured but his unwavering belief in his own morality and ability to make ethical decisions remains unscathed. As such, his discomfort is continuously overcome; unlike Cecilia who was tied to a guardian and unable to act, David repeatedly resorts to the only strength a captive has—he leaves the bad hosts he meets and searches for a more suitable one. David, as a male and later as a male with money, continues to hold some ability to choose to whom to offer hospitality and often thinks of himself as a host, often acts in the position of host, and, even as a guest, remains in a state of lesser dependence than other guests such as his friend Cynthia.

rearranging his understanding of their relationship. His response is to flee the house of his host, escaping the credit relationship but also failing to address the problems there.

These novels show that, because credit uses the trappings of hospitality and offers the appearance of symbolic exchange, the guest believes himself to be functioning in a hospitality exchange. The host's selfish intentions attempt to turn a relationship based on symbolic capital into one based on the literal exchange of capital.⁹⁶ As such, their behavior fails to take into consideration the needs of the guest. Instead, the host delays as a means to invest in the financial gains the guest might offer. Thus, in the moment of the exchange, guests are often unaware of their ill-usage. Unable to depend on the hospitality system to produce reciprocal relationships, the guest is faced with questioning every interaction with a host or risking his well-being with a bad host.

The Capital of Reputation

Each of the scenarios discussed above involved guests with some amount of power; both Cecilia and David are susceptible to credit relationships because they have the fortune to be gained from an exchange. This fortune, however, does offer them ways to eventually improve their situation: David eventually finds a circle of friends whom he supports financially and Cecilia does manage to choose her own company when she comes of age and can manage her own property.⁹⁷ Cynthia's situation as toad-eater with which the chapter opens offers a different view. As a dependent, Cynthia is not useful for credit financial gains but her vulnerability makes her a more viable means of gaining symbolic capital. Thus, while credit relationships use social capital for financial gain, some hosts use financial entrapments for symbolic capital gains. These hosts make a display of their hospitality, highlighting their material generosity, while failing to take into consideration their guest's comfort and happiness. Guests in this position, like Cynthia as toad-eater, find themselves confined in a broken hospitality system that consistently

⁹⁶ Gautier claims that the issues Fielding deals with in her novels are not ones of old versus new hospitality but one that "expose[s] contradictions within the emerging bourgeois ideology" (196). Indeed, Fielding, Burney and other novelists are less concerned with how a new ethic is replacing an old, but with how the new ethic is creating new paradoxes in moral behavior.

⁹⁷ Though Burney's Cecilia is saved from the particular misuse of being a toad-eater because of her fortune, Sharon Long Damoff notes that her final book, *The Wanderer*, features a dependent guest who is made more vulnerable by the "the way in which reputation becomes reality" and leads several female characters to refuse to host Juliet for fear of losing their good reputation.

requires them to “pay” more into the exchange than they receive; yet, still in need and dependent, these guests can only continue this loan of symbolic capital without real hope of a return. This relationship thus includes a reversal of roles: the guest must cater to her host’s needs while the host is dependent on the guest for symbolic gain. Tasked with more responsibility in the exchange, the guest becomes anxious and struggles to return the hospitality act to its ethical function.

In many representations, this situation is exacerbated by the host’s unawareness of her misuse of the exchange. While the bad host in a creditory situation is always consciously scheming for his own gain, the bad host building a reputation is often unaware of her own intentions. Such unconscious intentions undermine ethical situations wherein motive is used to determine the rectitude of actions. This, Adam Smith argues, is a problem for any ethical situation, like that of hospitality, wherein judgment and ethical positions require a detached perspective. The host may be influenced by a real desire to help the guest and by a desire for the praise such an act will elicit. While both motives help produce the action, “how far his conduct may have been influenced by the one [motive] and how far by the other, may frequently be unknown even to himself” (126). How one interprets these actions, Smith argues, depends on the disposition of the observer: those “disposed to lessen the merit” will attribute the action to love of praise, while those “disposed to think more favourably” will see good intentions as the chief motivator (126-7). But here Smith speaks of the external observer. Within the exchange, such judgment becomes more difficult. The host, believing her intentions are good, fails to understand the guest’s dissatisfaction and believes that the deteriorating relationship is caused by the lack of gratitude. Because focused on the public interpretation of the exchange, these hosts fail to adapt their behavior to ease their guests. Instead, the guest becomes a placeholder in the exchange rather than an acting member. Somewhere between friend and possession, the guest experiences anxiety about her place in society and value in the household.

Charlotte Lennox’s *Sophia*, in many cases a conventional text following genre norms, includes representations of negative hospitality that cuts the guest out of the relationship. Following the financial hardships and social threats that plague Sophia, the narrative builds a series of illustrations of Sophia’s virtuous patience. Most threatening is the behavior of Mrs.

Howard, who treats Sophia as a toad-eater and preys on her financial dependency.⁹⁸ Mrs. Howard, a member of the new upper class, seeks social prestige and has worked hard to cultivate a reputation for benevolence through a “few ostentatious benefactions” and subscriptions to “some fashionable charities” (162). These public behaviors are contrasted by her private ones: she serves her guests with “parsimony,” collects her rents “with the most unrelenting rigor,” and turns the poor away “sighing from her gate” (162). She takes in Sophia, then, to improve her reputation for charity while also taking advantage of Sophia’s “economical talents” by putting her to work on embroidery (162). The narrator thus characterizes Mrs. Howard as one of “those who are most celebrated for their charity, [but] are in reality least sensible to the feelings of humanity” (162-3).⁹⁹ Mrs. Howard’s own lack of moral questioning perpetuates this contradiction. She, like Smith’s imperfect agent, does not thoroughly analyze her own hospitality. Choosing only to broadcast her benevolent actions, she fails to consider the effect of all of her actions or to evaluate the consistency of her intentions.

However, Mrs. Howard soon extends her lack of consideration to viciousness when she finds her interests challenged in the hospitality exchange. Only interested in her gain in reputation by hosting Sophia, Mrs. Howard fails her duties to protect her guest and ultimately actively plots to hurt Sophia when hosting Sophia no longer serves her interests. When her young, rich nephew falls in love with Sophia and expresses an interest in marrying her, Mrs. Howard no longer wishes to host Sophia but does not wish to lose the social capital she has gained. Because this marriage would hurt Mrs. Howard’s fortune, she resolves to send Sophia from her house despite Sophia’s lack of interest in the boy or of place to go. Thinking only of her own desires, Mrs. Howard convinces herself that Sophia has abused her position as a guest and deserves punishment; she schemes “to destroy Sophia’s reputation, and to secure her own” and

⁹⁸ Charles Hinnant, studying gift exchange in the eighteenth century, claims that gift-givers are “likely to expect, even demand, some form of reciprocation” and these demands only increase “the greater the social distance between the donor and recipient.” In such cases, the gift was specifically used as “part of a campaign of conquest and possession” (147). Such is certainly the case for Sophia as she escapes from the care of a man seeking a sexual return to Mrs. Howard’s home where financial returns are expected.

⁹⁹ According to Eve Tavor Bannet, a discomfort with nobility and the newly rich, such as Mrs. Howard, is pervasive in Lennox’s work. Aristocrats and “pseudo-aristocrats” are shown “to use politeness to control and mitigate conflicts arising from local competition for power, spouses, and markets” (78). While Bannet reads this narrative trend as Lennox using capitalism to create or restore relationships, *Sophia* suggests that such economic structures fail to create long-term, stable relationships.

decides that, rather than dismiss Sophia “with contempt,” she will “ruin her with all possible gentleness” (166). Continuing to barter in symbolic capital, Mrs. Howard seeks to build her own reputation at the cost of her guest’s. As such, Mrs. Howard begins to spread rumors that Sophia seduced her nephew in order to gain his fortune. Thus, rather than protect her guest, Mrs. Howard actively works against Sophia’s interests in order to further display her generosity and capacity for forgiveness. So concerned with her own interests, Mrs. Howard becomes a vicious host and reveals the shallowness of her affection for Sophia.

Sarah Fielding continues to pursue this idea of selfish building of reputation through hospitality in her sequel to *David Simple, Volume the Last*. Whereas Cynthia’s host remains fairly hidden in the original narrative, Fielding spends a great deal of time discussing host motivation in her sequel. Here, she returns to the character of Mr. Orgueil and adds the character of Mrs. Orgueil to explore the limits and consequences of hosts who hope to build their reputation for hospitality without creating deep relationships with their guests. Mrs. Orgueil and her husband hold the traditional position of hosts as the wealthiest family in the neighborhood; the extended Simple family, as both old friends and as a family of quality, are often made guests at the Orgueil household. As the Simple family’s fortune diminishes, however, they fail to receive more than the promises of hospitality from the Orgueils. Mrs. Orgueil, continuously depicted as selfish, finds these misfortunes to be opportunities for displaying her generosity but also for acting on her jealousies of Cynthia. Her selfish behavior involves attempts to disrupt Cynthia and Camilla’s friendship, abuse Cynthia’s child, and keep her husband from helping either David’s or Cynthia’s families. For example, she takes in Cynthia’s daughter, little Cynthia, as an act of generosity. Yet, when the young girl is a guest in Orgueil’s care, Mrs. Orgueil repeatedly gives preference to her own daughter, Henrietta. Forced to sleep in a damp room rather than share with Henrietta, Cynthia falls ill and dies. Mrs. Orgueil’s jealousies of the mother thus inspire poor hospitality and expose Cynthia’s daughter to harm. Though she acts generously in order to maintain a reputation for generosity, her behaviors are always motivated by her own desires.

But Mrs. Orgueil herself lacks awareness of her own inhospitable desires, a lack that makes it difficult for her to understand hospitable relationships and moral behavior at all. She fails to take any blame for young Cynthia’s death, refusing to see how her inhospitable

behavior—and the jealous intentions that inspired it—might have caused the girl’s death. Instead, she continues to offer ‘benevolent’ acts for insincere motives. Indeed, Mrs. Orgueil encourages her husband to help Cynthia and her husband find a place in Jamaica that results in the opportunity to take in young Cynthia. Mrs. Orgueil secretly hopes that Cynthia would fall prey to the “Violent Heat of that Climate, as nothing was more apt to weaken her Constitution.” Yet, Mrs. Orgueil remains unaware of this desire because “this Motive lay too deep in Mrs. Orgueil’s Breast even for her own Discovery of it; and she would have started as strongly at the most distant step towards Murder, as the most tender-hearted Creature upon Earth” (340). Mrs. Orgueil remains convinced of her own benevolent intentions and, because of this self-deception, is unable to see the consequences of her actions. Instead, she blames Cynthia and her family for all of their own downfalls and uses their misfortunes as reasons to not offer further hospitality.

Her husband also lacks awareness of his inhospitality; yet he prides himself on his ethical behavior and builds his identity and reputation on a specific set of rules.¹⁰⁰ First introduced in *David Simple* before his marriage, Mr. Orgueil there was faulted for failing to “make any allowance for the Frailties of Human Nature” (52) and viewing compassion as “a very great Weakness” that detracts from moral behavior determined by “the real Love of *Rectitude*” (64-5). Mr. Orgueil’s insists that he only act when “the Laws of Society and right Reason” (65) and this determination dictates that his actions are ultimately routed in a desire for a virtuous reputation. He is revealed to be one of “a Set of Men in the World, who pass through Life with very good Reputations, whose Actions are in the general justly to be applauded, and yet upon a near Examination their Principles are all bad, and their Hearts hardened to all tender Sensations” (65). His actions go only so far as to fulfill his sense of pride that he gathers from following moral principles. Without a sense of compassion, however, Mr. Orgueil remains detached from those he is obligated to assist and thus fails to offer real aid or hospitality. Indeed, his philosophy often only justifies Orgueil in not offering assistance to those in need. When David suffers misfortune after misfortune, Orgueil convinces himself not to help because “David was voluntarily miserable, for he could not be unavoidably so whilst he had a God [--Human Reason--] at his

¹⁰⁰ Gerard A. Barker reads Orgueil’s character as a critique of Stoicism, which sought to detach emotion from moral decisions. Disinterest, this critique shows, is not the only quality necessary for a moral character (72). However, in Fielding’s sequel, Orgueil is shown to have a selfish motive in removing his emotion—namely, he gains a sense of moral superiority.

Command” (332). Because David was unable to foresee the consequences of his choices, Orgueil contends, he is unworthy of receiving aid. While a truly hospitable host would seek to understand David’s situation and offer relief, Orgueil cannot feel compassion and so holds David accountable for each of his mistakes no matter how justified.

This lack of compassion derives from Mr. Orgueil’s rules that attempt to systematize hospitality and give him the objective positioning necessary to judge ethically. This positioning absents Mr. Orgueil from the hospitality cycle altogether and makes it difficult for him to create relationships. Attempting to codify the system, Mr. Orgueil fails to involve himself in the practical logic of hospitality exchange and, in the case of his wife’s mistreatment of Cynthia’s child, remains so distant from the exchange that he does not notice the child’s illness. Though the child is in his house, Mr. Orgueil spends his time “in his Study, contemplating on his Rule of Rectitude, and exulting in the Beauties of Human Reason” (328). These rules, codified to make exchanges more ethical, actually detract from Mr. Orgueil’s ability to offer hospitality because they distance him mentally and emotionally from his guests. Intent on knowing his duty, Mr. Orgueil fails to fulfill his duties to protect his guests and welcome them in his home. Mr. Orgueil remains oblivious to his failure to uphold his hospitable responsibilities and his motives also remain hidden to himself and further detract from his ability to host. Indeed, he believes that he offers hospitality to David and his family. When David seeks his help, Orgueil offers it in the form of Advice “which it was impossible for his Family to feed on...[and] what either his Disposition, or his Situation, rendered impracticable” (330-1). Mr. Orgueil believes that such advice and reasoning are the duties of the host. Yet, because advice cannot provide hospitality or aid, offering only advice leads to Orgueil’s failure to uphold his responsibilities to host.

The Orgueils’ behavior exemplifies the most threatening form of hospitality. Seeking their generous reputations, they repeatedly draw the Simple family into exchanges that resemble hospitality but fail to create a relationship between the host and guest. Because they do not truly consider the needs of their neighbors or guests, the Orgueils wreak havoc on the Simples’ lives with false or vague promise of aid and hospitality that never comes. The hospitality that is offered manifests in forms that fail to connect with the Simples, denying their need and confining them to act against their inclinations. The Simple family, of course, is the party who suffers; constantly anxious and hopeful of assistance, they look to their so-called hosts for aid and

protection. Offered only enough hospitality to continue their dependence and their hope, the family becomes toad-eaters. Thus, real hospitality is not exchanged when only the reputation built by dealing in the symbolic capital of hospitality is pursued.

The prevalence of bad hosts threatens the individual guests but also leads to distrust of the entire system of hospitality. Guests, once subjected to the abuses of a host, worry about the intentions of any other hosts who offer hospitality. Hospitality is no longer the bastion of protection from a threatening world but a threat itself. Indeed, this threat is particularly imposing because of the ability for hosts to deceive guests, hiding their self-interest behind guises of benevolence. Following an encounter with a deceptive host, a guest is reluctant to accept any offer of welcome because unsure how to judge the benevolence of the offer. In such an inscrutable world, then, the guests turns to those most easy to understand because most like herself—other guests.

CHAPTER THREE

GUESTS AS HOSTS

Guests seek the company of other guests because the welcome they meet with from these guests is easier to scrutinize. In similar positions, guests have a greater sense of potential interests and feel more confident in reading other guest's behavior. Though still cautious, guests find the sense of comfort and sympathy they expect from hospitality in one another. Such is the case for Cynthia and David in Sarah Fielding's *David Simple*. The two characters share a series of conversations about Cynthia's position as a toad-eater where both characters seek to accommodate the needs and desires of the other; Cynthia objects to troubling David with her situation, and David insists the telling will bring him pleasure. Each receives from the other the accommodation that they earlier sought from a host. This particular exchange, however, actively seeks to exclude a host and is instead enacted more ideally because between two guests. Indeed, David hopes to hear how Cynthia came to be in her position as a toad-eater and plots to visit Cynthia her when her host is gone (91). The guests thus take over the obligations of hosting one another in an environment that excludes host and their potential to distort hospitality. In the place of that guest-host relationship blossoms a more egalitarian guest-guest relationship.

The more equal relationship between guests stems from the benevolent motivations each guest expresses. Such benevolence is, however, connected to the contexts of being a guest in the novels discussed here. Because guests do not direct hospitality but react to the host, they take a more passive position. This passivity is closely linked to the disinterested behavior so idealized in hospitality. Cynthia and David's exchange, for example, is disinterested as each passively approaches the other and act only because the other desires it. Cynthia repeatedly apologizes for speaking so much of herself, but she relates her story to David because of "the Sincerity which was visible in his Manner of expressing himself," a manner expressed in his many encouragements to continue (92). For David's part, he tells Cynthia that he want to hear her story because "nothing in this World was capable of giving him so much Pleasure" as relieving her distress (92). Their desire to please the other defines the passive guest position. As the guest replaces his own intentions with the desires of another, he opens himself to the motivations of an

outside force. This openness takes away self-control but encourages hospitable service. This passive guest is thus vulnerable to bad hosts but perfectly hospitable to a fellow guest.

The exchange between guests thus has the potential to be ideal but reveals a flaw of practice; the exchange can only be perpetuated by two similar characters. Seeking guests instead of hosts, the new positive form of hospitality reveals narcissism in the system. Cynthia and David are able to offer one another benevolence because they recognize elements of their own character and position in the other. David, for example, recognizes and sympathizes with Cynthia's treatment. When she is accused of envy she did not feel, David "could easily comprehend the Reasonableness of what *Cynthia* said" because he, like Cynthia had never had "one envious Thought" (96). The hospitality between guests is made possible, then, because these characters share traits that make them vulnerable to other the self-interested hosting so common in the novels.

Because of this similarity, reciprocal hospitality remains confined to guests and cannot be transferred into the larger contexts of hospitality exchange. The exchange between guests is ultimately unsustainable because the guest lacks the space to entertain and ability to protect guests. Instead, the hospitable encounters must evolve to maintain the newfound benevolence in a stable relationship. Indeed, eighteenth-century novels generally extend a hospitable relationship into a filial one, as the guests involved in an exchange are more stably connected through marriage. David and Cynthia's relationship ends when it cannot be perpetuated in marriage. Though David offers his hand, Cynthia refuses and the two guests return to their vulnerable positions as guests to bad hosts. Their hospitality alone cannot protect them from the returning to the less benevolent world. In other situations, however, novels show that hospitality makes way for more sustained relationships by converting those relationships between strangers into intimate family relationships. Although such a conversion or evolution results in more stable connections between partners of the exchange, it fails to solve hospitality's ethical problems or, ultimately to protect the guests.

This chapter will explore the nature of the guest's passivity, arguing that passivity became increasingly defined by disinterested behavior. I will show how the definition of passivity became more closely associated with benevolence as eighteenth-century novels emphasized its potential to create openness to other's needs. This idea of passivity, however,

counters other definitions of passivity that saw human desires as an uncontrollable, external force capable of inspiring action. To combat this competing definition, the novels discussed here allowed a means to control personal passions; reason offered a way to ensure the repression of passions, even as reason itself is shown to have self-interested connections to self-preservation. This chapter will discuss how the balance between benevolence and reason become associated with gender in the novels. Female guests, because of the elevated consequences of their vulnerability are depicted as emblems not just of passivity but also of reason; conversely, male guests reject the protection that reason might offer to embrace the disinterested state and the vulnerabilities it creates.¹⁰¹ Ultimately, I will argue, both men and women characters escape the problems of these imbalances in relationships with other guests, who share the same need for reason and impulse towards disinterestedness.

Passive Relationships

The guest position, unlike that of the host, is predicated on passive behaviors. The passive state is defined by its openness to outside influences; passive individuals react to external motivations which are internalized to inspire action or, perhaps more accurately, reaction.¹⁰² An ideal guest remains open to the host's welcome and waits for accommodation; in fact, he accommodates the host by internalizing the host's desires and using those desires to inform his own actions. Cynthia and David's exchange illustrates such openness and accommodation: Cynthia, open to David's requests, tells her story to accommodate David's desire, a desire which soon can be attributed to Cynthia as she enjoys the sympathy she receives in response. Yet, even in less ideal exchanges, the nature of the guest encourages passivity. Even in positions of

¹⁰¹ Travel literature also reveals interesting gender dynamics, as the traveler is often termed male and the foreign cites were identified as female. See Susan Lamb, *Bringing Travel Home to England: Tourism, Gender, and Imaginative Literature in the Eighteenth Century*, 12.

¹⁰² In *The Power of the Passive Self in English Literature, 1640-1770*, Scott Paul Gordon argues that passivity "locates the agency for such behaviors outside the individual to eliminate any space in which individuals could calculate their interest or even consider their audience" and blames any incendiary actions on an outside source; inspired by "another individual, ... external nature or in God" (4-5), the actor can act without being an agent. Gordon describes this flaw as the "cost of defining oneself not as a freely choosing actor but as the passive agent of another force" (8). Such ideal passivity leads to disinterested intentions but it does not lead to control over oneself or the surrounding contexts and people. As such, the guest is certainly able to act morally, as defined by benevolent intentions, but is not able to control when, where, or how to act on those intentions.

vulnerability and subject to abuse from the host, the guest responds to his host, attempting to mediate rather than control, reacting rather than acting.

This less active position offers the guest a certain moral standing. His very passivity allows for the disinterested perspective so highly prized in the eighteenth century. Because the guest must react to the host, he approaches the hospitable exchange with little thought of personal gain.¹⁰³ Indeed, Cynthia does not tell her story to help her own position but to accommodate David's requests, requests which she believes to be disinterested. The narrative does indicate that Cynthia's willingness to respond to David's request is based on his own disinterest. Had she suspected David of ulterior motives, Cynthia might have been less forthcoming with such personal information. Her position as a toad-eater has taught Cynthia this caution; she is wary of being too open to another and exposing herself to harm. However, the novel's ideal relationships make clear that, though some self-interest is necessary to protect the guest, the passive state is more easily adapted to the demands of intentional ethics and benevolent hospitality. The guest's passivity, then, encourages disinterest, an ideal intention, but this disinterest must be mediated if the guest is to be protected from bad hospitality.¹⁰⁴

This disinterested definition of passivity was opposed to an older definition of passivity that proclaimed the outside force motivating action was the passions. Gordon notes that this older definition of passivity, still used in the eighteenth century, connected the "passions" to the passive state, attributing the responsibility for action to uncontrollable desire. For example, blameworthy desires such as lust were considered passive and thus allowed the agent who acted on this passion to deny responsibility for his predatory actions. These passions, however, are far from disinterested and, as such, threaten the ethical value of passivity proposed in the competing definition. Philosophy, by promoting disinterested intentions, spends a considerable amount of time warning about the passions that misguide behavior. Bayle finds that "Passion and Prejudice do but too often obscure the Ideas of natural Equity" and calls for his reader to "raise his

¹⁰³ Scott Paul Gordon notes that this passive disinterest was often a trait attributed to women and has led scholars to claim "the first 'modern' subject was a woman." I will follow Gordon in claiming that this trait was encouraged beyond women as "all subjects come to be defined—indeed, come to define themselves—by means of qualities of passivity and responsiveness rather than activity and responsibility" as well as his suspicions that passivity became the defining trait of modern subjects (*Passive* 8).

¹⁰⁴ Gordon notes the rarity with which literature claimed this trait of passivity could be upheld; eighteenth-century novels in outlining the dangers of the selfish host also suggest that the "disinterested self is a rare thing" (*Passive* 6).

Contemplations above” such passions (69). But Bayle here defines these passions as “private Interests” and argues that seeing these passions in any other way is a corruption of the mind. Hutcheson similarly calls passions the “Springs of Vice” that are born of “a mistaken Self-Love, made so violent, as to overcome Benevolence” (121). Though passions may feel like the work of an outside force, they are considered the very essence of self-interest in intentional philosophy and turned into a source of evil.¹⁰⁵ For these philosophers, passion is not an external force but an internal vice capable of a violence that can overcome a person’s better motives.

The same distinction is made in the eighteenth-century novel; passivity is portrayed as virtuous when disinterested and as immoral when passionate. Here, however, the definitions come in conflict and vie for control over characters and plot.¹⁰⁶ For example, in Charlotte Lennox’s *Sophia*, Sophia and her sister Harriot represent the two definitions of passive. Patricia Spacks, one of the few critics to comment on the work, reads the novel against its proposed moral message and argues that passivity is revealed as a form of cultural oppression for women in the novel.¹⁰⁷ Harriot, the more sexually available sister, is condemned for her freedom in the text; Spacks sees Harriot as the more active sister because she “slams doors, storms at those who displease her, often controls her mother’s actions; she openly expresses her rage at her sister; she

¹⁰⁵ Christine Roulston sees the repression of the passions as part of the work of sentimental fiction, particularly for women. She argues that the “process of revelation and self-revelation that takes place in sentimental discourse works less to expose the subject—as scientific or moral experiment—than to reveal the subject’s control over, and domestication of, her desire” (xix).

¹⁰⁶ The problems of this conflict are escalated for women, whose virtue lay both in inactivity and activity in the eighteenth century. Sharon Long Damoff, among others, has defined this conflict of action as the central moral problem explored in Burney’s *Cecilia*. Relating the scenes of Cecilia’s charitable and hospitable attempts, Damoff argues that Burney’s heroines are often perplexed because a woman was instructed to “avert her eyes” and remain chaste while also extolled to follow Christian imperatives to aid the distressed (154). To do the latter, one must both see and act; this action, however, exposes a woman to claims of acting on passion, particularly if the host or gift recipient is a man. Indeed, Judith Frank also notes this catch 22 and argues that “Cecilia is taken to be unchaste precisely because of her benevolence: indeed, nothing could be more mutually exclusive than the claims of benevolence and the claims of feminine propriety” (154). If a woman acts on the Christian commandment to love your neighbor, she risks appearing unchaste. Feminists like Helene Cixous have tried to reclaim this position, giving power to the loss of self inherent in women’s benevolence. Though portrayed more positively, this celebration of women gift-giving does not solve the problem of women being made available. Though this “outpouring” can be “intoxicating,” it can do so only with the loss of reason that can protect a woman (163).

¹⁰⁷ Patricia Spacks expresses some discomfort with the emphasis on passivity as a moral state in the eighteenth century. Noting both eighteenth-century praise of action and that “only the self can experience happiness,” Spacks is surprised by the continued insistence to privilege self-denial. This passivity, Spacks argues, creates moral inconsistencies as “protagonists evade the moral problem of their titillation at the suffering of others by extravagant identification with victims” (“Sisters” 126). Passivity rather than action does create moral inconsistencies and paradoxes that the eighteenth-century novel struggled to overcome; yet, the emphasis on the passive guest position offers much to the ethical constructions of the period.

acquires fine clothes and jewelry and flaunts her acquisitions as well as her beauty” (141). Sophia, on the other hand, “follows the path of meekness, too ‘innocent’ to know any sexual feelings in herself, too docile to oppose her mother, always choosing restrictive courses, so eager for goodness that she allows herself little pleasure...she does not trust her intuitions and she considers physical response an index of danger” (141). However, when both definitions of passivity are employed, it is evident that both sisters are passive: Harriot is passive to her passions, letting them rule her actions, while Sophia is passive to desires of others, such as her mother. Though Spacks argues that Sophia’s disinterested passivity is oppressive while Harriot’s more passionate passivity is punished, Lennox’s novel of rewards for moral behavior is not privileging passivity so much as a specific kind of disinterested passivity. Sophia, monitoring her behavior with reason and maintaining benevolent intentions, is passive but also creates that passivity in her husband; as will be seen, their relationship thus exemplifies two equal parties—two passive guests—in a hospitable exchange. Though neither Sophia or Harriet have the authority of the host position, the guest position—and the passivity it requires—holds a moral power and seeks new types of relationships that give the guest equal power to the host.

To address this dueling notion of passivity, many philosophers and literary texts promote the use of reason to regulate the passions and promote disinterest.¹⁰⁸ In many ways, these novels again took their lead from works of philosophy which acknowledged that the passivity they encouraged needed a means to fight against the passions and avoid the violence of deception they caused. Most philosophies turned to reason as a vehicle to moderate these passions and leave the path open for a more benevolent form of passivity. For example, Bayle recommends judging behavior according to “a sober Inquiry” (69), while Cumberland claims that reason naturally “*inclines Men...to assist one another mutually*” (642). For both philosophers, reason is a means to regulate passions in order to allow man’s natural benevolence to shine. Reason continues to hold an important place in intentional ethics as the century progresses. In *Theory of*

¹⁰⁸ As Scott Paul Gordon notes in his study of eighteenth-century quixotic characters, *The Practice of Quixotism: Postmodern Theory and Eighteenth-Century Women’s Writing*, reason and benevolence are contradictory approaches to relationships. Gordon argues that, while quixotes were originally used to “reaffirm the stark distinction between reality and delusion,” eighteenth-century quixotes often “disrupt this project” of affirming the reader’s world view (6). This disruption is carried out by showing how reason and reality weaken the practice of benevolence. Drawing from Sarah Fielding’s work, Gordon argues that the quixote’s “unthinking goodness seems utterly incompatible with the reasoned choice and deliberation on which...producing prudence depends” (71).

Moral Sentiments, Smith places much responsibility on reason listing it as the “principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us, with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in it” (137). In Smith’s formulation, reason serves two functions: it suppresses the passions of self-interest and also returns us to our passive state as “one of the multitude” whose actions must respond to the needs of others. Passivity as an ideal thus needs reason to maintain the path of disinterested intentions.

The guest must balance reason and benevolence in order to be a responsible guest in the exchange of hospitality; he must follow the ideal but survive the practice of hospitality. Reason is necessary to control the exchange but, because it requires an awareness of potential harm, it also makes disinterested behavior more difficult. Julie Choi, however, notes that the eighteenth century was a time of “curious fluidity between the two traditionally discrete domains of head and heart, intellect and feeling, in this period” (642). Choi refers to this fluidity as “common sense” drawing on the dual meaning of the word sense as both rational thought and physical sense reception as well as the shared nature of the word common. Drawing from Enlightenment thinkers following Locke, Choi argues that “the reigning belief was that to be a fully reasoning being, one had first to be a fully sentient subject” (642). Comparing reason and the moral sense response that philosophers related to a natural human benevolence, Choi argues that the eighteenth century did not see the heart and head as an easy binary. Eighteenth-century novels use this fluidity, Choi argues, to create a new relationship with the reading public; the feminine but disembodied narrative voice “permits the technology of a seemingly seamless entry into the soul of another. Women who engineer this possibility have a stake in creating a view that presents itself as if from nowhere; in the spirit of a common enlightenment, a common reason, they take their share in construing that fiction of ultimate authority: objectivity” (659). What Choi’s work reveals is that the fluidity between reason and sensibility is best pursued from a passive position—here one of disembodiment—but also that this position lends itself the authority of objectivity. I see a similar fluidity in the representations of hospitality. Though these characters do not and cannot erase their bodies, they do work from a more passive state. This passive state internalizes the desires of others, allowing for a close sympathetic union. At the

same time, the guests in the novels begin to regulate the exchange, choosing to create hospitable relationships with other guests able to sympathize with their position. The new exchange thus has two passive participants, each able to adhere to the guest position's blend of reason and benevolence in order to fulfill the ideals and the means of practice for the guest.

Feminine Reason

The ideal balance between reason and passivity, however, manifests differently based on the gender of the guest. In eighteenth-century novels, female guests require more protection from the host, both physically and morally. Physically, women must guard against violence and particularly against sexual violence; if raped, assaulted or seduced, the female guest's social status diminishes and she can become even more exposed to violence as their status as guest is compromised. A woman's wealth is also at risk from the host; if this wealth is questioned or lost, a woman faces difficulty supporting herself and can be exposed to more violence. Morally a woman's reputation was more fragile than a man's and of more importance. In a society that demanded chastity, women had to guard not just against actual violence but also against slander and rumor of improper behavior. If her reputation was compromised, a woman might lose her social support and also be exposed to mistreatment. To combat this greater vulnerability, literature shows female protagonists making greater use of reason.¹⁰⁹ Remaining detached from hospitality exchanges and reserved from the host, women attempt to foresee threats to their person and preserve both their body and virtue. At the same time, these women seek to accommodate those around them, passively reacting to the host's desires. Indeed, as guests, these women had to prove their disinterested passivity to maintain their position in the exchange. Their disinterest, however, was tempered by a reason used to protect themselves, a self-interested

¹⁰⁹ Identifying women rather than men with rationality counters prevailing gender dynamics. As Helene Moglen notes in her work on gender in the eighteenth-century, "male interiority was identified with reason, female interiority with feeling" and argues that women's feeling nature "required cultural embodiment and control" (3). It is this very association that perhaps reverses the gendered association of these traits in representations of hospitality. Though Moglen suggests that feminine feeling needed external regulation, these novels show female guests forced to take on traits of rationality because of their vulnerability.

move in its very nature.¹¹⁰ With this conflict of self-interest and disinterest, women rarely actively combated violence but rather worked to preempt attacks.

Upon entering a hospitality exchange, these female guests remain passive to their hosts, seeking only to fulfill the host's desires. For many of the female protagonists, this passivity manifests itself in good conversation and good "nature." When placed in social situations, these women strive to put others at ease, displaying how a guest repays the host for physical accommodation in social accommodation. In the novels discussed here, both Cecilia and Sophia require skill at reading others' behavior and seeking to make those around them more comfortable. For example, Sophia first catches Sir Charles Stanley's attention because of her skill at hospitality. The narrator places her social abilities in her "nature," "a dignity which she derived from innate virtue, and exalted understanding" (62). Here, these qualities suggest the traits of an ideal guest: an "innate virtue" of passive accommodation and an "exalted understanding" of reason to control this accommodation. Indeed, Sophia consistently defers to the guest position and seeks to accommodate the needs of others. When she first meets Sir Charles, she and her sister are technically equal hosts; Sophia, however, attempts to divert attention from herself and let her sister shine as host. Yet in so doing, Sophia displays both her ability to control her own passions and her desire to fulfill others' desires. This behavior, however, only makes Sophia more attractive and "displayed her whole power of charming" in her ability to converse (62-3). Sophia, by trying to accommodate her sister rather than their guest, displays her own ideal characteristics as a guest. Placing her sister in the host position, Sophia performs as an ideal guest who puts the host's needs above any others. Sophia continues to perform as an ideal host and "inspire friendship" (163) throughout the novel. She wins over Mrs. Howard and the whole Lawson family and continues to act as the ideal guest in both households. Indeed, she is as accommodating to Mrs. Howard's selfish demands as she is to the Lawsons' "true politeness which is founded on good sense and good nature" (99). Sophia thus proves herself an ideal guest capable of disinterested intentions.

¹¹⁰ Nancy Armstrong's influential *Desire and Domestic Fiction* contends that the novel, and its female authors and characters, ushered in "a whole new vocabulary for social relations, terms that attached precise moral value to certain qualities of mind" (4). For Armstrong, it is precisely the emphasis on women that creates the moral importance of intention; I argue that such that the turn to intention was part of a much larger social moment but would agree that this movement was both developed and spread by women.

Cecilia is also a benevolent guest and attempts to uphold the passive ideals of this position, though her situations certainly makes such behavior more difficult. Cecilia is introduced to the reader as a guest who strives to keep her own interests in check in order to better serve her hosts. Despite her grief over her uncle's death, Cecilia seeks to act graciously to Mr. Harrel as he takes her into his protection and escorts her to his home. She represses her sorrow about leaving her old home and instead responds to Mr. Harrel's desire to "dispel her melancholy"; putting aside her own distress, Cecilia "revived her spirits by plans of future happiness, dwelt upon the delight with which she should meet her young friend, and by accepting his consolation, amply rewarded his trouble" (7). Though Cecilia more clearly struggles to enact the ideal of disinterestedness than Sophia, she too seeks to "reward" her host by attending to his desire. Because his desire is to ease Cecilia's grief, these two display a perfect exemplar of a hospitality exchange. Like Sophia, Cecilia responded passively to the host's desires, neither starting nor pursuing the exchange but responding to the needs that arise in the situation. Thus, both women display the benevolent, disinterested nature prized in a guest.

As they seek to please their hosts, these guests must also protect themselves. Indeed, such protection is necessary as Sophia is threatened by Sir Charles and Cecilia by Mr. Harrel—men they seek to accommodate as hosts in the texts. To combat the selfish intentions of these men and others in the novel, these guests use reason to detect bad intentions and evaluate the hospitality exchange.¹¹¹ This reason thus helps preserve the women but also turns them from mere guests to both guests and moral observers.¹¹² With these new duties, Cecilia and Sophia find themselves given more of the ethical responsibilities of the exchange. As guests, however, these protagonists find difficulty acting on their reasoned insights.

Sophia's reason is moderated by Mr. Herbert, her declared guardian. Herbert is not a guardian of Sophia's property but of her "honour and reputation" (94). He acts as Sophia's voice of reason and warns her to judge closely of Sir Charles' motives and avoid "debasement of her sex and character" with too easy a trust (80). Herbert pushes Sophia to develop her own

¹¹¹ My discussion of reason here resembles Martha Brown's definition of female reason as "prudence," defining prudence as a particular use of reason to "order...passions" and protects oneself from fraud (32).

¹¹² Paula Backscheider notes that this detached perspective is one feminists have identified as part of the female perspective. Noting both American and French feminists, she finds that women are often encouraged to see themselves from internal and external viewpoints (7-8).

sense of reason and praises her for its use. In one exemplary scene of this relationship, Herbert prompts Sophia to tell him “when was it that your heart, or rather your reason, gave you these secret admonitions you spoke of?” and then praises her answer that she “immediately” suspected Sir Charles of “some latent design [that] lay concealed under his specious offer” (87-88). Sophia here proclaims her ability to overcome her initial benevolent reaction of gratitude to Sir Charles for his generosity in order to reason through her need for preservation. Through this tutelage, Sophia is able to accurately interpret Sir Charles’s malevolent intentions and protect herself and her family from accepting his offers to take them in and make them his guests. In so doing, she protects herself from being the victim of Charles’s unmitigated lust and his designs to make her his mistress.¹¹³ Sophia’s need for a host, however, remains undiminished, and she ultimately changes one bad host for another as she moves away from Sir Charles and into the house of Mrs. Howard, one of the bad hosts discussed in the previous chapter.

Cecilia also asserts her own reason in an attempt to save herself from the malevolent intentions of her host, Mr. Harrel. Despite their happy start to hospitality, Mr. Harrel takes advantage of Cecilia’s fortune and seeks to ensnare her in a life of luxury. Though Cecilia is already Harrel’s guest and is unaware of the extent of his misuse of her fortune, she is able to see the flaws in his hosting and takes steps to preserve herself. She sees the flaws in luxuries that are “very shallow as sources of happiness” (163) and then seeks to take control of her own behavior, though a guest, and “arranged the occupation of her hours of solitude” to avoid as much of the luxury and the company of those who enjoyed it (55). Yet Cecilia finds such a resolution difficult to follow when living in the Harrel’s house and, after being disappointed in her ability to remove herself from such a life, determines to move in with another guardian. Cecilia’s attempts are only partially successful, however; she must remain a guest and Mr. Harrel’s house remains the place where she would be best protected. Less successful than Sophia in avoiding the self-interest of her host, Cecilia does portray the guest’s need for reason. Though her reason helps her see her danger, Cecilia, as a guest, remains unable to act fully on her moral knowledge.

¹¹³ Correctly judging Sir Charles’ motives is made more difficult by the irrational and passionate reactions of Sophia’s mother and sister. Patricia Spacks claims that Charlotte Lennox and other female authors of her age “convey more psychological complexity than they can afford to acknowledge.” Among these complexities are sibling rivalry and “the need to grow beyond parents” and “the freedom and pleasure as well as the superior importance of intelligence” (“Sisters” 150). Sophia, to use her reason, must contradict both sister and mother while exhibiting a freedom of sorts in doing so.

Cecilia's relative lack of success, however, shows a downfall in the guest position and its passivity. By seeking to protect herself from the interested advances of others, the guest must herself be interested. Again and again, Cecilia must disappoint her own benevolence in order to protect herself. Her own interests ultimately must trump her benevolence. Her dissatisfaction with the Harrel household becomes coupled with her own attraction to Delvile. With her interests for preservation so coupled with her own amatory interests, Cecilia find that "neither exertion of the most active benevolence, nor the steady course of the most virtuous conduct, sufficed any longer to wholly engage her thought, or constitute her felicity; she had purposes that came nearer home, and cares that threatened to absorb in themselves that heart and those faculties which hitherto had only seemed animated for the service of others" (252). The demands of the passive position of guest also demand a rigor in maintaining control over oneself. The constant diligence, as well as its interruption, threatens to interrupt the easy flow of hospitality. The moral demands on the guest in this situation are complex. To remain passive requires a sense of benevolence easy for these moral characters to exhibit. However, when coupled with a need for protection or even one's own desires, this passivity is difficult to maintain. The only way to avoid the pitfalls Cecilia encounters is to find a host who poses no threat and thus relieves the guest of her need to preserve herself. Such a host would need to share the ethical responsibilities that the guest has acquired; in other words, the necessary host would be another guest, equally benevolent and passive and, therefore, non-threatening to the creation of a disinterested relationship.

Masculine Vulnerability

The male protagonist's ideal guest behavior is less straightforward. Men, because not kept passive by their gender, are often hosts in control of the hospitality exchange. David Simple and Matthew Bramble, the two male protagonists explored here, both serve as hosts on some level in the texts.¹¹⁴ David does not require the hospitality of others at all times and very often offers it; indeed, he does not begin the story as a guest in his brother's house but as his equal.

¹¹⁴ It is worth noting that the two male characters discussed here qualify as men of feeling. Barker notes two types of men of feeling. David Simple exhibits traits of the "naïve Man of Feeling" because "the goodness of his heart dramatically underlines the malevolence of those who abuse him, even though his own qualities make him more vulnerable to deception." The "naïve Man of Feeling" is opposed to the "worldly Man of Feeling" whose is a more "idealized figure designed to be emulated and to expound traditional moral principles" (69-70). Matthew Bramble lies between these two poles; still vulnerable, he is certainly aware of the potential threats that surround him.

Matt Bramble runs a country estate and, before his travels, serves primarily as a host to his neighbors and dependents. On his journey, he often reverts to that position, taking old friends and strangers into his company. Though occasionally hosts, both men also take on the role of the ideal guest, expressing benevolent intentions and passively responding to the needs of others. Though often privileged with the authority of the host, these men consistently defer that authority and are uncomfortable with the host position. Rather, these men attempt to give up the host position and act as guests, taking on the traits of receptiveness and reciprocity.

David Simple, for example, finds it easier to follow his benevolent nature in the guest position.¹¹⁵ We are introduced to David through his relationship with his brother Daniel. Daniel acts solely on selfish desires, while David has only disinterested ones. David repeatedly hands over his ability to host—his money and his status as older brother—to Daniel. This impulse stems from benevolence: David “had no Ambition, nor any Delight in Grandeur. The only Use he had for Money, was to serve his Friends” (23). As a result of this desire to serve others, David repeatedly gives up his means to host. Though Daniel’s mistreatment shakes David’s belief in goodness, his own benevolence convinces him to continue to serve others; he reasons that “his own Mind was a Proof to him, that Generosity, Good-nature, and a Capacity for real Friendship, were to be found in the World” (41). David’s benevolent behavior is thus supported by his passive rejection of authority and his continued belief that he will find a worthy host.¹¹⁶ David thus takes up the guest position, traveling in search of a host—but a host who would be a version of himself. David thus begins to indicate what the new hospitality relationship would look like: two equal, passive guests attempting to accommodate the other without being driven by self-interest.

Matthew Bramble also gives up his authority as a host but in a very different manner. Uncomfortable with the host position and his own benevolence, Bramble adopts a misanthropic persona. His nephew Jerry reveals his character as he starts to understand his uncle’s

¹¹⁵ Liz Bellamy also comments on David’s passive behaviors and claims that he is a “feminized hero” designed for a female audience which was “debarred from the field of public action but which was also seen as being under threat from the general dominance of materialistic and acquisitive values emanating from the commercial system” (132). David’s passivity denounced the selfish desires of the market to this female audience.

¹¹⁶ As Barker notes, David Simple does not change as a character in Fielding’s original novel or its sequel; rather he remains “ingenuous, benevolent, ready to be shocked anew by each instance of cruelty or injustice” (77). His static character suggests a continued ethical approval of his passive and reactionary state.

motivations.¹¹⁷ He comes to believe that his uncle's "peevishness arises partly from bodily pain, and partly from a natural excess of mental sensibility" (15-16). Jery suspects that Bramble feels too much of others' pain and puts up a defense of irritability. At the same time, it seems that if Bramble is not focused on the needs of others, he is unhappy. Jery finds that his uncle "betrays no mark of disquiet" when he is in the company of others, and only "when his spirits are not exerted externally, they seem to recoil to prey upon himself" (46). Bramble thus requires a somewhat passive stance—responding to the needs of others—in order to meet his ideals of benevolence. He finds himself most happy when in the position of the guest responding to the host rather than the host who is required to serve another. This discomfort is perhaps best illustrated in Bramble's awkward offer of charity to a widow in Bath; though certainly comfortable with the benevolent intentions, he cannot handle the widow's gratitude, pacing the room when she faints and cursing at her to stay quiet when she expresses gratitude. Bramble wishes to give the gift but not to receive the gratitude the host deserves. Instead, he is much more comfortable secretly and passively helping those around him.

The male protagonists face similar challenges maintaining the passive position and balancing their needs with their benevolence. Matthew Bramble, for example, must relinquish his benevolent intentions in order to protect himself. His protection, however, is not the reasoned work of Cecilia and thus does not have a specific host's intentions to deflect. Instead, Bramble turns his misanthropy towards all. Jery again notes this behavior and explains that Bramble "affects misanthropy, in order to conceal the sensibility of a heart, which is tender, even to a degree of weakness. This delicacy of feeling or soreness of mind, makes him timorous and fearful; but then he is afraid of nothing so much as dishonor; and although he is exceedingly cautious of giving offence, he will fire at the least hint of insolence or ill-breeding" (26-27). Bramble here sets up two defenses: he creates a prickly exterior to save him from his sensitivity to others' pain and he fights for honor as his own interest. Neither of these defenses are the product of reason, but each makes the exchange of hospitality more difficult. Indeed, Bramble's defense creates a problem similar to Cecilia's liminal position between action and passivity,

¹¹⁷ Ronald Paulson explores Jery's role in *Humphry Clinker* and argues that Bramble's nephew is a "detached omniscience" in the epistolary novel who does not act but observes his uncle's journey (54). In this novel, the observational status aligned with reason is given to an additional character rather than held by the protagonist.

interest and disinterest. Evan Gottlieb describes this problem as one of “physical and social distance” that disrupts Bramble’s ability to act on his benevolent intentions (93). Bramble needs protection from the demands he feels as a potential host; he finds some relief in the guest position but must now learn how to limit his response and benevolent impulses to his host in order to preserve himself and regain some ability to act on benevolence.

David Simple, on the other hand, refuses to protect himself or use reason to judge others; he strives to maintain the ideal of benevolence and so remains vulnerable to the interested plots of others. His solution, while virtuous, fails to preserve his own well-being and leaves him open to harm. David begins life protected by his brother Daniel, who perceives the interested motives of others because of his own selfish intentions. Indeed, Daniel’s own suspicions, as Gordon points out, are predicated on his own immorality. David, in contrast, is unable to see the signs of an interested act, having “never had any ill Designs on others, [had] never thought of their having any upon him” (8). Despite his efforts to gain experience and knowledge to judge the others’ interests himself, David never does learn to reason through this experience to protect himself. Instead, he argues against reason and associates it with self-interest. David agrees with a companion that “what is generally called Sense, has very little to do with what a Man thinks; where Self is at all concerned, Inclination steps in, and will not give the Judgement fair play, but forces it to wrest and torture the Meaning of every thing to its own purposes” (67). Reason is a source of self-preservation and, as such, cannot be entirely disconnected from self-interest; for David, this necessary connection makes reason immoral. David’s only hope for preservation, then, is to meet with a host who will treat him benevolently, understand his moral code, and replicate his behavior.

Husbands as Hosts

The positive portrayals of hospitality in these eighteenth-century novels are those exhibited between two guest characters. These portrayals involve an exchange with a character who shares, or comes to share, the protagonist’s perspective on benevolence and who also embraces the passive position. These two participants, then, create an exchange of hospitality that exemplifies the ideal of disinterested return. To reach this ideal, however, each actor must overcome his or her own interests; only when this is done is the possibility for a deep relationship possible. In

many ways, this hospitable exchange resembles those with more active hosts, involving welcome and the sharing of food and resources. In many others, however, this exchange is more personalized and emphasizes conversation. Moreover, this exchange is limited by the guests' status; these guests remain vulnerable because neither can protect against the influences of the outside world. Likewise, this positive hospitality exchange is unstable, as neither guest can offer a consistent place to enact the exchange. These weaknesses result in the hospitable relationship morphing into familial ones through marriage. In each of the novels discussed here, a guest becomes a husband—a position with authority to offer protection and with stability as the guests can build a home.¹¹⁸

In Lennox's *Sophia*, this ideal exchange is ultimately enacted between Sir Charles and Sophia. Despite Charles' early identification as a bad host, he is inspired to reform by Sophia's example. Sir Charles must overcome his lust for Sophia and the self-interested intention to make her his mistress in order to become an ideal guest himself. To do so, he must abandon his previous efforts at hosting, which designed to hold Sophia captive. Indeed, Sir Charles original motives were to seduce Sophia's sister, Harriot; attracted to Sophia's virtues, he later turns his attentions to Sophia whom he hopes to convince to be his mistress. He uses a host position, introducing his intentions by showering gifts on the sisters and their mother and hoping that their gratitude will lead to sexual reciprocation. He particularly targets Mrs. Darnley, Sophia's mother, for his gifts in the hope of hiding the real intentions behind his generosity. His indirection garners the admiration of Sophia, who "construed all this munificence into proofs of the sincerity of his affections for her" (82). His gifts escalate until he offers the family a house and thus extends his gift-giving to becoming a literal host. Kept in check by his technical status as a guest in the Darnley's apartment, Sir Charles would gain more control over the family by having them stay in a house he owns. The magnitude of this gift gives Sophia pause, and she complains that "her notions of this manner [were] confused and uncertain" (87). Sophia then reasons through Sir Charles' offer with the help of her mentor, Mr. Herbert; the two suspect Sir Charles's motives and find a means to remove Sophia from his presence and turn down his gift. Sir Charles,

¹¹⁸ According to Paula Backscheider, courtship is of interest to narrative because of its liminal status "between childhood and adulthood, between dependency and responsibility, between autonomy and relationship, and invested private and public concerns" (21). Hospitality, like courtship, remains between two states; this liminal state perhaps affects the trajectory towards marriage in these texts as both courtship and hospitality gain stability in marriage.

surprised and humiliated at his rebuff, spends the rest of the novel striving to rule his passions and reach a passive position himself. The very desire that led Charles to act as a bad host—his desire for Sophia—ultimately inspires him to reform; this reform includes denying this passion and seeking to act disinterestedly.

Sir Charles does eventually achieve some success overcoming his passions and acting on disinterested motives. He gives without expecting a return: he shows Mr. Herbert a will he drew up without Sophia's knowledge that left much of his property to her. Indeed, Lennox reveals Sir Charles' continued reformation and shows how Sophia's benevolence inspires his own, while at the same time revealing the limits and difficulties of setting aside self-interest. In one scene, Sir Charles meets a woman who has received charity from Sophia and follows Sophia's example, giving the woman two guineas. His motivations, though certainly more charitable than earlier in the narrative, were not entirely disinterested but derived from the "gratitude she expressed for her young benefactress" (190). Sir Charles aids this woman in her distress, but he is still thinking of his love for Sophia and not the woman's need. Sir Charles is forced to confront this interested motivation when he believes Sophia is in love with the young farmer, William. Thinking Sophia only requires money to allow a marriage with William to go forward, Sir Charles resolves a "generous design of removing this obstacle to her union with the person whom she preferred to him, and, by making her happy, entitle himself to her esteem, since he had unfortunately lost her heart" (186). The narrator makes clear, however, that Sir Charles, "applaud[s] himself for the uncommon disinterestedness of his conduct" too soon; rather, "Sir Charles either did not or would not perceive the latent hope that lurked within his bosom, and which, perhaps, suggested the designs he had formed" to inspire Sophia to love him (187). Though still interested in Sophia, his motives are much less selfish than before and reveal a potential to act in response to others' needs; thinking first of Sophia's desires, Sir Charles begins to take on a passive position.

The novel concludes when Sir Charles again offers his home to Sophia, but now in the position of his wife rather than mistress, a position of more equality for Sophia. In pursuing this more equal relationship, Sir Charles takes on more passive qualities. Now vulnerable, he now worries that Sophia might be acting for selfish interests in accepting his hand: "he was afraid, that dazzled with the splendor of his fortune, she would sacrifice her inclination to her interest, and give him her hand without her heart;... he trembled lest, mistaking gratitude for love, she

should be deceived by her own generosity and nice sense of obligation, and imagine it was the lover she preferred, when the benefactor only touched her heart” (150). Sir Charles, now more passive, worries about protecting himself in that new position; at the same time, he remains true to his new intentions that require reading Sophia’s intentions. Because their passivity and desire to please one another is now equal, Sophia and Sir Charles create a new hospitable relationship. The two are married, creating a union wherein both are protected from their anxieties; Sir Charles is now assured of Sophia’s intentions, and Sophia is no longer vulnerable to Sir Charles’ lust. This more stable relationship is idealized as a supposed continuation of positive hospitality. Yet to allow this relationship to survive, Sir Charles is no longer a host or a guest but a husband working to build a version of marriage of two partners in similar passive positions.

Burney’s *Cecilia* also ends in an ideal marriage between two equal, passive partners. Mortimer, the only son of the Delvilles, is introduced in the story as a hospitable host, able to protect Cecilia from unwanted advances at a masquerade. Dressed as a white domino, Mortimer rescues Cecilia from a “confinement” wherein her “mind seemed almost as little at liberty as my person” (112). Unlike her literal hosts, the Harrels, Mortimer offers Cecilia freedom from the interests of others, repeatedly offering her a means of protection from her many unwanted suitors. Mortimer appears himself so capable of protection because he acts the part of the guest. He lacks self-interest and exhibits passive receptivity to Cecilia’s needs.¹¹⁹ His motives are not entirely disinterested, however: Mortimer later reveals that his hospitality towards Cecilia is motivated by his admiration for her, coupled with his belief that she was engaged to Sir Robert Floyer. Mortimer is able to act receptively to Cecilia when he was “bound in honour to forbear all efforts at supplanting a man, to whom I though you almost united, I considered you already as married, and eagerly as I sought your society, I sought it not with more pleasure than innocence” (511). Imagining he cannot act on those self-interested motives, he is able to remain passive. Mortimer’s innocent intentions to serve Cecilia as she becomes the wife of another are disrupted only when his passions are given a vent by learning that Cecilia is not engaged. When faced with

¹¹⁹ Margaret Doody notes that Mortimer is himself a compromised character because “made into an idol and image” to his parents (136). Unable to make decisions for himself or escape the care of his parents, Mortimer is certainly an odd choice for a masculine hero; however, his compromised position also makes him a guest, able to join Cecilia in a passive, disinterested, and thus hospitable state.

the strength of his self-interest, Mortimer's only recourse is bursts of passion followed by distant, cold behavior; so focused on keeping his passions in check, Mortimer is no longer hospitable.

Two interests thus disrupt this ideal exchange of disinterested benevolence. Mortimer's love for Cecilia disrupts the passive exchange as does Cecilia's attraction to Mortimer. Indeed, both parties' love for the other creates strong passions that each party attempts to overcome; disinterest, however, becomes more difficult. An additional, and perhaps more complex, interest threatens their ideal exchange. Mortimer's family pride also threatens to halt the turn towards familial connection similar to the turn taken in *Sophia*. Instead, Mortimer's refusal to relinquish his family name and adhere to his parents' wishes makes impossible any love relationship that could continue the exchange of hospitable intentions. Mortimer's hospitality is only restored after he has set aside the latter passion and made himself a passive party, willing to take Cecilia's name. Then his behavior once again becomes focused on serving Cecilia; both lovers, however, find that their desire to aid one another is necessarily in conflict with their desire to be guest figures to the elder Mr. and Mrs. Delvile. Cecilia, as guest to Mrs. Delvile, struggles to set aside her responsibility to such a skilled hostess; Mortimer, as their son, struggles to set aside his filial duties. Thus, Burney creates a scenario in which a perfect exchange of hospitality is impossible; unable to be passive to multiple hosts, and struggling to overcome self-interested passions, Mortimer and Cecilia's own exchange is repeatedly thwarted, a conflict which will be discussed in chapter four. Ultimately, however, this couple is also united in marriage.

David Simple's relationship with Valentine and Camilla, siblings he saves from destitution, creates a hospitality exchange that also ends in matrimony. In this relationship, however, there is no interest to be overcome, only a shared benevolence to be discovered. This relationship begins with David's act of charity; David rescues Camilla and a sick Valentine from hunger and homelessness and receives the intense gratitude of Camilla for doing so (117). Taken into David's home and nursed to health, the brother and sister have difficulty believing David's benevolence and must overcome their own pride in order to accept his aid: originally from a place of privilege, the siblings are "ashamed to be such a Burthen to [David]" (120). David does not see the pair as a burden but instead hopes he has found fellow guests with a similar passivity and benevolence to himself. The narrator confirms Valentine and Camilla's own benevolence, affirming that "such an open Simplicity in their Manner, and such a Goodness of Heart appeared

in their Love to each other, as would have made any one less credulous than Mr. Simple have a good Opinion of them; and they had both such a Strength of Understanding, as made them the most delightful Companions in the World” (120). The siblings thus possess the proper good will and the necessary reason to control their passions and so are portrayed as ideal guests. Their demeanor leads to good hospitality when coupled with David’s equal disinterestedness. Indeed, the only interest David is able to pursue in this relationship is his interest in helping others; he feels “Raptures” when he thinks “that he was the Cause” for Camilla’s happiness (155). Though in David’s home, his approach to hosting the siblings and their reaction to it allows for an equal exchange of hospitality as a passive interaction.

If anything disrupts this exchange and eventual matrimonial union, it is the disinterested passivity of both Camilla and David as they restrain their passions for one another. David is reluctant to mention his attraction for fear that Camilla and her brother would think he expected “a Compliance from them both, on account of the Obligations they owed him” (254). Camilla, on the other hand, fulfills expectations that a woman would not pursue a man and remains quietly worrying about David’s intentions. Their mutual passivity threatens to stall the relationship until Camilla and Valentine’s father arrives; a figure of authority, their father is able to easily settle two marriages among the friends, uniting Camilla and David as well as Cynthia and Valentine. The two couples proceed to create a perfectly mutual society. They fulfill the ideal and “exert their own Faculties for the common Good, neither envying those who in any respect have a Superiority over them, nor despising such as they think their Inferiors” and so live in “Harmony” (281). As Mika Suzuki describes it, this “society” creates “a world of perfect communication and familiarity where every moral value is shared. They do not feel the need to confess their emotions as they can correctly anticipate the others’ reactions. They only exchange ideas about the world seen from the spectator’s viewpoint, so as to confirm their moral ideas and beliefs” (211). These marriages, then, confirm the benevolence of hospitality and seal the relationships between them all.¹²⁰ Moreover, they make the hospitality exchange permanent and, as the two

¹²⁰ Gautier notes that the larger, social moral quandaries addressed in David’s quest are “deflected rather than resolved” when David forms his small circle of friends. Their retirement and “the deflection of the vulnerability issue marks a central contradiction within the culture of sensibility” (207).

couples form a community together, seek to offer protection to its members from the outside world.

In a different format, *Humphry Clinker* presents a positive portrayal of hospitality that does not result in marriage for the protagonist but does for his immediate family. Matthew Bramble's relationship with the Scottish ex-soldier Lismahago ends in a marriage between the Scotsman and Bramble's sister Tabitha. The two men's first exchange requires Bramble to readjust his hospitality; used to providing charity to those in need, Bramble attempts the same for Lismahago who appears to be in want. Lismahago, however, takes offense to this treatment and insists that he is not a dependent but an equal.¹²¹ He insists, "I am a gentleman; and entered the service as other gentlemen do, with such hopes and sentiments as honourable ambition inspires—If I have not been lucky in the lottery of life, so neither do I think myself unfortunate" (178). Declaring himself capable of taking care of his needs, Lismahago demands that Bramble not see him with sympathy and therefore not from a superior position. Bramble accepts this demand and the two men proceed to interact as equals in a balanced hospitable exchange. Jery observes that the two literally balance one another's moods and passions, creating a passive exchange: in their conversation, "sometimes they were warmed into such altercation as seemed to threaten an abrupt dissolution of their society; but Mr. Bramble set guard over his own irascibility, the more vigilantly as the officer was his guest; and when, in spite of all his efforts, he began to wax warm, the other prudently cooled in the same proportion" (179). Though this exchange certainly differs from the previous examples of disinterested, passive exchange, these two men's example does display ideal hospitality. As equals in the exchange, both men look to the needs of others; because they care about the other's desires, their own passions are put in check. Thus, the receptivity of both guests functions because of their understanding of hospitality.¹²²

¹²¹ Charlotte Sussman argues that Lismahago is a symbol of an expanding world and a new sense of identity. This identity, however, is based on "adoptability" and "mobility" and exposes a greater need for hospitality in a world where "communities are no longer able to anchor" society and culture is less stable (604).

¹²² Evan Gottlieb considers this new relationship to be based on Adam Smith's concept of sympathy. Contrasting this sympathy as more interested in self-preservation and requiring more "concerted efforts from the people involved" (98) than the earlier Humean model, Gottlieb finds that Lismahago pushes to be "an active agent rather than merely...the passive object of another's sympathies." As such Lismahago "effectively alters the terms upon which sympathy can be utilized as a mode of social unification" (100). This more active position makes Lismahago a participant in the exchange, but still a participant who is passively open to the needs of another.

Marriage also stabilizes and lengthens this exchange. Bramble and Lismahago's ideal relationship initially appears to be transitory; Lismahago joins the family on their journey briefly and then parts ways. However, when Lismahago again happens to become a member of their traveling party, he and Bramble's sister, Tabitha, decide to marry. The strange and comical marriage of these two "originals" certainly adds to the humor of the story and contrasts the more conventional, youthful marriage of Lydia, Bramble's niece, and Dennison, the son of the narrative's most praised host. Lismahago and Tabitha's wedding also serves to continue the hospitality exchange between Lismahago and Bramble. Lismahago joins the family back on their Welsh estate, thus adding a guest to the family rather than taking his bride away. This marriage, even if less ideal than the unions of the younger couples traditionally joined in narratives, still serves the same purpose of prolonging hospitality.¹²³ Husbands, in these novels, are presented as the means to create and extend positive hospitality exchanges.

Positive representations of hospitality in eighteenth-century novels are thus stabilized into filial relationships as one member of the exchange becomes a husband. The hospitable disposition of disinterested passivity that helped form these filial relationships remains important. Indeed, the transfer of the hospitable relationship to one of family relation is not a simple shift to kinship bonds as a better or more ethical relation. Rather, hospitality remains an integral foundation to these relationships; as hospitality is based on intentional ethics, so too are these family connections determined by a shared sense of virtue and reciprocity. These ties are thus made according to choice and not to traditional family definitions. Yet, in changing its dynamics, hospitality between guests raises questions about the continued viability of hospitality as an ethical relationship between strangers. As the next chapter will discuss, the eighteenth-century novel suggests that hospitality may not be able to escape the vulnerability and instability that marriage promises to eradicate.¹²⁴

¹²³ Gottlieb argues that the new filial connection replaces not just a benevolent exchange of hospitality but also sympathetic national unity between Bramble's Wales and Lismahago's Scotland (105).

¹²⁴ Mireille Rosello argues that friction and discomfort are necessary to good hospitality and "might signify that other inhospitalities (such as the usurpation of the land by colonizers, for example, have instituted a *Pax Romana* in which hosts are always hosts, where guests are always guests." She continues, arguing that "it is the paradoxical nature of conditional and unconditional hospitality alike to be a practice that cannot tolerate perfection, that is inherently perverse, always and eminently corruptible. It constantly tests the host's and the guest's thresholds of

fear, and their willingness to live with that fear, and with their malaise” (176). In other words, if hospitality depends on equality between guest and host, conflict is a sign that the relationship is remaining in flux.

CHAPTER FOUR

LIMITING HOSPITALITY

Charlotte Lennox's *Sophia* ends conventionally with the marriage of Sophia to Sir Charles, her social superior and now her moral equal. The ideal union of this hospitable pair is troubled only by Sophia's continued relation to her self-interested sister. Clearly lacking the disinterested disposition necessary for hospitality, Harriot is banished not only from the Sophia's household but also from the country. Sir Charles and Sophia offer a dowry of two thousand pounds to help Harriot, now a cast-off mistress, find a husband. This fortune encourages the courtship of an army captain and the two are soon wed. In a selfishly motivated action, Sir Charles "procured [Harriot's] husband a better commission; but designedly in one of the colonies, whither he insisted upon his wife's accompanying him" (198). Separated from "the delights of London" and thus any chance for fulfilling her greed (198), Harriot is thoroughly punished in this new life for her former behavior. Her banishment, however, helps preserve the happy union of Sophia and Charles; once her sister has been removed from the country, Sophia is no longer disturbed by Harriot's "ill-conduct" and is capable of embracing her new life and "tast[ing] the good fortune which heaven had bestowed on her" now that "these domestic storms [had] blown over" (199). Sophia's happy marriage is thus dependent on Harriot's exclusion from Sophia's circle of acquaintance.

This exclusion, however, is not presented as a flaw in hospitality or as a problem in the new filial relationship. Rather, distance from Harriot is necessary to preserve the filial union and to allow for the disinterested intentions on which Sophia's and Sir Charles' union relies. Before the marriage, the greed and self-interest of Sophia's family had consistently threatened any hospitality exchange. In fact, Sir Charles claims that the selfish intentions of Sophia's mother and sister had directly led to his own inappropriate desires for Sophia; we learn from the narrator that Sir Charles "had always loved [Sophia] with the most ardent passion, and had not the light character of her mother and sister concurred with those prejudices of his youth, his fortune, and his converse with the gay world led him into," he would have earlier sought marriage to her

(149). Seeking to protect their ideal union, Sophia and Sir Charles must exclude Sophia's sister and the lifestyle of immorality and luxury she represents. Such a limitation on their welcome contradicts the ideals of hospitality, which call for openness, benevolence, and passivity. Yet, to protect these very traits, they must be violated. Herein lays the central paradox of hospitality: its ability to be enacted depends on a violation of its ideal principles.

This chapter will argue that the paradox found in *Sophia's* conclusion is evident in many other eighteenth-century novels' resolutions. These novels encounter the paradox in the descriptions of hospitable practice that ultimately must be resolved on one side of the paradox. Comedies, such as *Sophia*, praise the ideal characteristics of benevolence and disinterest; however, these novels tend to embrace the limits that allow for a happy union to be continued. Willing to overlook the moral inconsistencies of such a position, these novels, here represented by *Humphry Clinker*, suggest that the preservation of positive hospitality is worth the restrictions placed on welcome. Tragedies emphasize the opposite side of the paradox, suggesting the impossibility of the ideal of hospitality to be enacted in practice. Detailing how worldly forces cannot be controlled or easily limited, these texts, including the tragic sequel to *David Simple*, argue that pure hospitality cannot be practiced in such a flawed world. The chapter will end by examining Burney's illustrations of the hospitality paradox in *Cecilia*. Though the novel ends in a marriage between virtuous characters, the limitations necessary for such a happy union are not enforced; rather, elements of tragic perspectives pervade the text, mitigating the happy ending but emphasizing a more realistic practice. Ultimately, none of these texts are able to yoke ideal and practice together; rather, they indicate the fragile and unstable nature of hospitality and the relationships it creates.

Limitations at the Threshold

All of these novels acknowledge the difficulty of reconciling the hospitable ideal with the practice of hospitality. While the ideal calls for openness and unlimited benevolence, practice requires boundaries and rules. Even when problems of perception and association discussed in chapters one and two are overcome in positive exchanges of hospitality, new problems of limitations arise. These limitations require the benevolent guest to temper good intentions with

worries of self-preservation.¹²⁵ As the previous chapter discussed, the guest works to exclude hosts and create a community of like-minded guests as a means of self-preservation. In doing so, these guest communities risk retiring from the hospitality exchange all together as they seek to separate themselves from selfish hosts. In the case of *Sophia*, for example, Sir Charles and Sophia have matched their benevolent intentions to their actions towards one another; yet, to preserve this balanced state, they must stop opening their home to all others. Their hospitable relationship thus leaves less room for new connections and in many ways separates the couple from any larger exchange of hospitality. Like *Sophia*, other eighteenth-century novels sought to determine how best to limit hospitality. This question is particularly difficult for literary texts because of their emphasis on the guest position. The balance between limits and openness, then, is particularly fraught in these novels and, in many cases, not completely resolved.

The practice of limiting hospitality was not new in the eighteenth-century. Limitations had long been an accepted part of earlier systems of hospitality. Felicity Heal relates how early modern hospitality was primarily limited to family members and only occasionally opened to others who were often of the same socio-economic class.¹²⁶ In each case, these exchanges, like the positive hospitality in the eighteenth-century novel, are limited according to similarities shared between the host and the guest. However, earlier forms of limitation looked primarily to outward markers of family and class while hospitality based on intentional ethics seeks to limit according to internal attributes of virtue. These older versions of limitation were thus easier to reconcile into an ethical code, often drawn from Saint Ambrose's theories proposed in the fourth century. He outlined an ethics of hospitality based on a "series of concentric circles, the innermost one consisting of the household, since a man's first duty was to his family, and then extending outwards to comprehend spiritual and other kin, neighbours, friends, and finally strangers and enemies" (Heal 19). This system, which privileged family, was used as a guide for conduct throughout the medieval and early modern eras and worked to reconcile an ideal with a practice. The ideal was to include more and more "circles" into the hospitality exchange but also

¹²⁵ The host balances his needs and duties by hosting some and excluding others. Derrida refers to this exclusion as a type of violence and thus at odds with hospitality ethics: "No hospitality in the classic sense, without sovereignty of oneself over one's home, but since there is no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised by filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence" (55).

¹²⁶ See Heal, 394-96.

condoned limiting welcome to those guests most similar to the host. In the eighteenth century, the growing importance of intentions complicated this practice. Though these novels still draw their circles around family members, families are now defined not by blood but by dispositions as like-minded couples are united in matrimony. *Sophia* literalized this shift; Sophia's new relationship with Charles based on shared dispositions allows her to sever old ties with her blood relations. Her sister, in the new hospitality system, receives less welcome than a like-minded, chosen guest, especially those like Charles who are still marked as family. A new model of concentric circles based on intentions and dispositions is developed, and novels attempt to adapt these new markers of similarity into an old model of hospitable practice.

Philosophy attempted to reconcile old methods of limitation with new intentional criteria to better conceive hospitable ideals into practice. Many such theories allow for a "natural" impulse which limits openness while simultaneously encouraging a broader benevolence. These works uphold the ideal of intentional ethics and the importance of disposition and openness but also includes a family first model as an aside. For example, Richard Cumberland first proposes a "Benevolence...towards all" but then adds that "a more particular Regard and Kindness toward chosen Friends" is to be expected and encouraged (311). Adapting a theory of limitations, Cumberland here replaces the family with a group of chosen friends. While he acknowledges a need to limit hospitality, he does so according to choice rather than blood. Though vague in how he would construct such limitations, Cumberland suggests that they do have a place in the practice of hospitality. Francis Hutcheson creates a more complex pattern of limitation in his version of intentional ethics. He allows that hospitality and benevolence is first extended to those most like us before being offered more universally. He notes that some limitation is good because it keeps us from being "distracted with a multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our regard; or become useless, by being equally extended to the Multitudes at vast distances"; and to combat this problem "Nature has more powerfully determined us to admire, and love the morally Qualitys of others which affect our selves, and has given us more powerful Impressions of Goodwill toward those who are beneficent to our selves" (148-9). For Hutcheson, hospitality is an open benevolence to others but, to remain possible in the world, must be limited to those individuals more closely connected to the host. He believes that shared interest helps hospitality to be distributed, and argues that "For the strengthening

therefore our Motives to Industry, we have the strongest Attractions of Blood, of Friendship, of Gratitude, and the additional Motives of Honour, and even of external interest” (186). Hutcheson acknowledges that an entirely open benevolence would exhaust hosts and guests. Limited hospitality here helps encourage good intentions to practice or to inspire intention to “Motives to Industry.” In this case, these motives can be used to develop hospitality among smaller, limited groups of people and then developed to inspire more extensive hospitality.¹²⁷ What these acknowledgements of limitation begin to show is both a need for limits and a more flexible idea of how limitations might be applied.

Flexibility in these limiting factors creates new problems for the practice of hospitality. It is useful to think of these problems as problems at the threshold of hospitality or problems that plague hospitality as it attempts to move from ideal to practice or from intention to action. The threshold is the place of initiation but also of limitation and marks the moment of decision between opening the door and closing it. The threshold also symbolically stands for the moment when identities, and thus responsibilities, of host and guest are accepted. Using Saint Ambrose’s theory of concentric circles helped to define more clearly the liminal space of the threshold; helping to determine whom to open the door to, this system made identities and obligations more clear cut. In the new intentional system, the threshold is harder to navigate. First, judgments to determine similar disposition take time and perception; as discussed earlier, such judgment struggles to determine the proper connections between the actions seen and the intentions motivating them. Second, the guest has more difficulty regulating the threshold than the host; the host has the power to open or close the door, while the guest can only make his case for being allowed entrance. In many ways, the guest position that the novel uses places the protagonists on the wrong side of the door to be able to implement any sort of limitation. Third, as these guests found a means to limit by seeking hospitality from other guests, their ability to maintain their obligations and to remain disinterested and passive become more difficult.¹²⁸ In putting up these

¹²⁷ Hume does not modify St. Ambrose’s limitations as much as his peers. He argues that “whoever is united to us by any connection is always sure of a share of our love, proportion’d to the connexion, without enquiring into his other qualities. Thus the relation of blood produces the strongest tie the mind is capable of in the love of parents to their children, and a lesser degree of the same affection, as the relation lessens” (qtd. in Gottlieb 352). For Hume, blood relation trumps that of disposition.

¹²⁸ Though their studies take very different approaches to the eighteenth-century novel, both Spacks and Gordon conclude that these texts seek a balance between self-interest and disinterest. Gordon argues that “the discourse of

barriers, these guests work counter to the responsibilities of the guest. These factors suggest that reconciling the paradox of hospitality is impossible. Jacques Derrida inherits this paradox in his modern theories and also looks to the threshold as the place for limitations. He finds in hospitality an “axiom of self-limitation or self-contradiction...from the outset, hospitality limits itself at its very beginning, it remains forever on the threshold of itself, it governs the threshold—and hence it forbids in some way even what it seems to allow to cross the threshold to pass across it” (*Hostipitality* 14). This hesitation—the unfulfilled possibility of hospitality—marks the ends of these novels. Surrounded by others capable of ideal hospitality as these novels have defined it, the narratives stop short of calling it hospitality, instead transforming these relationships into filial ones that threaten hospitality in their imposition of limits. In these novels’ conclusions, the authors show some hesitation in their ability to define hospitality—as though they too “do not know what it is.”¹²⁹

Humphry Clinker and the Development of Limits

Different literary genres approach limitations and their resulting ethical quandaries according to their specific conventions. Comedic ending underscore the return to stability found in new hospitable unions; in doing so, comedies tend to praise limitations and the happy unions they preserve. Generally terminating in nuptial scenes, examples of this genre rarely acknowledge the ethical paradoxes found in these limitations or explore how positive hospitality can continue following the marriage. The lack of ethical consistency in comedic endings is particularly noteworthy in the eighteenth century when many of these texts claim a didactic purpose. John Mullan finds these inconsistencies frustrating in novels of sensibility, which are particularly concerned with depicting characters’ benevolent intentions. Mullan argues that the “benevolence depicted in novels of sentiment fails to live up to this model of a ‘universal’

self-interest” helped structure modern conceptions of social interaction, while “the discourse of disinterestedness” offered “a more palatable self-image” that encouraged social progress (*Passive* 10). Similarly, Spacks contends that philosophies of the day suggested “all virtue and happiness depend on selflessness” while acknowledging that “only the self can experience happiness.” This apparent contradiction, Spacks claims, helped structure the novel’s ethical conflicts (“Sisters” 126).

¹²⁹ Derrida then goes on to discuss the impossible—what can come “despite of” the threshold. A despite I don’t see in the eighteenth century novels. Derrida sees hospitality “only tak[ing] place beyond hospitality, in deciding to let it come, overcoming the hospitality that paralyzes itself on the threshold which it is...In this sense, hospitality is always to come, but a ‘to come’ that does not and will never present itself as such, in the present” (*Hostipitality* 14).

capacity, to a general bond” because this benevolence fails to inspire reform in the system and is often characterized as “anomalous” and “fleeting” (144-45). He claims that the ethical standards presented in many eighteenth-century novels are not durable and are too limiting of the recipients of hospitality to inspire anything but superficial change; the acts, he complains, are far too personal to promote larger political change. In limiting the recipients of hospitality to those with similar dispositions, the ethical exchange of hospitality is removed from the larger world. The happy marriages signal the reward for virtuous characters but also the end to the hospitality search. To preserve their hospitable relationships, these benevolent guests abandon larger attempts to find and promote hospitality in the world. The comedic ending of *Humphry Clinker* reveals the abandonment of the hospitality journey and the embrace of regulation. Because it follows a less conventional protagonist and ending than its more romantic counterparts, including *Sophia*, *Humphry Clinker* exposes more fully hospitality’s need for limitations as well as the narrative’s abandonment of larger social reform.

Matthew Bramble is no damsel in distress but rather an older man in questionable health seeking relief for his physical ailments. His journey, rather than one that continually opens to new hospitality relationships, gradually limits Bramble’s interactions with society to help manage his physical ailments and social distress. Hospitality is still highly valuable to Bramble and offers some relief to his mind and body. For example, Bramble finds some relief when among his old naval friends, who also suffer health problems; they find that good company and hospitality “seemed to triumph over the wreck of their constitutions” that trouble them when in private (52). The opposite is true of the larger crowds found in Bath; Bramble’s nephew observes that his uncle finds “the general mixture of all degrees assembled in our public rooms...[to be] a monstrous jumble of heterogeneous principles; a vile mob of noise and impertinence, without decency or subordination” (45-6). For his own comfort, then, Bramble requires limiting invitation and interaction.¹³⁰ As the novel progresses, Bramble defines these limitations according to internal dispositions rather than external markers. He writes to his friend, Dr. Lewis, that he is willing to “put up with many inconveniences for the sake of agreeable society” but then

¹³⁰ This concern has been noted by Lance Bertelsen, who has argued that the novel progressively imposes limitations, noting that as the family moves north, Bramble limits his interactions with “crowds—and thus the number of ‘connexions’ to which his mind and body most respond” (127). Rather than remain open to large groups of people, Bramble instead restricts his interaction to his family and a few friends.

qualifies that he is only willing to do so for society of a certain disposition; he wishes to exclude many of those he has met in Bath and London because they are “too much engrossed by schemes of interest or ambition, to have any room left for sentiment or friendship” (116). Such a statement suggests that it is not the “mixing of all degrees” that causes Bramble’s health fits but the mixing, indeed prevalence, of self-interested individuals into his society of disinterested friends.

These limitations by disposition, however, generally take the form of more classical limitations. Like Saint Ambrose’s model, Bramble generally limits according to family and then social class. Indeed, Charlotte Sussman argues that these worthy and unworthy dispositions are defined according to conservative definitions of class. Sussman claims that what threatens Bramble’s constitution are “innovative forms of consumption” displayed by those who selfishly and ostentatiously display their wealth and are represented as members of a rising middle class. Sussman connects luxury to a very classist disposition to keep out “socio-economic disruptions,” and argues that Bramble’s rejection of these forces calls for a reestablishment of an old order wherein family relationships were part of the social hierarchy (610). However, such limitations also work to keep out those with different dispositions. Because a proper hospitable disposition rejects economic notions of relationship, these limitations are often along such class lines.¹³¹ Though certainly using older lines of limitation, Smollett adapts these older, accepted versions of exclusion to promote limitations based on a newer, internalized criterion. Bramble’s class exclusions, like the marriages of Lydia to Dennison and Lismahago to Tabitha, circumscribe a new circle based on disposition in the old form of family relationship. Smollett, unsure how to define the limitations this new group of hospitable friends will require, returns to an old formula that allowed for exclusions of those less similar.

The novel culminates in an example of stable limitations. George Dennison, an industrious farmer in northern England, serves as an example to Bramble and his family. Following Bramble’s near drowning and its associated traveling impediments, Dennison extends an invitation to the entire ensemble to join his family at their farm rather than stay at a local inn.

¹³¹ David M. Weed adds that similar limitations are made for women, who are excluded from Smollett’s ideal of hospitable friendship between men. This exclusion underscores the narcissism of such exclusions: only those of the same sentiment and same position can be included. See Weed, 633. Evan Gottlieb sees the excluded party as the Highland Scots, who are rejected in the national definition of a Briton. See Gottlieb, 106.

Following all etiquette of good hosting, Dennison takes in the entire entourage, at whose house Bramble finds a picture of hospitality: Bramble writes that, upon arrival, “the tea ready prepared by his lady, an amiable matron, who received us with all the benevolence of hospitality—The house is old fashioned and irregular, but lodgeable and commodious” (293). The secret to Dennison’s hospitality, Bramble learns, is frugality and limiting guests. Though Dennison’s house is open to distressed strangers (of a certain sort), it is not open to many of his neighbors. He tells his guests that

when a gay equipage came to my gates, I was never at home; those who visited me in a modest way, I received; and according to the remarks I made on their characters and conversation, either rejected their advances, or returned their civility.—I was in general despised among the fashionable company, as a low fellow, both in breeding and circumstances; nevertheless, I found a few individuals of moderate fortune, who gladly adopted my style of living; and many others would have acceded to our society, had they not been prevented by the pride, envy, and ambition of their wives and daughters. (300)

Dennison here clearly excludes those of his neighbors without the proper disposition to enter his circle of guests. He “rejected the advances” of those who pursued luxurious lifestyles or showed characters driven by self-interest. He accepted into his company only those who resembled himself or “adopted my style of living.” All who fail to conform to this rather narcissistic model were excluded from Dennison’s company. These stringent limitations, Dennison suggests, are what allow for his ideal hospitality to Bramble and his travelling companions.¹³²

However, Dennison’s limitations reveal how limitations also challenge the ability to perform hospitality. In preserving his house for only those like himself, Dennison acts inhospitably to all others: he lies to his neighbors and refuses to allow them to cross his threshold, he judges his neighbors for their worth, and he conceitedly speaks of his society as so clearly above that of his less worthy neighbors, they can only hope to “accede” to his group. The perfect hospitality Bramble so admires in Dennison is thus predicated on inhospitality. Yet, Bramble clearly embraces Dennison’s lifestyle and methods for limitation. He eagerly tours the

¹³² Finding virtue in such limitations, Weed refers to Mr. Dennison as “the last stronghold of masculine control in *Humphry Clinker*” and argues that Dennison’s limitations are routed in his renunciation of “commerce and public life” for “private land” (621). This distinction, however, reveals that hospitable openness is replaced with a privacy suspect for its connections to self-interest.

farm and enlists Dennison in the reform of his friend Baynard. Their connection is also co-opted into a filial relationship as Lydia, Bramble's niece, marries Dennison's son. United in disposition and family, the novel ends when Bramble takes leave of the Dennisons to return to his own estate in Wales. The novel suggests that Bramble will attempt to recreate Dennison's domestic happiness when he is once again instated as host but the comedy ends before this aftermath is fully investigated.¹³³ However, some indications of future difficulty are present. First, Bramble, though capable of hosting, continually seeks the guest position in the narrative; as such, it is difficult to imagine him denying his neighbors entrance into his home or refusing to accept an invitation. Indeed, his passive character seems ill-adapted for Dennison's aggressive, active form of hospitality. Second, Bramble's sister Tabitha remains a self-interested character. Her marriage to Lismahago suggests the continuation of his and Bramble's positive hospitality; however, the marriage itself hardly promises to be one of uninterrupted happiness. Bramble will certainly continue to associate with, and even feel affection for, his self-interested sister. This one instance of inability to regulate the intentions of others or exclude such company suggests a larger problem in implementing such limitations in practice. *Humphry Clinker* and other comedic narratives thus argue for the importance of limitations to hospitality but raise unanswered questions about the ethical responsibilities of hospitality.

David Simple and the Intruding World

Sarah Fielding's *David Simple* also ends with a comedic dual marriage of David and Camilla and Valentine and Cynthia, an ending which restores stability and creates a circle of like-minded guests to preserve the continued exchange of hospitality. United as family and living in perfect equality together, the group retires to the country to live off David's fortune. Unlike other families, this family is united not by blood but by their hospitable dispositions; they are, as David's description of a friend outlines, people "who could be trusted...whose every Action proceeded either from obedience to the *Divine Will*, or from the Delight he took in doing good; who could not see another's suffering without Pain, nor his Pleasures without sharing them" (68-

¹³³ Jeffrey L. Duncan finds Dennison's well-ordered farm to be a triumph of "reason and labor" in the novel and contends that this "process of realizing a possibility" will be taken to Wales with Bramble and his family (522). Applied to the hospitable exchange, this process suggests that the limitations created through reason can be used to realize a more positive hospitality.

69). Having found one another, the group has no further need for larger society and no longer seeks or offers hospitality. As in *Humphry Clinker*, this happy union is based on the exclusion of other company. Yet, this comedic ending also raises questions as to the ethical message of the text and the practice of hospitality. As Scott Paul Gordon puts it, the balance of disinterested hospitality is never shown “working outside the safety of the ‘laboratory’” and thus the larger practice of positive hospitality is questioned; the only way to preserve the happy community “seems to be withdrawal from the world” (*Quixote* 77). Such retirement, however, counters the David’s disinterested desire to learn of the sufferings of others; indeed, his disinterested nature is hard to imagine limited to only his family. Moreover, the ending of the novel shows David’s completed quest—he has found a true friend—but the problem of society that the text points out is not resolved.¹³⁴ Without a means to actively combat these problems, the family will certainly still remain susceptible to the interests of others. The novel, then, offers a happy ending only in so far as the characters are able to detach themselves from the vice-filled world around them but does not show how this exclusionary hospitality would be practiced.

Unlike Smollett, however, Fielding returns to this hospitable community and explores these ethical inconsistencies. Dissatisfied with the impracticality of the comedic ending, Fielding returned to the text nine years later to add a sequel, *Volume the Last*.¹³⁵ This volume changes the narrative from a comedy to a tragedy as the family experiences a series of hardships, illnesses, separations and deaths as David’s fortune dwindles away.¹³⁶ Unable to maintain their happy isolation because of physical necessity, the family abandons the boundaries set around their happy community and once again seeks hospitality from the outside world. The reversal of fortune Fielding depicts illustrates tragedy’s different approach to the paradox of hospitality. Whereas comedic endings support imposing limitations on hospitality in order to preserve ideal relationships, tragedy emphasizes how difficult these limitations are in practice, particularly for

¹³⁴ Linda Bree finds the moral message at the end of the original novel “modest,” and points out that “David has converted no one from vice to virtue; in fact, he has made no attempt to change the society he has found so alien to his own ideals” (45).

¹³⁵ Sarah Fielding’s life had been quite tragic in these nine years; she lost three siblings between 1750 and 1754 and became financially strained.

¹³⁶ According to Linda Bree, the crucial difference between the original novel and its sequel is the state of David’s fortune. As he David loses his wealth, he “crosses the single most important dividing line in that society: that between self-sufficient and suppliant” (83). Without this fortune and with a family to care for, David is unable to walk away from hospitality that he suspects or even recognizes as deceitful as he was in the first novel.

the passive guest. Indeed, Fielding's happy union of disinterested guests is never able to offer the protection of a true host, and the family spends most of the sequel searching for such a protector. Ultimately, Fielding's additions refute any ability to safely or permanently limit hospitality even as the need for such limits in an inhospitable world escalates.

The prelude to the sequel, authored by a "friend of the author," suggests that Fielding is preoccupied with the paradox of hospitality. Here, Fielding is described to be struggling to deliver a version of positive hospitality that can be practiced in the context of an intruding, selfish world. The prelude claims that Fielding wishes to "illustrate that well-known Observation, that 'The Attainment of our Wishes is but too often the Beginning of our Sorrows'" (285). This conventional saying marks the shift from comedy to tragedy but also suggests that the attainment of ideal hospitality is impossible to protect; the impulse to extend this hospitality found in a comedic ending must always come to an end. The prelude suggests that the sequel does not abandon hospitality as an ethic but no longer offers hospitality as a safe haven from the pressures of an inhospitable world; rather, the positive hospitality enacted by the Simple family will show that "every Evil may be lessened and alleviated" but the prelude does not suggest that such evils can be avoided (285). Fielding herself offers a more pessimistic version of this moral and questions the possibility for hospitality to exist in the world. She writes that her sequel illustrates the "Truth of the Observation... 'That solid and lasting Happiness is not to be attained in this World,' adding only that "a frequent Repetition of this Observation is necessary, in order to remind People of its Truth" (291-292). Here, hospitality is seen as a vulnerable condition and as an ethic that cannot be practiced in an inhospitable world. Clearly, Fielding wishes to revise her original message; limitations are deemed impossible, and hospitality is impossible without limits. As unsatisfactory as the closed group was to a hospitable ethic of openness, a return to that openness appears even more damaging. Thus, Fielding pursues the paradox of hospitality: in order to enact hospitality, it must be limited; at the same time, hospitality must remain open to the untrusted stranger.

Fielding's sequel reiterates the need for limitations found in her original text. As in David's original quest for a true friend, the potential hosts in *Volume the Last* are too self-interested to offer hospitality. Fielding highlights the difference between these bad hosts to the hospitality of the Simple family, whose disinterested community is difficult to relate to those

outside their positive exchange of hospitality. For example, Mrs. Orgueil repeatedly estimates Cynthia and Camilla's relationship according to her own interested motives.¹³⁷ Taking an extreme disliking to Cynthia, she attempts to usurp her enemy in Camilla's affection through tactics meant to divide their self interests. Because both Camilla and Cynthia practice a disinterested hospitality, attempts to arouse jealousy or offers of social promotion have little affect on their relationship. Mrs. Orgueil's lack of success, and her decision to even attempt such an usurpation, illustrates her misunderstanding of their shared hospitality. In another instance, David attempts to explain his family's disinterested relationship in order to beg for aid for his family; the loan shark he seeks aid from, however, is incapable of understanding such shared hospitality. David asks for a loan to support his family, offering Valentine's promise to send money as collateral. Because Valentine is not legally obliged to share this money with David, the loan shark refuses the collateral, mystifying David who can only complain that "the Word *Obligation* was never one thought of by either of us, from our first Acquaintance" (345). Because the loan shark sees the world from a more selfish viewpoint, he fails to trust in such generosity. In a world that is not united or disinterested, the Simple family finds their hospitable circle continually at odds with those outside their circle. For protection from such a world, limitations are necessary for the practice of hospitality.

However, the guest in need of hospitality cannot enact these necessary limitations but instead must remain vulnerable. David and his family find themselves in the position of a supplicating guest as David's fortune gradually diminishes. This change in financial position affects their ability to remain segregated from the rest of society; they must open their circle in order to ask for external aid. The volume is introduced, then, not by a change in the characters, but by a "strange and unexpected change of Fortune" that they face (349). Though their hospitable dispositions experience "no Alteration" (349), this lack of self-interest ultimately leads them once again into need; had David taken a more active, assertive role in managing his wealth, such a change in situation might not have occurred. Passively hospitable, the family's luck fails passively as well; their fortune slowly diminishes not because of luxury but because of

¹³⁷ Mrs. Orgueil thoroughly misjudges the women's relationship. Indeed, Mika Suzuki argues that the ideal of this circle of friends is perhaps best represented by the two women; Camilia and Cynthia share a "tacit understanding" wherein "they can feel assured in comprehending the sentiments of each other" (Suzuki 210).

the family's passive acceptance of Mr. Ratcliffe's, a beneficiary later discovered to be self-interested, financial advice. The family discovers that, as their need for hospitality increases, their ability to act on their good will once again decreases; the world thus returns the family to their former precarious station and out into the open system of hospitality that they had attempted to escape. The family members cannot separate themselves from society or protect themselves from subsequent threats of intruding inhospitable forces. The sequel thus once again follows the plight of the guest who must remain passive to the host.

Fielding escalates the moral complexities of this position in her sequel. While the original text outlines how David misread hospitality exchanges because of his own disinterested nature and position as a guest, the sequel complicates this perspective further by David's financial distress. His family's need and the general threat of want make disinterest nearly impossible for David; though not concerned for himself, he is rarely thinking of the needs of potential hosts he approaches for help. This mindset further obscures David's ability to see the intentions behind the hospitality he does receive. Indeed, the story enumerates how the very unity, morality, and filial love the group shares only makes them more vulnerable to negative forms of hospitality. David is found repeating his earlier errors in judgment because his love for his family clouds his ability to see deception. The narrator, in hyperbolic detail, reveals that Mr. Ratcliff and Mr. Orgueil

got an Ascendancy over the Mind of *David Simple*, that no Creature on Earth could ever have obtained, had SELF alone been his Consideration. Not even if they had found him in a sick Bed, loaded with Poverty and Pain, no human Arm extended for his Assistance, his only Support a Conscience void of Offence, and Hope in another Life. But he was entangled in the snare of Love for others, and his Inclination blinded his Judgment, till he in a manner forced himself to fancy he believed that *Ratcliff* and *Orgueil* would be his Friends, against that almost infallible Proof to the contrary, that the true Words of Kindness never fell from their Lips. (326-327)

Here, Fielding drives home that it is the connection made with the rest of his family that causes David to make mistakes. His poor judgment is no longer the product of his guest position or benevolence but a result of his own interested desire to provide for his family. While his disinterest was unmitigated in the original novel, David struggles to balance the interests of his

closest hospitality circle in the larger system of exchange.¹³⁸ Indeed, this dependence is far different from David's earlier search for a friend; during that search, David easily severed ties with anyone once he found them unsuitable to be called his friend. Moreover, David had before been seeking benevolent individuals for his hospitable group but now only needs a more material hospitality. Desperate for assistance, David no longer uses the same criteria to choose his acquaintance and appears less hospitable himself as he seeks out society members with influence and money and thus the capacity to assist him. Armed with a desire to see only good intentions in others and an interest in gaining material assistance, David reenters the system of hospitality ill-equipped to properly manage it.

The family's need not only obscures David's ability to properly perceive hospitality exchanges, it also limits his ability to act when inconsistencies between a host's declared intentions and actions are found. In this way, the entire Simple family find themselves in the situation of a toad-eater. Dependent on the hospitality of Orgueil and Ratcliff, the family must remain grateful for the inhospitable aid they do receive, must flatter their hosts to continue the relationship, and continually find themselves made hopeful by promises of hospitality that are never realized. Such inconsistencies determine the Simple family's relationship with the Orgueils; the family expresses gratitude for hospitality received to bolster the reputation of the Orgueil family and remain hopeful that vague promises of further aid will materialize. Indeed, like the mountebank's boy, the family is repeatedly asked to "*swallow a toad*" but then supplicated when given "something to expel it again, that they may be ready to swallow the next [the mountebanks] think proper to prepare for them" (103). In one such moment, the Simples are convinced to remain in close connection to the Orgueils when they agree to pay for the burial of Camilla and Valentine's father, an act which "again enslaved [David's] Mind to *Orgueil*, and fixed his Chain as strong as ever" (336). The narrator is quick to remind the reader that David's "Blindness" is not caused by "Flattery" or the "Prospect of Favour" but by "Fears and Apprehensions of our Friends Miseries, and ardent Wishes for their Happiness" (336). David's

¹³⁸ As Richard Terry points out, the specific "sentimentally intensified form" of friendship the Simple family practices makes them particularly susceptible to being undermined (537). Their family thus depends on being "cloistered from reality" (532). David's previously lauded sensibility now helps him make unwise decisions and, as Terry points out, David's sensitivity becomes a liability to his friends rather than moral guide. Because David cannot stand back and observe, he is girded into bad situations and pushed into the company of inhospitable men.

interest in preserving his family here motivates his acceptance of hospitality from unworthy hosts. The family's moral disposition does not save them from inhospitality, then, but forces them to suffer more; indeed, interest in preserving this union only further limits David's ability to act in exchanges of hospitality.

David's efforts at preservation, however, are not enough and the hospitable community slowly dissolves under the pressure of the family's need and dependency on others. Valentine and Cynthia are convinced to move to Jamaica in hopes of making money and again establishing the community's self-sufficiency. Their separation marks the beginning of a long bout of worries about hunger, housing and health for the rest of the family and culminates in the deaths of Valentine, Camilla, their father, and all but one of their collective children. The novel ends with David's death and his death bed realization of the paradox of hospitality; David relates to Cynthia how the finding of positive hospitality imposed needs for impossible limits that ultimately threatened both the practice and ideal of hospitality. He tells Cynthia, "little did I imagine, that the greatest Misery, and sharpest Sting of my Life, was to arise from a Woman's permitting me to love and esteem her...that the attaining a faithful and tender Friend, that strong Pursuit of my Life, and which I thought the Height of Happiness, should lead to its very contrary, and by that Means shew me the short sightedness of all Human Wisdom" (401). The delights of friendship and hospitality, David claims, are "more than weigh[ed] down" by the sadness it also ushers in. The creation of the ideal hospitality community makes David more vulnerable to unhappiness and replaced his disinterested disposition with an interest in his family's well-being. Moreover, his concern for those closest to him—those that he hoped to live with in happy solitude—create a new dependency on and vulnerability to inhospitable hosts. He recounts to Cynthia that "in obtaining my Wishes, I had multiplied my Cares; ... when Poverty broke in upon us, I found, that to bear the Poverty of many, was almost insupportable. —Then, indeed, my Mind began to be seized with Fear—I was no longer my former Self—Pictures of the Distress of my Family began to succeed each other in my Mind, and Terror and Timidity conquered my better Judgment" (401-402). David is certainly still benevolent and his concerns for the suffering of his family indicate his continued passive disinterest; however, David confines this disinterest into the closest circle of hospitality and no longer approaches the larger world with benevolent

disinterest. Because David relinquishes his disinterested passivity to more actively advocate for the interests of his family, the ideal of hospitality is revealed as an impossible standard.

Moreover, David's interests for his family harm his judgment and made the family more vulnerable to negative hospitality. In finding a community of hospitable guests, David did not escape the problems of hospitality found in the original novel but actually increases his vulnerability to bad hosts and also questions the ability for positive hospitality to be practiced. Desperate for his family, David admits into his circle "Persons more properly called Persecutors" than friends. These "fancied Friends became my Plagues, and my real ones, by their sufferings, tore up my Heart by the Roots, and frightened me into bearing the insolent Persecutions of the others—I found my Mind in such Chains as are much worse than any Slavery of the Body" (402). David finds he must accept the inhospitable to maintain his hospitable circle of friends. To keep his close friends happy and healthy, he must admit those less worthy into his circle. It is only with the death of Camilla that David again seeks to cut off his family from the rest of society. Following her death, he tells Cynthia, "my Eyes were forced wide open, to discover the Fallacy of fancying any real or lasting Happiness can arise from an Attachment to Objects subject to Infirmities, Diseases, and to certain Death: and I would not, for any Thing this World can give, lead over again the last Twelve-month of my Life" (402). No longer attached to much or many in the world, David again returns to a policy of exclusions, though now his isolation is from all worldly objects. David here finds hospitality a paradox: when it is on the threshold of reality, it disappears. Hospitality needs more prudence, foresight, and caution, *David Simple* argues, than are possible. Even with a group of perfectly reciprocal individuals, hospitality cannot quite exist in the world but must continue to be pursued.

Fielding ends her sequel not only acknowledging the impossibility for hospitality in the world but also suggesting a necessary belief in hospitality. Cynthia promises David that she and his one remaining daughter will remain safe after his death because of an unnamed man's hospitality. She speaks highly of her new host as "one whose Power assisted his Inclination to confer the highest Benefits. Then she related the Manner and the Kindness with which she was received, and the Joy with which it inspired her, till she made his Pleasure and Gratitude equal with her own" (400). Cynthia hopes for hospitality and her relation of her host seems promising. Yet, as the reader remembers the family's prior distresses and Cynthia's own position as a toad-

eater, the future looks less promising. Cynthia needs hospitality and, as a guest, cannot suspect the motives of her host. The reader is left wondering if this is another instance of bad judgment but also knowing that Cynthia has no other choice. Hospitality, Fielding suggests, may be unattainable and unsustainable but is still worthy of pursuit.

Cecilia and the Problem of Society

Frances Burney's *Cecilia* also questions the possibility of attaining positive hospitality but makes more palatable flawed versions of hospitality. Burney balances the hospitality paradox by showing the contradiction between limitations and an ideal of openness. However, unlike her comedic counterparts, Burney rejects the instatement of limitations and instead promotes a continued openness and passivity despite the vulnerability associated with this state. In fact, this ethical stance mitigates Burney's conclusion of the novel. Her comedy is not conventional; though the virtuous couple is united at the end of the novel, their happiness is moderated by their continued involvement with the outside world and the larger system of hospitality. Indeed, in many ways, this marriage is less than ideal; the union requires Cecilia to relinquish her sizable fortune to allow the proud Delviles to continue their family line with name intact. To accommodate the Delville family torment, the couple part immediately following the wedding ceremony; as a result, Cecilia is forced to leave her house, and eventually experiences a mental breakdown while attempting to find her husband in London. Even when happily restored to her friends and even some fortune, the book ends with Cecilia's measured happiness; she has

all the happiness human life seems capable of receiving:--yet human it was, and as such imperfect! She knew that, at times, the whole family must murmur at her loss of fortune, and at times she murmured herself to be thus portionless, tho' and HEIRESS. Rationally, however, she surveyed the world at large, and finding that of the few who had any happiness, there were none without some misery, she checked the rising sigh of repining mortality, and, grateful with general felicity, bore partial evil with chearfullest resignation. (941)

These final sentences of the novel are certainly not in the style of a "happily-ever-after" marriage ending. Rather this happy ending is tempered with the same sense of lack of control that Cecilia

experiences throughout the novel, a move which readers and critics alike found puzzling.¹³⁹ Yet, in this style of conclusion, Burney's novel does what *Sophia* and *Humphry Clinker* did not—namely, it does not forget the novel's earlier lessons and so cannot paint a picture of perfect hospitality. *Cecilia*'s end refuses to limit hospitality even as it acknowledges a need to do so. The ending, dissatisfying as it may be, refers back to two trends of hospitality explored earlier in the novel: Cecilia attempts to set limits and exclude others from her hospitable circle as a guest and as a host. Her lessons on the necessity but impossibility of such limits inform the less classically happy ending.

Cecilia first attempts to close her hospitality circle while a guest in the Harrel's house are ultimately unsuccessful. As a guest in someone else's home, she is unable to regulate her company or her time. She attempts to anyway, formulating a "scheme of happiness" that would allow her "to drop all idle and uninteresting acquaintance, who while they contribute neither to use nor pleasure, make so large a part of the community...[and] to select such only as by their piety could elevate her mind, by their knowledge improve her understanding, or by their accomplishments and manners delight her affections" (55). This decision would certainly offer Cecilia some control over her environment but would also seriously limit her interactions. Indeed, such a plan would force her to ignore her own hosts. As such, the plan is impossible to set in motion and Cecilia must structure the plan as a future goal; she acknowledges that "the society she meant to form could not be selected in the house of another, where, though to some she might show a preference, there were none she could reject" (56). Cecilia's ideal plan would be to limit her company and close her circle; as a guest, however, such behavior would go against her duties as a guest. Indeed, such limitations work against the demands of hospitality to be open.

Even Cecilia's modified plan proves to be too narrow for her role as a guest. Though she decides to structure her own time and limit her visits to others, Cecilia soon finds even these limits are beyond her abilities. Only days after forming her resolution, she finds herself visiting Miss Larolles—a woman whose company she does not wish to include in her ideal circle of

¹³⁹ For a more complete list of reader and critic reactions to *Cecilia*, see Doody, 144-148. Doody herself finds finesse in this ending. The ending is more in keeping with the sense throughout the novel that the characters are "affected by social circumstances more profound than he or she can grasp, and it is often the circumstances, not just the individual, that the novelist wishes us to focus upon" (118).

hospitality. Yet, she finds that she must visit to placate Mrs. Harrel and rectify her perceived inhospitality. This event teaches Cecilia that “the impracticability of beginning at present the alteration of her way of life she had projected, and therefore thought it most expedient to assume no singularity till her independency should enable her to support it with consistency” (70). In other words, Cecilia learns that she has little control over her company and her time while a guest. Moreover, Cecilia finds that her plan to limit her company is far too strict to be practical or pleasurable. She finds herself too fully alone and completely outside any exchange of hospitality; she reasons that “a rigid seclusion from company was productive of a lassitude as little favourable to active virtue as dissipation itself, she resolved to soften her plan, and by mingling amusement with benevolence, to try, at least, to approach that golden mean” (131). Her limitations isolate her and affect her ability to function in a community; Cecilia must interact with others, including those less ideal for her closed community.

Though this experience causes Cecilia to look expectantly towards her future autonomy, she finds that this form of limitation does not work as a host either. She had imagined her plan would be easier to enact when she was a host and in her own home, but she finds new difficulties enacting her plan then as well. She resolves to structure her time as a host as well and live “without regard to unmeaning wonder or selfish remonstrances” (792). This plan includes limiting her guests and excluding members of society from her company. Cecilia again designs to surround herself only with those who share her disposition. She begins to enact “the plan she had early formed at Mrs. Harrel’s” but finds “that part by which the useless or frivolous were to be excluded from her house, she found could only be supported by driving from her half her acquaintance” (792). To enact such a plan would place her in the inhospitable situation of the Delvile castle. There, no neighbors visited because Lord Delvile’s pride excluded them; here, Cecilia finds that her own determination to limit her company would threaten to do the same. In order to remain connected to the community and involved at all in hospitality, she must allow some whom she might wish to exclude from her company.

Moreover, Cecilia finds that she cannot control her guests. She first learns this lesson when she invites Mrs. Harrel to be her guest, a duty she feels compelled to do in gratitude for her previous hosting and because of Mrs. Harrel’s obvious need. But Cecilia finds that, as a host, she cannot force her version of hospitality on her guest. Mrs. Harrel “proved to her nothing more

than a trouble and incumbrance; with no inherent resources, she was continually in search of occasional supplies; she fatigued Cecilia with wonder at the privacy of her life, and tormented her with proposals of parties and entertainments” (792). Mrs. Harrel’s widowed state has not made her more inclined towards Cecilia’s lifestyle, and Cecilia’s guest finds her house inhospitable as Cecilia formerly found hers. Moreover, those whom Cecilia might wish to cultivate relationships with are also uncontrollable. She finds that the “wise, good, and intelligent” were only “with difficulty attainable.” Because of these valuable traits, “all who possessed at once both talents and wealth, were so generally courted they were rarely to be procured; and all who to talents alone owed their consequence, demanded, if worth acquiring, time and delicacy to be obtained” (793). Thus, Cecilia finds enacting her plans of exclusion to be more difficult than she had imagined and, on a certain level, virtually impossible to enact. Though these limits sound prudent and desirable—indeed, they should allow hospitality to be performed well—Cecilia is not able to control her environment enough to enact them. She requires a connection to society to pursue her plans of benevolence, and limitations would counter this project.

In other words, Cecilia requires society to build hospitality but that very requirement implies a lack of control. To remain hospitable, Cecilia must also remain vulnerable to the interests of others and open to other configurations of hospitality. The inability to limit hospitality is found in her marriage with Mortimer. The ideal couple will continue their positive exchange of disinterested hospitality with one another but do not segregate themselves from less worthy society. Instead, Cecilia acknowledges with self-interest the sacrifice of her name and fortune for the marriage, and does not censor the perspective of the more interested world but rather “murmurs” along with them. Though she concludes that her hospitable marriage was worth the sacrifice, Cecilia does not reject all self-interest from her own perspective or from those of her guests. Indeed, her sacrifice allows for the continued self-interest of the Delvilles; their family name intact, the Delvilles have asserted their interest on the hospitable union of Mortimer and Cecilia. Thus, remaining open to the interests of others and maintaining relationships with her new self-interested blood relations, the hospitable union in *Cecilia* suggests that hospitality must make room for dissimilar dispositions and seek to accommodate others despite the vulnerabilities and “lesser evils” these accommodations require.

Though each of the texts explored here offers a different means to balance hospitality with self-preservation, they all grapple with the same paradox of hospitality. The ideal of hospitality calls for openness while the practice requires limitations. This paradox is complicated by the ethical responsibilities inherent in hospitality exchanges. These novels each emphasize a different ethical perspective, arguing for the ethical necessity to limit or for the necessity to remain open. Yet, each author qualifies the positive hospitality relationships created in the texts. These novels thus suggest that hospitality is never able to reach its ideal. As intentions are both hard to control and hard to know, so too is hospitality riddled with the complexities of the individuals who create them. Though the benevolent guest can choose how to respond to this reality, hospitality, the eighteenth century reminds us, must always be qualified.

CONCLUSION

I began this study with a discussion of Vicemius Knox's opinions on the ethical implications of traditional forms of hospitality. It is now appropriate to reconsider the passage that I quoted at the outset:

The days of Elizabeth have been extolled as the days of genuine hospitality. The doors were thrown open, and, at the sound of the dinner-bell, all the neighbouring country crowded to the smoking table. These were happy times, indeed, says the railer against modern refinement. Yet it has been justly doubted, whether this indiscriminate hospitality was laudable. There was something generous and magnificent in the idea, and it gave the nobles of the land the influence of kings over their neighbourhood. Yet if its motive and its moral effects are considered, it will appear to be justly exploded. It proceeded from the love of power and from ostentation, and it produced gluttony, drunkenness, and all their consequent vices. (231)

It is perhaps easy to see the eighteenth-century "railer" might look nostalgically on a depiction of hospitality based on action. Easier to enact, this idea of Elizabethan hospitality offers an escape from the exhaustion of moral questioning eighteenth-century novels suggest was associated with hospitality. At the same time, Knox's distrust of such markers of hospitality indicates that hospitality cannot return to an active definition; intention has become too important to the moral landscape to eradicate the "just doubt" of "indiscriminate hospitality." Hospitality is in ethical crisis and, as this project attempts to show, this crisis is only multiplied when examined closely. If anything, the nuances of the crisis muddy the larger picture of hospitality.

In many ways this project ends where it begins: hospitality in ethical crisis because ill-defined and difficult to enact. Beginning with the task to imagine a hospitable system based on intentional ideals, eighteenth-century novels end still seeking this image. The task to imagine hospitality differently continued after the eighteenth century and persists today. However, there is no single image of hospitality that can encompass all of its forms and meanings; hospitality is an ethic that, admirably, draws no conclusions and, frustratingly, draws to no conclusions. Peter Melville, studying hospitality in the Romantic era embraces the eighteenth-century's bequeathal of a still unresolved ethical standard for hospitality. Instead, he astutely argues that "If a

structural impossibility is what makes hospitality meaningful, then it is the historical or contextual singularity of particular instances of such failure that are the meaning” (18). This project hopes to illuminate the “singularity” of the eighteenth-century moment and the meaning that literary texts created from the failures of hospitality at that time.

In doing so, I endeavored to show that an era of British narrative literature often dismissed as merely didactic is, in fact, intimately intertwined in the ethical quandaries that define the modern era. Intimately engaged in philosophical discussions that helped define individuals by their intentions, these texts do not merely apply a new system of ethics but instead question an action’s foundations and consequences. These texts do not follow a tidy revelation to illuminate the modern subject through personal interiority but examine interiority’s interaction with the external world. As the depictions of hospitality show, the relation between interior desire and exterior world is not easily balanced. By taking the guest perspective, these narratives humanize rational theories, exposing the vulnerabilities, conflicts of interests, and lack of authority that riddle the practice of these new ethical standards. In so doing, these novels also question the ideals that create such uncomfortable positions. The readers are left with a variety of answers from these narratives as a whole but also from any one narrative in its singularity; neither version of hospitality that Knox outlines is adequate but the fluctuation between poles does offer some hope for respite in the company of others.

These lessons are worth recalling in our own time, when hospitality is once again being redefined. The eighteenth century reminds us that hospitality does little good as an ethic if it is unable to be practiced; the impossibility of hospitality can only be celebrated if worldly solutions are also explored. In the absence of such practice, narrative shows us, guests are the ones who suffer and bad hosts are rarely punished. It is also worth noting that the suffering found in these eighteenth-century novels are lessened by limitations; though hospitality is ideally an ethic of openness to difference, its practice asks us to search for similarity in a society where openness to others poses dangers to self-preservation. The eighteenth-century novel shows us how the very definition of similarity can be redefined; rejecting the sameness of family, class or gender, these novels define sameness by an elective relation rather than a filial relation. As we encounter new differences in our hospitable circumstances, it is worth remembering the eighteenth century’s explorations of identity and difference.

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