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University of Tennessee School of Law

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People have often asked me why I chose to become a law teacher rather than practice the law. For the past two years my answers have usually been somewhat guarded, but until this past year I was not aware of the reason for the caution. During my developmental leave which ended July 1, 1981, it was my privilege to serve as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard Law School. I also taught a course at Boston University in Professional Responsibility two days each week. The contrast between teaching and research on the one hand and working as a dean was never sharper. I discovered that in some respects deanng is more akin to the practice of law than to the lonely but splendid work of the study and the classroom.

Practicing law and the administration of an institution are similar in the sense that both involve the management of the events and affairs that structure the lives of people. And in this sense, among others, both callings are important and demanding work. And, of course, the application of ideas to these events and affairs, their testing, modification and sometimes rejection or reformulation — all play a significant part in the role of the lawyer and the academic leader. What is not as substantial a part of such work, for many of us caught up in the daily swirl of events, is the generation and development of new ideas. I am not saying that practicing lawyers and deans do not need, have, or use ideas in their work, plenty of them. Rather, I am suggesting that the crystallizing process which evolves an idea with important and defensible implications for others is one, I have rediscovered to my frustration and delight, which requires protracted thinking. It is also desirable if in this process one commits to writing the essentials of the idea, then discusses or argues it with others, and then reviews the idea all over again. What I am describing is essentially the collegial process — ideally — of the university community, the law school not excepted.

The luxury of this past year was the time to think deeply about the work of one's classroom, to reflect on the questions raised during class, research some of them further, and weave these reflections into subsequent classes. This is the single most obvious contrast to the lawyer who also serves as a dean or other administrator. This teaching cycle also provided me with one of my major time and effort-structuring devices.

It is too soon to say whether I have begun the process which may ripen into even one new idea, good or bad. At the least I was, during this time away from the affairs of institutional management, consciously embarked upon a search for one or more ideas in the realm of professional ethics. What concerned me is the relative paucity in the literature of the subject, until quite recently, of explicit connections between the rather specific do's and don'ts of the Code of Professional Responsibility (or the older Canons for that matter) on the one hand and the more general ideas and ideals of broader ethical thought. For instance, are there justifications that appeal to the ethicist or social philosopher as readily as do those of our professional code to us as lawyers such practices as not revealing the confidences of the client, especially in the absence of a request for compelled testimony in a court of law? One of the lines of inquiry I have begun to pursue involves the consciousness, both among lawyers themselves and among

(Continued on Page 5)
SOME ADVICE FROM A SHADE TREE LAWYER

(Editor's note: Col. Tom Elam, class of '31, addressed the March graduates at the hooding ceremony and consented to a reprint of his remarks.)

You may never have heard of a "shade tree" lawyer, but you are looking at one, as I have actually tried cases on more than one occasion before a Justice of the Peace at his home or on his farm in the country, and court was held under the trees in his front yard.

On one occasion, I very vigorously objected to certain evidence upon the ground that it was hearsay, and the Squire said, "I know it is, but I want to hear it."

When I attended the University law school almost 50 years ago, I think we had maybe 40 or 50 in the entire law school, a handful of professors, and it seems to me about 3 classrooms. I remember one occasion when the then Dean Whitham declared classes for the day adjourned due to the malodorous condition of the premises, which had been occasioned by a few indolent characters, desiring a day off, and who had planted a heavy dose of hydrogen sulphide in the lower area of the building.

About all I remember from my class on wills was the alleged testament of an old-timer in the Knoxville area, reputedly a matter of record in the Probate Court at the old courthouse, as follows, "In the name of God, amen. A featherbed to my wife named Jen, and also my saw and hammer, but if she marries again, then goddamn her."

No student in my day will ever forget the panic, terrors, and frustrations induced by the wicked cross-examinations of a professor by the name or Harold Warner, later Dean, and a tremendous fellow, but one who also reminded his students that, when they entered the portals of his class, all friendship ceased.

When I started the practice of law in Union City, where I have remained ever since, with the exception of my military service for six years in World War II, it was in the middle of the depression and, as they say, times were hard. My expenses were something like this: secretary, $40.00 per month; rent, $10.00; telephone, $7.50.

My first set of Tennessee Reports cost $200.00, and that included the cases in which to put them.

Remuneration was in line with expenses. A full-blown abstract, with each title instrument documented, together with preparation of deed of trust and note, carried a fee of $15.00; a continuation, $7.50; a warranty deed, $5.00; and we had a minimum of $2.50 for advice and consultation.

We undertook to get $25.00 for a divorce, but I have taken a cow on one occasion for a fee, and a couple of pigs on another occasion; and I still have an old double-barreled shotgun, which was my only compensation for some other similar work.

The following observations relate to some basic principles which I believe are essential to success in the practice:

1. I take it for granted that all lawyers, young, or old, expect to work hard, long and diligently; otherwise, they are in the wrong business.

2. Prepare yourself for any problem, trial or otherwise, with all the zeal, skill, and ability at your command. I once thought cases could be over-prepared — rubbish — the harder you work, the more likely an attorney will see the problem and develop what is necessary to help your client, or perhaps carry the day in court, if it goes to trial. By all means, read and know the problem.

3. Respect the Courts. They are wrong at times, but seldom venal. Courtesy is never misplaced and certainly not with a judge. More than likely, he will respond in kind. Never mislead him or abuse his confidence.

4. Take nothing for granted and undertake to anticipate every possible eventuality. If you think you have a case you can't lose, it's a good idea to look at it again.

5. Never try to mislead a jury, as all jurors consider themselves to be detectives and quite often they may be smarter than the lawyer, certainly in some areas. Select them with care and give consideration to their background, station in life, and any other factor which may enter into their decision in any particular case. I have read many magic formulas on the art of jury selection, but this is something I think a lawyer learns only by experience. If you get a wild verdict, you can fairly accurately conclude that there was room for improvement in what you did. Sometimes, careful as you may be, you may irritate or offend a juror and this may prove disastrous.

6. Never ask a question unless you know the answer. There are exceptions — he has killed you by his testimony, then you can "give it to him" and take your chances; otherwise, let him alone.

7. Although many lawyers disagree, I think interrogatories are useless except in technical situations, questions of identity and jurisdiction, or when information is available in no other manner. It is well to remember that opposing counsel will have the opportunity to shape answers to reveal no more than he is required to do under professional and ethical compulsion.

Discovery is far preferable, as it opens more doors and leads to an evaluation of the witness, but it is also a two-edged sword.

8. The law, as we practice it today, is and probably has always been partisan in nature, or what we refer to as the adversary system. This means a lawyer fights to the last for his client until he prevails, or until sound judgment dictates another course. It does not mean that he has to misbehave in the process, or belittle or ridicule his opponent. If he belittles or mimics anyone in court, let that person be himself. It does not involve any misuse of the twin jewels of our profession, which are integrity and responsibility — but, partisan always.

In spite of what one may find in Ecclesiastes 9:11, I think the race usually goes to the swift and the battle to the strong.

Consequently, never forsake your principles or leave a task unfinished, FOR:

"On the fields of desolation rests the bones of countless thousands who, on the verge of victory, sat down to rest and resting died."
HAZEN MOORE: A Truly "International" Lawyer

He was born in Japan, the son of a U.S. Air Force serviceman. Three months later, his family moved back to the states. He grew up far from the shores of Japan and attended high school in Nashville, where his parents still reside. But the Japanese culture always held a fascination for Hazen Moore, and his undergraduate and legal studies have led him to cross the Pacific three times, most recently to pursue the Japanese equivalent of the Master of Laws degree at the University of Kyoto, Japan.

In 1975, Hazen earned a B.A. in Political Science with an Asian emphasis at the University of Tennessee. After a year in law school, he received a scholarship from the McClure Fellowship committee to study the Japanese language and to take a course in law at Kansai Gaidai University in Japan. He stayed there for six months, living with a Japanese family. Following another quarter's study at UT College of Law, he worked for NASA for six months, then returned to UT for another year of law school.

With a second McClure Fellowship award, Hazen spent the summer of 1979 taking three semesters of law at the University of Tokyo. He applied and was accepted into the Stanford Language School in Japan for the next year, supported with funds from the Japan Foundation. Through the summer of 1980, he worked for the Kyoto Comparative Law Center, editing the Administrative Law Section of a multi-volume treatise entitled Doing Business in Japan, published by Matthew Bender under the general editorship of Zentaro Kitagawa.

He finished his UT law school studies over the next year, earning the J.D. in March of 1981. Since then, Hazen has worked part-time with UT alums John Harper and Richard Baumgartner in the firm then known as Gilreath, Pryor and Rowland. (See "Alumni News")

Hazen Moore is now back in Japan. A scholarship from Mondusho, the Japanese Department of Law, has made it possible for him to spend the next two and a half years pursuing a Japanese degree in law. Afterwards, he would like to gain some experience in commercial law practice with an American law firm that has a branch office in Japan, with hopes of being transferred to Japan sometime in the near future. With the limited number of such law firms in the U.S., he has set quite a goal for himself. With his experience and dedication, any one of those firms would be lucky to have him.

UT SCORES WELL ON JULY BAR EXAM

The most recent statistics for persons successful in taking the Tennessee bar examination were released in October, and UT graduates again fared quite well.

Of those University of Tennessee graduates who were taking the July, 1981 bar exam for the first time, 99 per cent passed. Five out of ten UT repeaters passed, for an average of 94.7 per cent, compared with the statewide overall passage rate of 86.5 per cent.

August Hooding Features

Dr. Charles Reynolds

Marking his official return to active duty, Dean Kenneth Penegar introduced the featured speaker at August hooding, Dr. Charles Reynolds. Professor and Head of the Department of Religious Studies since 1980, Dr. Reynolds is also an Adjunct Professor of the Department of Philosophy.

His articles have been published in the Journal of Religion and the Harvard Theological Review, and he was principal author of the annually refunded proposal to the Knoxville City Government to support the Rape Crisis Center.

Dean Penegar and Associate Dean Mary Jo Hoover presented the academic hoods to those of the fourteen summer graduates who participated in the ceremony on August 21 in the Moot Court Room.

Dean Penegar, Dr. Reynolds, Associate Dean Hoover.
MOOT COURT TEAMS' ADVISORS RECOGNIZE TEAM ACHIEVEMENTS

LAW WEEK'S DIVERSIONS CULMINATE IN AWARDS BANQUET

This year's LAWN GALA was forced indoors again by the weather, but spirits were high, as indicated by the memorable address by Knoxville attorney Tom McAdams. After ample picnic foods were consumed to the accompaniment of Bluegrass music, a hot tub session and juggling lessons were auctioned off for the benefit of the Allan Novak Fund. A quartet of guinea pigs and a double date with Professors Beverly Rowlett and John Sobieski were also featured items for sale. The talents of our law students were showcased in the LAW FOLLIES the next evening.

On the last day of the Law Week celebration, four students competed in the Advocates Prize Moot Court Competition. Following a luncheon with the judges of the competition, Circuit Court Judge Abner Mikva for the District of Columbia, Judge Damon Keith of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and U.S. District Court Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., the advocates took their turns at the podium.

Finalists Laurel Denton and Kelly Frey of Knoxville made a good case for their side, but Melinda Meador of Gleason, Tennessee and John Doyle of Murfreesboro were the victors. Their award was presented at the SBA banquet that night. Melinda J. Branscomb was selected as Outstanding Graduate of the Year. The winner of the Harold Warner Outstanding Teacher Award was Professor John Sobieski.

The many other students who distinguished themselves on moot court teams and otherwise academically were also given special recognition. The evening concluded in dancing and served as an appropriate end to another exhilarating Law Week.
"CLINICAL EDUCATION IN ITS PRIME"

Luncheon Address
Association of American Law Schools
1981 Annual Meeting, Section on Clinics

Kenneth L. Penegar
Dean and Professor of Law
The University of Tennessee

(Insert, Alumni Headnotes, Vol 10, Issue 1)
Grant Gilmore gave the Storr's lectures at Yale in 1978 and published these under the title The Ages of American Law. He la­
mented the spate of historiography about law in the recent decade. He says that when people turn to the past, they have lost faith in the future. I do not think that need be the case, and I do not think it is true for legal education, certainly not for the dynamic clinical side of it, which is my subject today. The reason I mentioned Grant Gilmore is that I borrow a page from his idea about the ages of American law.

My topic is "Clinical Education in its Prime." First I undertake a very brief historical journey with you, going through CLEPR's last report highlighting some of the things that are both positive and negative. There is a price to pay for the encouragement that we can take from the short history of clinical education, and the price is a series of new tensions which I want to describe for you and comment upon. Secondly, I find the meaning of clinical education, unlike some of its detractors within American legal education more broadly conceived, I find the meaning crystal clear and very exhilarating. And thirdly, I think that there is a new coinage for old ideals in legal education through the clinical model.

Very briefly, let me look with you at CLEPR's '78-'79 report. In summing up, the report says this review began with a question, "Could CLEPR over a ten-year span, and with limited resources, establish clinical methodology as a permanent, respected, and effective element of legal education?" The answer at the end of the fifth biennium, i.e. the ten years, must be an ambivalent both yes and no. The indicators are: One, from a handful of law schools with clinical programs for credit in 1969, the number had grown to include almost every law school in the country. I am not sure what that weasell word "almost" means, but a lot more have them than don't have them, presumably. Secondly, there has been an increase of 185% in the number of credit-granting clinical programs, an increase of 320% (I did not think anything went up like that except paper and the price of air travel) in the number of fields of law in which there are clinical offerings. Clinical legal education can no longer be labeled as a poverty law, the report says; there are also clinical programs in administrative law, antitrust, securities law, environmental law, family law, immigration law, women's rights, to name a few. Tax law clinics at three law schools with clinical programs for credit in 1976, are now of the law school-operated type. No, because as, they quote, Professor Gordon Gee, now Dean, writing in his introduction to this survey, "Clinical legal education in many corners within the legal community is still on trial. Even with its phenomenal success it must prove itself every day, a burden which will seem entirely unfair," and then he says, "the indicators are there has not been sufficient integration of clinical programs into the curriculum, most schools still put a fairly low maximum allowable credit limitation on clinical work, and thirdly, clinical teachers have not received parity in tenure track appoint­ments and so on with so-called academic teachers." On the bright side, Gee concludes that the critical issue is financing.

This progress has been achieved at the expense of the creation of some tensions. Tensions are not altogether unhealthy; they can increase our strength. Certainly, that is true in a pluralistic society like our own. One of the things that I want to put to rest at the outset is a false kind of issue, the one that many of our critics posit as the conflict between craft on the one hand and development of theory and philosophy about law on the other. I think that is a spurious non-issue, and I cite as the best evidence of that the fact that during this same decade, in which the clinical movement has grown so rapidly and developed so wide a scope that also during the same time law schools have greatly expanded their courses and seminars in jurispru­dence, legal philosophy and theory of the law generally. Whatever the connection between these two developments, the clinical movement does not appear to have hurt or diminished the more theoretical and philosophical traditions of legal education in America. But the tension, I think, can be pinpointed more specifically than that, and the one I want to address with you in my time here really relates to something that a great law teacher and respected friend of mine, Frank Allen, has written. An article of his has enjoyed such influence that I think it deserved head-on confrontation. This is his piece entitled, "The New Anti-Intellectualism in American Legal Educa­tion." He wrote this in the Mercer Law Review of 1977:

"The issues raised by the new intellectualism cannot be charac­terized as a conflict between clinical and classroom instruction. The incontestable fact is that both clinical and traditional instruction can be trivial or profound, can serve broad social and humanitarian goals or the narrowest of goals. Indeed, properly conceived and executed clinical programs advance the higher edu­cation educational aspirations and support the objectives of classroom instruction. So far so good. In other words, people who purported to find a lot of ammunition for at­tacking clinical education in Allen's article would seem to have been misinformed. But he continues, "Nevertheless, candor requires it to be said that certain aspects of the clinical movement have contributed to the rise of the new intellectualism." Allen discusses five factors which, in his view, make for a lowered esteem for the clinical movement as it has developed in the last decade or so. As I understand his points, they are: One, the grounds sometimes used to justify clinical educa­tion in the American law school scene sound very much like those grounds advanced by people on the outside of our craft. He does not identify them, but I take it he means people like those serving on the Clare and Devitt committees and those rule-makers in Indiana who established the new admission rules there — perhaps also Chief Justice Burger and others, I don't know for he does not identify them. He says it appears that some of the defenders within our midst sound too much like those obvious philistines on the outside. Second, he says there is a rank competition for resources, and for a place in the curriculum. And third, that there is often a lack of supervision of clinical programs. And fourth, there is a triviality of much of the work done, failure to grasp and deal with larger social issues, and fifth, there is downright hostility on the part of some clinicians to empirical research. Well, I think those reasons are insubstantial. The second, third, and fourth, I think all of us probably in this room would agree that something needs to be done about. Some of the work is trivial, some of the programs are relatively unsupervised, and so on. Sure, there is a competition for resources, sure there is a competition for a place in the sun of the curriculum of American law schools.

For the first reason, I would suppose that Frank Allen would be the best candidate to distinguish a good argument from a poor one. And as to the fifth, hostility toward empirical research, I think it grossly unfair to pick on clinical professors when it is not exactly a favorite theme of most teachers in law schools in America. Now, has it been even after the Realists started inviting us, cajoling us to get outside the library and into the world. Well, there is a...
deeper concern, voiced by Frank Allen. He finds that the clinical movement grew out of a reformist tradition whose concerns are larger than clinical education or law practice narrowly conceived. He said, "But to the extent that the reformist zeal in the movement encompasses more than the problems of law practice narrowly conceived (whatever that is), the movement may be founded on an ideology and policy imperatives that are inapplicable and that remain unexamined and are indeed undisclosed." So there, I think, is the real bugbear for Frank Allen! We are hiding some ideology. What is it? What is it we are sitting on that so disturbs the traditionalists in our midst in the law school world?

A More Positive Appraisal

I want to shift very quickly from that rather negative assessment. I shall return implicitly to some of these themes in what follows: But I want to offer my own personal testament, if you will, to the professional and institutional significance and meaning of clinical education, especially in law because I know more about that. To my mind, the most distinctive element of clinical education, and I find it to be true in law at least, is the necessity for engagement, the necessity for both the student and the teacher to engage other human beings, be they participants in the formal systems of the law or otherwise, engagement, commitment and involvement. And this posture, which I think is both intellectual in character as well as moral and of the spirit, really, is in sharp contrast to the stance offered traditionally by other features of the American law school. The stance here, traditionally, has been one of disengagement, of objectivity, standing back; the values are brought to the scene only by the client, perhaps by the student, but never clearly and fully dealt with in the classroom, as they have to be in the clinical setting everyday. Well, I think from this detached stance, one can see how the philosophy of law in our law schools has been characterized for the longer term. According to one very old orthodoxy, the law is a science; accordingly the study of law is a science. It is value free according to this tradition. It is at the service of any group or any person who chooses to seize or use its institution.

It seems to me the prospect and the great promise of clinical education in law, and I think it is being realized in this very decade in which you and I live and work, exists on two levels. Number one, the law schools emerge for the first time as a social institution in their own right. That is, people who have nothing to do with work, exists on two levels. Number one, the law schools emerge for the first time as a social institution in their own right. That is, people who have nothing to do with work and others are given an explicitly professional thrust to their training in the formative years. And secondly, the necessity of the professional thrust of "service" of others.

New the question of course has to be answered, one that you would want to address, seems to me is what kind of professionalism are we talking about? That term is one that is easily bandied about and given very different, subjective meanings. To my mind the dominant professional idea of our age is a corollary of what I call laissez faire utilitarianism. Now the corollary runs like this: that the lawyer serves the public good by serving individual interests zealously. Isn't that basically the ethic that we inherited as lawyers? You have only to look at such things as the Code of Professional Responsibility to see how that is chiseled in stone, if you will, that idea, that ethic. Charles Fried has even given moral foundation to it in an article called "The Lawyer as Friend: Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship." Richard Wassertrom has given another gloss to it in his article in Human Rights, dealing with role morality.** We have something different from general morality, we have role morality, which we can stand behind and let the client and the client's interests determine or the bad of certain actions that we take on behalf of that client. I think this is a heady time in which to be discussing these issues because the Kutak Commission arguably looks in a different direction, from that ethic of the lawyer serving the common good by serving individual interests zealously. What I am suggesting here is that the whole idea of professionalism is being reinvestigated, reconceptualized, redefined, at a time when clinical education is there, when it is fully developed, when it is ready to do some things, I suggest, it could be doing to maximize its opportunity. This is where clinical education directly challenges the older, value free, or neutral stance of law in law schools.

The challenge is to the capacity of the older model to serve a complex age. This is not a radical departure, probably not even a departure at all, from even older ideals and ideas. The very term professional, or professionalism, is capable of multiple meanings, and I refer here to that excellent article by William Simon, "Ideology of Advocacy" in the Wisconsin Law Review, in 1978. Consider in that vein this judgment, not of a lawyer, but of a historian, Burton Bluestein, at the University of Illinois, who has written a book called The Culture of Professionalism. The book's thesis is that professionalism as we know them in this century are the fruit of the middle class's efforts in the 19th century to gain personal advance through the creation of a meritocracy, in which the university becomes the primary facilitative institution. He writes in that book:

"The question for Americans is how does society make professional behavior accountable to the public without curtailing the independence upon which creative skills, the imagination and the imaginative use of knowledge depend. The culture of professionalism has allowed Americans to achieve educated expressions of freedom and self-realization, yet it has also allowed the perfect educated techniques of fraudulence and deceit."

In medicine, law, education, business, government, the ministry, all the proliferating services middle-class Americans thrive on, who shall draw the fine line between competent services and corruption? Too harsh a judgment? Too ill-informed an observer? Well then consider someone a little closer to our own bailiwick, Morton Horowitz, a legal historian. He says, in another context,

"The desire to separate law and politics has always been a central aspiration of the American legal profession. Politics in American thought has usually represented power and will, the clash of interests and the subjectivity of values. Law, on the other hand, has been the only plausible claimant to the role of objectivity and political neutrality."

"The special power of the legal profession," Horowitz continues, "in American society has always been grounded in some theory of the distinctively objective and autonomous nature of Law." Horowitz goes on to conclude in the Transformation of American Law, that law is, of course, politically based. And probably our eighteenth century predecessors in law knew this better than those in the nineteenth. It would seem that we in the twentieth century have been captured by our own mythology. I cite as a supporting proposition for that statement the evidence of the New York state bar, which recently in considering the Kutak revision proposals, soundly defeated the proposals on the rationale, according to the New York Times, that number one, lawyers should not be coerced to virtue by giving services pro bono publico to anyone they do not choose to give it to, and secondly, because certain features of the Kutak revision would require the lawyer to "rat" on his client. Surely, this is a vestige of that older ethic I earlier invoked.

But legal principles are also normatively based. Work in the clinic involves moral choices everyday. It seems to me this is where we can talk profitably about the new coinage in American legal education. But there are, it seems to me, two traps to be wary of. One of them, and I give Frank Allen his due on this point, is the trap of the "is," that is of being so concerned with current features of practice that we hold...
that up as some kind of implicit model for what might be rather than inventing a new alternative to the "is" of current practice to which our students are introduced. And the second is simply the other side of a related old coin, namely, the trivializing and dispiriting cultivation of skills without theory of purpose to me if we are genuinely trying to avoid that double-sided trap we shall have to build larger models to integrate the present raw materials. Not as if we were making some kind of salad, but simply beginning with larger frameworks, larger conceptions. I believe a book by Gary Bellow and Beau Moulton, Lawyering Process, is way ahead of its time. I find it thoroughly stimulating, and if there is one practical suggestion I could make, it is that we write more books like that. To stimulate not only our fellow faculty members and our students, but the Frank Allen of our calling as well across the country, so they will know what we are about.

Let me suggest in summary fashion some modest steps for transition from where we are to that sunnier prime of clinical education in law. Under this heading, about five or six suggestions, they appear in a particular order really just as they occurred to me. But basically, the overarching theme is to be more speculative. First, experiment more! For instance, find ways to simplify the law or at least access to it. Why cannot we devise handbooks, for example, which would allow the client to ring her or his own name by resort to the clerk of the court rather than using a lawyer's service at all. Simple complaints in the small claims courts, instructing public groups on how to do that efficaciously without the use of lawyers or other advisors. Have public evaluation sessions not only on the substance of the law as our clinic, for example does on old age benefits, but also on the employment, engagement and intelligent use of professionals, including lawyers. Ours is an increasingly professional age as Bledstein is telling us. Do we really know how effectively to use professionals?

Secondly, stimulate the creation of coherent information about the law and its institutions in your community. So much of law practice can be who you know to do the thing that needs to be done for your client. Do you have in your community a ready reference for all the authorities by subject matter, available in public hands and so on?

Third, develop tests or applications of major hypotheses that we gain from social science literature more broadly. For example, the significance of organizations, both as users and recipients of law to use the terminology of Donald Black. He has shorn it. It seems to me if we were aware of Law ways in which results may be predicted by, among other factors, whether individuals or organizations are involved as litigants. Now you know from your own practical experience, the more likely you are as an individual litigant to face an organization on the other side, the more likely the other side is going to win. All right, let us consider organizing some of the people and groups who are your regular clients. What about organizing the families whose children are regularly before the juvenile court? Rather than just having a friends-of-the-juvenile-court kind of experience group, perhaps we should not organize the families themselves who are the consumers of the services of the juvenile court authorities. You can readily think of other examples.

Fourth, explicitly and consciously experiment with team services for your clientele, not only with other lawyers, which I know you do anyway, but with other professionals, social workers, psychologists, and the like.

Fifth, try to build some case histories. It really astonishes me that we have had clinics for ten years and longer, but we have not yet seen real casebooks in which the experiences of your clientele and your lawyers in your clinics are put together between the covers of books. Now they may not deserve hard covers immediately, but think of the rich variety of cases that come to you. Rather than use hypotheticals all the time, and I am not suggesting an exclusive "tele" kind of thinking, but could we not test some strategies and tactics, the use of this statute, that precedent, this device, that forum, by a sampling of that rich variety of cases that come into your clinic daily? I find as a teacher of Professional Responsibility that the students who are concurrently taking courses in clinic have enormously valuable experience for my classes. They bring insights into the importance of which they do not fully appreciate until we drop them on the table, develop them and talk about them extensively in our seminar.

Sixth, expand the clinic's reach for clients beyond the poor. CLEPR's report suggests a steady movement in that direction already. For example, the tax and bankruptcy possibilities. Let me suggest another, maybe not so obvious, possibility. Service to public agencies, State agencies, particularly those dealing with welfare, prisons, and other human/social services, are often in need of good ideas, independent advice. You can be of enormous assistance to a state administrator who is well-disposed to get fresh ideas, critiques, and evaluations.

Seventh, help stimulate the creation of new and community-based institutions for resolution of disputes without resorting to lawyers and the courts.

Eighth, consider alternatives to the traditional model of lawyer professionalism, whether yours is of the Monroe Freedman variety or Charles Fried. Again, I cite William Onion's article in which he concludes that maybe to avoid the difficulties and restraints of that old ethic we simply may have to have a non-professional model, by which he means that you have to judge the morality of your advice to a client, not on whether he or she thinks it is right or desirable on the client's value scheme, and you can hide behind that on the role morality idea, but rather whether together you can evaluate the outcome as a morally defensible concept as a human being would do, whether you are a licensed lawyer or not, that is, unshielded by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In short, the clinic should be a place and an experience where one looks beyond the contemporary "is" of our society and explores some possible preferred future practices. I do not mean to imply any surrender of values or older ideas, but rather, on the contrary, to re-emphasize those while taking account rather consciously of contemporary trends which seem to me to erode those old values. For example, and I cite only four of such trends that underpin the suggestions I just made you. One is the constant assault on human dignity in our society. Welfare searches, and, more recently, the general strip-search in police departments of urban settings of America. Secondly, an increasingly bureaucratic state, an accompanying estrangement from traditional institutions including personhood. And fourth, the rise and growth of very large organizations which affect our lives without any corresponding ability on our part to affect their development and reach. A very modest illustration in our part of the country, the Tennessee Valley Authority recently appointed private counsel, one of them formerly director of our legal clinic, to be a kind of ombudsman, to be a spokesperson for consumer groups on rate-setting for the Tennessee Valley Authority in its production of electricity and sale to local utilities.

In conclusion, it seems to me the future challenge of clinical education is not just an integration of theory with practice, as important as that idea is, it is not just service to the poor and others ill-served by lawyers and legal institutions, as important as that is. Rather it is to find and develop new definitions, new conceptions of practice and professionalism in which new definitions and conceptions give proper scope, proper reflection to the complexities of our age. To put the idea differently, it seems to me the clinical educator is in a unique position, and because of that position, has a unique responsibility to bridge the gap between law and its traditional conservatism on the one hand and the frankly pragmatic, spiritual idealism of many of its practitioners including the future lawyers who sit at your feet through three years of law school.

Clinical Education
In Its Prime

By Kenneth L. Penegar
laymen, which our literature, especially the highly normative literature of such materials as the CPR, has generated by which one frames the debate about such questions. And what are the sources of the normative ideas contained within the Code and related literature? At some point one must take rather explicit account of social theory in the search for seminal influences in this intellectual tradition. What seems relatively clear to me at this point in my search is that too little attention has been paid to the social designs which are immanent within the various professional codes, that is, we have neglected a vision of the kind of society we want. Of course there are assumptions, but in all fairness most of them are never made explicit. The debate about a new code, accordingly, is only half a debate when the larger social implications are not identified, projected, and discussed.

It is an exciting time to be thinking about such matters. The ABA, for instance, has before it a complete revision of the CPR. Lawyers everywhere engaged in the debate about it are aware, perhaps more keenly than ever before, of the scrutiny which thoughtful non-lawyers will bring to bear on this effort. At the same time the nation as a whole appears to be embarked on a similar search for new social and political ideas, or at least a reassessment of older ones. The elaborate structure of liberalism as a set of ideas — political, legal, social — is undergoing the most rigorous scholarly and popular testing and examination of this generation at least and perhaps of this century. What better time to be embarked on the enterprise of the articulation and development of ideas. Ironically, this is a time, we are told, when society values the cloister little but the market much; yet, how valuable some new ideas will be to that society.

Hal Wellford, Chairperson of Moot Court Board, draws reactions from Judge Wise­man and Acting Dean Kirby.

The autographed football went to Acting Dean Kirby; Placement Director Sandy O’Rourke calls for bids.

Professor Neil Cohen offers lessons in juggling.

And the band played on . . .

Judge Damon Keith adds his comments, with smiles from Judge Wiseman and Acting Dean Kirby.

Judge Abner Mikva inspires deep thoughts in the minds of Kate Ambrose and Judge Wiseman.
EARLY RECRUITING AT GEORGE C. TAYLOR

With the advent of Fall Semester at the end of August came an early Fall Recruiting Season. On-campus interviewing began September 1st and continues in full swing. Below is a partial listing of the legal employers with whom the Office of Career Planning and Placement has coordinated interviews thus far. Although the

fall is a most active recruiting period, the Office of Career Planning and Placement continues to coordinate interviews and provide employment resources throughout the year.

Sandra S. O'Rourke, Director
Office of Career Planning & Placement

On-Campus Interviewers

Armstrong, Allen, Braden, Goodman, McBride & Prewitt, Memphis, TN
Arthur Andersen & Company, Knoxville, TN
Baker, Worthington, Crossley, Stansberry & Woolf, Knoxville, TN
Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, TN
Bernstein, Susano, Stair & Cohen, Knoxville, TN
Bone and Woods, Nashville, TN
Bout, Cummings, Connors & Berry, Knoxville, TN
Chambiss, Bahner, Crutchfield, Gaston & Irvine, Chattanooga, TN
The Honorable Lewis H. Conner, Jr., Nashville, TN
Daniel, Harvit, Batson and Nolan, Clarksville, TN
Dennis, Corby, Webb, Carollo and Williams, Atlanta, GA
Donelson, Stokes and Bartholomew, Nashville, TN
Egerton, McAfee, Armstead & Davis, P.C., Knoxville, TN
Frantz, McConnell & Seymour, Knoxville, TN
Gearshier, Peters & Horton, Chattanooga, TN
Gulf Oil, Sanford & Robinson, Nashville, TN
Harris, Shelton, Dunlap & Cobb, Memphis, TN
Harrell, Bell, Martin & Sloan, Nashville, TN
Hayswoth, Baldwin & Miles, Greenville, SC
Heiskel, Donelson, Adams, Williams & Kirsch, Memphis, TN
Howard University School of Law — REGIONAL
HEBER SMITH Fellowship, Cookeville, TN
Hunter, Smith and Davis, Kingsport, TN
Huntz, Knott & Williams, Richmond, VA
Kinnerly, Montgomery, Howard & Finley, Knoxville, TN
King, Balfour & Little, Nashville, TN
Kullman, Lang, Inman & Bee, New Orleans, LA
Laughlin, Halle, Clark & Gibson, Memphis, TN
Leitner, Warner, Owens, Moffitt, Williams & Dooley, Chattanooga, TN
Lockridge & Becker, Knoxville, TN
Long, Aldridge, Hener, Stevens & Sumner, Atlanta, GA
Lowndes, Drozdick & Doster, Orlando, FL
Manier, White, Herod, Holbbauge & Smith, P.C., Nashville, TN
Marks, Marks & Carter, Clarksville, TN
Martin, Tate, Morrow & Marston, P.C., Memphis, TN
Miller & Martin, Chattanooga, TN
Mitchell, Mitchell, Copedge, Borlett & Bates, Dalton, GA
James W. Pannell, Franklin, TN
The Honorable James Parrott, Philadelphia, PA
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Nashville, TN
Penn, Stuart, Eskridge & Jones, Abingdon, VA
Smith Currie & Hancock, Atlanta, GA
Somers & Altenbach, Atlanta, GA
Stephelo, Caldwell & Heggie, Chattanooga, TN
Strang, Fletcher, Carriger, Atlanta, GA
Sommers & Altenbach, Atlanta, GA
Stephelo, Caldwell & Heggie, Chattanooga, TN
Strang, Fletcher, Carriger, Walker, Hodge & Smith, Chattanooga, TN
U.S. Army (JAGC), Ft. Campbell, KY
Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, TN
Waldrop, Farmer, Todd & Breen, Jackson, TN
Woods, Rugers, Mace, Walker & Thornton, Roanoke, VA
Walter Lansden Dortch & Davis, Nashville, TN
Waring, Cox, Sklar, Allen, Chatlet & Watson, Memphis, TN
Wildman, Hanford, Allen, Dixon & McDonnell, Memphis, TN
Witt, Gatlher & Whikelater, Chattanooga, TN

Southeastern Law Placement Consortium Employers

This Annual Recruitment Program held in Atlanta is sponsored cooperatively by ten Southeastern Law Schools and affords a unique and convenient recruitment opportunity for legal employers across the country.

Adams, Duque & Hazeltein, Los Angeles, CA
Akerman, Serteerlitz & Edson, Orlando, FL
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Washington, DC
Andrews, Kurth, Campbell & Jones, Houston, TX
Arent, Fox, Kintner, Polin & Kahn, Washington, DC
Baker and Botts, Washington, DC
Cafette, Hesler & Griswold, Cleveland, Ohio
Chafee, Forberbach, Beck & Guyton, Houston, TX
Foreman & Dyess, Houston, TX
Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banner, Tampa, FL
Freytag, Marshall, Benaie, Laforce, Rubenstein & Shulman, Los Angeles, CA
Greenbaum, Dolt & McDonald, Louisville, KY
Hahn, Loesser, Friedman, Dean & Wellman, New York, NY
Henkel, Hackett, Edge & Fleming, Atlanta, GA
Holland & Knight, Tampa, FL
Holme, Roberton & Owen, Denver, CO
Hughes & Hill, Dallas, TX
Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, Atlanta, GA
Jenkins & Gilchrist, Houston, TX
Johnson, Swanson & Barbree, Dallas, TX
Johnston, Adams, Watcher, Rotlevent, Carrere & Deerege, New Orleans, LA
Jones, Bird & Howell, Atlanta, GA
Jones, Walker, Walchler, Portalvnt, Camera & Dereege, New Orleans, LA
Kimbbie, Hamann, Jennings, Womack, Carlson & Kriskern, P.A., Miami, FL
Leonard, Koehn, Rose & Hutt, P.C., Dallas, TX
Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, AZ
Mahoney, Haddow & Adams, Jacksonvile, FL
Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, CA
Nelson, Mullins & Crier, Columbia, SC
Oglethor, Dements, Smoak, Stewart & Edwards, Atlanta, GA
Pepper, Hamilton & Gheutch, Philadelphia, PA
Porter & Clements, Houston, TX
Rain, Harrell, Emery, Young & Doke, Dallas, TX
Robins, Zele, Lakin & Kaplan, Minneapolis, MN
Rudnick & Wolfe, Chicago, IL
Scoggin, Ivey, Goodman & Weiss, Atlanta, GA
Shaw, Pitman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, DC
Shaw, Spangler & Roth, Denver, CO
Shearman & Sterling, New York
Siroe, Permut, Friend, Friedman, Held & Apolinsky, Birmingham, AL
Smith & Hulsey, Jacksonville, FL
Stephle & Johnson, Washington, DC
Strasburger & Price, Dallas, TX
Stribf, Lang, Weeks & Cardon, Phoenix, AZ
Thompson & Knight, Dallas, TX
Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Atlanta, GA
U.S. Steel, Tax Department, Pittsburgh, PA
Vinson & Elkins, Houston, TX and Washington, DC
Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Trimble, Dallas, TX
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Winston-Salem, NC
Worsham, Forsythe & Sampsell, Dallas, TX

WHY DO WE FEAR JUSTICE?

Quoting from Aristotle, James Madison, and Learned Hand, Robert McKay explored the reasoning behind "The Fear of Justice" in the second Charles H. Miller Lecture in Professional Responsibility. He discussed the complex nature of the instrumentalities of justice, the courts and the lawyers, and the difficulties in understanding the laws themselves. His conclusion was that "something has gone wrong."

For instance, Professor McKay suggested that attorneys as a group have fallen short in the effort to provide legal services to the poor. The right to counsel is not assured in civil matters as it is in criminal cases, and legal services personnel have been criticized as activists bringing cases against "the administration" and for being successful. Reduced funding for legal services is a critical problem. There is no support among the organized American bar for requiring that attorneys provide a certain amount of pro bono service. As a result, the definition of "justice" appears as elusive as ever before.

Professor McKay is Director of the Institute for Judicial Administration at New York University and Director of the Justice Program of the Aspen Institute for Humanities Studies. The lecture series is funded partially by an endowment from Professor Emeritus Charles H. Miller, former Director of the UT Legal Clinic, and partially by other donations to the College of Law. The lecture was delivered on May 13th in the Moot Court Room before an audience of students, faculty, and practicing attorneys.

Professor Robert B. McKay
class of '69
ROBERT PRYOR and FRANK FLYNN recently celebrated the opening of their new law offices in Suite 600, 706 Walnut Street, Knoxville, Tennessee 37901.

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class of '73
DICK JERMAN, JR., was sworn in as his father's replacement as Judge of the 13th Circuit on March 2. Governor Lamar Alexander made the appointment when Judge Dick Jerman, Sr., retired in February.

B. WAUGH CRIGLER has been appointed United States Magistrate for the Western District of Virginia in Charlottesville.

Crigler, a principal in the Culpeper firm of Davies, Crigler, Barrett & Will, P.C. of Culpeper, Virginia, graduated from Washington & Lee University in 1970 and received his J.D. from UT. He clerked for the Honorable Robert L. Taylor in U.S. District Court, Knoxville, before entering private practice in Culpeper.

He is immediate past president of the Culpeper Bar and currently a member of the Executive Committee of the Virginia Bar Association Young Lawyers Section. Crigler chaired the Section's Criminal Law and Corrections Committee and is co-chairman of the ASA Young Lawyer's Community Projects Committee. He is married to the former Anne Kendall, Hollins '70, and they have three children.

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class of '74
Murfreesboro attorney BART GORDON was recently elected Chairman of the Tennessee Democratic Party.

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class of '77
JOHN HARBER has become associated with the recently organized law firm of Pryor & Flynn in Knoxville.

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class of '78
ROBERT J. KRAEMER, JR. has opened a law office in the Westwood Building at 5616 Kingston Pike in Knoxville. He was a former staff attorney in the Public Law Institute.

GAIL (BOWLING) GOOD and ED GOOD have returned to Knoxville from Reno, Nevada to pursue their medical studies. Ed Good is working part-time for the firm of Pryor & Flynn, and he and Gail will soon be applying to medical school.

* 

class of '80
Formerly Staff Attorney in charge of the Public Law Institute's Traffic Law Education program, HARVEY GOODMAN has now opened an office in downtown Knoxville.

The members of the Chattanooga firm of Leitner, Warner, Owens, Moffitt, Williams & Dooley have announced that JOHN B. CURTIS, JR. and GREGORY M. LEITNER have become associated with them in the general practice of law.

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College of Trial Advocacy 1981 Breeds Success

Faculty Member Richard Speight demonstrates a closing argument.

For the fifth successive and successful year, the Continuing Legal Education Program presented aspiring and experienced trial lawyers an opportunity to fine tune their advocacy skills. From August 16-21, 1981, the participants were exposed to the learning-by-doing method of the College of Trial Advocacy.

With the aid of videotape replay and a dedicated faculty including the noted Ronald Carlson, and practicing attorneys Richard Speight, J. Houston Gordon, Tom Scott and Robert Pryor, each participant received individualized evaluations of their advocacy skills. Professor Gary Anderson coordinates the intensive week-long program, and he's already making plans for a spectacular College in the first week of August, 1982. This year's faculty will be expanded to feature Professor James McElhaney and several other experienced trial lawyers to handle the exceptional attendance expected in 1982.

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PUBLIC LAW INSTITUTE

General Sessions Judges Meet in Memphis

The Public Law Institute coordinated the educational portion of the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Tennessee General Sessions Judges Conference at the Hyatt Regency in Memphis.

During three days of meetings in mid-September, the seventy-five judges in attendance received an update on criminal and civil law from the Office of the Attorney General. In addition, courses on Ethics, Evidence, Equity, Sentencing, and Judicial Compensation were offered by Professor Grayfred Gray, Professor Robert Banks, Jr. from Memphis Law School, Assistant District Attorney General Jim Hall, Judge Haywood Barry from Wilson County, and Steve Adams, Director of the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System.

Next year the Conference will meet in Gatlinburg. Knox County Judge Harold Wimberly takes over as Conference President from Judge John Getz of Shelby County.

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OTHER PEOPLE'S MORALS: The Lawyer's Conscience


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A NEW LOOK TO THE ACADEMIC CALENDAR '81-'82

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Fall Semester, 1981

Registration .................. August 24-25
Classes Begin ................. August 26
Thanksgiving Break ........ November 26-27
Classes End .................. December 4
Examination Period ........ December 7-18

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Spring Semester, 1982

Registration .................. January 11-12
Classes Begin ................ January 13
Spring Break ................. March 22-27
Classes End .................. April 30
Examination Period ........ May 3-14

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Summer 1982 Term

Registration .................. May 24
Classes Begin ................ May 25
Classes End .................. July 13
Examination Period ........ July 16-22

SENATOR JIM SASSER ADDRESSES JUNE HOODING AUDIENCE

Senator Sasser urges graduates to make good use of their Law School diplomas.

Mary Jo Hoover hoods Katharine Ambrose.

Senator Sasser and Chancellor Jack Reese lead the procession of faculty and students.

Acting Dean Kirby congratulates relatives of graduates for supporting them through Law School.