Writing Awareness

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"We looked like bozos going in there on the first day trying to organize the kids," said Mark vehemently, a note of bitterness coloring his voice. Acknowledging that the situation had improved as we learned the middle school students’ names and faces, he still concluded that we continued to compromise what little authority we had—and to look ridiculous—in our ritual of “ronding up the steers.”

I felt myself tensing defensively as I listened. Mark was one of five mentors participating in the pilot semester of an after-school literacy mentoring program. In the program, graduate and advanced undergraduate students worked with urban middle school students for two hours a week and took a closely linked writing seminar in which they analyzed theories of writing, pedagogy, and ethnography, as well as their mentoring experiences. As instructor, I’d designed this combination to prepare student mentors for doing their own ethnographic research into literate practices and pedagogy. As a researcher, I’d begun an ethnographic study of how participants’ metaphors for literacy, learning, and teaching correlated with our accomplishments in these areas.

I’d known we’d encounter problems, given the new program and new environment. And I’d known mentors’ feedback and suggestions could provide crucial guides in working through those problems and redesigning the program. Nonetheless, I tensed as I listened to Mark and his colleagues emphasize important issues like middle schoolers’ association of some mentoring rooms with play time, the lack of supplies, and the need for orderly means of moving students from common spaces to mentoring sites. As I tried to respond and take notes on mentors’ suggestions, I realized that I was tightening my solar plexus into a knot, hunching my shoulders, and collapsing my chest. While my response was probably not noticeable to most onlookers, I’d drawn up my abdomen and arched...
my spine backward slightly. As I’d physically drawn back into myself, pulling my limbs closer to my trunk, I’d restricted my breathing as well, taking progressively quicker, shallower breaths. My affect was a guarded self-protectiveness, but I became consciously aware of it only after noting my bodily constriction. Only when I felt I’d nearly cut off my breathing did I recognize a stance I’d learned to associate with defensiveness. Only then did I begin to see that I was diminishing my ability to process mentors’ feedback because I was hearing it as, implicitly, a critique of my direction of the mentoring program.

Not until after the seminar session, while I was taking fieldnotes, did I begin to grasp that the emotional edge of mentors’ critiques probably arose from their deep investments in reaching and positively affecting their middle school mentees. Deirdre’s voice, emphatic, almost aching, echoed in my head, as I recalled her query: “How do I develop a rapport with these kids?” With that echo, the voices of mentors’ worries rustled in my mind, recalling their concern about determining the source of the tensions in their mentee relationships: how much grew from middle schoolers’ perception of the program as remedial? how much from programmatic failures? how much from family and neighborhood circumstances beyond any of our control? and how much from their individual mentoring styles? Belatedly, over fieldnotes and tea, as I pieced together descriptions of the seminar’s discussion, the interactional tone, and my own responses, I was able to understand and empathize with mentors’ frustrations and anxieties. Only as I composed the pieces of the fieldnote puzzle did I begin to grasp how I’d diminished my awareness of mentors’ concerns—and so, of course, of a pedagogical opportunity to work with those concerns—by unconsciously embodying my defensiveness.

The process of composing ethnography can powerfully develop a reciprocal awareness of one’s teacherly practices and of students’ actions and responses. Such reciprocal awareness, or reflexivity, forms the heart of critical pedagogy. In this essay, I argue that an embodied, writerly ethnography, one that works explicitly with figuration, offers a productive method for critical pedagogy. Section I uses composition and ethnographic theory to argue for a writerly critical ethnography to show how embodied ethnography can further the goals of reflexivity and critical pedagogy. Section II builds on composition theorists’ arguments for embodied writing and for the inherently figurative nature of language to define a phenomenological ethnography. It shows how this ethnography examines metaphoric logic to explore the intersection of body, emotion, and cognition in order to analyze how that intersection shapes social, cultural, and pedagogical systems. Section III uses Gestalt theory to illustrate how the embodied, figurative awareness this process offers can help us to shift our perceptions of systems and our roles in them. In the first two sections, I incorporate ethnographic depictions based on my fieldnotes on the mentoring seminar, and the final section rereads these depictions through the essay’s theoretical lenses. Thus, I conclude that this embodied, writerly ethnography can help us not only to confront some of our most pressing pedagogical concerns but to pursue critical pedagogy’s goals of more equitable relations and social justice.
Embodied Ethnography: Lens for Reflexivity and Critical Pedagogy

Like Ira Shor, I see critical pedagogy as a means for “self and social change,” for approaching “individual growth as an active, cooperative, social process” that involves both cognition and affective activity. It springs from reflexivity, which “can transform our thoughts and behavior, which in turn have the power to alter reality itself” (22). As Ann Berthoff explains, reflexivity entails examining our theory and practice so we can derive a method from the dialectic of their relationship (xi). Mariolina Salvatori argues that to accomplish such reflexivity, we must make manifest (or aware) our implicit theories and methods (445-50). It is this process that enables us, first, to see the dialectic between our theory and our practice and, next, to derive—and perhaps change—the methods implicit in that dialectic. Because critical pedagogy involves the emotions, teachers who practice it must look reflexively at affective, as well as intellectual, interactions. Writing awareness through embodied ethnography provides a particularly generative means of achieving such reflexivity about both the cognitive and affective dimensions of our pedagogical interactions and about their intersection. It allows us to (re)compose awareness, to derive and change the method inherent in the theory-practice dialectics of our classroom interactions. Thus, it enables us to foster “self and social change.”

Arnetha Ball and Ted Lardner point to both the significance and the challenge of looking reflexively at the affective dimensions of pedagogical interaction. In “Dispositions Toward Language,” they argue that their concept of “teacher efficacy” extends reflexive pedagogy “[b]y making affect a central issue in theorizing pedagogy” and thus moving “closest to the largely unspoken dimensions of pedagogical experience” (478). They hold that by “[o]pening up these deeply felt but difficult to name dimensions of interaction, teacher efficacy speaks to the cumulative effect of teachers’ knowledge and experience on their feelings about their students and their own ability to teach them” (478). It is these “deeply felt,” “difficult to name” regions an embodied ethnography probes—and that our mentoring seminar broached.

In the second half of his class presentation, Mark focused on the process of rereading his own fieldnotes and the perceptual shift he’d experienced while doing so. Often when he was initially writing the notes, he explained, Mark had felt quite emotionally invested in the mentoring session he was describing. He emphasized the significance of returning to the notes later, when he felt more emotional distance. Citing Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw’s *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes*, Mark explained what he found to be the need for a sort of double perspective: “You have to be involved and aware, but you have to divorce yourself to be objective.” In composing his notes, Mark explained, he tended to read his mentees’ resistance, misbehavior, and other responses by thinking “He’s reacting to me” or by concluding that the student was, at the least, reacting to the mentoring situation. Mark contrasted his initial tendency to “take it personally” with later rereadings of his fieldnotes. At these points, he explained, he found himself thinking, “They’re being kids” and “They’re being who they are.” The re-evaluation he experienced in rereading had led him to evaluate his own mentoring more positively, Mark continued.
But he named his revised expectations as one of the most significant shifts he’d experienced. Holding his hand just above his forehead, Mark commented that he’d begun mentoring with expectations “up here.” Those expectations had plummeted almost immediately, he went on, dropping his hand to just below the level of the grade school desk in which he sat. On first reading his mentees’ work, he’d felt quite disappointed, thinking they had “godawful spelling.” In contrast, when he looked back at students’ papers and the mentoring process, Mark had decided that his expectations for students needed to remain high but that his middle school mentees were much brighter than he’d thought at his initial reading. Raising his hand to a level mid-way between its two earlier positions, he named that point as his current expectation level and concluded that not only had his perspective on each of his mentees changed as he reread his fieldnotes but that “I’m almost as positive as when I came in.” Describing his revised expectations as “more realistic,” Mark noted his plans to reread his fieldnotes sporadically and, especially, to notice the chemistry and group dynamics among mentees in addition to his own interaction with them.

Ethnography seems to have functioned for Mark not only as the research method he was learning but as an educational experience that shifted his perceptions. In “The Problematic of Experience,” Min-Zhan Lu and Bruce Horner argue that combining critical ethnography and critical pedagogy in the classroom offers a way of working toward social justice and social change. A commitment to those goals has sharpened in ethnographic practice and methodology over the last twenty years as well. Critical ethnography that works explicitly with the literary, subjective nature of language and seeks to foster social change has evolved as a significant force. Critical ethnography calls for dialogue between researcher and research subjects and for reflexivity about the literary, figurative aspects of any depiction. Such ethnographies work with the tension between the desire to produce rich, thick description of existing social conditions and the desire to change those conditions when they appear manifestly unjust. Lu and Horner emphasize this tension and its relationship to that between discourse and experience (266).

Because of the inevitable gulf between lived experience and our languaged representations of that experience, Lu and Horner argue for including all participants’ voices in research and pedagogical encounters. They extend critical pedagogy’s usual emphasis on problematizing students’ experiences to argue that such pedagogy should problematize the teacher’s knowledge and experience as well (267). Lu and Horner echo critical ethnography’s concern with the tension between understanding and changing its research context, particularly when they emphasize the pull between producing knowledge about students and fostering students’ change (271). They advocate creative efforts to use this tension productively and to use the experience of the teacher (as well as the student) in

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3 George Marcus and Michael Fischer describe the movement and many of its key texts in *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences*.

4 For examples of such work, see Austin; Fischer and Abedi; Harrison; McCarthy and Fishman; Mienczakowski; Schaafsma.
critical projects (268). Reflexivity, or reciprocal awareness, is crucial to such efforts. It allows us to access and examine the dynamics of student-teacher interactions (rather than to produce a static knowledge of either party). Accessing the intersecting bodily, emotional, and cognitive dimensions of student-teacher dynamics enables a holistic reflexivity. It does so by exploring the interactional system at various moments, by examining the roles participants play and what those roles reveal about how a particular classroom’s theory-practice dialectic operates in specific instances. Increased awareness of the system’s function and of our (changing) roles in it can help us to modify those roles and their impact. As we become more aware of the disjunctures between our theory and our practice, we can work toward systemic change by revising our own roles.

Lu and Horner conclude by suggesting that compositionists “use the new interventions in one field, ethnography or pedagogy, to address the specific dilemmas faced by the other” (275). I’m drawing on pedagogical theories of affect, like Ball and Lardner’s, and on new theories of an embodied writing and pedagogy, such as Kristie S. Fleckenstein’s and Richard E. Miller work, to show that an embodied ethnography provides access to the intersecting bodily, affective, and cognitive dimensions of learning. Conversely, I’m using that embodied ethnography to argue for a composition research-pedagogy that pursues social change by examining this intersection to revise the role of teacher (and researcher) in classroom systems. In doing so, this research-pedagogy enacts power dynamics that offer participants the opportunity to craft and experience more equitable social relations.

Seeing the Mesh: How Embodied Ethnography Accesses the Intersection of Body, Emotion, and Cognition

Fleckenstein’s “Writing Bodies: Somatic Mind in Composition Studies” and Miller’s “The Nervous System” represent a new attention in composition studies to the body and the embodied-ness of writing and pedagogy. Their exploration of this embodiment illuminates a crucial, previously ignored, dimension of the theory-practice intersection. Deriving a method from the dialectic of the theory-practice relationship, in Berthoff’s terms, requires attending to this bodily dimension because in it we enact the theories we hold implicitly but not yet consciously. Attending to it provides a crucial source of information about our cognitive and emotional processes, information that, as many feminist epistemologists have noted, has been repressed from awareness through Western science’s emphasis on excluding subjective, bodily perceptions as valid sources of knowledge (e.g., see Griffin, especially “Place” 73-96).

Fleckenstein argues that this bodily dimension is inherently integrated with intellectual experience, whether or not an individual is aware of the integration. She defines “somatic mind” as “a permeable materiality in which mind and body resolve into a single entity which is (re)formed by the constantly shifting boundaries of discursive and corporeal intertextualities” (286). Fleckenstein thus refigures Lu and Horner’s tension between discourse and experience. She explains that “[t]here is no natural, biologically essential body; but there is no textual or symbolic body, either” (289). Drawing on cultural anthropologist
Gregory Bateson, Fleckenstein argues that instead the physical and symbolic aspects of our experience intersect to produce our perception, which integrates discursive and corporeal codes. Thus, we experience ourselves in and through our contexts, our material and social environments. But because our perceptions become part of these contexts and because we continually re-integrate discursive and corporeal codes through those perceptions, we are not only shaped by our contexts, we reshape them as well. In doing so, we reshape our own experience. Somatic mind, Fleckenstein explains, “turns back on its own constituting system to (re)constitute the context that creates it. It becomes a sign—a difference that makes a difference—in its own system” (289). The moment when embodied mind reconstitutes its context makes possible reciprocal awareness. Through it, we can learn how we interweave discursive and corporeal codes in specific circumstances, how our bodily, affective, and cognitive dimensions intersect. It allows us to flesh out Berthoff’s explicit method and to grasp the theory-practice dialectic.

For Fleckenstein, the theory-practice dialectic takes shape through the process of immersion in and emergence from relations with a context and an other. Linking immersion with metaphoric, or “is logic,” and emergence with simile-based, or “as if logic,” she explains that the first enacts corporeal coding while the second performs discursive coding (295). She draws on Bateson to associate simile-based logic with classifying objects and metaphoric logic with symbolizing relationships among beings and between beings and environment. Bateson shows how the former logic has contributed to Western epistemology’s mind-body dichotomy, its combative rather than complementary approach to other groups and the environment, and to individualist, blame-apportioning approaches rather than systemic analyses (see especially 177-94; 244-70; 309-37). He associates metaphoric logic both with emotional interactions and with literature, music, dance, and the arts. Rather than arguing for metaphoric over simile-based logic, Bateson advocates drawing on the arts, religion, and human relationships as uses of metaphoric logic that in fact integrate not only the two kinds of thought but the aware and unaware levels of mind that shape our experience (particulary 432-45; 446-53; 454-71). Thus he valorizes experiences that integrate our bodily, emotional, and cognitive dimensions. Fleckenstein extends his work to argue that such experiences combine immersion and emergence. Writing, she argues, ideally combines them as well to integrate corporeal and emotional—or metaphoric—dimensions of experience with its cognitive—or simile-based—dimensions. Immersion enables us to write from our subjectivity, to experience and respond to our intellectual and other contexts, and to mentally evoke (and thus speak) to our readers. Emergence, on the other hand, allows us to step back into “the abstract as if logic of politics, of ideology, of hegemony—into the responsibility of and for boundaries” (297-98).

The same dialectic is required in teaching. An embodied, reflexive ethnography can enable us to examine the dialectic, to recognize where and how we’re enacting pedagogically a corporeal, emotional, metaphoric logic and to undulate between that realm and a discursive logic. Such ethnography itself operates precisely through this undulation, as it moves from the immersion of participant-observation and initial fieldnotes to the emergence of later rereading and coding
fieldnotes and composing an ethnographic text. It cycles between the two stages throughout much of its process.

In seminar, mentors explored this rhythm and its writerly and intellectual ramifications. When Mark finished his class presentation, we discussed the implications of his observation process. As he and Peter explored metaphors for using multiple ethnographic perspectives, they played with the notion of a person watching himself while the watched self observed yet a third “self.” The process was something like watching yourself on t.v. as the “you” on television watched yourself doing something, Mark commented. As the discussion unfolded, I asked Mark whether he’d considered incorporating these multiple perspectives into his ethnography paper. He described the possibility of composing two narrative layers. Seeking elaboration, I asked whether one layer would describe a mentoring session blow-by-blow, while the other layer would present the mentor’s later perspective based on a rereading of his own fieldnotes.

“Thank you!” said Mark as he glanced at me, his voice rising slightly in his response. He’d chuckled as I articulated the phrase “blow-by-blow,” then immediately took up the metaphor. As he turned quickly back to Peter, Mark transposed the figure, explaining, “One is a play-by-play,” as he began describing plans for designing the two narrative layers. As their conversation evolved, Mark and Peter joked about combinations of sportscasters who could represent each narrative layer. Mark then described a contrasting layer that might detail how the fieldnote writer felt or thought about the play-by-play events. Deirdre spoke little but listened intently, occasionally punctuating Mark and Peter’s conversation with vigorous nods.

Miller’s “The Nervous System” offers a powerful frame for reading such interactions and their intersecting bodily, affective, and intellectual dimensions. He argues that attending to our visceral reactions when writing can help us to “excavate bodily responses for material evidence of the ways a culture is present in the writer’s very act of experiencing the composing process and in the reader’s responses to the writer’s text” (272-73). Such attention is equally warranted during pedagogical interactions. The “material evidence” provided by our bodily and emotional responses illustrates how we literally embody and enact cultural metaphors. My teacherly defensiveness in this essay’s opening vignette suggests that I was, in Fleckenstein’s terms, corporeally coding my experience through the metaphor of combat. My use of the figure “blow-by-blow” in characterizing Mark’s first narrative layer, which was to describe the incidents of mentoring, similarly suggests a metaphorics of conflict. Only in the process of rereading and coding my fieldnotes on the seminar did I perceive this figural thread. The realization felt particularly ironic given that, consciously, I see myself as working from feminist metaphors of negotiation and collaboration. Yet the theory I enacted was clearly another, one I’d severed from my conscious awareness and could access only by reading my embodied and languaged metaphorics. This reading, accomplished through the performance of an embodied, reflexive ethnography, allowed me to grasp more of the dialectic between my pedagogical theory and my practice.

Miller details an example of such attention to the visceral in his own writing process. Describing the act of composing a particular poem, he explains how he
felt “overwhelmed with grief”; the act of writing, he says, “caused tears to run down my face” (273, 276). He explains that “writing the poem provided me with a kind of emotional experience which, in turn, supplied me with a new analytical machinery to think about a host of problems related to ‘composition,’ broadly construed as the art of putting oneself and one’s writing together” (273). This writing incident mattered, he concludes, on two levels: that of experience, “in that I physically responded during the process of composing” and that of cognition, “because it provided me with the material for a revision of both my professional and my personal circumstances” (273).

My own realization parallels Miller’s description. While composing an ethnography, I recognized that I was enacting pedagogically an unaware metaphorics of combat. At the level of experience, I saw myself embodying conflicted metaphorics (collaboration/negotiation vs. combat), and I responded viscerally to the knowledge. But the realization has also provided me with an analytic frame, with “the material for a revision of both my professional and my personal circumstances.” Through it, I accessed the intersection between my emotional and cognitive processes by using embodied ethnography to bring my own metaphoric logic into awareness. Like Mark, I’ll enter future pedagogical situations with a new set of lenses. I’ll attend to my embodied and rhetorical actions to augment my awareness of where, when, and how I enact the metaphorics of conflict. Because metaphoric logic is the level where emotion, cognition, and embodiment mesh, accessing it and its connection with discursive logic enables me to derive a method from my own theory-practice intersections. As Gestalt theorists Joseph Zinker and Gordon Wheeler both demonstrate, developing such awareness, such an analytic frame, is the first step in transforming an interactional system: when one’s own role in the system changes, its dynamics shift. Because it’s rooted in the ethnographer’s explicit attention to her subjects’ and her own experiences of reality, the ethnography that produces this awareness is phenomenological.

Reweaving the Mesh:
Embodied Ethnography, Awareness, and Change

Zinker holds that insight and change rely on increased awareness of the metaphorics that undergird our being and doing, our bodily, emotional, and cognitive experience. Such vision, he says, can “organize itself around another’s wholeness” by focusing on the process, rather than content, of interactions. This vision develops metaphoric perceptions of another’s bodily and affective process, and one’s own, as a means of accessing interlocutors’ basic assumptions, worldview, and phenomenological experience of reality (Foreword xiv). Because such phenomenological experience is “a highly personal sensory experience at this moment in time and place,” Zinker argues, “Actuality as it is experienced is a private affair” (Good Form 96). In Zinker’s terms, then, we can never truly know another’s experience. “Sensitive people may express what they experience when they are with us,” he concludes, “but if they were to make an interpretation of the ‘real’ meaning of my behavior, the purity of our experience as it is concretely revealed at this moment would be lost” (Good Form 96).
Yet insights are possible. First, we can listen to others’ terms and our own, attending especially to figural language and its sensory referents. Second, we can attend to both our own embodied metaphorics and others’. “If we construct a ‘process picture’ of him,” says Zinker of an example interlocutor, “made of his words, his voice, his physical choreography, his way of gazing sadly, then that picture, that idea, that metaphor will ‘pull for’ seeing a part of his wholeness” (Foreword xiv). Zinker argues that such perception can allow the perceiver insights “where [the other’s] awareness has not yet traveled” (Foreword xiv). Nonetheless, this potential for insight doesn’t enable objectivity or a naming of “reality.” As Zinker emphasizes, “The content of my experiencing is as valid a datum for me as another person’s experiencing is for him or her. There are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ experiential phenomena; things ‘just are’” (Good Form 96). In this view, no one’s metaphorics can trump another’s. It offers no single “reality,” providing instead one composed of the intersections among individuals’ phenomenological experiences. This approach makes possible an ethnography that negotiates among such experiences by bringing their metaphorics into focus—into awareness—and then putting those metaphorics into dialogue.

This ethnographic dialogue among metaphorical systems can work toward the social change that both critical pedagogy and critical ethnography seek. It enables the ethnographer to revise her or his role in a given system and so to revise the dynamic of the system itself. Gestalt theorist Gordon Wheeler argues that developing the kind of awareness such ethnography offers feeds the spring of personal and systemic change, explaining that “therapeutic change flows from going to the contact that is possible” (145-46). Thus, it starts, to invoke Lu and Horner’s terms, with the desire to describe participants and the system’s dynamic, to produce knowledge—or awareness—about their workings. Wheeler argues that by using this existing contact to foster awareness, people can initiate change: “The complex interpersonal intervention of joining-and-analyzing that contact process, thereby destructuring it, unblocks the rich and spontaneous possibility of a new and more satisfying creative adjustment, a new organization of self in the field” (146). The very recognition and analysis of an embodied metaphorics—for instance, a metaphorics of conflict—produces an expanded awareness that tills the ground for one to experiment with different roles, different approaches to similar situations and systems. For Wheeler, the very process of developing this jointly crafted awareness fosters systemic change. His work implies that the tension between thick description and encouraging change, as described by Lu and Horner, can become generative if we devise more fully collaborative ethnographic methods in which subjects and researchers, students and teachers, negotiate the naming of their experiences. Such collaboration requires Fleckenstein’s undulation between immersion and emergence, between the visceral, corporeal experience of our own and others’ subjectivities, on one hand, and the abstracted experience of “responsibility of and for boundaries” on the other.

Mark’s presentation demonstrates just this undulation in his description of shuttling between initial fieldnotes, written while he was still emotionally invested in the events described, and later rereadings of those fieldnotes when he had greater emotional distance. Reading Mark’s presentation through the lens of Ball and Lardner’s argument about teacher affect might suggest that Mark has
problematically decreased his expectations for students. In contrast, I argue that Mark’s presentation demonstrates greater development of his ability to see his students’ achievements, achievements that were initially invisible to him. His revised emotional dynamic, his undulation between immersion and emergence, has enabled Mark to see dimensions and motivations of his students’ behavior that he’d previously interpreted more narrowly through the lens of his pedagogical interaction with them. In Wheeler’s terms, this broader vision and awareness ground the capacity to make different, more effective interventions in any system, pedagogical or otherwise. In Lu and Horner’s terms, Mark problematizes his own teacherly experience. He enacts the work of Fleckenstein’s somatic mind by attending to his emotional-intellectual experience to revise his context in shifting his perception of it, changing it by changing his participation in it.

Mark’s work sparked my own parallel development. His transposition of my conflict-based “blow-by-blow” figure into a team-based “play-by-play” metaphor crystallizes one moment of the seminar’s underlying, pervasive tension between metaphoric systems. Mark’s transposition is a single example of mentors’ frequent, often extended, use of the metaphors of team play and teamwork. Mark and Peter acted out of this metaphorics when they centered the discussion of writing strategies among themselves—peers and colleagues—rather than responding primarily to me as instructor. I developed awareness of this tension between metaphoric systems through the process of composing this embodied, literary ethnographic representation of the seminar. In doing so, I paralleled Mark’s enactment of the immersion-emergence cycle.

This essay begins the work of negotiating mentors’ team-based metaphorics with my own conflict-based metaphorics. It takes a first step toward Wheeler’s awareness, toward unblocking “the rich and spontaneous possibility of a new and more satisfying creative adjustment, a new organization of self in the field.” Thus, it works, in Berthoff’s terms, toward deriving a method from the dialectic between theory and practice. It is the form—or rather the process—of embodied, literary ethnography that enables the essay to make its beginning.

If this paper’s scope permitted, I’d present and analyze further instances of mentors’ rhetorical and enacted uses of team-based metaphors. Further, I’d chart what I’m beginning to see as an inevitable tension between team and conflict metaphors in pedagogical situations, and I’d theorize means of working productively with this tension, à la Lu and Horner.

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