

Maori Education and Reconciliation

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The meaning of citizenship for many Indigenous peoples has historically entailed assimilation into the nation-state through colonizing education policies and practices. Several democratic nation-states are now seeking reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and redefining the meaning of citizenship within their borders. Using recent multicultural education and the politics of reconciliation research, this paper examines the possibility of reconciliation between nation-states and Indigenous peoples, focusing on the Maori of New Zealand and their quest for full inclusion and citizen rights. The paper illustrates why the politics of reconciliation is viewed as necessary to construct a political partnership that fosters a new meaning of citizenship. This analysis suggests that a new meaning of citizenship is emerging in New Zealand because the voices of the Maori are being recognized by the dominant group and historical injustices are being acknowledged through the Waitangi Tribunal process.

Introduction

In what recent scholarship has described as the ‘age of apology’ several democratic nation-states, whose histories depend upon the colonization of Indigenous peoples, have undergone national soul searching with their past.¹ Perhaps through present day social-ills persistent within Indigenous communities, or the nation-state’s desire to correct past injustices, these nation-states have recognized the devastating impact that colonizing education policies and practices have had on the lives of Indigenous communities. Australia and Canada have both issued government apologies for colonizing education policies and practices. In 2008, the Australian government issued a formal apology regarding the ‘Stolen Generations’ of Aboriginal children; and the Canadian government offered an apology to First Nations Peoples for the residential boarding school system.² As Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper lamented, “The government of Canada sincerely apologizes and asks the forgiveness of the aboriginal peoples of this country for failing them so profoundly. We are sorry.”³

What these gestures of reconciliation suggest is that a new discourse on the meaning of citizenship is emerging between nation-states and Indigenous peoples. Nation-states are moving beyond the assimilation policies and accommodation strategies of earlier periods to richer notions of political engagement. Yet can reconciliation help Indigenous peoples and the nation-state reconstruct new meanings of citizenship from the legacies of cultural genocide? This paper brings together the recent literature in multicultural education concerning Indigenous peoples and explores how it might be complimented by the current scholarship in the pol-

itics of reconciliation. Specifically, the paper focuses on the Maori of New Zealand and their quest for full inclusion and citizen rights. The educational experiences of the Maori entailed assimilation into the nation-state. However, the aim of Maori education is to decolonize their linguistic, cultural, and epistemological systems from the enduring legacy of colonization. The paper illustrates why the politics of reconciliation is viewed as necessary to construct a political partnership that fosters a new meaning of citizenship. Using the Waitangi Tribunal as a current example of reconciliation engagement, this analysis suggests that new meanings of citizenship can emerge in New Zealand because the voices of the Maori are being recognized and the historical injustices are being acknowledged by the dominant group.

¹ See Mark Gibney et al., *The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). This text analyzes and assesses several examples of formal apologies by nation-states.

² For a detailed account of both examples of reconciliation, see Dirk Moses, “Official Apologies, Reconciliation, and Settler Colonialism: Australian Indigenous Alterity and Political Agency,” *Citizenship Studies* 15, 2 (2011): 145-159; Stephen Winter, “Legitimacy, Citizenship and State Redress,” *Citizenship Studies* 15, 6/7 (2011): 799-814.

³ The Canadian government embarked on a truth and reconciliation tour that documented the stories of boarding school policies and experiences. The goal of the tour was to bring the colonial history of Indigenous education into public view in order to reconstruct a new national narrative and the meaning of citizenship. See DeNeen L. Brown, “Canadian Government Apologizes for Abuse of Indigenous People,” *The Washington Post*, June 1, 2008, accessed July 1, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/06/11/AR2008061100419.html>

Citizenship and Indigenous Peoples

The meaning of citizenship for Indigenous peoples has historically entailed assimilation into the nation-state. Nation-states are sovereign, autonomous, and legal entities that have maintained control over specific boundaries since the modern period. Such control linked a particular group of people to a specific territory, thus creating the modern notion of citizenship. States Castles (2004), "Citizenship depended on membership of a nation, seen as a cultural community, whose members were held together by bonds of solidarity, based on shared history, values, and traditions."⁴ Those on the outside of the nation-state's definition of citizenship were to be assimilated into the broader society through education and other socio-political structures, creating "a nation-state in which one culture—Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Celtic—was dominant."⁵ While the nation-state considered education as a good for developing conceptions of citizenship, in the case of Indigenous peoples education precluded them from practicing their cultures or speaking their languages. To be a citizen meant obviating their indigeneity in favor of acceptable forms of citizenship in the nation-state.

Grande (2004) describes a specific kind of citizenship-education imposed on Indigenous groups that directly contradicted their worldviews. Among these were the beliefs in progress, individualism, and reason, as well as the belief that human beings were separate from and superior to nature. Within the colonizing education structures, "human beings are perceived to have dominion over nature and all beings incapable of rational thought."⁶ These beliefs became deeply embedded in the educational experiences of Indigenous minds and bodies, calling for what Smith (1999) describes as the "decolonization of the mind."⁷ The concept of decolonization refers to the Indigenous struggle for self-determination and sovereignty, such as the reclamation of lands, revitalization of languages, and the right to self-govern. Decolonization "seeks freedom from colonial forms of thinking [and] to revive native, local, and vernacular forms of knowledge."⁸ It not only entails recovery from geographical and linguistic erasure as a result of colonizing experiences, but also the regeneration of the Indigenous group's sense of humanity and being in the world.

These experiences of citizenship-education and decolonization raise conceptual and practical problems for democratic nation-states seeking reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. Within the lived experience of Indigenous peoples lies the spirit of resistance towards colonialist structures, such that their "struggles are not about inclusion and enfranchisement to the 'new world order' but, rather, are part of the indigenous project of sovereignty and indigenization."⁹ Given that the story of citizenship for Indigenous peoples has entailed assimilation into the nation-state, their political struggle has been a process of resistance and survival to remain Indigenous. Rather than full citizenship inclusion, Indigenous peoples seek greater sovereignty as nations.¹⁰ The political aim of many Indigenous groups, therefore, is to "survive as distinct nations while participating in soci-

ety at large, but on their own self-determining terms rather than conditions imposed by authorities."¹¹ This suggests that nation-states must rethink their current political structure to one that recognizes Indigenous sovereignty and nationhood.

Maori Education: A Colonizing History

The colonization process of the Maori solidified in 1840 with the signing of the Waitangi Treaty. Bringing together representatives from the British Crown and over 500 Maori leaders, the Treaty inaugurated the new nation-state. However, the Maori soon realized that the effects of the Treaty relegated them to colonized status. As Bishop (2003) describes, "in 1852... Pakeha (non-Maori, European) settlers were empowered to take over direct control of governance from the British, and over ensuing decades by the means of armed invasion of Maori lands."¹² The results of these invasions disempowered the Maori to own land and participate in the political process. The aim of Pakeha, now the politically dominant group in New Zealand, was to assimilate the Maori into the broader society, eroding their identity, culture, and language, with education serving as a principle site for this assimilation process. As Penetito (2009) explains, Pakeha believed that "Maori culture, especially language, is

⁴ Stephen Castles, "Migration, Citizenship, and Education," in *Diversity & Citizenship Education: Global Perspectives*, ed. James A. Banks (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 20.

⁵ James A. Banks, "Multicultural Education: Dimensions and Paradigms," in *The Routledge International Companion to Multicultural Education*, ed. James A. Banks (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 11.

⁶ Sandy Grande, *Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 69.

⁷ Linda T. Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (New York: Zed Books, 1999), 7. Smith explains further: "The reach of imperialism into 'our heads' challenges those who belong to colonized communities to understand how this [colonization] occurred, partly because we perceive a need to decolonize our minds, to recover ourselves, to claim a space in which to develop a sense of authentic humanity."

⁸ Pramod Nayar, *Postcolonialism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (New York: Continuum, 2010), 3.

⁹ Grande, *Red Pedagogy*, 29.

¹⁰ For a concise meaning of sovereignty and nationhood, see David E. Wilkins, *American Indian Politics and the American Political System* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). Wilkins states that "tribal peoples are the original—the indigenous—inhabitants of North America and they are nations in the most fundamental sense of the word." Nationhood is built upon the concept of sovereignty, the idea that there is a "distinct political entity which exercises a measure of jurisdictional power over a specific territory" (see page 47).

¹¹ Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, *The Politics of Indigeneity: Challenging the State in Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand* (Dunedin, NZ: University of Otago Press, 2005), 13.

¹² Russell Bishop, "Changing Power Relations in Education: Kaupapa Maori Messages for 'Mainstream' Education in Aotearoa/New Zealand," *Comparative Education* 39, 2 (2003): 221-222.

best kept for home. . . [and] that Pakeha know best what is in the interests of Maori.”¹³

Similar to other Indigenous groups, Maori children experienced the full brunt of the colonization process in the mid-nineteenth century with the establishment of schools. Originally beginning with mission schools in the early part of the century, the education of Maori children eventually transitioned into state sponsored Native schools run by Pakeha teachers and administrators. McMurphy-Pilkington (2008) provides a general description:

These Native schools operated largely under Pakeha-defined (non-Maori) structures, with curriculum and values using a Pakeha cultural perspective. The ultimate objective of the Native schools was to Europeanize Maori by instilling those norms and values that the dominant Pakeha group deemed desirable.¹⁴

The Native schools proved devastating in terms of the loss of language for children and the Maori more generally. By the 1880's, Maori children attended either state sponsored schools—the national education system for all New Zealand children—or Native schools. The goals of both were to assimilate Maori children into acceptable forms of citizenship.

Despite the continued civilizing mission of Native Schools into the twentieth century, Maori communities struggled to make these schools serve their own purposes. Maori communities played key roles in deciding curriculum, choosing quality teachers, and reporting to the Ministry of Education. This demonstrates the active steps made by the Maori to define the meaning and future of their educational experiences within their own communities. Simon and Smith (2001) state that the “educational achievements were shared by the community and seemed to affirm the belief that education provided a way ahead to a better life.”¹⁵ Maori communities transformed Native Schools in fundamental ways. They were often seen as a source for advancement of citizenship participation in society, but with the intention of remaining Maori. By the end of the Native School system in 1969, “there were Maori teachers in service. . . [and] communities believed that the schools were indeed theirs.”¹⁶

The Maori struggle for cultural and linguistic survival developed within a cultural revitalization movement, known as *kaupapa Maori*. Begun in 1985, the *kaupapa Maori* movement responded to the growing dissatisfaction among the Maori towards their colonizing experiences and low academic achievement among Maori students. Incorporating traditional Maori culture, language, and epistemologies, *kaupapa Maori* schools are rooted within the lived experiences of Maori families, elders, and communities. Harrison and Papa (2005) offer an example of an Indigenous knowledge and language program. Maori children, ages 5 – 18, learn the traditional languages, cultures, and epistemologies for the purpose of “providing children with knowledge and confidence in their heritage, and student achievement.”¹⁷ The *kaupapa Maori* movement, however, is not only a struggle for greater educational sovereignty or cultural revitalization.

It also serves as an organizing principle of Maori solidarity, commitment, and belonging within the nation-state.

Some scholars criticize the *kaupapa Maori* movement for embracing a parochial neo-tribal and uncritical anti-modernist position. The *kaupapa Maori* movement, argues Rata (2004), is a self-conscious traditionalism that reflects the desire to be rooted only within primordial ways of being and knowing. Rata argues that “*Kaupapa Maori* education demonstrates the features of a closed society...[whose] objectives are the restoration of tribal ties and kinship relations.”¹⁸ Such neo-tribal perspectives conflict with the value of individual autonomy promoted within democratic societies by embracing a communal-based identity system that has negative “consequences. . . for the maintenance of liberal democracy.”¹⁹ The *kaupapa Maori* movement, according to Rata, is an anti-modernist backlash against capitalist structures in line with postmodern notions of the locality of knowledge and rejection of meta-narratives rather than a movement to restore authentic Maori culture, language, and epistemology.

One of the primary concerns in Rata's criticism is that *kaupapa Maori* education devalues the ideal of the autonomous critical thinker in a democratic education system. Using the Kantian conception of the critical thinker, whose knowledge is derived from objective principles, Rata argues that students should have the power “to accept or reject the ideas of their teachers.” The traditionalism valued in *kaupapa Maori* education creates the situation in which Maori students would essentially regard “the family or clan or tribe [as] the world writ large.” What Rata finds problematic is that the community-based kinship system in *kaupapa Maori* education solidifies ethnic boundaries between those “political leaders and intellectuals who make the primordial. . . a plausible history for the group” and everyone else. These boundaries maintain inequalities and hierarchies between teachers and students, such that students blindly follow the traditions and cultures instructed by their leaders that may require critical reflection and analysis.²⁰

Underlying Rata's criticisms is the assumption that the

¹³ Wally Penetito, “The Struggle to Educate the Maori in New Zealand,” in *The Routledge International Companion to Multicultural Education*, ed. James A. Banks (New York and London: Routledge, 2009), 291.

¹⁴ Colleen McMurphy-Pilkington, “Indigenous People: Emancipatory Possibilities in Curriculum Development,” *Canadian Journal of Education* 31, 3 (2008): 618.

¹⁵ Judith Simon and Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *A Civilizing Mission?: Perceptions and Representations of the New Zealand Native School System* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2001), 304.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 304.

¹⁷ Barbara Harrison and Rahui Papa, “The Development of an Indigenous Knowledge Program in a New Zealand Maori-language Immersion School,” *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 36, 1 (2005): 57.

¹⁸ Elizabeth Rata, “Kaupapa Maori Education in New Zealand,” in *Citizenship and Political Education Today*, ed. Jack Demaine (New York: Palgrave-McMillan, 2004), 71.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 73.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 73, 72, 67.

modernist conception of individual autonomy is necessary for the maintenance of a democratic society and its education system. Apple (2001) problematizes this assumption by illuminating the ways individual autonomy aligns with neoliberal values. Neoliberalism holds the belief that the free market can solve the pervasive problems in education, privileging the teaching and reproduction of “choice, competition, performance management and individual responsibility” among students.²¹ Individualism, according to Apple, rather than being a neutral concept, reproduces the hierarchies and inequalities of class already present in democratic societies. Students from lower class families lack economic and social resources relative to middle and upper class students. The free market in capitalist democracies “systematically privilege higher socio-economic families through their knowledge and material resources.”²² The value of individual autonomy, in actuality, serves the interests of capitalism over the democratic aims of equality and justice.

Apple’s critical analysis of neoliberalism aligns with the perspective among Indigenous scholars. Democracy within Native communities has been built on the values of “participation, solidarity, and redistribution.”²³ Neoliberalism has disrupted these values of democracy by introducing the neoliberal concepts of capitalism and individualism into community life. The way to reestablish Indigenous democratic practices from the aftermath of the neoliberal policies “is to rebuild democracy from the perspective of the reaffirmation of [Indigenous] culture.”²⁴ Whereas the critics of *kaupapa Maori* education regard the reaffirmation of traditional cultures, languages, and epistemologies that diminishes the critical thinking skills among students required to maintain democratic societies, Indigenous perspectives regard community-based attachments as being central to the idea and maintenance of democracy.

Regardless, the *kaupapa Maori* movement critically responds to the dominant view of colonizing education within New Zealand. Given that Pakeha relegated the Maori to the status of second-class citizenship, neither fully including them into the democratic process nor recognizing their sovereign status as Indigenous peoples, full citizenship within the nation-state for the Maori begins with the affirmation and revitalization of their languages, cultures, and epistemologies nurtured within *kaupapa Maori* contexts. States Penetito, the “Maori want an education that begins with their identification as Maori before expanding into the world at large. . . that is designed to uphold their *mana* (status) as *tangatawhenua* (indigenous or first peoples) of Aotearoa New Zealand.”²⁵ For the Maori, citizenship within the nation-state initially entails strong affiliation with their identification as Indigenous peoples. Thus any political discourse reconstructing the meaning of citizenship concerning the Maori must take into account their aims of Indigenous affiliation, decolonization, and sovereignty.

The Politics of Reconciliation

The politics of reconciliation have become more prominent within the political literature over the past several

decades, yet scholars debate the exact role reconciliation should play in transitional and democratic societies. Reconciliation can refer to a set of tools or techniques, such as “reparations and compensations, apologies, commemorations and memorials, truth telling initiatives, rehabilitations, and amnesties”; it can refer to a set of goals, such as “nation-building, individual or collective healing after trauma”; or it can refer to a set of theories “to provide a normative framework for evaluating the tools and goals of reconciliation.”²⁶ Yet underlying these different roles of reconciliation is the tension between religious and secular ideologies. Religious ideologies, according to Jonathan VanAntwerpen (2008), emphasize individual forgiveness and collective healing in reconciliation, while secular ideologies emphasize individual tolerance and collective civic trust and amnesty.²⁷

Definitions of reconciliation vary within the current political literature. Opatow (2001) defines reconciliation as a process that “mediates a conflictual past with a desired, peaceful future. . . [it] can move people from antagonism to coexistence.”²⁸ Reconciliation works through past and existing conflict between persons or groups for the purpose of reaching some level of peaceful coexistence. Crocker (1999) states that reconciliation can range in meaning from “simple coexistence” to more “robust conceptions. . . [such as] forgiveness, mercy, and a shared comprehensive vision, mutual healing, or harmony.”²⁹ Such parties might not become friends through the reconciliation process, but possibly find healing and peace through acts of forgiveness, pardon, or mercy. Cole (2007) defines reconciliation as a “dynamic, complex, and long-term process, not an end-point. . . [and it is] not synonymous with amnesia, forgetfulness, or ‘letting go’.”³⁰ Reconciliation is not a final state of being or a basis for groups to forgive and forget past injustices, rather it en-

²¹ Michael Apple, “Global Crises, Social Justice, and Education,” in *Global Crises, Social Justice, and Education*, ed. Michael Apple (New York: Routledge, 2009), 2.

²² Michael Apple, “Comparing Neo-Liberal Projects and Inequality in Education,” *Comparative Education* 37, 4 (2001), 418.

²³ Abya Yala Net. Democracy and Neoliberalism. Retrieved from <http://abyayala.nativeweb.org/ecuador/96encuen/demo.html>

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Penetito, “The Struggle to Educate,” 291.

²⁶ Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, “Introduction: Struggles for Inclusion and Reconciliation,” in *The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies*, eds. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12.

²⁷ Jonathan VanAntwerpen, “Reconciliation Reconceived: Religion, Secularism, and the Language of Transition,” in *The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies*, eds. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25-47.

²⁸ Susan Opatow, “Reconciliation in Times of Impunity: Challenges for Social Justice,” *Social Justice Research* 14, 2 (2001): 160.

²⁹ David Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,” *Ethics International Affairs* 13 (1999): 60.

³⁰ Elizabeth Cole, “Introduction: Reconciliation and History Education,” in *Teaching the Violent Past: History, Education, and Reconciliation*, ed. Elizabeth Cole (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 10.

gages estranged groups in a truthful and open-ended political discourse.

Bashir (2008) extends these basic definitions of reconciliation and describes it as an “intergroup process that is embedded in power relations,” primarily between dominant and historically oppressed social groups.³¹ Social groups are different from social associations. Unlike social associations, such as political parties or organizations, which are voluntary, a social group “is typically involuntary and from birth.” For the most part individuals do not choose their racial, ethnic, or national backgrounds or identities—they find themselves in the midst of these social groups. The circumstances of these groups are not due to luck or happenstance, but rather to the longstanding practices and policies by dominant groups within the nation-state. As a result certain social groups present unique challenges to the nation-state because of their historical oppression, which “give rise to a distinctive claim for, and need for, reconciliation.” Because the injustices experienced by historically oppressed social groups persist, strategies for political accommodation and citizenship, according to Bashir, must be reframed from mere political inclusion to a politics of reconciliation.³²

For Bashir, the politics of reconciliation must include three main principles to help guide political engagement between dominant and historically oppressed social groups. The first principle recognizes “the significance of the collective memory and history of exclusion.” Dominant groups within the nation-state erase, suppress, and marginalize the stories of historically oppressed social groups, thus “downplaying the occurrences of past harms...and [portraying] the dominant group as not responsible for causing these harms.” What the first principle allows for is a critical space for these stories of exclusion to emerge within public consciousness. These stories challenge the meta-narrative of historical amnesia usually pervasive throughout the nation-state, offering a counter-discourse to the dominant group’s preeminence in the national story and their understanding of citizenship. Historically oppressed social groups remain skeptical, in fact, of “any conception of democratic inclusion that requires them to set aside these memories of oppression and exclusion.”³³

The second principle of reconciliation centers on the responsibility of the dominant group to take seriously the collective memory of exclusion voiced by historically oppressed social groups within the nation-state. Specifically, it emphasizes the need for dominant groups to “[acknowledge] the occurrence of historical injustice and seeks to repair them.” This principle argues that unless the dominant group recognizes that historical injustices are not accidental occurrences but a central part of the national story—and that they have the moral responsibility to repair those historical injustices towards historically oppressed social groups—it will be unlikely that the oppressed social group would want to participate in the political process. Bashir refers to the examples of Native Americans and African Americans within the United States who will remain distrustful and skeptical of any attempts of democratic accommodation and inclusion by the nation-state until “the past wrongs against their ancestors are acknowledged as an integral part of American history.”³⁴

The third principle of reconciliation emphasizes the complicity of dominant groups in the historical injustices of oppressed social groups, requiring “the oppressors and dominators to take responsibility for causing these injustices and offer a public apology.” Public apologies can take on multiple forms and activities—memorials, museums, or holidays—and they must be perceived as authentic attempts of atonement on behalf the dominant group as opposed to being symbolic gestures devoid of sincerity. The purpose of these apologies, according to Bashir, “is not to romanticize or perpetuate guilt or victimhood...[but rather to] help citizens... understand differently their history and its connection to current political, social, and economic inequalities.” Public apologies can have positive effects for historically oppressed social groups even when the perpetrators are no longer living. There is the recognition that the legacies of those injustices remain tied to the contemporary struggle of historically oppressed social groups; and there is the realization that dominant groups still benefit from the continued oppression of those groups.³⁵

These principles of reconciliation compel nation-states desiring new relationships with Indigenous peoples to move beyond earlier approaches of assimilation and accommodation to more robust forms of democratic citizenship. Reconciliation complicates the easy solution of democratic citizenship for nation-states that attempt to smooth over historical injustices committed against Indigenous peoples, what Rouhana (2008) describes as the “politics of historical denial.”³⁶ There is something superficial about democratic citizenship without an honest and truthful engagement of colonization and its current impact on the lives of Indigenous peoples. Without the stories of colonization coming into public consciousness, together with an authentic apology and reparations by the nation-state, the political power structure remains intact and distrust among Indigenous peoples continues. Reconciliation establishes the conditions for nation-states to confront the colonial past and its continued legacy head on as opposed to relegating it to something permanently in the past with little relevance to contemporary forms of oppression over Indigenous peoples.

This leads to the insight that reconciliation compels the nation-state to acknowledge, repair, and apologize for historical injustices alongside seeking more contemporary forms of democratic citizenship of Indigenous peoples. The

³¹ Bashir Bashir, “Accommodating Historically Oppressed Social Groups: Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Reconciliation,” in *The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies*, eds. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 55.

³² *Ibid.*, 51 and 53.

³³ *Ibid.*, 55, 56, and 56.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 57 and 57.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 57 and 58.

³⁶ Nadim Rouhana, “Reconciling History and Equal Citizenship in Israel: Democracy and the Politics of Historical Denial,” in *The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies*, eds. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 73.

achievement of full, democratic citizenship of minority groups “cannot be meaningfully realized without the tangible and intangible rectification of past injustices.”³⁷ What this suggests is that the nation-state cannot, morally speaking, offer one hand of meaningful and authentic forms of democratic citizenship towards Indigenous peoples without also offering the other hand of reconciliation. While the strategies and definitions of reconciliation might be disputed, depending on the specific localities and needs of Indigenous communities, the politics of reconciliation situates historical memory, open acknowledgment, and public apology as necessary conditions for dominant and Indigenous groups reconstructing meanings of democratic citizenship. Otherwise the quest for full citizenship of Indigenous peoples remains incomplete and superficial.

Reconciliation and New Meanings of Citizenship

The historical narrative of Maori and Pakeha relations is caught up within a legacy of colonization, but Pakeha now recognize the need to repair the relationship. Penetito describes how these groups are currently entering into a new political partnership:

[T]here is evidence that a ‘soft revolution’ is taking place in the hearts and minds (and in the classrooms, bedrooms, and boardrooms) of New Zealanders right now. There seems to be a tacit acceptance by Pakeha that perhaps a majority of Maori tribes were deeply disadvantaged by an overly zealous colonial power and that a settled future might depend on a public examination of New Zealand’s history.³⁸

The soft revolution is described as “an emerging new consensus” between the Maori and Pakeha, a “radical hopefulness” for healing the relationship.³⁹ There is, it seems, an effort among both groups to recognize their joint political partnership and find new ways of engaging one another in light of New Zealand’s colonial past.

Several voices within the Maori scholarship, however, differ as to the kind of relationship needed between the Maori and Pakeha. These differences hinge on the meaning of Indigenous sovereignty and what it should entail. One voice asserts that Maori sovereignty should extend over the entire nation, while another asserts that there should be the creation of separate Maori institutions. Other voices advocate for constitutional-based power-sharing arrangements between the Maori and Pakeha, a partnership that recognizes the sovereignty of both groups. At the center of these voices is the Maori principle of *tinio rangatiratanga* (chieftainship), which refers to “Maori power and empowerment; self-determination and control over jurisdictions and destinies; [and] bi-culturalism and partnerships.”⁴⁰ This concept affirms that Maori sovereignty is less about separation or succession from the nation-state and more about “building bridges by working together in a spirit of constructive

engagement.”⁴¹ The Maori, according to this principle, are willing to engage in the new emerging consensus.

What is taking place between the Maori and Pakeha resonates with the reconciliation process described in Bashir’s analysis. Various events have specifically helped change the mood in New Zealand politics and foster an emerging new consensus between these groups. One example of addressing Bashir’s principles is the Waitangi Tribunal. Established in 1975, the Tribunal hears the stories of exclusion among the Maori and offers an ongoing attempt by Pakeha to “redress . . . past injustices on the part of the Crown against tribes.”⁴² The Tribunal sets out “to establish a more just society . . . [and] originate out of the notion of a sense of grievance, loss, or separation.”⁴³ The Waitangi Tribunal resonates with Bashir’s three principles in two important ways. The process of storytelling suggests, first, that Pakeha are willing to hear the stories of exclusion voiced by the Maori; and, second, the outcomes of the Tribunal suggest that Pakeha are willing to repair the historical injustices committed against the Maori for the sake of a more robust political partnership.

The Waitangi Tribunal is not without criticism. Gibbs (2006) criticizes the Waitangi Tribunal for being too immersed in the social contract and rights-based tradition. When the Tribunal became the site to examine the Maori demands for reparations, both groups regarded the Waitangi Treaty of 1840 as a binding document, a contractual agreement that stands over both parties as a shared standard of justice. Breaches to the Treaty require some form of reparations of justice, an “exacting [of] what is due or what is demanded by the situation.”⁴⁴ Yet the Treaty engenders two dilemmas. The first dilemma recognizes that the nation-state becomes both the wrongdoer of the Treaty and the dispenser of justice, such that “the Crown holds most, if not all, of the cards.” The second dilemma recognizes that the rights-based approach relies too heavily on the accurate interpretation of historical events. For Gibbs, “historical ‘facts’ are highly constructed” and they are often used “to legitimate the exercise of (colonial) power.”⁴⁵

Regardless, the Waitangi Tribunal brings the Maori and Pakeha together in a political partnership to help foster new meanings of citizenship. Examining publicly the colonial past helps the Maori and Pakeha interpret the past in such a way that they can reconstruct new meanings of citizenship. Reconstructing accurate interpretations of the past becomes

³⁷ Ibid, 70.

³⁸ Penetito, “The Struggle to Educate,” 289.

³⁹ Ibid, 297.

⁴⁰ Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, “Engaging with Indigeneity: Tino Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa,” in *Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, eds. Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, and Will Sanders (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 99.

⁴¹ Ibid, 103.

⁴² Penetito, “The Struggle to Educate,” 295.

⁴³ Ibid, 295.

⁴⁴ Meredith Gibbs, “Justice as Reconciliation and Restoring Mana in New Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process.” *Political Science* 58, 2 (2006): 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 22 and 23.

unnecessary and only historical interpretations can emerge into public view. The meaning of citizenship, rather than being fixed and determined, has been a fluid and socially constructed concept within Maori and Pakeha relations.⁴⁶ Specific interests since the Waitangi Treaty have compelled the Maori to promote an Indigenous identity that created tensions between them and the nation-state's push towards social cohesion. The Tribunal's process of storytelling, by foregrounding multiple interpretations of the past, has created "a sense of hope among the people for a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand the historical legacy."⁴⁷ Held in tension, these stories help groups reconstruct feelings of belonging within the nation-state and move "toward mutually acceptable interpretations of those events."⁴⁸

The Waitangi Tribunal helps restore what Gibbs describes as *mana* (status) or balance between the Maori and Pakeha. Restoring *mana* requires that the Tribunal be transformed exclusively from reparation as fulfilling a social contract to reparation as a reconciliation process. Reconciliation, instead of redressing what is due injured groups in purely legal terms, allows "parties to move forward in a relationship of good faith and trust."⁴⁹ The Tribunal as reconciliation brings the Maori and Pakeha to a more equal standing and builds trust and respect between them. Restoring *mana* includes mitigating long-standing prejudice against the Maori, as well as creating strategies to "ensure the cultural survival of the Maori," such as "re-establishing an economic base, return of significant sites, and key institutional power-sharing arrangements."⁵⁰ Understanding the Waitangi Tribunal process as reconciliation recognizes, first, the asymmetrical relationship between these groups, but then, second, works to situate the Maori on a more equal footing with Pakeha to engender significant, political engagement on the meanings of citizenship.

The political process of the Waitangi Tribunal illustrates why the politics of reconciliation is necessary for Pakeha seeking new relationships with the Maori. Two implications become important. First, given that Pakeha desire a new relationship with the Maori—and this entails new forms of democratic citizenship—it is necessary for them to confront their complicity in the colonizing history directly. In the background of the political discourse of citizenship is the colonizing, educational history of the Maori people. This history cannot be sidestepped when the question of citizenship is raised. Doing so would be to ignore the complexity of citizenship experiences within the national story. Thus the Tribunal as a process of reconciliation—a process that not only recognizes Maori educational history, but that also recognizes their aims of decolonization and sovereignty—has become a necessary step to help Pakeha and Maori create new meanings of citizenship and belonging.

The second implication refers to the necessity for official apologies. What the politics of reconciliation necessitates, and what is evident through the Waitangi Tribunal process, is a specific way for Pakeha to publicly apologize for the colonizing policies and practices of the nation-state. Apologizing for the enduring effects of colonization in Maori communi-

ties strengthens the meaning of citizenship within the nation-state. Apologies, according to Gibbs, can go a long way to improve the relationship between the Maori and Pakeha, beginning "the healing process and recognizes tribal mana, authority, power, and identity."⁵¹ An apology by the nation-state signals the validation of the Maori's story of injustice and affirms their identity and recognition as first peoples. Whether these groups become political friends or forgiveness is granted on the part of Maori through the reconciliation process remains undetermined. Critical is that reconciliation and the act of offering an official apology establish the necessary conditions to reconstruct robust meanings of citizenship and belonging from the legacies of cultural genocide.

Conclusion: Implications for Education

Indigenous peoples present unique challenges to democratic nation-states. Histories of colonization reveal a story of citizenship exclusion and marginalization, the impact of which persists into the current social and political milieu. Nation-states seeking political partnerships with Indigenous peoples must find new ways to engage those groups in light of their colonizing histories. The politics of reconciliation provides the political framework necessary for this engagement. Reconciliation opens a dialogical space for nation-states and Indigenous peoples to engage in critical discourse on the impact and legacy of colonization. The direct engagement with colonization in the reconciliation process in turn establishes the conditions for an authentic discourse on new meanings of citizenship to emerge within the public sphere. In what ways might the politics of reconciliation inform educational practice? This paper concludes by offering two strategies on how reconciliation might relate to education more directly and how these strategies might further the aims of decolonization.

The reconciliation process could relate more directly to education, first, by developing the capacity for reconciliation among students through intentional curricular transformations in history textbooks and pedagogical practices. Cole

⁴⁶ For a detailed account of the changing meaning of Maori citizenship, see Louise Humpage, "Revision Required: Reconciling New Zealand Citizenship with Maori Nationalism," *National Identities* 10, 3, 247-261.

⁴⁷ Penetito, "The Struggle to Educate," 295.

⁴⁸ Susan Dwyer, "Reconciliation for Realists," *Report-Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy* 19, 2/3 (1999): 21.

⁴⁹ Gibbs, "Justice as Reconciliation," 25.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁵¹ Meredith Gibbs, "Apology and Reconciliation in New Zealand's Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process," in *The Age of Apology: Facing up to the Past*, eds. Mark Gibney, Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Niklaus Steiner (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 165. Gibbs focuses on the Ngai Tahu and the official apology the Crown made for the historical injustices committed against them. While the tribe received a substantial amount of compensation, many believed that the most important part of the settlement process was the formal apology. For these tribal members, it was the first step in the healing process.

argues that reconciliation cannot be realized among everyday citizens unless education accurately reflects what she calls the “violent past” of nation-states within the history curriculum. States Cole, “new history textbooks and programs can help to establish a new narrative of the nation, including a new portrayal of the self and those previously designated as Other.”⁵² For Cole, teaching the violent past can help students transform the perception of the Other as enemy to equal citizen. The curricular transformation suggested by Cole would move beyond the simple construction of curriculum, such as examining and teaching the basic facts of New Zealand’s history, to one that intentionally utilizes the story of colonization as a pedagogical tool to develop the capacity for reconciliation among students as future citizens.

Another strategy would be to create pathways for the story of exclusion and oppression to emerge among Maori students. Brayboy (2005) proposes a particular vision of critical race theory relevant for Indigenous peoples. Based on a central tenant of critical race theory, which requires researchers “to recognize the experiential knowledge of people of color,”⁵³ Brayboy particularizes this tenant to Indigenous education in what he calls tribal critical race theory.⁵⁴ Tribal critical race theory requires that the stories of Indigenous peoples be seen as legitimate sources of data and be heard in such a way that “value is attributed to them and both the authority and the nuance of stories are understood.”⁵⁵ The connection of storytelling to the politics of reconciliation becomes apparent. Given that dominant groups must be willing to hear the stories of exclusion of historically oppressed social groups, an intentional tribal critical race theory provides the space for Maori students to share their stories of exclusion and have them be taken seriously within dominant educational settings.

These educational strategies will help to further the important task of decolonizing the mind among Maori students. An important claim in decolonization begins with colonized groups becoming aware of the reality of colonization in their daily lives.⁵⁶ The first educational strategy—curricular transformation—establishes a critical space for students to interrogate the history and reality of colonization on the individual, institutional, and cultural levels. Insofar as textbooks and pedagogies include the violent past, Maori students would become aware of the pervasiveness of colonization in their own minds, bodies, and communities. The second educational strategy—the significance of storytelling among Indigenous students—provides the space for Maori students to identify how colonization has permeated their own ways of thinking and being. Sharing stories helps Indigenous students develop the critical consciousness required for their own liberation. Stories become sites of resistance towards colonizing structures, serving as the means by which Indigenous peoples “turn from being subjugated human beings to being liberated human beings.”⁵⁷

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⁵² Cole, “Introduction,” 20.

⁵³ David Gillborn and Deborah Youdell, “Critical Perspectives on Race and Schooling,” in *The Routledge International Companion to Multicultural Education*, ed. James A. Banks (New York: Routledge, 2009), 178.

⁵⁴ Bryan McKinley Jones Brayboy, “Toward a Tribal Critical Race Theory in Education,” *Urban Review* 37, 5 (2005).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 440.

⁵⁶ Indigenous scholars view decolonization as an active process towards Indigenous liberation, describing it as follows: “Decolonization is the intelligent, calculated, and active resistance to the forces of colonialism that perpetuate the subjugation and/or exploitation of our minds, bodies, and lands, and it is engaged for the ultimate purpose of overturning the colonial structure and realizing Indigenous liberation.” See Waziyatawin and Michael Yellow Bird, “Beginning Decolonization,” in *For Indigenous Eyes Only: A Decolonization Handbook*, eds. Angela Cavender Wilson and Michael Yellow Bird (Santa Fe: School of American Research, 2005), 2.

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